Analyticity and conceptual decompositionism: problems to be solved

Alex de Britto Rodrigues (UFPR PHD student)

There is a group of authors (JACKENDOFF, 1983, 1990; LEVIN, 1993; LEVIN;

RAPPAPORT, 1995; PINKER, 2008; BEAVERS, 2010, among others) who claims that
abstract conceptual structures underlie the sentences and consist of primitive conceptual units
smaller than the lexical items, which are so called conceptual primitives or primitive
predicates. The following representation of the verb butter is an enlightening example of
analysis according to this theoretical perspective:
1. butter: [Event CAUSE [GO [Thing BUTTER], [Path TO [ON Thing])])])])]
(JACKENDOFF, 1990, 54)
In capital letters are the primitive predicates which compose the concept of butter, and
in small letter are the ontological categories of such primitives. The traditional literature on
conceptual semantics is full of analysis like that (like those in LEVIN, 1993; CANADO,
2013; DEAL, 2013; VERBNET, 2016) and shares some theoretical presuppositions, which
can be described as the following:
Any lexical semantic representation will be consistent with our approach if it
recognizes that verb meanings [but not only verbs] include certain common
elements that tie verbs together into semantically defined classes, but at the same
time allows for the cross-classification of verbs. These considerations impose
certain requirements on the "grain size" of these elements: they must be neither
so finely chosen as to prevent the identification of the relevant verb classes, nor
so coarsely chosen as to prevent the cross-classification of verbs. In addition, the
representation must provide for the encoding of the localized differences in
meaning that distinguish among the members of the classes.
A lexical semantic representation that takes the form of a predicate
decomposition involves two basic types of primitive elements: primitive
predicates and constants [like BUTTER in 1]. (LEVIN; RAPAPPORT HOVAV,
1995, p. 23)
One of the semantic proprieties which this perspective is supposed to deal with is
analyticity, as it can be seen in Jackendoff (1983, p. 11): Semantic theory should be able to
account formally for so-called semantic properties of utterances, such as synonymy,
anomaly, analyticity, and presupposition. In particular, the notion of valid inference must be
explicated. (emphasis added). Since the author is one of the most salient theorists of
conceptual semantics who suggests conceptual structures, the concern about analyticity is a
presupposition, even if not explicitly, shared among the conceptual semantics authors because
the conceptual structures representing lexical items consist of a kind of analyticity
manifestation, as it will be seen further on. Jackendoff (1983, p. 117) also says that analytical
truth is a truth in virtue of conceptual structure. All these assumptions results in some
problems for the theoretical perspective.

Main aims
Elucidate some problems in lexical conceptual decomposition which are ignored or do
not receive much attention.
Indicate the debatable notion of analyticity as a key to understand these problems.
Explore some criticism from Quines anti analytical-synthetical distinction position and
Fodors conceptual atomist position.
 The problem about this concern is that analyticity is not properly explained, but only
presupposed. The theory must account for this concept, but the author avoids the discussion
and problematizing around it as he says that the debate on the plausibility of analyticity, thus
an apparently important philosophical dispute has arisen pointless (JACKENDOFF, 1983,
p. 117). In order to understand why the author arrives at this conclusion, it is important to
recover some notions and critics on analyticity.
It is commonly said in the philosophical tradition (LEIBNIZ, 1968 [1714]; KANT, 1997
[1783]; FREGE, 2009 [1892]) that there are two kinds of expressed truth: the synthetic one,
which requires the extra-linguistic knowledge to be attested, as the truth of the utterance the
sky is blue; and the analytic one, which relies on the linguistic/semantic system to be
recognized, like the utterance a is a, or kill is to cause somebodys death. Therefore, the
analytical truth can be defined as the truth in virtue of meaning, considering by meaning
the semantics encoded in a specific linguistic system. This concept is analyzed and developed
by Carnap (1947) as the truth in all description states, which means that it is the truth in all
possible worlds (but considering a specific linguistic system).
The criticism on the synthetic/analytic distinction has in Quine (1960) one of the most
referential authors. He tries to disbelieve this distinction suggesting that the tradition does not
explain satisfactorily what analycity is. First of all, it can be used to define one word, but
this process is circular since the definition can also be defined by the word. The concept of
synonym also is not useful to account for an appropriate explanation because of a similar
problem: a is synonym of b if a is b is analytic, but to explain what synonym is it
cannot be alluded to analyticity (circularity problem: analyticity explains synonym and
synonym explains analyticity) and, therefore, synonym would be another concept lacking
an independent and clear definition. To sum up the problem pointed out by Quine, when
someone assumes an analytical truth, this one only delimitates some utterances supposedly
analytical, taking the explanation of analyticity for granted.
Moving from the philosophical debate to the conceptual/semantic debate, Fodor (1970;
1975; 1980; 1998; 2003; 2008), an assumed quinean, tries to explain the lexical concepts as
atoms, that is, one lexical concept could not be decomposed in smaller conceptual parts.
The reason for that would be the impossibility of identifying a precise and independently clear
reference of the so called conceptual primitives and the lack of evidence concerning the
judgments of speakers. The attempts of facing the Fodors criticism (JACKENDOFF, 1983;
PINKER, 2008) are not strongly developed and tend to consist of two paths: first,
misunderstanding the Fodors requirement of clarity and independent definition; and second,
postulating chunks, a kind of abstract condensed group of pieces of concepts (primitives
in conceptual structures) which allows the speakers to process lexical items with different
conceptual complexities in the same way (with the same effort). As can be seen, the chunks
supposedly solve the problems pointed by Fodor, but they also explains too much since any
problem concerning definitions in terms of conceptual structure would be considered a matter
of abstract underlying vague condensed structure (which is a way to see a chunk), that is,
the chunk solution has the weakness of explaining too much in a not precise way.

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