Consciousness and Cognition 27 (2014) 147154

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Consciousness and Cognition

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog

Embodied free will beliefs: Some effects of physical states

on metaphysical opinions
Michael R. Ent , Roy F. Baumeister
Florida State University, 1107 West Call Street, Tallahassee, FL 32306, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The present research suggests that peoples bodily states affect their beliefs about free will.
Received 18 December 2013 People with epilepsy and people with panic disorder, which are disorders characterized by
Available online 2 June 2014 a lack of control over ones body, reported less belief in free will compared to people with-
out such disorders (Study 1). The more intensely people felt sexual desire, physical tired-
Keywords: ness, and the urge to urinate, the less they believed in free will (Study 2). Among non-
Free will dieters, the more intensely they felt hunger, the less they believed in free will. However,
Embodied cognition
dieters showed a trend in the opposite direction (Study 3).
2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

A growing body of literature suggests that peoples bodily states and sensations affect how they process information
(Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). To date, much of the research on this topic has focused
on how bodily cues activate specic responses to specic stimuli. For example, many studies have demonstrated that making
approach versus avoidance arm movements can affect peoples judgments of a target stimulus (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, &
Berntson, 1993; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). Taking that work a bold and meaningful step further, recent work has suggested
that bodily states and sensations may also affect peoples broad, abstract views about the social world. Specically, having a
proclivity toward feeling physically disgusted has been linked to political conservatism (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar,
Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2011; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010). In the present research, we tested the hypothesis that bodily
states are related to a different type of broad, abstract view: belief in free will.
Belief in free will has important behavioral consequences. Peoples aggression, dishonesty, helpfulness, job performance,
and conformity have all been found to be related to their beliefs about free will (Alquist & Baumeister, 2010; Baumeister,
Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009; Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele, 2011; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Therefore, the factors that shape
peoples free will beliefs may have far-reaching effects. However, research about the factors that affect free will beliefs is
scarce.
Preliminary evidence suggests that free will beliefs are related to peoples bodily states. In a longitudinal study, people
reported less belief in free will on days in which they had vomited compared to days in which they had not vomited
(Lambert, Ent, & Baumeister, 2010/unpublished). The primary purpose of the present research was to test the hypothesis that
peoples bodily states would affect their free will beliefs. Specically, we predicted that experiencing involuntary bodily
states would reduce belief in free will.

Corresponding author. Address: Florida State University, 1107 West Call Street, Tallahassee, FL 32306, United States.
E-mail address: ent@psy.fsu.edu (M.R. Ent).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.05.001
1053-8100/ 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
148 M.R. Ent, R.F. Baumeister / Consciousness and Cognition 27 (2014) 147154

1.1. Belief in free will

The experience of free will is an everyday part of human life. All people have the impression that they cause events and
control their own actions. However, the term free will has been dened in various ways. Both scholars and laypersons con-
tinue to debate what qualies as a free action. Specialists tend to dene free will differently than laypersons. Although spe-
cialists tend to invoke complex issues surrounding causality and inevitability, laypersons tend focus on ones ability to make
choices and be responsible for them (e.g., Monroe & Malle, 2010). For present purposes, the laypersons denition was suf-
cient, especially insofar as we made no assumptions about what free will is and in what sense it may be considered real. We
simply asked people to rate the extent of their own belief in free will.
Previous research has described what laypersons regard as free will. Monroe and Malle (2010) asked laypersons to
describe what they thought it meant to have free will, and then the researchers systematically coded the data. A majority
of the respondents included the ability to make choices in their description of free will. People also commonly mentioned
freedom from external constraints and the ability to follow ones wants and desires. Stillman et al. (2011) collected autobio-
graphical narratives from people who were either instructed to describe free or unfree actions. After coding the data, the
researchers found that people associated free actions with reaching goals, conscious thought and deliberation, and acting
in accordance with ones morals. In contrast, when people described unfree actions they were likely to describe failure to
resist external forces and failure to achieve ones goals.
Most evidence suggests that people generally believe in free will. For example, peoples responses to questionnaires gen-
erally indicate some degree of positive belief (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005; Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane,
2008). In addition, the typical pattern of results of experiments in which free will beliefs are manipulated suggests that the
default of baseline condition includes accepting freedom of will. Researchers have manipulated peoples free will beliefs by
having them read essays or statements that are either consistent with or in opposition to the idea that free will exists. In
these experiments, the typical nding is that the pro-free-will and neutral conditions produce identical results, whereas
the anti-free-will condition is different. The implication is that supporting free will belief merely conrms what people
already think, whereas denying free will departs from that baseline.
Because belief in free will has behavioral consequences, it is important to understand the sources of this belief. Belief in
free will has been explained as deriving from cultural conditioning (e.g., Skinner, 1971; Skinner, 1975), human evolution
(e.g., Rakos, 2004), and from peoples repeated observation that thoughts precede, and often seem consistent with, ones
actions (e.g., Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). The present research was not designed to support or refute the varying points
of view just discussed. These views are also not mutually exclusive; we believe that culture, evolution, and the thought-
action link all continue to inuence peoples beliefs about free will. The present research focused on embodied cognition
as yet another factor that may inuence peoples free will beliefs.
Peoples beliefs about their own free will sometimes differ from their beliefs about the free will of people in general.
For example, people tend to believe that they have more personal control over their actions than other people do
(Pronin & Kugler, 2011). Conversely, some people may believe that their own free will is limited by their circumstances,
but that others have complete control over their actions. Peoples bodily states may affect both their beliefs about their
own free will and their beliefs about the free will of people in general. Because ones bodily states affect oneself more
than they affect others, we predicted that peoples bodily states would affect their beliefs about their personal free will.
In addition, peoples bodily states and sensations can affect how they regard others (e.g. Williams & Bargh, 2008).
Therefore, we predicted that some of peoples bodily states would also affect their beliefs about the free will of people
in general.

1.2. Embodied cognition

The term embodied cognition refers to the idea that cognitive representations and operations are linked to and inu-
enced by bodily states and the brains modality-specic systems (Niedenthal et al., 2005). Cognitive and social scientists
have provided abundant evidence suggesting that peoples physical bodies play an inuential role in information pro-
cessing. Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) found that peoples emotional responses could be affected by manipulating
their facial expressions. Specically, people rated cartoons as funnier if they held a pen in their mouth in a way that
facilitated smiling (i.e., with their teeth), as opposed to a way that inhibited smiling (i.e., with their lips). Cacioppo
et al. (1993) found that executing an approach-related arm movement led people to rate ideographs more positively
than executing an avoidance-related arm movement. Williams and Bargh (2008) had participants rate a target person
on various dimensions after holding a warm cup of coffee or a cup of iced coffee. Participants who held the warm cup
of coffee rated the target as displaying more interpersonal warmth, compared to participants who held the iced coffee.
Examples of this type are plentiful, suggesting that bodily states and sensations have a pronounced effect on how peo-
ple process information. Researchers have used the concept of embodied cognition to shed new light on topics as
diverse as religious belief (Barsalou, Barbey, Simmons, & Santos, 2005) and language comprehension (Glenberg &
Kaschak, 2002). The present research applied the concept of embodied cognition to the study of free will beliefs. That
is, we tested the hypothesis that bodily sensations and operations affect peoples cognitions related to free will.
 M.R. Ent, R.F. Baumeister / Consciousness and Cognition 27 (2014) 147154 149

2. Study 1

People may have diminished belief in free will if they frequently lack control over their physical bodies, because having
free will means having the ability to control ones own actions. Accordingly, Study 1 tested the hypothesis that people with
medical disorders characterized by a lack of control over ones body would report less belief in free will compared to people
without such disorders. Specically, this study focused on epilepsy and panic disorder.
Epilepsy is a disorder characterized by abnormal neuronal activity. Symptoms of epilepsy include muscle spasms and loss
of consciousness (National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke [NINDS], 2012). People with epilepsy experience
feelings of unpredictability and helplessness associated with the disorder (Baker, Jacoby, Buck, Stalgis, & Monnet, 1997;
Devillis, Devellis, Wallston, & Wallston, 1980). Because helplessness seems inimical to free will, having epilepsy may dimin-
ish peoples belief in free will.
Panic disorder is characterized by recurrent attacks of intense fear and sympathetic nervous system activation. During a
panic attack, an individual may experience chills or hot ashes, trembling or shaking, sweating, heart palpitations, and/or
other physical symptoms associated with anxiety (Sundel & Sundel, 1998). Panic attacks are typically uncontrollable and
unpredictable (National Institute of Mental Health [NIMH], 2010). People with panic disorder experience a lack of control
over their bodies each time that they have a panic attack. Frequently experiencing a loss of bodily control may cause people
with panic disorder to report diminished belief in free will.
We administered measures of belief in free will to people with epilepsy, people with panic disorder, and people without
either of these disorders. We predicted that people with panic disorder or epilepsy would report less belief in free will com-
pared to people without these disorders. We predicted that people with these disorders would report low belief in personal
free will, because some symptoms of these disorders affect peoples ability to control their own bodies. Epilepsy and panic
disorder are chronic disorders that have wide-ranging effects on peoples lives, so they are likely to affect how one views the
comprehensive state of the world. Therefore, we also entertained the prediction that people with these disorders would
report low belief in free will in general. A priori, we had little basis for predicting differential effects, so we expected that
these disorders would affect peoples beliefs about free will in general and about their own free will to an equal degree.

2.1. Method

Participants. Seventy-four people from the United States completed a survey about their free will beliefs on Amazons
Mechanical Turk website. Twenty-three participants (17 female) had panic disorder, 16 participants (6 female) had epilepsy,
and 35 people (21 female) were control participants. The average age of participants was 32.71 years.
Procedure. Participants completed a computerized, online version of the Free Will and Determinism Scale (Rakos et al.,
2008), which consists of a subscale measuring peoples beliefs about their own free will and one measuring their beliefs
about people in general having free will. Participants rated all items on a ve-point scale from not true at all to almost
always true. The Personal Will subscale contains 8 items; example items are I am in charge of the decisions I make
and I have free will. The General Will subscale contains 14 items; example items are Free will is a basic part of human
nature and People have free will regardless of wealth or life circumstances. A survey titled Epilepsy and Personal Beliefs
recruited only participants who had been formally diagnosed with epilepsy. A survey titled Panic Disorder and Personal
Beliefs recruited only participants who had been formally diagnosed with panic disorder. Control participants completed
a survey on the topic of personal beliefs. Panic disorder and epilepsy were the only disorders that we included in this study.
We did not conrm that all control participants were without panic disorder and epilepsy. It is therefore in theory possible
that some participants in the control condition also had one of these disorders, but that would have reduced our statistical
power and worked against the hypothesis. We also note that all three surveys started at the same time but it took longer to
attract an adequate sample of people with epilepsy and panic disorder, so those surveys recruited over a longer period of
time than the control condition.

2.2. Results

ANOVA revealed that participants with epilepsy (M = 52.63, SD = 11.72) reported less belief in general free will than con-
trol participants (M = 59.97, SD = 6.69), F(1, 49) = 8.11, p < .01. Participants with epilepsy (M = 29.50, SD = 6.71) also reported
marginally less belief in personal free will than control participants (M = 32.57, SD = 4.24), F(1, 49) = 3.95, p = .053. A mixed-
model ANOVA revealed that the type of free will measured (personal vs. general) interacted with the grouping variable (epi-
lepsy vs. control) to predict participants free will belief scores, interaction F(1, 49) = 6.13, p < .05. This suggests that epilepsy
affects peoples beliefs about free will in general more than their beliefs about their own free will.
ANOVA revealed that participants with panic disorder (M = 55.91, SD = 8.50) reported less belief in general free will com-
pared to control participants (M = 59.97, SD = 6.69), F(1, 56) = 4.12, p < .05. However, the groups did not signicantly differ in
their beliefs about their personal free will, F(1, 56) = .427, ns. A mixed-model ANOVA revealed that the type of free will mea-
sured (personal vs. general) interacted with the grouping variable (panic disorder vs. control) to predict participants free will
belief scores, F(1, 56) = 4.86, p < .05. This suggests that having a panic disorder affected peoples beliefs about free will in gen-
eral more than it affected their beliefs about their own free will.
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2.3. Discussion

Epilepsy and panic disorder were both correlated with relatively low belief in general free will. To be sure, these ndings
are technically correlational, but cautious causal speculation seems warranted in this case. A priori, it is plausible that having
a medical disorder that causes one to lack control over his or her body may lower ones belief in free will. In contrast, the
reverse causal explanation is considerably less plausible: We doubt that beliefs in a lack of general free will cause people
to have epilepsy or panic disorder. (Indeed, such causation would raise alarming ethical concerns about experimental manip-
ulations of those beliefs.)
Contrary to predictions, having epilepsy or panic disorder did not affect peoples beliefs specically about their own free
will to the same extent that they affected peoples beliefs about free will in general. In fact, panic disorder had no discernible
effect on peoples beliefs about their own personal free will. Moreover, the interactions on both variables indicated that the
effects of both disorders were signicantly stronger on beliefs about general than personal free will. Perhaps peoples
responses to the Personal Will subscale are mainly shaped by temporary states, as opposed to chronic states, because the
items used to assess personal free will could be interpreted as asking about ones immediate sense of freedom. For example,
the item I actively choose what to do from among the options I have could refer an immediate situation rather than an
overall assessment of how controllable the world is. It is unlikely that any participant completed the questionnaire while
actually having a seizure or a panic attack. Therefore, if the Personal Will subscale focused on momentarily current states,
then having panic disorder or epilepsy would be unlikely to affect peoples scores on this measure. Meanwhile, chronic or
recurring episodes of loss of control may be likely to affect peoples beliefs about free will in general, especially because
the items used to assess general free will may be easily interpreted as referring to the chronic state of the world. An example
item is Free will is part of the human spirit.
Another possible explanation is that people with panic disorder and epilepsy may use their personal experiences to
gauge how controllable the world is. People with these disorders may regard their lack of control over their bodies as
evidence that people do not have much free will. Thus, they may believe that free will is generally limited, but that they
themselves possess as much as anybody. The pattern of results in Study 1 is conceptually similar to the personal/group
discrimination discrepancy in which people tend to report a higher level of discrimination against their group as a whole
than against themselves personally (Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990). There are many possible explanations
for this effect, and some would not make sense when applied to the study of free will beliefs. However, denial is a pos-
sible (if only partial) explanation for both the personal/group discrimination discrepancy and the results of Study 1. Peo-
ple sometimes deny troubling information about themselves to avoid anxiety. Acknowledging discrimination against
oneself or limits to ones own free will may be more troubling than acknowledging discrimination against ones group
or limits to the free will of people in general. This is because information that is very relevant to oneself has more of a
potential to be troubling than information that is only vaguely self-relevant. Thus, people who fear that they lack free
will might be more willing to acknowledge that people in general have low free will than to acknowledge that they per-
sonally have low free will.
There are limitations to Study 1 that warrant discussion. We argue that people with epilepsy and people with panic dis-
order believe less in free will than the general population because people with such disorders lack control over their physical
bodies. However, people with these disorders may differ from the general population in ways other than the degree to which
they are in control of their physical bodies. For example, symptoms of panic disorder and epilepsy could be debilitating
enough to cause concerns about ones job security, ones ability to access adequate treatment, and perhaps ones dependency
on others for support. Lacking a sense of control in these domains may cause diminished belief in free will. Studies 2 and 3
were designed to avoid this ambiguity by focusing on the general population rather than subsets of the population. In any
case, Study 1 provided preliminary evidence that bodily states may affect peoples free will beliefs.

3. Study 2

The experience of temporary physical needs may remind people that they lack complete control over their physical
bodies. Insofar as abstract beliefs can be swayed by bodily states, such experiences of involuntary bodily responses may
lower peoples belief in free will. Physical needs arise automatically and independently of personal choice. By arising in that
way, they may call attention to how subjective states (and, by extension, subsequent actions aimed at satisfying those needs)
are caused by factors outside ones personal control. In this study, we administered surveys that asked people about their
physical needs and their beliefs about their free will. Study 2 tested the hypothesis that participants self-reported hunger,
thirst, physical tiredness, need to urinate, and desire for sexual intercourse would be negatively correlated with participants
belief in free will. Specically, we hypothesized that these uctuating bodily states would be related to peoples beliefs about
their own free will.

3.1. Method

Participants. Eighty-one people (29 female) completed a survey about their physical needs and free will beliefs on Ama-
zons Mechanical Turk website. Participants ages ranged from 18 to 70 years (M = 29.79).
 M.R. Ent, R.F. Baumeister / Consciousness and Cognition 27 (2014) 147154 151

Procedure. Participants beliefs regarding their own free will were assessed using the Personal Will subscale of the Free
Will and Determinism Scale (Rakos et al., 2008). Peoples beliefs about free will in general were not measured in this study.
Participants also rated the degree to which they were currently experiencing physical needs on an 11-point scale from
not at all to extremely. This questionnaire contained the following items: Currently, I have to urinate, Currently, I
have a desire for sexual intercourse, Currently, I am physically tired, Currently, I am thirsty, and Currently, I am hungry.
These were the only physical needs/desires that participants were asked about.

3.2. Results and discussion

On a scale of 111, participants average level of need to urinate was 3.25, their average level of sexual desire was 3.95,
their average level of tiredness was 5.00, their average level of thirst was 5.28, and their average level of hunger was 5.12.
These ndings are consistent with recent evidence that people experience low-level physical desires frequently throughout
the day (Hofmann, Baumeister, Frster, & Vohs, 2011).
Inspection of raw data revealed that participants scores on the physical desires tended to be either very high or very low.
KolmogorovSmirnov and ShapiroWilk tests of normality conrmed that participants self-reported desires were not nor-
mally distributed. To correct for this, we log-transformed participants scores on all ve of the physical desires that we
measured.
Peoples belief in their personal free will was negatively correlated with their need to urinate, r(79) = .408, p < .001, their
sexual desire, r(79) = .309, p < .01, and their physical tiredness, r(79) = .253, p < .05. In addition, peoples belief in free will
displayed a negative, though non-signicant, correlation with their level of thirst, r(79) = .166, p = .14, ns. Peoples belief in
free will was not related to their level of hunger, r(79) = .011, ns. The nding that peoples level of hunger was unrelated to
their free will beliefs was unexpected. In Study 3, we sought to explain why hunger (unlike the other desires measured) was
unrelated to belief in free will.
The results of Study 2 may seem at odds with recent research on inhibitory spillover. Tuk, Trampe, and Warlop (2011)
found that inhibiting the urge to urinate was associated with a high degree of inhibitory control in unrelated domains
(e.g., monetary decision making). If people have more control over their impulses when they have to urinate (vs. when
they do not have to urinate), then one might expect that the need to urinate might be associated with increased belief
in free will. After all, part of having free will is having control over ones actions and impulses. Tuk et al. (2011) argued
that inhibitory spillover effects are unintentional byproducts of activating a general inhibitory network in the brain. If this
is the case, then people are unlikely to be aware that having to urinate might actually increase their inhibitory control. The
results of Study 2 are consistent with the idea that people are unaware of inhibitory spillover effects and support our
hypothesis that experiencing physical needs may limit peoples sense of control over their bodies, and ultimately their
belief in free will.
Overall, these results suggest that the more intensely people feel sexual desire, tiredness, and the need to urinate, the less
they believe in free will. Thus, this study provided further evidence that bodily states affect free will beliefs.

4. Study 3

In Study 3, we sought to understand why hunger did not resemble other physical needs in its effect on belief in free will.
We reasoned that many people are dieters. The essence of dieting involves resisting the urge to eat. Dieters might therefore
regard resisting hunger as positive evidence of their control over behavior and thus of free will precisely opposite to the
general pattern that strong physical needs reduce belief in free will.
To be sure, not all experiences of hunger among dieters would constitute gratifying experiences of control. Some dieters
will sometimes succumb and eat, which they may regard as a failure of self-control (and thus a lack of free will). Others may
struggle and see an uncertain outcome. Still, many dieters presumably manage to resist desires for food and therefore would
come away with an enhanced sense of their capacity to control their actions.
The present study tested the hypothesis that dieting status and hunger would inuence beliefs about free will. Among
non-dieters, the stronger the physical desire for food, the less they should believe in free will, consistent with the general
pattern that that physical needs reduce free will beliefs (Study 2). We predicted that this pattern would be eliminated
and possibly reversed among dieters, because for them resisting the urge to eat would constitute a positive manifestation
of effective personal control over ones actions.

4.1. Method

Participants. One hundred and twelve people (72 female) from the United States completed this study on Amazons
Mechanical Turk website. Participants ages ranged from 18 to 72 years (M = 38). There were 35 dieters and 77 non-dieters
in the sample.
Procedure. Participants signed up for a study called Food and Personal Beliefs. At the beginning of the study, participants
were asked How hungry are you right now? They responded on a 100-point scale from not at all to very much. Next,
participants completed the Personal Will subscale of the Free Will and Determinism Scale (Rakos et al., 2008). Then, partic-
152 M.R. Ent, R.F. Baumeister / Consciousness and Cognition 27 (2014) 147154

ipants were asked whether they were on a diet. They were also asked To what degree do you attempt to restrict the amount/
type of food you eat? Participants responded to this item on a 100-point scale from not at all to very much.

4.2. Results and discussion

Regression analysis revealed that, controlling for the degree to which participants restricted their diet, dieting status (on a
diet vs. not on a diet) and hunger interacted to predict peoples belief in their personal free will, b = 0.07, t(111) = 2.13,
p < .04 (see Fig. 1). The main effect of dieting status was not signicant, b = 0.16, t(111) = 0.13, p = .896, ns, nor was the main
effect of hunger, b = 0.02, t(111) = 1.54, p = .128, ns. The interaction was probed by analyzing dieters separately from non-
dieters. Among non-dieters, hunger was negatively related to belief in personal free will, b = 0.05, t(111) = 2.29, p < .03.
Among dieters, hunger was positively related to belief in personal free will, though this trend fell short of signicance,
b = 0.02, t(111) = 0.93, p = .354, ns.
Ordinary (non-dieting) people may well experience hunger as a reduction in their free will, akin to other bodily desires
and states, but dieters may view things quite differently. Dieters who resist hunger successfully may feel that their free will
(that is, their sense of being in control of their actions and lives) has been validated. We found a signicant interaction
between hunger and dieting status. Non-dieters believed less in free will to the extent that they were hungry, which is con-
sistent with the general pattern that bodily states and desires reduce the sense of free will. Dieters, in contrast, showed a
trend in the opposite direction.

5. General discussion

The present studies provided evidence that peoples bodily states affect their free will beliefs. People with epilepsy and
people with panic disorder, both of which are chronic disorders characterized by a lack of control over ones body, reported
less belief in free will than people without such disorders (Study 1). The more intensely people felt the need to urinate, the
wish to sleep, and the desire for sex, the less they believed in free will (Study 2). Among dieters, experiencing hunger was
associated with low belief in free will, but dieters showed a trend in the opposite direction (Study 3).
Previous research has demonstrated that bodily states affect peoples attitudes, emotions, and impressions of others (for a
review, see Niedenthal et al., 2005). The present research extends this literature by nding that bodily states can affect peo-
ples beliefs about abstract philosophical generalizations (i.e., free will beliefs), albeit ones that have been shown to have
important pragmatic, behavioral consequences.
Not only everyday, transient bodily states but also chronic bodily afictions (i.e., having versus not having a medical dis-
order characterized by symptoms that limit peoples control over their bodies) were linked to free will beliefs (Study 1). Pre-
vious research on embodiment has focused on short-term, experimental manipulations of the body, but the present research
suggests that peoples chronic bodily states also affect their cognition. In that respect, the implications of the present
research extend far beyond the determinants of beliefs about free will. Further work may usefully investigate how physical
and mental afictions can alter abstract opinions and broad worldviews in ways the person may be unlikely to suspect.
Peoples bodily states can change frequently throughout the course of a day and throughout the course of ones life. If
peoples bodily states affect their free will beliefs, then peoples free will beliefs may display small shifts quite frequently.
In contrast, the inuences of culture and evolution on peoples free will belief are probably fairly stable. Evolution shapes
human behavior very slowly, and cultures rarely change overnight. Given that peoples bodily state change frequently,
the link between free will beliefs and bodily states may suggest that peoples free will beliefs could vacillate frequently. If
free will beliefs vacillate often, then the behavioral tendencies that are affected by free will beliefs may also slightly change

Fig. 1. Dieting status interacted with hunger to predict belief in personal free will.
 M.R. Ent, R.F. Baumeister / Consciousness and Cognition 27 (2014) 147154 153

often. For example, ones level of helpfulness may uctuate throughout the day due to uctuations in ones belief in free will,
which may be affected by ones frequently changing bodily states.

5.1. Limitations

One possible limitation of the present research is that participants who were feeling physical desires and participants
with medical disorders arguably had truly less free will than others. These participants may have reported low belief in free
will because their free will was actually limited by their physical bodies. For example, if having free will means having full
control over ones own actions and decisions, then one could argue that having panic disorder may reduce ones free will.
People with panic disorder may feel that their choices are limited because they must avoid places and situations in which
they have had panic attacks in the past (NIMH, 2010). Reporting low belief in free will when one has limited free will would
not be an example of embodied cognition; it could be simply observing and recognizing the facts. However, the pattern of
results in Study 2 suggests that bodily states affect peoples beliefs about the free will of people in general as well as beliefs
about ones own free will. The freedom of people in general would not be affected by one persons physical needs or chronic
disorders. Thus, the effect of bodily states on free will beliefs in the present research cannot be described as merely accurate
observation on the part of the participants.
In Study 3, we did not collect data on whether people ended up eating as a result of being hungry. Presumably dieters who
broke down and ate fattening foods would regard the episode as a failure of free will, and that would have contributed to
weakening the link between hunger and free will beliefs among the dieters. Future research may examine whether dieters
who successfully resist hunger experience an increase in free will beliefs, whereas those who succumb to temptation end up
with reduced belief in free will. Nonetheless, the present ndings demonstrate that free will beliefs are inuenced by both
the bodily state of hunger and dieting status.
Another possible limitation is that all of the bodily states involved in the present research decreased (rather than
increased) peoples belief in free will. To be sure, this issue may be unavoidable. In general, people tend to believe strongly
in free will (Nahmias et al., 2005; Rakos et al., 2008), so attempts to increase peoples already strong belief in free will have
been found to be largely ineffective (Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Bodily states characterized by voluntary
control over the body may serve to reinforce peoples already high belief in free will, but such states are unlikely to raise
peoples belief in free will even higher. Nevertheless, future research could attempt to identify bodily states that would
increase peoples belief in free will even above and beyond their high baseline level of belief. In any case, the present research
did support the primary hypothesis that free will beliefs and bodily states are related.

5.2. Conclusion

The extent to which people feel that outcomes both their own and those of others are controllable appears to be
affected by low-level bodily cues. Others have assumed that beliefs about free will are shaped by religious and political doc-
trines and logical reasoning, yet such beliefs are at least inuenced by bodily cues as seemingly innocuous as a full bladder or
an unfullled desire for sex. A sense of being in control may uctuate both between and within individuals, but the present
ndings suggest something more far-reaching; peoples belief in free will (not just their own, but the very existence of free
will) can be diminished by physical cues.
Although much of the research on embodied cognition has focused on how specic bodily cues affect responses to specic
stimuli, the present research suggests that bodily states and sensations can also affect peoples abstract, philosophical beliefs
(i.e., free will beliefs). Previous work has found that these beliefs affect how people view the world and how they interact
with others. Thus, evidence that bodily states affect free will beliefs suggests that embodiment may be a more far-reaching
phenomenon than previous research has demonstrated.

Acknowledgment

This work was supported by the John Templeton Foundation (Grant No. 089009-545-031416).

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