Pointers in Political Law Seg 2015 Combined Segregate SEPARATE

MAGIC AREAS in POLITICAL LAW
2016 Bar Examination

Dean ED VINCENT S. ALBANO
Bar Review Director
IMMUNITY OF STATE FROM SUIT
Reason behind the principle of State immunity.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodies in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution. It is as well a universally recognized
principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is
based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service
would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of
every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper
administration of the government. (Professional Video Inc. v. TESDA, G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009).
Immunity of State from suit; a generally accepted principle of international law.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes
that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.[Kawanakoa v.
Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign
state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem,
non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, unduly vex the peace of nations. [De Haber v. Queen of
Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must
be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In
such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
ARTICLE II Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Constitution mandates self-reliant economy, but does not impose policy of monopoly.
The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not
encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the
world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and
services.
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas
of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can
determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the
entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has
decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to
Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy. (Rep. Espina, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., G.R. No. 143855,
September 21, 2010).
STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision
specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their
obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement
of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus. The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA
which states that Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies,
standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and
operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to
reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not
only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. (METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008,
VELASCO, JR., J.).
ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 1

Right to information.
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about themselves. Considering
that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable
to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If
such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive:
A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to
such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students Facebook friends,
STC did not violate the minors right to privacy, as it was the minors Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. (RHONDA AVE S.
VIVARES, et al. v. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, et al., G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.).
Disclosure of SALN.
The Court, in Valmonte v. Berlmonte, Jr., ruled that the right to information goes hand in hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role
of the citizenry in government decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. The importance of the said
right was pragmatically explicated that the incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nations problems nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general
interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. However,
restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law.
Thus, while public concern like public interest eludes exact definition and has been said to embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen, the Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article IX, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as
a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from the right to know. Both of
constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there is a duty on the part of
members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law.
Valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in their requests
for access to such personal information and their publication. However, custodians of public documents must not concern
themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking to access to the records. The moral or material
injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestors responsibility and lookout. While public manner in
which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it the
authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust. (Re:
Request for copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum
Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary (A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012,
En Banc [Mendoza]).
ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS
Substantive due process.

As to substantive due process, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by
its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy. Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth
and progress in the population and economic centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to
serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill
the compelling government purpose. With regard to procedural process the clamping of the petitioners vehicles was
within the exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles
by clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such
circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. (Valentino L. Legaspi V. City Of Cebu, Et Al./Bienvenido P. Jaban,
Sr., Et Al. V. Court Of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. 159110/G.R. No. 159692. December 10, 2013).
Temporary protection order under RA 9262 can be issued ex parte; time is of the essence.
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from
further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their
life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all
the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. (Tua v.
Hon. Mangrobang, et al., G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014, Peralta, J).
Ex-parte issuance of TPO not violative of due process.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ
of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take
could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of

women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. (Tua v. Hon. Mangrobang, et al., G.R.
No. 170701, January 22, 2014, Peralta, J).
Equal protection clause does not require universal application of laws.

The fact that a Municipal Judge applying for promotion to the RTC was not considered because he has not yet
complied with the 5-year requirement of incumbency in the first level court cannot rightfully contend that there is
violation of the equal protection and due process clause.
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen applicants who cannot be all
accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best qualified among the applicants, and
not to discriminate against any particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it
bears a rationale relationship to some legitimate government end. (Villanueva v. JBC, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015).
The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. The mere fact that the
legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid.
Mandatory drug testing of students; valid.

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c) and (d), for secondary and tertiary level students and public and
private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicion less arrangement. The primary legislative intent is not
criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily
treated as criminals, hence, constitutional.
Schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose
conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. In the case at bar, the SC is of the view
and so holds that the paragraph (c) and (d) are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.
To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. (SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB) and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY(PDEA), G.R. No.
157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.).
Mandatory drug testing of persons charged with crimes; unconstitutional.

There is no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. The operative concepts in
the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicion less." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicion less. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicion less are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and
are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB) and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY(PDEA), G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.).
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the LGC-amending RA 9009,
no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP100 million income criterion. .
The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences
between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify, necessarily
implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to
be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court finds that all these requisites
have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.
The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long
before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. To
impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed
unfair. (LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499,
178056 December 21, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.)
Stop and frisk search.

One of the jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is stop and frisk. Stop and frisk searches are often
confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court.
Stop and frisk searches are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of
citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness
present in the situation where the police officer finds him or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience
of the police officer. The case of the accused was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard
a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal about riding a jeepney and carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signaled to the police that the
accused was suspicious. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of

suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. For warrantless
searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014).
Meaning of the phrase within area of immediate control.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless
search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters reach. Otherwise stated, a
valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the
area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. (People v. Calantiao,
G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014).
Plain View Doctrine.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his immediate control. This is so
because "[o]bjects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence." "The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to
supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and
permits the warrantless seizure." The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in his situation because the police
officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which
was in his possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to his lawful arrest. (People v. Calantiao,
G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014.
The four (4) aspects of press freedom

Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of
freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication;
(3) freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of circulation. (Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales, et al., G.R.
No. 168338, 15 February 2008, En Banc [Puno, CJ]).
Overbreadth doctrine.
Sec. 4(a)(3) that penalizes the intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer
data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses,
as it violates the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems does not suffer from overbreadth
in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it does not intrude into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may
not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.
But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of
vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom
to destroy other peoples computer systems and private documents. (Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Sec. of Justice, et al., G.R. No.
203335 & other cases, February 11, 2014).
Aggregate-based airtime is unreasonable and arbitrary; reasons.

The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits leveling the playing field does not constitute a compelling
state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a
clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the COMELEC has done
is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time
when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and
dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many
of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in
languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different
dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself a form of suppression of his political
speech. (GMA Network Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357. September 2, 2014).
Monitoring requirement is valid; reasonable.

Section 7(d) of the Resolution which provides that during the campaign period, it is unlawful for any newspaper
or publication, radio, television or cable television station, or other mass media, or any person making use of the mass
media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or election propaganda purposes to any
candidate or party in excess of the size, duration or frequency authorized by law or these rules is valid. The contention
that compliance with the New Rules in order to avoid administrative or criminal liability would be unfair, cruel and
oppressive, hence, unreasonable is not correct.
The Reporting Requirement for the Comelecs monitoring is reasonable. It is a basic postulate of due process,
specifically in relation to its substantive component, that any governmental rule or regulation must be reasonable in its
operations and its impositions. Any restrictions, as well as sanctions, must be reasonably related to the purpose or

objective of the government in a manner that would not work unnecessary and unjustifiable burdens on the citizenry.
(GMA Network Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357. September 2, 2014).
Freedom of expression, etc.

The removal of the tarpaulin was in violation of their fundamental right to freedom of expression. The contention
that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda which is subject to regulation, especially so that it was oversized is not
correct.
Article III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances. The right to freedom of expression was upheld in ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780 [2000], when the SC
overruled the COMELEC when it prevented ABS-CBN from conducting exit surveys. In Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75
[1948], the SC likewise recognized the constitutional right to freedom of speech; to peaceful assembly and to petition for
redress of grievances, although not absolute when it issued a writ of mandamus to compel the Mayor of Manila to issue a
permit to use the street. (The Diocese of Bacolod, etc. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191728, January 21, 2015, Leonen, J).
Removal of tarpaulin, content-based restriction.

The COMELECs contention that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation is not
correct. Assuming arguendo that the size restriction sought to be applied . . . is a mere time, place, and manner regulation,
its still unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a constitutionally sanctioned objective.
The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or content-based. (See: Wilson R. Huhn,
Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional
Calculus, 79 IND. L. J. 801 (2004).228 Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155, 207208 (2008)). Regardless, the disposition of
this case will be the same. Generally, compared with other forms of speech, the proposed speech is content-based.
On-its-face invalidation of penal statutes not allowed.

The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The
rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the
same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best,
amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. The
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If
warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
applied to him. (Romualdez vs. Comelec, supra.; (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council, et al., G.R. No. 178552, October 10, 2010).
Clear and present danger is not the only test to restrain forms of speech.
The clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by the courts. Generally, said
doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government and even other evils which do not clearly
undermine national security. Since not all evils can be measured in terms of proximity and degree the Court, however, in
several cases Ayer Productions vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 (1988) and Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 28 SCRA 835 (1969)
applied the balancing of interests test. In Gonzales vs. COMELEC, it was said that where the legislation under
constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized way and where the effect
of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of
impressionistic calculation, then the balancing interests test can be applied. (Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Freedom of Religion; effect of insulting words.

There is nothing in petitioner's statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief,
nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible
exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults
directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his
words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His
claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed
to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. They simply illustrate that
petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Hence, his speech cannot be protected
by the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. (ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, et al., G.R. No.
164785, March 15, 2010, Velasco).
When does custodial investigation commences.

Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of the crime under investigation. (People v. Pavillare, 386 Phil. 126, 136 [2000]). As a rule, a police line-up is
not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at
this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police lineup. (People v. Pepino, et al., G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016).
The ruling on this point in People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 332, is instructive thus:
x x x The guarantees of Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda
rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation
starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun
to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the

custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked
at this stage.
Police power and freedom of speech; press guarantee of equal opportunity to public service.
Resolution No. 9674 of the COMELEC which requires SWS & Pulse Asia and other survey firms to submit to the
COMELEC the names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys is valid.
The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be
disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act as it is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and
effects the constitutional policy of "guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service." Section 5.2(a)'s
requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails petitioners' free speech rights nor violates the constitutional
proscription against the impairment of contracts. (SWS, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA
124, Leonen, J).
Freedom of speech, etc. and franchises; content-neutral restriction.

Res. No. 9615 of the COMELEC which prohibits the posting of election campaign materials during the election
period in PUVs and transport terminals is not valid as it unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to
freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport
terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince
others to agree with them.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and
transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively
inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their
franchise or permit to operate. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, 755 SCRA 411).
Nature of Sec. 7[g] items 5 & 6 in relation to Section 7[f] of Res. No. 9615.
They are content-neutral regulation.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts
the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the
constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom
of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (United States v. OBrien, 391 U.S. 367, 377).
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control
the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech
clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
While Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed provisions, furthers an important and substantial
governmental interest, i.e., ensuring equal opportunity, time and space among candidates aimed at the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. It is further conceded that the governmental interest in imposing the said
prohibition is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. However, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, 755 SCRA 411).
COMELECs prohibition against the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places.
It is void and unconstitutional.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and,
by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once
the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily
his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on
reporting by newspaper or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly
paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere
manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his
private property. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, 755 SCRA 411 citing Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712).
State may regulate the posting of commercial ads on vehicles.

A prohibition on the posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is considered a regulation on the ownership
of the vehicle per se; the restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle does not have any relation to its
operation as a PUV.
On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial advertisements on windows of buses, because it
hinders police authorities from seeing whether the passengers inside are safe, is a regulation on the franchise or permit to
operate. It has a direct relation to the operation of the vehicle as a PUV, i.e., the safety of the passengers. (1-UTAK v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, 755 SCRA 411).
Regulation of freedom of speech.

The government's interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses
the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner's prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan
during the suspension period.
Petitioner's offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible
to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such,

the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and
compelling government interest in regulating petitioners utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time television are blatantly
indecent if not outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of
statutory disciplinary powers. It is the kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and
prevent should such action served and further compelling state interests. One who utters indecent, insulting, or offensive
words on television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language of FCC, a pig in the parlor.
Public interest would be served if the pig is reasonably restrained or even removed from the parlor. (ELISEO F. SORIANO
v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, et al., G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010, Velasco, J).
Roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop cannot be considered a formal arrest.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner Rodel Luz could not be said to
have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take
him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which Luz was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact xx x PO3 Altea himself testified that the only reason they went to the police
sub-station was the Luz had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take Luz into custody. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788,
February 29, 2012, 2nd Div., Sereno).
Spontaneous statements to the police, not part of questioning; admissible in evidence.

The constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is no applicable if the accused went to the police and
voluntarily told the police that the victim jumped out of his jeep, as he was never held for questioning. Custodial
investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected of having
committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. (People v. Canton, 442
Phil. 743 (2002)). The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police
would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. The assailed statements were
spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner,
together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement that the
victim jumped out of his vehicle. Thus, the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable. (Jesalva v.
People, G.R. No. 187725, January 19, 2011, Nachura, J).
A letter admitting shortage of dollars in the collection in a bank is not an uncounselled confession.
The contention of an accused that a letter to the bank explaining the shortage of her dollar is inadmissible for
being an uncounselled extrajudicial confession is not correct. The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity
depended on its being executed with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission
under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that was admissible against her. Such rule provides that the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. An admission, if voluntary, is
admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and
it is the admitters fault if the admission does not. (US v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578). By virtue of its being made by the party
himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter.
The letter was not a confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft.
Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the
offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein. (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011,
Bersamin, J).
Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she wrote the letter because she
spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid
and better appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial investigation, or under coercion by
the investigating authorities of the Government. The distinction of her situation from that of a person arrested or detained
and under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense derived from the clear intent of insulating the latter
from police coercion or intimidation underlying Section 12 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. (People v.
Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011, Bersamin, J).
Effect if accused is invited by police.

R.A. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to include the practice of issuing an invitation to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law. This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a
police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this
scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure, he may
have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. MARK JASON CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014).
Limitation on the right to travel

The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that such restriction is in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means
be construed as limiting the Courts inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by
judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person
from doing something; to regulate is to govern or direct according to rule. To ensure management of court docket and to
avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to
submit, together with his application for leave of absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a

certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA. The said certification shall state the
condition of his docket based on his Certificate of Service for the month immediately preceding the date of his intended
travel, that he has decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant
to Section 15[1] and [2], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, for travelling abroad without having been officially allowed by the Court, Judge Macarine is guilty of
violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. (Office of Administrative Services Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Ignacio B. Macarine, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, 18 July 2012, 2nd Div. [Brion]).
There is double jeopardy if a person is charged with the same offense.

An accused would be put in double jeopardy if he is charged with imprudence resulting in homicide after pleading
guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
The accuseds negative constitutional right not be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is merely taken into consideration in the imposition of the penalty. As the careless
act is single, the offense of criminal negligence remains one and the same and cannot be split into different crimes and
prosecutions. (Jason Ivler v. Hon. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172176, November 17, 2010).
Oral order of dismissal of a criminal case; no double jeopardy; void.

An oral order of dismissal of an information issued by a Justice of the Sandiganbayan due to delay is a void order.
In Corpuz vs. SB, G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 294, it was said that the dismissal made in open court by
the Chairman, which was not reduced in writing, is not a valid dismissal or termination of the cases. This is because the
Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same without the approval or consent of the other members of the
Division. The Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court and under its internal rules Section 1(b) of the 1984 Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, which is now Section 1(b), Rule VIII of the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, an order,
resolution or judgment, in order to be valid or considered as an official action of the Court itself - must bear the unanimous
approval of the members of the division, or in case of lack thereof, by the majority vote of the members of a special
division of five. (Monico Jacob, et al. vs. SB, et.al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010).
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates that a judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case
grounded on the violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial. A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a
violation of the provision; hence, such order is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective. (Monico Jacob,
et.al. vs. SB, et.al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010).
Citizenship
Republic Act No. 9225 (The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003)
Section 5[2] of The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x.
(1) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and,
at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath. x x x.
Naturalization laws are strictly construed, burden lies in the petitioner to prove qualifications.
Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of
law.
Under the law, one of the qualifications for a person to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization is that he must
own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation. (Sec. 2, Revised Naturalization Law (RA 473)).
The qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation means not only that the
person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment
gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for
an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the
object of charity or a public charge. (Chua Kian Lai v. Republic, 158 Phil. 44 (1974); In the Matter of the Petition of Tiong
v. Republic, supra; In the Matter of the Petition of Ban Uan, supra; Chiao v. Republic, 154 Phil. 8 (1974); Watt v. Republic,
150-B Phil. 610 (1972)). His income should permit him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
civilization. (In the Matter of the Petition of Ban Uan, 154 Phil. 552 (1974); In the Matter of the Petition of Tiong v.
Republic, 157 Phil. 107 (1974); Tan v. Republic, 121 Phil. 643 (1965); Rep. v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18,
2012).
Effect of use of American passport after renunciation of foreign citizenship.

A dual citizen who renounced his American citizenship is not qualified to run for public office if he subsequently
uses his American passport. The declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this

Act." This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2) requires those who have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position,
indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a
former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport which indicates the
recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship,
is to allow a complete disregard of this policy. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013).
Sen. Grace Poe admittedly foundling, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. During the
deliberations in the 1935 Constitutional convention, there was an attempt to amend the proposed provisions on
citizenship to include foundlings in the concept of natural-born citizens but it was not carried out not because there was
any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not citizens but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. In fact some delegates were able to convince their colleagues that there is no more need
to expressly declare foundlings a Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized. In the words of Chief Justice
Fernando, the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. In fact, there is nothing in the 1935, 1973, 1987
Constitution for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to deny
the use of the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the Constitution really intended to take this
path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization. (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, J).
Q Are they any provisions of the Constitution that discriminate against foundlings? Explain.
Answer: None. There was no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the
State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11
which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,"
Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article
XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status. (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8,
2016, Perez, J).
Q Are there other provisions of Philippine law that would support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos?
Explain.
Answer: Yes. Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights,
duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis
and Ellis v. Republic, 117 Phil. 976 [1963], a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This
Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but
also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil
Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined
by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she
being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-
Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and the Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the
"Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may
be adopted. (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016,
Perez, J).
Q The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not
result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must
perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship." Is the
ruling of the COMELEC correct? Explain.
Answer: No. The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregarded consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in
general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 409 Phil. 633, 649 [2001], repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's
ilipino citizenship x x x." (Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 692 Phil. 407, 420 [2012]). Also included is Parreno v.
Commission on Audit, 551 Phil. 368, 381 [2007], which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, 531 Phil. 407, 417 [2006], where it
was said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v.
Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ...
recover his natural-born citizenship." (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697;
221698-700, March 8, 2016).
Q The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-
born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." Is the ruling correct?
Explain.
Answer: No. R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may
be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once
lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in
Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of
his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or
perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, it was pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the
1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized
in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they
would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives. (G.R. No. 217126-27, 10 November 2015; Mary Grace
Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016).
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to the Court. And while we may always revisit
a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., where it was decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016).
DELEGATION OF POWERS
Tests to determine valid delegation of powers.

Sec. 26(a) provides that the Cybercrime Coordinating Center (CICC) shall have the powers to formulate a national
cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer
emergency response team (CERT). Such delegation of powers is valid.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests:
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. (Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil. 563
[2007]).
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow
when it provided a definition of cybersecurity. (Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Sec. of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335 & other cases,
February 11, 2014).
Reason for delegation of powers.

It is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the enforcement and administration of a law
may be delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like the Secretary of Finance in this case.
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and many technical fields of governmental
functions as in matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious,
not to say specific solutions.
Thus, rules and regulations implementing the law are designed to fill in the details or to make explicit what is
general, which otherwise cannot all be incorporated in the provision of the law. Such rules and regulations, when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, "deserve to be
given weight and respect by the courts in view of the rule-making authority given to those who formulate them and their
specific expertise in their respective fields." To be valid, a revenue regulation must be within the scope of statutory

authority or standard granted by the legislature. Specifically, the regulation must (1) be germane to the object and purpose
of the law; (2) not contradict, but conform to, the standards the law prescribes; and (3) be issued for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect the general provisions of our tax laws. (LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY v. CA, G.R. No.
125346, November 11, 2014).
Power of Ombudsman to investigate.

RA 6770 provisos granting investigative, prosecutorial and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman are not
unconstitutional. The espoused theory of undue delegation of authority is untenable. It is the 1987 Constitution no less
which granted and allowed the grant by Congress of sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary powers to the
Ombudsman. he Office of the Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended
the office to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to enable it to carry out its mandate as protector of the
people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government. They, however, left it to Congress to invest the office
with more broad powers to enforce its own action. And so it was that RA 6770 was enacted empowering, under Sec. 15(1)
thereof, the Ombudsman to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of
cases [of which he has primary jurisdiction. (DR. PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), REGIONAL DIRECTOR of the Department of Health, Region VIII, and FLORA DELA PEA, G.R. No.
159883, March 31, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.).
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Separation of powers; political question.

Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the Supreme Court may inquire whether or not the decision
to expel a Senator is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In Alejandrino v.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924), the Supreme Court held that it could not compel the Senate to reinstate a Senator who
assaulted another Senator and was suspended for disorderly behavior, because it could not compel a separate and co-
equal department to take any particular action. In Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960), it was held that the Supreme
Court could not interfere with the suspension of a Congressman for disorderly behavior, because the House of
Representatives is the judge of what constitute disorderly behavior. The assault of a fellow Senator constitutes disorderly
behavior.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, as expressed in Art II of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. An exchange of notes falls into the category
of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. Hence, the Non-
Surrender Bilateral Agreement in the exchange note is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international
written contract among nations.
An act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great respect. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of legislators is provided by the inviolable doctrine
of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government. Thus, absent any clear
contravention of the law, the courts should exercise utmost caution in declaring any executive agreement invalid. (BAYAN
MUNA, et al. v. ALBERTO ROMULO, et al., G.R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011, J. Velasco, Jr.).
ARTICLE VI Legislative Department
When the one-subject requirement of a bill satisfied.

The one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object. (Tio v.
Videogram Regulatory Board, 235 Phil. 198, 204 [1987]).
It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect. (Remman Ent. Inc., et al. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, et al., G.R. No.
197676, February 4, 2014).
HRET as sole judge.

Article VI, Section 17 provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of
these Tribunals, (Co v. HRET, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692), which is conferred upon the HRET and the
SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who
has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives. (Co v. HRET).
A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the
qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate. (Rep. Danilo Ramon
Fernandez v. HRET, et al., G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009).
Effect if a winning Congressional candidate has been proclaimed; taken his oath and assumed office.
The COMELEC would lose jurisdiction, instead, the HRET would now have jurisdiction, once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives. COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. (Guerrero v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 458 (2000); Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106
(1999)).

Under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. As the Court explained in Lazatin v.
House Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391 [1988], the use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred x x x. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature x x x. Earlier,
this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as full, clear and complete
Mandatory drug testing as additional qualification; void.

It is unconstitutional for the COMELEC to impose mandatory drug testing before an elected official may assume
office because it is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution.
The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. (SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB), et al., G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.).
Party List.
In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2% threshold, "proportional
representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats.
The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats of the first party and other qualified party-
list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans: The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least 2% of the
total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the
second party, it should be entitled to twice the latters number of seats and so on.
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based
on proportional representation. In simplified form, it is written as follows:
Additional seats for concerned party = (No. of votes of concerned party/No. of votes of the first party) x No. of
additional seats allocated to first party. The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the
number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is
necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the
reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that
provided by the law.
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioners case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an
additional seat. Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one, then it did not obtain or
reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that in order to be entitled to
one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat. (CITIZENS
BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) v. COMELEC represented by CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR., G.R. No.
172103, 13 April 2007, J. Velasco, Jr.).
Constitutionality of PDAF.
The defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is the authority of legislators to participate in the
post-enactment phases of project implementation. At its core, legislators, may it be through project lists, prior
consultations or program menus, have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they
desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. They are also granted the statutory authority to
participate in the area of fund release as well as fund realignment.
Legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the
law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the executive department be deprived of what the
Constitution has vested as its own. (Belgica, et al. v. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 208566 &
companion cases, November 19, 2013).
Post-enactment measures like project identification, etc., not part of the oversight power of Congress.
These post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have
been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in as Guingona, Jr. puts it the various operational aspects of
budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the regulation and release
of funds in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada,
cannot be overstated from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any
of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards
this end, the Court abandoned its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise
that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents reliance on the same faltered altogether. (Belgica, et
al. v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., et al. & companion cases).
2013 PDAF Article as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel violate the principle of non-delegability of
powers.
Insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, it violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which
as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress. (Bengzon v. Sec. of Justice & Insular Auditor, 62 Phil. 912 (1936)). That the
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made

by law. To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation it was held in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor, that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for
(b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum
fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that
they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. (Belgica, et al. v.
Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., et al. & companion cases).
Power of Augmentation of Public Funds; Purposes of RA 8439.

R. A. No. 8439 was enacted as a manifestation of the States recognition of science and technology as an essential
component for the attainment of national development and progress. The law offers a program of human resources
development in science and technology to help realize and maintain a sufficient pool of talent and manpower that will
sustain the initiative for total science and technology mastery. In furtherance of this objective, the law not only ensures
scholarship programs and improved science and engineering education, but also affords incentives for those pursuing
careers in science and technology. Moreover, the salary scale of science and technology personnel is differentiated by R. A.
No. 8439 from the salary scales of government employees under the existing law.
Section 7 of R. A. No. 8439 confers the Magna Carta benefits consisting of additional allowances and benefits to
DOST officers and employees, such as honorarium, share in royalties, hazard, subsistence, laundry, and housing and
quarter allowances, longevity pay, and medical examination. But the Magna Carta benefits will remain merely paper
benefits without the corresponding allocation of funds in the GAA. (Nazareth v. The Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, et al., G.R. No.
188635, January 29, 2013).
Limitations to the authority to transfer funds.

The authority granted to the President is subject to two essential requisites in order that a transfer of
appropriation from the agencys savings would be validly effected. The first requires that there must be savings from the
authorized appropriation of the agency. The second demands that there must be an existing item, project, activity, purpose
or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings would be transferred for augmentation purposes only.
(Nazareth v. Villar, et al., supra.).
ARTICLE VII Executive Department
Faithful execution clause.

The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance
with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation
imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal
principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them. This is precisely why the law
provides that "administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution." (NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, et al. v. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, et al., G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013).
Presidential immunity from suit; reasons.

The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly
reserved in the present constitution. The President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently
made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987
Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. (LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY
RUBRICO CARBONEL, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010, Velasco, J.).
Effect/s if the heads of offices are allowed to transfer funds within their respective offices..
By allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective offices, the Constitution
itself ensures the fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of powers among the
three main branches of the Government. In Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150, it was
said that the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court,
of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to another within the Executive has not
been the mere offshoot of established usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of the
American Governors-General. Act No. 1902 (An Act authorizing the Governor-General to direct any unexpended balances of
appropriations be returned to the general fund of the Insular Treasury and to transfer from the general fund moneys which
have been returned thereto), passed on May 18, 1909 by the First Philippine Legislature, was the first enabling law that
granted statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The authority was without any limitation, for the Act
explicitly empowered the Governor-General to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau or
office to another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally been appropriated for that bureau or office. (Araullo, et
al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion cases, July 11, 2014).

Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Art. VI, Section 25(5) of the Constitution must be made upon
a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within
their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
(Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion cases, July 11, 2014).
Concept of savings.
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in the GAA free from any obligation or
encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii)from appropriations balances arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from
appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and
thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a
lesser cost.
The three instances are a sure indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose of the
appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no longer existent. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III,
et al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion cases, July 11, 2014, Bersamin, J).
Cross-broader transfer of funds, unconstitutional

Although the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which
included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute his
own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to
spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth
resides in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would
threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion
cases, July 11, 2014, Bersamin, J).
Need for item in augmentation.

Should there be augmentation of savings, it is required that there should be an item in the project to which the
savings may be transferred. In Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385, it was ruled that there
must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may
be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had
set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This
interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to
the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al.,
supra).
Nature of the power to deport; Act of State; subject to judicial review.

It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged
alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established
by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own
judgment from that of Congress or of the President, (Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360,
November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330, 347; Ledesma vs. CA, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 656, 681; Taada
vs. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18, 48-49), the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether
or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. (Republic vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 167741, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 495, 502;
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004,
419 SCRA 141, 148; Domingo vs. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235 (2004); House of Sara Lee vs. Rey, 500 SCRA 419 (2006); Secretary
of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Roruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009).
Designation of Solicitor General as Acting Secretary of Justice; void.

When the designation is void, hence, unconstitutional. Sec. 13, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. Likewise, Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides that unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or
employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
(Funa v. Acting Sec. of Justice Alberto N. Agra, et al., G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013).
Exceptions to the prohibition against holding multiple positions.

According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53, the only two
exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3,

Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive
officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of the officials offices. (Funa v. Acting Sec. of Justice Alberto N. Agra, et al., G.R. No.
191644, February 19, 2013).
Former President Joseph Estrada granted absolute pardon.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in
fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. (Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 206666,
January 21, 2015, Leonardo de Castro, J).
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
The only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2)
cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that
any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 38 [1940] and Pelobello v. Palatino,72 Phil. 441, 442 [1941] the SC declared
that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action. In Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. it was also said that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not
be circumscribed by legislative action. The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not
be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution. (Atty.
Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, et l., supra.).
Foreign relations
There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive Department
without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary. One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It
would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of foreign policy. Precisely
because of the nature of the questions presented, and the lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, we
make no attempt to lay down general guidelines covering other situations not involved here, and confine the opinion only
to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this matter.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in
this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
(Vinuya, et al. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, En Banc [Del
Castillo]).
Q A petition was filed questioning the Constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
[EDCA] between the Philippines and the USA. To resolve the issues, the Supreme Court was confronted with this
issue on the duty of the State to protect its citizens, represented by the President. State the Constitutional
provision on such duty. Explain.
Answer: The 1987 Constitution has vested the executive power in the President of the Republic of the Philippines
(Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1). While the vastness of the executive power that has been consolidated in the person of the
President cannot be expressed fully in one provision, the Constitution has stated the prime duty of the government, of
which the President is the head:
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call
upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service. (Sec. 4, Article II, Constitution;
Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426 and companion cases, January 12,
2016, Sereno, J)
The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried out earnestly and effectively throughout the whole
territory of the Philippines in accordance with the Constitutional provision on national territory. Hence, the President of
the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of the Philippine archipelago, including all the
islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories over which it has sovereignty or jurisdiction. These
territories consist of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains; including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas; and the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions.
Q How does the President carry out such important duty? Explain.
Answer: To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped with authority over the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), which is the protector of the people and the state. The AFP's role is to secure the sovereignty of the
State and the integrity of the national territory. In addition, the Executive is Constitutionally empowered to maintain peace
and order; protect life, liberty, and property; and promote the general welfare (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3). In recognition
of these powers, Congress has specified that the President must oversee, ensure, and reinforce our defensive capabilities
against external and internal threats (see Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 18 in relation to Art. II, Secs. 3, 4 & 7; Executive Order
No. 292 [Administrative Code of 1987], Book IV [Executive Branch], Title VIII [National Defense], Secs. l, 15, 26 & 33
[hereinafter Administrative Code of 1987]) and, in the same vein, ensure that the country is adequately prepared for all
national and local emergencies arising from natural and man-made disasters. (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV
[Executive Branch], Title XII [Local Government], Sec. 3[5]; Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)

Q Is such power absolute? Explain.
Answer: No. This power is limited by the Constitution itself, because the President may call out the AFP to prevent or
suppress instances of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, (Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 18) but not suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus for a period exceeding 60 days, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law
exceeding that same span. In the exercise of these powers, the President is also duty-bound to submit a report to Congress,
in person or in writing, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and Congress may in turn revoke the proclamation or suspension. The same provision provides for the
Supreme Court's review of the factual basis for the proclamation or suspension, as well as the promulgation of the decision
within 30 days from filing. (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)
Q State the role of the Senate in relation to the power of the President as the sole organ in international
relations. Explain.
Answer: The power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the international sphere inheres in the person of
the President. This power, however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument the Chief
Executive so desires. The Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements the President enters into,
as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution, obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members.
(Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)
Q What is the so-called Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement [EDCA]? Explain.

Answer: EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed
Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no
longer necessary. Accordingly, in June 2014, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the U.S. Embassy exchanged
diplomatic notes confirming the completion of all necessary internal requirements for the agreement to enter into force in
the two countries. (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)
Pardoning power of the President.

The Court impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon an accused without pardon because that would be a
limitation on the part of the power of the Chief Executive. The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the
President and may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the court, save only when it contravenes the
limitations set forth by the Constitution. (San Diego v. People, G.R. No. 176114, April 8, 2015, 755 SCRA 260).
VFA is constitutional.
The contention that the VFA is unconstitutional because it allows the transfer of custody of an accused to a
foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused, which also violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1) is not correct.
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a
member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other
accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local
jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the
world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power.
But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the
extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is
curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of
procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of another State due to
the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of
jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and
members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another States territory. On the contrary, the
Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2; Laude, et al. v. Hon. Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde, et al., G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015, Leonen, J).
Q What is the attitude of the SC on the expansive power of the President on foreign affairs? Explain.
Answer: The Court has long treated this power as something the Courts must not unduly restrict. As stated recently in
Vinuya v. Romulo:
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However,
the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the
courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari. (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al)
Q Why is the President invested as the sole organ in international relations by the Constitution? Explain.
Answer: In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the US Supreme Court held that "[t]he President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations." It is quite apparent that if,
in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment - perhaps serious embarrassment - is to be avoided and
success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry
within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory

restriction which would not be admissible where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has
the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of
war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials
(Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al)
Q Are there limitations on the power of the President as the defender of the State and sole authority in foreign
relations? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987
Constitution expressly limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities.
The initial limitation is found in Section 21 of the provisions on the Executive Department: "No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The
specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions, the full text of which reads as follows:
SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate
and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
It is quite plain that the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution intended to add to the basic requirements
of a treaty under Section 21 of Article VII. This means that both provisions must be read as additional limitations to the
President's overarching executive function in matters of defense and foreign relations. (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive
Secretary, et al., supra)
Q State the basis why EDCA is an executive agreement? Explain.

Answer: EDCA can be in the form of an executive agreement, since it merely involves "adjustments in detail" in the
implementation of the MDT and the VFA. There are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already
been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Section 25.
Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate. (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive
Q What is one distinguishing feature of executive agreements? Explain.

Answer: One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not affected by
a lack of Senate concurrence. (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, supra). This distinctive feature was
recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading ( 1961 ), viz:
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the
Senate or by Congress.
xx xx
[T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our
history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular
relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and
navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously
questioned by our courts.
That notion was carried over to the present Constitution. The Constitutional Commission
members ultimately decided that the term "international agreements" as contemplated in Section 21,
Article VII, does not include executive agreements, and that a proviso is no longer needed. Their
discussion is reproduced below. (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)
Q The President is granted a vast power to enter into executive agreements. What is the role of the Supreme
Court? Explain.
Answer: In the field of external affairs, the President must be given a larger measure of authority and wider discretion,
subject only to the least amount of checks and restrictions under the Constitution. The rationale behind this power and
discretion was recognized by the Court in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, cited earlier.
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the Guidelines in the Negotiation of International Agreements and its
Ratification, thus, correctly reflected the inherent powers of the President when it stated that the DF A "shall determine
whether an agreement is an executive agreement or a treaty."
Accordingly, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court does not look into whether an international
agreement should be in the form of a treaty or an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a statute
requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast constitutional powers and prerogatives granted to the President in the field
of foreign affairs, the task of the Court is to determine whether the international agreement is consistent with the
applicable limitations (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra). This is so because of the principle of separation
of powers that the SC cannot intrude into the wisdom of the Executive Department.
ARTICLE VIII Judiciary Department
Requisites of the power of judicial review.

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. (Lawyers

Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670
SCRA 373, 382; Funa v. The Chaiman, CSC Francisco Duque III, et al., G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014, Bersamin, J).
Q Petitioners invoked the power of judicial review in seeking to declare EDCA unconstitutional. They
contended that the Constitution explicitly prohibits the presence of military forces in the country except under a
treaty concurred in by the Senate. Explain the concept of the power of judicial review.
Answer: The power of judicial review specially refers to both the authority and the duty of this Court to determine
whether a branch or an instrumentality of government has acted beyond the scope of the latter's constitutional powers
(See: Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012, 676 SCRA 579; Tagolino v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013, 693 SCRA 574; Gutierrez v. House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, 658 Phil. 322 (2011); Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra; Demetria v. Alba, 232 Phil. 222
[1987]). As articulated in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the power of judicial review involves the power to
resolve cases in which the questions concern the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission, this Court exhaustively discussed this "moderating power" as part of the system of checks and balances under
the Constitution. In our fundamental law, the role of the Court is to determine whether a branch of government has
adhered to the specific restrictions and limitations of the latter's power:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. x x x. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but
as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if
the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any
living constitution. x x x. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of [the 1935] Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)
How the 1987 Constitution strengthened the power of judicial review.

The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in the 1987 Constitution. The scope of that power has
been extended to the determination of whether in matters traditionally considered to be within the sphere of appreciation
of another branch of government, an exercise of discretion has been attended with grave abuse (Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, supra note 94; Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra note 94; Tanada v.
Angara, 338 Phil. 546 [1997]; Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 809-810 (citing Llamas v.
Orbos, 279 Phil. 920 [1991]; Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, 20 November 1991, 203 SCRA
767; Gonzales v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, 19 November 1990, 191 SCRA 452; Coseteng v. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, 12 July
1990, 187 SCRA 377; Daza v. Singson, 259 Phil. 980 [1989]). The expansion of this power has made the political question
doctrine "no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review." (Oposa v. Factoran, supra)
This moderating power, however, must be exercised carefully and only if it cannot be completely avoided. The
Constitution is so incisively designed that it identifies the spheres of expertise within which the different branches of
government shall function and the questions of policy that they shall resolve (Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415, 442 [1968]).
Since the power of judicial review involves the delicate exercise of examining the validity or constitutionality of an act of a
coequal branch of government, this Court must continually exercise restraint to avoid the risk of supplanting the wisdom
of the constitutionally appointed actor with that of its own. (See: Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra note 93;
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); and Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra; Saguisag, et al. v. Executive
Stringent requirements for the exercise of the power of judicial review.

Even as the Courts are left with no recourse but to bare our power to check an act of a coequal branch of
government - in this case the executive they must abide by the stringent requirements for the exercise of that power

under the Constitution. Demetria v. Alba and Francisco v. House of Representatives cite the "pillars" of the limitations on the
power of judicial review as enunciated in the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority (297 U.S. 288, 346-348 [1936]), Francisco redressed these "pillars" under the following
categories:
1. That there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. That rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. That judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. That there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. That the parties are not in estoppel
6. That the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality
(Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)
Safeguards in the exercise of the power of judicial review.

These are the specific safeguards laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review. It may
invoke the power only when the following four stringent requirements are satisfied: (a) there is an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners possess locus standi; ( c) the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity;
and ( d) the issue of constitutionality is the !is mota of the case. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 471 (2010); David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 753 (2006); Francisco v. House of
Representatives, supra note 93 at 892; Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra; Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.,
supra)
Senate investigation of a case already pending in court does not violate the sub-judice rule.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. In this case, the subject matter of the senate
inquiry is no longer sub judice for the reason that the Court has denied with finality the motion for reconsideration of its
decision filed by Chavez. Even assuming that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court, still, such circumstance
would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or administrative action
should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose. (See Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704, October 17,
2006)
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts
conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia,
undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to
determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need
not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
legislation.
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its
investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. (REGHIS M. ROMERO II, et al. v. SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA,
et al., G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.)
Judicial power may not be exercised in vacuum; meaning of principle.

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A courts exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a
particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other
words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20
Phil. 523 [1911], the Court elucidated that [t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was
fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply
directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised
in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. (Conchita Carpio-Morales v. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Political question does not preclude judicial review.

The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional
organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the
discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental
right to expression.
Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479 [1989], Per J. Cortes, En Banc, limited the use of the political question
doctrine:
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the
latter alone to decide.
How the court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has undergone an evolution since the time
that it had been first invoked in Marcos v. Manglapus. Increasingly, this court has taken the historical and social context of
the case and the relevance of pronouncements of carefully and narrowly tailored constitutional doctrines. This trend was
followed in cases such as Daza v. Singson, 259 Phil. 980 [1989] and Coseteng v. Mitra Jr., G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990, 1987
SCRA 377.

Impeachment
Meaning of initiate in impeachment.

The term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of
the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the
House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. (Francisco v. House of
Representatives, et al., 460 Phil. 830 (2003). What ends the initiation is the referral to the Committee on Justice. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period. (Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459,
February 15, 2011).
Power of suspension by the Ombudsman.

Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act vests the Office of the Ombudsman with disciplinary authority over all elective
and appointive officials of the government, except officials who may be removed only by impeachment, Members of the
Congress, and the Judiciary. While CTD has the rank of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, he does not belong to the Judiciary
but to the Executive Department. This simply means that he has the same compensation and privileges as a Justice of the
Court of Appeals. If the Supreme Court were to investigate CTD, it would be performing a non-judicial function. This will
violate the principle of separation of powers. (Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 405 (1968).
Preventive suspension by Ombudsman.

If a public officer fails the lifestyle check conducted by the office because his assets were grossly disproportionate
to his salary and allowances and charged with graft and corrupt practices and pending the completion of investigations, he
was suspended from office for six months, the suspension is valid.
The suspension meted out to him is preventive and not punitive. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 grants the
Ombudsman the power to impose preventive suspension up to six months. Preventive suspension may be imposed
without any notice or hearing. It is merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation and is not the final
determination of the guilt of the officer concerned. (Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 (1999).
Requisites for issuance of preventive suspension.

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence
of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of
the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided. (The Ombudsman v. Valeroso, 548 Phil. 688, 695 [2007]; Conchita Carpio-Morales v. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
ARTICLE IX Constitutional Commissions/Elections
Jurisdiction of COMELEC; decisions to be brought to SC via Rule 64.

The COMELECs declaration that Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate in the bidding process for the COMELECs
procurement of 23,000 units of optical mark readers may not be brought to the SC via Rule 64. Article IX-A, Section 7 of the
1987 Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.
The phrase decision, order, or ruling of constitutional commissions, the COMELEC included, that may be
brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those rendered in
the commissions exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Garces v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114795, July
17, 1996, 259 SCRA 99, 107). In the case of the COMELEC, this would limit the provisions coverage to the decisions,
orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating
to the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective offices. (Bedol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009, 606
SCRA 554; Querubin, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015, Velasco, J).
Residence and domicile once again interpreted.

While voting gives rise to a strong presumption of residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. (Domino v.
COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798 (1999). In Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 SCRA 1106 (1999) it was held that a persons
registration as voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The registration of a voter in a
place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence. (Faypon v.
Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954). To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and
probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode. (Pundaodaya v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 179313,
September 17, 2009).
Designation of CSC Chairman to the Board of GSIS, ECC, etc. violates the independence of the Commission.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated with

appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and
welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other
corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-
related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence,
when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may
exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing
interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers, or
approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The Court also notes that Duques
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem,
a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear
contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the
principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duques designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An
office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch. (Dennis Funa v. The
Chairman, CSC, Francisco Duque III, et al., G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014, Bersamin, J).
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Promotional appointment of COA Chairman; condition.

Villars appointment as Chairman of COA is not prohibited under the Constitution after his resignation as
Commissioner. The Constitutional provision provides: The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other
commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion
of the term of the predecessor. The provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner
to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence
of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan
or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in
said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not
to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). There is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article
IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the
aforestated circumstances or conditions. (Dennis A. Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, Reynaldo A. Villar, G.R.
No. 192791 April 24, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.).
ARTICLE XII General Provisions / National Patrimony
Meaning and purpose of the Filipinization of public utilities.

The Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of nationalism which
gripped the 1935 Constitutional Convention. (Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Anti-Dummy Board, 46 SCRA 474 (1972). The
1987 Constitution provides for the Filipinization of public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for the
operation of public utilities should be granted only to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. The
provision is an express recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and
for national security. The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from assuming control of
public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest. This specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens
control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution: to conserve and develop our
patrimony and ensure a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet the minimum nationality
requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted authority to
operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its capital must be owned by Filipino citizens. (Gamboa v. Teves, et al., G.R.
No. 176579, June 28, 2011).
Aliens cannot acquire land in the Philippines.

A foreigner who married a Filipino is not entitled to a share of a parcel of land they acquired during marriage
even if the money used to purchase it came from him. Under the Constitution, save in cases of hereditary succession no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain. He was well aware of the constitutional prohibition and openly admitted the same. His
actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition, hence, he cannot be entitled to a share of the
real properties. Contracts that violate the Constitution and the law are null and void, vest not rights, create no obligations
and produce no legal effect at all. The denial of his claim does not amount to injustice. It is the Constitution itself that
demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. The purpose of the prohibition is to conserve
and develop the national patrimony. (Beumer vs. Amores, G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012).
Academic Freedom
Even if the education department had not issued such prohibition, private schools still have the authority to
promulgate and enforce a similar prohibition pursuant to their right to establish disciplinary rules and regulations. This
right has been recognized in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which has the character of law. Section 78 of
the 1992 Manual of Regulations of Regulations for Private Schools. (Espiritu Santo Parochial School v. NLRC, 258 Phil. 600
(1989)).

The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with the mandate in the Constitution (Art. XIV, Sec. 3(2),
Constitution) for schools to teach discipline; (Jenosa v. Dalariate, G.R. No. 172138, September 8, 2010) in fact, schools have
the duty to develop discipline in students. (Marian College, Inc. v. CA, 401 Phil. 431 (2000) Corollarily, the Court has always
recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions on students who violate disciplinary rules. The penalty for
violations includes dismissal or exclusion from re-enrollment.
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
The term franchise includes not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of statute, but also
those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchise has been delegated by Congress.
The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to operate the toll
facility/system. By explicit provisions of the PDs, the TRB was given power to grant administrative franchise for toll
facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 12, Section 11 of the Constitution on the grant of franchise or other forms of
authorization to operate public utilities may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of
qualified Filipino citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as contracts; and (c) no
such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority
to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of
subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some administrative agencies. (Ernesto Francisco,
Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, GR Number 166910, October 19, 2010, VELASCO, JR., J.).
Local Governments
Condonation doctrine without basis in the Constitution and law.

Effect of the 1987 Constitution on the condonation doctrine.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the other legal provisions now leads to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability
to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local officials administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, 279 Phil.
920, 937 [1991], to apply to administrative offenses (Conchita Carpio-Morales v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 217126-27, November
10, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
3-term limit, its rationale; coverage.

As stressed in Socrates v. COMELEC(G.R. No. 154512, 2002), the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers
only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. An elective local official
cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term, albeit he is allowed to seek a
fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by
reason of the prohibition. There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or
her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the
third. (MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, G.R. No. 20171, January 8,
2013, VELASCO, JR., J.).
Effect of voluntary renunciation.

As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary
renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall not, in determining service for
three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected. This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to
skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as
distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
The almost two-year period during which Abundos opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be
considered an involuntary interruption of Abundos continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the
context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. It cannot
be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an
ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In
other words, during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his
heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective
position such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in
the mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. (MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, G.R. No. 20171, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.)
Plebiscite; the phrase by the qualified voters therein includes all voters in the LGU affected; issue, a novel one of
first impression.
The COMELECs ruling that only the voters of Cabanatuan City shall participate in the plebiscite to convert
Cabanatuan City into a highly urbanized city is not correct.
The phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 means the qualified voters not only in the city proposed
to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to
harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

The respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453 in a vacuum. Their interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs
afoul of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which explicitly requires that all residents in the "political units directly affected"
should be made to vote. (Umali v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 203974, & companion cases, April 22, 2014).
LGUs have the power to classify and reclassify their properties; police power measure.
Ordinance No. 8187, otherwise known as An Ordinance Amending Ord. No. 8119, Otherwise Known as The
Manila Comprehensive Land Use and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 By Creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy
Industrial Zone (1-3). The creation of the industrial zones lifted the prohibition against owners and operators of
businesses including Chevron and the other oil companies from operating in designated commercial zones, an industrial
zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is valid. The petition is a sequel to the case of SJS v. Mayor Atienza, J.
where the SC found that said ordinance (No. 8027) was enacted to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila, hence it ordered the operators of the Pandacan depots to immediately relocate and transfer their oil
terminals. But despite the finality of said judgment, the City of Manila enacted an ordinance, (Ordinance No. 8171)
repealing Ordinance No. 8027 on the theory that a local government unit can classify and reclassify its own properties.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code, the LGU is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents that the
removal of the oil depots in the Pandacan area is necessary to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies contention that the Pandacan
terminals have never been the subject of terrorist attacks, hence, the petitions are based on unfounded fears and mere
conjectures is not correct. (SJS, et al. v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836 & companion cases, November 25, 2014, Perez, J).
LGU has the power to impose fees for purposes of regulation in the exercise of police power.
Ordinance No. 18, series of 2003, entitled An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special Projects is a
valid ordinance. The primary purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate the placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair
and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus listed
therein, which included Smarts telecommunications tower. Clearly, the purpose of the assailed Ordinance is to regulate
the enumerated activities particularly related to the construction and maintenance of various structures. The fees in
Ordinance No. 18 are not impositions on the building or structure itself; rather, they are impositions on the activity subject
of government regulation, such as the installation and construction of the structures. (Angeles University Foundation v.
City of Angeles, G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 539, 373).
Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of the identified special
projects, which included cell sites or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily
regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute to the revenues of the Municipality,
this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes. (Smart Communications, Inc. v.
Mun. of Malvar, Batangas, G.R. No. 204429, February 18, 2014).
Population not an indispensable requirement; merely alternative.

A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office.
The requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement. (Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 2, 2010).
3-term limit; effect of disqualification.

It is true that he occupied the position of mayor in the following periods: 1995-1998; 1998-2001; 2001-2004;
2004-2007 but because of his disqualification he was not duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales
hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-
2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales occupancy of the position of
mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-
term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit
rule. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009).
Exceptional situation in the 3-term limit.

In the 2004 elections, Torres was proclaimed as the winner, but after the protest was decided Abundo was finally
proclaimed as the winner, hence, he served as Mayor starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30,
2007 or for a period of one year and one month. In the 2010 local elections, he is not disqualified because he was not
running for a fourth term, violating of the 3-term limit rule.
The rule is so because he did not serve the full term in the 2004-2007 elections, when he was initially deprived of
title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually
declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of RA 7160, or
the Local Government Code provide that no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. The 3-term limit has two (2) basic requirements, thus:
(1) That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2) That he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311
SCRA 602).
Abundo could not have served for a full term in 2004-2007 because the opponent was proclaimed as the winner,
hence, Abundo was termporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency of the election protest.
The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired
portion of the term but while was declared the winner for the 2004-2007 term, his full term has been substantially
reduced by the actual service by his opponent. Hence, there was involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and

cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term. (Mayor Abelardo Abundo, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
201716, January 8, 2013).
Reason why a preventively suspended elective public officer cannot run for a fourth term.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to
this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the
functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons
exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily
prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A
serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some
involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting
title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a
term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the
three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions
when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the
enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective
interruption is. (Simon Aldovino, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, Brion, J).
Criterion in creating a local government unit.

When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area
requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the
creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that
islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended
to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then,
be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. (Navarro, et al. V. Executive Secretary Ermita,
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011).
Prohibition against midnight appointments; applies only to Presidential appointees; not to LGUs.
A midnight appointment refers to those appointments made within two months immediately prior to the next
presidential election. Midnight appointments are prohibited under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make the appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is duty-bound to prepare for the orderly
transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he or she should not do acts which he or she ought to know, would
embarrass or obstruct the policies of his or her successor. (Aytona v. Castillo, No. L-193313, January 19, 1962, 4 SCRA 1,
9-10 [Per CJ. Bengzon, En Banc]). An outgoing President should not deprive the new administration of an opportunity to
make the corresponding appointments.
However, the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It
does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. (The Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No.
202331, April 22, 2015, 757 SCRA 222, Leonen, J, citing De Rama v. CA, 405 Phil. 531, 353 SCRA 94).
Ways of amending the Constitution.

There are several ways of proposing amendments to the Constitution. One is by way of a constitutional
convention and the other is proposal of of Congress as a constituent body.
There is a third way of proposing amendments to the Constitution; however, the people through initiative upon
petition of at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per cent of the registered voters in it, may directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
This right is not operative without an implementing law. (Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution).
Police Power
Ordinance prevails over restrictions on use of property.

An ordinance re-classifying the area as institutional, hence, the owner expanded the school shall prevail over the
restriction in the title.
The ordinance as it is an exercise of police power. As early as Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust
Co., 183 Phil. 176 (1979), the SC upheld the validity of an ordinance declaring the residential area in Mandaluyong as
industrial and commercial zone as it was passed in the exercise of police power. Since the motives behind the passage of
the questioned resolution is reasonable, and it being a legitime response to a felt public need, not whimsical or oppressive,
the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipalitys exercise of police power.
(Learning Child, Inc., et al. v. Ayala Alabang Village Asso., et al., G.R. No. 134269, and other companion cases, July 7, 2010).

20% senior citizen discount considered as an exercise of police power.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be
gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic
commodities. The discount serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives on
contributing to the development and progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of honoring the elderly
is an integral part of this law. (Manila Memorial Park, Inc., et al. v. Sec. of the DSWD, et al., G.R. No. 175356, December 3,
2013).
Eminent Domain
Agency that determines just compensation.

The RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has been conferred with the original and exclusive power to
determine just compensation for parcels of land acquired by the State pursuant to the agrarian reform program. To guide
the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors which must be taken into consideration to
accurately determine the amount of just compensation to be awarded in a particular case. They are: (a) the acquisition
cost of the land; (b) the current value of like properties; (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income
therefrom; (d) the owners sworn valuation; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by government assessors;
(g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the
property; and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if
any. It, however, bears stressing that courts are not constrained to adopt the said formula in every case since the
determination of the amount of just compensation essentially partakes the nature of a judicial function. In this accord,
courts may either adopt the DAR formula or proceed with its own application for as long as the factors listed in Section 17
of RA 6657 have been duly considered. (LBP v. Hababag, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 172352, September 16, 2015, reiterating the the
landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil.
777 [1989]).
Point to determine just compensation.

Compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use
and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, the
evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial court for the valuation of the subject portion must be based on the
values prevalent at such time of taking for like agricultural lands. (DAR v. Berina, et al., G.R. No. 183901; LBP v. Berina, et
al., G.R. No. 183931, July 9, 2014).
Concept of public use.

Public use, in common acceptation, means use by the public. However, the concept has expanded to include
utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public. In Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of
Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 169914, April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 59, 175, Justice Corona, in his dissenting
opinion said that:
To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of the term public use has evolved
over time in response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use which was traditionally
understood as strictly limited to actual use by the public has already been abandoned. Public use has
now been held to be synonymous with public interest, public benefit, and public convenience. (Rep.
v. Heirs of Saturnino Borbon, et al., G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015).
Effect if the expropriator abandons the public use.

It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings for
expropriation. The effects of abandoning the public purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Lozada, Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to
use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the
judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the
property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law,
and the judgment would violate the property owner's right to justice, fairness and equity. (G.R. No.
176625, February 25, 2010, 613 SCRA 618; Rep. v. Heirs of Saturnino Borbon, et al., G.R. No. 165354,
January 12, 2015).
Compensation to be paid; basis; instance of an inverse condemnation proceedings.

The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which states in clear and
categorical language that [p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. (Art. III, Sec. 9,
Constitution). This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription. (Napocor v. Heirs of Sangkay, G.R.
No. 165828, August 24, 2011). Thus, it has been ruled that the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395 does
not extend to an action to recover just compensation. (Napocor v. Sangkay). It would be a confiscatory act on the part of
the government to take the property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive them of their right to just
compensation, solely because they failed to institute inverse condemnation proceedings within five years from the time
the transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it was not the duty of respondent spouses to demand for just
compensation. Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before occupying their
property. In the normal course of events, before the expropriating power enters a private property, it must first file an
action for eminent domain (Rule 67, Sec. 1, Rules of Court) and deposit with the authorized government depositary an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. (Sec. 2, Rule 67). Due to its omission, however, respondents were
constrained to file inverse condemnation proceedings to demand the payment of just compensation before the trial court.

NAPOCOR cannot invoke the statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent spouses constitutional right to just
compensation. (National Power Corporation v. Sps. Saludares, G.R. No. 189127, April 25, 2012).
No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are awarded
if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value.
(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI), G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013).
RA No. 8974 otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Project
and for Other Purposes provides for guidelines for expropriation proceedings.
The requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property are: (1)
the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the defendant; (3) payment of
an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR
including payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in
cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to the court
of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials.
Upon compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an expropriation case is entitled to a writ of possession
as a matter of right, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No
hearing is required, and the court exercises neither its discretion nor its judgment in determining the amount of the
provisional value of the properties to be expropriated, as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8974. (Rep. v. Far East Ent. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009 citing Capitol Steel Corp. v. PHIVIDEC
Industrial Authority, G.R. No. 169453, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 590).
Public Officers
Reorganization must be done in good faith.

It is a well-established rule that a reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule,
the test of good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more
efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good faith. A demotion in office, i.e.,
the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties,
responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is
shown for it. (Gayatano v. CSC, G.R. No. 93064, June 27, 1992, 210 SCRA 183). Consequently, before a demotion may be
effected pursuant to a reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential.
(Bautista v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010).
Power of Ombudsman to impose administrative liability; nature.

It is already well-settled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is
not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero, Jr., G.R. No. 172635, October
20, 2010, 634 SCRA 135). In Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 396 (2005), the fact that the refusal, without just
cause, of any officer to comply with the order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action under Section 15(3) of RA 6670, is a strong indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not
merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. (Fajardo v. Officer of the Ombudsman, et
al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012, Del Castillo, J). Under the threefold liability rule, any act or omission of any public
official or employee can result in criminal, civil, or administrative liability, each of which is independent of the other.
(Regidor, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 166086-92, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 244; Fajardo v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.,
G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012).
Election Laws
Dual citizen is disqualified from running for public office.

Only Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines could run for and hold
elective public office. This is so if the candidates used his foreign passport after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he is
disqualified from running for a public office.
Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v.
Commission on Elections, his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport
after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13,
2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. While Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9,
2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.
The reason for Arnados disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections being a candidate
without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the
2013 elections on October 1, 2012. (Arnado v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015, Del Castillo, J).
Requirement to be met to justify the cancellation of a COC on the ground of material/false representation.
In order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation pertains to
a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right
to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. (Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 386
[1999]). The material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided
for in the Local Government Code. (Villafuerte v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014, 717 SCRA
312, 323, citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, supra, at 389, citing RA 7160, Section 39 on qualifications).
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. (Arnado v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 210164, August 18, 2015, Del Castillo, J).

Two (2) remedies to prevent candidate from running.
There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race.
One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy. In Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782,
the Court has differentiated the two remedies thuswise:
[A] petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the
OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can
only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is isqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course
under Section 68 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election. (Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Nature of petition under Sec. 78; similar to a quo warranto proceeding.

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding
that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public
office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that
is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, a
proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed
before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Agustin v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J; see also Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
179695 and G.R. No. 1823689, December 19, 2008, 574 SCRA 782).
False representation attempts to mislead, misinform electorates.

Requisite of material misrepresentation as a ground to cancel COC or to disqualify a candidate.
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code involves
a finding not only that a person lacked a qualification for the office he is vying for but also that such he made a material
representation in the CoC that was false. It was stressed in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010,
622 SCRA 744, 769, that in addition to materiality there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would otherwise render the candidate ineligible, viz.:
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Given the purpose of the
requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates
qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the
result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently
absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a
candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both
cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. (See also Fermin v. Commission on
Elections, supra note 29, at 792; Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999,
312 SCRA 447, 455; (Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).).
Dual citizen cannot run for public office.

A dual citizen who renounced his other citizenship but used his foreign passport thereafter is not eligible to run
and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte because after having renounced his USA citizenship
and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of
the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having been already issued his
Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the
first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be
considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012.
His continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after the renunciation
of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. (Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420). Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the
Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code for being a dual citizen.
A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the
qualifications for elective office. (Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 33, at 457). Even if it made no finding
that the petitioner had deliberately attempted to mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his CoC, the
COMELEC could still declare him disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility under the Local Government Code.
(Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).
The petitioner was declared disqualified by final judgment before election day; hence, the votes cast for him should
not be counted.
The effect of the petitioners disqualification under the April 23, 2013 resolution depended on when the
disqualification attained finality. The distinction exists because of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987), which states that any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not

be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
In Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163776, and G.R. No. 165736, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23, the Court
has expounded on the effect of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 thusly:
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states that any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Agustin v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Conviction for libel; candidate is disqualified.

Someone who was convicted of the crime of libel run for public office is disqualified to run for public office,
because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code) which shall be removed
after the expiration of five years from his service of sentence.
In Teves v. Comelec, 604 Phil. 717 [2009], the five-year period of disqualification would end only on 25 May 2010
or five years from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid the fine he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. In this
case, since he served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period shall end only on 16
February 2016. Thus, he is disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then. (Mary Elizabeth
Ty-Delgado v. HRET, et al., G.R. No. 219603, January 26, 2016, Carpio, J).
Election protest to be filed within 10 days is mandatory and jurisdictional requirement.

Jurisprudence teaches that the rule prescribing the 10-day reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional,
and that the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the protest. Violation of
this rule should neither be taken lightly nor brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is
not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, the non-compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction
over the case.
The rationale behind the non-extendible 10-day prescriptive period is not difficult to deduce every candidate
interested in the outcome of the election is expected to be vigilant enough in protecting his or her votes and would,
therefore, enlist the aid of volunteer poll watchers in every clustered precinct to guard against or document possible
irregularities, or that the candidate would personally be present at or, at the very least, would send representatives to the
canvassing areas to ensure the proper tallying of votes and to monitor the real-time results of the elections as they are
electronically transmitted. Consequently, they are expected to know of the exact moment the winning candidate is
proclaimed by the board of canvassers concerned. (Maria Angela Garcia v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 216691, July 21, 2015,
Velasco, J).
Concept of nuisance candidates.

Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy to put the election process in mockery or
disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for
which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate. (Timbol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015, Leonen, J).
Wreath of victory cannot be transferred to an ineligible candidate.

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate,
he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other
intervening circumstances his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may
have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However,
notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only
pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast
in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for
public office. (Casan Macode Maquiling v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])
Substitution of under age candidate.

In Cerafica v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014, Perez, J, a minor filed his certificate of candidacy as
an official candidate of the Liberal Party. He withdrew his certificate after the deadline of filing of certificates of candidacy,
and then, another one filed his certificate of candidacy as her substitute. It was contended that there can be no valid
substitution. Is the contention correct? Why?
HELD: No, because she was an official candidate/nominee of the party, hence, she can be validly substituted. Under Sec. 77
of BP 881, not just any person, but only an official candidate of a registered political party may be substituted. In Luna v.
COMELEC, 550 Phil. 284 [2007], the SC held that a candidate who was also under age, withdrew his COC before election
day and was substituted by a qualified candidate and it was held that substitution was proper.
If candidate made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his
eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy
under Section 78 of the Election Code.

Moreover, the candidate has already withdrawn his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared that he
was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless his certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance
with Section 78 of the Election Code, his certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.
Administrative Law
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

A resolution was issued by Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) Board of Directors removing a certain
Setudo, Jr. as a member of the Board of Directors is not within the jurisdiction of the court to decide. The National
Electrification Administration has jurisdiction, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The NEA has the power of
supervision and control over electric cooperatives under Secs. 5 & 7. PD No. 1645, hence, the resolution removing the
Director within the power of NEA to review. The RTC has no jurisdiction (Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Setudo, Jr.,
G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012, Peralta, J).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been
placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al., G.R. No. 18487, August
15, 2011). In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged,
dismiss the case without prejudice. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al., supra.).
Basis of the doctrine.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. (Public Hearing
Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010,
631 SCRA 73, 79; Montanez v. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), G.R. No. 183142, September 17, 2009,
600 SCRA 217). The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies; exceptions.

It is true that whenever a decision of an administrative agency may be questioned and the law provides for a
remedy of appeal within the administrative structure of government, there must be compliance with the same, otherwise
recourse to the courts directly would be improper for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The rule regarding
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable (1) where the question in dispute is
purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, - Gonzales vs. Hechanova, L-21897, October 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230;
Abaya vs. Villegas, L-25641, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA; Mitra vs. Subido, L-21691, September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127.
Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
(Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291), when there is no due process observed (Villanos vs. Subido, 45 SCRA 299), or where
the protestant has no other recourse (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637).
The appeal provided for under Section 6 of DENR DAO 2003-30 is only applicable, based on the first sentence
thereof, if the person or entity charged with the duty to exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to the appropriate
government agency has been a party or has been made a party in the proceedings wherein the decision to be appealed was
rendered. It has been established by the facts that petitioner was never made a party to the proceedings before respondent
DENR-EMB RVI. Petitioner was only informed that the project had already been approved after the ECC was already
granted. Not being a party to the said proceedings, it does not appear that petitioner was officially furnished a copy of the
decision, from which the 15-day period to appeal should be reckoned, and which would warrant the application of Section
6, Article II of DENR DAO 2003-30. (Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan, et al., G.R. No. 190870, June 26,
2012, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Writ of Continuing Mandamus
The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC; Rationale of the said Rules.
Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal-point from the initiation of regulation by Congress to the
implementation of regulatory programs by the appropriate government agencies.
Thus, a government agencys inaction, if any, has serious implications on the future of environmental law
enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent that they seek to change the scope of the regulatory process, will have to
rely on such agencies to take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial component. Accordingly, questions
regarding the propriety of an agencys action or inaction will need to be analyzed.
This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ of mandamus, which allows for the
enforcement of the conduct of the tasks to which the writ pertains: the performance of a legal duty.
The writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision and, in order to do this, the court may
compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to
monitor compliance with its decision. (Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan, et al., G.R. No. 190870, June 26,
2012, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Writ of Kalikasan
Waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such
as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.

In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. In any case, it is the Courts considered view that a ruling on the
application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan. It also finds it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute.
In the same vein, it cannot grant damages that have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows
the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or
that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law. (Most. Rev. Pedro D.
Arigo, et al. v. Scott H. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 15, 2014).
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Doctrine of Incorporation; The Doctrine of Transformation.

The doctrine of incorporation means that the rules of international law for part of the law of the land and no
legislative action is required to make them applicable to a country. The Philippines follows his doctrine, because Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution states that the Philippines adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land.
The doctrine of transformation on the other hand requires that an international law principle be transformed into
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism, such as local legislation. (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association
of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007). The transformation theory is applied in the Philippines
through treaty-making power of the President. Through this power, rules and principles embodied in a treaty in force
would be transformed into Philippine Law and shall become valid and effective upon the concurrence of 2/3 of all
members of the Senate.
Jurisdictional rules under the International Criminal Court.

The Roman Statute provides for the following jurisdiction:
1. ICC shall have the power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern, covering the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as
defined in the Statute. (Article 5, Rome Statute; Pimentel, Jr. V. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
158088, July 6, 2005)
2. The Court shall have jurisdiction over the person of an accused only if the crime was committed in the
territory of a State a party to the Rome Statute or if the accused is a national of a State that is party to the
Rome Statute. (Article 12, Rome Statute)
3. A person shall not be criminally liable under the Rome Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at
the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and after the entry into force of the Rome
Statute. (Article 11 and 22, Rome Statute)
BASELINE LAW
The Philippine Baseline Law (RA 9522) can constitutionally convert internal waters into archipelagic waters,
hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including over flight.
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters
under UNCLOS III (Article 49(1)), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not
preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation,
consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. (Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011).
Good Luck to All 2016 Bar Examinees
We Are Praying for Your Success
God Bless
From: ABRC Family

Pointers in Political Law Seg 2015 Combined Segregate SEPARATE

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MAGIC AREAS in POLITICAL LAW

2016 Bar Examination

Reason behind the principle of State immunity.

Immunity of State from suit; a generally accepted principle of international law.

ARTICLE II Declaration of Principles and State Policies

STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 1

ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS

Substantive due process.

Ex-parte issuance of TPO not violative of due process.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 2

Equal protection clause does not require universal application of laws.

Mandatory drug testing of students; valid.

Mandatory drug testing of persons charged with crimes; unconstitutional.

Stop and frisk search.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 3

Plain View Doctrine.

The four (4) aspects of press freedom

Aggregate-based airtime is unreasonable and arbitrary; reasons.

Monitoring requirement is valid; reasonable.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 4

Freedom of expression, etc.

Removal of tarpaulin, content-based restriction.

On-its-face invalidation of penal statutes not allowed.

Freedom of Religion; effect of insulting words.

When does custodial investigation commences.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 5

Freedom of speech, etc. and franchises; content-neutral restriction.

State may regulate the posting of commercial ads on vehicles.

Regulation of freedom of speech.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 6

Spontaneous statements to the police, not part of questioning; admissible in evidence.

Effect if accused is invited by police.

Limitation on the right to travel

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 7

There is double jeopardy if a person is charged with the same offense.

Oral order of dismissal of a criminal case; no double jeopardy; void.

Effect of use of American passport after renunciation of foreign citizenship.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 8

Sen. Grace Poe admittedly foundling, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 9

Tests to determine valid delegation of powers.

Reason for delegation of powers.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 10

Power of Ombudsman to investigate.

Separation of powers; political question.

ARTICLE VI Legislative Department

When the one-subject requirement of a bill satisfied.

HRET as sole judge.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 11

Mandatory drug testing as additional qualification; void.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 12

Power of Augmentation of Public Funds; Purposes of RA 8439.

Limitations to the authority to transfer funds.

ARTICLE VII Executive Department

Faithful execution clause.

Presidential immunity from suit; reasons.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 13

Cross-broader transfer of funds, unconstitutional

Need for item in augmentation.

Nature of the power to deport; Act of State; subject to judicial review.

Designation of Solicitor General as Acting Secretary of Justice; void.

Exceptions to the prohibition against holding multiple positions.

ABRC2016.Pointers in Political Law (seg 2015) combined-segregate/SEPARATE/EVSA/crys 14