DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs.
of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of
judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the RTC
against the private respondents. Later, in an
order, the trial court dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly
received a copy of the order of dismissal on
March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a
motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998,
the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners
filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal
fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied
the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late. This was received by
petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration but this too was
denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the
dismissal of the notice of appeal before the
CA. In the appellate court, petitioners
claimed that they had seasonably filed their
notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal started to
run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the
day they received the final order of the trial
court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice
had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. On
September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from
March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court,
the order was the final order appealable
under the Rules.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order
triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary
period to appeal, the February 12, 1998
order dismissing the complaint or the July 1,
1998 order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their
notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration should be
deemed as the final order. In the case of
Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial
court declared petitioner non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon
receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an
omnibus motion to set it aside. When the
omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the
15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order,
this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He
then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed for having been filed
out of time. The court a quo ruled that
petitioner should have appealed within 15
days after the dismissal of his complaint
since this was the final order that was
appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed
the trial court and declared that it was the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of
an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what
ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more
recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.
where the SC again considered the order
denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration as the final order which
finally disposed of the issues involved in the
case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the
SC sustained petitioners view that the order
dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order
contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall
also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and
Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably
filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22,
1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying
their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that
the appeal shall be taken within 15 days
from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive
word or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense
in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the
use of or in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within
15 days from the notice of judgment or
within 15 days from notice of the final
order, which we already determined to refer
to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion
for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the
spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to
15 days to hasten the disposition of cases.
The original period of appeal (in this case
March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still
applies. The fresh period of 15 days
becomes significant only when a party opts
to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case
and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify
any error of judgment. While we aim to
resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver
justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either
file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the RTCs decision or file it within
 15 days from receipt of theGuillermo
order (theOmolon
final died intestate and was survived by Cleofe Omolon.
order) denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Sometime
Obviously, in the
July 1995, Cleofe Omolon filed a petition for the reconstitution of
new 15-day period may be availed of only ifthe RTC of Lapu-Lapu City (in a cadastral proceeding). On January
subject lot before
rendered a decision, granting the petition.
either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final andHowever,
executoryupon
afterpresentation of the aforesaid order to the Office of the Register of D
the lapse of the original appeal period
informed that the owners copy had already been issued to Ruben Augusto, pursuant
provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners
by the court dated August 23, 1996 the same was in the possession of Atty. Noel Archi
here filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
Hence
1998 or five days from receipt of Cleofe
the orderfiled a petition before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City alleging that as law
possessor of Lot
denying their motion for reconsideration onNo. 4429, she had every right to have and hold the owners duplicat
She prayed that after due proceedings, the respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty.
July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal
ordered to surrender the owners copy of the said title
was well within the fresh appeal period of
15 days, as already discussed.
In their Comment on the petition, therein respondents Ruben and Atty. Archival allege
Absolute Sale executed by siblings Augusto, was falsified and fictitious, and, thus, nu
NOTE: interim, Cleofe had her adverse claim annotated at the dorsal portion of the title in
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City.
The FRESH PERIOD RULE do not apply
to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final
The RTC issued an order directing Atty. Noel Archival to produce the owners copy of
Orders or Resolutions of thetheCommission
annotation ofonCleofes interest, upon which the owners duplicate copy of the title
Elections and the Commission on Audit)
because Rule 64 is derived from the
Constitution. It is likewiseThe trial court
doubtful whetherdeclared that, based on the pleadings, the issue of ownership over the
raised, a matter which the court, sitting as a cadastral court, could not pass upon. The
it will apply to criminal cases.
ruled that pending resolution of the issue of ownership over the property in an appro
therefor, there was a need for the annotation of the petitioners interest over the propert

os AUTHOR:
The respondents therein filed a "Motion for a Partial Reconsideration" of the Order all
ecember 10, 2003 interest
NOTES: In over theasks
case sir property hadthebeen
regarding issuesufficiently
of limited protected by the annotation of her a
respondents
jurisdiction suggested
of RTC serving that the Court
as cadastral partially
courts Ive alsoreconsider its Order dated 22 October
o,SR, J.: new order
included enjoining
the doctrine the respondent to produce the owners copy of OCT No. 3560 be
below
gical order) the Register of Deeds.
usto and her siblings, Jose Augusto, Magdalena Augusto and Alfonso Augusto, all married,
TheMactan,
-owners of a parcel of land located in Barrio court issued anCebu.
Opon, Order(Lot
denying the motion of the respondents therein.
No. 4429)

20, 1961, the then Justice of the Peace The and respondents filed a notice
Ex-Officio Notary Public ofnotarized
appeal from the said
a Deed of order to the Court of Appeals. T
ale where the siblings sold the property toorder denying
Guillermo due course
Omolon therefor,
for P200.00. on its perception
Guillermo Omolon that the orders subject thereof w
e, Cleofe, caused the aforesaid document hence, not appealable.
to be registered in the Office of the City Assessor of
City. Tax Declaration No. 02729 was issued thereafter and the vendors took possession of the
The respondents, now the petitioners, filed the instant petition arguing that contrary t
public respondent, the Order was final and appealable, as the same disposed of the case
ntime, the property was registered in the names of Monico, Felisa, Jose, Filomeno, Teofilo and
l surnamed Augusto, under Original Certificate of Title (OCT).
 Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (n
P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enable
produce the owners copy of the OCT is interlocutory
only and not
in cases where appealable
there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any
serious objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide n
controversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issues, such as the question a
of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final order, and not
beyond its competence before.
ory one.6 A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
Exemptions under rule 39 are confined only to natural persons a
ing or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
juridical entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of salaries, wages and earning from
rder or judgment is deemed final if it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights,
services rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule further requires that such earnings be inten
ights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch
support of the judgment debtors family.
udes them until it is reversed or set aside. Where no issue is left for future consideration,
compliance with the terms of the order, such order is final and appealable.8 In contrast, an
ry if it does not finally dispose of DISSENTING/CONCURRING
the case. OPINION(S):
der of the public respondent directing the petitioners to produce the owners copy of OCT No.
e of the Register of Deeds for the annotation of the private respondents interest over the
interlocutory and not final; hence, not appealable by means of a writ of error. The public
t fully disposed of the case as it had not yet ruled on whether to grant the private respondents
ender of the owners copy of OCT No. 3560. As gleaned from the order of the respondent
that he had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership over the property
o dismiss the petition. Before so doing, he believed it was necessary that the petitioners claim
be annotated at the dorsal portion of the title before the institution of an ordinary motion for
e conflicting claims of ownership over the property:
adings of the parties, the court gathers that ownership over the land in question is disputed by
this court, sitting as a cadastral court, cannot pass upon. However, since the petitioner has also
is for claiming possession of the owners copy of OCT No. 3560, by virtue of the Deed of
nnex "A"), and in view of the willingness of Atty. Archival to Spouses De los Santos
have petitioners Vs. Vda De
interest
mangubat
ck of the title, the court feels that for the protection of both parties, the owners copy of OCT
ossession of Atty. Noel Archival must be produced, in order that petitioners Facts: interest may be
-land dispute case. Filed in the RTC of
pending resolution of the issue on ownership in the proper proceedings.
Bulacan
spondent Atty. Noel Archival is hereby directed to produce the owners copy ofagainst
- RTC decided OCT No.petitioner on May 3,
Office of the Clerk of Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this
2000. order to allow the
oners interest, after which the title may be returned to the respondent - Petitioner received the decision on May 12,
ction: In fine, the assailed order of the respondent judge partook2000 of the nature of an ad
- May 29, 2000 petitioner
is is not to say that the respondent court sitting as a cadastral court had no jurisdiction to delvefiled a motion for
e issue of ownership over the property. reconsideration via registered mail which
was denied on July 18,2000
eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested -inOnly the on
regional
Augusttrial courtdid petitioners
3, 2000
isdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely asreceive a cadastral court.ofAimed
the denial the MR
plicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings- On by August
conferring uponpetititioner
15, 2000 the filed a
ts the authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" notice ofbut
appeal
alsohowever
"over allit waws denied on
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
August 17, 2000 to which the RTC held that
it was filed out of time.
- Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA to which on October 27, 2000 it
was dismissed on two grounds that first, the
verification and the non-forum shopping
certification is signed by petitioners counsel
which is proscribed by law; and second, the
petitioners failed to file a Motion for
Reconsideration before resorting to the
petition for certiorari. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail.
Thus the instant petition.
Ruling:
To deny herein petitioners the benefit of the
"fresh period rule" will amount to injustice,
if not absurdity, since the subject notice of
judgment and final order were issued two
years later or in the year 2000, as compared
to the notice of judgment and final order in
Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will
be incongruous and illogical that parties
receiving notices of judgment and final
orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the
benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those
later rulings of the lower courts such as in
the instant case, will not.
Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal on
August 15, 2000 or 12 days from receipt of
the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration on August 3, 2000. Hence,
following the "fresh period rule," the notice
of appeal filed by petitioners may now be
considered as having been filed well within
the fresh period of 15 days.
MADRIGAL TRANSPORT vs.
LAPANDAY
August 11, 2004 | Panganiban | Rule 45
Petition
Facts:
Petitioner Madrigal Transport filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the RTC of
Manila, Branch 49.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Complaint for Damages against Respondents Lapanday
Holdings Corporation, Macondray and Co., and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of
Manila, Branch 36.
In the latter complaint, Madrigal alleged (1) that it had entered into a joint venture agreement
with Lapanday for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping
requirements of Del Monte Philippines, Inc.; (2) that it had done so on the strength of the
representations of Lorenzo, in his capacity either as chairman of the board or as president of
Del Monte, Lapanday and Macondray; (3) that Macondray had thereafter been appointed --
allegedly upon the insistence of Lapanday as broker, for the purpose of securing charter
hire contracts from Del Monte; (4) that pursuant to the joint venture agreement, Madrigal had
purchased a vessel by obtaining a P10,000,000 bank loan; and (5) that contrary to their
representations and guarantees and despite demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo had allegedly
been unable to deliver those Del Monte charter hire contracts.
The insolvency court (Br. 49) declared petitioner insolvent. The respondents filed their
respective Motions to Dismiss the complaint in Branch 36.
Branch 36 granted the motion for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The court
opined that when petitioner was declared insolvent, it lost its right to file a complaint for
damages since the exclusive right to institute said actions is now vested with the court-
appointed assignee.
Petitioner filed MR which was denied. Petitioner then went to the CA on a petition for
certiorari. CA granted petition. Respondents moved for reconsideration.
Ruling of the CA: The RTCs Order granting the Motion to Dismiss was final, therefore, the
proper remedy was an appeal.
Hence this petition.

Issue/Held: Whether or not Appeal was the proper remedy. YES.

Ratio:

Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Hence,certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari ithat there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.

An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the
proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore the
remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.
Petitioner avers that Section 5 of Rule 16 bars the filing of an appeal when the dismissal is based
on lack of cause of action. It adds that Section 5 limits the remedy of appeal only to dismissals
grounded on prior judgments or on the statute of limitations, or to claims that have been
extinguished or are unenforceable. We find this interpretation absurd.

The provision is clear. Dismissals on the aforesaid grounds constitute res judicata. However,
such dismissals are still subject to a timely appeal. For those based on other grounds, the
complaint can be refiled. Section 5, therefore, confirms that an appeal is the remedy for the
dismissal of an action.

Citing Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41, petitioner further claims that it was prohibited from filing
an appeal. Section 1(a) of the said Rule prohibits the filing of an appeal from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration, because the remedy is to appeal the main decision as petitioner could
have done. In fact, under Section 9, Rule 37, the remedy against an order denying a motion for
reconsideration is to appeal the judgment or final order. Section 1(h) does not apply, because the
trial courts Order did not dismiss the action without prejudice.

Where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prove
adequate -- either in point of promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of
justice could result -- a writ of certiorari may still be issued. Petitioner cites some of these
exceptions to justify the remedy it has undertaken with the appellate court, but these are not
applicable to the present factual milieu.

Even assuming that the Order of the RTC was erroneous, its error did not constitute grave abuse
of discretion. Petitioner asserts that the trial court should not have dismissed the Complaint or
should have at least allowed the substitution of the assignee in petitioners stead. These alleged
errors of judgment, however, do not constitute a despotic, capricious, or whimsical exercise of
power. On the contrary, petitioner availed of certiorari because the 15-day period within which
to file an appeal had already lapsed. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the
lapsed remedy of appeal.