G.R. No. 112127 July 17, 1995 ISSUE: Whether or not Inciong should be held liable.
hether or not Inciong should be held liable.
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, REMEDIOS FRANCO, FRANCISCO N. LOPEZ,
CECILIA P. VDA. DE LOPEZ, REDAN LOPEZ AND REMARENE
LOPEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a member of the board of
trustees of Central Philippine University when he executed a donation
to the school, stating that the land must be for exclusive use of a
medical college. 50 years later, The heirs of Ramon Lopez filed an
action to annul the donation, stating the failure of the school to
construct the medical college over the land. RTC ruled in favor of
respondents, which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether there is a resolutory condition
RULING:
The donation was an onerous one, where failure of the school to
construct a medical college would give the heirs the power to revoke
the donation, reverting the property back to the heirs of the donor. It
is therefore a resolutory condition. Although, the period was not
stated, and the courts should have fixed a period, in this case, 50
years has lapsed since the donation was executed, thus fixing a
period would serve no purpose and the property must already be
reverted back.
257 SCRA 578 Mercantile Law Negotiable Instruments in
General Signature of Makers Guaranty
In February 1983, Rene Naybe took out a loan from Philippine Bank
of Communications (PBC) in the amount of P50k. For that he
executed a promissory note in the same amount. Naybe was able to
convince Baldomero Inciong, Jr. and Gregorio Pantanosas to co-sign
with him as co-makers. The promissory note went due and it was left
unpaid. PBC demanded payment from the three but still no payment
was made. PBC then sue the three but PBC later released
Pantanosas from its obligations. Naybe left for Saudi Arabia hence
cant be issued summons and the complaint against him was
subsequently dropped. Inciong was left to face the suit. He argued
that that since the complaint against Naybe was dropped, and that
Pantanosas was released from his obligations, he too should have
been released.
possess the three theaters in question and to terminate said
HELD: Yes. Inciong is considering himself as a guarantor in the
promissory note. And he was basing his argument based on Article
2080 of the Civil Code which provides that guarantors are released
from their obligations if the creditors shall release their debtors. It is to
be noted however that Inciong did not sign the promissory note as a
guarantor. He signed it as a solidary co-maker.
A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor
does not become a solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes.
There is a difference between a solidary co-debtor and a fiador in
solidum (surety). The latter, outside of the liability he assumes to pay
the debt before the property of the principal debtor has been
exhausted, retains all the other rights, actions and benefits which
pertain to him by reason of the fiansa; while a solidary co-debtor has
no other rights than those bestowed upon him.
Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states
that the three signatories therein are jointly and severally liable, any
one, some or all of them may be proceeded against for the entire
obligation. The choice is left to the solidary creditor (PBC) to
determine against whom he will enforce collection. Consequently,
the dismissal of the case against Pontanosas may not be deemed as
having discharged Inciong from liability as well. As regards Naybe,
suffice it to say that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him.
Inciong, therefore, may only have recourse against his co-makers, as
provided by law.
Jaucian vs. Querol
Creditor (D) vs. Estate of "solidary" debtor (P)
GR L-11307, October 5, 1918
Facts: Lino Dayandante and Hermenegilda Rogero (P)
acknowledged themselves to be indebted to Roman Jaucian (D)
"jointly and severally".
Rogero (P) signed the document in the capacity of surety for
Dayandante, but the instrument showed that both debtors bound
themselves jointly and severally to the creditor. There was nothing in
the terms of the obligation itself to show that the relation between the
two debtors was that of principal and surety.
Rogero (P) sued Jaucian (D) for fraud. But in his answer, Jaucian (D)
asked for judgment against the Rogero (P) for the amount due upon
the obligation. The court ruled in favor of Jaucian (D).
While the case was pending, Rogero (P) died and her estate was
substituted as plaintiff. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled that the
document was valid and Rogero (P) was a surety of the debtor.
Jaucian (D) filed a claim against the estate of Rogero (P). Francisco
Querol (P), the administrator of Rogero's (P) estate, demanded a
judgment from the court of his claim against Dayandante that he is
indeed insolvent and that Jaucian (D) exhausted all means to collect
from the principal debtor.
Issues: Is the surety solidary liable with the principal debtor? May the
creditor sue a "surety" without exhausting all means against the
primary debtor?
Ruling: Yes. Rogero (P), though a surety for Dayandante, was
nevertheless bound jointly and severally with him in the obligation.
Article 1822 of the Civil Code provides:
By security a person binds himself to pay or perform for a third
person in case the latter should fail to do so.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides:
A creditor may sue any of the joint and several (solidarios) debtors or
all of them simultaneously. The claims instituted against one shall not
be an obstacle for those that may be later presented against the
others, as long as it does not appear that the debt has been collected
in full.
Rogero (P) was solidary liable for the full amount of the obligation
without any right to demand the exhaustion of the property of the
principal debtor. Her position so far as the creditor was concerned
was exactly the same as if she had been the principal debtor.
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v CA
G.R. No. 85161
September 11, 1991
Facts:
Respondent and petitioner entered into a lease agreement for the
term six (6) years over the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol Theaters
and the land on which they are situated. After more than two (2)
years of operation, the respondent lessor made demands for the
repossession of the said leased properties in view of the Sy's arrears
in monthly rentals and non-payment of amusement taxes.
In pursuance of their latter agreement, Sy's arrears in rental were
reduced. However, the accrued amusement tax liability of the three
(3) theaters to the City Government of Cabanatuan City had
accumulated despite the fact that Sy had been deducting the amount
of P4,000.00 from his monthly rental. Sy filed the present action for
reformation of the lease agreement, damages and injunction and
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to enjoin OVEC
from entering and taking possession of the three theaters.
OVEC on the other hand, alleged in its answer by way of
counterclaims that by reason of Sy's violation of the terms of the
subject lease agreement and became authorized to enter and
agreement. The trial court arrived at the conclusions that Sy is not
entitled to the reformation of the lease agreement and further
concluded that Sy was not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in his favor after the commencement of the action and that the
injunction bond filed by Sy is liable for whatever damages OVEC may
have suffered by reason of the injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not Sy is entitled to reformation of the lease agreement.
Held:
No. The repossession of the leased premises by OVEC after the
cancellation and termination of the lease was in accordance with the
stipulation of the parties in the said agreement and the law applicable
thereto and that the consequent forfeiture of Sy's cash deposit in
favor of OVEC was clearly agreed upon by them in the lease
agreement. The court found no ambiguity in the provisions of the
lease agreement. It held that the provisions are fair and reasonable
and therefore, should be respected and enforced as the law between
the parties. It held that the cancellation or termination of the
agreement prior to its expiration period is justified as it was brought
about by Sy's own default in his compliance with the terms of the
agreement and not motivated by fraud or greed.
Inchausti vs. Yulo (novation)
Held:
The contract of May 12, 1911 does not constitute a novation of the
former one of Aug.12, 1909, with respect to the other debtors who
executed this contract. First, in order that an obligation may be
extinguished by another which substitutes it, it is necessary that it
should be so expressly declared or that the old and the new be
incompatible in all points(art. 1292). It is always necessary to state
that it is the intentionof the contracting parties to extinguish the
former obligation by the new one. The obligation to pay a sum of
money is not novated in a new instrument wherein the old is ratified,
by changing only the term of payment and adding other obligations
not incompatible with the old one.
The obligation being solidary, the remission of any part of the debt
made by a creditor in favor of one or more of the solidary debtors
necessarily benefits the others, and therefore there can be no doubt
that, in accordance with the provision of Art. 1215, 1222, the
defendant has the right to enjoy the benefits of the partial remission.
At present judgment can be rendered only as to P112,500.
Facts: This suit is brought for the recovery of a certain sum of money,
the balance of a current account opened by the firm of Inchausti &
Company with Teodor Yulo and after his death continued by Gregorio
Yulo as principal representative of his children. On Aug.12, 1909,
Gregorio Yulo, in representation of his 3 siblings, executed a notarial
instrument, ratifying all the contents of the prior document of Jan.26,
1908, severally and joint acknowledged their indebtedness for
P253,445.42, 10 % per annum, 5 installments. Plaintiff brought an
action againsta Gregorio for the payment of the said balance due. But
on May 12, 1911, 3 siblings executed another instrument in
recognition of the debt, reduced to P225,000, interest reduced to 6%
per annum, installments increased to 8.
 WON INCHAUSTI lost its right for agreeing with other obligors in the If not, WON it has any effect in the action brought and in this
Issue: WON INCHAUSTI can sue Gregorio alone, here being other reduction of debt, proroguing (discontinuing) the obligation and the WON THE CONTRACT with the 3 obligors constitute a novation present suit. YES.
obligors. YES. extension for time of payment, in accordance with May 12 1911 (substitution) of Aug 12 1909 affidavit, entered into the 6 debtors who
affidavit. NO. assumed the payment of P253,445.42. NO.