GRIEF, DEATH, AND LONGING IN STOIC AND

CHRISTIAN ETHICS
Paul Scherz
ABSTRACT
The Stoic rejection of the passion of grief strikes many ethicists writing on dying
as inhuman, selfish, or lacking appreciation for the world. This essay argues
that Stoics rejected grief and the fear of death because these passions alienated
one from the present through sorrow or anxiety for the future, disrupting ones
ability to fulfill obligations of care for others and to feel gratitude for the gift of
loved ones. Early Christian writers on death, such as Ambrose, maintained
much of the substance of Stoic doctrine but transformed it through their belief in
the resurrection and their corresponding revaluation of the future. While these
writers rejected grief as an affective response to death, they affirmed longing for
lost loved ones. These authors provide an example of how contemporary religious
ethicists can use Stoic insights for recovering the tradition of the art of dying.
KEY WORDS: stoicism, virtue ethics, ars moriendi, end of life ethics, bioethics,
passions

1. Introduction
Dying today all too often occurs in a way that people say they do not
want, such as in a hospital after a long engagement with medical
interventions with little chance of success.1 Although religious ethi-
cists are recovering the insights of the late medieval and early modern
tradition of ars moriendi in order to confront this medicalized dying,
these same scholars question the value of the Stoic approach toward
death that shaped that tradition. Stoic criticisms of grief, indifference
toward death, and concern for autarchy and self-control seem to pre-
sent three fundamental problems for ones relations to the world and
others. Failure to grieve the loss of a loved one seems to be inhuman
or at least a radically deficient account of human affections.2 Moreover,

Paul Scherz is an Assistant Professor of Moral Theology and Ethics at the Catholic University
of America who studies bioethics, religion and science, and Stoic ethics. He is currently com-
pleting a manuscript comparing Stoic and Aristotelian models of moral formation as responses
to problems in contemporary biomedical research ethics. Paul Scherz, scherz@cua.edu.

1
There is a large literature criticizing medicalized dying, including Kaufman 2006; Bish-
op 2011; Verhey 2011, 976; Gawande 2014.
2
While few authors explicitly make this criticism, it seems to lie in the background of
their rejection of Stoicism. See Wolterstorff 1987, 26.

JRE 45.1:728. V
C 2017 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.
8 Journal of Religious Ethics

lack of grief seems to show little concern for others, with Christopher
Vogt rejecting Stoic patience as based on a radically individualistic
understanding of human life without any sense of the importance of
dialogue or interdependence (Vogt 2004, 73).3 Failure to grieve also
seems to show ingratitude toward God by not taking Gods gifts seri-
ously enough to mourn them (Verhey 2011, 154). At least since Augus-
tine, theologians have argued that these Stoic positions contradict
Christian ideas of the goodness of creation, the positive role of emo-
tions in the moral life, and the importance of relationality. The debate
over grief and death is thus part of a larger argument over the role of
Stoicism in Christian ethics.4
This rejection of Stoicism is unfortunate because, in their consolations
to those who are mourning, the Stoics shared the same fundamental
goal of those authors recovering the Christian art of dying: the expan-
sion of the preparation for death to the whole of life. While personal
peace was certainly one goal of Stoic consolation, I argue that the more
important aim of these writings was to help individuals relate better to
the divine and to others through an understanding of death that would
allow a focus on present obligations of care by dissipating anxiety about
the future.5 Time is central to Stoicism, which attempted to refocus the
individual on the present, since it is all we have (Goldschmidt 1969;
Hadot 1995, 21737). While memory allows one to integrate the past
into ones present existence, the future is more problematic, since we do
not control it and it draws us from ourselves in anxiety. Grief calls us
from the pressing needs of the present and shatters the happy memories
of our loved ones. This discussion will not be primarily a theoretical
defense of the connected doctrines of indifferents, the idea that virtue is
the only good and vice the only evil, and apatheia, the ideal absence of
passion in the sage. Instead, I will investigate how these understandings

3
See also Verhey 2011, 103, 144; Wolterstorff 2008, 21618. Nicholas Wolterstorff argues
that eudaimonistic ethics in general have little place for care for others aside from the
effects of that care on oneself. These arguments also touch on another criticism of Stoicism,
the apparent pride displayed in control and autarchy, which is related to, but beyond, the
scope of this essay.
4
There is a large literature on different aspects of this relationship, but a broad engage-
ment and debate is found in Cochran 2011, 2012; Rowe 2012.
5
My interpretation of Stoic ethics draws on Inwood 1985; Hadot 1995; Foucault 2005;
Reydams-Schils 2005; and Benatouil 2006. I draw largely on sources from the Roman peri-
od. While there is debate over philosophical differences between early, middle, and late Sto-
icism, I follow those who see Roman Stoicism as largely continuous with early Greek
Stoicism aside from shifts in emphasis (Reydams-Schils 2005, 3). Overviews of Stoic ethics
that do see differences and place Stoicism in relation to the broader context of Hellenistic
ethics and current philosophical concerns are found in Annas 1993; Nussbaum 1996.
 Grief, Death, and Longing in Stoic 9

of affective responses to death shape behavior and relationships toward

the dying.6
It is important to understand the Stoic approach to grief because only
then can one understand the aspects of Stoicism that early Christians
adopted and those which they changed, a goal obscured when their dif-
ferences are framed in terms of the indifference of death and the lack of
passion. Though the reception of Stoicism in Christian thought was com-
plex and early theologians were eclectic in their use of philosophy,7 if
one focuses on Latin Christian consolations, one finds a shift in the Stoic
stance toward the future due to eschatological hopes for the resurrection,
even while these authors embrace Stoic indifference toward death and
hostility to grief. This revaluation of the future allowed these theologians
to exploit a distinction already present in Stoic thought between distress
at loss and missing one who is absent. I will argue that Ambrose sought
to transform grief at present loss to a feeling of longing for the lost
loved one, a longing that could be fulfilled on the last day. These Chris-
tian writers transform Stoic ethics while staying within its general
structure, providing an example of how revelation transformed ancient
secular virtue. This example from early Christianity shows the fertility
of Stoicism for thought on death and how contemporary Christian ethics
could adopt and transform the Stoic art of dying to confront contempo-
rary medicalized dying.

2. Death and Stoic Anthropology

The goal of Stoic ethics, as for most forms of ancient ethics, is eudai-
monia (happiness), which Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, defined as a
good flow of life. Stoics also defined happiness as living in agreement
with nature and with the will of the administrator of the whole (Long
and Sedley 1987, 395 [63C]). These two definitions amount to the same
thing because Stoic nature is not a static system of forms or essential
properties but is the dynamic unfolding of providential divine reason
through history (although admittedly a cyclical history).8 The sage
achieves happiness by accepting events encountered in the flow of life as
given by God, which requires living in accordance with reason that rec-
ognizes the Logos at work in the world.
Stoics describe moral formation as a process of oikei
osis (appropria-
tion) under the control of a positive disposition toward oneself that

6
I will use affection and affective to refer to those responses that the Stoics would
call path
e or eupatheia, and which might be called emotions in contemporary language.
7
The essential sources on early Christianity and Stoicism are Spanneut 1957; Colish
1990.
8
This idea of providence raises problems of theodicy, which there is not space to explore.
10 Journal of Religious Ethics

promotes self-preservation.9 One comes to understand oneself and appro-

priate ones true identity as a rational animal connected to the divine
reason, and to live accordingly. This pattern of appropriation is not only
self-directed, but also requires that one form proper relationships with
others. Just as one is called to recognize oneself as a partaker in divine
reason, one is called to recognize this capacity in others.10 Ones obliga-
tions to others are not just negative duties, because the model of this
social appropriation is a parents care for a child, which itself models
divine care for the world (Blundell 1990; Striker 1983). Stoicism empha-
sizes ones obligations to care for others.
Yet, this centrality of care for others is seemingly belied by their rejec-
tion of the passions. The Stoics followed Socratess intellectualist equiva-
lence of virtue and knowledge. This knowledge is not merely the ability
to repeat doctrine, but one must make this knowledge a part of ones
character through a lifetime of meditation and ascetic exercises.11 Aris-
totle opposed this Socratic model, arguing that the prerational passions
must be habituated in line with virtuous desire (Aristotle 1992, 47375
[7.2]). Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics were psychological monists, and thus
did not propose separate prerational faculties for affective responses: an
affective response is primarily a cognitive judgment on the value of a
state of affairs.12 These judgments subsequently lead to actions and
affections, but they are fundamentally judgments that can be accepted,
rejected, and over the course of time altered by the intellect.
Making these value judgments is easy for the Stoic sage, since the only
true good is virtue and the only true evil is vice. Everything else is indifferent
because such things can be used for good or bad purposes. Some things, the
preferred indifferentslike life, health, and wealthare more in line with
human nature and thus deserve to be selected, all things being equal. Yet,
the sage will obediently follow a divine command to die for her beliefs or to
live in poverty. Chrysippus gives a sense of this stance when he says, As
long as the consequences are not clear to me, I cleave ever to what is better
adapted to secure those things that are in accordance with nature. . . . But if I
really knew that it was ordained for me to be ill at this present moment, I
would even seek illness (Epictetus 1998, 243 [2.6.10]). Incorrect judgments
of the value of a thing or situation lead to the four passions (path
e) of desire,

9
The primary sources for this doctrine are Cicero 2006, 233, 23741, 28185 [3.5.16,
3.6.2021, 3.19.6264]; Seneca 1925, 397411 [121]; and Hierocles 2009. Citations taken
from primary classical texts refer to the page number and then the standard scholarly ref-
erence style in brackets of book, chapter/letter, and line/part, depending on the work.
10
This focus on rationality makes Stoicism, like other ancient ethics, problematic in
regard to disability. These questions are beyond the scope of this essay.
11
On spiritual exercises, see Hadot 1995; Foucault 2005; and Sellars 2003.
12
This discussion of Stoic passions follows Graver 2007. Other sources include Sorabji
2000; Nussbaum 2001, 188.
 Grief, Death, and Longing in Stoic 11

pleasure, fear, and distress, which drive faulty moral reasoning and vicious
action (Cicero 1927, 33951 [4.69]). If one judges wealth to be an actual
good, then greedy desire for it can lead to unjust action, fear of losing it can
lead one to betray principles, and pleasure at its possession or distress at its
loss can distract one from pursuing virtue. If death is seen as an evil, one
fears the tyrant who can kill, becoming the servant of injustice through
action or omission. On the other hand, correct judgments lead to different
affective responses (eupatheia) that are rational and peaceful (Diogenes
Laertius 1925, 221 [7.116]; Graver 2007, 59). There is a corresponding
eupathic response for all of the passions save for distress: wish or will corre-
sponding to desire, joy corresponding to pleasure, and caution corresponding
to fear. Distress at a present evil cannot be a rational response for the Stoics
because it would require denying the goodness of the providence that brought
about the state of affairs. This lack of a eupathic corollary to distress will
have important implications for Latin Christian understandings of grief.
One of the most natural temptations is to place the presence of ones
family and friends in the category of goods whose loss is to be avoided at all
costs. It is easy enough to have courage in the face of ones own death, but
harder to face the death of ones child with equanimity. Yet to the Stoics,
viewing the loss of family members as an evil is as dangerous as placing
ones happiness at the mercy of anything else in the world. Threats to fami-
ly were a tool of imperial control over the patrician class, and deaths of
loved ones threatened belief in Providence. These considerations were not
dry, abstract analyses for the Roman Stoics. Many of them had lost beloved
children and close friends. Marcus Aurelius lost seven of his thirteen chil-
dren before adulthood (Reydams-Schils 2005, 115). After the loss of his
daughter Tullia, Cicero wrote a consolation to himself that partially
inspired the Stoic-influenced Tusculan Disputations (Reydams-Schils
2005, 11921). Seneca lost his son a mere three weeks before he was sent
into exile himself (Seneca 1932b, 423 [2.5]). It is because they felt the force
of grief that the Stoics wrote so much about it.

3. Grief, Fear, and the Present in Stoicism

Passions disrupt moral reasoning in part by driving us from the present.
Chrysippus states that only the present exists (or belongs), while the past
and the future subsist: the past has occurred and cannot be changed, while
the future is out of our control (Long and Sedley 1987, 304).13 It is only in

13
Here, I pass by the broader complexities of the Stoic conception of time, which, like
void, place, and words, is not a fully existent being. For Stoics, only corporeal entities exist,
so the incorporeals are something, but not beings. The ramifications of this doctrine are
described in Goldschmidt 1969. For differences among Stoics on time, see Reydams-Schils
2005, 2930.
12 Journal of Religious Ethics

the lived present that one acts and happiness occurs. Pierre Hadot most
strongly emphasizes the importance of a focus on the present for Stoic
ethics and Hellenistic ethics more generally through his discussion of spiri-
tual exercises that focus on the present moment and the wonder of being
(Hadot 1995, 21737). Remaining present prevents worries or inconsequen-
tial aspects of life from dragging one from what is truly important. Michel
Foucault also emphasizes this focus on the present, but in terms of the
nullification of the future. A fundamental theme in the practice of the self
is that we should not let ourselves be worried about the future, precisely
because the future is nonexistent or even if it preexists as predetermined
by the Logos, out of our control (Foucault 2005, 46465).
One can exorcise fears of the future through the praemeditatio
malorum, by which one imagines that ones worst fears have come to
pass (Foucault 2005, 46673). Through this imaginative exercise, one
understands that even if the worst occurs, one can survive it with virtue
intact. In one sense, this meditation is a practical exercise of mentally
preparing oneself for the future. As Seneca notes, It is the unexpected
that puts the heaviest load on us. . . . Our minds should be sent forward
in advance to meet all problems, and we should consider, not what is
wont to happen, but what can happen (Seneca 1920, 433 [91.34]).14
Yet such meditation is also an exercise in making the future present and
showing that it is nothing: It is a nullification of the future by making
everything possible present . . . in a sort of present test of thought (Fou-
cault 2005, 471). It is not only a nullification of the future, but an exer-
cise that teaches that the things that may be lost or experienced are
indifferent. This meditation is thus meant to exorcise anxiety, allowing
the individual to refocus on present action rather than on fears of future
loss.
Death is the most important anxiety from which to free oneself if one
would live fully in the present (Foucault 2005, 47779). To combat this
anxiety, the Stoics argued propositions that seem extreme to modern
ears: death comes for all, we soon follow our loved ones, life is filled with
pain, the good are taken young to protect them from the dangers of life,
and the more Platonic idea of the body as prison for the soul. Many of
these are standard rhetorical tropes of the ancient genre of consolation,
but we possess them largely in Stoic versions.
It is in this context of the nullification of the future and living fully in
the present that we must place what are perhaps Epictetuss most shock-
ing words, ones frequently cited in arguments against using Stoicism in
Christian ethics. Epictetus recommends that even as you kiss your child,
your brother, or your friend to think of him as though it were something

14
See also Seneca 1932b, 427 [5.3]; Cicero 1927, 26163 [3.14].
 Grief, Death, and Longing in Stoic 13

like a jar or a crystal goblet, so that when it breaks you will . . . not be
troubled (Epictetus 1928, 211 [3.24.8485]). Epictetuss harsh language
argues the Stoic case for considering the death of a loved one as indiffer-
ent as a way to maintain apatheia. To critics of Stoicism, this stance
presents four questions: (1) Does considering the deaths of others as
indifferent and to be met with apatheia cause one to neglect ones obliga-
tions to others? (2) Do the doctrines of indifferents and apatheia cause
emotional distance from our loved ones? (3) Do these doctrines cause one
to underrate the gifts given by God? (4) Is it inhuman to not grieve loved
ones?

3.1 Apatheia and duties to others

The fear that grief undermines duties toward others is one of the pri-
mary motivators of Stoic doctrine. Stoics argued that mourners should
continue to be of public service (Seneca 1932d, 37375 [6.5]), and some
mourners must assume responsibility for orphans and parents (Seneca
1932c, 21 [5.6]; Seneca 1932b, 48183 [18.9]). Less obviously, the mourn-
er insults others by not allowing herself to be consoled by them. Seneca
criticizes Octavias grief for her son: Surrounded by children and grand-
children, she would not lay aside her garb of mourning, and, putting a
slight on all her nearest, accounted herself utterly bereft though they
still lived (Seneca 1932c, 1113 [2.4]). As social creatures, we must
allow others to console us. Grief can alienate one from the present, caus-
ing the neglect of essential duties and relationships.
These reminders of mortality, the indifference of all except virtue, and
the need for apatheia also serve to help one care for those who are sick
and dying. Epictetus argues that passions undermine care within the
family, as shown in his exchange with a Roman official with a sick
daughter (Epictetus 1998, 7789 [1.11]). The official was so troubled by
her illness that he fled until word came to him that she had recovered.
He defends his actions by saying he acted naturally, as any father would,
since fear of the potential death of a family member seems natural. Epic-
tetus argued that genuine affection for a family member involves staying
by a sickbed and caring for the family member rather than the passion-
ate reaction of fear and grief. To truly care, the official needed to retrain
his passions.15
It is this point that has perhaps most relevance for the contemporary
ars moriendi. Our failure to be present to the dying can involve physical
flight by abandoning the dying in institutions, but it even more frequent-
ly takes the form of flight from the reality of the situation. One believes

15
That grief is the passion he refers to is shown by his use of the example of Achilless
inordinate reaction to Patrocluss death in his grief (Epictetus 1998, 85 [1.11.31]).
14 Journal of Religious Ethics

that another week in intensive care, or another intervention, can save

the dying. Frequently, families fail to even discuss death until it is too
late to take measures to enable a good death. Excessive medical care
results from our inability to love each other as mortals who are destined
to break like a jar, our failure to face our own mortality and meditate on
death. Stoics saw that humans grief, far from emphasizing shared vul-
nerability, could just as well drive one from facing vulnerability. It is for
this reason that the later ars moriendi tradition recommended shielding
those who were dying from their familynot through a rejection of fami-
ly bonds, but because exposure to family, their grief, their fear, their anx-
ieties about inheritances, deterred the dying from preparing for death
(Erasmus 1988, 434; Comper 1977, 20, 37).16
It is important to remember that Stoic doctrine does not absolve one
of responsibility for how one acts toward the indifferents. Are these
externals to be used carelessly? Not at all. . . . They must be used careful-
ly, because their use is not a matter of indifference, and at the same
time with steadfastness and peace of mind, because the material is indif-
ferent (Epictetus 1998, 233 [2.5.67]).17 Actions with indifferents are
how one aligns oneself with Providence. Epictetus acknowledges that
such a stance is not easy, which is why it is so difficult to become a sage.
It is . . . difficult to unite and combine these two thingsthe carefulness
of the man who is devoted to material things and the steadfastness of
the man who disregards them, but it is not impossible (Epictetus 1998,
235 [2.5.9]).

3.2 Apatheia and affection

Concerns may remain that such care will be emotionally detached, a
dutiful going through the motions of care without the rich affective inter-
actions that we desire from our family and friends. It conjures up
notions of the emotionless Stoic or Kants depressed philanthropist.18
Few would desire to spend their dying days with such a caregiver, even
if the care were otherwise excellent.
Yet, one must recall that Epictetuss shocking memento mori occurs
while one kisses ones child. What harm is there if you whisper to your-
self, at the very moment you are kissing your child, and say, To-morrow
you will die (Epictetus 1928, 213 [3.24.88])? One is still kissing ones
child; natural familial affection is continuing but with a reminder of the
actual nature of ones family member as mortal. It would be odd if the

16
For a criticism of this view, see Verhey 2011, 14445.
17
Here the indifferent is not the family member, but the death of the family member. In
Faire Usage, Thomas Benatouil shows the central role of a concept of use in ancient ethics
that does not correspond to the contemporary concept of instrumental use.
18
For discussion, see Hursthouse 2002, 91107.
 Grief, Death, and Longing in Stoic 15

Stoics, who encouraged family affection more than any other ancient phi-
losophy, were to undermine that affection (Reydams-Schils 2005, 78;
Foucault 1986, 14576). Recognition of mortality need not have that
effect. As Richard Sorabji, following Mary Midgley, reminds us, knowl-
edge that we will lose another should increase rather than decrease our
affection for them (Sorabji 2000, 216). Seneca argues this point, saying,
Snatch the pleasures your children bring, let your children in turn find
delight in you, and drain joy to the dregs without delay (Seneca 1932c,
31 [10.4]). By bringing to mind the shortness of life, these exercises refo-
cus us on the present joy to be experienced with those who may be lost
to us so soon.

3.3 Loved ones as gifts

Even if the doctrines of indifferents and apatheia do not deform our
behavior toward loved ones, one might agree with Allen Verhey that the
absence of grief does not show proper gratitude toward God because it
disparages Gods gifts. If one loved the lost family member while alive,
then one should grieve her when she leaves (Verhey 2011, 154). Yet, the
Stoics were very concerned about how grief reflected ones relation to the
divine. Epictetus argues that mourning results from misrecognition of
loved ones: one fails to recognize that a beloved is mortal and thus
relates to him inappropriately, not holding him as possibly leaving at
any moment but believing that he will remain forever. Even worse, one
comes to think of the object of ones love as ones own. Instead, Epictetus
recognizes that the beloved is not your own possession; it has been giv-
en you for the present, not inseparably nor for ever (Epictetus 1928,
213 [3.24.86]).19 Like other indifferents, the presence of a loved one is a
gift from God and must be experienced in its vulnerability. The presence
of a loved one is under Gods command, and one should think of how one
might be obedient to these commands in daily life (Epictetus 1928, 215
[3.24.95]). The Stoic cosmos is not static, but dynamic, and thus one
must be prepared for the losses that come through the providentially
ordered changes in the cosmos. For all these things are changes of a
preliminary state into something else; it is not a case of destruction, but
a certain ordered dispensation and management (Epictetus 1928, 215
[3.24.9293]).20

19
See also Epictetus 1928, 279 [4.1.1014].
20
Augustines reflections on his response to the death of the friend of his youth echo
these opinions, despite his rejection of the Stoic doctrines of indifferents and apatheia. His
grief over his friend was due to his failure to recognize the friend as mortal, part of a
changing world, and thus to love appropriately (Augustine 1961, 78, 8081 [4.7, 4.10]). All
things should be loved in God if they are to be loved securely.
16 Journal of Religious Ethics

Instead of emotionally distancing one from the world, the doctrine of

indifferents allows one to appropriate the indifferents in the right way
as gifts rather than possessions, and to enjoy them in the present
moment. Essential to the Stoic understanding of the preferable things of
this world is that they are given on loan, which God may recall at any
time. Instead of grasping after the things of this world as if they were
truly ones possessions, one should return them freely. To someone on a
journey desiring his children and wife, Epictetus asks, Are they yours?
Do they not belong to Him who gave them? To Him who made you? Will
you not, therefore, give up what is not your own? (Epictetus 1928, 281
[4.1.107]). On a more negative note, Seneca reminds Marcia that we
have . . . no reason to be puffed up as if we were surrounded with the
things that belong to us; we have received them merely as a loan. . . . We
ought always to keep in readiness the gifts that have been granted for a
time not fixed, and, when called upon, to restore them without
complaint (Seneca 1932c, 2931 [10.24]). As Seneca notes, the failure
to freely let go of what is not fundamentally ones own can indicate injus-
tice and ingratitude.
He who does not leave to the giver the power over his own gift is unfair, he
who does not count whatever he receives as gain and yet counts whatever
he gives back as loss, is greedy. . . . Count this then among your greatest
blessingsthe fact that you have had an excellent brother! There is no rea-
son for you to think of how much longer you might have had himthink,
rather of how long you did have him. (Seneca 1932d, 385 [10.2, 4])21
Stoic theory emphasized the gifted nature of the world, arguing that one
must receive it with gratitude, which is demonstrated by letting go of
the gifts that one was given, grateful for the time one was allowed to
spend with them.

3.4 Inhumanity, memory, and pre-passions

The Stoic focus on the present may seem to denigrate the past as well
as the future. Yet as this last quotation suggests, the past is important
for the Stoics because memory integrates the past into ones present
character and experience. He limits his pleasures too narrowly who
thinks that he enjoys only those which he now has and sees. . . . Our
thoughts must be turned towards time that has passed, and whatever
has once brought pleasure must be recalled, and we must ruminate over
it by frequent thought (Seneca 1932d, 385 [10.34]).22 It is important to
range over the entirety of ones life and relationships, appropriating all

21
See also Seneca 1932c, 1921 [5.4]. Ambrose 1953, 162 [1.3] makes a similar point.
22
See also Seneca 1932a, 31719 [10.26]; Seneca 1925, 13133 [99.46].
 Grief, Death, and Longing in Stoic 17

that one has experienced and all those that one has loved into ones pre-
sent character.
The Stoics were concerned that grief blocks us from properly appropri-
ating the past, and undermines duties toward others even once they are
dead, since loved ones deserve to be remembered frequently and with joy
(Seneca 1932c, 1517 [3.4]). Recalling the pleasure one had sharing their
love can be a great joy and encourages gratitude toward God for the gift
of loving so long (Seneca 1925, 143 [99.23]; 1932c, 1921 [5.4]; 1932d,
387 [10.6]). Grief blocks this joyful memory: No one can cherish and
cling to a memory that he has rendered an affliction to himself (Seneca
1932c, 15 [3.2]).23 Either one remembers the dead only with sorrow,
which is not how anyone would want to be remembered, or, even worse,
one suppresses the memory of the dead because it is too painful. To for-
get the beloved dead, to bury their memory along with their bodies . . .
this is the mark of a soul below that of man (Seneca 1925, 14345
[99.24]).
It may be surprising to hear a Stoic accuse others of inhumanity, since
many people are suspicious that suppressing mourning for a loved one is
either impossible or inhuman, but the Stoics did recognize a place for
affective responses to death in their system as less than full passions. A
true passion requires that reason assent to a judgment. Yet, a person
can have bodily and affective reactions to experiences before reason has
processed the impression and made a judgment (Graver 2007, 85108;
Sorabji 2000, 6692). Such responses, like shivering when cold, fear in
the face of a storm at sea, or blushing at bad language, are beyond ones
control and thus are neither passions nor worthy of moral judgment.
Seneca calls them the beginnings that are preliminary to passions or a
preparation for passion (Seneca 1928, 171, 175 [2.2.5, 2.4.1]).24
Seneca sees a pre-passion toward grief arising from nature. In
response to the claim, But to experience a sense of loss (desiderium) for
loved ones is natural (Seneca 1932c, 22 [7.1] as translated in Reydams-
Schils 2005, 137), Seneca argues that death or the absence of those one
loves brings a bite and causes the soul to contract. To Helvia, he
explains, Tears are wrung from us by the necessity of Nature, and the
life-force, smitten by the stroke of grief, shakes both the whole body, and

23
Christian sources also remarked on the relationship of memory to grief. John Chrysos-
tom notes that grief and memory of the dead are extinguished at the same time, except for
a saint, whose memory grows because the love for him did not arise from nature, but from
reason associated with correct judgment (John Chrysostom 2006, 4748).
24
Exegetes who accepted the ideal of the sages equanimity used pre-passions to explain
emotional outbursts in Scripture (Sorabji 2000, 34356; Graver 2007, 85108; Attridge
2010; and Buch-Hansen 2010). The pre-passions have a long history in Christian ethics,
from Evagrius Ponticuss eight deadly thoughts, to the seven deadly sins, to interpretations
of the first stirrings of sinful thoughts (Sorabji 2000, 357418).
18 Journal of Religious Ethics

the eyes also, from which it presses out and causes to flow the moisture
that lies within (Seneca 1925, 141 [99.18]). The shock of loss has physio-
logical effects that are not due to reason, but these tears can still ease
the soul, a reminder of the corporeality of the soul in Stoic psychology.
To not have your soul contract at a funeral is inhuman (Seneca 1925,
139 [99.15]), but one must balance piety and reason to sense a loss
(desiderium) but also to crush that feeling (Seneca 1932b, 47071 [16.1]).
Seneca even suggests that the sage will feel a true grief (vero maerori)
and a true emotion (veris adfectibus) at a funeral that includes joy in the
memory of the lost one (Seneca 1925, 13639 [99.1516]), but the sages
affection will still allow her to be quiet and at peace (Seneca 1925, 141
[99.20]). Yet, these discussions of the sages affective responses to death
are undeveloped in Seneca and the Stoic tradition.25

4. Christian Longing
Many Christian writers of the first four centuries adopted attitudes
toward grief and death superficially similar to Stoicism in their funeral
orations and other treatises. While Tertullian, Cyprian, and Ambrose
were certainly not StoicsScripture was the primary influence on their
ethical thoughtthey adopted an eclectic mix of the philosophical ideas
of the surrounding milieu. Stoicism appears in their writing because it
was the predominant moral philosophy in the first two centuries of the
Common Era, and because Neoplatonism adopted much of Stoic ethics.
Moreover, Stoics or Stoic-influenced authors like Cicero wrote some of
the most important Latin examples of the genre of consolation. The main
point of Christian consolation was that the resurrection of Christ has
overcome death and through death one enters eternal life, yet this exhor-
tation sits beside many traditional arguments as to why death is not an
evil: death ends the sorrows of life and vice; it saves the virtuous from
falling; even that the body is the prison of the soul. Commentators are
correct to note that Augustine marks a major break with prior Christian
attitudes toward death, especially Ambroses, by proclaiming death an
evil, which allowed for a positive appraisal of grief (Cavadini 1999; Jones
2007, 3789; and Banner 2014, 13954).
By focusing only on Augustines changed stance toward death and
grief, commentators tend to argue that earlier Christian writers in large
part just repeat the Stoic analysis. Yet, I argue that a major transforma-
tion occurs in the Latin Christian tradition in relation to affective
responses toward death even though much of the Stoic approach
remains. While grief is disallowed, these writers accept longing and

25
For Stoic ideas of appropriate affective responses to death in Stoicism, see Reydams-
Schils 2005, 13441; Graver 2009, 99101.
 Grief, Death, and Longing in Stoic 19

missing. Tertullian argues that death is like the beginning of a journey,

and that he who has gone ahead is not to be mourned (lugendus),
though certainly he will be missed (desirandus) (Tertullian 1959, 209
[9.3]).26 In the face of a plague ravaging Carthage, Cyprian preaches
that our brethren who have been freed from the world . . . should not be
mourned, since we know that they are not lost but sent before . . . that
as travellers, as voyagers are wont to be, they should be longed for
(desiderari), not lamented (Cyprian 1958, 215 [20]).27 In his funeral ser-
mon for his beloved brother Satyrus, Ambrose declares, There is a great
difference between longing for what you had and grieving because you
have lost it (Ambrose 1953, 165 [1.10]).28 In these sources, one finds a
distinction between grieving/mourning and longing/missing, with the for-
mer frowned upon and the latter approved.
Charles Favez recognized a distinction between lugere and desiderium
in his classic work on Latin Christian consolation, but he interpreted it
as the difference between excessive grief and a virtuous grief falling
near the Aristotelian mean (Favez 1937, 149). In Ambrose, there are
references to acceptable grief (naturae dolor), but this seems more like
Senecas pre-passion (Ambrose 1955, 214 [1.10]). However, the distinction
between lugere and desiderium refers to categorically distinct passions
with different objects. The words translated as longing or missing are
variants of desiderare or desiderium, which can be translated simply as
desire or longing, but which also has a technical meaning, since Cicero
described desiderium as different from other passions felt at a loss. It is
a subpassion of desire (libido), the desire for one who is absent (Cicero
1927, 348 [4.9.21]), and is distinct from other passions felt at the death
of a loved one, such as luctus, maeror, dolor, or lamentatio, because these
are all subpassions of distress (aegritudo) (Cicero 1927, 344 [4.7.16]).
It is not altogether clear whether Seneca or Epictetus distinguished
these passions. Seneca saw desiderium as natural, referring to the way
animals frantically search for their young when they are taken (Seneca
1932c, 22 [7.2]),29 but he does not distinguish it from distress consistent-
ly. Epictetus clearly collapses grief and longing in the chapter from
which his most shocking responses to loss come. His initial subject there
is not grief, but his students homesickness, which he sees as both dis-
tress and longing for someone who is not present. Your loved one is pre-
sent to you like a fig . . . at a fixed season of the year, and that if you

26
Latin text from Tertullian 1839, 25.
27
Latin text from Cyprian 1844, 618.
28
Et plurimum refert desiderare, quod habueris, et lugere, quod amiseris (Ambrose 1955,
214 [1.10]).
29
Ambrose uses a similar image of an ox seeking its yokemate, feeling that a part of
itself is missing, in describing his longing for his brother (Ambrose 1953, 164 [1.8]).
20 Journal of Religious Ethics

hanker for it in the winter, you are a fool. If . . . you long for your son . . .
at a time when he is not given to you, rest assured that you are hanker-
ing for a fig in wintertime (Epictetus 1928, 213 [3.24.8687]). Thus, the
revaluation of longing seems to be distinctly Christian.
Christian authors found this distinction in the New Testament sources
on affective responses to death. While Christian consolations used many
passages from the Wisdom literature to support their stance that death
is not an evil, two passages from Paul shaped their thought on the affec-
tive response to death. They cite 1 Thessalonians 4:13 in their rejection
of grief: But we do not want you to be uninformed, brothers and sisters,
about those who have died, so that you may not grieve as others do who
have no hope, a seeming rejection of a negative affective response
because of faith in the resurrection.30 A more complex passage, Philippi-
ans 1:2124, describes both an acceptance of death and a desire for those
who are gone, especially verse 23: I am hard pressed between the two:
my desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better. Here,
Paul desires death in order to be with Christ, a desire for one who is
absent.31 Christian consolations assimilate the longing for dead loved
ones to this longing to be with Christ.
In his two orations at his brothers death, Ambrose provides one of
the most beautiful descriptions of this longing. Ambrose is frequently
described as merely following Stoic or Neoplatonic thought on death,
especially since commentators tend to focus on his more theoretical work
De bono mortis. While both De bono mortis and these orations discuss
physical death as objectively indifferent, it is only in his reaction to his
brothers death that he wrestles with the affective response to the loss of
a loved one. In these orations, he tacks back and forth between consola-
tory meditations and a description of his heartfelt longing for his broth-
er. The first oration focuses on longing, but the second is also bookended
by discussions of longing and filled with recurring references to longing.
These orations show that this call for longing rather than grieving is
not merely a brute prescription, which might always cause someone to
reply: but I feel grief. Instead, Ambrose means to transform his affec-
tive response from grief into longing by the very act of speaking of his
brother, writing about him, and rereading these thoughts. In this very

30
Scriptural quotations are from Attridge 2006. One can interpret this passage in con-
text as merely ruling out grief without hope, but that is not how these authors understood
it.
31
The Greek word translated as desire in this passage, epithumia, which as here can
mean longing but generally refers to sinful desire (Buchsel 1965), is translated as desider-
ium in the Vulgate and in some versions of the Old Latin translation of the Bible. Other
Old Latin variants translate it as cupio or concupiscentia (Frede 1966). One could speculate
that the use of desiderium in this passage influenced its importance in the Latin tradition.
 Grief, Death, and Longing in Stoic 21

book wherein I am attempting to console others I am driven by a power-

ful impulse into longing for my lost brother, since it does not allow me to
forget him. . . . I long for him when I speak, I long for him when I read
again what I have composed (Ambrose 1953, 214 [2.42]). He uses this
work of memory tied to scriptural and philosophical meditation to gener-
ate this feeling of longing. Just as the Stoics used practices of the self
like the praemeditatio malorum, self-writing, or meditation on philosoph-
ical teachings to transform judgments and thus passions, Ambrose uses
this oration to attempt to work on his own and his audiences affections.
Yet while the Stoics used these practices to extirpate the passion of
grief, Ambrose is trying to transform grief into longing. What I am
doing is not contrary to Scripture, namely, that I should grieve more
patiently, but long more ardently [ut patientius doleam, inpatientius
desiderem] (Ambrose 1953, 214 [2.42]; 1955, 271). His discussions of the
resurrection in the second oration are not mere philosophical arguments
to show that death is not evil so Christians should not grieve at loss, but
meditations that redirect his considerations into the future, generating a
different affective response. Ambrose recognizes that in the death of a
loved one, one begins with grief, but he traces how one can reinterpret
this death in light of Christs death and resurrection to shape affections
into a longing for the loved one in the future resurrection of the body.
For Ambrose, ones emotional state is not just a given, but can be acted
upon, and not merely in the long-term project of virtue formation, but in
the immediate meditation on the truths of faith.

5. Stoic and Christian Consolation Compared

These Christian consolations bear a complex relationship to Stoicism,
neither a relationship of simple continuity nor of simple rejection, but
one of transformation. To take a first point, Christian consolation
reworked Stoic considerations of time. Like the Stoics, the past with the
lost loved one becomes present through the work of memory, engender-
ing happiness, and thanksgiving. Unlike the Stoics, Christian memory
also refers one to the future by increasing longing for the loved one and
desire for the future eschatological state. Why do we not hasten and
run . . . so that we can greet our parents? A great number of our dear
ones there await us, parents, brothers, children (Cyprian 1958, 220
[26]).
This points to the second transformation, that of the future. For the
Stoics, the individual lacks knowledge of the future, so it could be a
source of anxiety. Hope is not a eupathic affection for the Stoics. In con-
trast, through faith and hope, the Christian possesses a sure knowledge
of the future. Salvation becomes real through Gods promise, so the
Christian can dwell on this future without anxiety. The Christian can
22 Journal of Religious Ethics

long to see the loved one who died in Christ because she can hope that
the loved one will come to eternal life. Following 1 Thessalonians 4:13,
grief and fear become evidence of lack of faith (Cyprian 1958, 203 [6]).
While Seneca offers some hints that we might temporarily see our loved
ones again based on the dream of Scipio, there is nothing like the same
hope for the future (Seneca 1932c, 8997 [2526]; Ker 2009, 110).
This focus on the future does not deny the present, though. Christian
consolations maintain the focus on the present in two ways. First, this
trust in the future allows one to better serve others in the present. Phi-
lippians 1:2124 balances longing for Christ with the need to serve
others in the present: If I am to live in the flesh, that means fruitful
labor for me. Trust in and longing for the future removes the fear of
death and grief that the Stoics saw blocking the proper performance of
virtuous action (Ambrose 1953, 21415 [2.43]). Thus, Cyprian called on
the Christians of Carthage to lose the fear of death so that they might
properly care for the sick in the great plague striking the city (Cyprian
1958, 212 [16]). These authors answer the question of why one ought not
seek death if it is indifferent and one longs to be with the departed as
Socrates did: humans should live to serve God and others in this good
creation. Yet they recognize the weariness for life that comes with
bereavement; the longing to be with a lost spouse, parent, or child that
Christians may feel; and the desire to attain the fullness of life amid the
trials of the world. Such feelings are not all of Christian life nor even
common, but they occur after loss. These authors respond with a call to
serve others and God, and a recognition that one is united to Christ in
both life and death.
Beyond merely removing the anxieties driving us from the present,
Ambrose also suggests the ways that the future itself is made present,
that the longed-for reunion is foreshadowed now. Primarily, this occurs
through Christ. Both living and dying can bring one into relation with
Christ: For to me, living is Christ and dying is gain (Philippians 1:21).
The beloved dead are present because both the dead and the mourner
belong to the Body of Christ, the Church (Ambrose 1953, 16364 [1.6]).
Through the communion of saints, the departed can act to fulfill ones
longing through intercessions. Through your intercessions, I hope that
I, who long for you, may obtain the favor of being called to you the more
quickly (Ambrose 1953, 259 [2.135]). Ambrose even hints that the dead
can become present in ones heart. In regard to their sister, he asks,
Console her, then, brother, you who can visit her soul and enter her
mind. Let her see that you are present (Ambrose 1953, 194 [1.77]).
Longing does not drive one from the present in the way grief can.
Christianity thus dramatically transforms Stoic affective responses,
but the result is not outside of the Stoic ethical framework. If one
accepts the differences between Christian beliefs and Stoic philosophy,
 Grief, Death, and Longing in Stoic 23

then Christian longing can be eupathic. Unlike grief, longing is not associat-
ed with distress, for which there is no eupathic counterpart. Instead, longing
is associated with desire, which has the eupathic counterpart of wish (Dioge-
nes Laertius 1925, 221 [7.116]; Graver 2007, 59). Wishing is eupathic because
it is a desire for actual goods, mostly for othersthat another should attain
virtue or that one should become virtuous friends with her (eros). In part,
one desires the other to be with Christ, the Logos, which is the true good, mir-
roring the Logos in Stoicism, but as a person. In turn, one longs for oneself to
be present with Christ, which is also ones own good. Further, one desires
friendship with the dead. Thus, longing fulfills the most important criterion
for a eupathic response. It is based on true judgment, a judgment that what
is actually good is good, and a judgment based on knowledge of a future that
is sure because of divine promise. Finally, Ambrose argues that this longing
can eventually be peaceful, through the example of David, who, though he
begged God to save his son with Bathsheba, did not mourn when the child
died because of his great faith that he would see the child again (Ambrose
1953, 2067 [2.25]). His faith and hope brought peace. In contrast, David
mourned for Absalom and Amnon, whom he knew to be doomed by their vices
(Ambrose 1953, 208 [2.28]).32 Thus, longing can be assimilated to Stoic
eupathic affective responses, transforming the system, while not necessarily
rejecting its basic framework. This transformation occurs through hope,
hope in the resurrection of the dead, and thus provides an example of how
theological virtues transform a secular virtue ethic in early Christian
thought through a complex reenvisioning of reality that reshapes proper
affective responses.

6. Conclusions
Christian consolations drew much from the Stoics, yet even the Latin
authors most in continuity with Stoicism subtly transformed the affec-
tive response to death. Beyond exegetical concerns, this essay suggests
three important considerations. First, the Stoics were not isolated, cold
individualists, but were concerned about right affective relations. They
can thus be important interlocutors for contemporary Christian ethicists,
just as they influenced Christian writers in the patristic period. This is
especially true for areas like the recovery of the ars moriendi tradition
that already has Stoic elements. Much in these early modern texts
becomes incomprehensible if not read with this Stoic background. Con-
temporary religious ethics can learn much from Stoicism on the dangers
of passions like grief and fear in regard to care for others, as well as the

32
This exegesis raises questions of how one should feel in response to the death of a per-
son whom one fears is lost or whose state one does not know. I set this question aside for
now because of the great diversity of opinion among the authors of Christian consolation.
24 Journal of Religious Ethics

importance of temporality and a focus on the present for ethical thought.

These insights could help ethicists confront the contemporary medicali-
zation of death. It is grief and fear that drive us from recognizing the
nearness of death or the mortality of loved ones, from considering pallia-
tive care when appropriate, from discerning our priorities for our last
days, or from enjoying the present even in the face of death.
Second, the authors of both Stoic and Christian consolations provide les-
sons for how to rework emotions, such as the transformation of grief into
gratitude for the persons life or longing to see the person again. This
change is not merely dependent on the long-term habituation of prera-
tional passions, but can be addressed through meditation either prior to or
in the moment of grief. One can focus on joyful memories to bring grati-
tude. One can contemplate the resurrection to encourage longing.
Finally, this essay suggests that some Christian writers embraced a
longing for death that is not suicidal. Rather, it is the longing to rejoin
the lost loved one, a longing that many Christians feel, especially those
who have lost a spouse. Ultimately, it is a longing to rejoin Christ. One
longs not for ones personal nonexistence, but to be present with Christ
and with ones loved ones. Such an affective response can be obscured
when death is considered an evil, even though recognizing this response
is necessary for good pastoral care. When properly formed, it is not a
rejection of life because it still trusts and hopes in the Providential
unfolding of history, even if Gods purposes are obscure in the moment.
It holds to the good of the past made present in memory. Moreover, it
still seeks to serve God and others in the present. Through such longing,
one does not seek control over ones death but remains obedient to Gods
command and looks to the duties that even the dying and grieving can
perform in relation to others.33

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I thank Gretchen Reydams-Schils, China Scherz, and Zachary Keith for comments on
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