GR. No. 184823 October 6, 2010 4.

Petitioners alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation by the

Bureau;
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs. 5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the period in question;
AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondent.
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales contemplated under Sections
DECISION 106(A) (2) (a), and 108(B) (1) of the Tax Code of 1997;

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right,
privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of
taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his
entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural due process as non-
observance of the prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial
claims would result in the denial of his claim.
7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the two (2) year period
prescribed in Section 229 of the Tax Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to
refund, and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake of
the nature of exemption from taxation.13

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the
Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a
July 30, 2008 Decision1 and the October 6, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Tax Appeals
Decision partially granting respondents claim for refund/credit. Pertinent portions of the Decision
(CTA) En Banc.
read:

Factual Antecedents
For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to validly claim a refund, Section 112 (A)
of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides:
Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in the manufacturing, producing,
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.
and processing of steel and its by-products.3 It is registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) as a Value-Added Tax (VAT) entity4 and its products, "close impression die steel forgings"
and "tool and dies," are registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer status.5 (A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period
creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the
July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 in the total amount of P3,891,123.82 with the petitioner
extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop
Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center.6
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the following requisites: (1) the
taxpayer is engaged in sales which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is
Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA
VAT-registered; (3) the claim must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter
when such sales were made; and (4) the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to
On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review7 with the CTA for the refund/credit of the such sales, except the transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been
same input VAT. The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 7065 and was raffled to the Second applied against the output tax.
Division of the CTA.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been complied [with] by petitioner.
In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002, it generated and recorded zero-rated sales in the amount of P131,791,399.00,8 which was
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by petitioner, such as the Sales
paid pursuant to Section 106(A) (2) (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
Invoices (Exhibits "II" to "II-262," "JJ" to "JJ-431," "KK" to "KK-394" and "LL") shows that it is
1997 (NIRC);9 that for the said period, it incurred and paid input VAT amounting
engaged in sales which are zero-rated.
to P3,912,088.14 from purchases and importation attributable to its zero-rated sales;10and that in
its application for refund/credit filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and
Duty Drawback Center, it only claimed the amount of P3,891,123.82.11 The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The Certificate of Registration with OCN
1RC0000148499 (Exhibit "C") with the BIR proves that petitioner is a registered VAT taxpayer.
In response, petitioner filed his Answer12 raising the following special and affirmative defenses,
to wit:
In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its administrative claim for refund on
September 30, 2004 (Exhibit "N") and the present Petition for Review on September 30, 2004,
both within the two (2) year prescriptive period from the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, which is from September 30, 2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there are some documents and claims of
petitioner that are baseless and have not been satisfactorily substantiated.
xxxx
In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit
certificate representing unutilized excess input VAT payments for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002, which are attributable to its zero-rated sales for the same period, but in the
reduced amount of P3,239,119.25, computed as follows:
Amount of Claimed Input VAT P 3,891,123.82
Less:
Exceptions as found by the ICPA 41,020.37
Net Creditable Input VAT P 3,850,103.45
Less:
Output VAT Due 610,984.20
Excess Creditable Input VAT P 3,239,119.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT
CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner [in] the reduced amount of THREE MILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN AND 25/100 PESOS
(P3,239,119.25), representing the unutilized input VAT incurred for the months of July to
September 2002.
SO ORDERED.14
Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,15 insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the
two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the
NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax
refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on
September 29, 2004.16 He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code,17 which provides that when
the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the
simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and
229 of the NIRC.18 According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a
"condition precedent"19 before a judicial claim can be filed. He explained that the rationale of
such requirement rests not only on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies but
also on the fact that the CTA is an appellate body which exercises the power of judicial review
over administrative actions of the BIR. 20
The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration
for lack of merit. Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc via a Petition for
Review.21
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Divisions Decision allowing the partial
tax refund/credit in favor of respondent. However, as to the reckoning point for counting the two-
year period, the CTA En Banc ruled:
Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims were filed beyond the period allowed
by law and hence, the honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the same. In addition, petitioner
further contends that respondent's filing of the administrative and judicial [claims] effectively
eliminates the authority of the honorable Court to exercise jurisdiction over the judicial claim.
We are not persuaded.
Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.
(A) In General. Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall
file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days
following the close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however,
That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
[x x x x ]
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty five (25) days from the close of
each taxable quarter within which to file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or
receipts. In the case at bar, the taxable quarter involved was for the period of July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002. Applying Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, respondent has until October 25,
2002 within which to file its quarterly return for its gross sales or receipts [with] which it complied
when it filed its VAT Quarterly Return on October 20, 2002.
In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period provided under Section 229 of the 1997
NIRC should start from the payment of tax subject claim for refund. As stated above, respondent
filed its VAT Return for the taxable third quarter of 2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus,
respondent's administrative and judicial claims for refund filed on September 30, 2004 were filed
on time because AICHI has until October 20, 2004 within which to file its claim for refund.
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention that the 1997 NIRC requires the
previous filing of an administrative claim for refund prior to the judicial claim. This should not be
the case as the law does not prohibit the simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial
claims for refund. What is controlling is that both claims for refund must be filed within the two-
year prescriptive period.
In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to disturb the findings and conclusion
spelled out in the assailed January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA
Second Division. What the instant petition seeks is for the Court En Banc to view and appreciate
the evidence in their own perspective of things, which unfortunately had already been
considered and passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008
Resolution of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 7065 entitled, "AICHI Forging Company
of Asia, Inc. petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent" are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc denied23 his Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the issue of whether respondents
judicial and administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive
period provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of
the NIRC.24
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner maintains that respondents administrative and judicial claims for tax refund/credit
were filed in violation of Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.25 He posits that pursuant to Article
13 of the Civil Code,26 since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax
refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on
September 29, 2004.27
Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in
determining the start of the two-year period as the said provision pertains to the compliance
requirements in the payment of VAT.28 He asserts that it is Section 112, paragraph (A), of the
same Code that should apply because it specifically provides for the period within which a claim
for tax refund/ credit should be made.29
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the administrative claim with the BIR and the judicial
claim with the CTA were filed on the same day.30 He opines that the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the
prior filing of an administrative claim.31 He insists that such procedural requirement is based on
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the fact that the CTA is an appellate
body exercising judicial review over administrative actions of the CIR.32
Respondents Arguments
For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a refund/credit of its unutilized input VAT for
the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 as a matter of right because it has substantially
complied with all the requirements provided by law.33 Respondent likewise defends the CTA En
Banc in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in computing the prescriptive period for the claim
for tax refund/credit. Respondent believes that Section 112(A) of the NIRC must be read
together with Section 114(A) of the same Code.34
As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its administrative and judicial claims, respondent
contends that it first filed an administrative claim with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax
Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF before it filed a judicial claim with the CTA. 35 To
prove this, respondent points out that its Claimant Information Sheet No. 49702 36 and BIR Form
No. 1914 for the third quarter of 2002,37 which were filed with the DOF, were attached as
Annexes "M" and "N," respectively, to the Petition for Review filed with the CTA.38 Respondent
further contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the
claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both
claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period.39 In support thereof, respondent cites
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc.40 where it was ruled that "[i]f,
however, the [CIR] takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about to end,
the suit or proceeding must be started in the [CTA] before the end of the two-year period without
awaiting the decision of the [CIR]."41 Lastly, respondent argues that even if the period had
already lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of equity considering that it is not a
jurisdictional requirement.42
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made
In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT,
the Second Division of the CTA applied Section 112(A) of the NIRC, which states:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of
creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the
extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in
the case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1)
and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly accounted
for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP):
Provided, further, That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale
and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or services, and the amount of
creditable input tax due or paid cannot be directly and entirely attributed to any one of the
transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into consideration Sections 114 and 229 of the NIRC,
which read:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax.
(A) In General. Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall
file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days
following the close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however,
That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in accordance with Section 236, shall file a
return and pay the tax due thereon within twenty-five (25) days from the date of cancellation of
registration: Provided, That only one consolidated return shall be filed by the taxpayer for his
principal place of business or head office and all branches.

SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected.
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal
revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of
any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have
been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has
been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether
or not such tax, penalty or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from
the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise
after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without written claim
therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was
made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the two-year period for filing a claim for
refund/credit of unutilized input VAT should start from the date of payment of tax and not from
the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.43
The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year prescriptive period, however,
has already been resolved in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation,44 where we ruled that Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the applicable provision in
determining the start of the two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT,
and that Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply only to
instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes."45 We explained
that:
The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no uncertain terms
that unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax due
the taxpayer must be claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable
quarter when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of
whether said tax was paid or not. As the CA aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied the
aforequoted Sec. 112 (A), "[P]rescriptive period commences from the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made and not from the time the input VAT was paid nor from the
time the official receipt was issued." Thus, when a zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a
year after the pertinent transaction, said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax
credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT. The reckoning frame would always be the end of the
quarter when the pertinent sales or transaction was made, regardless when the input VAT was
paid. Be that as it may, and given that the last creditable input VAT due for the period covering
the progress billing of September 6, 1996 is the third quarter of 1996 ending on September 30,
1996, any claim for unutilized creditable input VAT refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed
two years after September 30, 1996 or, to be precise, on September 30, 1998. Consequently,
MPCs claim for refund or tax credit filed on December 10, 1999 had already prescribed.
Reckoning for prescriptive period under
Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec. 204(C) or 229 of the NIRC
which, for the purpose of refund, prescribes a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive
limit for the filing of a claim therefor. Secs. 204(C) and 229 respectively provide:
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes.
The Commissioner may
(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without
authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition
by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been
rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of
taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a
claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided,
however, That a return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for
credit or refund.
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any
manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty,
or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from
the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise
after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim
therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was
made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive period, reckoned from date of
payment of the tax or penalty, for the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both
provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal
revenue taxes.
MPCs creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is an indirect tax which can be
shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of
the taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt
client, resulting in a zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transaction, does not, standing alone,
deprive the taxpayer of its right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input VAT, albeit the
erroneous, illegal, or wrongful payment angle does not enter the equation.
xxxx
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112 (A) of the NIRC, providing a
two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the
relevant sales or transactions were made pertaining to the creditable input VAT, applies to
the instant case, and not to the other actions which refer to erroneous payment of
taxes.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En Banc erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and
229 of the NIRC in computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund/credit of
unutilized input VAT. To be clear, Section 112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the
refund/credit of input VAT. Thus, the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made.
The administrative claim was timely filed
Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine whether the administrative claim was
timely filed.
47
Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days,
and taking into account the fact that the year 2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits that the
two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/ credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002 expired on September 29, 2004.48
We do not agree.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,49 we said that as
between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is
the latter that must prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.50 Thus:
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987 deal with the same subject matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this
reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being
the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the
two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return on
April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998
7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999
18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999
19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of
the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
filed within the reglementary period.51
Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the
period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence,
respondents administrative claim was timely filed.
The filing of the judicial claim was premature
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, we
are constrained to deny respondents claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation
of Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which provides that:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases,
the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in
support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of
the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer
affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after
the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim
with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days, from the date of the
submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit]," within
which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers
recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the
CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax
refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30
days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on September
30, 2004. Obviously, respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-
day period. For this reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Respondents assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period is not fatal to the filing of
a judicial claim as long as both the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-
year prescriptive period52 has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondents view. Subsection (A) of the
said provision states that "any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or
paid attributable to such sales." The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a
tax credit certificate or refund" refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to
appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the same
provision, which states that the CIR has "120 days from the submission of complete documents
in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to
decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112(D) of
the NIRC, which already provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the
decision or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section 112(D) of the NIRC envisions
two scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period;
and (2) when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both instances, the taxpayer has
30 days within which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is
crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA.
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc.53 relied upon by
respondent, we find the same inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section
306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. And as already discussed, Section 229 does not apply to
refunds/credits of input VAT, such as the instant case.
In fine, the premature filing of respondents claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA
warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 30, 2008 Decision and the
October 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No. 7065
for having been prematurely filed.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,
vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,1 Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure (Rules) are the April 30, 20082 and August 1, 20083 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 of Caloocan City, which annulled and set aside the
Orders dated September 4, 20065 and November 16, 20066 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 50 of Caloocan City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634.
The facts are simple and undisputed:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the
MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases
were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules).7 Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003 Order
on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.8 On July 2, 2004, Uy,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then
Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied
Cos motion for reconsideration.10 When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself
from handling the criminal cases per Order dated January 10, 2005.11 The cases were,
thereafter, raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the
revival of the criminal cases.12 It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23,
2005.13 Cos motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on December 16, 2005.14 Co
then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 171096.15 We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13,
2006.16 There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and
executory on March 20, 2006.17
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634
were re-raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on
July 13, 2006.18 Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues
already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096.19 In spite of this, Judge Esteban
V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Cos motion. 20 When the court
subsequently denied Uys motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006,21 Uy filed a petition
for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the
Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to
proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.22Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.
According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in this petition:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER ONTHE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF THESE CASES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN REVIVING THE
CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH WERE DISMISSED ON THE
GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; and
3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE CASES WERE ONLY
PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED:
a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS
COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL
DISMISSAL;
b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS
FOR COMPUTING THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR;
c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER ARE REVIVED IPSO FACTO BY THE FILING OF MOTION
TO REVIVE THESE CASES.23
Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to
speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the
initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay,
which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) 24 and Section 2,
Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure25 mandating that the entire
trial period should not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed
final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire
jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion because its revival would already put him in
double jeopardy.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such
dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after
notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the
trial courts issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Lastly,
even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003
when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late
since year 2004 was a leap year.
The petition is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this petition were also the meat of the
controversy in Cos previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We dismissed per Resolution
dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006. While
the first petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural infirmities, this Court nonetheless
stated therein that "[i]n any event, the petition lacks sufficient showing that respondent court had
committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court
of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the finality of Our February
13, 2006 Resolution in G.R. No. 171096, the same already constitutes as res judicata between
the parties. On this ground alone, this petition should have been dismissed outright.
Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised in the present petition, Cos
arguments are nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:
First, Cos charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to
show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was
attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the
part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "speedy trial is a relative term and
necessarily a flexible concept."26 In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. 27 The factors
to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the
right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.28 Surely, mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be
regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular
regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.29 "While the Court
recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration
of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals.
Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what
offend the right of the accused to speedy trial."30
Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused
or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party
is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order
granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is
served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.31 In this case, it is apparent
from the records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon which was served on
the private complainant at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule
15 of the Rules.32 The fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for provisional
dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue
her complaint."33 The importance of a prior notice to the offended party of a motion for
provisional dismissal is aptly explained in People v. Lacson:34
x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that
the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of
any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the
offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through
the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the
victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing.
The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the
requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or
the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the
motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the accused
for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due
process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case
with the consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill
the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide
opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and other evidence and
prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his
concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his property.35
And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a
leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of
receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the
criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of
whether it is a regular year or a leap year.39 Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a
yearis composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40 which was subsequently
reiterated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 41 thus:
x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Cos supposition that the dismissal of
Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of
the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not
thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
after notice to the offended party. When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall
according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours
become permanent one year after the issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it
and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
should not be literally interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process; thus, said in one case:
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain." It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become
to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month."
provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one
To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to
year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008
prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
until February 29, 2008.42
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.36

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the
We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better
one-year period reckoned from the time Uy received the order of dismissal on July2, 2003
rule is that the reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private counsel
consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal. When a party is represented by a
counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given
address.37 Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party has appeared 1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003
by counsel, service upon the former shall be made upon the latter.38
2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003
Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order
reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such 3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2003
interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the
offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or unwittingly not comply.
Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal 4th calendar month October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003
with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could
not be expected to act at all times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within 5th calendar month November 3, 2003 to December 2, 2003
the prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill-will or
malice, may simply exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.
6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004

Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of
7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004
Uys motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Cos categorical admission
that Uy is represented by a private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order
on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period 8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004
for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of
provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal 9th calendar month March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004
is likewise the private counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.

10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004

 11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004
12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004
In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was filed as a dilatory
tactic to prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As correctly pointed
out by Uy since the time when the "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" was filed, the issues raised
herein were already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting
through the guidance and advice of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless
and vexatious legal maneuver for no purpose other than to delay the trial court proceedings. It
appears that Atty. Maglaques conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility
which enjoins lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse court
processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyers Oath also upholds in particular:
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as
a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients x x x.1wphi1
This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt termination of
litigation is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice. In Spouses Aguilar v.
Manila Banking Corporation,43We said:
The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must
see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a
counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1,
2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which
affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan
City, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed Criminal
Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid
by the petitioner.
The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate
Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque for his acts that appear to have violated the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Rule on Forum Shopping.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine
law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving
Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent
judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of
the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the
second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with
his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San
Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs marriage to EUGENIA, they begot
seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano,
Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio
Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed
to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which
end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately
and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA
from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on
the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter,
ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorneys feesand costs
until 1987. of the suit to SOLEDAD.3

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ruling of the RTC
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora facts,4 disposing thusly:
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to
be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, (a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH
1983, which was registered bearing the following names: FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in (b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium
the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of
issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names: Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
x x x" (c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in
the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties
stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela No pronouncement as to costs.
Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted
until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997. SO ORDERED.5

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office Decision of the CA
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son
of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm Both parties appealed to the CA.6
named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were
acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of pro-indiviso share consisting of her
share in the said properties plus her share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was
bequeathed to her in the latters last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE
Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the portion of the subject properties;that the ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the
 IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT
THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE
UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from
the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF
Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
ARE APPLICABLE;
found in the condominium unit.

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION
No pronouncement as to costs.
OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND
LACHES; and
SO ORDERED.11
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE
INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.13
FEE.7
Issues
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation
PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
and Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was
unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS LAW OFFICE; and
courts approval of the Agreement;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce
PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM
sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the
HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
subjectcondominium unit; and

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, 9 holding and ruling:
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to
the subject law books.14
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latters death on July
12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to
not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens
the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris,
is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage
entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by
virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of
defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such,
the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity
ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution,
which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal
and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of
the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that
the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse,
or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be
given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement)
that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the
divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed
reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to
their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then
in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the
event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the
marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In
the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent
court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial
order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be
decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply.
The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall
be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the
late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as
an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the
action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law
for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was
not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12,
1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71
of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine
law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before
the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of
its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1wphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer
proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As
the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the
bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their
allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in
Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the
name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent
evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1wphi1 The plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not
evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase
of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions ofP159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions
of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the units purchase price
of P1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of
her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she
had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not
acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law
practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioners assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin
this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN
Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The
was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY.
only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each LUNA.
other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law
in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA
corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to
who bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law
arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to
rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he
joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
headed.30
another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her
marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve
Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and
L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus: Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds
and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained
to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to
ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the
prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish
lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of
ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court,
viz.: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued
on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, SO ORDERED.
Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of P97,588.89,
Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated Associate Justice
May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M",
forP4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The
connection was simply not established. x x x"

SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole
industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:

"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty. G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as
vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company
vs.
were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
paid for them fully or partially. x x x"

x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as
reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction
in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March
25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders
and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to
be an American citizen7 born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American,
and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the
Dominican court issuedCivil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's
marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them
joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil
Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No.
362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with
attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that
she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and
that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it,
Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause
of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001,
Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship,
as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to
speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca
commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery
and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with
bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is
DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is
hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO
HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to
Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up
during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal
support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order,
Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA- paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract
G.R. SP No. 68187. another marriage.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court
granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of
which reads:
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the
foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still
a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also
did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let
that nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent
of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she
court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the
applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a
Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil
year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil
Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of
Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
P250,000.00.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam,
SO ORDERED.23
USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an
American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.
resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued.
Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse
September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being
assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
The Issues

Ruling of the CA
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance
of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated follows:
August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state
I
a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT

SO ORDERED.26
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT
OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
following premises:
II
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-
admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO
action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca
THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente
declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign
divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO
 PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
To Whom It May Concern:
IV
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A whose other particulars are as follows:
GRAVE ABUSE.30
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair:
brown
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by
an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none
decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning
point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV,
by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213
and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly
affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June
8, 2000.
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the
propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the
questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether
the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit. (SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her
divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an Official Receipt No. 5939988
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative issued at Manila
of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born
there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment 34 in which she
stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification
(ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778
would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the
affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of
Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be
deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition
on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from
the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued
on October 11, 1995after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the
Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only
on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no
error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this
Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to
January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in
question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the
affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order
No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec.
3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services
andimplement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus,
the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the
Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen
clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish
the Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days
from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by
the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order
of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13,
2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming
the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of
close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca
was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No.
RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8,
2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's
passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was
not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her
original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously
because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of
that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC
on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in
the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition
were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex
"B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995,
is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition,
the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No.
01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC
9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with
Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective
attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but
represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose,
before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident
in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the
jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x
x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years
of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin
Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied
by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502
Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special
power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to
subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States
of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996
after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil
Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca
was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can
be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the
national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an
American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact
admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor
challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact
or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect
to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a
Rodriguez: husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x
x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Family Code, providing as follows:
Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
Art. 26. x x x x
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
follows:
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
upon the title to the thing;
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
follows:
mistake of law or fact.

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in
foreigner; and
order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is remarry.
subject to proof to the contrary.41
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45
proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the
Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of
Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the valid divorce proceedings.
June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of
Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property
determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the
relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their
country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at
family home, thus:
the time a valid divorce is obtained.42

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
their marriage consists only of the real property and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang,
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of
judicataeffect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to
marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife
to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which,
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving
per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that,
them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43
"THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996
in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged
and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision
of said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus
estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's
conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang. 48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under
the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept
and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the
other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the
truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with
the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law
it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's
motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached
therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim
for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to
support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had
discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any
rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on
November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had
been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement.
In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity
of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in
G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to
that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably
removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the
ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
R. No. 190755 November 24, 2010
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO ONG, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the October 20, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-CV No. 84445 entitled Alfredo Ong v. Land Bank of the Philippines, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17 in Tabaco City.
The Facts
On March 18, 1996, spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from Land Bank
Legazpi City in the amount of PhP 16 million. The loan was secured by three (3) residential lots,
five (5) cargo trucks, and a warehouse. Under the loan agreement, PhP 6 million of the loan
would be short-term and would mature on February 28, 1997, while the balance of PhP 10
million would be payable in seven (7) years. The Notice of Loan Approval dated February 22,
1996 contained an acceleration clause wherein any default in payment of amortizations or other
charges would accelerate the maturity of the loan.1
Subsequently, however, the Spouses Sy found they could no longer pay their loan. On
December 9, 1996, they sold three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000 to
Angelina Gloria Ong, Evangelines mother, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
The relevant portion of the document2 is quoted as follows:
WHEREAS, we are no longer in a position to settle our obligation with the bank;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P150,000.00) Philippine Currency, we hereby these presents SELL, CEDE,
TRANSFER and CONVEY, by way of sale unto ANGELINA GLORIA ONG, also of legal age,
Filipino citizen, married to Alfredo Ong, and also a resident of Tabaco, Albay, Philippines, their
heirs and assigns, the above-mentioned debt with the said LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and by reason hereof they can make the necessary representation with the bank for the proper
restructuring of the loan with the said bank in their favor;
That as soon as our obligation has been duly settled, the bank is authorized to release the
mortgage in favor of the vendees and for this purpose VENDEES can register this instrument
with the Register of Deeds for the issuance of the titles already in their names.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our signatures this 9th day of December
1996 at Tabaco, Albay, Philippines.
(signed) (signed)
EVANGELINE O. SY JOHNSON B. SY
Vendor Vendor
Evangelines father, petitioner Alfredo Ong, later went to Land Bank to inform it about the sale
and assumption of mortgage.3 Atty. Edna Hingco, the Legazpi City Land Bank Branch Head, told
Alfredo and his counsel Atty. Ireneo de Lumen that there was nothing wrong with the agreement
with the Spouses Sy but provided them with requirements for the assumption of mortgage. They
were also told that Alfredo should pay part of the principal which was computed at PhP 750,000
and to update due or accrued interests on the promissory notes so that Atty. Hingco could easily
approve the assumption of mortgage. Two weeks later, Alfredo issued a check for PhP 750,000
and personally gave it to Atty. Hingco. A receipt was issued for his payment. He also submitted
the other documents required by Land Bank, such as financial statements for 1994 and 1995.
Atty. Hingco then informed Alfredo that the certificate of title of the Spouses Sy would be
transferred in his name but this never materialized. No notice of transfer was sent to him. 4
Alfredo later found out that his application for assumption of mortgage was not approved by
Land Bank. The bank learned from its credit investigation report that the Ongs had a real estate
mortgage in the amount of PhP 18,300,000 with another bank that was past due. Alfredo
claimed that this was fully paid later on. Nonetheless, Land Bank foreclosed the mortgage of the
Spouses Sy after several months. Alfredo only learned of the foreclosure when he saw the
subject mortgage properties included in a Notice of Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale at
the RTC in Tabaco, Albay. Alfredos other counsel, Atty. Madrilejos, subsequently talked to Land
Banks lawyer and was told that the PhP 750,000 he paid would be returned to him. 5
On December 12, 1997, Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of money with damages
against Land Bank in Civil Case No. T-1941, as Alfredos payment was not returned by Land
Bank. Alfredo maintained that Land Banks foreclosure without informing him of the denial of his
assumption of the mortgage was done in bad faith. He argued that he was lured into believing
that his payment of PhP 750,000 would cause Land Bank to approve his assumption of the loan
of the Spouses Sy and the transfer of the mortgaged properties in his and his wifes name.6 He
also claimed incurring expenses for attorneys fees of PhP 150,000, filing fee of PhP 15,000, and
PhP 250,000 in moral damages.7
Testifying for Land Bank, Atty. Hingco claimed during trial that as branch manager she had no
authority to approve loans and could not assure anybody that their assumption of mortgage
would be approved. She testified that the breakdown of Alfredos payment was as follows:
PhP 101,409.59 applied to principal
216,246.56 accrued interests receivable
396,571.77 interests
18,766.10 penalties
16,805.98 accounts receivable
----------------
Total: 750,000.00
According to Atty. Hingco, the bank processes an assumption of mortgage as a new loan, since
the new borrower is considered a new client. They used character, capacity, capital, collateral,
and conditions in determining who can qualify to assume a loan. Alfredos proposal to assume
the loan, she explained, was referred to a separate office, the Lending Center. 8
During cross-examination, Atty. Hingco testified that several months after Alfredo made the
tender of payment, she received word that the Lending Center rejected Alfredos loan
application. She stated that it was the Lending Center and not her that should have informed
Alfredo about the denial of his and his wifes assumption of mortgage. She added that although
she told Alfredo that the agreement between the spouses Sy and Alfredo was valid between
them and that the bank would accept payments from him, Alfredo did not pay any further amount
so the foreclosure of the loan collaterals ensued. She admitted that Alfredo demanded the return
of the PhP 750,000 but said that there was no written demand before the case against the bank
was filed in court. She said that Alfredo had made the payment of PhP 750,000 even before he
applied for the assumption of mortgage and that the bank received the said amount because the
subject account was past due and demandable; and the Deed of Assumption of Mortgage was
not used as the basis for the payment. 9
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC held that the contract approving the assumption of mortgage was not perfected as a
result of the credit investigation conducted on Alfredo. It noted that Alfredo was not even
informed of the disapproval of the assumption of mortgage but was just told that the accounts of
the spouses Sy had matured and gone unpaid. It ruled that under the principle of equity and
justice, the bank should return the amount Alfredo had paid with interest at 12% per annum
computed from the filing of the complaint. The RTC further held that Alfredo was entitled to
attorneys fees and litigation expenses for being compelled to litigate. 10
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is rendered, ordering defendant bank to pay
plaintiff, Alfredo Ong the amount of P750,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum computed from
Dec. 12, 1997 and attorneys fees and litigation expenses of P50,000.00.
Costs against defendant bank.
SO ORDERED.11
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, Land Bank faulted the trial court for (1) holding that the payment of PhP 750,000
made by Ong was one of the requirements for the approval of his proposal to assume the
mortgage of the Sy spouses; (2) erroneously ordering Land Bank to return the amount of PhP
750,000 to Ong on the ground of its failure to effect novation; and (3) erroneously affirming the
award of PhP 50,000 to Ong as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.12 It held that Alfredos recourse is not against the Sy
spouses. According to the appellate court, the payment of PhP 750,000 was for the approval of
his assumption of mortgage and not for payment of arrears incurred by the Sy spouses. As such,
it ruled that it would be incorrect to consider Alfredo a third person with no interest in the
fulfillment of the obligation under Article 1236 of the Civil Code. Although Land Bank was not
bound by the Deed between Alfredo and the Spouses Sy, the appellate court found that Alfredo
and Land Banks active preparations for Alfredos assumption of mortgage essentially novated
the agreement.
On January 5, 2010, the CA denied Land Banks motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, Land Bank appealed to us.
The Issues
I denied. The circumstances of the instant case show that the second paragraph of Art. 1236 does
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code does
not apply and in finding that there is no novation.
II
Whether the Court of Appeals misconstrued the evidence and the law when it affirmed
the trial court decisions ordering Land Bank to pay Ong the amount of Php750,000.00
with interest at 12% annum.
III
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it affirmed the award of
Php50,000.00 to Ong as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
The Ruling of this Court
We affirm with modification the appealed decision.
Recourse is against Land Bank
Land Bank contends that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code backs their claim that Alfredo should have
sought recourse against the Spouses Sy instead of Land Bank. Art. 1236 provides:
The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no
interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid
without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the
payment has been beneficial to the debtor.1avvphi1
We agree with Land Bank on this point as to the first part of paragraph 1 of Art. 1236. Land Bank
was not bound to accept Alfredos payment, since as far as the former was concerned, he did
not have an interest in the payment of the loan of the Spouses Sy. However, in the context of the
second part of said paragraph, Alfredo was not making payment to fulfill the obligation of the
Spouses Sy. Alfredo made a conditional payment so that the properties subject of the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage would be titled in his name. It is clear from the records that
Land Bank required Alfredo to make payment before his assumption of mortgage would be
approved. He was informed that the certificate of title would be transferred accordingly. He, thus,
made payment not as a debtor but as a prospective mortgagor. But the trial court stated:
[T]he contract was not perfected or consummated because of the adverse finding in the credit
investigation which led to the disapproval of the proposed assumption. There was no evidence
presented that plaintiff was informed of the disapproval. What he received was a letter dated
May 22, 1997 informing him that the account of spouses Sy had matured but there [were] no
payments. This was sent even before the conduct of the credit investigation on June 20, 1997
which led to the disapproval of the proposed assumption of the loans of spouses Sy.13
Alfredo, as a third person, did not, therefore, have an interest in the fulfillment of the obligation of
the Spouses Sy, since his interest hinged on Land Banks approval of his application, which was
not apply. As Alfredo made the payment for his own interest and not on behalf of the Spouses
Sy, recourse is not against the latter. And as Alfredo was not paying for another, he cannot
demand from the debtors, the Spouses Sy, what he has paid.
Novation of the loan agreement
Land Bank also faults the CA for finding that novation applies to the instant case. It reasons that
a substitution of debtors was made without its consent; thus, it was not bound to recognize the
substitution under the rules on novation.
On the matter of novation, Spouses Benjamin and Agrifina Lim v. M.B. Finance
Corporation14 provides the following discussion:
Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or modificatory. It is extinctive when an
old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the place of the former;
it is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it remains compatible with
the amendatory agreement. An extinctive novation results either by changing the object or
principal conditions (objective or real), or by substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating
a third person in the rights of the creditor (subjective or personal). Under this mode, novation
would have dual functions one to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a
new one in its place requiring a conflux of four essential requisites: (1) a previous valid
obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of
the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. x x x
In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the same, it is
imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be
on every point incompatible with each other. The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two
obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
Furthermore, Art. 1293 of the Civil Code states:
Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, may be
made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the consent of
the creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives him rights mentioned in articles 1236 and 1237.
We do not agree, then, with the CA in holding that there was a novation in the contract between
the parties. Not all the elements of novation were present. Novation must be expressly
consented to. Moreover, the conflicting intention and acts of the parties underscore the absence
of any express disclosure or circumstances with which to deduce a clear and unequivocal intent
by the parties to novate the old agreement.15 Land Bank is thus correct when it argues that there
was no novation in the following:
[W]hether or not Alfredo Ong has an interest in the obligation and payment was made with the
knowledge or consent of Spouses Sy, he may still pay the obligation for the reason that even
before he paid the amount of P750,000.00 on January 31, 1997, the substitution of debtors was
already perfected by and between Spouses Sy and Spouses Ong as evidenced by a Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage executed by them on December 9, 1996. And since the
substitution of debtors was made without the consent of Land Bank a requirement which is
indispensable in order to effect a novation of the obligation, it is therefore not bound to recognize
the substitution of debtors. Land Bank did not intervene in the contract between Spouses Sy and
Spouses Ong and did not expressly give its consent to this substitution.16
Unjust enrichment
Land Bank maintains that the trial court erroneously applied the principle of equity and justice in
ordering it to return the PhP 750,000 paid by Alfredo. Alfredo was allegedly in bad faith and in
estoppel. Land Bank contends that it enjoyed the presumption of regularity and was in good faith
when it accepted Alfredos tender of PhP 750,000. It reasons that it did not unduly enrich itself at
Alfredos expense during the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, since it tendered its bid by
subtracting PhP 750,000 from the Spouses Sys outstanding loan obligation. Alfredos recourse
then, according to Land Bank, is to have his payment reimbursed by the Spouses Sy.
We rule that Land Bank is still liable for the return of the PhP 750,000 based on the principle of
unjust enrichment. Land Bank is correct in arguing that it has no obligation as creditor to
recognize Alfredo as a person with interest in the fulfillment of the obligation. But while Land
Bank is not bound to accept the substitution of debtors in the subject real estate mortgage, it is
estopped by its action of accepting Alfredos payment from arguing that it does not have to
recognize Alfredo as the new debtor. The elements of estoppel are:
First, the actor who usually must have knowledge, notice or suspicion of the true facts,
communicates something to another in a misleading way, either by words, conduct or silence;
second, the other in fact relies, and relies reasonably or justifiably, upon that communication;
third, the other would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to assert any claim
inconsistent with his earlier conduct; and fourth, the actor knows, expects or foresees that the
other would act upon the information given or that a reasonable person in the actors position
would expect or foresee such action.17
By accepting Alfredos payment and keeping silent on the status of Alfredos application, Land
Bank misled Alfredo to believe that he had for all intents and purposes stepped into the shoes of
the Spouses Sy.
The defense of Land Bank Legazpi City Branch Manager Atty. Hingco that it was the banks
Lending Center that should have notified Alfredo of his assumption of mortgage disapproval is
unavailing. The Lending Centers lack of notice of disapproval, the Tabaco Branchs silence on
the disapproval, and the banks subsequent actions show a failure of the bank as a whole, first,
to notify Alfredo that he is not a recognized debtor in the eyes of the bank; and second, to
apprise him of how and when he could collect on the payment that the bank no longer had a
right to keep.
We turn then on the principle upon which Land Bank must return Alfredos payment. Unjust
enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity
and good conscience."18 There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a
person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages
to another.19
Additionally, unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order
that the accion in rem verso may prosper, the following conditions must concur: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the enrichment of
the defendant is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based
on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict.20 The principle of unjust enrichment essentially
contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment
has no right to receive it.21
The principle applies to the parties in the instant case, as, Alfredo, having been deemed
disqualified from assuming the loan, had no duty to pay petitioner bank and the latter had no
right to receive it.
Moreover, the Civil Code likewise requires under Art. 19 that "[e]very person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith." Land Bank, however, did not even bother to inform
Alfredo that it was no longer approving his assumption of the Spouses Sys mortgage. Yet it
acknowledged his interest in the loan when the branch head of the bank wrote to tell him that his
daughters loan had not been paid.22 Land Bank made Alfredo believe that with the payment of
PhP 750,000, he would be able to assume the mortgage of the Spouses Sy. The act of receiving
payment without returning it when demanded is contrary to the adage of giving someone what is
due to him. The outcome of the application would have been different had Land Bank first
conducted the credit investigation before accepting Alfredos payment. He would have been
notified that his assumption of mortgage had been disapproved; and he would not have taken
the futile action of paying PhP 750,000. The procedure Land Bank took in acting on Alfredos
application cannot be said to have been fair and proper.
As to the claim that the trial court erred in applying equity to Alfredos case, we hold that Alfredo
had no other remedy to recover from Land Bank and the lower court properly exercised its
equity jurisdiction in resolving the collection suit. As we have held in one case:
Equity, as the complement of legal jurisdiction, seeks to reach and complete justice where courts
of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the
letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously
expressed by different courts.23
Another claim made by Land Bank is the presumption of regularity it enjoys and that it was in
good faith when it accepted Alfredos tender of PhP 750,000.
The defense of good faith fails to convince given Land Banks actions. Alfredo was not treated as
a mere prospective borrower. After he had paid PhP 750,000, he was made to sign bank
documents including a promissory note and real estate mortgage. He was assured by Atty.
Hingco that the titles to the properties covered by the Spouses Sys real estate mortgage would
be transferred in his name, and upon payment of the PhP 750,000, the account would be
considered current and renewed in his name.24
Land Bank posits as a defense that it did not unduly enrich itself at Alfredos expense during the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, since it tendered its bid by subtracting PhP 750,000
from the Spouses Sys outstanding loan obligation. It is observed that this is the first time Land
Bank is revealing this defense. However, issues, arguments, theories, and causes not raised
below may no longer be posed on appeal.25 Land Banks contention, thus, cannot be entertained
at this point.1avvphi1
Land Bank further questions the lower courts decision on the basis of the inconsistencies made
by Alfredo on the witness stand. It argues that Alfredo was not a credible witness and his
testimony failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of regular duties
on the part of Land Bank.
This claim, however, touches on factual findings by the trial court, and we defer to these findings
of the trial court as sustained by the appellate court. These are generally binding on us. While
there are exceptions to this rule, Land Bank has not satisfactorily shown that any of them is
applicable to this issue.26 Hence, the rule that the trial court is in a unique position to observe the
demeanor of witnesses should be applied and respected27 in the instant case.
In sum, we hold that Land Bank may not keep the PhP 750,000 paid by Alfredo as it had already
foreclosed on the mortgaged lands.
Interest and attorneys fees
As to the applicable interest rate, we reiterate the guidelines found in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals:28
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of
the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so
reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification
of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base
for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
No evidence was presented by Alfredo that he had sent a written demand to Land Bank before
he filed the collection suit. Only the verbal agreement between the lawyers of the parties on the
return of the payment was mentioned.29 Consequently, the obligation of Land Bank to return the
payment made by Alfredo upon the formers denial of the latters application for assumption of
mortgage must be reckoned from the date of judicial demand on December 12, 1997, as
correctly determined by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court.
The next question is the propriety of the imposition of interest and the proper imposable rate of
applicable interest. The RTC granted the rate of 12% per annum which was affirmed by the CA.
From the above-quoted guidelines, however, the proper imposable interest rate is 6% per
annum pursuant to Art. 2209 of the Civil Code.Sunga-Chan v. Court of Appeals is illuminating in
this regard:
In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., the Court held that the legal interest at 12% per annum under Central
Bank (CB) Circular No. 416 shall be adjudged only in cases involving the loan or forbearance of
money. And for transactions involving payment of indemnities in the concept of damages
arising from default in the performance of obligations in general and/or for money judgment
not involving a loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the governing provision is Art.
2209 of the Civil Code prescribing a yearly 6% interest. Art. 2209 pertinently provides:
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor
incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be
the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest,
which is six per cent per annum.
The term "forbearance," within the context of usury law, has been described as a contractual
obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of time, from requiring the
borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and payable.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the imposition of interest, if proper, and the
applicable rate, as follows: The 12% per annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only
to loans or forbearance of money, goods, or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan
or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, while the6% per annum under Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code applies "when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the concept
of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of obligations in
general," with the application of both rates reckoned "from the time the complaint was filed until
the [adjudged] amount is fully paid." In either instance, the reckoning period for the
commencement of the running of the legal interest shall be subject to the condition "that the
courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the award of
interest."30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on our ruling above, forbearance of money refers to the contractual obligation of the
lender or creditor to desist for a fixed period from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the
loan or debt then due and for which 12% per annum is imposed as interest in the absence of a
stipulated rate. In the instant case, Alfredos conditional payment to Land Bank does not
constitute forbearance of money, since there was no agreement or obligation for Alfredo to pay
Land Bank the amount of PhP 750,000, and the obligation of Land Bank to return what Alfredo
has conditionally paid is still in dispute and has not yet been determined. Thus, it cannot be said
that Land Banks alleged obligation has become a forbearance of money.
On the award of attorneys fees, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation were awarded
because Alfredo was compelled to litigate due to the unjust refusal of Land Bank to refund the
amount he paid. There are instances when it is just and equitable to award attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation.31 Art. 2208 of the Civil Code pertinently states:
In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:
 (2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons
or to incur expenses to protect his interest.
Given that Alfredo was indeed compelled to litigate against Land Bank and incur expenses to
protect his interest, we find that the award falls under the exception above and is, thus, proper
given the circumstances.
On a final note. The instant case would not have been litigated had Land Bank been more
circumspect in dealing with Alfredo. The bank chose to accept payment from Alfredo even before
a credit investigation was underway, a procedure worsened by the failure to even inform him of
his credit standings impact on his assumption of mortgage. It was, therefore, negligent to a
certain degree in handling the transaction with Alfredo. It should be remembered that the
business of a bank is affected with public interest and it should observe a higher standard of
diligence when dealing with the public.32
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-CV No. 84445 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the amount of PhP 750,000 will earn interest at 6% per
annum reckoned from December 12, 1997, and the total aggregate monetary awards will in turn
earn 12% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152411 September 29, 2004
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 44209, as well as its Resolution2 denying the petitioners motion for the
reconsideration thereof. Themo1 mo2Court of Appeals set aside the Decision3 of Branch 150 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which dismissed the complaint of the respondent
against the petitioner for sum of money and damages.
The Facts of the Case
Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an integrated
system of research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the project,
laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology
and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baos. Providentially, the Ferdinand E.
Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory
furniture, including the fabrication thereof.
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact
a corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina, the Executive
Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to
fabricate the laboratory furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building
Project, for the account of the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB to
proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, and requested Padolina to forward the
contract of the project to FEMF for its approval.
On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase order and
downpayment for the office and laboratory furniture for the project, thus:
1.
Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P2,934,068.90
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture Co.,
College, Laguna
Attention : Mr. Hector C. Navasero
President
Downpayment : 40% or P1,173,627.56
2. Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P573,375.00
Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc.
1st Avenue, Bagumbayan Tanyag, Taguig, Metro Manila
Downpayment : 50% or P286,687.504
Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared as soon as possible before the
issuance of the purchase orders and the downpayment for the goods, and would be transmitted
to the FEMF as soon as possible.
In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to
proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF Executive
Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested for copies of the shop drawings and a sample
contract5 for the project, and that such contract and drawings had to be finalized before the down
payment could be remitted to the PHILAB the following week. However, PHILAB failed to
forward any sample contract.
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory furniture to BIOTECH
after having been duly inspected by their representatives and FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.
On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted P600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for the laboratory
furniture for the BIOTECH project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 253 to FEMF.
On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial payment of P800,000 to PHILAB, for which
the latter issued Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The remittances were in the form of checks
drawn by FEMF and delivered to PHILAB, through Padolina.
On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los Baos and FEMF,
represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support and donate sums of money to UP for the
construction of buildings, installation of laboratory and other capitalization for the project, not to
exceed P29,000,000.00. The obligations of FEMF under the MOA are the following:

ARTICLE II
OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION
2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its principal objectives of promoting
philantrophic and scientific projects through financial support to such projects that will
contribute to the countrys economic development, shall grant such financial support
and donate such sums of money to the RESEARCH COMPLEX as may be necessary
for the construction of buildings, installation of laboratories, setting up of offices and
physical plants and facilities and other capital investment of the RESEARCH
COMPLEX and/or any of its component Research Institutes not to exceed P29 Million.
For this purpose, the FOUNDATION shall:
(a) Acquire and donate to the UNIVERSITY the site for the RESEARCH
COMPLEX; and
(b) Donate or cause to be donated to the UNIVERSITY the sum of
TWENTY-NINE MILLION PESOS (P29,000,000.00) for the construction of
the buildings of the National Institutes of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) and the installation of their laboratories and their
physical plants and other facilities to enable them to commence operations.
2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject to the approval of the Board of
Trustees of the FOUNDATION, continue to support the activities of the RESEARCH
COMPLEX by way of recurrent additional grants and donations for specific research
and development projects which may be mutually agreed upon and, from time to time,
additional grants and donations of such amounts as may be necessary to provide the
RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its Research Institutes with operational
flexibility especially with regard to incentives to staff purchase of equipment/facilities,
travel abroad, recruitment of local and expatriate staff and such other activities and
inputs which are difficult to obtain under usual government rules and regulations.6
7 40/100 (P702,939.40) plus an additional amount (as shall be determined during the
The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on November 25, 1982.
In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract for the installation of laboratory
furniture to BIOTECH, by January 12, 1983. However, Navasero failed to do so. In a Letter
dated February 1, 1983, BIOTECH reminded Navasero of the need to submit the contract so
that it could be submitted to FEMF for its evaluation and approval.8 Instead of submitting the said
contract, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH an accomplishment report on the project as of
February 28, 1983, and requested payment thereon.9 By May 1983, PHILAB had completed
78% of the project, amounting to P2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of P2,934,068.90. The
FEMF had already paid forty percent (40%) of the total cost of the project. On May 12, 1983,
Padolina wrote Lirio and furnished him the progress billing from PHILAB. 10 On August 11, 1983,
the FEMF made another partial payment of P836,119.52 representing the already delivered
laboratory and office furniture after the requisite inspection and verification thereof by
representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and PHILAB. The payment was made in the form of
a check, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 202 to FEMF through Padolina. 11
On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No. 01643 in the amount
of P702,939.40 for the final payment of laboratory furniture. Representatives from BIOTECH,
PHILAB, and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a verification of the accomplishment of the work and
confirmed the same. BIOTECH forwarded the invoice to Lirio on December 18, 1984 for its
payment.12 Lirio, in turn, forwarded the invoice to Gapud, presumably sometime in the early part
of 1985. However, the FEMF failed to pay the bill. PHILAB reiterated its request for payment
through a letter on May 9, 1985.13 BIOTECH again wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985, requesting the
payment of PHILABs bill.14 It sent another letter to Gapud, on November 22, 1985, again
appealing for the payment of PHILABs bill.15 In a Letter to BIOTECH dated December 5, 1985,
PHILAB requested payment of P702,939.40 plus interest thereon of P224,940.61.16 There was,
however, no response from the FEMF. On February 24, 1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH,
appealing for the payment of its bill even on installment basis.17
President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA Revolution. On March
26, 1986, Navasero wrote BIOTECH requesting for its much-needed assistance for the payment
of the balance already due plus interest of P295,234.55 for its fabrication and supply of
laboratory furniture.18
On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her help to secure the
payment of the amount due from the FEMF.19 The letter was referred to then Budget Minister
Alberto Romulo, who referred the letter to then UP President Edgardo Angara on June 9, 1986.
On September 30, 1986, Raul P. de Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los Baos, wrote then
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga,
submitting PHILABs claim to be officially entered as "accounts payable" as soon as the assets
of FEMF were liquidated by the PCGG.20
In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant contract and the
MOA for its perusal.21
Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of the contract executed between
PHILAB and FEMF. In a Letter dated October 20, 1987, Navasero informed De Guzman that
PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any contract regarding the fabrication and delivery of
laboratory furniture to BIOTECH.
Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. In the
complaint, PHILAB prayed that it be paid the following:
(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE &
hearing) to cover the actual cost of money which at the time of transaction the value of
the peso was eleven to a dollar (P11.00:$1) and twenty seven (27%) percent interest
on the total amount from August 1982 until fully paid;
(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) exemplary damages;
(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (P50,000.00) as and for attorneys fees; and
(4) Cost of suit.22
PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:
3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through its officials, particularly MR. WILLIAM
PADOLINA, Director, asked plaintiff to supply and install several laboratory furnitures
and equipment at BIOTECH, a research laboratory of herein defendant located at its
campus in College, Laguna, for a total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (P2,939,058.90);
 4. After the completion of the delivery and installation of said laboratory furnitures and
equipment at defendants BIOTECH Laboratory, defendant paid three (3) times on
installment basis:
a) P600,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 253 dated August 24, 1982;
b) P800,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 256 dated October 22, 1982;
c) P836,119.52 as per Official Receipt No. 202 dated August 11, 1983;
thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE & 40/100 (P702,939.40).
5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the past eight years, defendant
arrogantly and maliciously made plaintiff believe that it was going to pay the balance
aforestated, that was why plaintiffs President and General Manager himself, HECTOR
C. NAVASERO, personally went to and from UP Los Baos to talk with defendants
responsible officers in the hope of expecting payment, when, in truth and in fact,
defendant had no intention to pay whatsoever right from the start on a misplaced
ground of technicalities. Some of plaintiffs demand letters since year 1983 up to the
present are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H hereof;
6. That by reason of defendants malicious, evil and unnecessary misrepresentations
that it was going to pay its obligation and asking plaintiff so many red tapes and
requirements to submit, compliance of all of which took plaintiff almost eight (8) years
to finish, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay, defendant
should be ordered to pay plaintiff no less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) exemplary damages, so that other government institutions may be
warned that they must not unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the people
they serve.23
In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action against it
because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH; and
that the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for the purchase price of the
laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to pay for the laboratory furniture
supplied by PHILAB.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint without
prejudice to PHILABs recourse against the FEMF. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without prejudice to
plaintiff's recourse to the assets of the Marcos Foundation for the unpaid balance
of P792,939.49.
SO ORDERED.24
Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the trial court erred in
finding that:
1. the contract for the supply and installation of subject laboratory furniture and
equipment was between PHILAB and the Marcos Foundation; and,
2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the Philippines, is liable to pay the
respondent the balance of the purchase price.25
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there was never a contract
between FEMF and PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA between
the FEMF and UP since it was never a party thereto. The appellate court ruled that, although UP
did not bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the
maxim: "No one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another."
The Present Petition
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, UP, now the
petitioner, filed its petition for review contending that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW ON
CONTRACTS BETWEEN PHILAB AND THE MARCOS FOUNDATION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF
UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE
MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO PHILAB.26
Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts may not be the subject of appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as this mode of appeal is generally
restricted to questions of law.27However, this rule is not absolute. The Court may review the
factual findings of the CA should they be contrary to those of the trial court. 28 Correspondingly,
this Court may review findings of facts when the judgment of the CA is premised on a
misapprehension of facts.29
On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA overlooked the evidentiary effect
and substance of the corresponding letters and communications which support the statements
of the witnesses showing affirmatively that an implied contract of sale existed between PHILAB
and the FEMF. The petitioner furthermore asserts that no contract existed between it and the
respondent as it could not have entered into any agreement without the requisite public bidding
and a formal written contract.
The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did not err in not applying the law on
contracts between the respondent and the FEMF. It, likewise, attests that it was never privy to
the MOA entered into between the petitioner and the FEMF. The respondent adds that what the
FEMF donated was a sum of money equivalent toP29,000,000, and not the laboratory
equipment supplied by it to the petitioner. The respondent submits that the petitioner, being the
recipient of the laboratory furniture, should not enrich itself at the expense of the respondent.
The petition is meritorious.
It bears stressing that the respondents cause of action is one for sum of money predicated on
the alleged promise of the petitioner to pay for the purchase price of the furniture, which, despite
demands, the petitioner failed to do. However, the respondent failed to prove that the petitioner
ever obliged itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by it. Hence, the respondent is not
entitled to its claim against the petitioner.
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the petitioner and
FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said agreement. Contracts take effect only between the
parties and their assigns.30 A contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against
one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof.31 Likewise admitted by the parties, is the fact that there was no written contract executed
by the petitioner, the respondent and FEMF relating to the fabrication and delivery of office and
laboratory furniture to the BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner
and the respondent entered into a contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture. The parties
are in accord that the FEMF had remitted to the respondent partial payments via checks drawn
and issued by the FEMF to the respondent, through Padolina, in the total amount
of P2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of the project ofP2,934,068.90 and that the respondent
received the said checks and issued receipts therefor to the FEMF. There is also no controversy
that the petitioner did not pay a single centavo for the said furniture delivered by the respondent
that the petitioner had been using ever since.
We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-in-fact contract of sale was
entered into between the respondent and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is one implied from
facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to contract. It arises where the intention of
the parties is not expressed, but an agreement in fact creating an obligation. It is a contract, the
existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct and not by direct or explicit words
between parties but is to be deduced from conduct of the parties, language used, or things done
by them, or other pertinent circumstances attending the transaction. To create contracts implied
in fact, circumstances must warrant inference that one expected compensation and the other to
pay.32 An implied-in-fact contract requires the parties intent to enter into a contract; it is a true
contract.33 The conduct of the parties is to be viewed as a reasonable man would view it, to
determine the existence or not of an implied-in-fact contract.34 The totality of the acts/conducts of
the parties must be considered to determine their intention. An implied-in-fact contract will not
arise unless the meeting of minds is indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or sign.35
In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time Padolina contacted it for the fabrication
and supply of the laboratory furniture until the go-signal was given to it to fabricate and deliver
the furniture to BIOTECH as beneficiary, that the FEMF was to pay for the same. Indeed,
Padolina asked the respondent to prepare the draft of the contract to be received by the FEMF
prior to the execution of the parties (the respondent and FEMF), but somehow, the respondent
failed to prepare one. The respondent knew that the petitioner was merely the donee-beneficiary
of the laboratory furniture and not the buyer; nor was it liable for the payment of the purchase
price thereof. From the inception, the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of accounts of the
respondent, for which the latter unconditionally issued receipts to and under the name of the
FEMF. Indeed, witness Lirio testified:
Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB Industries was aware that it was the
Marcos Foundation who would be paying for this particular transaction for the
completion of this particular transaction?
A: I think they are fully aware.
Q: What is your basis for saying so?
A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr. Padolina. Secondly, there were occasions
during our inspection in Los Baos, at the installation site, there were occasions, two
or three occasions, when we met with Mr. Navasero who is the President, I think, or
manager of PHILAB, and we appraised him that it was really between the foundation
and him to which includes (sic) the construction company constructing the building. He
is fully aware that it is the foundation who (sic) engaged them and issued the
payments.36
The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed the petitioner and sought its
assistance for the collection of the amount due from the FEMF:
Dear Dr. Padolina:
May we request for your much-needed assistance in the payment of the balance still
due us on the laboratory furniture we supplied and installed two years ago?
Business is still slow and we will appreciate having these funds as soon as possible to
keep up our operations.
We look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter.
Very truly yours,
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.37
The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking her assistance for the payment of
the amount due, in which the respondent admitted it tried to collect from her predecessor,
namely, the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos:
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
At the instance of the national government, subject laboratory furnitures were supplied
by our company to the National Institute of Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology
(BIOTECH), University of the Philippines, Los Baos, Laguna, in 1984.
Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-
NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (P2,939,058.90), the previous
administration had so far paid us the sum ofP2,236,119.52 thus leaving a balance of
PESOS: ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100 (P1,412.748.61) inclusive of interest of 24% per annum and
30% exchange rate adjustment.
On several occasions, we have tried to collect this amount from your predecessor, the
latest of which was subject invoice (01643) we submitted to DR. W. PADOLINA,
deputy director of BIOTECH. But this, notwithstanding, our claim has remained
unacted upon up to now. Copy of said invoice is hereto attached for easy reference.
Now that your excellency is the head of our government, we sincerely hope that
payment of this obligation will soon be made as this is one project the Republic of the
Philippines has use of and derives benefit from.38
Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and statements of accounts for the
payments of the laboratory furniture it delivered to the petitioner which the petitioner, through
Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF for its payment. However, the FEMF failed to pay the last
statement of account of the respondent because of the onset of the EDSA upheaval. It was only
when the respondent lost all hope of collecting its claim from the government and/or the PCGG
did it file the complaint against the petitioner for the collection of the payment of its last delivery
of laboratory furniture.
We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for the claim of the respondent based
on the maxim that no one should enrich itself at the expense of another.
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or
obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the
sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.39
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove
that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that
the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.40 Unjust
enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation
to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request.41 Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a
prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.42
Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. (Boldface supplied)
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that
the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment
of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action
based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.43
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no
other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action
under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle
of accion in rem verso will not lie.44
The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in
this case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-
fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. The petitioner legally acquired the
laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory
furniture.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals isREVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 150, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated February
10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this present
complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin
[petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation ([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and
distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of [respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of plastic and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street,
Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing
in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts.
[Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of [respondent].
[Respondent] further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of [petitioners] office to
[respondents] office, and in view of the fact that some of the [respondents] employeeshad
transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondents] products,
especially its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same
material and colors but was selling these products at a lower price as [respondents] plastic-
made automotive parts and to the same customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the
manufacture ofautomotive underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing,
shock absorberbushing, center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioners] manufacture of
the same automotive parts with plastic materialwas taken from [respondents] idea of using
plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondents] products all of
which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and
public policy and have caused [respondent] damages in terms oflost and unrealizedprofits in the
amount of TWO MILLION PESOS as of the date of [respondents] complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioners] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute this action and
thereby to incur expenses in the way of attorneys fees and other litigation expenses in the
amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except for the following
facts: that it is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic
and metal and that theres physical proximity of [petitioners] office to [respondent]s office, and for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative income statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002,
that someof [respondents] employees had transferred to [petitioner] and that over the years it shows the decline of the sales in 2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not
[petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondents] products, especially its plastic made disclose if this pertains to the subject automotive parts or to the other products of Jesichris like
automotive parts. plates.

As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair competition as the
plastic-made automotive parts are mere reproductions of original parts and their construction
and composition merely conforms to the specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they
intend to replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it "originated" the use of plastic for these
automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument that [respondent] indeed originated
the use of these plastic automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and
sell these as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only
exclusive manufacturer of these plastic-made automotive parts as there are other
establishments which were already openly selling them to the public.3
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of Willaware that
prejudiced Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal damages be awarded in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris rights.
The RTCs award of attorneys fees and exemplary damages is also maintained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award
of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) actual damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos nominal damages is awarded.

After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly
SO ORDERED.5
invaded the rights or interest of respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts
amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further opined that under the circumstances, in order
for respondents property rights to be preserved, petitioners acts of manufacturing similar Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was denied for lack of
plastic-made automotive parts such as those of respondents and the selling of the merit by the CA in a Resolution dated February 10, 2011.
sameproducts to respondents customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have to be
enjoined. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our
resolution:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual damages, One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties
attorneys fees and One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The
are not competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?
court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from manufacturing the plastic-made automotive
parts as those manufactured by plaintiffs.
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages
and attorneys fees?
SO ORDERED.4

(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
been established?

On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property protecting a good belonging
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive parts, should it be
to another,the copying thereof for production and selling does not add up to unfair competition
considered in the light of the said copyrights were considered to be void by no less
as competition is promoted by law to benefit consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did
than this Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?
not lure away respondents employees to get trade secrets. It points out that the plastic spare
parts sold by respondent are traded in the market and the copying of these can be done by
simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made. (5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris has
established "goodwill?"6
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an
unfair competition case to prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to
characteristics of unfair competition are present in the instant case as the parties are trade rivals unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
and petitioners acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying its products and
employing its former employees.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on
humanrelations, and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. a damage suit and the products are not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of
Relevant portions of said decision read: patent registration is immaterial in the present case.

Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in advancing its business
interest against Jesichris, however, the Court finds no basis for the award by the RTC of actual
damages. One is entitled to actual damages as one has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada,
who was engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only revealed that there was a
discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount was mentioned. As
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by
intellectual property laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of
"unfair competition" in American jurisdictions, the term coverseven cases of discovery of trade
secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference
with the fulfillment of a competitors contracts, or any malicious interference with the latters
business.8
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts
amounting tounfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any
other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person
who thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not competitionper
sebut the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair
chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair
competition and not competition where the means usedare fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve
an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as
"contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the
language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of
the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.9
Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly
shifting his business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his
luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade
secrets of the respondent.12
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to
himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business
so that later on he can take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of
wanton wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony of petitioners witnesses
indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with the business of respondent, to wit:
[Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr., admitted that it was never engaged in
the business of plastic-made automotive parts until recently, year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic)
not? Manufacturer of kitchenware and distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: And you said you have known the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you
have known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic) physically become familiar with these products, plastic
automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of color, size, shape and
composition as those sold by Jesichris was due largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris
employees to Willaware.
Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Manufacturing Company?

Here, both characteristics are present.

Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.

First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of
Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I dont know the
plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good
exact date.
conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed respondents formeremployees, deliberately
copied respondents products and even went to the extent of selling these products to
respondents customers.10 Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have transferred to
your company, is it not?
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioners hiring of the former employees
of respondent and petitioners act of copying the subject plastic parts of respondent were Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:
Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the
business of [respondent].1wphi1 [Petitioners] acts can be characterized as executed with
Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).
mischievous subtle calculation. To illustrate, in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court
observes that [petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic kitchenware previous to its
manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged the services of the then mold setter Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?
and maintenance operator of [respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De
Guzman was hired by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive
Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.
spare parts were not being made. It baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold
setter and maintenance operator to remedy its problem. [Petitioners] engagement of De
Guzman indicates that it is banking on his experience gained from working for [respondent]. Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?

Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man of Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the other one, just one
[respondent], was fired because he was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this month ago.
accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the
same position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his
employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De Guzman.11
That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was buttressed by the
testimony of [petitioners] witness, Joel Torres:
Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware Product Corporation
(sic)?
A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you kindly inform this
court what unusual even (sic) transpired between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What is that?
A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market and then I passed by
the place where they were having a drinking spree, sir.
Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?
A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.
Q: And who else was there?
A: William Salinas, sir.
Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them drinking?
A: Jun Molina called me, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas
uttered something, sir.
Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?
A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"
Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?
A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin
ko na siya."
Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you gather to be referred
to as your "amo"?
A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been
deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in nominal damages is
awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010 and
Resolution dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-
SUPER), Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of
respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting
bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on
the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental
Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9
January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union, which reads:
 ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with
pay to any employee in case of death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse,
children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and
accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of
death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the
employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with
proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V.
Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus
died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims
for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident
insurance.7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement
and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA.
Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, 8 prompting
the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region
(NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel
submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the
parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to
Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section
4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or
must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by
the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation
(MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental
Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar
provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer
Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the
delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary
contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugans child was only 24
weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 37-
38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same
compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who
signed the CBA with their respective employees unions were the same as the representatives of
Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor
legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for
the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there
are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as
legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel, relying on
Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could
die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality.
Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead
from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be
applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could
not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the
right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since
neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof
were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn
child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom would
have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits bound the
Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister
companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and
incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither
could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to
the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the
covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of
employees "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided
under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable
elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employees
"dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be
presented.18
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate
dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not
have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically,
his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the
labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married,
making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein
petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the
amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits,
or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claims for
bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employees
dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded
from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal
person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel
pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the
phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon
said childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non
for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were
lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos
Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is
used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the
purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to
serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of
a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such
event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be
covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected
employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has
proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as
condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following
[Continental Steels] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court,
however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less
than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave
and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latters immediate family, extend
to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the
unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical
purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan
S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with
juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the
CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or
sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The
requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1)
death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of
the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of
the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos claim for
bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the
terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear
and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the
same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union
sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the
negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality
only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code
on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of
the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived
every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1
acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of
and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the his unborn child.
unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were
passed on to or assumed by the childs parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under
death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the
the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
latters death.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.
give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by
loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the
death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could
death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died
die.
during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn
benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the
from conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.29 In the same way, the CBA
death.
and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. InMarcopper Mining v. National
Labor Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel
itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that
sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition,26 even
"when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the
an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39
same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the
weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance.
interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is
Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependentmay be the parent,
involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons.
spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee.
What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution,
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have
to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn
fetus in the mothers womb. In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we
categorically stated that:
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents.
In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz: When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice,
the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the
law must accord the underprivileged worker.
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.) declared:

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives
them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social
justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and
Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the
Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao,
which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the
amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from
the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could
not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of
Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the
wife of respondent.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on
the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud
for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12Another, which is the subject
of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the
intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws. 16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary
into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite
true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to
a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and
have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any
conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not
intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence
of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
for utter lack of merit.
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that SO ORDERED.
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire,
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was
filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecutions witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple
exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner
instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the
wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to
the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
imposed on him aP200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioners act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in
performing a marriage ceremony without the couples marriage license, the petitioner violated
Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage
Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of
any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the
latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount
of P200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act
of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioners negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the
basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum
standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses
of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added
that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioners criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of
the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the
Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that
the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that
the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere
in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot
convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is
not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURTS RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven
by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.
Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony"
and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on
these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in
turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article
625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article
3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was
clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this
fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioners allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioners allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails
to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioners admission
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Floridas testimony that there had indeed
been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The
testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear
and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution
witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to
the petitioners allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code
when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner
may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of
a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence
of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the
couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioners knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates
his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article
3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of
the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision
clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law.
The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by
the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof
require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with
section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently
declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act,
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a
fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month,
or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC
that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section
39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present
case.1wphi1 As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the
provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition
of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this
point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides
for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities;
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such
regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of P200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of
the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro,
Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez,
Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S.
Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol
Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese
Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco,
Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta &
Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z.
Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C.
Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela
Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine
V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana
Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R.
Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel
Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and
Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R.
Laws,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare
and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and
NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF
PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez,
and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Donato Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.,
as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by
Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY
G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS
SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National
President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly
Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr.,
Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development,
HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D.,
AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and
ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO
JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive
Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL
A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY,
WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA
BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH
MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department
of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI
SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS
FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of
the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed
country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While
governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the
bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor,
but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the
development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a
representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming
societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring
concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the
judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful
eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when
called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation
vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth
control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views
on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass
gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in
every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its
decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong
and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines,
Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in
their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and
Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution,
and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and
taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of
Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria
Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and
on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity
as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation
Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf
of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys.
Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia
Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
28
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation,
Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim
in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a
citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an
accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality
of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.35
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to
contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other
health problems.36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the
RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the
use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use
of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included
in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer
patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-
IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited
to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health
physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are
specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in
schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they
argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling
state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to
free speech.42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According
to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude
because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical
practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to
avail of the practitioners services.44
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH
Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it
is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of
the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in
accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full
range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own
preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is
granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to
refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the
Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive
health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right
of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In
the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative
authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power
to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution.52
The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs)
and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the
RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and
the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the
Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-
intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic
Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De
Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others.
On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy
and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which
these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on
August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the
SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60)
days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of
the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country
enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution
of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed,
they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution
is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to
"dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37
thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking
abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be
delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which
recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-
term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal
ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365,
approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that
"family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will
be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be
further reduced."
and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay
officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the
contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will
be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the
program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of
family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential
synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a
part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all
health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies." controversy.

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved 1] Power of Judicial Review
from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to
2] Actual Case or Controversy
one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its
adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna 3] Facial Challenge
Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive
health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
4] Locus Standi

The RH Law
5] Declaratory Relief

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the 6] One Subject/One Title Rule
population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in
2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and
to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. 1] Right to Life
To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide
information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for 2] Right to Health
schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes
certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the
current laws on contraception, women's health and population control. 4] The Family

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo 5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner 6] Due Process
ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very
essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the 7] Equal Protection
State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the
situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
8] Involuntary Servitude

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As
provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of 9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician.
What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State 10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
 DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves
the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should
submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in
the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and
"characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of
the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the
Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with
the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the
Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that
the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government
has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive
and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and
accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of
separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of
powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and
of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive
or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and
caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the
acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at
the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific
point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate
its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be
limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to
judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes
back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative
and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to
make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied
in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others.
In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review
is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing
of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary
in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled
authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete
with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or The Court is not persuaded.
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions
raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom,
judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's
for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the
challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 110 Verily,
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance
complained of102
of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no
authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could
Locus Standi
possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that
the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete
acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same
is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the
matter NOW.
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits
Facial Challenge one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.115
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
measure.105 Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, for prohibition under Rule 65.121
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
One Subject-One Title
interest."116

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount
26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may
them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation
be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a
claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens
population control measure.123
and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although
they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population
control measure,124and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health"
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-
are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or
with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the
the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information
other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119 on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning
methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of
set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot births in the country.
deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral
well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well.
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent
tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
pregnancy.
supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to
the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH
Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of
religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the
issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a
broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the
Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in
the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother
or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the
petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the
provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was
written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in
the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases
supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right
to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn
child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the
RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after
fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to
afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use
results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that
the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of
man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient,
the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of
these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not
violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive
health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the
public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are
not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration
to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other
experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a
determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as
an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is
not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the
implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional
since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation
of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes
and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines
is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The
Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966,
prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the
promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through
the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the
years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being
a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health
and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No.
6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The
Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine
national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of
no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles
are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of
the Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of
Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable
because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that
the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The
problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded
the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life
begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are
those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and
second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule
of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant,
formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing
into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the
female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and
maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was
written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that
the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus
was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their
deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the
sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it
was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs
to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized
ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself.
It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from
within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All
these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes
from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes.
A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the
fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized
ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is
human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the
moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before
with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people;
we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution,
it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a
Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the
Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So,
Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very,
very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception.
There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is
one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been
expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the
sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the
so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already
occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root.
What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum
to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and,
therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not
these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is
now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child
from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm
and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to
prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which
should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be
deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that
I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in
the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and
pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical
answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are
already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it
disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no
unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives,
such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized
from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs Justice Bersamin:
is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Alright.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Atty. Noche:
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by
petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even
Medical Meaning
condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical,
Atty. Noche:
Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually
taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which
Justice Bersamin: the embryo develops."160

There is no life. The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools
in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of
fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual,
Atty. Noche:
with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.

So, there is no life to be protected.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins
after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization
Justice Bersamin: (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm
(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the
haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new
To be protected. cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or
primordium, of a human being."162
Atty. Noche:
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote:
Under Section 12, yes. "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination
of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus
Justice Bersamin: the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as
a genetic unity."
So you have no objection to condoms?
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the
Atty. Noche: Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

Not under Section 12, Article II. CONCLUSION

Justice Bersamin: The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its
strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus
human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity? those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of
biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that,
Atty. Noche: there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential"
human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this
objective scientific fact.
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing
here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded
life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any
specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
1] xx x.

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined
more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable
as follows:
conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services
and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman
health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement
that life begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct
of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after (3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
2] xx x.
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It
does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote
Section 4. x x x.
is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had
population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law (s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
but also to the Constitution. responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to
make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to
have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include
abortion, and access to abortifacients.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or
device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be
3] xx x.
provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential
decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation
contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392,
otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of The RH Law and Abortifacients
the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be
Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from
conception, explained:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by
Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169 (a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes
abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life
begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of
moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means
emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose
and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their
office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as
follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent
follows:
with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits
any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, (a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
(third kind).
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not
declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a
already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
- all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to [Emphasis supplied]
prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum,
the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its
planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy
viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It
but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted
started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
Administration (FDA).
implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA
that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a
drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in
every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend
to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on
the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the
proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
"abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they
pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-
IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is
indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared
invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered
as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
implantation of the fertilized ovum. consciousness among them.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of
contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174 the people, viz:

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these HEALTH
contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient
under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting
provide free medical care to paupers.
the same way.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle
and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the
that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and
country's health needs and problems.
its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word
" primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the
validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation,
the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
hazardous products.

2-The Right to Health

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of
essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter,
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and
always been, that
an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive
health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners
assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and ... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
satisfying sex lives.180 executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory,
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-
to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a
danger to the health of women.181
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A.
The Court's Position
No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when
they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained. 185
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution
is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
Constitution provides:
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law
and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation
of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive
drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in
place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are
safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed
and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice
of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for
Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not
inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices
are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device,
unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used
exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced
into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be
punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six
months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine,
pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed,
sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions
of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant
statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which
provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure,
distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The
DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this
procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on,
among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their
children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out
by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in
supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness
or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the
FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or
devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and
medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds
that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various
kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded
herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of
Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated,
and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory.
There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and
background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of
these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of
the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of
Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious
sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is
nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to
refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would
be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the
conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the
recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23
(a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no
escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient
seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section
7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c)
teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize. 191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement
to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on
those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act
against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law
are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of
contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive
health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are
required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person
seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of
religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a
serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by
the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor
injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify
regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers
state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of
rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make
decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of
responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment
of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to
attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of
compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation
of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the
threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and
information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific
mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor
sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public
interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure
maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or
practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that the
assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be
compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the
petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same
right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the
declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court
recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose
this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between
the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required
to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect
that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the
right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is
limited in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it
is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to
information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued
that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is
the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and
surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception
throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of
people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us
that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social
and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is
tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to
be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus,
the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and
our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in
our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this
is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of
religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in
recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of
church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not
encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and
State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much
less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate
against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which
refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations
collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect
the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following
mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution,
or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces,
or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring
any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the
concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets
or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148,
1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost
amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is
to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.
(Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates
conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to
advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.
(Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power
to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of
religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on
one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One
may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear
to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be
enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief
is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to
the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v.
Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration
of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it
was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the
first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear
and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and
law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the
doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the
least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the
Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present
danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which
employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one
form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression.
On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not
prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the
authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state
interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the
case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni
Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were
appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German
doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case
involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper
where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the
state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-
reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil,
whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state
would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that
enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited
government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos
implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests
can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the
state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to
carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall
prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert
which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state
interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state,
without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is
moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's
dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine,
form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in
the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard
of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs
and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets
of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law
respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the
right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of
family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven
medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-
based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the
poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of
identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to
promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method,
consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration
of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number
of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the
resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals
and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that
are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration
the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's
organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is
crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and
programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to
determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children
according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness,
health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives.
To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema.
Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause
the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance
its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one
religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects
diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot
be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly
mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health
care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation
or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's
claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law,
unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious
objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious
freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues
a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment
of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of
penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose
religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will,
refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas)
has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false
compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act
that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they
cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive
act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free
speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the
right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection
that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the
protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to
utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law
seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the
liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether
direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one
hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong
view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with
the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional
right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the
case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the
midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act
of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who
were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined
according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean
more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they
could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of
the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to
refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for
being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs
and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of
health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure
compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law
tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its
disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient
because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which
the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers,
chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office
are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection
clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law.
The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free
exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of
human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious
sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek
other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in
such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law
itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting
respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must
prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you
mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting
religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I
presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly
dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR
it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief
of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be
conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious
objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious
belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of
the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of
proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the
objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG
was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would
rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to
his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and
evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest
in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his
religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this
is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a
pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical
doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise
clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. 232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to
act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is
compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in
the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number
and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or
not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her
or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed
upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient
seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would
only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very
action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without
violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be
addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with
open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in
utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the
right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or
the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No.
9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in
relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at
all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services
and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes
of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health
services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of
responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices,
interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address
pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family
planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health
services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to
educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including
sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast
and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children
victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health services
that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction
pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of
women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and
promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all
sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the
above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with
due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth and the development of moral character and the right of children to be
brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment
and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including
fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state
interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended
pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete
facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino
maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no
RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of
maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs
for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable
stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law.
While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations,
the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a
mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC,
manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom
of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally
obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one
should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the
House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of
either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict
situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged
always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother)
when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not
intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or
murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the
child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As
quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have
been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage
license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the
type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them,
are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions
of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates
disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total
development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social
institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains
provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or
the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future
progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply
because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of
legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the
following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the
decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy
which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband
and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV
of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a
family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the
same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute
authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from
participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result
in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as
an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to
the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a
family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both
spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and
spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states,
is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be
allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to
only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and
such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the
Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to
privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older
than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to
privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by
couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law
provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural
or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of
the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and
guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it
comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is
clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard,
Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports
the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their
minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the
very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in
the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that
the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming
the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care
and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a
distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about
family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and
modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the
minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable
her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the
unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is
essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be
deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise
parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept
or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening
cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the
minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave
risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the
appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By
effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it
denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-
surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an
abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the
teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of
fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the
petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health
education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in
the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of
out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and
euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and
whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents
in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said
role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that
of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of
developing the youth and their important role in nation building. 253 Considering that Section 14
provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values
formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination;
sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based
violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's
rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and
responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the
RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and
physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate
provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties
of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education
program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious
beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners'
contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit. 254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH
Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due
process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private
health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a
"private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7
only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals
operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family
planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health
procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of
incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used
in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning
alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service
provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health
service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly
licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for
health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from
illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and
nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a
midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4)
barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited
government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the
community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of
"private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason
that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to
render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption
from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to
be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and
"methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical
procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care
service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding
reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is
hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally
provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including
the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model
or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty,
morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word
"knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used together in
relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and
correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While
health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions
regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with
the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing
with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of
the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive
health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the
concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the
laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense
that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class
differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all
others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace
all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or
"underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied;
citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of
the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development
of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH
Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence
of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of
the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-
accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private
and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose
which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether
to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render
pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite
to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable
burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would
raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law
seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government 9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List
health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children (EDL).266
of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to
substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but
distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
the teaching of reproductive health education.
associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

8-Involuntary Servitude
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration
requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48)
shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and
hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude
duties:
because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly
regulations issued pursuant to the same;
be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service
providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover,
the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation "(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of
The point of the OSG is well-taken. this Act;

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public "(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy,
and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right quality and fill of container;
but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A
fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis
practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public
for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with
morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the
regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors,
point of revoking such right altogether.264
 wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon
as determined by the FDA; the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local
Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to
the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
"x x x

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the
issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters,
them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies
wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to
and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall
report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused
likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient,
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
or any person;
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended
for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed; While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national
agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of
found to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient,
cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268Thus:
or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to
require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement
for the issuance of the appropriate authorization; (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
x x x.
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources,
are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects,
enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an
of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods."
which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general
From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective
jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself
behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as
weighs against it.270
follows:

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability
of health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay
of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of
health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
like the RH Law.
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide
these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the
RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally
applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III,
Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner
Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to
the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon
by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its
power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable
autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now
stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the
Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the
Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only
guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived
as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in
conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover,
natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as
an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has
been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic
v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not
duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution
and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does
not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program
of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more
readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the
religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law
hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that
man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be
allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough
room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that
peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that
what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it
be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal
distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the
country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The
European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now
burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse
effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which
could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now
trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with
incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino
Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would
happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger
generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility
rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use
coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to
solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what
the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law
should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the
judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative
branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that
would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality,
the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution
and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore
limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of
the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even
if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act
(R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women
or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any
family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A.
No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
 2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the
consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the
rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order,
dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have
been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
66724 denying petitioners appeal and affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his
petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They got
married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another
marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983.
The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The
alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a
sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for
a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave
birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.
Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract 5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation,
respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to
another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress
with whom he has three children.8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent
prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as
follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of
each month; and
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal.
His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
6 April 2005.12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly
issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover,
the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned
marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the
Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record
that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the
marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight
to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified
and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number
appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply
the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals.
(G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax
the observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the
party litigants.14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated,
there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and
dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in
Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the
marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor
the respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that "Marriage License
number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but
their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of
the same Code.19
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the
parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public
is interested.21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground
for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification
of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No.
3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search and
inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the
Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab
initio.
In Cario v. Cario,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract
of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one
year after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the
marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must
be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The
certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage
license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact
that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one
year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second
wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed
without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.lavvphi1

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License
Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before
No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on
the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows
December 8, 1982.

WITNESS
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.26
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The COURT
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
de Manuguit church.
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption
and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in
favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a WITNESS
marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite. 29
I dont remember your honor.
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is COURT
no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license
in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage.30 An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity WITNESS
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.31
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I dont
know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the
COURT
parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of
the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to
assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you
contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may already a Marriage Contract?
read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding
the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties. WITNESS

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,32 petitioner cannot Yes your honor.
pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists
took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took
place because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer COURT
by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly
and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the
allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery.
His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.34
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took
place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage,
thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. 36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of
the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local
civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has
fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of
law.38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds.
The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine
law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving
Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent
judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of
the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the
second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with
his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San
Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs marriage to EUGENIA, they begot
seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano,
Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio
Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed
to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which
end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately
and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA
from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on
the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter,
ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife
until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be
paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to
be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10,
1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in
the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was
issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties
stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela
Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted
until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son
of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm
named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against
the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were
acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through
their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of pro-indiviso share consisting of her
share in the said properties plus her share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was
bequeathed to her in the latters last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through
Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint
prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the portion of the subject properties;that the
same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the
share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the
subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorneys feesand costs
of the suit to SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by
Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium
unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of
Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in
the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as
soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT
THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE
UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE
 DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF
THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION
OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND
LACHES; and
Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.

IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE SO ORDERED.11

INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING
FEE.7
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.13

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
Issues

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW

In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF
PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation
and Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS LAW OFFICE; and
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic
courts approval of the Agreement;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF
PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM
HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8 C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the
subjectcondominium unit; and
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, 9 holding and ruling:

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latters death on July
the subject law books.14
12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did
not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens
is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10 The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to
the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should
determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate
entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property.
of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
Ruling of the Court
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from
the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other subsisted up to the time of his death
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the property relations between husband and wife.
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by
virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage. Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity
ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage. Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which (2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution,
which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special (3) When the marriage is annulled;
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal
and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that
the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse,
or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent
given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction. court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement)
that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the
divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed
reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to
their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then
in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the
event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the
marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial
order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be
decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply.
The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall
be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the
late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as
an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the
action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law
for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was
not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12,
1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71
of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine
law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before
the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of
its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1wphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer
proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As
the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the
bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their
allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in
Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the
name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent
evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1wphi1 The plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not
evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase
of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions ofP159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions
of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the units purchase price
of P1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of
her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she
had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not
acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law
practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioners assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin
this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the
Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab
initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this
was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied
only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each
other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled
upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to
arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to
joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby
marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the
Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No.
L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to
prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish
that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of
ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court,
viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued
on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement,
Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of P97,588.89,
Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the
loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated
May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M",
forP4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The
connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole
industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as
vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of
Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company
were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she
paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN
LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The
phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY.
LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to
prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law
office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA
who bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law
rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he
headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and
undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her
burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve
the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds
and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained
to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the
lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation
he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the
case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of
a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code
to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a
foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe
a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by
an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to
his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition
of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.34We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done. register.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:
(a) births;
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion
No. 181, series of 198237 both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of
the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

(b) deaths; Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
(c) marriages; registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

(d) annulments of marriages;

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
(e) divorces; by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
(f) legitimations; jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
(g) adoptions;
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing
(h) acknowledgment of natural children; must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
(i) naturalization; and filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

(j) changes of name. We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
status of persons: of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the
(1) Birth and death register; applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but
also divorces and dissolved marriages. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality
of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or
in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband
or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of
the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as
void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11on bigamy and was therefore
entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would
be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is
not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage
declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material
interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register
Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes
a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the
final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry
relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the
RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC
may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed"
the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the
provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect,
prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he
"is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now
seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a
ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the
Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza
emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of
Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the
case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-
Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases
of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil
status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared
that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them
to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she
was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
 (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by
the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of the
RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states
that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules
of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained
a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouses right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does
not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x
can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the
spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of Article 15 of the Civil Code.
the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic v.
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1wphi1
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when
are to be served."91
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution
the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
spouse cannot remarry. 11-68582 are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine SO ORDERED.
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition vs.
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment City, Negros Occidental, Respondent.
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
RESOLUTION
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family LEONEN, J.:
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
they will solemnize.
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio
V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.1
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license.
He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation2 and issued them to the contracting parties.3 He
notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties marriage.4 These "package marriages" are
allegedly common in Bacolod City.5
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo.
All affidavits were notarized on the day of the contracting parties marriages.6 The affidavits
contained the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.
(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge7
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo
allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal
trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected
with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not
connected with a judges official functions and duties as solemnizing officer.9Thus, Judge Rojo
cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits.
He also did not require the parties to present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as
required by law.
These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x
simple and elementary to ignore."10
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is
the father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making
false statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to
delay Frialyns case.12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge.13 The
Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary14 does not prohibit
judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will
solemnize.15 Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a
judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he
notarized.16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their
competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of
their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the
affidavit.17 The parties identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they solemnized.19 He pleaded "not to make him
[complainant Tupals] doormat, punching bag and chopping block"20 since other judges also
notarized affidavits of cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo
be fined P9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating the same offense will be dealt with more
severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
connected with municipal trial court judges official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on
the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary,21 a judges duty is to personally
examine the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing the marriage
ceremony.22 Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the
Court Administrator recommended a fine of P1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized.23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of
gross ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However,
they may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and
other conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90
dated February 26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to
perform the function of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of
this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as
notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents,
contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their
functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their
extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also
prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in fact of having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of
their courts territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement showing
when notarizing documents ex officio: compliance with (a) and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have
neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the
perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial judge who will solemnize the parties marriage.
fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer
(Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2)
As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to
public in such municipality or circuit.24
marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties affidavit of
cohabitation.
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the
exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judges official function
cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his courts territorial
and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the
jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
duty to examine the parties requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the
affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavits statements
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in
parties and examine the requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have complied with all the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the
the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation.
license.26
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function
and none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage.27 Before performing the marriage and duty to solemnize marriages.
ceremony, the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented.28
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no solemnized their marriages]."33 He notarized documents not connected with his official function
legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement.29 Instead, and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least
Judiciary does not expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he
five years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other.31 The judge must also
cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.
execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties qualifications to marry and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.32 Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides: To accept Judge Rojos argument will render the solemnizing officers duties to examine the
affidavit of cohabitation and to issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been
complied with redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a document he
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary assume that "the person authorized by law to
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
administer oaths" who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath
performs the marriage ceremony are two different persons.
that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to
the marriage.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from
notarizing "private documents x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the performance of their
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary
functions as judges."34 Since a marriage license is a public document, its "counterpart," the
also provides:
affidavit of cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of
cohabitation, he notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal
ratification of cohabitation. In the case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation,
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a
the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties to determine their
private document into a public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court without
qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to the
further proof of its authenticity."35The affidavit of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose," (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument
remains a private document until notarized. or document -

Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
documents. As discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judges official duty
to solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90s purpose is to "eliminate competition between judges
and private lawyers in transacting legal conveyancing business."36 He cited Borre v. Judge
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public
Moya37 where this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing
is the signatory to the instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not
a deed of sale. Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he did
personally know the signatory, he must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of
"not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing
identity.
business."38 Thus, he did not violate Circular No. 1-90.

In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties
In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context in which this court stated that
subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties
"[judges] should not compete with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal
were personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of evidence
conveyancing business."39
of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

At any rate, Circular No. 1-90s purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They
conveyancing business." So long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official
personally appeared before him to subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also
functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.
interviewed them on their qualifications to contract marriage. Thus, the parties to the affidavit of
cohabitation need not present their competent pieces of evidence of identity.44
Thus, in Mayor Quiones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a
certificate of candidacy. In Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr.,41 this court fined Judge Galapon for
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the
notarizing the verification page of an answer filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
parties personally known to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to
Adjudication Board. The documents involved in these cases were not used to transact "legal
their affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted with
conveyancing business." Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty
them.45 Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the
of violating Circular No. 1-90.
notary public.

Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were not connected with his official
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is
function and duty to solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos
public are lacking in Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in
v. Judge How46where this court held that "[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
the municipality or circuit of the judges court constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.42
improper considerations x x x"47were defenses against gross ignorance of the law charges. His
good faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold him administratively liable.
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they
solemnized does not make the practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to
However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres]
the contrary.43
only within the parameters of tolerable judgment x x x."48 Good faith "does not apply where the
issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. possible margins of error."49

Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b)
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the
signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory
to present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. x x x x
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts territorial jurisdiction before notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
requires notaries public to personally know the signatory to the document they will notarize or
require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. These are basic legal
principles and procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements
nine times is not good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity,50 "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer."51 If the law involved is basic, ignorance constitutes "lack of integrity." 52 Violating basic
legal principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it
being a serious charge:53
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations;54
b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months;55 or
c. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.56
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for
gross ignorance of the law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges
practice of notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court
finds suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months sufficient
sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law.1wphi1 They
should act with caution with respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical
requirements as in this case will be dealt with strictly.
WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and
other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His suspension is effective upon service on him of a copy of
this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay
City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of
them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa.
He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a
piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same,
he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted
Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose]. 9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the
story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign
a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual,
as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to
sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that
could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her
brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three
months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for
a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D.,
wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he
was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of
Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage
contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the
Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she
answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was
procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground
that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by
said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment
of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of
his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under
Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76
did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-
faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals
dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did
not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article
718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in
the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa
was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly,
it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit,
and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a
separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability.
Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any
liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic
of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of
the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ,
District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife
in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name
as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage
license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage
license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. 41 For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that
the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts 42 in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration
of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced
to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
this Courts review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48 Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room
for application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.55
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
the requirement of a marriage license.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisas
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
may be raised any time.
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions. exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.58
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear costs.
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent
SO ORDERED.
by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
laws.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a vs.
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least
five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an DECISION
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to TINGA, J.:
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married,
thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan,
in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they
had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on
the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro.
Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a
government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support
her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed
upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental
advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent. 7 The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC
No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De
Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until
properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated
without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage
license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived
together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was
no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary
action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of
their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for
support. Citing several authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a
collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for
declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail
enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase
the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with
respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.13

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that
appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally,
the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the
but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With
Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity
regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and
and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge
straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about
with respondent, saying that petitioners "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve
their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the
him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals
trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and
noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that
filiation.15
he is the legitimate father of the child.

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for
trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very
support. Citing the case of Nial v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of
same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to
a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the
see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions
existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the
for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void
trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without
rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity,
a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and
and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage
concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an
illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support
and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.20
fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent
executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to
obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore
entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of
the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on
November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for
death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as only by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondents own admission in the
it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend.
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic.
nullity.22 At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,
petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as
earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1"
marriage voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner
and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs.
and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
"D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five
and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of
years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was
kissing the petitioner.31
asked during cross-examination, thus

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
ATTY. CARPIO:
of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband
and wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is
SO ORDERED.
that correct?

A Yes, sir.25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name
for a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in
 an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their
marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10
GR. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and
vs.
one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Mayor as maximum.

DECISION
No pronouncement as to costs.

SERENO, CJ:
SO ORDERED.

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA
affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago
and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while
her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their
marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as
husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a
marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from
bigamy.
11
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
June 1974, 6asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this
married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court
if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility." 7 cannot do. The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial
decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their
marriage null and void in these proceedings.
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the
crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they
got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to THE CA RULING
her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage
was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for known of the previous marriage of Santos.
the prosecution.1wphi1She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April
1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court
after she had already married Santos.
simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in
question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12
THE RTC RULING
THE ISSUES
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence
of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case,
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
because she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it
there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8
beyond reasonable doubt.

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is
absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of
those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived
together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in
the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993.
Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is
void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards
her husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos'
s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion
of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.
It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
(Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People
v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's
existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy,
which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each
other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in
Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous
undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.
(Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the
totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in
the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a
learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the
more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former
was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings
of the R TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed,
the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had
the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses
during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was
validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the
principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty
within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis
B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman,
who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is
guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that
for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the
crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years.
Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on
her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of six months
and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day
to four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, 24petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months
imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to
raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the
presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26In this case, petitioner has
consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that
marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
pass judgment on the validity of the marriage.1wphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner
to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and
given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now
resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took
place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in
their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the
Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the
marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
1996 32 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any
objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in
Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she
was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked
him.35 On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime
in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for
only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at
least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although
the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34
of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each
other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in
which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary,
because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants
shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest
or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, 44 petitioner married Santos while
knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement
under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court
to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the
ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court
found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951,
the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since
the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court
acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate
of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation.
Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner
herein as innocent of the crime.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face
an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is
than her marriage contract. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in
prision correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the SO ORDERED.
State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment."

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage
and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a
mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is

GR. 173614 September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails
the Order,1dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in
Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and
reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad
Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of
Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that
Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3 They begot seven
children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and
Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner
before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005,
Eulogio passed away.7
In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered
into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34 8 of the Family Code,
which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without
any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and
Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said
provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon
the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of
Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground
of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance
impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife
under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all
surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan,
and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of
the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack
of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the
Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect
on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language of this
rule is plain and simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition
for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to
bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of
the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the
marriage null and void.12(Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with
costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her
Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its
Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the
assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,15which was on the authority for holding
that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the
death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living. 16 Where one or both
parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage
void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14,
2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may
file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion
for reconsideration held that the case of Nial vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the
Supreme Court has rejected the case of Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of
Void Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only
parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely
personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and
Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Nial vs.
Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the
parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be
prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the
parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence,
during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent who should
be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent
his heirs have already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right
should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot
repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially
when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union
because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such
void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the
petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living.
Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to
declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the
husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable. 17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005
and reinstate this case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1
June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised
therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole
question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the
hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a
direct recourse to this Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower
courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with
causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within
the competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of
hierarchy of courts.21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power
to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the
dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario,
respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person
were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the
applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code,
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to
a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio
was celebrated in 2004.1wphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on 3 August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to
reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in
scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under
the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of
petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language
of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes
it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in
the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages
and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost
for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging
the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
GR. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO
CARLOS II, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during
the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity
and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property,
reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court
of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-
subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by
Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd.
plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or
less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28,
Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE
THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
 PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August
el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental
por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un
mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts,
Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO
the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
PARCEL No. 6
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity
of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52;
por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS. 3

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by
deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of
Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.
of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the
160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents
declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their woman.
son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the
name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
Manila.
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City,
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged
the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In
their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This
the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his
remaining land of the first parcel between them.
own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel
of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent
Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. 5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its
report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum
of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing
of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the
portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061
of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel
said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel
TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval
and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila
to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval
and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila
to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation
expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that
the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling
the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of
Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a
quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The
fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did
not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a
claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to
an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and
the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of
the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit
the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary
judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of
marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively
dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own
brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty
years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is
sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a
closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather
that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the
rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of
marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."
(Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the
court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded
that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence
 of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Issues
Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage
license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents
it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the 1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision,
following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the
Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit: Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at
the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by
Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract
law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with
marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for
the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of
motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case
Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary
on the merits.
Judgments;

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be
of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of
validity of the marriage.
the laws and misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in
of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had
bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of
appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said
appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his
entitlement to inheritance rights as such. Our Ruling

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare
allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent
couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what
could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation.
Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more
credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his
life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his
household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to
conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues
pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of
judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to
intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a
quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure
that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.16
in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on
the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of the Civil Code.
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of
summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule,
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by
which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:
any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case.
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied) Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case,
We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
judgments. marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is
of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.Compulsory or
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and,
declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all
hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of
kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)
a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed
in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)
duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration
of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy,
been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was
loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the
rendered.15
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are
simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by
attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees law.
to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of
evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
before the court is not fabricated.
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on August 3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning
of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case
against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate
heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional
right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts.19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This
is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its
application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place.23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. 24 But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that
any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed
as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is
basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. 27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects
their successional rights.
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows
or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the
same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount
of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.29(Underscoring
supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-
interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on
succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of
the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad
and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral
relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right
to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate,
or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. 33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of
his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives,
like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without
issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but
petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first
half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes
petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or
illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then
petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be
protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may
be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the
presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral
relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II
is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother
of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is
proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other
causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the
case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave
the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. 36
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We
are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to
the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate
court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the
CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy
of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
(Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act
that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as
said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null
and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the
status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage
between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted
son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action
for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED
AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give
this case priority in its calendar.
No costs. Ruling of the Court of Appeals

GR. No. 158298 August 11, 2010 The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:

ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner, The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is
vs. not a party to the marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,4 however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the
DECISION RTC, thus:

BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to
be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been
dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage,
had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1 The
case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage
Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not
prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party,
which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the
petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the
marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-
appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply
misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those
specified in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject
petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded
as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
SO ORDERED.5
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue Hence, this appeal.
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the
Issues
validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.2
The petitioner raises the following issues:
Ruling of the RTC
I.
3
On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL
the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed)
PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND
and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and
JURISPRUDENCE;
Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).

II.
SO ORDERED.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for
IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE
reconsideration on November 14, 2000.
ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action
to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise
to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the
requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in
force at the time the marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage
already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.7 To
illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but
is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family
Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void,
considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the
marriage ceremony.8
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but,
being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.10
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December
26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity
of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,12 the children were allowed to file
after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage
to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There,
the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and
when each might be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore
the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent
by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40
of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.13
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity
of a marriage. According toCarlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to
be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural
law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
interest.15 Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the
action.16 Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the
real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.17
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in
the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a
brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the
right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001
and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children
of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the
deceaseds estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges
upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or
children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos
surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon
involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case.
We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be
prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresencianos
surviving wife,19stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is
relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code
required
20
a marriage license for their validity; hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a
marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined
herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power.1avvphi1 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the
action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.21
We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025
entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v.
Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the
legal owners of the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided
on November 26, 2009, and the petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23,
2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge
that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late
Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial right any
judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action,
however, considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor
non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his
initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead
an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial courts) own
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of
Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records
are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further
proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in
order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants;
then to determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or
children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was
the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of
said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.
No costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of
the December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia
S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the
nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
2, 2006, with the following disposition: following

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner ISSUES
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as
null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and
I
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy
DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
of this decision.

A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.

SO ORDERED.2
MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT
THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of CASE.
Appeal on September 11, 2006.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS.
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS"
RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was likewise
denied. C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY
HEREIN RESPONDENT.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul
the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A
in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to
PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS
Danilos appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the
NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2,
2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty II
of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE
the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
III
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli 3 to the effect that
the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988." THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE
ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A
LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension
INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the
Honorable Courts Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11,
2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before
the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its
decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a
decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the
factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to
be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the
effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case,
the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC while the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his
marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He
further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their
marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere
"failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital
obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is
explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word
"marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the
index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from
the words of a statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty
and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the
Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be
faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking
certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to
orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded
as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.
The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since
then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial of petitioners motion
for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioners earlier motion for extension of time
did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already
beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondents appeal and denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final
judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of his right to appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br.
254,15 the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution
so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints
of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This
constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence
and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid
and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD
A. TAMANO,Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage
laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13,
2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano
(Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife,
and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos
legitimate children with Zorayda,5filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil
rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The
complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated
under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior
marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared
as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced
Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because
divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant
Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one
contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they
(deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court
for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,8 and again,
another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20,
1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married
under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration
of nullity.13Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning
the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the
CA14 which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there
can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file
an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented
their evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such
purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996,
suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CAs temporary restraining order issued on February
29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court by
way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her
evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to
July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a
postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the
case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed,
on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No.
126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25 stating as one of the
reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of
marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned
judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio. 28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed,
declared Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous
under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of
the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the
late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of
the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not
an acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the
subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file
her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is
capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by
the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the validity
of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA held that Estrellita can
no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but
simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the
lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that
Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an
independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to Sen.
Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted
that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration
was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action
as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party in the senators subsequent
bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional
errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on
the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and
Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings
between the parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the
issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file
an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously
rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case
ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss,
and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in
upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the
opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the
validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36 laid down the rule that the
filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and,
consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she
merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial courts assurance that the
proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition
questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an
adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were
remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the
public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before
further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter
was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such
law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of
registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was
solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under
Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only
the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and
stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original
action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen
says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit
that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents legal
standing to challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning
that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda
and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter
was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for
the Supreme Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b)
she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public
prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous;
and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage
declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her
pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss
before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before
the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was
never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an
answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning the
validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we
affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her
argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to
the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the
complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the
Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on
April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section
6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance
of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days
computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to
file her Answer to the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it.
Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should
the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate
courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of
the case because after it denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow
the husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when,
under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case,
Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the
extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to
file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first
for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court.
However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for
certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is
an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the
rendition of the judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that
"[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary restraining
order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present
her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any
order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous
requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to
present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first
for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her
evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own
dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly
proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her
right to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R.
No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded
back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and
not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void
marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine
whether there is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the
court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a
report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the
parties and their respective counsels, if any.
 (2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any
his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
It has been held that:

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case
for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the
pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the
required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he
attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence
because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively,
unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of
laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing
body of law, specifically, the Civil Code in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim
Codes enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with
lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in
non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the
register their mutual desire to this effect.
proceedings in the trial court:

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that
Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under
the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of
the proceedings in the trial court.48
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of
nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, 55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-
under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)56 thereof, only
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute
one marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not
availed of during its effectivity.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
the petition is bigamy.
way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not
provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot the following manner, viz:
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of
Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages
provisions unless otherwise provided:
and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is
unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage.1wphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file
an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under
the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November
1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void
marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may
be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir,
is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since
both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. 60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a
way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages.
We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September
13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24,
2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order
No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment
of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is
this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in
Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He
arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the
afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate,
Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was
going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but
was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told
him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The
Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to
the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get
certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was
obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against
Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated
January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one
of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was
seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and
(c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No.
their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days
9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After
Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was 9, 1993 at their residence.28
issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite,
certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the
same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty.
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30
Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese. 31
that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the
bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty.
Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since
1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty.
Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the
The Ruling of the RTC
marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it
was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage
contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17 In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as
Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been
Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain
issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of
and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19He further testified that he did not know where
Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993,
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by
marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law,
and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She
testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the
marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to respondent declaring as follows:
their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went
back to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who 1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
 2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed
nullity of the marriage of the parties. only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the
marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-
Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the
same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October
2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in
Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria
Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39

The Ruling of the CA Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
Hence, this petition.
I
Grounds in Support of Petition
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF I
A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE
WAS ONE.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW
IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS
II DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A
VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A II
MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND
SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF
WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
III
The Ruling of this Court
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY
LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
The petition is meritorious.
COURT BELOW.35

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No.
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for
would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
 (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the
formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage
ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage
license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on
whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no
valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on
the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he
requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of
an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search,
a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required
to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative
value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria
and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another
couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License
No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of
Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not
comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification,
and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no
diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth
noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a
marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not
appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for
Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official
duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We
held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office,
thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The
fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the
best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other
witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied
for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the
contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of
the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license,
admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and
thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
Registrar still enjoys probative value. motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage
license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the
law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage
marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court.
of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid
marriage license issued for her and Syed.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
47 48 dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
In the case of Cario v. Cario, following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification
CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to
Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling
prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed
the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the
party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only No costs.
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said
that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the
SO ORDERED.
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to
have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
were validly married. To quote the CA:
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner,
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and vs.
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even
issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent DECISION
freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his.
Several pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer,
the witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as BRION, J.:
well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of
all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract. We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No.
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years 97-1282.2 The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns marriage with respondent Angelito
before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by
him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against THE FACTS
him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T.
Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of
give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some
friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal Mayor of Bian.
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3)
of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2,
after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked
Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the
for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was
exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.1wphi1
most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted
because of Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom
he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her
complaint:
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship had
been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the
part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a
troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his
indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their
separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their marriage
and became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological
examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed
between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the
trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the
alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she
remained firm on these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her
violently before they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his
behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you
got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).3
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his
behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the
marriage the respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a
serious and severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-
standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I
examined her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to
marital relationship with respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a statement rather on
the last page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned
that marriage between the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the
actual celebration of marriage. Respondent(s) immature, irresponsible and callous
emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful relationship. His
general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social
Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his
capacity to provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder
is chronic and long-standing in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was
present at the time of the wedding and became manifest thereafter due to stresses
and pressure of married life. He apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could
you explain what does chronic mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before
he entered marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust
was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because
psychological disorder are not detrimental to men but to others particularly and this
(sic) because the person who have this kind of disorder do not know that they have Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
this kind of disorder.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
Court:
A. Permanent and incurable.
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at
the time of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).

A. Yes, maam."
Court:

Court:
Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality

Court:
Disorder (sic).

Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment
exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social
Disorder. Court:

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)? Q. Why did you know?

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is
suffering that kind of disorder (sic). not aware that this kind of personality affect the other party (sic).

Court: Court:

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)? Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the
respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than
not he even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).
Court:
A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the
influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the
less than one year and one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work
as housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never receive and
enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the petitioner who
took sustainance of the vices. (sic)
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital
relationship but what he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).
Court:
 Q. What are the vices?
A. Alcohol and gambling.
Court:
Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder, he is good for nothing person.4
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently
states:5
Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of
Marriage" versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyns]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle
driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic,
womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge
within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was
described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of their day
to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much
so that it does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and
motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale.
She may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to
remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of
difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that
she set simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations.
However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific goals.
Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she is able to
discharge negative trends appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above]6
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines strongly
opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with
the RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said
about him was purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as
psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person
to be unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as "immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective
sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the
husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and
habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next
drinks" (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag,
points (sic) to one thing that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the
respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner
manifested by the formers being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst
of all a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior and attitude of
the respondent, decided, after one year and four months of messy days, to leave the
respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the
respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her
and that she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain
the latters niece (sic) and because they were living with her husbands family, she was obliged
to do the household chores an indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that
she served as a servant in his (sic) husbands family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of
their marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her
relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and
respect, instead, the respondent blamed the petitioners family for said early marriage and not to
his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist testimony quoted above]
would only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological
incapacity which is not only grave but also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar]
attesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the
essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is
entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a
speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater
tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the respondent, although
they are now separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made here a slave
and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment
should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will
be an instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of
herein respondent.8
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling
that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of
Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality
of evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from
evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the
evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the
aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not
found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the
respondent himself, the person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was
psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential
duties of marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand
testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the Court in
Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a
deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the
psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the
time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The
evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior
of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal
to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a permanent
compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and more
stable relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the
defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of
the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason
be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will
be a reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the foundation of
the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a
mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA
ruling based on the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the
legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256
SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that "the
finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioners
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the
Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis--vis
petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous";
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission
was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being
shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would make a person
unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:
"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to
causes of a psychic nature."
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being
clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on
existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to
define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG
relied on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage
that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with
Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside
the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an
abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual
obligations of marriage without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative
example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity
was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals9 declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be
confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."10
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in
Republic v. Court of Appeals11 (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.12
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of
Santos.13
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,14 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as
a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists
and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.15
Pesca v. Pesca16 clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending,
under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would
thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex
prospicit, non respicit."
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took
effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented,
including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these
pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference
the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us were
invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and
jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te17 (Te) which revisited the Molina
guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself
was taken from the Canon Law.18 Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed
to allow some resiliency in its application.19
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of
the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the
findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the
concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing
all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina,
but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting
v. Velez-Ting20 follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from
abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of
the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages: 21
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to
justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not
available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,22 merely stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded
on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.23 [Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.24
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the
Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application
of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.25 It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an
adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown.26 Mere difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.27
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos continuing doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological
incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own
examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the
differences in the trial court and the appellate courts appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns
presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the
root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence the
psychologists testimony and the psychological evaluation report that Jocelyn presented.
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological
condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming
from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the
evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is
not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not
be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a
determination though of a partys complete personality profile, information coming from persons
intimately related to him (such as the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is
an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if
not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely
on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information coming
from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could
not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report
that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity
exists.1avvphi1
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and testimony simply
provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder, supported
by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise
to the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can
they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is chronic or incurable;
Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even
during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not
support this declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on the
presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though,
is the psychologists own equivocation on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she
herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly
suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of Angelitos family
background and upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent
was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on
Angelitos awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or
requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyns cause.
b. Jocelyns Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the psychologists
testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns testimony, to find out whether she
provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelitos psychological incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on
Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical
beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she
declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be
indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her
relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not
before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings
exactly took place whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months
or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its
related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence
holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of
proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we
may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality
patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The
evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion
of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns account of
the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the
requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to
be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual
findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor in her present
appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA
correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the
present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010
ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR y ALUNAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (petitioner) challenges through his petition for review on
certiorari1 the decision dated May 31, 20052 and the resolution dated December 6, 20053 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207.The challenged decision reversed the
resolution4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, declaring the
marriage of the petitioner and Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (respondent) null and void on the
ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand,
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter worked. The
petitioner, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while the
respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their meeting led to a courtship, and they eventually
became sweethearts. They often spent nights together at the respondents rented room, and
soon entered into a common-law relationship.
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony
officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioners family was
apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the respondents work and because
she came from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the respondent begot four
(4) children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.5 The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He alleged that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and
irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from
their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick
child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name
Agraviador in her activities.
The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993
because she became "very close" to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their
love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her
psychological incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the petition.6 The RTC
denied this motion in its order dated July 2, 2001.7
In her answer,8 the respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs and maintained
that it was the petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner
wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former household
helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the
hospital before he died.
The RTC ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor General to investigate if collusion
existed between the parties.9 The RTC, in its Order of November 20, 2001, allowed the petitioner
to present his evidence ex parte.10The petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to substantiate his claims.
In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed what he stated in his petition, i.e., that the respondent
was carefree, irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly did what she wanted; did not
stay long in the conjugal dwelling; refused to do household chores; refused to take care of him
and their children; and consulted a witch doctor in order to bring bad luck upon him.
The petitioner further confirmed that the respondent abandoned their sick child, which led to the
latters death. The petitioner further stated that the respondent became very close to a male
border of their house; he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his
room several times.
The petitioner declared that he filed the petition for nullity because the respondent refused to
change; he loves his children and does not want their children to be affected by their mothers
conduct. He intimated that he might remarry if it would benefit their children.
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage
contract (Exh. "B")11and the psychiatric evaluation report (Exh. "A") 12 of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.
In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the following findings:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son and their helper, the psychological
report and the mental status examination, Enrique is found to be psychologically capable to fulfill
the essential obligations of marriage. He coped with Erlindas selfish and irresponsible behavior
as he dutifully performed what she failed to do for the family. He patiently tried to understand her
and exerted every effort to make her realize the harm caused by her neglect to the family.
Throughout their marriage, he provided emotional and material support for the family. He
engaged in other business endeavors aside from his employment as he maintained to be
financially productive.
The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. She
manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time before their marriage. She is known
to be stubborn and uncaring who did things her way without regard to the feelings of others. She
is an irresponsible individual who selfishly ignored and neglected her role as daughter to her
parents as wife to Enrique and mother to their children. Before the marriage at a young age of
17, Erlinda defied her parents as she lived alone, rented a room for herself and allowed Enrique
to sleep with her. She did not care about the needs of Enrique before and after marriage and
she maintained to be so with her children. She abandoned and relegated her duty to her family
to their helper. She never stayed long in their house despite pleadings from her children and
Enrique. Her irresponsible, uncaring behavior even led to the death of one of their children.
Likewise, she does not show concern and ignores a daughter who is presently manifesting
behavioral problem. She kept secrets as she never allowed her husband and children know
where she stays when shes not at work. She falsified documents as she hid her marital status
when she used her maiden surname in her present employment. She is having illicit affairs and
is reported to be presently having an affair with a lesbian. Her desire to bring bad fate and death
to Enrique through her consultation with a "mangkukulam" point out her lack of care, love, and
respect to Enrique.
Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and
support to her family.
The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality
Disorder). She has been having this disorder since her adolescence. There is no definite
treatment for this disorder. She is deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform the
obligations of marriage.
In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same examination as Enrique
underwent.13
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision of April 26,
2002. It saw merit in the petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report, and
concluded that:
Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the findings of the doctor show that
Respondent is indeed suffering from "Mixed Personality Disorder" that render her incapable of
complying with her marital obligations. Respondents refusal to commit herself to the marriage,
her tendencies to avoid a close relationship with Petitioner, preferring to be with her lover and
finally abandoning their home for a lesbian, a disregard of social norm, show that she was never
prepared for marital commitment in the first place. This incapacity is deeply rooted from her
family upbringing with no hope for a cure. Therefore, for the good of society and of the parties
themselves, it is best that this marriage between ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN and
ERLINDA AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it never took place at all. The Civil Registrar
of the City of Manila and the General Civil Registrar, National Census and Statistics Office, East
Avenue, Quezon City, are hereby requested to make the necessary correction of the civil record
of the marriage between the parties and on their respective civil status.
The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL AGRAVIADOR, EVELYN AGRAVIADOR
and EYMAREY AGRAVIADOR will however remain as their legitimate children.
It is SO ORDERED.14
The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC
decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision15 dated May 31, 2005, reversed and set aside the
RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.
The CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the
respondents personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did not mention
the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had no basis in concluding
that the respondents disorder had no definite treatment because he did not subject her to a
mental assessment.
The CA added that the "psychiatric remarks" in the Report were nothing but a showcase of
respondents character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a natal or supervening factor
that effectively incapacitated the respondent from accepting and complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may only give rise to a legal separation
suit.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution of
December 6, 2005.16
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the
CA ruling, based on the following arguments:
I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL TO ESTABLISH
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE RESPONDENT[;]
II. THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V. MOLINA [HAD BEEN] SATISIFIED[;]
III. THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION REPORT XXX STILL
STANDS FOR NOT HAVING BEEN CONTESTED XXX BY THE STATE AND/THE
RESPONDENT[; and]
IV. THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES HAD BEEN SATISIFIED[.]
The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners
marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
The Courts Ruling
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul
the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The totality of evidence presented
failed to establish the respondents
psychological incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It
introduced the concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although
this concept eludes exact definition.
The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both
members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, conceded that the
spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless,
incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990
edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."17
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage."19 It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals20 (the Molina case) where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
 exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later case,
Marcos v. Marcos,21further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is
no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,22 declared that it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it,
which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect
to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another. Ngo Te,
therefore, put into question the applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina.
Ting v. Velez-Ting23 and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo24 squarely met the issue and
laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that
Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation
of its stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a more
flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity.
Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence insufficient to
prove the respondents psychological incapacity.
a. Petitioners court testimony
For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of the petitioners testimony that essentially
confirmed what the petition alleged:
Q: Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed with children, and how
many?
A: Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2) girls.
Q: Where are they now?
A: All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the neglect and fault of
my said wife who abandone[d] him at the time of his illness.
Q: Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?
A: It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.
Q: Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?
A: She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature, whimsical and used to impose what she
wanted to get, she refused to do household chores, like cooking, caring for the husband and
children, used to stay from the conjugal dwelling, initially for weeks, then for months and lately
fully abandoned the family house and stay with a lesbian. [sic]
At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive and used to be very close to a male
renter in the ground floor of their house and caught them several times alone in his room, thus
explaining the reason why she refused to have sex since 1993, up to and until the present time.
Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult "mangkukulam" to bring bad fate against
the family and death for me.
Q: By the way did you give her the chance to change?
A: I gave her but she refused to reform.
Q: Can you not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?
A: I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she does not want to change for the
sake of our family.25
These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the petitioners testimony on
the respondents supposed psychological or mental malady. We glean from these exchanges the
petitioners theory that the respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or
unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality
traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires,
and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the
performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.26 The intent of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders existing at the time of the marriage clearly demonstrating an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 27 The psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.28
In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition
is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating
psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality
defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details
necessary to establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In
addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he
mention that the respondents malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the respondents means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the respondent
"does not accept her fault," "does not want to change," and "refused to reform" are insufficient to
establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated
by Article 36 of the Family Code.
In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,29 we ruled that it was not enough that the respondent, alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an
adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations had to be shown.
b. Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report
The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We
emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact,
recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to "undergo the same examination
[that the petitioner] underwent."30 Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner,
the parties second child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on
the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair gauge to
assess the petitioners own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to
be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same statement
cannot be made with respect to the respondents condition. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.31
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to
be declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.32 If a psychological disorder can be proven
by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit.33 No such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been
gathered in this case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondents
condition by stating that the respondent manifested "inflexible maladaptive behavior" before
marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage the respondent defied
her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with
her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the
incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac failed
to elucidate on the circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she did, for example,
why she "defied her parents" and decided to live alone; why she "neglected her obligations as a
daughter;" and why she often slept with the petitioner. This is an area where independent
evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the respondent, could prove
useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence was gathered in this case. In the
absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to
explain how and why the respondents so-called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already
present at the time of the marriage.
Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of
the respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration of the respondents purported
behavioral defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. In the "Background History" portion
of his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the respondent employed one of
her siblings to do the household chores; did not help in augmenting the familys earnings;
belittled the petitioners income; continued her studies despite the petitioners disapproval;
seldom stayed at home; became "close" to a male border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not
disclose the actual date of her departure to Taiwan; threatened to poison the petitioner and their
children; neglected and ignored their children; used her maiden name at work; and consulted a
witch doctor to bring bad fate to the petitioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded statement
that "Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect
and support to the family,"34 there was no other statement regarding the degree of severity of the
respondents condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave, and how it incapacitated
her to comply with the duties required in marriage. There was likewise no showing of a
supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychological condition that effectively incapacitated
the respondent from complying with the essential marital obligations. At any rate, the personality
flaws mentioned above, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Interestingly, Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondents
negative behavioral traits without balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the claim that the respondent refused to SO ORDERED.
engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the petitioner, but these claims
were not proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these accusations were true, the
Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were traits
that antedated or existed at the time of marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the respondent
abandoned her sick child which eventually led to the latters death appears to be an exaggerated
claim in the absence of any specifics and corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioners own
questionable traits his flirtatious nature before marriage and his admission that he inflicted
physical harm on the respondent every time he got jealous were not pursued. From this
perspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report appears to be no more than a one-sided
diagnosis against the respondent that we cannot consider a reliable basis to conclusively G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
establish the root cause and the degree of seriousness of her condition.1avvphi1
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to vs.
the conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had "no definite treatment." It did not ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order
to create a necessary inference that the respondents condition had no definite treatment or is DECISION
incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric Evaluation Reports failure to
support its findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply enumerated the
NACHURA, J.:
respondents perceived behavioral defects, and then associated these traits with mixed
personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself was not called on the witness
stand to expound on the findings and conclusions he made in his Psychiatric Evaluation Report. Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
It would have aided petitioners cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify. incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The
Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be
Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological
viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of
evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that
any definition.
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the
marital vinculum.35 Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved
at the whim of the parties, especially where the prices of evidence presented are grossly For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The petitioners marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation The remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
of psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It is not to be confused Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the
themselves. The State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that divorce young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a
should be available in this country. Neither should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3
with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual
infidelity, abandonment, and the like.36 Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a
where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after
existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he
marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and
to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie. sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. 4

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December 6, 2005, respectively, and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided
in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the petitioner. to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home.
As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25
years old, and she, 20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was
treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed
Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to
call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home and
live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his
inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the
patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go
home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents.
His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should
live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted
ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the
parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. 14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born
Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994
and is currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-
TE. He presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now
residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally
considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not
stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a
priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days
as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the
foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she
also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on],
respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March
1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the
boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The
parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to
locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job
but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek
help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole
family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime
while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called
petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and
when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be
cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared
so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became
angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to
file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her
how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of
marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23,
1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,]
petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never
applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses.
Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents
about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort.
Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent.
When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of
petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that
she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his
parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he
would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not
knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent
refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to
stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since
he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner
does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed
petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and
weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and
their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was
still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as
to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He
is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social
interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that
he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved
and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of
woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour.
She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring
her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she
used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization
that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a
serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and
respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for
granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is
extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring
in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and
incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since
childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities
that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null
and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of
appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In
sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required
certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or
opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.23 The CA later denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution. 24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June
15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity.
Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the
latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial
court orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed before the
RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply
with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition;
neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not
personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in
Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
the marriage between the parties is null and void.31
 I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family
Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth
P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf
of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family
Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee
were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation,
legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action
for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another
country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later,
even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on
this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they
agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute
divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to
whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not
pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an
action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging
problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the
State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action
for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void
marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees
now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The
result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity
as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact,
during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another
meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was
informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void
on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear
grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of
some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses
to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their
wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a
weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person
may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest
after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages
are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of
the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family
Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state,
the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a
valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal
hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into
the Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or
totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination
of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law in order to
give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of
interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called lack of due
discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach
to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned
for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage
was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what
came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems
that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so
designed as to allow some resiliency in its application. 38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 40 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the
most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact,
consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda,
a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to
sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law
to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is
located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted
down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third
paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of
giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give
consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars].
Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract
is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and
sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available.
Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of
consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act
of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the
consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic
incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an
increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every
case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they
arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of
free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain
anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not
normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the
activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it
is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted
continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its
responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a
person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to
posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the
conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at
the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary
freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible
impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true
that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would
seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in
which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely
what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one
reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in
a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent
may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that
he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more
clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between
the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on
the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a
free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an
intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the
consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of
consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person
afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of
knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the
delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal
object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an
intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only
with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in
facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming
the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the
obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave
intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to
distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.
Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid
matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the
essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology:
nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are
not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases
where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not
even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of
beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of
himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other
party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage.
Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good
and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the
other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case
concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while
the respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of
marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during
the moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital
consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to
assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the
party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and
especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in
the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards
money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal
relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of
empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present.
Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in
order to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One
of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which
do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or
several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is
impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage
include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality
was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating
because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to
fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as
incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider,
with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so
afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal
decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus
but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to
account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily
impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full
sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does
not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not
by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is
unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the
matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as
in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that
the clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a
reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in
the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that
the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is
judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something
rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad
habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this
invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however
remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It
would seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not
the fruit of some degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that
the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, 46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective
in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
 tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and
apart from each othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook
pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to
the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." 50 The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration
of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a
concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson
learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a
person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically
incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 55 there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist
who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the
advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract
to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could
necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations
of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is
not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts,
but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as
meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other
as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage
are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining
of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal
sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation
but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently
fall short of reasonable expectations.
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has
a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof
of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage
was entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician,
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of
the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at
an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with
the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as
adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto
repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality
disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and
long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated
episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the
individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more
than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of
character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors.
Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other
areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with
personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or
dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and
dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes
of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and
brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types.
Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive
from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness
were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to
lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net However,
later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain
stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the
etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance
of other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal
personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found
that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been
associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye
movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in
antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study
of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities,
compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders
are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that
can be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as
any of the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus
therapy may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others
through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to
agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or
doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard,
lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals
who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for
the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The
term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic"
personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic. 66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this
case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules
that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological
incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others,
allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree
with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the
persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person,
has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted
with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68Moreover, as shown
in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001,
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the
January 9, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.4
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in
1972 while they were classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on
July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their second
child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu City.7 In
September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded
to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years.
By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field 9 and, in 1980, he
began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its active
staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.11
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis,
born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21,
1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their
youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu
City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that
Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.14 But after they were married,
petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the
wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically
assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used
his gun and shot the gate of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as
anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his
fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped
calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried
to talk to her husband about the latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge
the same.16
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their
family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead
of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would
even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his
obligation to his children.19
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling. 20 He would gamble two or
three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever
he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wifes own jewelry to finance his
gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a
portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling
debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for
having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be
banned from the gambling establishments.23
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following
manifestations:
 1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to
sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off
his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to
give regular financial support to his family.24
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a
respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social
and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also
denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.25 As for his alleged
failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would
collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial
support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly
spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he
who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her
friends twice a week.28
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and gambling habits and
violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses
children from 1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when
Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.30
prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which
character traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family
Code. x x x
SO ORDERED.37
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision38 reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof
was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the
time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on
established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep.
of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines
should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February
13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed
that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the
principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been
filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining
compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit.
Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated
March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion
for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on
November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46reversing its first ruling and sustaining the
trial courts decision.47

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the
usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the
CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48
transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had
already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the
transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking, Hence, this petition.
compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner
suffers from a personality disorder.32
For our resolution are the following issues:

To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript
of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz,
a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras) interview with II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
Benjamins brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship with his fellow Family Code has been liberalized; and
doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.35
III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage between respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be We find merit in the petition.
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically,
the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who
I. On the issue of stare decisis. have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of
statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed,
either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the
this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.49 Basically,
the courts' limited resources.
it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil
Code.51 In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes
judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability.
Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and
perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing
was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos
social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law
discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in
solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts
Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:
while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and
disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the
reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of
Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal."
equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was
Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the
the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to
colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise
reach the decision."
refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we
Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is
"arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy
well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed
that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep
on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its
deal with for over two centuries."
merits.

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been
litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability;
courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second,
(2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to
known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof.
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine
Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command.
remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to
Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no
the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction
longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, 54 and
is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional
again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction
litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations
of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only
still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal
when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called
doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex
upon to consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter
prospicit, non respicit."
opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine. Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of
him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as
We have not.
of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and
the appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in hindsight, it void ab initio.
may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline,
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but
meaning and significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a
unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered
party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
as on "all fours" with another.57
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.621avvphi1.zw+
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners "defects" were present at the time of the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions,
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did
nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any other The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining
given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondents allegation of
proceedings. psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from
involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a
analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
took into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
with Benjamins brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling problems, or
set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the
his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior.
Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as
the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not been
available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.60 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be SO ORDERED.
weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006 his family such that reconciliation is very unlikely.10 The Public Prosecutor thereafter conducted a
brief cross-examination of Norma.11
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. Twelve days later, or on January 20, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision nullifying the marriage
NORMA CUISON-MELGAR, Respondents. of Norma and Eulogio. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

DECISION WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant petition for being impressed with merit. As
such, pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the marriage between Norma L.
Cuison-Melgar and Eulogio A. Melgar, Jr. is declared an ABSOLUTE NULLITY.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City is therefore ordered to cancel the Marriage Contract of
Filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is a petition for review on certiorari of the
the parties bearing Registry No. 180 in the Marriage Registry of said Office after payment of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, which
required fees.
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City (RTC)
nullifying the marriage of respondents Norma Cuison-Melgar (Norma) and Eulogio A.
Melgar2 (Eulogio) pursuant to Article 363 of the Family Code. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the following offices: The City Prosecution Office,
Dagupan City, the Solicitor General, and the Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
SO ORDERED.12
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in Dagupan
City. Their union begot five children, namely, Arneldo, Fermin, Norman, Marion Joy, and Eulogio The RTC reasoned that:
III. On August 19, 1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of
Eulogios psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.4 According to
With the testimony of the petitioner, the Court is convinced that defendant has been incorrigible
Norma, the manifestations of Eulogios psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual
in his vices such as habitual alcoholism, subjecting his family to physical maltreatment and many
alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his
times caused them to be scandalized, his being indolent by not at least trying to look for a job so
family since December 27, 1985.
that he could also help his wife in supporting his family, and also his uncalled for display of his
jealousy. These are clear manifestation of his psychological incapacity to perform his marital
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served by personal service on Eulogio on obligation to his wife such as showing respect, understanding and love to her. Defendant also
October 21, 1996 by the sheriff.5 Eulogio failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance became indifferent to the needs of his own children who really longed for a father who is willing
within the reglementary period. to make the sacrifice in looking for a job so as to support them. Without any communication to
his family since 1985, certaining [sic] reconciliation and love would be improbable. The attendant
circumstances in this case really point to the fact that defendant was unprepared to comply with
On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation on
his responsibilities as a good and responsible husband to his wife and a loving father to his
the case to determine whether or not there exists collusion between the contending parties.6 On
children x x x.13
December 18, 1996, Public Prosecutor Joven M. Maramba submitted his Manifestation to the
effect that no collusion existed between the contending parties.7 On December 19, 1996, the
RTC set the reception of evidence on January 8, 1997.8 Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal with the CA,
contending that the evidence presented are not sufficient to declare the marriage void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.14
On January 8, 1997, upon motion of Normas counsel, the RTC allowed the presentation of
evidence before the Clerk of Court.9 Norma testified that since the birth of their firstborn, Eulogio
has been a habitual alcoholic; when he is drunk he (a) sometimes sleeps on the streets, (b) On August 11, 1999, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC.15 The CA,
every so often, he goes to her office, utters unwholesome remarks against her and drags her quoting extensively Normas testimony, ratiocinated:
home, (c) he usually lays a hand on her, (d) he often scolds their children without justifiable
reason; his liquor drinking habit has brought shame and embarrassment on their family; when
[I]t has been adequately established that the decree of annulment is proper not simply because
she would refuse to give him money for his compulsive drinking habit, he would beat her up and
of defendants habitual alcoholism but likewise because of other causes amounting to
threaten her; he has not been employed since he was dismissed from work and he refuses to
psychological incapacity as a result of which defendant has failed to perform his obligations
look for a job; she has been the one supporting the family, providing for the education and the
under Articles 68-72, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code x x x.
basic needs of their children out of her salary as a government employee; on December 27,
1985, because of unbearable jealousy to her male officemates, Eulogio went to her office,
dragged her home and then beat her up; her brothers saw this, came to her rescue and then told Contrary to the submission of the appellant Republic, the grant of annulment is not based merely
Eulogio to get out of the house; and since then, Eulogio has not visited or communicated with on defendants habitual alcoholism but also because of his inability to cope with his other
essential marital obligations foremost of which is his obligation to live together with his wife,
observe mutual love, respect, fidelity and render mutual help and support.
For the whole duration of their marriage, that is, the period when they actually lived together as
husband and wide and even thereafter, defendant has miserably failed to perform his obligations
for which reason the plaintiff should not be made to suffer any longer. The contention of the
Republic that plaintiff never showed that she exerted effort to seek medical help for her husband
is stretching the obligations of the plaintiff beyond its limits. To our mind, it is equivalent to saying
that plaintiff deserves to be punished for all the inabilities of defendant to perform his
concomitant duties as a husband and a father all of which inabilities in the first place are in no
way attributable to the herein plaintiff.16
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
In its Petition,17 the OSG poses a sole issue for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT IS IN
THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.18
The OSG contends that the law does not contemplate mere inability to perform the essential
marital obligations as equivalent to or evidence of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code; that such inability must be due to causes that are psychological in nature; that
no psychiatrist or psychologist testified during the trial that a psychological disorder is the cause
of Eulogio's inability to look for a job, his resulting drunkenness, unbearable jealousy and other
disagreeable behavior; and that the decision failed to state the nature, gravity or seriousness,
and incurability of Eulogios alleged psychological incapacity.
In her Comment,19 Norma maintains that her testimony pointing to the facts and circumstances
of Eulogios immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional
laziness and indolence are more than enough proof of Eulogios psychological incapacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations, which justifies the dissolution of their marriage.
In its Reply,20 the OSG submits that Normas comments are irrelevant and not responsive to the
arguments in the petition. Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that Normas evidence fell short of
the requirements of the law since no competent evidence was presented during the trial to prove
that Eulogios inability to look for a job, his resulting drunkenness, jealousy and other
disagreeable behavior are manifestations of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.21 Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric
and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.22
In this regard, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates:
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court,23 the rule then applicable, provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. - If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Molina,24 the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and
the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.25(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at the trial level.
Other than the Public Prosecutors Manifestation26 that no collusion existed between the
contending parties and the brief cross-examination27 which had barely scratched the surface, no
pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment
was rendered.28 Truly, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.29
Be that as it may, the totality of evidence presented by Norma is completely insufficient to
sustain a finding that Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.31 It should refer to "no
less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage."32 The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 33
Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina34 the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. x x x.35(Emphasis supplied)
Later, the Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos36 that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as
a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.37

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
In the present case, Norma alone testified in support of her complaint for declaration of nullity of
her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. She failed to establish the fact that at the time
they were married, Eulogio was already suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. In fact, Norma admitted in her testimony that her marital woes and Eulogios
disagreeable behavior started only after the birth of their firstborn and when Eulogio lost his
job.38
Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of the basic
marital obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72,39 220,40 221,41 and 22542 of the Family Code. It
was not sufficiently proved that Eulogio was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical.lawphil.net

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of Eulogios immaturity,
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and
exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
abandonment of his family. These circumstances by themselves cannot be equated with
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make Eulogio completely unable
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.43
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal separation under Article
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
5544 of the Family Code. As the Court ruled in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina,45 it is not
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person, it
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
essential obligation of marriage.
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.46

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
All told, in order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
fabrication, evidence other than Normas lone testimony should have been adduced. While an
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
finding of psychological incapacity,47 an expert witness would have strengthened Normas claim
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
of Eulogios alleged psychological incapacity. Normas omission to present one is fatal to her
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
position. There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
showing that the "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
incurable.48

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71

The Court commiserates with Normas marital predicament, but as a court, even as the highest
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
one, it can only apply the letter and the spirit of the law; it cannot reinvent or modify it.
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
Unfortunately, law and jurisprudence are ranged against Normas stance. The Court has no
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
choice but to apply them accordingly, if it must be true to its mission under the rule of law. The
Courts first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061-D, dated January 20, 1997,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of Norma Cuison-Melgar in Civil Case No. CV-
96-01061-D is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010
RICARDO P. TORING, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31, 2004 decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA reversed the August 10, 2001
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-
36662,2 nullifying Ricardo's marriage with respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunts house in Cebu. Teresita was then his
cousins teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunts house. Despite
their slight difference in age (of five years), the younger Ricardo found the dance teacher
attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and they became sweethearts after three
months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already
pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City
Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for
annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita null and
void.
At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and
signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albarans
respective testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or opposition to the petition, nor did she
testify to refute the allegations against her.3
Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress
and a squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to
cover the familys living expenses and their childrens tuition. Teresita, however, was not adept in
managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many times, Ricardo would come home and be
welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid embarrassment.
Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita likewise failed to
remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. She left
the familys utility bills and their childrens tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying the rent
and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the family, so their children had to
live in a small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by Ricardos parents. When
confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she spent the funds Ricardo
sent to buy things for the house and for their children.
Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with another
mans child. During one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresitas stomach was
slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her
miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that
the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were
characterized by "withdrawals"; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife
transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in
Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and
went out on dates with other men when he was not around.
Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding
person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse
to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and
uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family; and was most
painfully unmindful of him.4 He believed that their marriage had broken down beyond repair and
that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one another.5
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage
was Teresitas Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill her essential marital obligations. To quote Dr. Albaran:
Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive pattern of
behaviors: a sense of entitlement as she expected favorable treatment and automatic
compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally exploitative as on several occasions she took
advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as she was unwilling to recognize
her partners [sic] feelings and needs[,] taking into consideration her own feelings and needs
only, her haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her proneness to blame others for her
failures and shortcomings. These patterns of behavior speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, which started to manifest in early adulthood. The disorder is considered to be grave
and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the symptoms as it is ego
syntonic and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Because of that[,] they remain
unmotivated for treatment and impervious to recovery.6
She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on
Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresitas eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did
not personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a personally-delivered notice for
the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that
there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the
psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague
and general conclusion on these parties personality traits but not on Teresitas psychological
makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and
sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the
evidence indicate that the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of
marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and incurable.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC believed
Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of Ricardos evidence,
found Teresita to be psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial courts findings did not satisfy the rules
and guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.7 The RTC failed to
specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused Teresitas psychological incapacity,
and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of celebration of
marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation do not appear to
have been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements
and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardos allegations on Teresitas overspending and
infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as
grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS
Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly the expert
testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court in declaring the nullity of the marriage
fully complied with Molina.
In its Comment,8 the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTCs decision, particularly
in its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this Courts guidelines for the proper
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Reiterating its earlier arguments
below, the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the trial court failed to show the
gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological incapacity of Teresita, and
failed as well to identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise, failed to show that
Teresita was completely unable to discharge her marital obligations due to her alleged
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Ricardos Reply9 reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of
Teresitas psychological incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He
claimed that sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise on the
subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging the root cause in a
petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary,
citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.10
These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it set aside
the RTCs decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,11 we held that psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological
incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."12
We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the
basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability established in the Santos
case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
 exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
a. Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony
Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital
obligations. To support her findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements told to her by
Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on the same
basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresitas disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is
grave and incurable.
To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in this
case, became the basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took place because of the
psychological incapacity of one of the parties at the time of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson,
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more,
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in considering psychological
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
In So v. Valera,15 the Court considered the psychologists testimony and conclusions to be
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondents psychological
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
incapacity because the facts, on which the conclusions were based, were all derived from the
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
petitioners statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In another
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
case, Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,16 the Court declared that while the various tests
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
administered on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
included in the text of the decision.
psychological condition, this same statement could not be made with respect to the respondent-
husbands psychological condition. To our mind, conclusions and generalizations about
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Teresitas psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
respect by our courts.13 such evidence.17

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying
factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. In so far as the
present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying our
established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family
Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in
the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must
have been there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept
that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that
there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction already then existing
was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.14
To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated
spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua
non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.18 This
recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should
be any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires.
Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina
need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still
essential although from sources other than the respondent spouse to show his or her
personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to
appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of
the condition.

In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioners
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them,
evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform
such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the
her duties as a wife. As already mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of the testimonies
allegedly incapacitated spouses condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent
of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latters psychological evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson
occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
from where she derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give
statements for purposes of Teresitas psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses
eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he
could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to
know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.
We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of Richardsons
interview with the pyschologist: Richardsons statement occupied a mere one paragraph
(comprising eleven sentences) in the psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated
instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his fathers alleged
womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita is a
Mormon).19
We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered from
some psychological disorder as far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find
these fights to be indicative of problems traceable to any basic psychological disorder existing at
the time of marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not uncommon in a marriage and
relate essentially to the usual roots of marital problems finances, fidelity and religion. The
psychologist, too, never delved into the relationship between mother and son except to observe
their estranged relationship due to a previous argument a money problem involving Ricardos
financial remittances to the family. To state the obvious, the psychologists evaluation never
explained how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at the time of the
spouses marriage, showed a debilitating psychological incapacity already existing at that time.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of Dr. Albarans
psychological evaluation to fully explain the details i.e., the what, how, when, where and since
when of Teresitas alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. It seems to us that, with hardly
any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of the blue that Teresitas
personality disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby that the incapacity
should have been there when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never explained, too,
the incapacitating nature of Teresitas alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the
essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately
explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresitas psychological
disorder.
Dr. Albarans testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it still
failed to provide the required insights that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps in her
written psychological evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albarans cross-examination only made the
evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she had difficulty pinpointing the root cause
of Teresitas personality disorder, due to the limited information she gathered from Ricardo and
Richardson regarding Teresitas personal and family history. To directly quote from the records,
Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when she said that "[t]he only data that I have is that, the
respondent seem [sic] to have grown from a tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the
[sic] contributory to the development of the personality disorder."20 Dr. Albarans obvious
uncertainty in her assessment only proves our point that a complete personality profile of the
spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not be determined from meager
information coming only from a biased source.
b. Ricardos testimony
Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however,
find Ricardos characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect" in
the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.21
Ricardos testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the familys
finances by not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations. Teresitas spendthrift
attitude, according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the house and lot intended to be their
family residence. This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not rise to the level of a
psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most, Teresitas
mismanagement of the familys finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or neglect, during
the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the familys financial support.
Teresitas alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological
incapacity, the respondents unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a
disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state;22 there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be faithful to her spouse. 23
In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a
disordered personality of this kind. Even Ricardos added testimony, relating to rumors of
Teresitas dates with other men and her pregnancy by another man, would not fill in the
deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse integral element and link to
Teresitas allegedly disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresitas alleged character traits already existed at the
inception of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological
incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.24 In the absence of this element, a marriage
cannot be annulled under Article 36.
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code
Citing Barcelona,25 Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a petition
for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary. We find this argument
completely at variance with Ricardos main argument against the assailed CA decision i.e., that
the RTC, in its decision, discussed thoroughly the root cause of Teresitas psychological
incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These conflicting positions, notwithstanding, we
see the need to address this issue to further clarify our statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo
misquoted and misinterpreted to support his present petition that "since the new Rules do not
require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there
is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity."26
In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state the "root cause"
of the respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The Court resolved this issue, ruling that
the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action because the petitioner instead of stating a
specific root cause clearly described thephysical manifestations indicative of the
psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the first
requirement in the Molina case that the "root cause" of the psychological incapacity be alleged
in an Article 36 petition.
Thus, contrary to Ricardos position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root cause"
requirement. The ruling simply means that the statement of the root cause does not need to be
in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes of many psychological disorders
are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical manifestations
constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(Rules)27 in fact provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.
As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of the
Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the need for an expert opinion to prove the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules, being procedural in
nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.1avvphi1
To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from
psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely
established that Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking
care of their familys finances a fault or deficiency that does not amount to the psychological
incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We reiterate that irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like,
do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be
due to a persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not
rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.28
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
NESTOR GALANG, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), challenging the decision2 dated November 25, 2004 and the resolution3 dated May
9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. The challenged decision
affirmed the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Angeles City, declaring the
marriage of Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar null and void on the ground of the
latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. They resided in
the house of the respondents father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent
worked as an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly.
Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a housewife. They have one child, Christopher.
On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. He
claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often asked money from their
friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the
respondent, Juvy suffers from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and
total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their] child." He posited that Juvys
incapacity was "extremely serious" and "appears to be incurable."5
The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties.
Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no
evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October
20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his
allegations.
In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast
because Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care;
and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there.6
The respondent further stated that Juvy squandered the P15,000.00 he entrusted to her. He
added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing
his (the respondents) fathers pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing
"mahjong" and "kuwaho" three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from
their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.7
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist,
who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she
wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond.8 In her
Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured
individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations
but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure
anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable
emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional tensions caused by
his wifes behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1)
being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her
involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which
exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude
towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to
change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital obligations as a loving,
responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the
defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.
The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated:
1. After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was manifested on
such occasions wherein the plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast, because
the defendant doesnt want to wake up early; this became the daily routine of the
plaintiff before reporting to work;
2. After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual, the
plaintiff was the one cooking for supper while the defendant was very busy with her
gambling activities and never attended to her husbands needs;
3. There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market because of
the irresponsible attitude of the defendant;
4. That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there was an
occasion wherein the defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff and use them
for gambling;
5. Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage took place,
wherein the defendant would come with stories so that people [would] feel pity on her
and give her money. Through false pretenses she [would] be able to deceive and take
money from neighbors, relatives and other people.
6. That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle (gambling),
but the defendant never listened to his advices;
7. That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the plaintiff
will leave for work, the defendant [would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go [to]
some place. This act reflects the incapacity of the defendant by being an irresponsible
mother;
8. That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted into the
couples separation.
Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral
disorders. These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and
stealing money. She doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty and these disorders
appear to be incorrigible.
The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life again and
hoping she would change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with special care, treating
her to places for a weekend vacation, cook[ing] her favorite food, but the defendant didnt care to
change, she did not prepare meals, wash clothes nor clean up. She neglected her duties and
failed to perform the basic obligations as a wife.
So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble opinion that there
is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform
her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.9
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court saw
merit in the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that:
After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting
evidence, this Court is convinced that as held in Santos case, the psychological incapacity of
respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which
Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry
out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple
existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause
of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before marriage although its overt
manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed
the ordinary means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject
are all obtaining in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is granted and the marriage between
petitioner and defendant is hereby declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.10
The CA Decision
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
The CA, in its decision dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. It explained that Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with
her acts of gambling and swindling, undermined her capacity to comply with her marital
obligations. In addition, the psychologist characterized Juvys condition to be permanent,
incurable and existing at the time of the celebration of her marriage with the respondent.11
The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution
dated May 9, 2005.12
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the
respondent was insufficient to establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential
marital obligations. The petitioner additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the
juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys condition.13 The respondent took the
exact opposite view.
The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on
the ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological
incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations.
The Courts Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition, and hold that no sufficient basis exists
to annul the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code
and Related Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."14
In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,15 the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
The defect should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage."16 We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
and Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient points are footnoted below.17 These guidelines
incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos.18
In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,19 we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary
to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of
evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
(Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages)20 which provided that "the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged."
Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te21 placed some cloud
in the continued applicability of the time-tested Molina22 guidelines. We stated in this case that
instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all
cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the
intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be considered as completely on
"all fours" with another.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting23 and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo,24 however,
laid to rest any question regarding the continued applicability of Molina.25 In these cases, we
clarified that Ngo Te26 did not abandon Molina.27 Far from abandoning Molina,28 Ngo Te29 simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained that Suazo 30 that Ngo
Te31 merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriages based on psychological incapacity.32
The Present Case
In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents
evidence the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological
report and evaluation insufficient to prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.
a. The respondents testimony
The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare
breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c)
squandered a huge amount of theP15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the
respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e)
falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order
to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.
These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires. We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v.
Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al.,33 we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be
shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other
words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage had to be
shown.34 A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity.
The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a
disordered personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that
rendered her unable to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed
to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in
nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. In
Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,35 we emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's
difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some
psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.
In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of stealing
the respondents ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent
entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these were mere isolated
incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for playing mahjong and kuwaho
for money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child was sick,
warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of
marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The
respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the
respondent refers to as "swindling") only two (2) years after their marriage, and after he let her
handle his salary and manage their finances. The evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to
augment the familys income during the early stages of their marriage by putting up a sari-sari
store and by working as a manicurist.
b. The Psychologists Report
The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to
establish that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at
the material time required by Article 36 of the Family Code.
To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions
exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents
description of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological
evaluation based on this one-sided description alone can hardly be considered as credible or
sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos36 that the person sought to
be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a
condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a
conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologists examination and
report. In this case, however, no such independent evidence has ever been gathered and
adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who intimately knew Juvy before and
after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have added
weight to the psychologists report.
Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed
Juvys negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity
(e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling
activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and declared that "psychological findings tend to
confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders x x x she doesnt
manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be
incorrigible."37 In the end, the psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for
her conclusion that "there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only
son."38
We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the
psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she administered on the
respondent and the root cause of Juvys psychological condition. We also stress that the acts
alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the marriage; there was no showing
that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report failed to
prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the
disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties. Significantly,
the report did not even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder found.
Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys condition. The reports
pronouncements that Juvy "lacks the initiative to change" and that her mental incapacity
"appears incorrigible"39 are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
c. The Psychologists Testimony
The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or
incurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her
report i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole
money from the respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her child without
linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again, these allegations, even if true, all
occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into
Juvys early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and
how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to
trace the history of Juvys psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability.1wphi1 In
these respects, she merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and
affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise, she jumped to the conclusion that
Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure. These unfounded
conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code
requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers
only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 40
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution
protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the
plaintiff.41 Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of
them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious
psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.42
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004 and May 9,
2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Nestor
Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer
Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims
that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and
Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it
was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with
one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others,
attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed by Eliseo
as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties
worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the
estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement
of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In
addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and
legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration
to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition
was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision
reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after
the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings
of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived
together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution
on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF
LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON
HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis
supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even
where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in
Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos
Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be
settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties
against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is
void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia
before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final days of
his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners
submission that the lower courts findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence
on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held
to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has
taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of
Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the
ruling in Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing
void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be
the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even
after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise,
as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued
by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de
Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage
and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage
exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the
fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a
record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is
not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown
any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration
must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
 (a) The jurisdictional facts; petitioners Paolo Josef2 and Janelle Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and
Gian Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of
the creditors, of the decedent; Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate; During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille
Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick)
as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed. obtained Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental with the following entries:
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
Father : Pablito S. Braza
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Date Received at the Local January 13, 1997
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record Civil Registrar :
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest
in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to Annotation : "Late Registration"
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January
13, 1997"
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law. on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be
known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza(Emphasis and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the underscoring supplied)
Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc
AFFIRMED in toto. Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille
were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005
SO ORDERED. before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition 8 to correct the
entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between
Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting
G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009 marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the
entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and
BRAZA, Petitioners, Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to
vs. determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille
PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and and Pablo as bigamous.
LUCILLE C. TITULAR,Respondents.
On Patricks Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 9 of September 6,
DECISION 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for
correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no
jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be
ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as
"Pablito Sicad Braza," were married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristinas co-
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order10 of November 29, 2007,
they filed the present petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions
on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cario v.
Cario,11 Lee v. Court of Appeals12 andRepublic v. Kho,13 they contend that even substantial
errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition
under Rule 108.14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code15 charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated
therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing,
or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.16
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to
nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn
Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a
DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patricks birth
records17 and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of
Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which
causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect
on March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be
filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.1avvphi1
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-
half of the death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second
wife contracted marriage with the husband while the latters marriage to the first wife was still
subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it being essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed
by the therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer
was not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in
their records of birth but to establish that they are not the latters children, hence, there was
nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the
name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu
Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition
deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in
their respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is
"Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that
the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding
the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower courts grant of the
petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in
the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in
SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's
petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon
receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of
Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to
the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared
before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in
Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed
that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was
working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a
certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances
in order for her to obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina
Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was
indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely
not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the
marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner,
Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in
the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent,
the court found basis in granting the latters prayer to straighten her record and rectify the
terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that:
(1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage
contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of
the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioners
counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases
for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being
the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used
by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the
void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the
following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE
ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE
ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB
INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected,
because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who
appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latters personal
circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio.16 Thus, the petition
instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of
a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and
final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There
is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which
does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties. 18 Here, the
issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily,
petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
 register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause
the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy
of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and
the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not
always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may
claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil
registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the
court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged
and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who
entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR
from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It
is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized
the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was
conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage
was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also
considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found
that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondents
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. 23 The court thus
made a categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not
hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition,
no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses
and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve
his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage.1wphi1Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and
documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the
marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where
all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage
to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by
the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage
by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial
Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-
CEB, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
GR No. 164435 September 29, 2009
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution2 dated
July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of
BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo,
being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on
January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial
proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H,
H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN
dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J.
Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora
Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on
November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church
wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City x x x.
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano
Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of
accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This
aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order
dated 2 August 2001.3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null
and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack
of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage
to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21,
2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with
Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been
declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of
sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28,
2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the
ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July
9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a
ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA,
citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent
declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy."5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where
petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH
THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE
OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING
PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN
DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO
VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING
THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED
PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true
that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of
the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioners marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her
appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated
by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for
suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 6 the Court
categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity. x x x
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed
to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded
as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this
legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. x x x7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners conviction of the
crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners
two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of
the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any
difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage." 11
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is
classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
"[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91
states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of
defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence
in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving. 12 Thus,
for petitioners defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence
that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present
sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own mother told Uy
in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally
unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly actually told Uy
about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory
testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is
hearsay.13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy
should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date of registration
of the bigamous marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of
prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court
to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The
penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The
minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within
the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium
period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a
maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo has
after all been declared by final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account of the latters
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse,
the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years,
Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as
to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES, Complainant,
vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
 DECISION In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
PERALTA, J.:
bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order 1 dated
September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16
respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution 2 dated January 2,
2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the
second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3 On January
crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004,
24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano
which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
(Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was not
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latters
applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code;
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as
that the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for
Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an
bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect
Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said
because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a
decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.6
completely void prior marriage.

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the dispositive portion of which
marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy
reads:
against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint
was an Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and
signed by Silverio,9 which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered
she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an Information10 for Bigamy was filed quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
SO ORDERED.

That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and
January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one
judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent
SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not
marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of
been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities.11
prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both
marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of
Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should be
Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration
speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for
crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution
filed its Comment13 arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by
respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting
respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among
a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has
others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere
not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in
contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument
that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:
of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest
by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan15 where we held:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and
the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a
valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment
of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of
securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage
ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the
annulment of the first without incurring criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for
bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which should represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed before us.20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v.
Beronilla,21 the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA)
the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA
dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in
behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed
criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of
actions even when the respective interests of the government were not properly represented by
the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of
the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question
the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of
the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we
required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of
its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for
the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did,
praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in
quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in
1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had
not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of
bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged,
among others, that:
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates
Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and became final
and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr.
Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other
words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore
wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
was declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's
first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that
the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the
accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born
before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that
therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. 31
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1wphi1
conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage without
the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accuseds first
Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was
deemed valid and subsisting.
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has
subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may
marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential
even enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy.38
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a
September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during
San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE.
the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
SO ORDERED.
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.35 G.R. No. 183824 December 8, 2010

Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted MYRNA P. ANTONE, Petitioner,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given vs.
retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial LEO R. BERONILLA, Respondent.
declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.

DECISION
We are not persuaded.

In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her
marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which
requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a
subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
nullify and set aside the issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102834, to wit: (a)
the Resolution1 dated 29 April 2008 dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which
assailed the trial courts Orders2 dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 in Criminal
Case No. 07-0907-CFM for Bigamy; and (b) the Resolution3 dated 18 July 2008 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the first resolution.
The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy were
rendered incomplete after herein respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the
court believed would negate the allegation in the Information that there was a first valid
marriage. The evidence presented showed that respondent later obtained a judicial declaration
of nullity of the first union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage.
The Antecedents
On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint 4 for
Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She
alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the
latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
5
On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding Information before the Regional Trial
Court, Pasay City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM and raffled to
Branch 115.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.6 He informed the
court that his marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007;7 that the decision became final and executory on 15
May 200[7];8 and that such decree has already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar
on 12 June 2007.9 He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid marriage, the
facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.10
In its comment/opposition to the motion,11 the prosecution, through herein petitioner, maintained
that the respondent committed an act which has all the essential requisites of bigamy. The
prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18 November 1978
has not yet been severed when he contracted a second marriage on 16 February 1991, for
which reason, bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first marriage
null and void on 27 April 2007.12 The prosecution also invoked the rulings of the Supreme Court
holding that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information,
and that facts contrary thereto are matters of defense which may be raised only during the
presentation of evidence.13
After a hearing on the motion,14 the court quashed the Information.15 Applying Morigo v.
People,16 it ruled:
Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla was actually never
legally married to Myrna Antone. On this score alone, the first element appears to be missing.
Furthermore, the statement in the definition of Bigamy which reads "before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved" clearly contemplates that the first marriage must at least be annullable or
voidable but definitely not void, as in this case. xxx [I]n a similar case, [the Supreme Court] had
the occasion to state:
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." xxx The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy,
it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. xxx17
The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said Order 18 on the
ground, among others, that the facts and the attending circumstances in Morigo are not on all
fours with the case at bar. It likewise pointed out that, in Mercado v. Tan,19 this Court has already
settled that "(a) declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense."20
In its Order of 6 December 2007,21 the court denied the motion for reconsideration stating that
Mercado has already been superseded by Morigo.
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment22 before the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Biliran, petitioner questioned the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. B-1290 on 5 October 2007. On 24 March 2008, the court set
aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the marriage of petitioner with respondent null and
void, and required herein petitioner (respondent in Civil Case No. B-1290) to file her "answer to
the complaint."23 On 21 July 2008, the court DISMISSED the petition for nullity of marriage for
failure of herein respondent (plaintiff in Civil Case No. B-1290) to submit his pre-trial
brief.24Respondent, however, challenged the orders issued by the court before the Court of
Appeals.25 The matter is still pending resolution thereat.26
Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 26 March 2008
before the Court of Appeals,27 herein petitioner alleged that the Pasay City trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and denied her motion for reconsideration.
In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition stating that:
The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the following reasons:
1. The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance that the allegations
in the petition are based on authentic records.
2. Since the petition assails the trial courts dismissal of the criminal information for
bigamy filed against private respondent Leo Beronilla, the petition, if at all warranted,
should be filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the Office of the Solicitor
General, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases.
3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of the subject
criminal case is tantamount to an acquittal based on the trial courts finding that the
first essential element of bigamy, which is a first valid marriage contracted by private
respondent is wanting. There is no clear showing in the petition that the dismissal was
tainted with arbitrariness which violated petitioners right to due process. Notably,
petitioner filed her comment/opposition to private respondents motion to quash before
the trial court issued its Order dated September 20, 2007 dismissing the information.
Hence, if there is no denial of due process, there can be no grave abuse of discretion
that would merit the application of the exception to the double jeopardy rule. 28
On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforequoted Resolution for lack of merit. 29
Hence, this petition.30
Our Ruling
I
We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite the defect in the pleading
and the question of legal standing to bring the action.
The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper
verification shall be treated as unsigned pleading.31
This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in order that the
ends of justice may be served.32 The defect being merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled
that the court may nevertheless order the correction of the pleading, or even act on the pleading
"if the attending circumstances are such that xxx strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice xxx may be served."33 At any rate, a pleading is
required to be verified only to ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations
were true and correct and not based on mere speculations.34
There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which has the
authority to represent the government in a judicial proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The
Administrative Code specifically defined its powers and functions to read, among others:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. xxx It shall
have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.35
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist
the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective
offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers
with respect to such cases.36
Thus, in Republic v. Partisala,37 we held that the summary dismissal of an action in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is in order.38 Not even
the appearance of the conformity of the public prosecutor in a petition for certiorari would suffice
because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to represent the People of the
Philippines is limited to the proceedings in the trial court. 39
We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
In Labaro v. Panay,40 this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order or ruling of
the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question
the order or ruling before us.41 xxx
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of
the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we
required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. 42 In light of
its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for
the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative,
Inc.,43 without requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to file a comment on the petition, this
Court determined the merits of the case involving a novel issue on the nature and scope of
jurisdiction of the Cooperative Development Authority to settle cooperative disputes as well as
the battle between two (2) factions concerning the management of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) "that inevitably threatens the very existence of one of
the countrys major cooperatives."44
And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant petition even
absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After all, "for justice to prevail, the scales must
balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone."45 To borrow the words of then
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the dismissal of a criminal case pending
with the trial court was sought:
[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society under
the rule of law, ensuring that all those who [come or are brought to court] are afforded a fair
opportunity to present their side[s]. xxx The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in
court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case.46
II
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition is in violation of the
respondents right against double jeopardy on the theory that he has already been practically
acquitted when the trial court quashed the Information.
Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a
valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the
case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.47
The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a) respondent has not
yet entered his plea to the charge when he filed the Motion to Quash the Information, and (2) the
case was dismissed not merely with his consent but, in fact, at his instance.48
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of
an order sustaining a motion to quash.49 More specifically, the granting of a motion to quash
anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is "not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense."50 Thus:
It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against petitioner was
based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that the facts charged
in the complaint do not constitute an offense. If this is so then the dismissal of said complaint will
not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, for it is provided in Section 8 of Rule
117 of the Rules of Court [now Section 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] that an order
sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless
the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule
[now substantially reproduced in Section 3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure] xxx.51
III
We now determine the merit of the petition did the trial court act without or in excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when it sustained respondents motion to quash on the
basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information?
Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a hypothetical admission
of the facts alleged in the information and any evidence contrary thereto can only be presented
as a matter of defense during trial.
Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.
We define a motion to quash an Information as
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed
against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the
face of the Information.52
This motion is "a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information,"53 for which
reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the face of the
information.54
As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:55
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute
the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no
offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on
this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential
elements of the offense as defined in the law.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, a reading of the information will disclose that the
essential elements of the offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore to
resolve the charges at the very outset, in a preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a
full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination. Given the circumstances of this case, we
feel it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss
the informations on the basis only of the petitioners evidence, such as [this]. 56
As in the recent case of Los Baos v. Pedro,57 where we found no merit in respondents
allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because "the Information duly
charged a specific offense and provide[d] the details on how the offense was committed,"58 we
see no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the case at bar. Clearly, the facts
alleged in its accusatory portion, which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, LEO R. BERONILLA,
having been united in a lawful marriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still
in force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo, which
subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity.59
sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code hereunder enumerated:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.60
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final
and executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces
of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information that a first
valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent marriage.
This should not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a
motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash even after taking into
consideration the established exceptions to the rule earlier recognized by this Court, among
others: (1) when the new allegations are admitted by the prosecution;61 (2) when the Rules so
permit, such as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy;62 and (3)
when facts have been established by evidence presented by both parties which destroyed the
prima facie truth of the allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion to quash
based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and "it would be pure
technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the
prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction xxx."63
For of what significance would the document showing the belated dissolution of the first
marriage offer? Would it serve to prevent the impracticability of proceeding with the trial in
accordance with People v. dela Rosa thereby warranting the non-observance of the settled rule
that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information? We
quote:
[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the allegations of the
information do not charge an offense, facts have been brought out by evidence presented by
both parties which destroy theprima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on
the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the nature of the ground of the motion to
quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due
course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible
conviction, and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and
expensive trial, on her part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as
well as of the prosecution.64(Emphasis supplied.)
We find that there is none.
With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared the first marriage
void ab initio, respondent heavily relied on the rulings 65 in People v. Mendoza and Morigo
declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because
there is no need for a judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is invalid; 66 and
(b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first
valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy incomplete.67
Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family Code, which was
promulgated by the late President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few years before respondents
subsequent marriage was celebrated in 1991.
The specific provision, which reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
was exhaustively discussed in Mercado,68 where this Court settled the "conflicting" jurisprudence
on "the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage." After establishing that
Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior
marriage and examining a long line of cases,69 this Court, concluded, in essence, that under the
Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a
bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated,
this Court declared that a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty of bigamy.70
Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold
the Order dated 6 December 2007 of the trial court, which maintained that Morigo has already
superseded Mercado. In fact, in Morigo, this Court clearly distinguished the two (2) cases from
one another, and explained:
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter
case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. xxx
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized xxx.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void
ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.71
The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces the position of this
Court to give full meaning to Article 40 of the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:72
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, xxx said marriage is not without legal
effects.1avvphil.zw+ Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment
of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
xxx.73 (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia
Serafico,74 this Court pronounced:
In a catena of cases,75 the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. xxx
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for
the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by
the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts
contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only
during the presentation of evidence.
All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so
quashing the Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence
introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to
quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information; and that facts not
alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is
obtaining in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City as well as the Resolutions dated 29 April 2008 and 18 July
2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
GR. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14
March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin
alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December
1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived
together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in
order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where
they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured
him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period
of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally
as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing
Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in
turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the
partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case,
and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered
properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court
denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to
present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of
Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February
2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008,
and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to
present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave
weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued
for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not
issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamins subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial
court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage
but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice
and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied
support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she
named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that
Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming
were owned by Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children, including
Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers
and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in the title.
As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were
bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution
of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered
co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two
condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot
under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of
Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and
190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and
Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a
separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was
married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share
in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley
while Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7,
1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is
further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT
Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos.
188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626,
194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637,
194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan,
Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go"
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the
words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioners money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are
properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the
administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her
collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-
ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared
FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the
petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition
and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No.
02-11-10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor
General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its
Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts
decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of
Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the
initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next
hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning,
Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not
around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based
on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or
dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and
void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual
contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No.
61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be
shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under
his existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a
clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from
the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with
modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-
appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722
shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-
appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of
respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
8
SO ORDERED.
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
courts ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
courts decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modification the trial courts decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived
her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that
she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an
inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right
but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence
was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July
2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all
made at Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court
warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted
for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available
witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day.
Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be
presented, disregarding the trial courts prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the
case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence
because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it
would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November
2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was
deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys
continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court
showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was
delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her
petition questioning the trial courts denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the
Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could
not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the
trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal
to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to
Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab
initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have
proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to
consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was
"married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he
stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his
wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names of
Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth
certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the
trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and
Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and
Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration
Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-
07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil
registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The
certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being
issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract,
the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. 12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of
record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and
Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
"was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover
her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially
from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not
a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the
informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly
married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary,
"shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to
them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers
issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly
falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals
did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the
Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive
portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals
adopted the trial courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1wphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage
shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the
one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or
irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the
crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that
what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article
349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is
therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand
of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained.
Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be
bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of
petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites
for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no
subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They
lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to
be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences
of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which
were given by Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a
number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally."
The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with
the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words
"married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution
from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from
hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in
his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error
which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32In this case, we have sufficiently
explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys
continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice
against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for
his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
GR No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA
affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago
and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while
her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2
June 1974, 6asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then,
married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that
if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the
crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they
got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to
her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage
was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for
the prosecution.1wphi1She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April
1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner
denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or
after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence
of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is
an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their
marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and
one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their
marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as
husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a
marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
bigamy.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
11
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court
(Emphasis supplied)
cannot do. The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial
decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their
marriage null and void in these proceedings. For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People
v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's
THE CA RULING
existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy,
which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not
THE RULING OF THE COURT
known of the previous marriage of Santos.

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court
simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each
question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12 other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in
Nepomuceno: 18
THE ISSUES
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case,
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous
because she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for
undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.
there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution
(Emphasis supplied)
beyond reasonable doubt.

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the
absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of
totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in
those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived
the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a
together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in
learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the
the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993.
more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former
void.
was the legal wife of Santos.

In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings
argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards
of the R TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed,
her husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos'
the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had
s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion
the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses
of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
during the trial. 20

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was
validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis
B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman,
who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is
guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that
for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the
crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years.
Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on
her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of six months
and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day
to four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, 24petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months
imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to
raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the
presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26In this case, petitioner has
consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that
marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
pass judgment on the validity of the marriage.1wphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner
to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and
given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now
resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took
place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in
their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the
Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the
marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
1996 32 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any
objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in
Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she
was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked
him.35 On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime
in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for
only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at
least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although
the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34
of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each
other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in
which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary,
because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face
an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not
satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less
than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in
an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the
State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage
and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a
mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants
shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest
or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, 44 petitioner married Santos while
knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement
under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court
to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the
ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court
found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951,
the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since
the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court
acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate
of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation.
Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner
herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this
fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of
prision correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
GR. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without
said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending
civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by
Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the
filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from
the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated
December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P.
Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second
marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that
the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-
captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court
is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it
appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had
already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared
"the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this
Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was
denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL
COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE
OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID
ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN
THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI
AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND
THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING
IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID
DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN
EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN
THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL
BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE
BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL
INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO
CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID
DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF
ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second
marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when
the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long
as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime DECISION
of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
NACHURA, J.:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The facts of the case are as follows:

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971,
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. petitioner gave birth to the spouses only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio
argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In
March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents home in Bancay 1st,
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
showed up at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11
separate. They executed a document to that effect.1 That was the last time petitioner saw him.
After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that not.2
what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
1985.3 Subsequently, however, Virgilios application for naturalization filed with the United States
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners marriage to Sofio was
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
subsisting.4 Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling,
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12

The RTC rendered its Decision5 on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit.
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
The RTC held that Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
Sofio Polborosa was already dead." It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present
provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the
spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded
time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial
belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-
charge for bigamy against him.
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1,
The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore
2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are
in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter testified that
hereby AFFIRMED.
her mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a strong
possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years old by then,
SO ORDERED. and people who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits,
and, even assuming as true petitioners testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a
drunkard, there is no evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6 She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in
G.R. No. 180863 September 8, 2009
this case and not the Family Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on
January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she
ANGELITA VALDEZ, Petitioner, had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of
vs. the Family Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be
found, was not expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the
Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007.7
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion for
Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,8 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that the
Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively
dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be expected to
comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio
Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner
already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the
presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofios
death, the OSG posits, could not be affected by the obligations created under the Family Code.9
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of the
Family Code.10Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly
repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its
provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights.11
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state that
we are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to
this Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies,
on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts;
on the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to
the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts. 12
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed
to prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the
Family Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January
11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil
Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according
to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know
his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead
and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.13
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court
proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentees estate.
In re Szatraw14 is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish national in
1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband,
on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their child and never
returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai, China.
However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In
1948, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing
that since the latter had been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any
news from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court
said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear
that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property
during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence
which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had
been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be
invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or
heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or
special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject
of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a
remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the
final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v.
Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had
been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized.
The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this
declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final
and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that
reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter
must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of
a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or
may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status
determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the judgment on the
subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence
of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare
instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a
person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact
finally determined.1avvphi1 If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because
he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is
still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.15
In Lukban v. Republic,16 petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco
Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after
a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his
parents and friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile. Believing her husband
was already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a
petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be
dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the
antecedents in Gue v. Republic17 are similar to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gues
husband left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China. From that day on,
he had not been heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his
whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she
asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial
declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is
not authorized by law.18
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
established by law19and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death
is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence,20 Sofio is to be presumed
dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to
petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the
Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not
required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the
Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the
Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-
founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid
at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the
objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of
Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by
operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the
time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated August 27, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be order3 dated December
15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP
Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantors
husband, presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato.
Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the
respondents inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate
moments; and (2) Jerrys expression of animosity toward the respondents father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent
ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or
about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerrys disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husbands declaration of presumptive death,
docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that
Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-
in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of
finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients directory whenever she
went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her
to file the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondents petition and declaring
Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her
husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without the former
receiving any news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order
dated December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor
is presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.5
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision,
the CA dismissed the petitioners petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs part,
and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latters order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition The
petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial
courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the
Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial
proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory
(hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they
are not subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the
declaration of her husbands presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct
the requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Courts
attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search
conducted and the respondents resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in
petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Courts Judgment in the Judicial
Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the courts judgment in summary proceedings, such as the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall
be immediately final and executory.
Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While
jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved
party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final does not
automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
in connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of
where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the
case of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. "ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the
and three of the same title. It states:
dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as
against the parties but even as against the courts.8 Modification of the courts ruling, no matter
how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary "ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v. proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not granted to parties because of the express mandate applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)
of Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express
"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."
provision of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was
erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due course to the Republics appeal and
order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege."
of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ
summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis
oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It
ours]
had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]

Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioners resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the
Court to question the RTCs order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.
Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
Death Under the Family Code
The Essential Requisites for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code,
there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the
Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more
stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of
proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouses
whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case
basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouseis already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).

To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an analysis of
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
the following relevant cases is warranted:

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
of the absentee.12

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that the present
The Present Spouse Has the Burden
spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was already
of Proof to Show that All the
dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
following:
Family Code Are Present

(1) He went to his in-laws house to look for her;

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41
of the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration
of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that (2) He sought the barangay captains aid to locate her;
the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.13
(3) He went to her friends houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among his
friends;
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during his free
Imposes a Stricter Standard
time;

Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have
had occasion to make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the (6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) Court found that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and
years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the only reported his wifes absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than
the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded
absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so
belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The
Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is
still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-founded
belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In this case, the
present spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the
absent spouses whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid
of the mass media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
(Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters
relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short,
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from
other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass
media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
who had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted
of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless. The Court
ruled that the present spouses investigations were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was
already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to
communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
iv.The present case
In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerrys whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients
directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the
records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients directory therein
were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her
hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers
these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the
situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and
prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities
or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouses bare assertion that he
inquired from his friends about his absent spouses whereabouts is insufficient as the names of
the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as
witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondents claim that she
conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-
founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about
her husbands whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely
engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are
insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted
on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."
Strict Standard Approach Is
Consistent with the States Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying
their marriage, has consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to ensure that a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a
tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and
should ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of ones spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this
Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse
must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had
been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing
spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code
for relief because of the xxx summary nature of its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the
States policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.24 Since marriage serves as
the familys foundation25 and since it is the states policy to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic social institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale to uphold the
sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of
which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most
fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic
state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouses Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently,
the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It
is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the
court's declaration.
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the
present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The
decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her
criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it
is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially
declared presumptively dead.
Final Word
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required in
petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts.
We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the
sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard
necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of
the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
GR. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January 20091 and 3
April 20092issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of
respondent.
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at
Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then
working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage
resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to
seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any
communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that
he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively
dead. The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City,
and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-0530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued
that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-
founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC
denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41,
Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA
had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the
judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,3 the CA ruled that a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated 3 April 2009.4
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues
 1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not
Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
subject to ordinary appeal

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the
evidence that respondent presented
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein
Our Ruling
shall be immediately final and executory.

1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,6 the Republic likewise appealed the CAs affirmation of the
of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately
RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse.
final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the
latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:
In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition assailing the
RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,5 the appellate court noted
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express
that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary
provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory."
judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final
and executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code.
The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it
Notice of Appeal is unavailing. be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the
RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case,
We affirm the CA ruling.
and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family
Law." Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by the
Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG should have filed
was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the
subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,7 issued a few months later.
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her
absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision
by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that,
under the Rules of Court,8 a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing special
proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this Court clarified that
while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls
under the category of special proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the
same Code. Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage,
petitioners action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather
than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this action was
not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed
the RTC Decision to the CA.

We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our ruling in
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary
appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary proceeding for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended "to set the
records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar."
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments
rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:9
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two
and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which
the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that,
in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics Notice of Appeal on
the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
respondents spouse was immediately final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary
appeal.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that
respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required
to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly
required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco,10 United States v.
Biasbas11 and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro12 as authorities on the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CAs affirmation of the RTCs grant of
respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British
subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving birth to their son while respondent
was on board a vessel working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the
ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to establish his "well-founded belief that the
absentee is already dead," as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this
Court recognized that this provision imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of
the Civil Code.13 The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the
absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to
be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by
the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the
Family Code are as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a "well-
founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United States
v. Biasbas,14 which it found to be instructive as to the diligence required in searching for a
missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining
the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that
she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of
the CA ruling affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had not been able to prove a "well-
founded belief" that his spouse was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the
Petition, and provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded
belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded
belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos
racionales."
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.1wphi1 It may be
proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to
elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or
circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of
life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as
it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,
competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is
still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring
supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters
relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short,
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from
other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass
media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief"
that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him
presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed,
"[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law."15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23
January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161062 July 31, 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FERVENTINO U. TANGO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated November 28, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76387 which denied the Republics appeal from the Order 2 dated
July 23, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 11 in Special Proceeding
No. 357. The trial court had declared the wife of respondent Ferventino U. Tango (Ferventino),
Maria Jose Villarba (Maria), presumptively dead under Article 413of the Family Code.
The present controversy arose from the following facts:
On March 9, 1987, Ferventino and Maria were married4 in civil rites before then Mayor Ignacio
Bunye of Muntinlupa City. None of Marias relatives witnessed the ceremony as they were
opposed to her relationship with Ferventino. The two had only spent a night together and had
been intimate once when Maria told Ferventino that she and her family will soon be leaving for
the United States of America (USA). Maria assured Ferventino, however, that she will file a
petition so he can live with her in the USA. In the event that said petition is denied, she promised
to return to the Philippines to live with him. On March 13, 1987, Maria and her family flew to
Seattle, USA.
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year before she stopped responding to his
letters. Out of resentment, he burned all the letters Maria wrote him. He claims to have forgotten
her address since.
Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria. Upon inquiry from the latters uncle,
Antonio Ledesma, in Las Pias, Ferventino learned that even Marias relatives were unaware of
her whereabouts. He also solicited the assistance of a friend in Texas, Capt. Luis Aris of the U.S.
Air Force, but to no avail. Finally, he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and Eusebia in Los
Angeles, and his aunt Anita Castro-Mayor in Seattle. Like, Ledesma though, their attempts to
find Maria proved fruitless. The next 14 years went by without any news of Maria.
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed a verified petition 5 dated October 1, 2001
before the Ligao City RTC for the declaration of presumptive death of Maria within the
contemplation of Article 41 of the Family Code.
When the case was called for initial hearing on January 8, 2002, nobody entered any opposition.
On July 22, 2002, Ferventino presented evidence ex parte and testified in court about the details
of his search. On July 23, 2002, Branch 11 of the Ligao City RTC issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring MARIA JOSE V. VILLARBA, wife of
FERVENTINO U. TANGO, presumptively dead within the meaning of Article 41 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED. 6
This prompted the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the Republic, to file a Notice of
Appeal.7 Acting thereon, Presiding Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva of the Ligao City RTC had the
records of the case transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, affirmed the RTCs Order. It held that Marias absence for 14 years without
information about her location despite diligent search by Ferventino was sufficient to support a
well-founded belief of her death. The appellate court observed that neither the OSG nor the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor objected to the evidence which Ferventino presented on trial. It
noted, in particular, that the OSG did not dispute the adequacy of Ferventinos basis to engender
a well-founded belief that Maria is dead. Hence, in a Decision dated November 28, 2003, the
Court of Appeals denied the Republics appeal in this tenor:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the July 23, 2002 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Ligao City, Branch 11 in Spec. Proc. No. 357 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.8
Before us, petitioner anchors this petition for review on certiorari on the following two grounds:
I.
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT ON THE ALLEGED EFFORTS MADE BY HIS FRIEND
AND RELATIVES IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, IS
HEARSAY AND DEVOID OF PROBATIVE VALUE[; AND]
II.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE AFORESAID TESTIMONY MAY BE CONSIDERED IN
EVIDENCE, THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENTS FRIEND AND RELATIVES IN
LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY
SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENTS ABSENT SPOUSE IS
PROBABLY DEAD.9
Unadorned, the issues for our determination are: (1) whether the testimony of respondent
Ferventino is hearsay; and (2) whether respondent Ferventino has established a basis to form a
well-founded belief that his absent spouse is already dead.
The Republic, through the OSG, contests the appellate courts holding that the absence of
respondents wife Maria for 14 years provides sufficient basis to entertain a well-founded belief
that she is dead. The OSG discounts respondents testimony, on the steps he took to find Maria,
as hearsay because none of the persons who purportedly helped in his search testified in court.
Notably, the OSG observes that only Capt. Aris gave a detailed account of his efforts to track
down Maria. According to Capt. Aris, he went over the Seattle phone directory for Marias name
and inquired about her from the registrars office in Seattle, but both efforts proved to be in vain.
The OSG belittles its failure to object to the admissibility of respondents testimony during trial.
Instead, it invokes Constitutional provisions that advocate the state policy of preserving marital
institutions.
On March 16, 2007, respondents counsel, Atty. Richie R. Regala, manifested to this Court his
intent to withdraw as counsel for respondent. According to Atty. Regala, he received a letter by
which respondent expressed a desire to withdraw from the proceeding. 10 In view of this, the
Court issued a Resolution11 on April 21, 2008 which deemed as waived the filing of respondents
comment on the petition. Previously, the Court of Appeals had also issued a Resolution 12 dated
October 15, 2003 submitting the case for decision and ordering its re-raffling for respondents
failure to file an appellees brief. In other words, apart from the verified petition for the declaration
of presumptive death of Maria dated October 1, 2001, which respondent filed before the Ligao
City RTC, he has not submitted any other pleading in connection with the petition.
Respondents apparent lack of desire to pursue the proceedings notwithstanding, the Court is
inclined to rule against the Republic.
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two
and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.13 From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which
the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.141avvphi1
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it filed a notice of
appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving
due course to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate
court. By no means did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of the
RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately final and executory.
Adding to the confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal and treated the same as
an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of the law, the judgment was
not appealable.15
Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at this level, the hands of the Court are
tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the trial court had long become final.
Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any respect even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.16 In light of the foregoing, it
would be unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the issues raised by petitioner.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of
quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only
exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable.17 None of the exceptions obtains here to merit the review sought.
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12
March 2007 Order3of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil
Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were
married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had
abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of
the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner,
which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned
that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts
of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayags
psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly
made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that
respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and
that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article
68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she
obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL
and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance
with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of
the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City,
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute
community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18
October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL
and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their
information and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not
apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent
in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule
does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1)
of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article
44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or
absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage
was contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed
either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties
agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on
co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with
the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may
be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary
to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the
decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision
without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which
denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.3 Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen
Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-
in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged
that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of
Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were
not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to
Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation
thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the
ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as
respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration 14 contending that the
doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice
and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration15arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of
R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged victim was an
essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the
coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW
OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004".17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of
Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the
RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community
of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing
and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or
necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since
Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by
marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the
conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in
a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary
parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal,
considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application
of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the
RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law
is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty
under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the
"Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the
defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences
provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple
violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering
the lack of similar rules under the special law.
20
In People v. Chowdury, the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to
define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise
known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were
not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the
persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under
Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing
Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said
special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy
under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be
applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the
RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of
violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another,
thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, thatalarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or
her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or
her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to
animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally
orthrough another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and
safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24 and that this intent must be effectuated
by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of
the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius"
finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of
statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. 25
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of
circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary
matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined
in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. 26 It is thus premature for petitioner to
argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of
whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or
absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A.
No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered
indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005
and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-
54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition
against respondents is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch
41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor
children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93
percent of a total population of 93.3 million adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the
admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church
and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence
against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms
of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the
women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor,
and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women
and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former
husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and
responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social
workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints
of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative
of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was
eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old,
who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around
her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and
even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions
and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive
wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man
eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's
Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair
when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household
help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent,
though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both
arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to
his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged
her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small
boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows
up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On
December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found
by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the
hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner
never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent
has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file
charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's
job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He
even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private
respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour
and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take
her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her
that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is
the President of three corporations 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation,
and J-Bros Trading Corporation of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In
contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely
draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid for
by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
corporation together with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands
of pesos from the corporations.16After private respondent confronted him about the affair,
petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of
the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24,
2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family
home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he
refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this
order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty
Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow
the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any
danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner
shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26
March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her
children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household
help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the
Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or
indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers,
letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO
in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK
and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the
Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He
should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or
control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a
house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he
received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which
himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the
Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be
reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15
days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the
Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up
a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two
sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an
amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional
provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the
Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in
Paraaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to
Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two
sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be
finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did
not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further
asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and
returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or
reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level
at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the
following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal
belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the
conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48
hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her
representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of
the household furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall
be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk
of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply
with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private
respondent filed another application24for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the
latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol
and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon
private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two
small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted
to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school.
On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a
criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at
the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to
get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl
Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against
Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as
follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another,
acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or
agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's
three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo
Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and
the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well
as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not
contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including,
ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to
the children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and
Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and
support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of
Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and
a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said
vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the
one taken by J Bros Tading;
 8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that
those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14,
The Issues
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are
conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I- I.
1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF
allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to THE LAW.
any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to
II.
the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the
encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of
gains. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE
THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for
another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause
why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's III.
manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner
be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262
already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
hereunder:
IV.
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO
and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
V.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
"exercise in futility."33 THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
Proceedings before the CA
The Ruling of the Court
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA)
a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A.
of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for
issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law." prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO)
against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for
failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the
civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the
validity
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so
that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod
City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
"inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by
the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law. We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997,"
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several
key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262
now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In
the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed
in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law."46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare
the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We
said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the
inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for
it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in
part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could
have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order
before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the
review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,
lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition
and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which
he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show
cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality
cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other
relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other
hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-
party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person
not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of
his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being
raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the
right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity
of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and
purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of
a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may,
Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine
legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it
may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the
form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in
one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the
temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order
issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty
(30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or
renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With
the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection
the rules on summary procedure. under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition Wednesday, December 10, 2003
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698).
Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court,
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups
he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic
expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court
children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic
in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant
violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or
thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an
the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good
expeditious and summary manner.
Senator respond to this kind of observation?

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR"
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of
time,56 should not be enjoined.
the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This
includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
States declared, thus:

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such
statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I
even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who correctly, Madam sponsor.
seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the
merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine
novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me
again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the
now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should domestic environment.
put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262. opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of
battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all
be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
situation for women, Mr. President.
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is
not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure
that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262,
representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 an amalgamation
domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more
of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in
superior to the Filipino woman.
Intimate Relationships Act"63 providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in
isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say? The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill
because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other
members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are
most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women,
the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that
children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be
enough protection extended to other family members particularly children who are excluded.
Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of
abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said
law.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular
measure.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, So, if I may propose an amendment
fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we
should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain
baseless complaints.
Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact,
it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as
14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my
the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and
heart to find out about these things.
women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of
both husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update
that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a
critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts,
sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President. SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Senator Sotto. Mr. President. Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill
but not the children.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would
be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is
inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda. The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
amendment, as amended, is approved.66

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I
will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr.
President.
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice
may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or
repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when
there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination
against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in
subordinate positions, compared with men."72
the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which quote the early studies:
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy the institutional rule of
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied) Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that
one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English
common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a
developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no
valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
thicker than their thumb.
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict
corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
importance than preventing violence to women.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike
women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true
equality."70
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her,
spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that
the husband can invoke for himself.
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality
and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The
with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-
temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of
based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders,
alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons,
pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's
bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by
companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to
suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's
men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that
right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public
gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than
the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims
of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of
every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical
Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these
incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the
very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions
or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family
violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above
estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United
States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these
incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child
abuse is often present as well.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against
women and children show that
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of
total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases
out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially
difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608
cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first
semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence
and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners
such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence
against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under
R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in
2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible
form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women,
is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no
superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their
husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's
abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8
percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of
female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United
States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human
beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly
also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences
on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi
and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted
Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other
Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.
 Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23

Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201

Acts of
580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Lasciviousness

Physical
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Injuries

Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
16 34 23 28 18 25 22
/Kidnapping 29

Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155

Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948

*2011 report covers only from January to August
Source: Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence
against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps,
because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of
women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times,
compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence;
and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence.75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less
likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who
experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the
hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases
of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many
years of physical or emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in
the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn
vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their
vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance
was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is
limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not
utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-
vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible
and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for
every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some
degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against
women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by
then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of
the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed
that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against
victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" first at the hands
of the offender and then of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor,
the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of
response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in
partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship."
Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable
greed" and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's
prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-
bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from
a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of
the police, the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy,
as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women
and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to
protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on
August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis
of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective
protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or
her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or
her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical
or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of
a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to
the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are
also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the
difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and
need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that phrases
like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely
controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental
or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree
of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long
as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as
the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral
word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does
not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that
they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her
by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the
family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of
family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court
is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the
order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order.
The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests,103 among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within
five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits
shall likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by
the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus,
the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a
mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006.
Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave
him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended.
Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in
futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited
period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he
can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to
complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from
the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check"
issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest
that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some
or all of the following reliefs:
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his
things and escort him from the residence;
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal
and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to
suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging
mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to
"protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue
thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on
Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: 110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for
an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining
positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is
not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence
implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an
order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate
equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis
supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be
established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1wphi1 A
Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be
acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad,
the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for
fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or
Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function.
The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other
law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it
would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of
acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a
clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words,
the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no
concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into
law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against
domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence
of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women
for equality but will be its fulfillment."118Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it
should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or,
in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist
from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all
laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence
of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall
be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."115
G.R. No. 170701 January 22, 2014
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner,
ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children vs.
exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus,
Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, Respondents.
 DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Decision 1
dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939.
On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition2 for herself and in behalf of her minor children,
Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and J ezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a protection order,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act
of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent claimed that she and her children had
suffered from petitioners abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the
children physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was
actually deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and, that she was threatened to
be deprived of her and her childrens financial support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City. They have three
children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27,
2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. In her Affidavit3 attached to the petition,
respondent claimed, among others, that: there was a time when petitioner went to her room and
cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to
proceed with the legal separation case she filed; she hid her fears although she was scared;
there was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that her
youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop his child from crying, petitioner
would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with
the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he wanted or she
would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious and threatened her of withholding his
financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and, on
May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with companions went to her new home and
forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her.
4
On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), which we quote in full:
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004, a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) effective for thirty (30) days
from date of receipt is hereby issued against respondent Ralph P. Tua.
For the purpose of the implementation of the Temporary Protection Order, the respondent
(herein petitioner Ralph) is hereby ordered to:
1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to commit personally or through another,
physical, verbal and emotional harm or abuse against the herein petitioner
(respondent) and other family and household members;
2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner (respondent) whether directly or indirectly or
engaged in any psychological form of harassment;
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers of the Law are hereby
commanded to effect this Order immediately and to use necessary force and measures under
the law to implement this Order.
Let the hearing for Permanent Protection Order be set on June 9, 2005 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.
SO ORDERED.5
In his Comment6 to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO, petitioner denied
respondents allegations and alleged, among others, that he had been maintaining a separate
abode from petitioner since November 2004; that it was respondent who verbally abused and
threatened him whenever their children's stay with him was extended; that respondent had been
staying with a certain Rebendor Zuiga despite the impropriety and moral implications of such
set-up; that despite their written agreement that their minor children should stay in their conjugal
home, the latter violated the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their conjugal dwelling
with their minor children and stayed with said Zuiga; and, that respondent is mentally,
psychologically, spiritually and morally unfit to keep the children in her custody. Petitioner
contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for being violative of
the due process clause of the Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and motion to lift TPO,
petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and hold
departure order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the RTC.
On June 9, 2005, the CA, in order not to render the petition moot and to avoid grave and
irreparable injury, issued a temporary restraining order to temporarily enjoin the parties and their
agents from enforcing the assailed May 23, 2005 TPO issued in Civil Case No. 0464-05.7
Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Manifestation,8 praying that the enforcement of all orders, decision to be issued by the RTC and
all the proceedings therein be restrained. A hearing9 was, subsequently, conducted on the
motion.
On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic) issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 0464-05 is UPHELD. 10
In so ruling, the CA found that the petition filed by respondent under RA 9262 is still pending
before the RTC; thus, the factual matters raised therein could not be passed upon in the petition
for certiorari filed with it. The CA noted that during the pendency of the herein proceedings,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash warrant issued by the RTC and which matter could not
also be a subject of this petition which assails the TPO dated May 23, 2005 and that the motion
to quash should have been filed with the RTC.
The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly issued by the RTC and found no Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section 15 of RA 9262 contending that
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof as the same were in complete accord with the had there been no ex parte issuance of the TPO, he would have been afforded due process of
provision of RA 9262. law and had properly presented his side on the matter; that the questioned provision simply
encourages arbitrary enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights which affects his life,
liberty and property.
As to petitioner's argument that there was no basis for the issuance of the TPO, considering that
the provision authorizing such issuance is unconstitutional, the CA ruled that since the matter
raised herein was the RTCs alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO, such matter We are not impressed.
could be resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions.
And that the requisites that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:
case was absent.

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the
Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the following issues:
protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of
I the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the
date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY
TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement
ERRED IN HOLDING AND FINDING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED
agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of
RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED NO
the issuance of a PPO.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER ISSUED THE TEMPORARY
PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO) DATED 23 MAY 2005 WITHOUT OBSERVING DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND BASIC HUMAN In Garcia v. Drilon,13 wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation
RIGHTS. of the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:

II A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING TO RULE ON THE
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF RA 9262 HAS DECIDED THE
CASE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT CONTRARY TO ITS FINDINGS THE The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SAID LAW IS THE LIS MOTA OF THE CASE.11 is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
Petitioner claims that contrary to the stance of the CA in not deciding the issue of the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It
constitutionality of RA 9262, the issue presented is the very lis mota in the instant case.
also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in his Comment to
respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO dated May 23, 2005 filed with the RTC.
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
However, without awaiting for the resolution of the same, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.
with the CA assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court
Contrary to the CA's finding that the matter raised in the petition filed with it was the RTCs
is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO which could be resolved without having to
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the
rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions, we find that since petitioner is
order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
assailing the validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent's right to a protection order is based upon,
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
the constitutionality of the said law must first be decided upon. After all, the alleged
unconstitutionality of RA 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance
of a protection order.12 Notwithstanding, however, we still find no merit to declare RA 9262 There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order.
unconstitutional. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay
was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)
days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay
Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay.1wphi1
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to
the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within
duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits
public order in the barangay."17
shall likewise be indicated on the notice.

Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by
discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23, 2005 as the petition was bereft of any indication of
the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
grounds for the issuance of the same. Petitioner claims that while the issuance of the TPO is ex
should not be issued.
parte, there must be a judicial determination of the basis thereof. He contends that the
allegations in respondent's affidavit attached to the petition, and without admitting the same to
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be be true, are nothing more than normal or usual quarrels between a husband and wife which are
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. not grave or imminent enough to merit the issuance of a TPO.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
We are not persuaded.
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.14 We quote again Section 15 of RA 9262 for ready reference, thus:

Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to
barangay officials to issue protection orders.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof."
Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency
of any law is primarily the function of the legislature.15 The act of Congress entrusting us with the
issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the
redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.16
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong
Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant
on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the
protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of
the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO.
The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court
sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall
include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex
parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the
respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus,
it is within the courts discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to
determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have
been committed.
And Section 5 of the same law provides:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the
woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of
custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal
right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or
properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or
properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of
controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual
activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or
through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate
family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or
her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or
her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to
animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's
child/children.
In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he cocked the gun and pointed the
same to his head in order to convince respondent not to proceed with the legal separation case;
feeding his other children with the food which another child spat out; and threatening the crying
child with a belt to stop him from crying which was repeatedly done; and holding respondent by
her nape when he got furious that she was asking him not to come often to their conjugal home
and hold office thereat after their agreed separation and threatening her of withholding half of the
financial support for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of a TPO.
Petitioner's actions would fall under the enumeration of Section 5, more particularly, paragraphs
a, d, e (2), f, h, and i.
It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.18We find that the CA did not
err when it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the
TPO.
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented during the hearing on the
merits on the issuance of the Permanent Protection Order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939, upholding the Regional Trial Court's issuance of the
Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite is hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch respondent's Petition for a
Permanent Protection Order.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Finance Center (AFPFC), Petitioner,
vs.
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to nullify and set
aside the Decision1 dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution2 dated March 9, 2012 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN. The CA affirmed the orders
and decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 granting
temporary and permanent protection orders, and denying the motion to lift the said temporary
protection order (TPO).
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt.
Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent
and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but
respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows:
Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection Order to be sufficient in form and
substance and to prevent great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, a TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER is forthwith issued to respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON
directing him to do the following acts:
1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to commit or committing further acts of
physical abuse and violence against the petitioner;
2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters from petitioner, her residence or
her place of work;
3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating, contacting or communicating with
petitioner; 4. Respondent is prohibited from using or possessing any firearm or deadly
weapon on occasions not related to his job;
5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the petitioner.
The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through the Chairman in the area where the
petitioner and respondent live at Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and Bobuntogan,
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any request for assistance from the
petitioner for the implementation of this order. They are also directed to accompany the
petitioner to their conjugal abode at Purok 2, Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her
personal belongings in order to insure the safety of the petitioner.
The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately serve the Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) upon the respondent personally and to seek and obtain the assistance of law
enforcement agents, if needed, for purposes of effecting the smooth implementation of this
order.
In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be served upon the respondent for him to file
an OPPOSITION within a period of five (5) days from receipt hereof and let a Preliminary
Conference and hearing on the merits be set on October 17, 2006 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.
To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondents retirement and other benefits,
the following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and
other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further
orders from the court:
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE DATE OF THE
PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A
PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR
POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A
LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID
HEARING.
IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY
CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT
SHALL ALLOW EX-PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER AND
RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
NO DELEGATION OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the TPO, appeared during the
scheduled pre-trial but informed the court that he did not yet have a counsel and requested for
time to hire his own counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file an opposition or answer
to the petition. Because of his failure to appear in the subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC
allowed the ex-parte presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused
to give her spousal support as directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no source of
livelihood since he had told her to resign from her job and concentrate on keeping their house),
the RTC issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal support in the
amount of P4,000.00 per month and fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which shall be
automatically deducted and given directly to respondent.5
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon never complied with the TPO as he
continued making threats and inflicting physical abuse on her person, and failed to give her
spousal support as ordered by the court.
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,6 as follows:
After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this case, this court finds that
there is a need to permanently protect the applicant, Daisy R. Yahon from further acts of
violence that might be committed by respondent against her. Evidences showed that respondent
who was a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at the Headquarters 4ID
Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City had been repeatedly inflicting physical, verbal,
emotional and economic abuse and violence upon the petitioner. Respondent in several
instances had slapped, mauled and punched petitioner causing her physical harm. Exhibits G
and D are medical certificates showing physical injuries suffered by petitioner inflicted by the
respondent at instances of their marital altercations. Respondent at the height of his anger often
poked a gun on petitioner and threatened to massacre her and her child causing them to flee for
their lives and sought refuge from other people. He had demanded sex from petitioner at an
unreasonable time when she was sick and chilling and when refused poked a gun at her.
Several police blotters were offered as evidence by petitioner documenting the incidents when
she was subjected to respondents ill temper and ill treatment. Verbally, petitioner was not
spared from respondents abuses by shouting at her that he was wishing she would die and he
would celebrate if it happens and by calling and sending her threatening text messages. These
incidents had caused petitioner great psychological trauma causing her [to] fear for her life and
these forced her to seek refuge from the court for protection. Economically, petitioner was also
deprived by respondent of her spousal support despite order of the court directing him to give a
monthly support of Php4,000.00. In view of the foregoing, this court finds a need to protect the
life of the petitioner not only physically but also emotionally and psychologically.
Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary, and there being no controverting
evidence presented by respondent, this Court finds that the applicant has established her case
by preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition,
thus, pursuant to Sec. 30 of A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC, let a PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER
be issued immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES A.YAHON is ordered to give to
petitioner, DAISY R. YAHON the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per
month by way of spousal support.
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon
is directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may
be due or released to him from the government and the said share of petitioner shall be
automatically deducted from respondents benefits and claims and be given directly to the
petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance Center of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of
RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola
St., Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and strict compliance.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), assisted by the
Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation and
Motion (To Lift Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP)8 dated November 10, 2008. Stating
that it was making a limited and special appearance, petitioner manifested that on August 29,
2008, it furnished the AFP Pension and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO
for appropriate action. The PGMC, on September 2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the
temporary withholding of the thirty-six (36) Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon.
Thereafter, on October 29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a letter to the Chief of Staff, AFP for the
OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO, and requesting for legal opinion as to the propriety of
releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the RTC that S/Sgt. Yahons check
representing his 36 MLS had been processed and is ready for payment by the AFPFC, but to
date said check has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its obligation under the TPO, the
RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons, and hence
the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally, petitioner contended that the
AFPFC is not a party-in-interest and is a complete stranger to the proceedings before the RTC
on the issuance of TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner lamented that it was
not afforded due process and it was thus improper to issue execution against the AFPFC.
Consequently, petitioner emphasized its position that the AFPFC cannot be directed to comply
with the TPO without violating its right to procedural due process.
In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid motion for having been
filed out of time. It noted that the September 28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007 Decision granting
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become final and executory.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the RTCs Order 10 dated
March 6, 2009.
On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying for the nullification
of the aforesaid orders and decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to automatically deduct from
S/Sgt. Yahons retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same to respondent as
spousal support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Respondent filed her Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction,
manifesting that there is no information as to whether S/Sgt. Yahon already received his
retirement benefit and that the latter has repeatedly violated the TPO, particularly on the
provision of spousal support.
After due hearing, the CAs Twenty-Second Division issued a Resolution 11 granting respondents
application, viz:
Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the parties, the Court finds meritorious private
respondents application for the issuance of an injunctive relief. While the 36-month lump sum
retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been given to him, yet as admitted by
petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been
released to him. It appears that the release of such pension could render ineffectual the eventual
ruling of the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue enjoining
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, its employees, agents, representatives, and
any all persons acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining pension that may be due to
S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon.
SO ORDERED.12
By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the
assailed orders and decision of the RTC. The CA likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner military institution may be
ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted
personnel, and to give the same directly to the latters lawful wife as spousal support in
compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against
women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary
relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption
in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 13 The
protection orders issued by the court may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order that may be issued by the barangay
shall be known as a Barangay Protection Order (BPO).14
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or
BPO, to wit:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally
or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated, and if
respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a
law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there
until respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and any designated family or
household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the
residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the
petitioner and any designated family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other
essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law
enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to
ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and
other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioners or respondents
removal of personal belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if
entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall
order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be
withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically
remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the
remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall
render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly
weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition
by the court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any
license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the
court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate
authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not
limited to, property damage, medical expenses, child care expenses and loss of
income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner temporary
shelter and other social services that the petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and
provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household
member, provided petitioner and any designated family or household member
consents to such relief. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTCs directive for the automatic deduction of
50% from S/Sgt. Yahons retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as
it contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation of
military personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638,15 which states: Section
31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned,
ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or
enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or
property accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of
the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this
Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative
bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of
the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his
exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection
with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor
of the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we held that a court order directing the Philippine
National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-
half of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latters conjugal share is illegal and improper, as
it violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from
execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39
enumerates those properties which are exempt from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any
pension or gratuity from the Government;(Emphasis supplied.)
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the
later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. 17 Statutes must
be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to
the later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.19
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as
laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage
of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted
directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt.
Yahons retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds, citing the
case of Pacific Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this Court sustained the CA when it held that the
garnishment of the amount of P10,500 payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in
the possession of the Bureau of Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void.
The CA therein relied on the previous rulings in Director of Commerce and Industry v.
Concepcion21 and Avendano v. Alikpala, et al.22 wherein this Court declared null and void the
garnishment of the salaries of government employees.
Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific Products:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees
in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not
be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its
officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is
that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing
officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be
entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing
is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.23
We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage
the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahons employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or
government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support
enforcement legislation.1wphi1In the United States, provisions of the Child Support
Enforcement Act24 allow garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has
failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these provisions were designed "to avoid
sovereign immunity problems" and provide that "moneys payable by the Government to any
individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings," the law is clearly intended to
"create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders
directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession."25
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal
protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon26 the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband
after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a
protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real
substantial distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy,
as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women
and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to
protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.27
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form of
violence committed against women economic abuse.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article
73 of the Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.28
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who
are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their
personal safety and security.
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 29, 2011
and Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP
No. 02953-MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No costs.
No. 169900 March 18, 2010
MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC.,
and ELVIRA GOZON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169977
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, ALFREDO GOZON, and WINIFRED GOZON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review,1 assailing the 7 July 2005
Decision2 and the 30 September 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74447.
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No. 5357.4 The
property is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon
(Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC) a
petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a
notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.
On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
(Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell5 (Agreement) involving the property for the
price of P18 million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement were that Alfredo would: (1) secure
an Affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredos exclusive property and to annotate the
Agreement at the back of TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to exclude
the property from the legal separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis
pendens pertaining to the said case and annotated on TCT No. 5357. However, despite
repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying
the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of
the property in September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the Agreement was annotated on TCT
No. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision6 in the legal separation case,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation between petitioner
and respondent. Accordingly, petitioner Elvira Robles Gozon is entitled to live separately from
respondent Alfredo Gozon without dissolution of their marriage bond. The conjugal partnership
of gains of the spouses is hereby declared DISSOLVED and LIQUIDATED. Being the offending
spouse, respondent is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their
child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.
Furthermore, said parties are required to mutually support their child Winifred R. Gozon as her
needs arises.
SO ORDERED.7
As regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed conjugal property.
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their
daughter, Winifred Gozon (Winifred). The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled
TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-105088 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the
Agreement and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508.
On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney9 executed in his favor by
Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million.10 IDRI paid
Alfredo P18 million, representing full payment for the property.11 Subsequently, the Register of
Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-1097612 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
13
On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
01. On the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:
1.1 The same is hereby made permanent by:
1.1.1 Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. and Gil Tabije, their agents,
representatives and all persons acting in their behalf from any
attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts of
further alienating or disposing of the subject property;
1.1.2. Enjoining defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. from
entering and fencing the property;
1.1.3. Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. to respect plaintiffs possession of the
property.
02. The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993, between plaintiff and
defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby approved, excluding the property and rights of
defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal
property subject of this case.
03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August 1994, entered into by and between
defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is hereby nullified and voided.
04. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, executed by defendant
Winifred Gozon, through defendant Alfredo Gozon, in favor of defendant Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby nullified and voided.
05. Defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby ordered to deliver its Transfer
Certificate of Title No. M-10976 to the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
06. The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to cancel
Certificate of Title Nos. 10508 "in the name of Winifred Gozon" and M-10976 "in the
name of Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.," and to restore Transfer Certificate of Title No.
5357 "in the name of Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Robles" with the Agreement to
Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993 fully annotated therein is hereby ordered.
07. Defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of plaintiff over his one-half undivided share in the subject property and to
comply with all the requirements for registering such deed.
08. Ordering defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to sit with plaintiff to agree on the selling
price of her undivided one-half share in the subject property, thereafter, to execute and
deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in favor of the plaintiff and to comply
with all the requirements for registering such deed, within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of this DECISION.
09. Thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Alfredo Gozon the balance
of Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) in his one-half undivided share in the property
to be set off by the award of damages in plaintiffs favor.
10. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon the price they
had agreed upon for the sale of her one-half undivided share in the subject property.
11. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to
pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the following:
11.1 Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as actual and compensatory
damages;
11.2 One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
11.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
11.4 Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) as attorneys fees; and
11.5 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as litigation expenses.
 11.6 The above awards are subject to set off of plaintiffs obligation in b) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
paragraph 9 hereof.
c) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
12. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the following:
d) P20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and

12.1 Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000.00) which constitute the amount

e) The awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby ordered
the former received from the latter pursuant to their Deed of Absolute Sale
deleted for lack of basis.
dated 26 October 1994, with legal interest therefrom;

4. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay
12.2 One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
defendant-appellant IDRI jointly and severally the following:

12.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages;

a) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
and

b) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

12.4 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as attorneys fees.

c) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.

13. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay costs of
suit.
Defendant Winifred Gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of defendant Alfredo Gozon was
14
awarded, is hereby given the option whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the
SO ORDERED.
subject land.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTCs decision with modification. The
The rest of the decision not inconsistent with this ruling stands.
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 7 July 2005 reads:

SO ORDERED.15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated April 3, 2001 of the RTC,
Branch 74, Malabon is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his petition, Mario alleges
that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
1. The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified
is declared null and void for the following reasons:
her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a
Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira.
a) The conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-appellee
Elvira Gozon;
On the other hand, IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Thus, IDRI prays
that the Court should uphold the validity of IDRIs TCT No. M-10976 over the property.
b) Defendant Alfredo Gozons one-half () undivided share has been
forfeited in favor of his daughter, defendant Winifred Gozon, by virtue of the
We find the petitions without merit.
decision in the legal separation case rendered by the RTC, Branch 16,
Cavite;
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the
property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code.
2. Defendant Alfredo Gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant Siochi the amount
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
of P5 Million which the latter paid as earnest money in consideration for the sale of the
subject land;
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the
3. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
pay plaintiff-appellant Siochi jointly and severally, the following:
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

a) P100,000.00 as moral damages;

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom
Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property
without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or
authority, the sale is void.16 The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire
sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted
the sale.17 Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the
property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its
validity.18 The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of
Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is
a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn,
the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI
clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the one-half undivided share
of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the
ruling of the Cavite RTC in the legal separation case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the
ruling of the Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the
net profits and the same is awarded to Winifred.
The Cavite RTC ruling finds support in the following provisions of the Family Code:
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which
shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject
to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the
innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
produce the following effects:
xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse
by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse; (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is
dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is
forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that "[f]or purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No.
(2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in
good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further
inquiries about the vendors title to the property. The representative of IDRI testified that he knew
about the existence of the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 5357 and the legal separation case
filed before the Cavite RTC. Thus, IDRI could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC decision
declaring the property as conjugal.
Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens was highly irregular. Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No.
1529,19 the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon order of the court, or (b) by the
Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration of the lis
pendens. In this case, the lis pendens was cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the request
of Alfredo. There was no court order for the cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did Elvira,
the party who caused the registration of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its
cancellation.
Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that
Alfredos donation of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article
12520 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the
consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.1avvphi1
Nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of the Malabon RTC for the reimbursement
of the P18 million paid by IDRI for the property, which was inadvertently omitted in the
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozons one-half amount paid by Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with legal interest
undivided share in favor of Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon computed from the finality of this Decision.
whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the property; and
SO ORDERED.
(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty,
Inc. jointly and severally the Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) which was the