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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 147437 May 8, 2009

LARRY V. CAMINOS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to other motorists is mutual,
coordinate and reciprocal.1 He is

bound to anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway are equal to his
own.2Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or property, 3 it is nevertheless his duty to operate his
motor vehicle with due and reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of others 4 as well
as for his own.5

This Petition for Review6 seeks the reversal of the Decision7 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14819 dated
28 February 1995. The assailed decision affirmed the judgment of conviction 8 rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 163 in Criminal Case No. 76653one for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
against petitioner Larry V. Caminos, Jr. but reduced the latters civil liability on account of the finding that the
negligence of Arnold Litonjua, the private offended party, had contributed to the vehicular collision subject of the
instant case.

The case is rooted on a vehicular collision that happened on the night of 21 June 1988 at the intersection of Ortigas
Avenue and Columbia Street in Mandaluyong City, right in front of Gate 6 of East Greenhills Subdivision. The
vehicles involved were a Mitsubishi Super Saloon9 driven by petitioner and a Volkswagen Karmann Ghia10driven by
Arnold Litonjua (Arnold). The mishap occurred at approximately 7:45 in the evening. 11 That night, the road was
wet.12 Arnold, who had earlier passed by Wack Wack Subdivision, was traversing Ortigas Avenue toward the
direction of Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue. He prepared to make a left turn as he reached the intersection of
Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street, and as soon as he had maneuvered the turn through the break in the traffic
island the Mitsubishi car driven by petitioner suddenly came ramming into his car from his right-hand side.
Petitioner, who was also traversing Ortigas Avenue, was headed towards the direction of San Juan and he
approached the same intersection from the opposite direction. 13

The force exerted by petitioners car heaved Arnolds car several feet away from the break in the island, sent it
turning 180 degrees until it finally settled on the outer lane of Ortigas Avenue. 14 It appears that it was the fender
on the left-hand side of petitioners car that made contact with Arnolds car, and that the impactwhich entered
from the right-hand side of Arnolds car to the leftwas established on the frontal center of the latter vehicle which
thus caused the left-hand side of its hood to curl upward. 15

Arnold immediately summoned to the scene of the collision Patrolman Ernesto Santos (Patrolman Santos), 16 a
traffic investigator of the Mandaluyong Police Force who at the time was manning the police outpost in front of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Building. 17 Patrolman Santos interrogated both petitioner and
Arnold and made a sketch depicting the relative positions of the two colliding vehicles after the impact. 18 The
sketch, signed by both petitioner and Arnold and countersigned by Patrolman Santos, shows petitioners car

which, it seems, was able to keep its momentum and general direction even upon impactwas stalled along
Ortigas Avenue a few feet away from the intersection and facing the direction of San Juan whereas Arnolds car had
settled on the outer lane of Ortigas Avenue with its rear facing the meeting point of the median lines of the
intersecting streets at a 45-degree angle.19

At the close of the investigation, a traffic accident investigation report (TAIR) 20 was forthwith issued by P/Cpl.
Antonio N. Nato of the Eastern Police District. The report revealed that at the time of the collision, Arnolds car,

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which had "no right of way,"21 was "turning left" whereas petitioners car was "going straight" and was "exceeding
lawful speed."22 It also indicated that the vision of the drivers was obstructed by the "center island flower bed." 23

Petitioner was subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City with reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to

property.24 He entered a negative plea on arraignment.25

At the ensuing trial, Patrolman Santos admitted having executed the sketch which depicts the post-collision
positions of the two vehicles.26 Arnolds testimony established that his vehicle was at a full stop at the intersection
when the incident happened.27 Told by the trial court to demonstrate how the incident transpired, he executed a
sketch which showed that his car had not yet invaded the portion of the road beyond the median line of the island
and that the path taken by petitioners car, depicted by broken lines, came swerving from the outer lane of the
road to the left and rushing toward the island where Arnolds car was executing a turn. 28 On cross-examination, he
admitted the correctness of the entry in the TAIR to the effect that he was turning left when hit by petitioners
car,29 but he claimed on re-direct examination that he had stopped at the intersection in order to keep the traffic
open to other vehicles and that it was then that petitioner bumped his car. On re-cross examination, however, he
stated that he had brought his car to a full stop before turning left but that the front portion thereof was already
two (2) feet into the other lane of Ortigas Avenue and well beyond the median line of the traffic island. 30

Antonio Litonjua (Antonio), the father of Arnold in whose name the Volkswagen car was registered, testified that
the estimation of the cost of repairs to be made on the car was initially made by SKB Motors Philippines, Inc. The
estimation report dated 30 June 1988 showed the total cost of repairs to be P73,962.00. The necessary works on
the car, according to Antonio, had not been performed by SKB Motors because the needed materials had not been
delivered.31 Meanwhile, SKB Motors allegedly ceased in its operation, so Antonio procured another repair estimation
this time from Fewkes Corporation.32 The estimation report was dated 13 December 1991, and it bloated the total
cost of repairs to P139,294.00.33 Ricardo Abrencia, resident manager of Fewkes Corporation, admitted that he
personally made and signed the said estimation report and that Antonio had already delivered a check
representing the payment for half of the total assessment. 34

Petitioner, the lone defense witness, was a company driver in the employ of Fortune Tobacco, Inc. assigned to drive
for the company secretary, Mariano Tanigan, who was with him at the time of the incident. In an effort to exonerate
himself from liability, he imputed negligence to Arnold as the cause of the mishap, claiming that that he, moments
before the collision, was actually carefully traversing Ortigas Avenue on second gear. He lamented that it was
Arnolds car which bumped his car and not the other way around and that he had not seen Arnolds car coming
from the left side of the intersectionwhich seems to suggest that Arnolds car was in fact in motion or in the
process of making the turn when the collision occurred. His speed at the time, according to his own estimate, was
between 25 and 30 kph because he had just passed by the stoplight located approximately 100 meters away at
the junction of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA, and that he even slowed down as he approached the intersection. 35

In its 18 September 1992 Decision,36 the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. The trial court relied
principally on the sketch made by Patrolman Santos depicting the post-collision positions of the two vehiclesthat
piece of evidence which neither of the parties assailed at the trialand found that of the two conflicting accounts
of how the collision happened it was Arnolds version that is consistent with the evidence. It pointed out that just
because Arnold had no right of way, as shown in the TAIR, does not account for fault on his part since it was in fact
petitioners car that came colliding with Arnolds car. It concluded that petitioner, by reason of his own admission
that he did not notice Arnolds car at the intersection, is solely to be blamed for the incident especially absent any
showing that there was any obstruction to his line of sight. Petitioner, according to the trial court, would have in
fact noticed on-coming vehicles coming across his path had he employed proper precaution. Accordingly, the trial
court ordered petitioner to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P139,294.00 as well as a fine in the same amount.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the factual findings of the trial court. In its Decision dated 28 February 1995, the
appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court against petitioner. However, it
mitigated the award of civil indemnity on its finding that Arnold himself was likewise reckless in maneuvering a left
turn inasmuch as he had neglected to look out, before entering the other lane of the road, for vehicles that could
likewise be possibly entering the intersection from his right side. 37

This notwithstanding, petitioner was still unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court. Seeking an acquittal, he
filed the present petition for review in which he maintains Arnolds own negligence was the principal determining
factor that caused the mishap and which should thus defeat any claim for damages. In declaring him liable to the
charge despite the existence of negligence attributable to Arnold, petitioner believes that the Court of Appeals had
misapplied the principle of last clear chance in this case.

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The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment, 38 argues that petitioners negligence is the proximate
cause of the collision and that Arnold Litonjuas negligence was contributory to the accident which, however, does
not bar recovery of damages. Additionally, it recommends the reduction of both the fine and the civil indemnity as
the same are beyond what the prosecution was able to prove at the trial.

The Court denies the petition.

Reckless imprudence generally defined by our penal law consists in voluntarily but without malice, doing or failing
to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree
of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. 39

Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure to take the necessary
precaution once the danger or

peril becomes foreseen.40 Thus, something more than mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle is
necessary to constitute the offense of reckless driving, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required.41 Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving
statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with
knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any
reasonable person.42

Hence, in prosecutions for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, whether or not one of the drivers
of the colliding automobiles is guilty of the offense is a question that lies in the manner and circumstances of the
operation of the motor vehicle,43 and a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires the concurrence of the
following elements, namely, (a) that the offender has done or failed to do an act; (b) that the act is voluntary; (c)
that the same is without malice; (d) that material damage results; and (e) that there has been inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender. 44

Among the elements constitutive of the offense, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive
determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of
precaution because it is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere
negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law. 45 This, because a conscious indifference to the
consequences of the conduct is all that that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the
accused,46that is, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.

Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code, however, does not detail what particular act or acts causing damage to
property may be characterized as reckless imprudence, certainly, as with all criminal prosecutions, the inquiry as
to whether the accused could be held liable for the offense is a question that must be addressed by the facts and
circumstances unique to a given case. Thus, if we must determine whether petitioner in this case has shown a
conscious indifference to the consequences of his conduct, our attention must necessarily drift to the most
fundamental factual predicate. And we proceed from petitioners contention that at the time the collision took
place, he was carefully driving the car as he in fact approached the intersection on second gear and that his speed
allegedly was somewhere between 25 and 30 kph which under normal conditions could be considered so safe and
manageable as to enable him to bring the car to a full stop when necessary.

Aside from the entry in the TAIR, however, which noted petitioners speed to be beyond what is lawful, the physical
evidence on record likewise seems to negate petitioners contention. The photographs taken of Arnolds car clearly
show that the extent of the damage to it could not have been caused by petitioners car running on second gear at
the speed of 25-30 kph. The fact that the hood of Arnolds car was violently wrenched as well as the fact that on
impact the car even turned around 180 degrees and was hurled several feet away from the junction to the outer
lane of Ortigas Avenuewhen in fact Arnold had already established his turn to the left on the inner lane and into
the opposite laneclearly demonstrate that the force of the collision had been created by a speed way beyond
what petitioners estimation.

Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in determining
whether a motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile, 47 and evidence of the extent of the damage caused
may show the force of the impact from which the rate of speed of the vehicle may be modestly inferred. 48While an
adverse inference may be gathered with respect to reckless driving 49 from proof of excessive speed under the
circumstances50 as in this case where the TAIR itself shows that petitioner approached the intersection in excess
of lawful speedsuch proof raises the presumption of imprudent driving which may be overcome by evidence, 51 or,
as otherwise stated, shifts the burden of proof so as to require the accused to show that under the circumstances
he was not driving in a careless or imprudent manner. 52

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We find, however, that petitioner has not been able to discharge that burden inasmuch as the physical evidence on
record is heavy with conviction way more than his bare assertion that his speed at the time of the incident was well
within what is controllable. Indeed, the facts of this case do warrant a finding that petitioner, on approach to the
junction, was traveling at a speed far greater than that conveniently fixed in his testimony. Insofar as such facts are
consistent with that finding, their truth must reasonably be admitted. 53

Speeding, moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to exercise such ordinary
care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered on the road. What is
reasonable speed, of course, is necessarily subjective as it must conform to the peculiarities of a given case but in
all cases, it is that which will enable the driver to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using
the highway.54 This standard of reasonableness is actually contained in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136. It states:

SEC. 35. Restriction as to speed.(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a
careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the
width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor
vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed
greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care
and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered 55 which will enable him
to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others
using the highway. 56

It is must be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance where the motorist is approaching
an intersection. Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally
require more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a street or highway. 57 A driver approaching an
intersection is generally under duty, among others, to be vigilant and to have the vehicle under control as to be
able to stop at the shortest possible notice,58 that is, he must look for vehicles that might be approaching from
within the radius that denotes the limit of danger.59

Since compliance with this duty is measured by whether an approaching motorist has exercised the level of
precaution required under the circumstances, then with more reason that he exhibit a relatively higher level of care
when the intersection is blind at the point where the roads meet. In other words, where the view at an intersection
is obstructed and an approaching motorist cannot get a good view to the right or left until he is close to the
intersection, prudence would dictate that he take particular care to observe the traffic before entering the
intersection or otherwise use reasonable care to avoid a collision, 60 which means that he is bound is to move with
the utmost caution until it is determinable that he can proceed safely and at the slowest speed possible 61 so that
the vehicle could be stopped within the distance the driver can see ahead. 62

On this score, what brings certain failure in petitioners case is his own admission that he had not seen Arnolds car
making a left turn at the intersection. Of course, there had been an arduous debate at the trial as to whether
Arnolds car was in motion or at a full stop at the intersection moments before the collision; nevertheless,
inasmuch as he (Arnold), as shown by the evidence, had been able to establish himself at the intersection
significantly ahead of petitioner, it defies logic to accord even a semblance of truth to petitioners assertion that he
had not seen Arnolds car entering the intersection laterally from his left especially when the said car admittedly
had already taken two feet of the other lane of the roadthe lane on which petitioner was proceeding to cross
and well beyond the median line of the intersecting road on which Arnold proceeded after making the turn. Indeed,
not even the fact that the view at the intersection was blocked by the flower bed on the traffic island could provide
an excuse for petitioner as it has likewise been established that he approached the intersection at such a speed
that could not, as in fact it did not, enable him to arrest his momentum and forestall the certainty of the collision.

It can only be surmised at this point that petitioner had inexcusably fallen short of the standard of care in a
situation which called for more precaution on the highway in failing to make an observation in the interest at least
of his own safety whether or not it was safe to enter the crossing. Since he is chargeable with what he should have
observed only had he exercised the commensurate care required under the circumstances of the case, the
inescapable conclusion is that he had inexcusably breached the elementary duties of a responsible, prudent and
reasonable motorist.

In general, the degree of care and attention required of a driver in a particular case in exercising reasonable care
will vary with and must be measured in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, such that it must be
commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use
of the vehicle.63 In other words, he must observe a sense of proportionality between precaution and the peculiar
risks attendant or even inherent in the condition of the road 64 which are open to ordinary observation.65 The
ultimate test, in other words, is to be found in the reasonable foreseeability that harm might result if

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commensurate care is not exercised. It is not necessary, however, that a motorist actually foresee the probability
of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable; it would suffice that he, in the position of an
ordinary prudent man, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of a general nature as
that suffered was to materialize.66 The evidence in this case is teeming with suggestion that petitioner had failed to
foresee the certainty of the collision that was about to happen as he entered the junction in question especially
considering that his lateral vision at the intersection was blocked by the structures on the road. In the same way,
he failed to solidly establish that such failure to foresee the danger lurking on the road could be deemed excusable
as indeed his contention that he was running at a safe speed is totally negated by the evidence derived from the
physical facts of the case.

Yet, petitioner clings to a chance of acquittal. In his petition, he theorizes that the negligence of Arnold, which
according to the Court of Appeals was incipient in character, was actually the principal determining factor which
caused the mishap and the fact that the TAIR indicated that Arnold had no right of way, it is he himself who had the
status of a favored driver. The contention is utterly without merit.

In traffic law parlance, the term "right of way" is understood as the right of one vehicle to proceed in a lawful
manner in preference to another approaching vehicle under such circumstances of direction, speed and proximity
as to give rise to a danger of collision unless one of the vehicles grants precedence to the other. 67 Although there is
authority to the effect that the right of way is merely of statutory creation and exists only according to express
statutory provision,68 it is generally recognized, where no statute or ordinance governs the matter, that the vehicle
first entering an intersection is entitled to the right of way, and it becomes the duty of the other vehicle likewise
approaching the intersection to proceed with sufficient care to permit the exercise of such right without danger of
collisions.69

In our setting, the right of way rule is governed by Section 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136, 70 which materially
provides:

Section 42. Right of Way.

(a) When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the
vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise hereinafter
provided. The driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right which he might
otherwise have hereunder.

(b) The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection shall yield the right of a way
to a vehicle within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such first-
mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly visible signal of
intention to turn as required in this Act. x x x.

The provision governs the situation when two vehicles approach the intersection from the same direction and one
of them intends make a turn on either side of the road. But the rule embodied in the said provision, also prevalent
in traffic statutes in the United States, has also been liberally applied to a situation in which two vehicles approach
an intersection from directly opposite directions at approximately the same time on the same street and one of
them attempts to make a left-hand turn into the intersecting street, so as to put the other upon his right, the
vehicle making the turn being under the duty of yielding to the other. 71

Nevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not absolute in terms. It is
actually subject to and is affected by the relative distances of the vehicles from the point of intersection. 72 Thus,
whether one of the drivers has the right of way or, as sometimes stated, has the status of a favored driver on the
highway, is a question that permeates a situation where the vehicles approach the crossing so nearly at the same
time and at such distances and speed that if either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision is likely
to occur.73 Otherwise stated, the statutory right of way rule under Section 42 of our traffic law applies only where
the vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the same time and not where one of the vehicles
enter the junction substantially in advance of the other.

Whether two vehicles are approaching the intersection at the same time does not necessarily depend on which of
the vehicles enters the intersection first. Rather, it is determined by the imminence of collision when the relative
distances and speeds of the two vehicles are considered. 74 It is said that two vehicles are approaching the
intersection at approximately the same time where it would appear to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in
the position of the driver approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued on their
courses at their speed, a collision would likely occur, hence, the driver of the vehicle approaching from the left
must give the right of precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his right. 751avvphi1

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Nevertheless, the rule requiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way to the driver on the right on
approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the left to come to a dead stop, but he is merely
required to approach the intersection with his vehicle under control so that he may yield the right of way to a
vehicle within the danger zone on his right.76 He is not bound to wait until there is no other vehicle on his right in
sight before proceeding to the intersection but only

until it is reasonably safe to proceed.77 Thus, in Adzuara v. Court of Appeals,78 it was established that a motorist
crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a turn; but if the person making the turn has
already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the person on the
thru-street, he is bound to give way to the former.

Moreover, in a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the person who was injured or who
was the driver of the motor vehicle with which the accuseds vehicle collided does not constitute a defense. 79In
fact, even where such driver is said to be guilty of a like offense, proof thereof may never work favors to the case
of the accused.80 In other words, proof that the offended party was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of
his automobile bears little weight, if at all, at least for purposes of establishing the accuseds culpability beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, even if we are to hypothesize that Arnold was likewise negligent in neglecting to keep a
proper lookout as he took a left turn at the intersection, such negligence, contrary to petitioners contention, will
nevertheless not support an acquittal. At best, it will only determine the applicability of several other rules
governing situations where concurring negligence exists and only for the purpose of arriving at a proper
assessment of the award of damages in favor of the private offended party.

But it must be asked: do the facts of the case support a finding that Arnold was likewise negligent in executing the
left turn? The answer is in the negative. It is as much unsafe as it is unjust to assume that Arnold, just because the
TAIR so indicated that he at the time had no right of way, that Arnold had performed a risky maneuver at the
intersection in failing

to keep a proper lookout for oncoming vehicles. In fact, aside from petitioners bare and self-serving assertion that
Arnolds fault was the principal determining cause of the mishap as well as his allegation that it was actually
Arnolds car that came colliding with his car, there is no slightest suggestion in the records that could tend to
negate what the physical evidence in this case has established. Clearly, it was petitioners negligence, as pointed
out by the OSG, that proximately caused the accident.1avvphi1

Finally, on the issue of damages, inasmuch as petitioner had not extended efforts to present countervailing
evidence disproving the extent and cost of the damage sustained by Arnolds car, the award assessed and ordered
by the trial court must stand.

All told, it must be needlessly emphasized that the measure of a motorists duty is such care as is, under the facts
and circumstances of the particular case, commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the
injuries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle, and in proportion to or commensurate with the
peculiar risk attendant on the circumstances and conditions in the particular case, 81 the driver being under the
duty to know and to take into consideration those circumstances and factors affecting the safe operation of the
vehicle which would be open to ordinary observation. 82

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14819 dated 28
February 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 163 in
Criminal Case No. 76653 dated 18 September 1992 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 128474 October 6, 2004
ARNEL GABRIEL, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The automobile has probably, directly or indirectly, caused more litigation than any other material objective of
human endeavor in a corresponding period of time and even more so since its invention. 1 This Court, on occasion,
is constrained to determine how and why particular motor vehicle accidents happen and whether the persons
responsible are criminally liable. The applicable standards for vehicular accident cases have long been settled by
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jurisprudence and the correct application of such standards invariably hinges on the particular facts involved. 2 The
Courts review though should by no means be perfunctory as the liberty of the accused is at stake.
The case emanates from a three-way vehicular collision on the night of 19 April 1990 along Maharlika Highway in
San Pablo City, Laguna. Three persons died as a result, and for their death, petitioner Arnel Gabriel (Gabriel) was
found guilty of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Double Homicide and Damage to Property by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City.3 Gabriel fruitlessly appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified
the RTCs decision by finding Gabriel liable instead for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide.4
The Information against Gabriel reads:
The undersigned Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ARNEL GABRIEL of the crime of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING TO MULTIPLE HOMICIDE, SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY under Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about April 19, 1990, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, being then the driver and person in
charge of a passenger type jeep with Plate No. NCF-726, owned by Marcelino Gabriel and insured
with Interworld Assurance Corporation, Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila, did then and there
recklessly, carelessly, imprudently and negligently manage and operate said vehicle along Brgy.
San Vicente, this city and without due regard to traffic rules and regulation (sic) and imprudence hit
the Volkswagen car with Plate No. DAU-203 driven by Fernando Pitargue and owned by Dr. Philip
Plantilla, insured with Jon Doe Insurance, causing damage to said car in the amount of P50,000.00,
Philippine Currency and inflicting mortal wounds to Fernando Pitargue and Carlos Asistido which
caused their immediate death and injuries to Dr. Philip Plantilla which required medical attendance
for a period of more than 30 days and incapacitated the said Dr. Philip Plantilla from performing his
customary labor during the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The three vehicles involved in the collision were a passenger type jeep (jeepney), 6 a Volkswagen Beetle car
(Beetle),7 and a six-wheeler Isuzu delivery truck (six-wheeler).8 The Beetle carried three persons, including Dr.
Philip Plantilla, director of the Nagcarlan District Hospital, who was injured in the accident. The other two occupants
of the Beetle died in the accident the driver, Fernando Pitargue, Sr., and Carlos Asistido. 9 The third fatality,
Isabela Banes, was one of the passengers of the jeepney driven by Gabriel. 10 On the other hand, the six-wheeler
was driven by Romeo Macabuhay, who also appeared as the principal witness of the prosecution. 11
The mishap occurred on the stretch of the Maharlika Highway located in Barangay San Vicente, San Pablo City. The
highway is a two-lane, two-way road. The prosecution alleged that on the night of the accident, the Beetle and the
six-wheeler were both traveling on the same lane of Maharlika Highway, proceeding towards the direction of San
Pablo City. The six-wheeler was behind the Beetle. The jeepney, on the other hand, was travelling the opposite lane
on the way to Atimonan, Quezon, purportedly at high speed. After negotiating a curve, the jeepney veered out of
its lane, swerving into the lane occupied by the Beetle and the six-wheeler. The jeepney collided with the left side
of the Beetle, forcing the latter out of the road and into the right shoulder of the highway. The collision with the
Beetle also forced the jeepney to turn turtle and thereafter hit the front portion of the truck, which was then fifteen
(15) meters behind the Beetle. The second impact forced the jeepney into the same right shoulder lane where the
stricken Beetle had rested. The six-wheeler meanwhile moved into the opposite side of the road and parked on the
left shoulder of the highway.
The three fatalities died on the spot. Their bodies lay prostrate on the ground by the time the police arrived at the
scene. The investigation at the scene was conducted by Patrolman Jerryson Laguras, who prepared a sketch
showing the relative positions of the vehicles and other significant findings. 12 Laguras also prepared the police
report. He testified as a prosecution witness. The prosecution also presented the truck driver, Macabuhay, who
recounted the collisions he had witnessed. Dr. Plantilla likewise testified on the injuries he sustained and the
expenses he incurred.13
Gabriel, in defense, admitted driving the jeepney on the night in question at the Maharlika Highway, on his way to
Quezon. While negotiating a curve near the scene of the accident, Gabriel noticed the headlights of an oncoming
vehicle focused towards his direction. He maneuvered his jeepney to the right of the road, and switched to low
gear. Despite the defensive moves which had put the jeepneys right front and rear wheels on the road shoulder,
according to Gabriel, his jeepney was bumped by the Beetle still. The left front wheel burst, causing the jeepney to
swerve to the right, fall on its right side, and slide towards the center of the highway. At that point, the jeepney was
placed on the other direction towards San Pablo City. In that position, the jeepney was hit by the six-wheeler,
causing some of the occupants of the jeepney to be thrown out. One of them, Menandro Marquez, testified for the
defense. He claimed that he was seated at the front seat of the jeepney, adding that the jeepney, while on the
extreme right of the Quezon-bound lane, was bumped by a brightly lighted vehicle. 14
Another witness for the defense, Barangay Chairman Dominador Gonzales, Jr. of San Vicente, San Pablo City,
corroborated Gabriels version of the events. He claimed witnessing the collision, which occurred after the Beetle
had tried to overtake the six-wheeler truck.15 The Beetles attempt to overtake led to its collision with the jeepney
traveling on the opposite lane.16
In convicting Gabriel, the RTC found the prosecutions version of the facts to be more credible. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Arnel Gabriel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Double Homicide and Damage to Property, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years also of prision correccional as maximum and to make the
following indemnifications:
1. To Dr. Philip Plantilla:
a) For the expenses he incurred P181,613.00
during his hospitalization at the

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Makati Medical Center

b) For reimbursement of his gifts to 10,000.0

the doctors and nurses who attended 0
to him at the Makati Medical Center

c) For actual damages of his 50,000.00

Volkswagen car which was a total
wreck
2. To the heirs of the deceased Fernando Pitargue, Sr.:
a) For loss of life of the P50,000.00
deceased Fernando, Sr.

b) For transfer fee of the 15,000.00

cadaver of Fernando
Pitargue

c) As reimbursement for 13,500.0

payment of the casket and 0
funeral services

d) For the grave site 491.00

e) For the loss of earning 129,360.00

3. To the heirs of the deceased Carlos Asistido:
a) For the loss of the life of Carlos Asistido P50,000.00

b) For the expenses during the wake 3,000.00

c) For the casket and funeral services 12,000.00

d) For loss of earnings 9,000.00

The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC except in two respects. The appellate court found that the RTC failed to
consider that Gabriel was also liable for the death of Isabela Banes, and thus found Gabriel guilty of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide, instead of Double Homicide.17 The Court of Appeals awarded Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to the heirs of Banes.18 Finally, the appellate court found no basis for the lower
courts award of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to Dr. Plantilla by way of reimbursement of his gifts to the
medical staff who attended to him.19
His appeal having failed, Gabriel now resorts to the present petition in an attempt to free himself of liability. In his
petition, Gabriel makes the broad claim that the RTC decision is not in accord with law, jurisprudence and the
record of the case, with the Court of Appeals similarly in error with its departure from the generally accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings.20 More particularly, he asserts that the RTC erred in finding that his negligence
was the proximate cause of the collision; in giving full credence to the testimony of Macabuhay; in lending weight
to the erroneous sketch prepared by Patrolman Laguras; and in failing to give credence to the testimonies of
Marquez and Gonzales, particularly their assertions that the first collision took place on the Quezon-bound lane not
the San Pablo-bound lane. Gabriel also raises questions on the damages awarded by the RTC and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Finally, Gabriel asserts that the Court of Appeals should not have awarded damages for the death
of Isabela Banes, considering that he was not charged in the Information with having caused her death.
The factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are congruent. Such concurrence is highly persuasive on
the Court, especially in a case such as this, where the determinative issues are essentially factual. Still, a review is
due on whether the conclusion of guilt is so supported by the evidence at hand that reasonable doubt could be
eliminated.
We cannot overemphasize the primacy in probative value of physical evidence, that mute but eloquent
manifestation of the truth.21 An examination of the wreck of the Beetle, as shown by photographic evidence, clearly
reveals that the vehicle was struck on its left side in the area where the hinges of the left door would have been.
The point of impact was so severe that it obliterated much of the side of the Beetle. The photographs of the
damage support the prosecutions version that the Beetle was hit from the left side by the jeepney, which veered
from its proper lane. The photographs also belie Gabriel and Marquezs claim that it was the Beetle which struck
the jeepney, as they depict that the Beetle was clearly bumped from the side and not from the front. Their version
would have had credence if the Beetle were moving laterally, which of course is an implausible sequence.
Just as the claims of Gabriel and Marquez on the point of impact are devoid of credence, the damage sustained by
the Beetle is not necessarily inconsistent with the defenses position that the accident occurred on the Quezon-
bound lane and not on the San Pablo-bound lane. Assuming the Beetle had veered the San Pablo-bound lane while
overtaking, it could have very well been struck on the side by the incoming jeepney. Indeed, the question on which
lane the first collision occurred is the most crucial at hand, as it determines which vehicle was on the wrong side of
the road. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals concluded that the collision occurred on the San Pablo-bound lane
and that it was the jeepney which veered to the wrong side. Such findings are supported by clear and convincing
evidence.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full credence to the testimony of the truck driver Macabuhay who
witnessed the first collision. Gabriel disputes the RTCs characterization of Macabuhay as a "disinterested witness,"
asserting that the latter, as a participant in the second collision, had every reason to proffer a biased testimony to
avoid his own liability.
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This disputation is quite strained. There is no serious allegation that Macabuhay was in any way responsible for the
first collision. It did not matter to him, or it would not affect his possible liability, whether it was the jeepney or the
Beetle which was at fault in the first collision. His testimony on the first collision may thus be deemed as neutral
and unbiased. Neither was there any evidence presented by Gabriel that would dispute Macabuhays credibility or
impartiality. Thus, Macabuhays testimony that the first collision took place on the San Pablo-bound lane was given
proper credence by the RTC.
On the other hand, the testimonies of defense witnesses Marquez and Gonzales on the location of the first collision
do not deserve credence. By his own admission, Marquez was sleepy at the time of the accident. 22 He lost
consciousness as a result of being flung out of the jeepney because of the collision, regaining it only after he was
admitted in a hospital in Manila.23 Moreover, Marquez was a friend of Gabriels and, according to the latter, it was
at his urging that they went on that fateful trip to Atimonan in the first place. 24 It is not hard to doubt that Marquez
is a biased witness. Although biased witnesses may be honest, they cannot as long as human nature remains
unchanged overcome the tendency to distort, magnify or even minimize, as their interest persuades, the
incidents which they relate.25
The testimony of Gonzales, which conveniently corroborates Gabriel on all material points, is even more
incredulous, notwithstanding Gonzaless being the Barangay Captain then of San Vicente, where the accident
occurred. As noted by the RTC, Gonzales declared that he was on the shoulder of the road, beside the truck, when
the first collision took place.26 From his vantage point, his view was obstructed by the truck. 27 He claimed to have
first heard the collision. He immediately took five big steps onto the highway, and then saw the Beetle and the
jeepney colliding.28 In short, the sound of the collision took place before the actual collision itself. If true, this would
rate as one of the greatest scientific revelations of all time. But since courts are obliged to take judicial notice of
the laws of nature,29 this Court prefers to side with prudence.30
The RTC also correctly pointed out that the natural tendency in such case would be for Gonzales to have taken
caution and avoid exposure to danger. 31 Instead, Gonzales, who was already on the shoulder of the road, stepped
into the highway and along the possible course of the collision he claimed to have heard occurring. The human
mind may be less predictable than the physical laws, but the conjunction of two unnatural occurrences at once is
just too much for this Court to believe but more than enough to taint the credibility of Gonzales.
Clearly then, based on his own admissions, Gonzales could not have possibly seen the first collision. The rest of his
tale is dubious as well, and the RTC drew up a damning charge sheet against Gonzales. He claimed witnessing the
accident at 8:30 p.m., and remaining at the scene up to 1:00 a.m., conversing with at least one of the police
officers on the scene. Yet nothing on the record establishes this claim, certainly not any of the police reports which
would have ordinarily noted such fact if true.32 Gonzales also admitted that while he witnessed the accident, he did
not mention the circumstance to the police, despite the fact that the accident occurred within his jurisdiction.
Instead, Gonzales waited for more than a month before traveling all the way to Manila to execute his affidavit. It
was only then that he publicly stated that he actually saw the accident happen.
An examination of Gonzaless affidavit reveals a curious passage, wherein he averred that he did not notice the
presence of a certain Felixberto Ulan in the premises of the incident whom he knew to be an employee of the six-
wheelers owner. Furthermore, Gonzales asserts that the story about this non-witness Ulan as a biased person is
incredible and unworthy of belief.
This startling declaration is apparently indicative of nothing. Felixberto Ulan, whoever he may be, was not a
witness of the prosecution, nor does he appear to have any relation to the case. It was markedly odd for Gonzales
to have made such an avowal at all, considering that he was ostensibly an accidental witness, seemingly
disinterested in the case, and outwardly reliable for neutral information. Instead, his recitals regarding Ulan further
revealed his partiality as a witness, as they smacked of a pre-emptive strike designed to challenge a possible or
expected countervailing account. It is not hard to believe that Gonzales was in cahoots with the defense, and his
testimony especially tailored to contradict the prosecutions version and not to manifest what actually happened.
The spectacle of biased witnesses posing as neutral observers is not unusual, especially in criminal cases wherein
a defendants liberty is at stake. Many times, their testimony falls down to ruin on the witness stand. Even the
most professional actor will find it more difficult to memorize the most carefully constructed scripts than for an
ordinary person to correctly narrate events that he truly witnessed or experienced through his own senses. Not
even the public office held by Gonzales could redeem the credibility of his flawed, inconsistent, and farfetched
testimony.
The lack of credibility of Gonzales as a witness is especially fatal for Gabriel since reliance was reposed on
Gonzales on another crucial factual issue. The police sketch of the accident scene, prepared by Patrolman Laguras,
illustrates the debris field as confined to a spot within the San Pablo-bound lane, with minimal debris on the
Quezon-bound lane. If accurate, the location of the debris field strongly strengthens the prosecutions claim that
the first collision occurred on the San Pablo-bound lane, with the jeepney on the wrong side of the road. Evidence
tending to show the position of the vehicles immediately after the accident tends to throw light on the issue of
speed and direction of the vehicles movements prior to, and at the time of, the accident. 33 Gabriel disputes the
accuracy of the sketch, asserting that the Quezon-bound lane was likewise littered with debris, and that the sketch
was prepared only after the debris had been swept to clear the road of obstructions. However, the police sketch
was disputed only through Gonzales, whose testimony has been shown to be not credible. Hence, Gabriel can
hardly argue that the presumption of regularity in the discharge of official duty has been overcome. Indeed, the
Court of Appeals correctly appreciated the presumption.
Consequently, two confirmed findings of fact militate against Gabriels defense. First, it was the Beetle which was
struck by the jeepney. Second, this collision occurred on the San Pablobound lane, thus showing that it was the
jeepney which veered from the correct lane. Gabriel, who was not attempting to overtake any vehicle, had no
reason to veer to the other lane. Moreover, as Macabuhay testified, the jeepney was travelling fast as it negotiated
a curve, causing it to swerve and hit the Beetle. The very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a
motorist must exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions
encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the

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highway.34 It is elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve. 35The motorist, in
approaching or rounding a curve, must reasonably anticipate that another vehicle may appear from the opposite
direction at any moment.36 Excessive speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the
accident on
or near a curve may constitute negligence.37 By failing to slow down, Gabriel acted recklessly and imprudently. His
behavior was the proximate cause of the fatal accident.38 The common finding of guilt by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals was correctly arrived at.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Gabriel was guilty of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Homicide, and not Double Homicide. This erroneous finding follows the appellate courts observation that the RTC
omitted in its findings the fact that the death of jeepney passenger Banes was likewise brought about by the
collision. Yet, the charges in the Information only seek to hold Gabriel liable for the deaths of Pitargue and Asistido.
No mention at all was made of Banes in the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General insists that the Court of
Appeals acted correctly, arguing that the offense designated in the Information was "Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Multiple Homicide." Still, it is settled that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined, not from
the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated
these being conclusions of lawbut by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 39 Thus, the
original designation of the offense as made by the RTC is correct. Accordingly, the indemnification award made by
the Court of Appeals of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to the heirs of Banes is likewise improper under the
circumstances.
A review of the other awards for damages is warranted. The Court of Appeals correctly deleted the award of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to Dr. Plantilla. There is no basis for the award other than the lone testimony of Dr.
Plantilla, and as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the testimony was not corroborated by reliable evidence. 40
Gabriel correctly points out that the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Dr. Plantilla for actual damages
to his Beetle was supported only by an estimate of the cost of repairs, and not by any proof of the actual amount
paid or assessed for the repairs. To recover actual damages, the amount of loss must be proven with competent
proof or the best evidence obtainable,41 and an indefinite cost-estimate cannot suffice. However, that pecuniary
loss was suffered by Dr. Plantilla by reason of damage to his Beetle is indubitable, and since the amount can no
longer be established with certainty, temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00).
However, we cannot sustain a similar argument raised by Gabriel regarding the actual damages awarded to Dr.
Plantilla for his hospitalization expenses. Dr. Plantilla testified on the amount he paid for hospitalization expenses,
and this was duly supported by the Summary of Charges presented in evidence. The Summary of Charges clearly
indicates the amount owed by Dr. Plantilla for his hospitalization expenses, and even notes the partial payments
already made therefor. Moreover, the RTC and the defense had the opportunity to examine the actual hospital
receipts which were made available at one point during the trial by the Government Services Insurance System
which had custody of them. The RTC and the Court of Appeals duly appreciated the evidence and adjudged the
proper award of indemnity for the hospitalization expenses of Dr. Plantilla.
Gabriel likewise challenges the award of actual damages to the heirs of Pitargue and Asistido due to loss of
earnings. He poses the bizarre argument that the seminal case of Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals 42 does not
apply, as the ruling therein applied only in cases of breach of contract of carriage. There is nothing in Villa Rey
Transit that qualifies the application of the formula adopted therein only to breaches of the contract of
carriage. Villa Rey Transit applies to all cases of wrongful death for the purpose of ascertaining the appropriate
amount of actual damages due the heirs, based on life expectancy and the rate at which losses sustained should
be fixed. However, the RTC did not apply the proper formula consistently adopted by this Court in computing the
damages for loss of earning capacity.43 The correct award for loss of earning capacity to the heirs of Pitargue is
Eighty-Six Thousand Two Hundred Six Pesos (P86,206.00),44 while that owing to the heirs of Asistido is Sixty-Two
Thousand Three Hundred Eighty-Eight Pesos (P62,388.00).45 These awards are apart from the standard death
indemnities and funeral expenses correctly evaluated by the RTC.
Finally, Gabriels argument that there is no proof on the monthly income of Asistido for the purpose of computing
loss of earning capacity deserves short shrift. It is settled that the absence of documentary evidence to support a
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said
damages.46Asistido earned his income by working as a carpenter. His son testified in court that Asistido earned at
least One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos ((P1,5000.00) a month.47 The testimony is sufficient basis for determining
compensatory damages for loss of earnings as a result of Asistidos wrongful death.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 3 October 1991 is affirmed,
subject to the following modifications: (1) the earlier finding that accused Arnel Gabriel is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Double Homicide and Damage to Property is REINSTATED;
(2) the award of actual damages to Dr. Philip Plantilla for the damage to his Volkswagen car is DELETED, and in
lieu thereof, an award for temperate damages for the property damage to the Volkswagen car in the amount of
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) is AWARDED; (3) the award for the loss of earnings to the heirs of Fernando
Pitargue Sr. is hereby reduced to Eighty-Six Thousand Two Hundred Six Pesos ((P86,206.00); and (4) the award for
the loss of earnings to the heirs of Carlos Asistido is hereby reduced to Sixty- Two Thousand Three Hundred Eighty
Eight Pesos (P62,388.00). The deletion ordered by the Court of Appeals of the award of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) to Dr. Philip Plantilla for reimbursement of his gifts to the medical staff who attended to him
is SUSTAINED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the December 28, 2011
Decision1and July 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. The assailed
issuances affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 12, in Criminal Case Nos. 09-
270107-08 which, in turn, affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Manila adjudging petitioner
Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco) guilty of drunk driving and resisting arrest. 4

The factual backdrop:

On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136 5 and
another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) 6 were filed against petitioner Sydeco with the
MeTC in Manila and eventually raffled to Branch 14 of that court. The accusatory portions of the interrelated
informations, docketed as Crim. Case No. 052527-CN for the first offense and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the
second, respectively read:

1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN

That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver and
owner of a car, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, drive, manage and operate the same along Roxas Blvd.
cor. Quirino Avenue, Malate, in said city, while under the influence of liquor, in violation of Section 56(f) of Republic
Act 4136.

Contrary to law.

2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN

That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully resist and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO2 Virgilio Paulino, SPO4 Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict
Cruz III, bonafide member of the Philippine National Police, Malate Police Station-9, duly qualified and appointed,
and while in the actual performance of their official duties as such police officers, by then and there resisting,
shoving and pushing, the hands of said officers while the latter was placing him under arrest for violation of Article
151 of the Revised Penal Code.

Contrary to law.

By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the cases as falling under, thus to be governed by, the Rule
on Summary Procedure.

When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies of SPO4
Efren Bodino (Bodino),7 PO2 Emanuelle Parungao8 and Ms. Laura Delos Santos,9 plus the documents each identified
while in the witness box, among which was Exh. "A", with sub-markings, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest 10executed by
SPO2 Bodino and two other police officers. The defenses witnesses, on the other hand, consisted of Sydeco
himself, his wife, Mildred, and Joenilo Pano.

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The prosecutions version of the incident, as summarized in and/or as may be deduced from, the CA decision now
on appeal is as follows:

On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and another officer
were manning a checkpoint established along Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave., Malate, Manila when, from
about twenty (20) meters away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up with plate number XAE-988.
Petitioner was behind the wheel. The team members, all inuniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the
petitioner to alightfrom the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby,before he resumes
driving.11 Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he could
manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at
P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "Pg ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." Atthat remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed
out to petitioner that his team had seen him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to
arrestpetitioner who put up resistance. Despite petitioners efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually
succeeded in subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to
be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issuedby that hospital, marked as Exh. "F". Petitioner was
then turned over to the Malate Police Station for disposition. 12 Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed tobe a victim
in the incident in question, adding in this regard that he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries,
robbery and arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his Counter-Affidavit 13 and his Complaint-
Affidavit14 appended thereto, petitioner averred that, in the early morning of June 12, 2006, he together with
Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and waitress, respectively, in his restaurant located along Macapagal Ave.,
Pasay City, were on the way home from on board his pick-up when signaled to stop by police officers at the area
immediately referred to above. Their flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle and its occupants, the
policemen then asked the petitioner to open the vehicles door and alight for a body and vehicle search, a directive
he refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead, he opened the vehicle window, uttering,
"plain view lang boss, plain view lang." Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it
turnedout, then told the petitioner that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of empty beer bottles in the trunk of
the vehicle. Petitioners explanation about being sober and that the empty bottles adverted to came from his
restaurant was ignored as P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth and poked a gun at his
head, at the same time blurting, "Pg ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka pang sinasabi." The officers
then pulled the petitioner out of the drivers seat and pushed him into the police mobile car, whereupon he,
petitioner, asked his companions to call up his wife. The policemen then brought petitioner to the Ospital ng
Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating
depicting petitioner as positive of alcoholic breath, although he refused to be examined and no alcohol breath
examination was conducted. He was thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006 and released in the
afternoon of June 13, 2006. Before his release, however, he was allowed to undergo actual medical examination
where the resulting medical certificate indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol
breath. Ten days later, petitioner filed his Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp. Aguilar and the other
police officers.

Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under Sec. 29 of R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not to place the erring driver under arrest, but to
confiscate his drivers license.

On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, his conviction of the offenses charges is hereby pronounced. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:

1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052527-CN; and

2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months and pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos
(P250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.

For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land Transportation Office the result of this case, stating
further the data required under Section 5815 of Republic Act 4136.

Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main submissions that the MeTC erred in: 1) according credit to
the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating, although the records custodian of Ospital ng Maynila was
presented to testify thereon instead of the issuing physician, and 2) upholding the veracity of the joint affidavit of
arrest of P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Efren Bodino, and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, considering that only SPO4 Bodino
appeared in court to testify.

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By Decision16 dated February 22, 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, addressing the first issue
thus raised in the appeal in the following wise: Dr. Balucatings failure to testify relative to petitioners alcoholic
breath, as indicatedin the medical certificate, is not fatal as such testimony would only serve to corroborate the
testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino, noting thatunder the Rules of Court, 17 observations of the police officers
regarding the petitioners behavior would suffice to support the conclusion of the latters drunken state on the day
he was apprehended.18

Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the prosecution has the discretion as to how many witnesses it
needs to present before the trial court, the positive testimony of a single credible witness as to the guilt of the
accused being reasonable enough to warrant a conviction. The RTC cited established jurisprudence 19 enunciating
the rule that preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number as "[W]itnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered." Following the denial by the RTC of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the CA on a
petition for review, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. By a Decision dated December 28, 2011, as
would be reiterated in a Resolution of July 18, 2012, the appellatecourt affirmed that of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2010 of the RTC, Manila, Branch 12,
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:

I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the police
officers; and

II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Harvey Balucating, in the absence
of his testimony before the Court.

The petition is meritorious.

Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial courts findings of fact does hold sway
when, as here, it appears in the record that facts and circumstancesof weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal. 20 Corollary, it is basic that an appeal in criminal
prosecutions throws the whole case wide open for review, inclusive of the matter of credibility and appreciation of
evidence.21` Peace officers and traffic enforcers,like other public officials and employees are bound to discharge
their duties with prudence, caution and attention, which careful men usually exercise in the management of their
own affairs.22

In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period material
appearednot to have performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the norm expected of peace
officers. They spotted the petitioners purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he
obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the drivers license orissue any ticket or similar citation paper
for traffic violation as required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136, which specifically provides:

SECTION 29. Confiscation of Drivers License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations x x x confiscate the license ofthe driver concerned and
issue a receipt prescribed and issuedby the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor
vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so
fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.x x x (Emphasis added.) Instead of
requiring the vehicles occupants to answer one or two routinary questions out of respectto what the Court has, in
Abenes v. Court of Appeals,23 adverted to as the motorists right of "free passage without [intrusive] interruption,"
P/Insp. Aguilar, et al. engaged petitioner in what appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when utterances
were made doubtless not to their liking, they ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle, concluding after seeing
three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk of the vehicle that petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol.
Then petitioner went on with his "plain view search" line. The remark apparently pissed the police officers off no
end as one of them immediately lashed at petitioner and his companions as "mga lasing" (drunk) and to get out of
the vehicle, an incongruous response to an otherwise reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically
described this particular event in his sinumpaang salaysay, as follows:

x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis, nag flash light sa loob ng sasakyan at sa aming
mga mukha.

x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa aminna kami ay magsi-baba at buksan ang pintuan ng nasabing sasakyan.
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x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon at pinigilan niya ako at ang aking kasama kong
waitress na bumaba.

x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulisang salitang "PLAIN VIEW LANG BOSS, PLAIN VIEW LANG" pero iyon ayhindi nila
pinansin. Sa halip as isang pulis ang nagsabi na "MGA LASING KAYO HETO MAY CASE PA KAYO NG BEER".

x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang kumuha ng susi ng sasakyan habang ang isang pulis
ang biglang sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya, nagbunot ng baril at tinutukan sa ulo si Kuya.

x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya subalit ako rin ay tinutukan ng baril. x x x na matapos
suntukin si Kuya aypinagtulungan siya ng mga pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at nang mailabas siyaay pinagtulakan
siya ng mga pulis sa gilid ng kalsada habang hawak ang kanilang baril. 24

Panos above account ironicallyfinds in a way collaboration from the arresting officers themselves who admitted
that they originally had no intention to search the vehicle in question nor subject its occupants to a body search.
The officers wrote in their aforementioned joint affidavit:

xxxx

That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for violation of RA 4136 (Driving under the influence
of liquor), and violation of Article 151 of the RPC (Resisting Arrest) x x x committed on or about 3:30A.M., June 11,
2006 along x x x Malate, Manila. x x x He began to raise his voice and converse with us rudely without considering
that we are in uniform, on duty and performing our job. P/INSP Manuel Aguilar pointed out that we saw him
swerving and driving under the influence of liquor that was why we are inviting him to our police station in which
our intention was to make him rest for a moment before he continue to drive. x x x (Emphasis added.)

In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner has not
committed any crime or suspected of having committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily understood,refers to a
movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or
movement.25 The act may become punishable when there is a sign indicating that swerving is prohibited or where
swerving partakes the nature ofreckless driving, a concept defined under RA 4136, as:

SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. Noperson shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without
reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the
highway and the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safetyor
rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.

Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving. To constitute
the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle, and a willful and wantondisregard of the consequences is required. 26 Nothing in the records indicate
that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone." Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred
at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life,
limb and property to third persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the petitioners car, they did not
issue any ticket for swerving as required under Section 29 of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered
the petitioner and his companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk
mainly because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle. On re-direct examination, SPO4 Bodino
testified:

Q: On that particular date, time and place what exactly prompted you to arrest the accused (sic) the charged in
for Viol. of Section 56(f) of R.A. 4136?

A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoynamin na amoy alak siya at yung sasakyan ay hindi maganda ang takbo.

Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you spotted the vehicle of the accused swerving, is
that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q. Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the vehicle of the accused?
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A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya pinahihinto?"

xxxx

Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?

A: He refused to ride with usgoing to the hospital, Your Honor.

x x x x27

Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between the police team,
on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latters refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle
search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioners twin gestures cannot plausibly be
considered as resisting a lawful order.28 He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of
this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a
crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the
road block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and
serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged
in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or
seriously disobeys such person or his agent. 29

There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or agents of a
person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioners act of exercising ones right against
unreasonable searches30 to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience
let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed
differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in
the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed. 31 Moreover, there
is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and his
companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no
reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and
frisk" action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle
was not because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention toinvite him to Station 9 so he could rest
before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an act indicative of
overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed
a gun and punched him on the face. None of the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioners
allegation aboutbeing physically hurt before being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication.
What the policemen claimed was that it took the three (3) of them to subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both
actions were done in excess of their authority granted under RA 4136. They relied on the medical certificate issued
by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner showed no physical injuries. The medical certificate was in fact
challenged not only because the petitioner insisted at every turn that he was not examined, but also because Dr.
Balucating failed to testify as to its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the medical record custodian ofthe Ospital ng
Maynila, testified, but only to attest that the hospital has a record of the certificate. The trial court, in its decision,
merely stated:

At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not testified upon by the doctor who issued
it.1wphi1 Instead, the Records Custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila was presented by the Prosecution to testify on
the said documents.

However, although the doctor who examined the accused was unable to testify to affirm the contents of the
Medical Certificate he issued (re: that he was found to have an alcoholic breath), this court finds that the
observation of herein private complainants as to the accuseds behavior and condition after the incident was
sufficient.

Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:

The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding x x x x

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person
Under Section 15 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, "at the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties
shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same." 32

In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical certificate Dr. Balucating issued on
June 12, 2006 as to petitioners intoxicated state, as the former was not able to testify as to its contents, but on the
testimony of SPO4Bodino, on the assumption that he and his fellow police officers were acting in the regular
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performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the
influence of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty
whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the
influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and
Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA), 33a term
defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while the drivers blood alcohol concentration
level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by
the [DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor
vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of
0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver isdriving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the
prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this
obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the
period material the threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under
Art. 22 of the RPC,34 penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar asthey are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of
RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e)
of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol,
even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.

Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution 35 of November 21, 2006 found, on the
strength of another physical examination from the same Ospital ng Maynila conducted by Dr. Devega on the
petitioner on the same day,June 12, but later hour, probable cause for slight physical injuries against P/Insp.
Aguilar et al. That finding to be sure tends to indicate that the police indeed man handled the petitioner and belied,
or at least cancelled out, the purported Dr. Balucatings finding as to petitioners true state.

The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the unfortunate incident, lost no time
incommencing the appropriate criminal charges against the police officers and Dr. Balucating, whomhe accused of
issuing Exh. "F" even without examining him. The element of immediacy in the filing lends credence to petitioners
profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of disobeying lawful order or resisting arrest. Certainly not to be
overlooked is the fact that petitioner,in so filing his complaint, could not have possibly been inspired by improper
motive, the police officers being complete strangers to him and vice versa. Withal, unless he had a legitimate
grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that petitioner would expose himself to harms way by filing a
harassment criminal suit against policemen.

Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason. 36 It is thus required that every circumstance favoring
ones innocence be duly taken into account.37 Given the deviation of the police officers from the standard and usual
procedure in dealing with traffic violation by perceived drivers under the influence of alcoholand executing an
arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in
the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed in People v. Ambrosio, 38 the presumption of regularity is
merely just that, a presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot
be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offenders culpability. In the
present case, the absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the
forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on the finding
of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.

In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or at least infavor of
the milderform of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of
proving the guiltof an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence and noton
the weakness of the defense.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASI:OE. Petitioner is hereby acquitted of the crimes charged in
Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

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G.R. Nos. 136066-67 February 4, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by
R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations which read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 96-5071

That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his control two (2) plastic bags containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (SHABU)
weighing more or less two (2) kilos and one (1) small plastic bag containing Methamphetamine Hydrocloride
weighing more or less fifteen (15) grams, which is a regulated drug, without any authority whatsoever.

Criminal Case No. 96-5132

That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his control twenty (20) pieces of live .22 cal. ammunitions, without first having obtained a
license or permit to possess or carry the same.

Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" on arraignment.1awphi1.nt The two cases were then jointly tried.

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members of the police force of Angeles City. Their testimonies
can be synthesized as follows:

On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received a
report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the
Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported that accused-appellant distributes illegal
drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City. On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of Angeles City, Col. Neopito
Gutierrez, immediately formed a team of operatives composed of Major Bernardino, Insp. Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel
Nunag, P02 Emmeraldo Nunag, SP01 Fernando Go, and some civilian assets, with SPO2 Mario Nulud, as team
investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag and the civilian informer positioned themselves across McArthur
Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel. The other group acted as their back up.

At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and
parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed
Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers.
As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded
from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces
of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-
O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent
plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-
appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the
confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. 3

When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic bags containing crystalline
substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters revealed that the siezed
items contained shabu.4 Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud together with accused-appellant brought these items for further
laboratory examination to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After due testing,
forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline substances yielded positive results for shabu.
The small plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942 kilograms of shabu. 5

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident.

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Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son
to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a
small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he
noticed a man approach and examine the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man
immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified
himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to
open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the
police officers companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him
away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.1awphi1.nt

Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes
until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez
opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken. 6

Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its material points. He testified that he
witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine security check around the premises of the Guess
Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel.7

On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a decision, 8 the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgement is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, the accused is hereby acquitted of
the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.

2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu, accused Binad Sy Chua
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS FOLLOWING FINDINGS:

A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BINAD SY CHUA WAS LAWFUL;

B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION OF SHABU ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON
HIM WERE CONDUCTED IN A LAWFUL AND VALID MANNER;

C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CRIME CHARGED IS SUFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REAONABLE DOUBT.10

Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives was unlawful;
that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest he has been under surveillance for two
years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste within which the arresting officers sought to arrest
and search him without a warrant; that the police officers had sufficient information about him and could have
easily arrested him. Accused-appellant further argues that since his arrest was null an void, the drugs that were
seized should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.

Accused-appellants argument is impressed with merit.

Although the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is not a hard and fast one.

It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves
the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate
judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. The only exception is if
there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the case. 11

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In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and substance that have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which casts doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. An appeal in
a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty and indemnity imposed
by the trial court.12 We are clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we
find that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of
the accused shall be considered.13 This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be
presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made upon accused-appellant, the
court a quo made the following findings:

Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of regulated drugs (shabu). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
x x x allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. x x x x

While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal affects (sic) of the accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

xxxxxxxxx

In the present case, the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the
Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a
search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a "stop and frisk". 14

A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusion of the trial court. It confused the
two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a "stop-and-frisk."

In Malacat v. Court of Appeals,15 we distinguished the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, to wit:

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search,
the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used
as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can
be madethe process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence.

xxxxxxxxx

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth amendment.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop-and-frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop-and-frisk". A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible

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criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. 16(Emphasis ours)

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles is applicable to justify the
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.

In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the
fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. 17 Accordingly, for this exception to apply two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 18

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals that when accused-
appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the McArthur Highway,
alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box.
Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime.

However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation of the law, the group of
SPO2 Nulud "hurriedly accosted"19 accused-appellant and later on "introduced themselves as police
officers."20Accused-appellant was arrested before the alleged drop-off of shabu was done. Probable cause in this
case was more imagined than real. Thus, there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search,
in light of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had committed a crime, was
committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the
view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest.21 Hence, in People v. Aminudin,22 we ruled that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing
was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject
to apprehension" (Emphasis supplied).

The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben 23 to justify the polices actions is misplaced. In the said case,
based on the information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner
Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on
those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a
person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open
his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the
night of his arrest.

In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior knowledge from the very same informant of
accused-appellants activities. No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team leader of the arresting operatives,
admitted that their informant has been telling them about the activities of accused-appellant for two years prior to
his actual arrest on September 21, 1996. An excerpt of the testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the illegality of
the arrest of accused-appellant as follows:

Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to you the name of this chinese drug pusher?

A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo Chua.

Q. And he had been mentioning these names to you even before September 21, 1996?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did this civilian informant have been telling you about the activities of this chinese drug
pusher reckoning in relation to September 21, 1996?

A. That was about two years already.

TRANSPORTATION
 27

Q. Nothwithstanding his two years personal knowledge which you gained from the civilian informant that
this chinese drug pusher have been engaged pushing drugs here in Angeles City, you did not think of
applying for a search warrant for this chinese drug pusher?

A. No, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was casually walking along the road near the Thunder Inn Hotel,
is that right?

A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer that he is the chinese drug pusher that will deliver to him
also.

Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or Binad Chua the accused in this case he alighted with a
Corolla car with plate number 999, I think, he just alighted when you saw him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually walked towards near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?

A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder Inn Hotel but he was pinpointed already by the civilian
informer.

Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?

A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn Hotel.

xxxxxxxxx

Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2 Nunag pounced on him as you used pounced on him in your
affidavit?

A. Yes, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you saw that alleged small plastic bag, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto juice box?

A. Yes, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q. But would you agree with me that not all crystalline substance is shabu?

A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time that we have been tailing the accused that he is really a drug
pusher.

Q. So you have been tailing this accused for quite a long time that you are very sure that what was brought
by him was shabu?

A. Yes, sir.24

The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities of accused-appellant. Considering that
the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the
actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before
arresting accused-appellant and searching his person. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to them
TRANSPORTATION
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hours before accused-appellants arrest was not a product of an "on-the-spot" tip which may excuse them from
obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting teams contention that their arrest of accused-appellant
was a product of an "on-the-spot" tip is untenable.

In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" in this case. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) 25 or contraband. The police
officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. 26 The
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed
about him.27 It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this
principle to apply.28

This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals.29 In said case, the
policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to
be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk." In People v. Solayao, 30 we
also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering the following circumstances: the
drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw the
policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that
armed persons where roaming the vicinity.

The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no valid "stop-and-frisk" in the case of
accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged
illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into
accused-appellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
Besides, at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct
reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There was, therefore, no
genuine reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellants arrest.

Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information given to them by their confidential
informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge
that accused-appellant had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.

At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accused-appellants warrantless arrest
and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid "stop-and frisk". For a valid "stop-and-frisk" the search
and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in this case. Besides, as we have earlier emphasized, the
information about the illegal activities of accused-appellant was not unknown to the apprehending officers. Hence,
the search and seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a valid "stop-and-frisk".

Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in accused-appellants
possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found in the Zest-O juice
box which contained crystalline substances later on identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and the
20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The police officers first arrested accused-
appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked into the sealed Zest-O juice box before they were able
to see and later on ascertain that the crystalline substance was shabu. There was no clear showing that the sealed
Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the small plastic bags which
allegedly contained crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition visible. These prohibited
substances were not in plain view of the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous
tree.

In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search,
or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is
bereft of any such showing.1a\^/phi1.net

All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much more cure, the
illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the presumption of
regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an
encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.31 In People v. Nubla,32 we clearly stated that:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-
appellants conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that a mere presumption. Once challenged
by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in

TRANSPORTATION
 27

the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the very same
items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field test where the items seized were
identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles City. 33 The items were therefore not
marked at the place where they were taken. In People v. Casimiro,34 we struck down with disbelief the reliability of
the identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place where they were seized, thus:

The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the
scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item allegedly
seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and
given by them to the crime laboratory.

The governments drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not undermine the
fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous
police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be
paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered.
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. 35

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua of violation of Section 16,
Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody, unless he is being lawfully held for
another crime.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G. R. No. 91378 June 9, 1992

FIRST MALAYAN LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISOSTOMO B. VITUG and ESTATE OF VICENTE TRINIDAD, Represented
by Widow GLORIA D. TRINIDAD, respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO. J.:

This case brings to the fore the importance of motor vehicle registration in determining who should be liable for the
death or injuries suffered by passengers or third persons as a consequence of the operation of a motor vehicle.

On June 26, 1984, Crisostomo B. Vitug filed Civil Case No. 84-25186 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Branch
XLIII, against the defendant. First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC for short), to recover damages
for physical injuries, loss of personal effects, and the wreck of his car as a result of a three-vehicle collision on
December 14, 1983. involving his car, another car, and an Isuzu cargo truck registered in the name of FMLFC and
driven by one Crispin Sicat.

TRANSPORTATION
 27

The evidence shows that while Vitug's car was at a full stop at the intersection of New York Street and Epifanio
delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Cubao, Quezon City, northward-bound, the on-coming Isuzu cargo truck bumped, a
Ford Granada car behind him with such force that the Ford car was thrown on top of Vitug's car crushing its roof.
The cargo truck thereafter struck Vitug's car in the rear causing the gas tank to explode and setting the car ablaze.

Stunned by the impact. Vitug was fortunately extricated from his car by solicitous bystanders before the vehicle
exploded. However, two of his passengers were burned to death. Vitug's car, valued at P70,000, was a total loss.

When he regained consciousness in the hospital, Vitug discovered that he had lost various personal articles valued
at P48,950, namely a necklace with a diamond pendant, a GP watch, a pair of Christian Dior eyeglasses. a gold
Cross pen and a pair of Bally shoes. Vitug also suffered injuries producing recurring pains in his neck and back.
Upon his physician's advice, he received further medical treatment in the United States which cost him
US$2,373.64 for his first trip, and US$5,596.64 for the second.

At the time of the accident on December 14, 1983, the Isuzu cargo truck was registered in the name of the First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC).

However, FMLFC denied any liability, alleging that it was not the owner of the truck. neither the employer of the
driver Crispin Sicat, because it had sold the truck to Vicente Trinidad on September 24. 1980, after the latter had
paid all his monthly amortizations under the financing lease agreement between FMLFC and Trinidad.

On FMLFC's motion, the lower court granted FMLFC's leave to file a third-party complaint against Trinidad and
admitted the third-party complaint filed therewith.

Answering the third-party complaint the Estate of Vicente Trinidad admitted that the truck was operated by the
deceased during his lifetime. Nevertheless it raised the defense that the estate of Vicente Trinidad was no longer
existing because the same had long been settled and partitioned extra judicially by his heirs.

On August 25, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision sentencing FMLFC to pay Vitug the sum of P133,950 with
interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, plus the sum of P10,000 as attorneys fees
and costs.

FMLFC appealed in due time to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision on November 27, 1989 modifying
the appealed judgment by ordering the third-party defendant-appellee (Estate of Vicente Trinidad) to indemnify the
appellant, FMLFC, for whatever amount the latter may pay Vitug under the judgment. In all other respects, the trial
court's decision was affirmed.

FMLFC has filed this petition for review on certiorari praying that the decision of the appellate court be reversed
and set aside.

On February 14, 1990, the Court dismissed the petition for insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to
comply with the Rules of Court and Circular 1-88 requiring the submission of (1) proof of service of the petition on
the adverse party, and (2) a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the petition was
filed late on February 1, 1990, the due date being January 27, 1990.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On April 16, 1990. we granted the same and reinstated the
petition. Without giving it due course, we required the respondents to comment.

After deliberating on the petition, the comments of the private respondents and the petitioner's reply thereto, we
find the petition to be bereft of merit, hence, resolved to deny it.

In the first place, the factual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the Isuzu vehicle which figured
in the mishap was still registered in the name of FMLFC at the time of the accident is not reviewable by this Court
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of Rules of Court.

This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who the actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the
registered owner is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third persons, and as such, directly and
primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of
record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered merely as his agent (MYC-
Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 10. citing Vargas vs. Langcay. 6 SCRA 174; Tamayo vs.
Aquino. 105 Phil. 949).

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 27

We believe that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually employed by the operator of
record. It is even not necessary to prove who the actual owner of the vehicle and the employer of
the driver is. Granting that, in this case, the father of the driver is the actual owner and that he is
the actual employer, following the well-settled principle that the operator of record continues to be
the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and third persons, and as
such is responsible for the consequences incident to its operation we must hold and consider such
owner-operator of record as the employer, in contemplation of law, of the driver. And, to give effect
to this policy of law as enunciated in the above cited decisions of this Court, we must now extend
the same and consider the actual operator and employer as the agent of the operator of record."
(Vargas vs. Langcay, 6 SCRA 178; citing Montoya vs. Ignacio, G.R. No. L-5868, Dec. 29, 1953;
Timbol vs. Osias, G.R. No. L-7547, April 30, 1955; Vda. de Medina vs. Cresencia, G.R. No. L-8194,
July 11, 1956; Necesito vs. Paras, G.R. No. L10605, June 30, 1955.)

. . . Were the registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed
transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape
said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done (Erezo vs. Jepte, 102 Phil
103.)

. . . The registered owner or operator of record is the one liable for damages caused by a vehicle
regardless of any alleged sale or lease made thereon." (MYC-Agro- Industrial Corp. vs. Vda. de
Caldo, 132 SCRA 11.)

In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle to be valid against third persons. it must be recorded in the
Land Transportation Office. For, although valid between the parties, the sale cannot affect third persons who rely
on the public registration of the motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC was the owner
and operator of the Izusu cargo truck, hence, fully liable to third parties injured by its operation due to the fault or
negligence of the driver thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and
the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Potenciano A. Flores for petitioner.
Robert Anthony C. Sison, Cesar B. Brillantes and Jose Z. Galsim for private respondent.
Jose F. Miravite for movants.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Public utilities are privately owned and operated businesses whose service are essential to the general public. They
are enterprises which specially cater to the needs of the public and conduce to their comfort and convenience. As
such, public utility services are impressed with public interest and concern. The same is true with respect to the
business of common carrier which holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced
upon it the right of public regulation when private properties are affected with public interest, hence, they cease to
be juris privati only. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in
effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to the control by the public for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. 1
An abdication of the licensing and regulatory government agencies of their functions as the instant petition seeks
to show, is indeed lamentable. Not only is it an unsound administrative policy but it is inimical to public trust and
public interest as well.
The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda, circulars and/or
orders of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising
and Regulatory Board LTFRB) 2 which, among others, (a) authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase
or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB and without hearing
and approval thereof by said agency in violation of Sec. 16(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended,
otherwise known as the Public Service Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix and determine just and
reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus operators, and (b) establish a presumption of public need in
TRANSPORTATION
 27

favor of applicants for certificates of public convenience (CPC) and place on the oppositor the burden of proving
that there is no need for the proposed service, in patent violation not only of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but
also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating that fares should be "just and reasonable." It is, likewise, violative of
the Rules of Court which places upon each party the burden to prove his own affirmative allegations. 3 The
offending provisions contained in the questioned issuances pointed out by petitioner, have resulted in the
introduction into our highways and thoroughfares thousands of old and smoke-belching buses, many of which are
right-hand driven, and have exposed our consumers to the burden of spiraling costs of public transportation
without hearing and due process.
The following memoranda, circulars and/or orders are sought to be nullified by the instant petition, viz: (a) DOTC
Memorandum Order 90-395, dated June 26, 1990 relative to the implementation of a fare range scheme for
provincial bus services in the country; (b) DOTC Department Order No.
92-587, dated March 30, 1992, defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services; (c) DOTC
Memorandum dated October 8, 1992, laying down rules and procedures to implement Department Order No. 92-
587; (d) LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, providing implementing guidelines on the DOTC Department
Order No. 92-587; and (e) LTFRB Order dated March 24, 1994 in Case No. 94-3112.
The relevant antecedents are as follows:
On June 26, 1990; then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB
Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of
15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. The text of the memorandum order
reads in full:
One of the policy reforms and measures that is in line with the thrusts and the priorities set out in
the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) 1987 1992) is the liberalization of
regulations in the transport sector. Along this line, the Government intends to move away gradually
from regulatory policies and make progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.
Based on several surveys and observations, bus companies are already charging passenger rates
above and below the official fare declared by LTFRB on many provincial routes. It is in this context
that some form of liberalization on public transport fares is to be tested on a pilot basis.
In view thereof, the LTFRB is hereby directed to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all
provincial bus routes in country (except those operating within Metro Manila). Transport Operators
shall be allowed to charge passengers within a range of fifteen percent (15%) above and fifteen
percent (15%) below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year.
Guidelines and procedures for the said scheme shall be prepared by LTFRB in coordination with the
DOTC Planning Service.
The implementation of the said fare range scheme shall start on 6 August 1990.
For compliance. (Emphasis ours.)
Finding the implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible," Remedios A.S. Fernando submitted the
following memorandum to Oscar M. Orbos on July 24, 1990, to wit:
With reference to DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 dated 26 June 1990 which the LTFRB
received on 19 July 1990, directing the Board "to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all
provincial bus routes in the country (except those operating within Metro Manila)" that will allow
operators "to charge passengers within a range of fifteen percent (15%) above and fifteen percent
(15%) below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year" the undersigned is respectfully
adverting the Secretary's attention to the following for his consideration:
1. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act prescribes the following for the fixing and
determination of rates (a) the rates to be approved should be proposed by public
service operators; (b) there should be a publication and notice to concerned or
affected parties in the territory affected; (c) a public hearing should be held for the
fixing of the rates; hence, implementation of the proposed fare range scheme on
August 6 without complying with the requirements of the Public Service Act may
not be legally feasible.
2. To allow bus operators in the country to charge fares fifteen (15%) above the
present LTFRB fares in the wake of the devastation, death and suffering caused by
the July 16 earthquake will not be socially warranted and will be politically unsound;
most likely public criticism against the DOTC and the LTFRB will be triggered by the
untimely motu propio implementation of the proposal by the mere expedient of
publicizing the fare range scheme without calling a public hearing, which scheme
many as early as during the Secretary's predecessor know through newspaper
reports and columnists' comments to be Asian Development Bank and World Bank
inspired.
3. More than inducing a reduction in bus fares by fifteen percent (15%) the
implementation of the proposal will instead trigger an upward adjustment in bus
fares by fifteen percent (15%) at a time when hundreds of thousands of people in
Central and Northern Luzon, particularly in Central Pangasinan, La Union, Baguio
City, Nueva Ecija, and the Cagayan Valley are suffering from the devastation and
havoc caused by the recent earthquake.
4. In lieu of the said proposal, the DOTC with its agencies involved in public
transportation can consider measures and reforms in the industry that will be
socially uplifting, especially for the people in the areas devastated by the recent
earthquake.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned respectfully suggests that the
implementation of the proposed fare range scheme this year be further studied and evaluated.

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On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed
an application for fare rate increase. An across-the-board increase of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per
kilometer for all types of provincial buses with a minimum-maximum fare range of fifteen (15%) percent over and
below the proposed basic per kilometer fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare range applying only to
ordinary, first class and premium class buses and a fifty-centavo (P0.50) minimum per kilometer fare for aircon
buses, was sought.
On December 6, 1990, private respondent PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-the-board
increase of six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses. The decrease was due to the drop in
the expected price of diesel.
The application was opposed by the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista alleging that the
proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the application contained no allegation on the rate of
return of the proposed increase in rates.
On December 14, 1990, public respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase in accordance
with the following schedule of fares on a straight computation method, viz:
AUTHORIZED FARES
LUZON
MIN. OF 5 KMS. SUCCEEDING KM.
REGULAR P1.50 P0.37
STUDENT P1.15 P0.28
VISAYAS/MINDANAO
REGULAR P1.60 P0.375
STUDENT P1.20 P0.285
FIRST CLASS (PER KM.)
LUZON P0.385
VISAYAS/
MINDANAO P0.395
PREMIERE CLASS (PER KM.)
LUZON P0.395
VISAYAS/
MINDANAO P0.405
AIRCON (PER KM.) P0.415. 4
On March 30, 1992, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications Pete Nicomedes
Prado issued Department Order No.
92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services. The full text of the said order is
reproduced below in view of the importance of the provisions contained therein:
WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 125 as amended, designates the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) as the primary policy, planning, regulating and implementing agency on
transportation;
WHEREAS, to achieve the objective of a viable, efficient, and dependable transportation system,
the transportation regulatory agencies under or attached to the DOTC have to harmonize their
decisions and adopt a common philosophy and direction;
WHEREAS, the government proposes to build on the successful liberalization measures pursued
over the last five years and bring the transport sector nearer to a balanced longer term regulatory
framework;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers granted by laws to the DOTC, the following policies and
principles in the economic regulation of land, air, and water transportation services are hereby
adopted:
1. Entry into and exit out of the industry. Following the Constitutional dictum against monopoly, no
franchise holder shall be permitted to maintain a monopoly on any route. A minimum of two
franchise holders shall be permitted to operate on any route.
The requirements to grant a certificate to operate, or certificate of public convenience, shall be:
proof of Filipino citizenship, financial capability, public need, and sufficient insurance cover to
protect the riding public.
In determining public need, the presumption of need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the
applicant. The burden of proving that there is no need for a proposed service shall be with the
oppositor(s).
In the interest of providing efficient public transport services, the use of the "prior operator" and
the "priority of filing" rules shall be discontinued. The route measured capacity test or other similar
tests of demand for vehicle/vessel fleet on any route shall be used only as a guide in weighing the
merits of each franchise application and not as a limit to the services offered.
Where there are limitations in facilities, such as congested road space in urban areas, or at airports
and ports, the use of demand management measures in conformity with market principles may be
considered.
The right of an operator to leave the industry is recognized as a business decision, subject only to
the filing of appropriate notice and following a phase-out period, to inform the public and to
minimize disruption of services.
2. Rate and Fare Setting. Freight rates shall be freed gradually from government
controls. Passenger fares shall also be deregulated, except for the lowest class of passenger
service (normally third class passenger transport) for which the government will fix indicative or
reference fares. Operators of particular services may fix their own fares within a range 15% above
and below the indicative or reference rate.

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Where there is lack of effective competition for services, or on specific routes, or for the transport
of particular commodities, maximum mandatory freight rates or passenger fares shall be set
temporarily by the government pending actions to increase the level of competition.
For unserved or single operator routes, the government shall contract such services in the most
advantageous terms to the public and the government, following public bids for the services. The
advisability of bidding out the services or using other kinds of incentives on such routes shall be
studied by the government.
3. Special Incentives and Financing for Fleet Acquisition. As a matter of policy, the government
shall not engage in special financing and incentive programs, including direct subsidies for fleet
acquisition and expansion. Only when the market situation warrants government intervention shall
programs of this type be considered. Existing programs shall be phased out gradually.
The Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the
Maritime Industry Authority are hereby directed to submit to the Office of the Secretary, within
forty-five (45) days of this Order, the detailed rules and procedures for the Implementation of the
policies herein set forth. In the formulation of such rules, the concerned agencies shall be guided
by the most recent studies on the subjects, such as the Provincial Road Passenger Transport Study,
the Civil Aviation Master Plan, the Presidential Task Force on the Inter-island Shipping Industry, and
the Inter-island Liner Shipping Rate Rationalization Study.
For the compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis ours)
On October 8, 1992, public respondent Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications Jesus
B. Garcia, Jr. issued a memorandum to the Acting Chairman of the LTFRB suggesting swift action on the adoption of
rules and procedures to implement above-quoted Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down deregulation and
other liberalization policies for the transport sector. Attached to the said memorandum was a revised draft of the
required rules and procedures covering (i) Entry Into and Exit Out of the Industry and (ii) Rate and Fare Setting,
with comments and suggestions from the World Bank incorporated therein. Likewise, resplendent from the said
memorandum is the statement of the DOTC Secretary that the adoption of the rules and procedures is a pre-
requisite to the approval of the Economic Integration Loan from the World Bank. 5
On February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587. The
Circular provides, among others, the following challenged portions:
xxx xxx xxx
IV. Policy Guidelines on the Issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience.
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The presumption
of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while burden of proving that
there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor'(s).
xxx xxx xxx
V. Rate and Fare Setting
The control in pricing shall be liberalized to introduce price competition complementary with the
quality of service, subject to prior notice and public hearing. Fares shall not be provisionally
authorized without public hearing.
A. On the General Structure of Rates
1. The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and
jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced
by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.
2. Fare systems for aircon buses are liberalized to cover first class and premier services.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours).
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing
provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a
petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%)
percent of the existing fares. Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16, 1994.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares.
On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The
dispositive portion reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Board after considering the arguments of the parties, hereby
DISMISSES FOR LACK OF MERIT the petition filed in the above-entitled case. This petition in this
case was resolved with dispatch at the request of petitioner to enable it to immediately avail of the
legal remedies or options it is entitled under existing laws.
SO ORDERED. 6
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining, prohibiting and preventing
respondents from implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned orders and memorandum
circulars. This meant that provincial bus fares were rolled back to the levels duly authorized by the LTFRB prior to
March 16, 1994. A moratorium was likewise enforced on the issuance of franchises for the operation of buses,
jeepneys, and taxicabs.
Petitioner KMU anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial
bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and
minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for
the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in
favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity, is illegal for being
violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court.

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In its Comment, private respondent PBOAP, while not actually touching upon the issues raised by the petitioner,
questions the wisdom and the manner by which the instant petition was filed. It asserts that the petitioner has no
legal standing to sue or has no real interest in the case at bench and in obtaining the reliefs prayed for.
In their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, public respondents DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr.
and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have the standing to maintain the instant suit. They further
claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public
need in applications for certificates of public convenience.
We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
At the outset, the threshold issue of locus standi must be struck. Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue.
The requirement of locus standi inheres from the definition of judicial power. Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
In Lamb v. Phipps, 7 we ruled that judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending between parties
who have the right to sue in the courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision is the principle of locus
standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the
controversy has the standing to sue. The rule therefore requires that a party must show a personal stake in the
outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf. 8
In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury
and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has
a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged
memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday,
are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions
of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this
barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental
importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as
the Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement of proper party. In
the recent case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al., 9 we ruled in the same lines and
enumerated some of the cases where the same policy was adopted, viz:
. . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of
its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency
Powers Cases, [G.R. No. L-2044 (Araneta v. Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756 (Araneta
v. Angeles); G.R. No. L-3054 (Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas); G.R. No. L-3055 (Guerrero v.
Commissioner of Customs); and G.R. No. L-3056 (Barredo v. Commission on Elections), 84 Phil. 368
(1949)], this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2621)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits
are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it
should be entertained," (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 [1972]) or that it "enjoys an open
discretion to entertain the same or not." [Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976)].
xxx xxx xxx
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
Congress, and even association of planters, and
non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to
question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various
government agencies or instrumentalities. Among such cases were those assailing the
constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836 insofar as it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of
vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives and to elective officials of both Houses of
Congress (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]); (b) Executive
Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987, which allowed members of
the cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or
positions (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]); (c) the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the General Appropriations Act (Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA
221 [1991]; (d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of desynchronized elections (Osmea v. Commission
on Elections, 199 SCRA 750 [1991]); (e) P.D. No. 1869 (the charter of the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation) on the ground that it is contrary to morals, public policy, and order
(Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., 197 SCRA 52 [1991]); and (f) R.A. No. 6975,
establishing the Philippine National Police. (Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 [1992]).
Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy regarding locus standi include those attacking
the validity or legality of (a) an order allowing the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition
imposed by R.A. No. 3452 (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377
[1965]; (b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the Constitution and
P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976 (Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, supra); (c) the
bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan (Laurel
v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 [1990]); (d) the approval without hearing by the Board of Investments of

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the amended application of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its plant
from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift of feedstock from naphtha
only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (Garcia v. Board of Investments, 177 SCRA 374
[1989]; Garcia v. Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288 [1990]); (e) the decisions, orders, rulings,
and resolutions of the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting the
National Power Corporation from indirect tax and duties (Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771
[1991]); (f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground
that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow the
petitioner substantial cross-examination; (Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board, 199 SCRA 454
[1991]); (g) Executive Order No. 478 which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported oil
products (Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 [1992]); (h) resolutions of the Commission
on Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of
Sanggunians (De Guia vs. Commission on Elections, 208 SCRA 420 [1992]); and (i) memorandum
orders issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of Police of Pasay City (Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc. v. Cuneta, 101 SCRA 662 [1980]).
In the 1975 case of Aquino v. Commission on Elections (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), this Court, despite its
unequivocal ruling that the petitioners therein had no personality to file the petition, resolved
nevertheless to pass upon the issues raised because of the far-reaching implications of the petition.
We did no less in De Guia v. COMELEC (Supra) where, although we declared that De Guia "does not
appear to have locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest," we brushed
aside the procedural infirmity "considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it
does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging
abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent."
Now on the merits of the case.
On the fare range scheme.
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, reads:
Sec. 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. The Commission shall have
power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act,
subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls, charges, classifications, or schedules thereof,
as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed,
observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its
discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any
hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice
to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service
equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business,
the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of
such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates. (Emphasis ours).
xxx xxx xxx
Under the foregoing provision, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the
power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is
likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said
executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust,
reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation
services provided by motorized vehicles."
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing
complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering
the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive
and delicate matters as
route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power
of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement
broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time or
competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC
and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public
service.
In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and
above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is
based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another. 10 A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the
trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. 11 The policy of allowing the provincial bus
operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic
state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares
every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it
"necessary" to do so. In Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co., 12 where respondent Philippine Railway Co.
was granted by the Public Service Commission the authority to change its freight rates at will, this Court
categorically declared that:

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In our opinion, the Public Service Commission was not authorized by law to delegate to the
Philippine Railway Co. the power of altering its freight rates whenever it should find it necessary to
do so in order to meet the competition of road trucks and autobuses, or to change its freight rates
at will, or to regard its present rates as maximum rates, and to fix lower rates whenever in the
opinion of the Philippine Railway Co. it would be to its advantage to do so.
The mere recital of the language of the application of the Philippine Railway Co. is enough to show
that it is untenable. The Legislature has delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of
fixing the rates of public services, but it has not authorized the Public Service Commission to
delegate that power to a common carrier or other public service. The rates of public services like
the Philippine Railway Co. have been approved or fixed by the Public Service Commission, and any
change in such rates must be authorized or approved by the Public Service Commission after they
have been shown to be just and reasonable. The public service may, of course, propose new rates,
as the Philippine Railway Co. did in case No. 31827, but it cannot lawfully make said new rates
effective without the approval of the Public Service Commission, and the Public Service
Commission itself cannot authorize a public service to enforce new rates without the prior approval
of said rates by the commission. The commission must approve new rates when they are submitted
to it, if the evidence shows them to be just and reasonable, otherwise it must disapprove them.
Clearly, the commission cannot determine in advance whether or not the new rates of the
Philippine Railway Co. will be just and reasonable, because it does not know what those rates will
be.
In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in effect asked for permission to change its freight
rates at will. It may change them every day or every hour, whenever it deems it necessary to do so
in order to meet competition or whenever in its opinion it would be to its advantage. Such a
procedure would create a most unsatisfactory state of affairs and largely defeat the purposes of
the public service law. 13 (Emphasis ours).
One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. If transport operators will
be authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent to 20% over and above the authorized fare
over a period of time, this will unduly prejudice a commuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been
computed in a manner similar to those of compounded bank interest rates.
Picture this situation. On December 14, 1990, the LTFRB authorized provincial bus operators to collect a thirty-
seven (P0.37) centavo per kilometer fare for ordinary buses. At the same time, they were allowed to impose and
collect a fare range of plus or minus 15% over the authorized rate. Thus P0.37 centavo per kilometer authorized
fare plus P0.05 centavos (which is 15% of P0.37 centavos) is equivalent to P0.42 centavos, the allowed rate in
1990. Supposing the LTFRB grants another five (P0.05) centavo increase per kilometer in 1994, then, the base or
reference for computation would have to be P0.47 centavos (which is P0.42 + P0.05 centavos). If bus operators will
exercise their authority to impose an additional 20% over and above the authorized fare, then the fare to be
collected shall amount to P0.56 (that is, P0.47 authorized LTFRB rate plus 20% of P0.47 which is P0.29). In effect,
commuters will be continuously subjected, not only to a double fare adjustment but to a compounding fare as well.
On their part, transport operators shall enjoy a bigger chunk of the pie. Aside from fare increase applied for, they
can still collect an additional amount by virtue of the authorized fare range. Mathematically, the situation
translates into the following:
Year** LTFRB authorized Fare Range Fare to be
rate*** collected per
kilometer
1990 P0.37 15% (P0.05) P0.42
1994 P0.42 + 0.05 = 0.47 20% (P0.09) P0.56
1998 P0.56 + 0.05 = 0.61 20% (P0.12) P0.73
2002 P0.73 + 0.05 = 0.78 20% (P0.16) P0.94
Moreover, rate making or rate fixing is not an easy task. It is a delicate and sensitive government function that
requires dexterity of judgment and sound discretion with the settled goal of arriving at a just and reasonable rate
acceptable to both the public utility and the public. Several factors, in fact, have to be taken into consideration
before a balance could be achieved. A rate should not be confiscatory as would place an operator in a situation
where he will continue to operate at a loss. Hence, the rate should enable public utilities to generate revenues
sufficient to cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on the investments. On the other hand, a rate
which is too high becomes discriminatory. It is contrary to public interest. A rate, therefore, must be reasonable and
fair and must be affordable to the end user who will utilize the services.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing and its far-reaching effects on millions of
commuters, government must not relinquish this important function in favor of those who would benefit and profit
from the industry. Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be done away with. The people, represented by
reputable oppositors, deserve to be given full opportunity to be heard in their opposition to any fare increase.
The present administrative procedure, 14 to our mind, already mirrors an orderly and satisfactory arrangement for
all parties involved. To do away with such a procedure and allow just one party, an interested party at that, to
determine what the rate should be, will undermine the right of the other parties to due process. The purpose of a
hearing is precisely to determine what a just and reasonable rate is. 15 Discarding such procedural and
constitutional right is certainly inimical to our fundamental law and to public interest.
On the presumption of public need.
A certificate of public convenience (CPC) is an authorization granted by the LTFRB for the operation of land
transportation services for public use as required by law. Pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Public Service Act, as
amended, the following requirements must be met before a CPC may be granted, to wit: (i) the applicant must be a
citizen of the Philippines, or a corporation or co-partnership, association or joint-stock company constituted and
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least 60 per centum of its stock or paid-up capital must belong

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entirely to citizens of the Philippines; (ii) the applicant must be financially capable of undertaking the proposed
service and meeting the responsibilities incident to its operation; and (iii) the applicant must prove that the
operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interest in a
proper and suitable manner. It is understood that there must be proper notice and hearing before the PSC can
exercise its power to issue a CPC.
While adopting in toto the foregoing requisites for the issuance of a CPC, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009,
Part IV, provides for yet incongruous and contradictory policy guideline on the issuance of a CPC. The guidelines
states:
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The presumption
of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while the burden of proving
that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's. (Emphasis ours).
The above-quoted provision is entirely incompatible and inconsistent with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act
which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the
operation of the public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. On the
contrary, the policy guideline states that the presumption of public need for a public service shall be deemed in
favor of the applicant. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.
By its terms, public convenience or necessity generally means something fitting or suited to the public need. 16 As
one of the basic requirements for the grant of a CPC, public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed
facility or service meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not
adequately supply. The existence or
non-existence of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by
evidence, real and/or testimonial; empirical data; statistics and such other means necessary, in a public hearing
conducted for that purpose. The object and purpose of such procedure, among other things, is to look out for, and
protect, the interests of both the public and the existing transport operators.
Verily, the power of a regulatory body to issue a CPC is founded on the condition that after full-dress hearing and
investigation, it shall find, as a fact, that the proposed operation is for the convenience of the public. 17 Basic
convenience is the primary consideration for which a CPC is issued, and that fact alone must be consistently borne
in mind. Also, existing operators in subject routes must be given an opportunity to offer proof and oppose the
application. Therefore, an applicant must, at all times, be required to prove his capacity and capability to furnish
the service which he has undertaken to
render. 18 And all this will be possible only if a public hearing were conducted for that purpose.
Otherwise stated, the establishment of public need in favor of an applicant reverses well-settled and
institutionalized judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative procedures. It allows the party who initiates the
proceedings to prove, by mere application, his affirmative allegations. Moreover, the offending provisions of the
LTFRB memorandum circular in question would in effect amend the Rules of Court by adding another disputable
presumption in the enumeration of 37 presumptions under Rule 131, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Such
usurpation of this Court's authority cannot be countenanced as only this Court is mandated by law to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. 19
Deregulation, while it may be ideal in certain situations, may not be ideal at all in our country given the present
circumstances. Advocacy of liberalized franchising and regulatory process is tantamount to an abdication by the
government of its inherent right to exercise police power, that is, the right of government to regulate public utilities
for protection of the public and the utilities themselves.
While we recognize the authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB to issue administrative orders to regulate the
transport sector, we find that they committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOTC Department Order
No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services and LTFRB Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009 promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, the said
administrative issuances being amendatory and violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court.
Consequently, we rule that the twenty (20%) per centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16,
1994 without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force and effect. No grave
abuse of discretion however was committed in the issuance of DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 and DOTC
Memorandum dated October 8, 1992, the same being merely internal communications between administrative
officers.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged administrative
issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary to law
and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the
authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public
need for a service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving
that there is no need for the proposed service to the oppositor.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the
bus fare rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda
and/or orders declared invalid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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