Lection 3 Is place matter or form?

1. We may distinguish generally between predicating B of A because it (A) is itself, and because it is
something else; and particularly between place which is common and in which all bodies are, and
the special place occupied primarily by each. I mean, for instance, that you are now in the heavens
because you are in the air and it is in the heavens; and you are in the air because you are on the
earth; and similarly on the earth because you are in this place which contains no more than you.
Now if place is what primarily contains each body, it would be a limit, so that the place would be
the form or shape of each body by which the magnitude or the matter of the magnitude is defined:
for this is the limit of each body. If, then, we look at the question in this way the place of a thing is
its form.

422. Having inquired dialectically into the question of places existence, the Philosopher now
attacks the question: what is place?

First he gives dialectical reasons showing that place is form or matter;

Secondly, he gives reasons to the contrary, at no. 429.

As to the first he does three things:

First he gives a reason showing that place is form;

Secondly, that place is matter, at no. 425.
Thirdly, from these he draws a corollary, at no. 428.

423. He says therefore first 52917 that just as in beings some are per se beings and others per
accidens, so in regard to place, one place is common, in which all bodies exist, and another is
proper and is called place, primarily and per se. Now common place is so called only per accidens
and in relation to a previous place. He explains this thus: I can say that you are in the heavens,
because you are in the air which is in the heavens, and that you are in the air and in the heavens,
because you are on earth and you are said to be on earth, because you are in a place containing
nothing but you.

424. Consequently, what contains a thing primarily and per se is its per se place. Now such a place
is the boundary at which a thing is terminated. Therefore, place is properly and per se a boundary of
a thing. But the boundary of each thing is its form, because it is through the form that the matter of
anything is limited to its own existence and magnitude to a determinate measure. For the quantities
of things follow upon their forms. According to this, therefore, it seems that place is the form.

However, it should be noted that in this argument there is the fallacy of consequent; for it is a
syllogism in the second figure with two affirmative premises.

2. But, if we regard the place as the extension of the magnitude, it is the matter. For this is different
from the magnitude: it is what is contained and defined by the form, as by a bounding plane. Matter
or the indeterminate is of this nature; when the boundary and attributes of a sphere are taken away,
nothing but the matter is left. This is why Plato in the Timaeus says that matter and space are the
same; for the 'participant' and space are identical. (It is true, indeed, that the account he gives there
of the 'participant' is different from what he says in his so-called 'unwritten teaching'. Nevertheless,
he did identify place and space.) I mention Plato because, while all hold place to be something, he
alone tried to say what it is.

425. Then [292] he gives a reason of Plato through which it seemed to him that place is matter. To
see this, one must note that the ancients thought that place was the space enveloped by the
boundaries of the container, which has the dimensions of length, breadth, and depth. But this space
did not seem to be the same as any sensible body, because the space remained the same even when
various bodies successively entered it and left. Thus it follows that place is a set of separate
dimensions.

426. From this Plato wished to demonstrate that place is matter. This is what he [Aristotle] says:
Because some consider that place is the distance of the magnitude of space distinct from every
sensible body, place would seem to be matter. For the distance or dimension of a magnitude is
distinct from the magnitude. For magnitude signifies something terminated by some species [or
form], as a line is terminated by points, and a surface by line, and a body by surface, and these are
species of magnitude. But the dimension of space is contained under a determined form as a body is
determined by a plane, i.e., by a surface, as, by a definite boundary. Now whatever is contained
under boundaries seems to be in itself not determined. What is not determined in itself but by a
form and boundary is matter which has the nature of the infinite. For were we to remove from some
spherical body its sensible qualities and the boundaries by which the dimension of its magnitude
acquires its definite figure, nothing would remain but the matter. Consequently the dimensions
themselves, which are not determined by themselves but by something else, are matter.

This followed mainly from the underlying principles of Plato, who posited numbers and quantities
as the substance of things.

427. Therefore, because place is dimensions and dimensions are matter, Plato said in the Timaeus
that place and matter are the same. For he said that whatever is a receptacle of anything is a place
(failing to distinguish between the receptiveness of place and of matter). Hence, since matter
receives form, it follows that matter is place.

Yet it should be noted that Plato spoke in various ways about receptacles: for in the Timaeus he said
that the receptacle is matter but in his unwritten teaching, i.e., his oral teaching in the schools, he
said that the receptacle was the large and the small, which however he allied with matter, as we
have said above. Yet no matter to what he attributed receptivity, he always said that the receptacle
and place are the same. Therefore, while many did say that place is something, Plato alone
endeavored to say what place is.

3. In view of these facts we should naturally expect to find difficulty in determining what place is, if
indeed it is one of these two things, matter or form. They demand a very close scrutiny, especially
as it is not easy to recognize them apart.

428. Then [293] he concludes from the foregoing that if place is either matter or form, it seems
reasonable to say that it is difficult to know what place is: because both matter and form involve
very lofty and difficult speculation; moreover, it is not easy to know either of them without the
other.

4. But it is at any rate not difficult to see that place cannot be either of them. The form and the
matter are not separate from the thing, whereas the place can be separated. As we pointed out,
where air was, water in turn comes to be, the one replacing the other; and similarly with other
bodies. Hence the place of a thing is neither a part nor a state of it, but is separable from it. For
place is supposed to be something like a vesselthe vessel being a transportable place. But the
vessel is no part of the thing.

429. Then [294] he gives five reasons to the contrary. In the first of these he says that it is not
difficult to see that place is neither matter nor form. For form and matter are not separate from the
thing of which they are components, whereas place can be separatedin the place where air was,
water now is. In like manner, other bodies also mutually change place. Hence it is clear that place is
not part of a thing, as matter or form. Nor is place an accident of a thing, because parts and
accidents are nor separable from a thing, whereas place is separable. He shows this by an example:
place seems to be related to the thing in place as a vessel, the only difference being that place is
immobile and the vessel mobile, as will be explained below (L.6). Consequently, since place is
separable, it is not form. But that place is not matter is shown not only by the fact that it is
separable, but also by the fact that it contains, whereas matter does not contain but is contained.

5. In so far then as it is separable from the thing, it is not the form: qua containing, it is different
from the matter.

430. He now gives a second reason [295]. Since he had shown that place is neither matter nor form
on the ground that place is separated from the thing in place, he now wishes to show that even if
place were never separated from the thing in place, yet the very fact that we say something is in
place shows that place is neither form nor matter. For whatever is said to be anywhere seems both to
be something and to be distinct from that in which it is. Hence, when something is said to be in
place, it follows that place is outside the thing, whereas matter and form are not outside the thing.
Therefore, neither matter nor form is place.

6. Also it is held that what is anywhere is both itself something and that there is a different thing
outside it.(Plato of course, if we may digress, ought to tell us why the form and the numbers are not
in place, if 'what participates' is placewhether what participates is the Great and the Small or the
matter, as he called it in writing in the Timaeus.)

431. In the third reason [296] he makes a digression to argue specifically against the position of
Plato. For it was said in Book III that Plato posited ideas and numbers as not in place. But logically,
according to his opinion about place, they should be in place, because whatever is participated is in
the participantand he said that species and numbers are participated either by matter or by the
large and the small. Accordingly, species and number exist in matter or in the large and small,
Therefore, if matter or the large and the small are place, it follows that numbers and species are in
place.

7. Further, how could a body be carried to its own place, if place was the matter or the form? It is
impossible that what has no reference to motion or the distinction of up and down can be place. So
place must be looked for among things which have these characteristics. If the place is in the thing
(it must be if it is either shape or matter) place will have a place: for both the form and the
indeterminate undergo change and motion along with the thing, and are not always in the same
place, but are where the thing is. Hence the place will have a place.

432. He gives the fourth reason [297]. In this regard he says that no good explanation could be
given of how something could be moved according to place, if matter and form are place. For it is
impossible to assign a place in things that are not moved up or down or in any direction of place;
hence place must be sought in things that are moved according to place. But if place is something
intrinsic to what is moved (which would be the case if matter or form were place), it follows that
place will be in a place, for whatever is changed in respect to place is itself in place. Now whatever
is in a thing, such as its species and the infinite, i.e., its matter, is moved with the thing, since they
are not always in the same place, but are wherever the thing is. Therefore, matter and form must be
in a place. Therefore, if either of them is place, it follows that place is in a place, which is
unacceptable.

8. Further, when water is produced from air, the place has been destroyed, for the resulting body is
not in the same place. What sort of destruction then is that? This concludes my statement of the
reasons why space must be something, and again of the difficulties that may be raised about its
essential nature.

433. The fifth reason is then given [298]. Whenever anything is corrupted, the parts of its species
are somehow corrupted. Now matter and form are the parts of the species. Therefore, when the
thing corrupts, then, at least per accidens, the matter and form are corrupted. Consequently, if matter
and form are place, it follows that place is corrupted, if place pertains to the species. Now the body
which is generated would not be in the same place, if the place of air pertained to the species of the
air, as when water is generated from air. But no explanation can be given of how place is corrupted;
hence it cannot be said that matter or form are place.

Finally, he summarizes by asserting that we have stated why it seems place must exist and what
causes doubt about its existence.
Lectio 4: Prerequisites to determining the truth about place.

1.The next step we must take is to see in how many senses one thing is said to be 'in' another. (esta
no cuenta)

434. After inquiring dialectically into the existence and nature of place, the Philosopher now
proceeds to the task of determining the truth.

First he lays down certain things necessary to the consideration of the truth:
Secondly, he determines the truth, at no. 445.

As to the first he does three things:

First he points out the ways in which one thing is said to be in another;
Secondly, he asks whether anything can be in itself, at no. 437;
Thirdly, he settles some difficulties previously raised, at no. 443.

2. (1) As the finger is 'in' the hand and generally the part 'in' the whole.(2) As the whole is 'in' the
parts: for there is no whole over and above the parts. (3) As man is 'in' animal and generally
species 'in' genus.(4) As the genus is 'in' the species and generally the part of the specific form 'in'
the definition of the specific form.

The first of these is the way in which a finger is said to be in the hand and in general how any part is
in its whole.

The second way is as the whole is said to be in the parts. And because this way is not so customary
as the first, he explains it by adding that the whole is not something outside the parts, and thus must
be understood as existing in the parts.

The third way is as man is said to be in animal, and any species in its genus.

The fourth way is as the genus is said to be in the species. And lest this way seem out of place, he
gives a reason for mentioning it: the genus is part of the definition of the species as is the
difference; hence in some way both the genus and the difference are said to be in the species as
parts in the whole.

3. (5) As health is 'in' the hot and the cold and generally the form 'in' the matter.(6) As the affairs of
Greece centre 'in' the king, and generally events centre 'in' their primary motive agent.(7) As the
existence of a thing centres 'in its good and generally 'in' its end, i.e. in 'that for the sake of which' it
exists.(8) In the strictest sense of all, as a thing is 'in' a vessel, and generally 'in' place.

The fifth way is as health is said to be in hot and cold things, the balance between which constitutes
health; and in general as any other form is in matter or a subject, whether it be an accidental or a
substantial form.

The sixth way is as the affairs of the Greeks are said to exist in the king of Greece, and generally as
everything that is moved is in the first mover. According to this way, I can say that something is in
me, because it is in my power to do it.

In the seventh way something is said to be in something as in something supremely loveable and
desirable, and generally as in an end. in this way someones heart is said to be in what he desires
and loves.
Finally in an eighth way something is said to be in something as in a vessel, and in general as a
thing in place is in its place.

He seems to have skipped the way in which something is in something as in time. But this is
reduced to the eighth way. For just as place is the measure of the mobile thing, so time is the
measure of motion.

436. Then he says that it is according to the eighth way that something is in a very proper sense said
to be in something. Hence, according to the rule given in Metaphysics IV and V, all the other modes
must somehow be reduced to this eighth way, according to which, something is in something as in a
place. This is done in the following way.

The thing in place is contained or included by its place and has rest and it has rest and immobility
therein. Therefore the way closest to this one is that in which a part is said to be in the integral
whole in which it is actually included. Accordingly, it will be said below that a thing in place is as a
separated part, and a part as a conjoined thing in place.

The whole which is according to reason is like this whole; hence it is said that what is in the notion
of something is in it, as animal in man.

Now just as it happens that the part of an integral whole is enclosed in a whole according to act, so
the part of a universal whole is enclosed in a whole according to potency for the genus extends to
more things potentially than the species does, although the species may have more elements in act.
Consequently, species is also said to be in the genus.

And because, just as the species is contained in the potency of the genus, so form is contained in the
potency of matter, it is further said that form is in the matter.

And because the whole has the notion of form in relation to the parts, as was said in Book II,
consequently the whole is also said to be in the parts. But just as form is enclosed under the passive
potency of matter, so the effect is enclosed under the active potency of the agent. Whence it is that
something is said to be in a first mover.

Finally, it is clear that the appetite rests in the good it desires and loves and is, indeed, fixed in it,
just as the thing in place is fixed in place. Hence the affection of the lover is said to be in the thing
loved.

And thus it is evident that all the other ways are derived from the last, which is the most proper.

4. One might raise the question whether a thing can be in itself, or whether nothing can be in itself
everything being either nowhere or in something else.

437. Then [302] he asks whether anything can be in itself, for Anaxagoras said above that the
infinite exists in itself.

Therefore, he first raises the question: whether one and the same thing can be in itself; or whether
nothing can, but all things either never are or are in something else.

5. The question is ambiguous; we may mean the thing qua itself or qua something else. When there
are parts of a wholethe one that in which a thing is, the other the thing which is in itthe whole
will be described as being in itself. For a thing is described in terms of its parts, as well as in terms
of the thing as a whole, e.g. a man is said to be white because the visible surface of him is white, or
to be scientific because his thinking faculty has been trained. The jar then will not be in itself and
the wine will not be in itself. But the jar of wine will: for the contents and the container are both
parts of the same whole.

438. Secondly [302] he answers this;

First he shows how something can be in itself;

Secondly, how it cannot, at no. 439.

He says first, therefore [301] that something may be understood to be in itself in two ways: in one
way, primarily and per se; in another way, in relation to something else, i.e., in relation to a part.
And it is in this second way that something may be said to be in itself. For when two parts of some
whole are so related that one part is that in which the other exists and the other is that which is in
the first, it follows that the whole is both that in which something exists (by reason of one part)
and that which is in this (by reason of the other), and thus is the whole said to be in itself.

For we observe that something is said of something according to a part, for example, someone is
called white because his surface is white, and a man is called knowing because science is in his
rational part. If therefore we take a jug full of wine as a certain whole whose parts are jug and
wine, neither of the parts will exist in itself, i.e., neither the jug nor the wine, but this whole, which
is a jug of wine, will be in itself inasmuch as each is a part of it, i.e., both the wine which is in the
jug and the jug in which the wine is. It is in this way, therefore, that one and the same thing can be
in itself.

6. In this sense then, but not primarily, a thing can be in itself, namely, as 'white' is in body (for the
visible surface is in body), and science is in the mind. It is from these, which are 'parts' (in the sense
at least of being 'in' the man), that the man is called white, etc. But the jar and the wine in
separation are not parts of a whole, though together they are. So when there are parts, a thing will
be in itself, as 'white' is in man because it is in body, and in body because it resides in the visible
surface. We cannot go further and say that it is in surface in virtue of something other than itself.
(Yet it is not in itself: though these are in a way the same thing,) they differ in essence, each having
a special nature and capacity, 'surface' and 'white'.

439. Then [302] he shows that nothing can be primarily in itself.

First he proposes what he intends, distinguishing both the way in which something is in itself and
the way in which it is not;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at no. 440.

He says, therefore, that there is no case of anything being primarily in itself. And he makes clear
what it is for something to be primarily in itself by citing an example of the opposite. For something
white is said to be in a body, because the surface is in the body: hence the white is nor primarily in
the body but in the surface. In like manner, science is said to be primarily in the soul, and not in the
man, in whom science exists by reason of the soul. And it is according to this, i.e., according to the
soul and the surface, that the appellations whereby a man is called white or knowing are
verified, since the soul and the surface are as parts of mannot that the surface is a part, but it is
like a part, inasmuch as it is something of the man, as The boundary of his body.

Now, if wine and jug are taken as separated one from the other, they are not parts; hence it belongs
to neither of them to exist in itself. But when they are together, as when a jug is full of wine, then
because both jug and wine are parts, the same thing will be existing in itself (as was explained
above), not primarily but through its parts, just as white is not primarily in the man but is there
through the body, and in the body through the surface. But it is not in the surface through anything
else; hence it is said to be in the surface primarily. Nor is that in which something exists primarily,
and that which is in it, the same, as in the case of white and surface. For surface and white are
specifically different, and the nature and potency of each is different.

7. Thus if we look at the matter inductively we do not find anything to be 'in' itself in any of the
senses that have been distinguished; and it can be seen by argument that it is impossible. For each
of two things will have to be both, e.g. the jar will have to be both vessel and wine, and the wine
both wine and jar, if it is possible for a thing to be in itself; so that, however true it might be that
they were in each other, the jar will receive the wine in virtue not of its being wine but of the wine's
being wine, and the wine will be in the jar in virtue not of its being a jar but of the jar's being a jar.
Now that they are different in respect of their essence is evident; for 'that in which something is' and
'that which is in it' would be differently defined.

440. Then [303] having pointed out the difference between being primarily in something and not
being primarily in something, he now shows that nothing is primarily in itself.

First he shows that nothing is primarily in itself per se;

Secondly, per accidens, at no. 442.

And he explains the first point in two ways: namely, inductively and with an argument. He says
therefore first, that by considering inductively all the ways determined above in which something is
said to be in itself, it is found that nothing exists in itself primarily and per se: for nothing is the
totality of itself, [i.e., in itself as whole in part?], nor as part [in whole?] as genus [in species?], and
so on. He lays this down by concluding from what has gone before, because just as it is clear in the
case of the white and of the surface (which are related as form and matter) that they differ both in
species and in power, the same thing can be considered in all the other modes.

441. Then [304] he proves the same thing with an argument and says that it is clear by reasoning
that it is impossible for anything to be primarily and per se in itself. For if there be anything such,
necessarily the same thing, in the same way, will have the notion both of that in which something is,
and that which is in it. Hence, each would have to be both the container and the content; for
example, the jug would be the vessel and the wine, and the wine both the wine and jug, if something
could be primarily and per se in itself. Now on this assumption (namely, that the wine is both the
jug and wine, and the jug both wine and jug), if anyone were to say that either is in the other, for
example, that the wine is in the jug, it would follow that the wine is received into the jug not
inasmuch it is wine, but inasmuch as wine is the jug. Wherefore, if to be in the jug primarily and per
se is a property of the jug (on the assumption that something is primarily and ptr se in itself), it
follows that nothing can be said to be in the jug except inasmuch as that something is the jug. And
so, if the wine is said to be in the jug, it follows that to be in the jug belongs to the wine, not
inasmuch as it is wine, but inasmuch as the wine is the jug.

For the same reason, if the jug receives the wine, it will receive it not inasmuch as the jug is jug but
inasmuch as the jug is wine. Now this is unacceptable. Hence, it is clear that it is under different
aspects that something is that in which and that which is in. For it is one thing to be that which
is in something, and another to be that in which something is. Consequently, nothing can be
primarily and per se in itself.

8. Nor is it possible for a thing to be in itself even incidentally: for two things would at the same
time in the same thing. The jar would be in itselfif a thing whose nature it is to receive can be in
itself; and that which it receives, namely (if wine) wine, will be in it. Obviously then a thing cannot
be in itself primarily.

442. Then [305] he shows that nothing exists primarily in itself even according to accident. For
something is said to be in something according to accident, when it is in it on account of something
else existing in it; as, for example, when we say that a man is in the sea because he is in a boat
which is in the sea: he is nevertheless said to be in the boat primarily, i.e., not according to a part. If
therefore something could be in itself primarily, though not per se but per accidens, it would be in
itself on account of something else being in it. And so it follows that two bodies are in the same
thing; namely, the body which is in something and that same thing as existing in itself. In this way a
jug will be in itself per accidens, if the jug itself, whose nature it is to receive something, is in itself,
and again that which it receives, i.e., the wine. Therefore, in the jug will exist both jug and wine, if,
because the wine is in the jug it follows that the jug is in itself; and so two bodies would be in the
same. Consequently, it is clearly impossible for anything to be primarily in itself.

Notice, however, that sometimes something is said to be in itself not according to an affirmation
but according to a negation, inasmuch as to be in itself signifies nothing more than not to be in
something else.

9. Zeno's problemthat if Place is something it must be in somethingis not difficult to solve.

There is nothing to prevent the first place from being 'in' something elsenot indeed in that as 'in'
place, but as health is 'in' the hot as a positive determination of it or as the hot is 'in' body as an
affection. So we escape the infinite regress.

443. Then [306] he settles certain doubts. First he destroys Zenos reason which was appealed to as
proof that place does not exist on the assumption that, if it did, it must exist in something else and
so on ad infinitum. But this, as he says, is not difficult to answer after one knows the various ways
in which something is said to be in something else.

For there is nothing to prevent our saying that place is in something: for while it is not in something
as in a place, it is in something in some other way, as form is in matter or an accident in a subject,
inasmuch as place is a boundary of the container. And this is what he adds: as health is in the hot as
a habit, and heat is in a body as a passion or accident. Hence it is not necessary to proceed to
infinity.

10. Another thing is plain: since the vessel is no part of what is in it (what contains in the strict
sense is different from what is contained), place could not be either the matter or the form of the
thing contained, but must differentfor the latter, both the matter and the shape, are parts of what
is contained. This then may serve as a critical statement of the difficulties involved.

444. Then [307] he also settles the doubts mentioned above about the nature of place (namely,
whether it be form or matter) by appealing to his proof that nothing exists in itself primarily and per
se. For it is clear from this proof that nothing can be the vessel or place of that which is contained in
it after the manner of a part such as matter or form is: for that which is in something and that in
which something is must be primarily and per se distinct, as we have shown. Hence, it follows that
neither form nor matter is place; rather place is something entirely different from the thing in place,
whereas matter and form belong to the thing in place as intrinsic parts thereof.

Finally he concludes that the things said above about place were said as contesting it. Some of these
oppositions have now been solved; others will be solved after the nature of place is manifested.
Lecture 5
Necessary previous notions for the definition of place.

1. What then after all is place? The answer to this question may be elucidated as follows. Let us
take for granted about it the various characteristics which are supposed correctly to belong to it
essentially. We assume then:
1. Place is what contains that of which it is the place.
2. Place is no part of the thing.
3. The immediate place of a thing is neither less nor greater than the thing.
4. Place can be left behind by the thing and is separable. In addition:
5. All place admits of the distinction of up and down, and each of the bodies is naturally carried to
its appropriate place and rests there, and this makes the place either up or down.
Having laid these foundations, we must complete the theory.

445. After setting forth a preliminary discussion about whether place exists and what it is, and after
solving some doubtful points on these matters, the Philosopher now begins the task of determining
the truth about place.

First he gives some presuppositions to be used in determining about place;

Secondly, he shows what qualities a definition of place should have, at no. 447;
Thirdly, he begins to determine about place, at no. 448.

446. He says first therefore [308] that it will be clear from the following just what place is. But we
must first adopt as it were certain suppositions and self-evident principles, those namely, which
appear intrinsic to place. Indeed, there are four such:

For all agree on this maxim, that place contains that of which it is the place, yet in such a way that
place is not any part of the thing in place. He says this to exclude the containing force of form,
which is part of a thing, but contains in a manner different from place.

The second supposition is that the primary place, i.e., that in which something exists primarily, is
equal to, and neither greater nor less than, the thing in place.

The third supposition is that a place exists for everything in place, i.e., that everything in place has a
place, but not in the sense that one and the same place is never lost by one and the same thing
capable of being in a place; for a place can be separated from a thing in place. However, when one
place is lost by a thing in place, it acquires another place.

The fourth supposition is that in all places there is found, as a [specific] difference of place, an up
and a down, and that each body, when it is outside its proper place, naturally seeks it and, when it
is in it, naturally remains there. Now the proper places of natural bodies are up and down, to
which they are naturally borne and in which they remain. But he says this in keeping with the
opinion of those who posited no body other than the four elements: for he has not yet proved the
heavenly body to be neither light nor heavywhich he will prove later in De Coelo, I . From these
presuppositions he proceeds to the consideration of what remains.

2. We ought to try to make our investigation such as will render an account of place, and will not
only solve the difficulties connected with it, but will also show that the attributes supposed to
belong to it do really belong to it, and further will make clear the cause of the trouble and of the
difficulties about it. Such is the most satisfactory kind of exposition.

447. He then [309] shows what qualities should be found in a definition of place. And he says that
in defining place our attention should be focused on four things which indeed are necessary for a
perfect definition:

First, that one show what place is, for a definition is an expression indicating what a thing is.

Secondly, that one resolve conflicting arguments about place: for the knowledge of truth involves
the solution of doubts.

Thirdly, that the given definition reveal the properties of place, which inhere in it, because a
definition is the middle term in a demonstration, by which the proper accidents are demonstrated of
the subject.

Fourthly, that from the definition of place the cause will be clear why there is disagreement about
place and of all the conflicting things said about it. Such a procedure is the most beautiful way of
defining anything.

3. First then we must understand that place would not have been thought of, if there had not been a
special kind of motion, namely that with respect to place. It is chiefly for this reason that we
suppose the heaven also to be in place, because it is in constant movement. Of this kind of change
there are two specieslocomotion on the one hand and, on the other, increase and diminution. For
these too involve variation of place: what was then in this place has now in turn changed to what is
larger or smaller.

448. Then [310] he determines about place;

First he shows what place is;

Secondly, at no. 487, he settles the doubts previously mentioned;
Thirdly, he assigns the cause of the natural properties of place, at no. 492.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows what place is;

Secondly, how something exists iu place, at no. 472(L.7).

As to the first he does two things:

First he mentions some facts preliminary to his hunt for the definition;
Secondly, he begins to investigate the definition of place, at no. 455 (L.6).

449. In regard to the first, be makes four preliminary statements, the first of which is that the
question of place would never have arisen were there no motion in regard to place. For it was
necessary to posit place as something distinct from the object in place, because two bodies are
found successively in the same place, and, in like manner, one body successively in two places.
(Similarly, it was the successive change of forms in one and the same matter that led to the
knowledge of matter). For this reason some are convinced that the heavens are in place, since they
are always in motion. Now, of motions, one is according to place per se, namely, the change of
place; another is consequently related to place, namely, increase and decline, beeause as a body
grows or decreases, it acquires a larger or a smaller place.

4. Again, when we say a thing is 'moved', the predicate either (1) belongs to it actually, in virtue of
its own nature, or (2) in virtue of something conjoined with it. In the latter case it may be either (a)
something which by its own nature is capable of being moved, e.g. the parts of the body or the nail
in the ship, or (b) something which is not in itself capable of being moved, but is always moved
through its conjunction with something else, as 'whiteness' or 'science'. These have changed their
place only because the subjects to which they belong do so.

450. He gives the second [311], saying that some things are moved, per se in act as in the case with
every body, while others according to accident. This latter can occur in two ways. For some things
that could be moved essentially are de facto moved accidentally, as the parts of a body while they
are in the whole body are moved per accidens but when they are separated they are moved per se.
Thus, a nail, when it is embedded in a ship, is moved per accidens, but when it is extracted it is
moved per se. Other things are not be moved per se, but only per accidens, as is the case with
whiteness and knowledge, which change place as that in which they are changes place. This point
was brought up because things are apt to be in place per se or per accidens, actually or potentially in
the same way as they are apt to be moved in those ways.

5. We say that a thing is in the world, in the sense of in place, because it is in the air, and the air is
in the world; and when we say it is in the air, we do not mean it is in every part of the air, but that it
is in the air because of the outer surface of the air which surrounds it; for if all the air were its
place, the place of a thing would not be equal to the thingwhich it is supposed to be, and which
the primary place in which a thing is actually is.

451. He gives the third [312] when he says that someone is said to be in the heavens as in a place
because he is in the air which indeed is in the heavens. Yet we do not say that anyone is in the entire
air primarily and per se, but by reason of the ultimate boundary of the air containing him he is said
to be in the air. For if the whole air were anythings place, e.g., a mans, the place and the thing in
place would not be equalwhich is against what was supposed above. But that in which something
exists primarily is seen to be the boundary of the containing body; and this is what primary place
means, i.e., equal.

6. When what surrounds, then, is not separate from the thing, but is in continuity with it, the thing is
said to be in what surrounds it, not in the sense of in place, but as a part in a whole. But when the
thing is separate and in contact, it is immediately 'in' the inner surface of the surrounding body, and
this surface is neither a part of what is in it nor yet greater than its extension, but equal to it; for the
extremities of things which touch are coincident.

452. He gives the fourth reason [313]. First, he mentions it; secondly, he proves it, at no. 453.

He says therefore first that whenever the container is not separate from the thing contained but is
continuous with it, the latter is not said to be in it as in a place, but as a part in a whole; as, for
example, when we say that one part of the air is contained by the totality of air. And he concludes
this from what went before, because where there is a continuum there is no ultimate boundary in
act, something that is required for place, as was stated above. But when the container is separated,
and contiguous to the thing contained, this latter is in place and exists in the ultimate boundary of
the container primarily and per se, of a container, that is, which is not a part of the contained and
neither greater nor less but equal in dimension. But how the container and the thing contained can
be equal he shows by pointing out that the ultimate boundaries of things touching are together:
whence, their ultimate boundaries must be equal.

7. Further, if one body is in continuity with another, it is not moved in that but with that. On the
other hand it is moved in that if it is separate. It makes no difference whether what contains is
moved or not.

453. Then he proves the fourth point by two arguments [314]. The first of these is that something
contained that forms a continuum with the container is not moved in the container but with the
container, as the part is moved simultaneously with the whole; but when it is separate from the
container, then it can be moved in it, whether the container be moved or notfor a man is moved
on a ship whether it be moving or at rest. Therefore, since something can be moved in a place, it
follows that place is a separated container.

8. Again, when it is not separate it is described as a part in a whole, as the pupil in the eye or the
hand in the body: when it is separate, as the water in the cask or the wine in the jar. For the hand is
moved with the body and the water in the cask.

454. He gives a second argument for the fourth point [315], saying that when the thing contained is
not separate from the container but continuous with it, then it is said to be in it as a part in a whole,
as sight is in the eye as a formal part and the hand in the body as an organic part. But when the
container and the thing contained are separate, then the latter is in it as in a vessel; as water in a
barrel or wine in a cup. The difference between the example in the first case and in the second is
that the hand is moved with the body, but not in the body, but the water is moved in the barrel.

Therefore, since we have said above that to be in place is to be there as in a vessel but not as a part
in a whole, it follows that place is like a separated container.