Application of Section 34 vis-a-vis Rule 138-A

of the Rules of Court

G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 EDANG ST., PASAY CITY,
PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 108, PASAY
CITY, METRO MANILA, PUBLIC RESPONDENT.

BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 EDANG ST., PASAY CITY, PRIVATE

RESPONDENT.

Facts:

The Rules of Court provides for instances when a non-lawyer

may appear in courts.

First, we have Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule,

which provides:

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law

student who has successfully completed his 3rd
year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law

student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of
 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school....

Second, Sec. 34 of Rule 138 which states that:

By whom litigation is conducted. - . In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
The above-mentioned Rules gave rise to the present case
which is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

It was directly filed with the Supreme Court assailing the

Resolutions which denied the appearance of the plaintiff
Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and
the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares,
to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case.

Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance before the

court for and on his behalf as the plaintiff in a Civil Case for
Abatement of Nuisance. Cruz, a fourth year law student,
anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court[3] that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Mijares required the petitioner to

secure a written permission from the Court Administrator
before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself,
a party-litigant. The counsel for for the other party filed a
Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which
petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion
to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed.
Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku, masama `yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the
pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing.

Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,[4] praying

for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion
alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent
judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the
contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial.
It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark,
reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the
belief that justice will not be served.

In an Order, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition

stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based
on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary
inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start
of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said order.

Later on, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In

the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of
petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and
jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements
or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, or the
Law Student Practice Rule, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration,[9] petitioner reiterated that

the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section
34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were
distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but
the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule
138-A. Hence this petition.
Issue:

Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and
when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the
case, or not.

Held:

The contention of Cruz has merit. The Court erred in

applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner's claim
is Section 34 of Rule 138, and is a rule distinct from Rule
138-A.

The rule recognizes the right of an individual to represent

himself in any case to which he is a party. As such, he may
personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation. In this
case, Cruz alleges that he is a law student and impliedly
asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case
himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this
decision. In effect, he runs the risk of falling into the snares
and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as
plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the
litigation of the Civil Case. He would then be acting not as a
counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to
represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the
petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to
the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded

Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court
never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the
guidelines for limited law student practice.

Additionally, however, the Court do not agree on Cruzs

contention that the Judge Mijares committed manifest bias
and partiality. In adopting the ruling in the administrative
complaint filed by Cruz, the Court ruled that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when
she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case. It stated
that absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in
favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.

Accordingly, the Petition is partially granted. The assailed

Resolution and Order of the Trial Court are modified. The
Trial Court is directed to admit the Entry of Appearance of
Cruz as a party litigant.

G.R. No. 109149, December 21, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEONCIO

SANTOCILDES, JR. Y SIGA-AN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Facts:

The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in Article III,

Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution . This
constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares the
right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the
arraignment to the promulgation of judgment. In turn,
Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests the
power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law to the Supreme Court. Section 1 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court explicitly states who are entitled to
practice law in the Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly
provides for the requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar.

In the present case, Santocildes Jr. was charged with the

crime of rape of a girl less than nine (9) years old. The trial
court rendered a decision finding him guilty as charged.
Hence, he duly filed a Notice of Appeal. In his brief, he made
the stated assignment of errors one of which is that he was
deprived though no fault of his own to be defended by a
person authorized to practice law amounting to denial of due
process.

Santocildes Jr. contends that he was represented during

trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all
intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even
conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of
the witnesses. On appeal, however, Santocildes Jr. secured
the services of a new lawyer, who discovered that Gualberto
C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Further
verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed
this fact. Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of
the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal
of the crime charged.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand,

maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellants
counsel during trial was not a member of the bar,
Santocildes Jr. was afforded due process since he has been
given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal that
said person "presented the evidence for the defense with the
ability of a seasoned lawyer and in general handled the case
of appellant in a professional and skillful manner."

Issue:

Whether there was denial of due process when Santocildes

Jr. was deprived though no fault of his own to be defended
by a person authorized to practice law, or not.

Held:

The right of the accused to be heard by himself and his

counsel goes much deeper than the question of ability or
skill. It lies at the heart of our adversarial system of justice.
Where the interplay of basic rights of the individual may
collide with the awesome forces of the state, we need a
professional learned in the law as well as ethically
committed to defend the accused by all means fair and
reasonable.

On the matter of proper representation by a member of the

bar, we had occasion to resolve a similar issue where the
Court set aside the assailed judgment and remanded the
case to the trial court for a new trial, explaining that:
 accused person is entitled to be represented by
a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against
her.Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there
is great danger that any defense presented in her
behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of
due process.
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance
and the presence and participation of counsel in criminal
proceedings should never be taken lightly. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed
to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where
the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory
machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the
fundamental principle of due process which basically means
that a person must be heard before being condemned. The
due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights;
it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily.

Jurisprudence has also held that "the right to practice law is

not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a
privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified.
In view of the foregoing, the assailed judgment is set aside,
and the case is hereby remanded to the trial court for new
trial. With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the
person named Gualberto C. Ompong in connection with this
case, the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines of Iloilo City is directed to conduct a prompt and
thorough investigation regarding this matter and to report
its recommendations to the Court.

G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE

ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS, PETITIONERS, VS. BINALBAGAN ISABELA
SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING,
RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
PAFLU, et al. filed a petition for review of an order, and the
en banc resolution, of the Court of Industrial Relations in a
case which granted respondent Quintin Muning, a non-
lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said
case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case
"PAFLU, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After
trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision,
ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became
final.

Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning

complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to
30% of the total backwages. Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a
similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila
and Tenazas, filed a manifestation indicating their non-
objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their
backwages, and, on the same day, Quintin Muning filed a
"Petition for Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20%
of the backwages. Muning's petition however was opposed
by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the ground that he is not a
lawyer.

The records of Case show that the charge was filed by

Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. In
all the hearings, appearances made in behalf of the
complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and
subsequently by Quintin Muning.

The Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the

backwages as compensation for professional services
rendered in the case, 10% of which shall go to Muning.

The award of 10% to Muning, who is not a lawyer according

to the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.

Issue:

Whether Muning, who is a not a lawyer is entitled to receive

attorneys fees, or not.

Held:
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in
Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., that an agreement providing for
the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union
president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and
cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is
no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the
present case.

The provision in Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 875 that --

"In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing

Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required
to be represented by legal counsel. . . . . . . .

is no justification for a ruling that the person representing

the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if
he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same
section adds that:

"it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or

Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine
witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in
the orderly presentation of evidence ",

thus making it clear that the representation should be

exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or

appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-
litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to
compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule
138, of the Rules of Court, providing An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, . . . . . .
This imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship
as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Certainly
public policy demands that legal work in representation of
parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing
tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules
and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to
judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts,
clients and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is

persuasive. There, it is stated:

"But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been

enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the
bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the
great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation
for strictly legal services cannot be recovered by one who
has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the
jurisdiction where the services were rendered." [5]

"No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as

an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to
practice. . . . .and is an attorney in good standing at the
time."[6]

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should
not be violated. And that if fees were to be allowed to non-
lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to
whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar
in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers
are not amenable to disciplinary measures. Being a court of
[10]

special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons

and cannot justify an exception.

In light thereof, the orders under review are hereby set aside
insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's
fees for Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other
respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
 G.R. No. 111474, August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI AND/OR JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN AND GILBERTO
SABSALON, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this
special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision of
[1]

respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo
Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits
and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal
rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date
of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for
attorney's fees.

Records show that Private respondents Domingo Maldigan

and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi
drivers. Aside from the daily "boundary", they were also
required to pay for car washing, and to further make a
deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for
every actual working day.
Later on Maldigan and Sabsalon failed to report for work
during their schedule despite repeated demands by herein
petitioner. It was found out that they voluntarily left their
jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators.
When Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement
of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, herein petitioners told
him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these
were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the
repairs of the taxi he was driving. When Maldigan insisted
on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his
services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination
from employment was effected when he refused to pay for
the washing of his taxi seat covers.
Maldigan and Sabsalon filed a complaint with the Manila
Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations
Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and
illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor
arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to
file the same and such unreasonable delay was not
consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed
to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be
interpreted as a mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings and it
accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that
Maldigan and Sabsalon services were not illegally
terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor
arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents
the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.

Respondent NLRC held that the daily deposits made by

respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is
covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the
Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits,
and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has
recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry.
Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the
respondents must be refunded therefor.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied

by the NLRC, this petition is was filed imputing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
It is important to take note that during the said proceedings,
it was Guillermo H. Pulia, who is not a lawyer, represented
Maldigan and Sabsalon.

Issue:
Whether the respondents are entitled to the payment of
accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest
thereon at the legal rate, and 10% of the total amount as and
for attorney's fees, or not.

Held:
First, as regards to accumulated deposits, the rule on Article
114 of the Labor Code does not apply to or permit deposits
to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in
the remittance of his "boundary." In other case, any balance
due to private respondents after proper accounting must be
returned to them with legal interest

Second, on the matter of the car wash payments, the labor

arbiter decided that there is nothing illegal in the practice
where the employers are requiring the drivers to shoulder
the expenses for washing. This is as much more to consider
the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the
context of the law. Consequently, private respondents are not
entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they
made.

Finally, as regards to the attorneys fees, Article 222 of the

Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the
NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent
themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the
members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H.
Pulia was the authorized representative of private
respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either
of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the
law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be

entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
compensation for his services necessarily imports the
[7]

existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for

the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot
exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer.

In consideration of that, the questioned judgment of

respondent National Labor Relations Commission was
modified by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car
wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public
respondent to order and effect the computation and payment
by petitioners of the refund for Maldigan's deposits, plus
legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this
resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.

G.R. No. 126625, September 23, 1997

KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et. al, RESPONDENTS

Facts:
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the
NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a party to the
case; (b) he represents an organization or its members, with
written authorization from them; or (c) he is a duly
accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines in cases referred to by the latter.
This is a petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon
Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. seeks to annul the
decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, and remand the cases to the Arbitration Branch
for a retrial on the merits.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
construction business nationwide with principal office at
Quezon City. Kanlaon Co., was contracted by the National
Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for its
plant employees in Iligan City. Engineers Paulino Estacio and
Mario Dulatre were hired by Kanlaon Co., as laborers in the
project and worked under the supervision of Estacio and
Dulatre. When the project neared its completion and
petitioner started terminating the services of private
respondents and its other employees.
Later on after the termination, forty-one laborers filed
separate complaints against Kanlaon Co., before Sub-
Regional Arbitration Branch in Iligan City claiming that
Kanlaon Co., paid them wages below the minimum and
sought payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-
month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-
respondents.

Some of the cases were assigned to two different Labor

Arbiters. Summonses and notices of preliminary conference
were issued and served on the two engineers and petitioner
through Engineer Estacio. The preliminary conferences
before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers
Estacio and Dulatre and private respondents. At the
conference, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner's liability
to private respondents and agreed to pay their wage
differentials and thirteenth-month pay. As a result of this
agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived petitioner's
right to file its position paper. Private respondents declared
that they, too, were dispensing with their position papers
and were adopting their complaints as their position paper.

Engineer Estacio appeared but requested for another week

to settle the claims. Labor Arbiter denied this request and
later issued an order granting the complaint and directing
petitioner to pay private respondents' claims. The other
Labor Arbiter issued a similar order.
Petitioner appealed, through the representation of Arthur
Abudiente, to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission. It alleged that it was denied due process and
that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to
represent and bind petitioner.
In a decision NLRC affirmed the orders of the Arbiters.
Petitioner's appeal by certiorari on the ground that NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in arbitrarily, capriciously and
whimsically making the following conclusions based not on
facts and evidence but on speculation, surmise and
conjecture.
In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor
arbiters and respondent Commission are void for the
following reasons: (1) there was no valid service of
summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty.
Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent
petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on appeal
to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters
and respondent Commission are based on unsubstantiated
and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of
petitioner's right to due process.
Issue:
Whether Estacio and Dulare are vald representatives of
Kanlaon Co., or not.
Held:

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither

were they duly-accredited members of a legal aid office.
Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity
as parties to the cases was authorized under the first
exception to the rule. However, their appearance on behalf
of Kanlaon Co., required written proof of authorization. It
was incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority
especially since both engineers were named co-respondents
in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority,
whatever statements and declarations Engineer Estacio
made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.
The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases
appealed to respondent Commission did not cure Engineer
Estacio's representation. Atty. Abundiente, in the first place,
had no authority to appear before the Commission. The
appellants' brief he filed was verified by him, not by Kanlaon
Co.,
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty.
Abundiente were authorized to appear as representatives of
Kanlaon Co., they could bind the latter only in procedural
matters before the arbiters and respondent Commission.
Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its
discretion in affirming the decisions of the labor arbiters
which were not only based on unauthorized representations,
but were also made in violation of petitioner's right to due
process.
 A.C. No. 8096, July 05, 2010

REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A. PANES, JR., COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY.

MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY. LEONARD BUENTIPO MANN, ATTY. RODOLFO U.
VIAJAR, JR., AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D. NADUA, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution passed
by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the
disbarment case filed by the complainants against the
respondents.

Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and

controlled corporation (GOCC), hired respondent Atty.
Michael A. Ignes as private legal counsel. The Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the Commission
on Audit (COA) gave their consent to the employment of Atty.
Ignes. However, controversy later erupted when two (2)
different groups, herein referred to as the Dela Pea board
and Yaphockun board, laid claim as the legitimate Board of
Directors of KWD.

The Dela Pea board also adopted its own Resolution

appointing respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and Atty.
Leonard Buentipo Mann as private collaborating counsels for
all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under the direct
supervision and control of Atty. Ignes.
Subsequently, Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Mann filed SCA
Cases in behalf of the KWD.

After some time, the OGCC had approved the retainership

contract of Atty. Benjamin B. Cuanan as new legal counsel of
KWD and stated that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes
had expired.

Later on, the OGCC also addressed Eleanor P. Gomba's

insistence that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes will
expire. The OGCC stated that as stipulated, the KWD or
OGCC may terminate the contract anytime without need of
judicial action; that OGCC's grant of authority to private
counsels is a privilege withdrawable under justifiable
circumstances; and that the termination of Atty. Ignes's
contract was justified by the fact that the Local Water
Utilities Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun board
as the new Board of Directors of KWD and that said board
had terminated Atty. Ignes's services and requested to hire
another counsel.

Alleging that Atty. Ignes, Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua acted
as counsel for KWD without legal authority, Vargas and
Panes Jr., filed a disbarment complaint against the
respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD). Complainants alleged that Atty. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and
Mann filed Cases as counsels of KWD without legal authority.
They likewise stated in their position paper that Atty. Ignes
continued representing KWD even after the OGCC had
confirmed the expiration of his contract.

In his defense, Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow

respondents can validly represent KWD since Atty. Ignes was
not notified of his contract's pre-termination. Atty. Mann
also stated that he stopped representing KWD after in
deference to the OGCC's stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and
Nadua echoed Atty. Mann's defense.[15]
Complainants filed a manifestation before the IBP with the
following attaching a transcript showed that Atty. Ignes
appeared as counsel of KWD and Ms. Gomba. He also
signed the notice of appeal.

In his report and recommendation, the Investigating

Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty.
Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating
Commissioner held that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as
counsel of KWD, and he was unaware of the pre-termination
of his contract when he filed pleadings in SCA Cases.

As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the Investigating

Commissioner recommended that they be fined P5,000 each
for appearing as attorneys for a party without authority to do
so founding that they failed to secure the conformity of the
OGCC and COA to their engagement as collaborating
counsels for KWD.

As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the

recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition.

Complainants contend that the IBP Board of Governors erred

in dismissing the case because Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr., Mann
and Nadua had no authority from the OGCC to file the
complaints and appear as counsels of KWD.
In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to
represent KWD had expired, but he and his fellow
respondents stopped representing KWD after that. He
submits that they are not guilty of appearing as counsels
without authority. In their comment, Attys. Viajar, Jr. and
Nadua propound similar arguments.

Issue:
Whether Attys. Ignes, Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann have valid
authority to appear as counsels of KWD?
Held:
After a careful study of the case and the parties'
submissions, we find respondents administratively liable.

At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the

need for OGCC and COA conformity if a GOCC hires private
lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the legal basis
of this rule. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the
OGCC which shall act as the principal law office of all
GOCCs. And Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 9,
enjoins GOCCs to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law
firms to handle their cases and legal matters. But the same
Section 3 provides that in exceptional cases, the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the
Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the
written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before
the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm.

The court finds that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had
no valid authority to appear as collaborating counsels of
KWD. Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Nadua was
engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel. Insofar as Attys.
Viajar, Jr. and Mann are concerned, their appointment as
collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has
no approval from the OGCC and COA.

In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of

KWD without authority, after his authority as its counsel had
expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his retainership
contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if
we assume as true that he was not notified of the pre-
termination of his contract, the records still disprove his
claim that he stopped representing KWD after April 17,
2007.

As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance on

was merely as counsel of Ms. Gomba. He indicted himself,
however, when he said that Ms. Gomba represents KWD per
the case title. The extremely urgent motion sought the
return of the facilities of KWD to its Arellano Office. Clearly,
Atty. Ignes filed and argued a motion with the interest of
KWD in mind. The notice of appeal in further validates that
Atty. Ignes still appeared as counsel of KWD after his
authority as counsel had expired. This fact was not lost on
the RTC in denying due course to the notice of appeal.

The following circumstances convince us that, indeed,

respondents willfully and deliberately appeared as counsels
of KWD without authority. They signed pleadings as counsels
of KWD. They presented themselves voluntarily, on their
own volition, as counsels of KWD even if they had no valid
authority to do so.

With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe that

respondents are innocent of the charge even if they insist
that the professional fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and
Mann, as collaborating counsels, were paid not from the
public coffers of KWD. To be sure, the facts were clear that
they appeared as counsels of KWD without authority, and not
merely as counsels of the members of the Dela Pea board
and KWD personnel in their private suits.

Consequently, for respondents' willful appearance as

counsels of KWD without authority to do so, there is a valid
ground to impose disciplinary action against them. Under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so.
Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of P5,000 on
each respondent.

The petition was granted. The assailed Resolution passed on

July 17, 2008 by the IBP Board of Governors is reversed and
set aside.
 G.R. No. 176530, June 16, 2009

SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA PADILLA AGBULOS,

PETITIONERS, VS. NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ AND ELENA G.
GARCIA, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and
Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B.
Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
complaint against spouses Constante Agbulos and Zenaida
Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract,
cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages. The
complaint alleged that Gutierrez inherited from their father,
Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land in the
name of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit,
Spouses Agbulos succeeded in making it appear that
Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale when, in truth, he
had already died. As a result, original TCT was cancelled and
a new one was issued in the name of the spouses. Based on
the notation at the back of the certificate of title, portions of
the property were brought under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna
Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).

In their defense, petitioners averred that Dr. Nicasio G.

Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia
were not the real parties in interest, that the Deed of Sale
was regularly executed before a notary public, that they
were possessors in good faith, and that the action had
prescribed.

On the day set for the presentation of the respondents'

(plaintiffs') evidence, Sps. Agbulos filed a Motion to Dismiss,
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter
of the case. Petitioners contended that the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the RTC,
had jurisdiction since the subject land was covered by the
CARP, and CLOAs had been awarded to tenants.
Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion
had been filed beyond the period for filing an Answer, that
the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based on the
allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no
jurisdiction since the parties had no tenancy relationship.

In an Order, the RTC granted the petitioners' motion and

dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC
held that the DARAB had jurisdiction, since the subject
property was under the CARP, some portions of it were
covered by registered CLOAs, and there was prima facie
showing of tenancy.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but was

denied the motion.[4]

Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC, which

gave due course to the same withot the consent of
Gutierezzes and Garcia.

Later on, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of Gutierezzes

and Garcia.

The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was

purely civil, not agrarian, in nature. According to the CA, the
allegations in the complaint revealed that the principal relief
sought was the nullification of the purported deed of sale
and reconveyance of the subject property. It also noted that
there was no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian
relations between the parties.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of the

Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside the
dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract,
cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages.

Held:

The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on

both procedural and substantive grounds.

A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is

presumed to represent such client before the appellate
court.

Elena Garcia did not actually withdraw Atty. Magbitang's

authority to represent respondents in the case. The letter
merely stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they
would pursue an appeal.

In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may

be ratified by the client either expressly or impliedly.
Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer's first
appearance and validates the action taken by him. Implied
ratification may take various forms, such as by silence or
acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits
flowing therefrom.[11] Respondents' silence or lack of
remonstration when the case was finally elevated to the CA
means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.

Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with

competence and diligence."Consequently, a lawyer is
entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him;
otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. In light of such mandate, Atty. Magbitang's
act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her
clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if not
commendable.

The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is

within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB.

For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must

be a tenancy relationship between the parties.

Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the

allegations in the complaint. Respondents' complaint did not
contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest,
imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and
the petitioners. We are in full agreement with the following
findings of the CA on this point.

On the alleged deficiency of the appellants' brief filed before

the CA by the respondents, suffice it to state that the
requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the
appellate court in arriving at a just and proper resolution of
the case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants' brief
sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was
able to arrive at a just decision. We have repeatedly held
that technical and procedural rules are intended to help
secure, not to suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from
a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be allowed in
order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
courts.[16]

In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied. The Court of

Appeals' Decision dated is affirmed.

G.R. No. 82760, August 30, 1990

 FELIMON MANANGAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH 28, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to

another, filing a labyrinth of cases and pleadings, thwarting
the smooth prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against
him for no less than twelve (12) years, and for masquerading
as Filemon Manangan when his real name is Andres
Culanag, petitioner has brought upon himself the severest
censure and a punishment for contempt. The Petition for
Certiorari he has filed likewise calls for dismissal.

The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended

Petition seek the annulment of the entire proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 639 of respondent Court, including the
Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by it, dated 19 July 1979, for
being stale/functus officio. It is claimed, inter alia, that
respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
making it appear that petitioner was duly tried and
convicted when the contrary was true, and that the Alias
Warrant of Arrest was irregularly issued because respondent
Court had already accepted a property bond.

In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that

respondent Court had irregularly assumed jurisdiction as it
is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the case considering that he was Legal Officer I of the
Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that he had supposedly
committed the offense in relation to that office.

Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of

quotations from the Decisions in the different cases filed by
petitioner, we recite the relevant ones below.

Felimon Manangan, representing himself as a lawyer, was

appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in Region
II. A Criminal Case entitled People v. Filemon Manangan
alias Andres Culanag was filed before the then Court of
First Instance charging Manangan with Execution of Deeds
by Intimidation under Article 298 of the Revised Penal
Code. Apparently, the Director of Lands had given his
imprimatur to the charge. An Order of Arrest was issued.

Manangan later filed before this Court a Petition for

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction entitled Filemon de Asis Manangan
v. Court of First Instance, et al., assailing the jurisdiction of
respondent Court to try the criminal case and seeking to
stay the Order of Arrest. The petition was dismissed for non-
payment of legal fees.

On the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did

not show up and, in fact, disappeared for about a year.

Later on, a Second Amended Information was filed, this time

identifying the accused as Andres Culanag (alias Andres M.
Culanag, Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan
and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan).

Manangan surfaced and, through alleged counsel, posted a

bailbond with the Municipal Circuit Court.

Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued and it is this Alias

Warrant that is challenged herein.

Manangan filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss the Criminal

Case, which was denied by respondent Court.

Manangan then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and

Mandamus before the Court of Appeals. The Petition sought
to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands, finding
Manangan guilty of extortion, impersonation and
abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal from the
service; and require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to
dismiss Criminal Case No. 639 pending in its Court. In a
Decision, promulgated, the Appellate Court dismissed the
Petition for absolute lack of legal and factual basis.

Later on, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by

Manangan, ostensibly through counsel, Atty. Benjamin
Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be dismissed on the
ground that the accused had already died such that
respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his
person. The Motion was denied.

Erroneously construing the German Decision as a final

judgment of conviction, CFI of Nueva Ecija reset the
promulgation and ordered the bondsmen to produce the
body of the accused on said date. Realizing the mistake, CFI
of Nueva Ecija vacated said order and ruled that the warrant
of arrest issued by this Court, shall remain in full force and
effect

Manangan again resorted to the Court of Appeals in another

Petition for Certiorari filed by one Atty. Benjamin Facun as
counsel for petitioner, this time praying for the annulment of
the proceedings in the Criminal Case on the ground that
the accused was already dead when the decision finding him
guilty of the crime x x x was rendered.

Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed

heirs of the accused, filed a Manifestation before respondent
Court asking for the dismissal and termination of the
Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused had
allegedly died.

CFI of Nueva Ecija refused to declare the case closed and

terminated inasmuch as the accused was alive when he
posted his bailbond (citing the Kapunan Decision) and
reiterated that the alias warrant issued by the Court which
up to the present has not yet been served upon the accused
as in full force and effect.
For the third time, the case was elevated to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, entitled Heirs of the
Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc.
The Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge denying the
closure and termination of the Criminal Case.

On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from

the Kapunan Decision and the Catral Order, dismissed the
Petition (hereinafter, the Aquino Decision), holding, inter
[3]

alia, that whether or not its denial of the motion to dismiss

that case constitutes a grave abuse of discretion, was
already passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-14428
(Kapunan Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata. It may not be
litigated anew, no matter what form the action for that
purpose may take.

On 28 June 1984, before respondent Court, petitioner-

accused filed an Omnibus Motion with Motion for New Trial,
which was denied for lack of merit in the Order of 19
November 1984. In the same Order, respondent Court
ordered the case archived until such time that the accused is
brought to the Court.

On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a

Motion to Quash on the grounds that: (1) the court trying
the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
person of the accused; and (2) the accused has been
previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted of the
offense charged.

It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting

disposition on the Motion to Quash, that the present Petition
was instituted.

The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is that

the Petition is without merit. Petitioner-accused had a
pending Motion to Quash before respondent Court and
should have awaited resolution thereon. He had a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.

Contrary to petitioners pretensions, the Alias Warrant of

Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest by disappearing
from the jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there
any indication in the records that the property bond, filed by
petitioner-accused in the Municipal Circuit Court of San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by
respondent Court and petitioner discharged on the basis
thereof. The Alias Warrant is not stale or functus officio, as
alleged. Unlike a search warrant, which is valid for only ten
(10) days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest
remains valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted.
Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with grave
abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full
force and effect.

Although there may have been some initial confusion on the

part of respondent Court arising from the Kapunan Decision,
that was timely rectified. In the final analysis, respondent
Court has not made it appear that petitioner-accused has
already been arraigned and tried, let alone convicted. No
jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again, therefore, no grave
abuse of discretion can be attributed to respondent Court.

Petitioners argument in his Amended Petition and Second

Amended Petition that it is the Sandiganbayan that has
exclusive jurisdiction over the Criminal Case neither holds
water considering that not only is he ineligible for the
position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands, Region II,
for not being a lawyer, but also because he was dismissed
from the service on 27 March 1980 by the Director of Lands,
who found him, with the approval of the Minister of Natural
Resources, guilty of extortion, impersonation and
abandonment of office (CA-GR No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.

However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a

Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out the present petition for
being fictitious and that by reason thereof petitioner should
be cited for contempt of Court. The Solicitor General has
also prayed that he be excused from filing a Comment on
petitioners Second Amended Petition, which we resolve to
grant.

The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the

records in the Criminal Case shows that:

a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M.

Culanag, the person charged in Criminal Case No. 639;
b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San
Marcelino, Zambales, who died on September 29, 1971 in
the vicinity of his residence where he and his driver died on
the spot; and
c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan
and knowing about the latters death, assumed the name,
qualifications and other personal circumstances of Filemon
Manangan. By means thereof, he was able to pass himself off
as a lawyer and to actually practice law, using even the
Certificate of Admission to the Philippine Bar of Filemon
Manangan which states that he was admitted to the Bar on
March 6, 1964. By this guise, [Andres M. Culanag]
succeeded in obtaining a position as Legal Officer I in the
Bureau of Lands.

In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a fictitious

person, having been born out of the lawful wedlock of
Segundino Manangan and Felipa Asis; and that assuming
that there is sufficient basis to charge him for contempt, it
will no longer prosper on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the
Solicitor General had also disclosed in the German Decision,
petitioner [Andres Culanag] had, on 23 February 1977, filed
Sp. Procs. No. 23 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, San Jose City Branch, for the change of his name from
Andres Culanag to Filemon Manangan. In that petition, he
claimed that his real name is Andres Culanag; that his entire
school records carry his name as Filemon Manangan: and
that he is the same person as Andres Culanag, the latter
being his real name. The impersonation was carried to the
extreme when, in petitioners Manifestation, dated 10
February 1983, before respondent Court, his supposed heirs
alleged that accused had died before the filing of the
Information on 29 September 1971, the exact date of death
of the real Filemon Manangan. More, petitioner also
masquerades under the name of Atty. Benjamin M. Facun in
the several pleadings filed in connection with the Criminal
Case.

In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that

petitioner had also committed impersonation when,
representing himself as Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a
petition with this Court praying that his right to practice law
be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those cases, we
ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is really Andres
Culanag, an impostor; dismissed the petitions; and directed
Andres Culanag to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt for filing the two false petitions (In
re: Andres Culanag, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 26). He
explained that he thought this Court would not discover
that he is a poseur, for which reason he apologizes to the
Court promising that he would not commit the same act if he
is excused and given another chance. On 12 November
1971, after finding his explanation unsatisfactory, we
adjudged him guilty of indirect contempt of Court under
Rule 71, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court and sentenced
[4]

him to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.

Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter
No. 190, entitled In Re Andres Culanag alias Atty. Ross V.
Pangilinan and Bar Matter No. 206, entitled Eriberto H.
Decena vs. Andres Culanag wherein, on 9 October 1984,
this Court Resolved to direct that petitioner be subjected to
mental examination by a doctor from the National Mental
Hospital after noting that petitioner was suffering from
some kind of mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat
petitioners present liability for contempt.

It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the

foregoing antecedents, petitioner still has the gall to claim
that he is, in truth and in fact, Filemon Manangan. The
evidence on hand, without need for more, and with
petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply establishes
that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is
guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation and highly
improper conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct,
degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of
justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).

While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent

decisions allude to Filemon Manangan and that Andres
Culanag is just an alias of Filemon Manangan, those
statements actually refer to the person of Andres Culanag
and not to the real Filemon Manangan, long since dead.

The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is

apparent that the contumacious acts continue to this day.

WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the

Second Amended Petition are hereby dismissed for utter lack
of merit; (2) petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court,
severely censured, and sentenced to suffer three (3) months
imprisonment, the same to be served at the Provincial Jail of
Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his appearance during the trial of
the subject criminal case; (3) respondent Court is hereby
directed to retrieve Criminal Case No. 639 from its archives
and to proceed to its determination with deliberate dispatch;
(4) all Courts are directed not to recognize any person
representing himself as Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon
Manangan, or Atty. Benjamin M. Facun; and (5) petitioners
real name is declared to be Andres Culanag.

Treble costs against petitioner.