Hedonism

Hedonism is the doctrine that pleasure is the good. It was important in ancient discussions, and many positions
were taken, from the view that pleasure is to be avoided to the view that immediate bodily pleasure is to be sought.
More elevated views of pleasure were also taken, and have been revived in modern times. There are three varieties
of hedonism. Psychological hedonists hold that we can pursue only pleasure; evaluative hedonists that pleasure is
what we ought to pursue; reflective hedonists that it is what on reflection gives value to any pursuit. Arguments for
psychological hedonism suggest that an actions are a function of what they think will maximize their
pleasure overall. Explaining altruism can lead such theories into truism. Similar arguments are used for reflective
hedonism, and the same problem arises. The difficulty for evaluative hedonism lies in deciding how we can
establish certain ends as desirable. The claim that pleasure is to be maximized seems immoral to many. Hedonism
also faces problems with the measurement of pleasure.

1 History and varieties of hedonism

Hedonism is the doctrine that pleasure is the good (see Pleasure; Good, theories of the). It has usually been viewed as
a doctrine of self-indulgence, and so morally suspect. In classical Greece the pre-philosophical picture of pleasure is
given in the Myth of Prodicus, where Pleasure vies with Virtue in tempting Hercules. Among philosophers, some
advocated pursuit of immediate bodily pleasures (see Cyrenaics); some, hoping to show disreputable pleasures to be
detrimental to overall pleasure, took the maximization of pleasure over life as the good (their hope is helped if
non-bodily pleasures are included) (see Democritus; Protagoras); some (such as Plato in Republic and Aristotle in
Nicomachean Ethics) held that at least the good life is the pleasantest, and perhaps that, if you understood about
pleasure, arguing from hedonistic premises would lead you to the morally right conclusion (see Plato; Aristotle); some
held that pleasure is to be avoided (see Cynics). After Aristotle, Epicurus and his followers advocated a life of
physical pleasure unadulterated by pain, and of unanxious memory and anticipation of such pleasures. For a number
of centuries they were an influential school. The Stoics, by contrast, considered pleasure to be a false belief in the
wellbeing (see Stoicism).
In the Middle Ages the topic did not arouse such excitement, although it was treated in commentaries on Aristotle. In
post-Cartesian philosophy Claude-Adrien Helvetius was a proponent, and many of the British empiricists adopted
some form of hedonism. This was developed into utilitarianism by Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill
(see Utilitarianism). J.S. Mill (1861) distinguished higher from lower pleasures, declaring the former, more admirable,
pleasures pleasanter. Hedonism received judicious consideration from Henry Sidgwick and was vigorously attacked by
G.E. Moore, but has benefited from sophisticated development at the hands of Richard Brandt (1979).
Psychological hedonists hold that we can pursue only pleasure; evaluative hedonists that pleasure is what we ought to
pursue; reflective hedonists that it is what on reflection gives value to any pursuit. Some have tried to be all three at
once, usually through failure to notice the differences. The varieties of hedonism in the first paragraph above will
match with types in these three to produce different forms of hedonism. Further variations may be introduced as
follows: (a) while the pleasure in question is usually the own, it may be that of any human or sentient being
(see Animals and ethics); (b) different views of the nature of pleasure will yield different pictures of the goal in life
(see Eudaimonia). For example, if pleasure is the realization of own good functioning, we get one picture (see
Perfectionism); if it is the satisfaction of desire, another (see Desire).

2 Psychological, evaluative and reflective hedonism

Whether this distinction holds depends on conclusions about the distinction between fact and value (see Fact/value
distinction). In classical Greek philosophy it was standard practice to argue from the supposed fact that something is
the only thing wanted (or really wanted) by an individual or species, to the conclusion that it is the good of that
individual or species. To show that everyone wants only pleasure was thought necessary and sufficient to show that
pleasure is the human good, and so what humans ought to pursue. If it is invalid to argue from facts about what people
do want to conclusions about what they ought to want, then there will be a clear difference between holding that we all
do want pleasure and holding that we ought to. Indeed, it will be a waste of time telling people that they ought to want
pleasure if pleasure is the only thing they are capable of wanting. Proponents of evaluative hedonism seem to suppose
the falsity of the psychological variety.

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge (1998)
 Reflective hedonism is a halfway house. The thesis is that when we reflect on what is valuable in life, then only
considerations of pleasure weigh; but in many of our pursuits we lose sight of this. Thus I may become
overconscientious and in all my actions be ruled by considerations of duty; when I stand back and review my life, it is
its dreary lack of pleasure which convinces me that it is all worthless. This is a psychological thesis about our
reflective valuing which allows us to make sense of raising questions about the worth of what we actually pursue.

3 Arguments for hedonism

(a) Psychological hedonism. Arguments may be to the effect that all of every actions are a function of what
they consider will maximize their pleasure overall, or will be the pleasantest thing in itself of the available alternatives.
It will depend on how the end of pleasure is conceived. Apparent exceptions, such as altruistic acts, will have to be
shown nevertheless to be a function of the goal as specified. Two points are important here. First, suggesting a way in
which an agent might see an act as maximizing pleasure is not showing that they do: hypotheses have to be
substantiated. Second, showing that an act is a function of what the agent thinks the most titillating in prospect of the
available alternatives is not showing it to be a function of what they think will maximize pleasure overall. In other
words, one has to ensure that one has evidence for the hypothesis, and to be sufficiently precise about its formulation
to be sure that the evidence tells in favour of it and not some other view.
Faced with apparent counterexamples, such as altruism, there is a temptation to claim that if the agent does not
envisage some pleasure from their altruism, or view it with pleasure, then they do not really want to act as they do.
This saves the thesis but at the cost of making it truistic; pleasure can no longer illuminate why we desire anything: if
pleasure is absent we do not count as desiring.
In these arguments, not only is it important to beware the slide into making the thesis truistic; one must also take care
about the relations between various explanations in terms of pleasure. If I am depressed, I may recoil from the
prospect of going to a party which I know I should enjoy if I made the effort. Evidence about what I view with
pleasure does not seem relevant to the question of what I think will produce pleasure, or conversely. It is necessary to
argue the connection.
(b) Evaluative hedonism. The issue here depends on the possibilities for establishing the desirability of ends. Is it
intuitively obvious that in some sense pleasure is (the) good? Or by some account of rationality is it the only rational
thing to pursue? Or does pleasure alone make sense of our moral concerns? The argument is not now about actual
pursuits, nor about what counts as wanting, but about how one might argue that pleasure ought to be pursued or
desired.
(c) Reflective hedonism. Points paralleling those on psychological hedonism hold. First, there are arguments as to
whether all our reflective valuing does in the last resort rely on appeal to hedonistic considerations; second, there is the
possibility of arguing that we count as evaluating only if we refer to hedonistic grounds. There is the same risk of
lapse into truism.

4 Problems for hedonism

Hedonism may be aimed at supplying either a rationale for morality, or an alternative to it. Since most forms of
hedonism judge the worth of courses of action by their consequences in terms of pleasure, they encounter the
problems, as rationales of morality, of consequentialism (see Consequentialism): moral judgments of worth seem
often partly or wholly independent of consequences, certainly of pleasure, however long-term (see Deontological
ethics; Intuitionism in ethics). For egoistic forms of hedonism, there is the problem of explaining the apparently
anti-egoistic bias of morality (see Egoism and altruism).
Whether considered as a rationale of morality or an alternative, hedonism has problems with the measurement of
pleasure. It is not clear what to make of the question whether a given episode of skating gave as much pleasure as the
supping of a glass of wine. They seem incommensurable. If these problems can be surmounted, there remain
problems, for non-egoistic hedonists, of comparing different pleasures.
See also: Asceticism; Economics and ethics; Eudoxus; Happiness; Moral motivation; Rational Choice Theory;
Suffering
JUSTIN GOSLING

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge (1998)
 References and further reading
Aristotle (c. mid 4th century BC) Nicomachean Ethics, trans. with notes by T. Irwin, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1985.(Contains two important discussions of pleasure, 1152b-1154b and
1172a16-1176a29, which attempt to reconcile the hedonist and anti-hedonist insights of predecessors.)
Bentham, J. (1789) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart,
revised F. Rosen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. (Central modern account, which gives a qualified hedonistic
basis for utilitarianism.)
Brandt, R.B. (1979) A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Sophisticated contemporary
discussion, which defends hedonism against modern criticisms.)
Gosling, J.C.B. (1969) Pleasure and Desire, Oxford: Clarendon Press.(Discusses the issues introduced in this entry,
in 2-4.)
Gosling, J.C.B. and Taylor, C.C.W (1982) The Greeks on Pleasure, Oxford: Clarendon Press.(Comprehensive
discussion of the disputes in classical Greece up to Epicurus and the early Stoics.)
Mill, J.S. (1861) Utilitarianism, in J. Gray (ed.) On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991.(Classic modern discussion of hedonistic utilitarianism.)
Moore, G.E. (1903) Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Contains spirited attack on
hedonism, especially that of J.S. Mill.)
Plamenatz, J. (1958) The English Utilitarians, Oxford: Blackwell.(Treatment of some of the main figures in the
British empiricist tradition.)
Plato (c.380-367 BC) Republic, trans. G.M. Grube, revised by C. Reeve, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1992.(Seeks to justify life of reason as most pleasant.)
Sidgwick, H. (1874) The Methods of Ethics, London: Macmillan; 7th edn, 1907. (Contains well-balanced and careful
assessment of hedonism.)

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge (1998)