X.

JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OF MINOR NATURAL CHILDREN (Rule 105)

RULE 105
Judicial Approval of Voluntary Recognition of Minor Natural Children

Section 1. Venue. Where judicial approval of a voluntary recognition of a minor natural child is required, such child or his parents
shall obtain the same by filing a petition to that effect with the Court of First Instance of the province in which the child resides. In
the City of Manila, the petition shall be filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

Section 2. Contents of petition. The petition for judicial approval of a voluntary recognition of a minor natural child shall contain
the following allegations:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names and residences of the parents who acknowledged the child, or of either of them, and their compulsory heirs,
and the person or persons with whom the child lives;
(c) The fact that the recognition made by the parent or parents took place in a statement before a court of record or in an
authentic writing, copy of the statement or writing being attached to the petition.

Section 3. Order for hearing. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the same, shall fix the
date and place for the hearing thereof, which date shall not be more than six (6) months after the entry of the order, and shall,
moreover, cause a copy of the order to be served personally or by mail upon the interested parties, and published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper or newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Section 4. Opposition. Any interested party must, within fifteen (15) days from the service, or from the last date of publication, of
the order referred to in the next preceding section, file his opposition to the petition, stating the grounds or reasons therefor.

Section 5. Judgment. If, from the evidence presented during the hearing, the court is satisfied that the recognition of the minor
natural child was willingly and voluntarily made by he parent or parents concerned, and that the recognition is for the best interest
of the child, it shall render judgment granting judicial approval of such recognition.

Section 6. Service of judgment upon civil registrar. A copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the preceding section
shall be served upon the civil registrar whose duty it shall be to enter the same in the register.

Family Code

Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. (n)

Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are
likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a
written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)

Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (n)

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)



 [G.R. No. L-46746. March 15, 1990.]
LIGAYA GAPUSAN-CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PROSPERO PARCON, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FILIATION; RECOGNITION OF NATURAL CHILDREN; VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY RECOGNITION;
DISTINGUISHED. Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory. Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is
an admission of the fact of paternity or maternity by the presumed parent, expressed in the form prescribed by the Civil Code.
Its essence lies in the avowal of the parent that the child is his; the formality is added to make the admission incontestable, in
view of its consequences." The form is prescribed by Article 278 of the Civil Code, earlier adverted to; it provides that a
voluntary recognition "shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing." Compulsory recognition is sometimes also called judicial recognition, to distinguish it from that which is a purely
voluntary act of the parent. It is recognition decreed by final judgment of a competent court. It is governed by Articles 283 and
284, setting forth the cases in which the father or mother, respectively, is obliged to recognize a natural child, and Article 285,
providing that generally, the action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL APPROVAL, NOT NECESSARY IF RECOGNITION IS VOLUNTARILY MADE. The matter of
whether or not judicial approval is needful for the efficacy of voluntary recognition is dealt with in Article 281 of the Civil Code.
ART. 281. A child who is of age cannot be recognized without his consent. When the recognition of a minor does not take place
in a record of birth or in a will, judicial approval shall be necessary. A minor can in any case impugn the recognition within four
years following the attainment of his majority. In other words, judicial approval is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily made
1) of a person who is of age, only his consent being necessary; or 2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record
of birth or in a will. It is admitted on all sides that no judicial action or proceeding was ever brought during the lifetime of Felisa
to compel her to recognize Ligaya as her daughter. It is also evident that Ligaya's recognition as Felisa's daughter was not made
in a record of birth or a will, a circumstance which would have made judicial approval unnecessary, only her own consent to the
recognition being required. The acknowledgment was made in authentic writings, and hence, conformably with the legal
provisions above cited, judicial approval thereof was needed if the writings had been executed during Ligaya's minority. In other
words, the question of whether or not the absence of judicial approval negated the effect of the writings as a mode of
recognition of Ligaya is dependent upon the latter's age at the time the writings were made.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF RECOGNITION OF MINOR IS NEEDED. Judicial approval is
needful if the recognition of the minor is effected, not through a record of birth or in a will but through a statement in a court of
record or an authentic document. In any case the individual recognized can impugn the recognition within four years following
the attainment of his majority.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "AUTHENTIC WRITING", DEFINED. "An 'authentic writing' for purposes of voluntary recognition . . . (is)
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the father" (or mother), including "a public instrument (one acknowledged
before a notary public or other competent official with the formalities required by law), and, of course, a public or official
document in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The sworn statement of assets and liabilities filed by
Felisa Parcon is a public document, having been executed and submitted pursuant to a requirement of the law. So it has been
held by this Court.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSENT REQUIRED IN VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OF A PERSON OF AGE MAY BE GIVEN EXPRESSLY OR
TACITLY. The consent required by Article 281 of a person of age who has been voluntarily recognized may be given expressly
or tacitly. Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary recognition, the evidence shows that she has in fact
consented thereto. Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to impugn it at any time before her
mother's death, but is made clearly manifest and conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the judicial proceeding for
the settlement of her mother's estate as basis for her rights thereto. Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the
time of her recognition, and therefore judicial approval of the recognition was necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her
ratification of that recognition, after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of the proceedings for the settlement
of her deceased mother's estate on the claim precisely that she was the decedent's acknowledged natural daughter.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OR INSUFFICIENCY OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL; NOT A DEFECT AVAILABLE TO THE RECOGNIZING
PARENT. The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is clearly intended for the benefit of the minor. "The
lack of judicial approval can not impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment made. The judicial approval is for the protection
of the minor against any acknowledgment made to his prejudice." "Therefore, the lack or insufficiency of such approval is NOT a
defect available to the recognizing parent but one which the minor may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the minor
consents to the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should make no difference. Implied consent to the
 acknowledgment may be shown (e.g.,) by such acts as keeping, even after reaching the age of majority, the acknowledgment
papers and the use of the parent's surname."

D E C I S I O N - NARVASA, J p:
Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue on April 6, 1966 in Bacolod City. Neither her
surviving spouse, Prospero Parcon, nor her other known relatives three (3) sisters and a nephew - made any move to settle
her estate judicially. Cdphil

It was Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Felisa Gapusan Parcon, who
instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate. About a year and eight months after Felisa's demise, or
on January 15, 1968, Ligaya filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate
and for issuance of letters of administration in her favor. 1 She also sought her designation as Special Administratrix pending her
appointment as regular administratrix. 2

By Order dated January 16, 1968, the Court appointed Ligaya Special Administratrix of Felisa Parcon's estate.

On April 22, 1968, Prospero Parcon, Felisa Parcon's surviving husband, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
of January 16, 1968. 3 He denied that Ligaya was an acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife, and applied for his own
appointment as administrator of his wife's estate. 4

Hearings were had on the issue of Ligaya's claimed filiation. Ligaya presented, among other proofs, 5 the following
documents:

a) Felisa Parcon's sworn statement of assets and liabilities wherein Ligaya is named and described as the daughter of
Felisa (Exh. 4);
b) Felisa Parcon's application for GSIS life insurance in which Ligaya is set out as her (Felisa's) daughter (Exh. 3);
c) Check No. 44046 of the Government Service Insurance System in the sum of P505.50 paid to her (Ligaya) as her share
in the death benefits due the heirs of Felisa Parcon (Exh. 2); and
d) a family photograph, showing Ligaya beside the deceased (Exh. 1).
Prospero Parcon, on the other hand, sought to demonstrate that Ligaya's exhibits did not constitute conclusive proof of
her claimed status of acknowledged natural child, for the reason that:

a) another document, Felisa's application for membership in Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation (NOTF), merely
named Ligaya as her "adopted daughter;"
b) in the distribution of death benefits pursuant to the decedent's GSIS insurance policy, supra, Ligaya was allocated
only P500.00 whereas Prospero received P1,000.00; and
c) Mrs. Leticia Papasin (Felisa's sister) and Vice-Mayor Solomon Mendoza travelled from afar to affirm before the
Probate Court on the witness stand that Ligaya was not the daughter of Felisa, 6 Mrs. Papasin's testimony being that in 1942 an
unknown "drifter" had sold Ligaya, then an infant, to Felisa.

The Probate Court found for Ligaya. Its Order dated April 16, 1969 disposed as follows: 7
"WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that petitioner is the acknowledged natural child of the late Felisa Gapusan,
and for being the next of kin of the deceased (Rule 78, Rules of Court), she is hereby appointed regular
administratrix of the properties of the above-mentioned deceased with the same bond given by her as special
administratrix, with costs against the oppositors." Llphil

On appeal seasonably perfected, the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division), in a Decision dated April 13, 1977, (1) set aside
the Probate Court's Order of January 16, 1968 (appointing Ligaya Special Administratrix) and of April 16, 1969 (declaring her the
decedent's acknowledged natural child and appointing her regular administratrix), and (2) appointed Prospero Parcon regular
administrator of his wife's estate. In that Court's view, the evidence at best showed merely that Ligaya had been treated as a
daughter by Felisa, but that this did "not constitute acknowledgment" but "only a ground to compel recognition;" and that
Ligaya had failed to establish that she had been acknowledged by Felisa in accordance with Article 278 of the Civil Code (Article
131 of the Civil Code of 1889). Appeal has in turn been taken from this judgment to this Court by Ligaya Gapusan-Chua.

Here, Ligaya insists that the evidence submitted by her does indeed sufficiently establish her status as the
acknowledged natural child of Felisa Parcon, and that her appointment as regular administratrix is justified by law and
jurisprudence.

 More particularly, she contends that the sworn statement of assets and liabilities, a public document submitted by the
decedent pursuant to a legal requirement therefor, and the latter's application for life insurance were in law indubitable
recognition by her mother of her status as an acknowledged natural child, voluntarily made, and were adequate foundation for
a judicial declaration of her status as heir. These statements, she alleges, were "authentic writings" in contemplation of Article
278 of the Civil Code:

ART. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing."

These, she contends, together with her treatment as a daughter by Felisa a fact found to have been established by
the evidence by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals eliminate all doubt about the juridical verity of her recognition
as a natural child.

Prospero Parcon disagrees. He argues that, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the statements designating Ligaya as
Felisa's daughter merely furnished ground for Ligaya to compel recognition by action which, however, should have been
brought during the lifetime of the putative parent in accordance with Article 285 of the Civil Code, reading as follows: Llphil

ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard
and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.

Since, Parcon continues, no such action was instituted prior to the death of Felisa, proof of the "authentic document" (sworn
statement of assets and liabilities) in the proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate was inefficacious as basis for a
declaration of filiation or heirship.

The issue thus presented is whether or not Felisa's sworn statement of assets and liabilities and her application for
insurance are "authentic writings" which effectively operated as a recognition of Ligaya Gapusan-Chua as her natural child, even
if no action was brought by the latter to compel the former, during her lifetime, to recognize her as such.

Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory. 8

Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of paternity or maternity by the presumed parent,
expressed in the form prescribed by the Civil Code. Its essence lies in the avowal of the parent that the child is his; the formality
is added to make the admission incontestable, in view of its consequences." 9 The form is prescribed by Article 278 of the Civil
Code, earlier adverted to; it provides that a voluntary recognition "shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing." 10

Compulsory recognition is sometimes also called judicial recognition, to distinguish it from that which is a purely
voluntary act of the parent. 11 It is recognition decreed by final judgment of a competent court. It is governed by Articles 283
and 284, setting forth the cases in which the father or mother, respectively, is obliged to recognize a natural child, and Article
285, providing that generally, the action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents. 12

The matter of whether or not judicial approval is needful for the efficacy of voluntary recognition is dealt with in Article
281 of the Civil Code. 13

ART. 281. A child who is of age cannot be recognized without his consent.
When the recognition of a minor does not take place in a record of birth or in a will, judicial approval shall be
necessary.

A minor can in any case impugn the recognition within four years following the attainment of his majority.
In other words, judicial approval is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily made
 1) of a person who is of age, only his consent being necessary; or
2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of birth or in a will.

On the other hand, judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor is effected, not through a record of birth
or in a will but through a statement in a court of record or an authentic document. In any case the individual recognized can
impugn the recognition within four years following the attainment of his majority. 14

Now, there are no less than three (3) writings submitted in evidence in this case in which Felisa Gapusan Parcon
describes Ligaya Gapusan-Chua as her daughter, viz.:

a) Felisa's sworn statement of assets and liabilities, in which she names and describes Ligaya as her daughter (Exh. 4);
b) her application for GSIS life insurance in which she again describes Ligaya as her daughter (Exh. 3); and
c) her application for membership in the Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation, where she names Ligaya as her
"adopted daughter" (Exh. 1).

Each of these writings is undoubtedly an "authentic writing" within the contemplation of Article 278. "An 'authentic
writing' for purposes of voluntary recognition . . . (is) understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the father" (or mother),
including "a public instrument (one acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official with the formalities
required by law), 15 and, of course, a public or official document in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The sworn statement of assets and liabilities filed by Felisa Parcon is a public document, having been executed and submitted
pursuant to a requirement of the law. So it has been held by this Court. 16 The other two writings above mentioned are, to be
sure, not public documents, but this is of no moment; neither of them has to be a public document in order to be categorized as
an "authentic writing." It is enough that they are the genuine or indubitable writings of Felisa Gapusan Parcon. That in one of
the writings, Felisa's application for membership in the Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation, Felisa describes Ligaya as her
"adopted" daughter is also inconsequential. It may be explained by her reluctance to confess publicly to her colleagues in the
teaching profession that she had borne a child out of wedlock. It is in any case a categorical avowal by Felisa that Ligaya is
indeed her daughter, an admission entirely consistent with the two other authentic writings executed by her in which she
acknowledges Ligaya to be her daughter without qualification. Moreover, if these three (3) writings are considered in
conjunction with the undisputed fact that Ligaya had been continuously treated by Felisa as her daughter, the proposition that
Ligaya was indeed Felisa's daughter becomes well nigh conclusive. Lljur

It is admitted on all sides that no judicial action or proceeding was ever brought during the lifetime of Felisa to compel
her to recognize Ligaya as her daughter. It is also evident that Ligaya's recognition as Felisa's daughter was not made in a record
of birth or a will, a circumstance which would have made judicial approval unnecessary, only her own consent to the recognition
being required. The acknowledgment was made in authentic writings, and hence, conformably with the legal provisions above
cited, judicial approval thereof was needed if the writings had been executed during Ligaya's minority. 17 In other words, the
question of whether or not the absence of judicial approval negated the effect of the writings as a mode of recognition of Ligaya
is dependent upon the latter's age at the time the writings were made.

The point need not be belabored, however. For whether Ligaya were still a minor or already of age at the time of her
recognition in the authentic writings mentioned, that circumstance would be immaterial in the light of the attendant facts.

In the first place, the consent required by Article 281 of a person of age who has been voluntarily recognized may be
given expressly or tacitly. 18Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary recognition, the evidence shows
that she has in fact consented thereto. Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to impugn it at any
time before her mother's death, but is made clearly manifest and conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of her mother's estate as basis for her rights thereto. Assuming on the other hand, that she was a
minor at the time of her recognition, and therefore judicial approval of the recognition was necessary, the absence thereof was
cured by her ratification of that recognition, after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of the proceedings for the
settlement of her deceased mother's estate on the claim precisely that she was the decedent's acknowledged natural
daughter. 19 The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is clearly intended for the benefit of the minor. "The
lack of judicial approval can not impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment made. The judicial approval is for the protection
of the minor against any acknowledgment made to his prejudice." 20 "Therefore, the lack or insufficiency of such approval is
NOT a defect available to the recognizing parent but one which the minor may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the
minor consents to the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should make no difference. Implied consent to the
acknowledgment may be shown (e.g.,) by such acts as keeping, even after reaching the age of majority, the acknowledgment
papers and the use of the parent's surname."21
 Upon the foregoing facts and considerations, Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a voluntarily acknowledged
natural child of Felisa Gapusan Parcon. She is therefore entitled, in accordance with Article 282 of the Civil Code, to bear her
mother's surname, and to receive the hereditary portion accorded to her by the Code. LibLex

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) dated April 13, 1977 is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the Orders of the Probate Court dated January 16, 1968 appointing Ligaya Gapusan-Chua
Special Administratrix and of April 16, 1969 declaring said Ligaya Gapusan-Chua the decedent's acknowledged natural child
and appointing her regular administratrix are REINSTATED AND HEREBY AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
XI. CONSTITUTION OF FAMILY HOME (Rule 106)

RULE 106
Constitution of Family Home (deemed repealed by Family Code)

Section 1. Who may constitute. The head of a family owning a house and the land on which it is situated may constitute the same
into a family home by filing a verified petition to that effect with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
property is located. In the City of Manila, the petition shall be filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

When there is danger that a person obliged to give support may lose his or her fortune because of grave mismanagement or on
account of riotous living, his or her spouse, if any, and a majority of those entitled to be supported by him or by her may petition the
Court of First Instance for the creation of the family home.


Section 2. Contents of petition. The petition shall contain the following particulars:
(a) Description of the property;
(b) An estimate of its actual value;
(c) A statement that the petitioner is actually residing in the premises;
(d) The encumbrances thereon;
(e) The names and addresses of all the creditors of the petitioner or head of the family and of all mortgages and other
persons who have an interest in the property;
(f) The names of all the beneficiaries of the family home.

Section 3. Notice and publication. The court shall notify the creditors, mortgagees and all other persons who have an interest in
the estate, of the filing of the petition, causing copies thereof to be served upon them, and published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The petition shall, moreover, be caused to be posted in a conspicuous
place in the parcel of land mentioned therein, and also in a conspicuous place of the municipal building of the municipality or city in
which the land is situated, for at least fourteen (14) days prior to the day of the hearing.

Section 4. Objection and date of hearing. In the notice and publication required in the preceding section, the court shall require
the interested parties to file their objection to the petition within a period of not less than thirty (30) days from receipt of notice or
from the date of last publication, and shall fix the date and time of the hearing of the petition.

Section 5. Order. After hearing, if the court finds that the actual value of the proposed family home does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos, or thirty thousand pesos in chartered cities, and that no third person is prejudiced thereby, or that creditors have
given sufficient security for their credits, the petition shall be approved.

Section 6. Registration of order. A certified copy of the order of the court approving the establishment of the family home shall be
furnished the register of deeds who shall record the same in the registry of property.

Family Code (EO 209)

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling
house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)

Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who
are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. (226a)

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
 (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a)

Art. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own
property.

Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to
guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home. (227a, 228a)

Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred
thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a
family home shall be the basis of evaluation.

For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least
equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. (231a)

Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the
written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of
conflict, the court shall decide. (235a)

Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (238a)

Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may
apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so
order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its
constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any
of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.

At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to
the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be
delivered to the judgment debtor. (247a, 248a)

Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the
beneficiary of, only one family home. (n)

Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. (n)

 [G.R. No. 86355. May 31, 1990.]
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-
SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N - GANCAYCO, J p:

The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.

The facts are undisputed.

On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled "Francisco
Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which read as follows: LexLib

"WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and set aside.
Judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay
jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly, defendants-
appellees are ordered to pay jointly and severally to:

1. Plaintiffs appellants, the Salinas spouses:
a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of their son Audie
Salinas;
b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said Audie Salinas;
c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and
d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:
a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan-Culan; and
b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.
3. Both plaintiffs-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.

All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed." 1

The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at
Malalag, Davao del Sur.

On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing
an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-
0008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of
agricultural land located at Dalagbong, Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of
P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in
the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that
the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of
this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code
except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof; and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family
home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land although it
is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original
possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An
opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.

In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by
defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on September 2, 1988. Cdrep

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that the trial court erred and acted in excess of
its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set aside levy on the properties and in denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitioner contends that only a question of law is involved in
this petition. He asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and was duly
constituted as a family home under the Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Thus, petitioner argues that the said
residential house and lot is exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the
decision in this case pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which became
final in 1988 is not one of those instances enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code when the family home may be
levied upon and sold on execution. It is further alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the said house and lot became a
family home only on August 4, 1988 when the Family Code became effective, and that the Family Code cannot be interpreted
in such a way that all family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupancy
prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of said Code; and that it also erred when it declared that Article 162 of the Family Code does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:

"Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is
situated."

"Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law."

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence, There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the
home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

"Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution;
and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others
who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building."

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and
lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially
or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code.
It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year
after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). LLpr

The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner
and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter
shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153
of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
have a retroactive effect.

 Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability
which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the
money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the
sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

 [G.R. No. 185064. January 16, 2012.]
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR.
and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS, respondents.

DECISION - REYES, J p:

Nature of the Petition
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa (Araceli) and
Ernesto S. De Mesa (Ernesto), assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision 1 dated June 6, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated October 23,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391 entitled"Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto De Mesa v. Spouses Claudio Acero, Jr., et al."

The Antecedent Facts
This involves a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
was formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M) issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan
and registered under Araceli's name. The petitioners jointly purchased the subject property on April 17, 1984 while they were still
merely cohabiting before their marriage. A house was later constructed on the subject property, which the petitioners thereafter
occupied as their family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.

Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. (Claudio) in the amount of P100,000.00, which was
secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation
payable to Claudio.

When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored as the account from which it was drawn had already been closed.
The petitioners failed to heed Claudio's subsequent demand for payment. SICaDA

Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with the Prosecutor's Office of Malolos, Bulacan a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) against the petitioners. After preliminary investigation, an information for violation of B.P. 22 was filed against the
petitioners with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.

On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a Decision 3 acquitting the petitioners but ordering them to pay Claudio the amount of
P100,000.00 with legal interest from date of demand until fully paid.

On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte (Sheriff Samonte) levied upon the subject
property. On March 9, 1994, the subject property was sold on public auction; Claudio was the highest bidder and the corresponding
certificate of sale was issued to him.

Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased the subject property to the petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva (Juanito) for a monthly
rent of P5,500.00. However, the petitioners and Juanito defaulted in the payment of the rent and as of October 3, 1998, their total
accountabilities to Claudio amounted to P170,500.00.

Meanwhile, on March 24, 1995, a Final Deed of Sale 4 over the subject property was issued to Claudio and on April 4, 1995, the
Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan cancelled TCT No. T-76.725 (M) and issued TCT No. T-221755 (M) 5 in his favor.

Unable to collect the aforementioned rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma. Rufina Acero (Rufina) (collectively referred to as Spouses
Acero) filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan against the petitioners and
Juanito. In their defense, the petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the subject property. The petitioners deny
that they are mere lessors; on the contrary, they are the lawful owners of the subject property and, thus cannot be evicted
therefrom.

On July 22, 1999, the MTC rendered a Decision, 6 giving due course to Spouses Acero's complaint and ordering the petitioners and
Juanito to vacate the subject property. Finding merit in Spouses Acero's claims, the MTC dismissed the petitioners' claim of
ownership over the subject property. According to the MTC, title to the subject property belongs to Claudio as shown by TCT No. T-
221755 (M). AcaEDC

The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudio's name up to the time the
complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by Sheriff Samonte, the regularity of
the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Claudio's Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
The petitioners appealed the MTC's July 22, 1999 Decision to the RTC. This appeal was, however, dismissed in a Decision dated
November 22, 1999 due to the petitioners' failure to submit their Memorandum. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the said
decision but the same was denied in an Order dated January 31, 2000.

Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review 7 with the CA assailing the RTC's November 22, 1999 Decision and January
31, 2000 Order. In a December 21, 2006 Decision, 8 the CA denied the petitioner's petition for review. This became final on July 25,
2007. 9

In the interregnum, on October 29, 1999, the petitioners filed against the respondents a complaint 10 to nullify TCT No. T-221755
(M) and other documents with damages with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners asserted that the subject
property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon
for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution.

On September 3, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision, 11 which dismissed the petitioners' complaint. Citing Article 155 (3) of
the Family Code, the RTC ruled that even assuming that the subject property is a family home, the exemption from execution does
not apply. A mortgage was constituted over the subject property to secure the loan Araceli obtained from Claudio and it was levied
upon as payment therefor.

The petitioners sought reconsideration of the RTC's September 3, 2002 Decision but this was denied in a Resolution 12 dated
January 14, 2003.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's disposition in its Decision 13 dated June 6, 2008. The CA ratiocinated that the exemption of a
family home from execution, attachment or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is not automatic and should accordingly
be raised and proved to the Sheriff prior to the execution, forced sale or attachment. The appellate court noted that at no time did
the petitioners raise the supposed exemption of the subject property from execution on account of the same being a family home.
The petitioners then sought reconsideration of the said June 6, 2008 Decision but the same was denied by the CA in its
Resolution 14 dated October 23, 2008. aHSAIT

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. T-221755 (M). They insist that
the execution sale that was conducted is a nullity considering that the subject property is a family home. The petitioners assert that,
contrary to the disposition of the CA, a prior demonstration that the subject property is a family home is not required before it can
be exempted from execution.

In their Comment, 15 Spouses Acero claimed that this petition ought to be denied on the ground of forum-shopping as the issues
raised had already been determined by the MTC in its July 22, 1999 Decision on the complaint for ejectment filed by them, which
had already become final and executory following the petitioner's failure to appeal the CA's December 21, 2006 Decision affirming it.

Issues
The threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping; and (b) whether the
lower courts erred in refusing to cancel Claudio's Torrens title TCT No. T-221755 (M) over the subject property.

The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Forum-Shopping
On the first issue, we find that the petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping.

There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable
opinion in another forum through means other than an appeal or certiorari. Forum-shopping exists when two or more actions
involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. 16
Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other. The elements of forum-shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. 17

There is no identity of issues and reliefs prayed for in the ejectment case and in the action to cancel TCT No. T-221755 (M). Verily,
the primordial issue in the ejectment case is who among the contending parties has a better right of possession over the subject
property while ownership is the core issue in an action to cancel a Torrens title. cCAIES
It is true that the petitioners raised the issue of ownership over the subject property in the ejectment case. However, the resolution
thereof is only provisional as the same is solely for the purpose of determining who among the parties therein has a better right of
possession over the subject property.

Accordingly, a judgment rendered in an ejectment case is not a bar to action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building. Neither shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein. This issue is far from being novel and there is no reason to depart from
this Court's previous pronouncements. InMalabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc., 18 this Court had previously clarified that a
decision in an ejectment case is not res judicata in an annulment of title case and vice-versa given the provisional and inconclusive
nature of the determination of the issue of ownership in the former.

Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties or at
least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in
the other.

Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and ejectment cases. The issue of ownership
was likewise being contended, with same set of evidence being presented in both cases. However, it cannot be
inferred that a judgment in the ejectment case would amount to res judicata in the annulment case, and vice-
versa.

This issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases iterating the principle that a judgment
rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a
different cause of action involving possession.

It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of
the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of
ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de
facto. Therefore, the provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with
finality.

Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for annulment would abate an ejectment suit must
be resolved in the negative. DHcESI

A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the filing or consideration of an
ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings. This is so because an ejectment case is simply designed to
summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly
deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings.19 (citations omitted)

Second Issue: Nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M)
Anent the second issue, this Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners' complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-
221755 (M).

The subject property is a family home.
The petitioners maintain that the subject property is a family home and, accordingly, the sale thereof on execution was a nullity.
In Ramos v. Pangilinan, 20this Court laid down the rules relative to exemption of family homes from execution:

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based
on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it
must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and
233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the
courts and the registration of the court's order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is
located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves
the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to
 comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the
privilege.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the
family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse,
its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts
depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not
apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after
August 3, 1988. 21 (citations omitted)

In the earlier case of Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., 22 we stressed that: aEDCSI

Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family
homes constructed after the effectivity of theFamily Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation
of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. 23 (emphasis supplied and citation
omitted)

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a
family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from
execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be
family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the same
was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.

The family home's exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at
public auction.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, we nevertheless
rule that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners' complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the CA
that the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the
time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. As the CA aptly pointed out: Cdpr

In the light of the facts above summarized, it is evident that appellants did not assert their claim of exemption
within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a
time after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for
judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of
sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of execution to put an end to litigation. . . . . 24

The foregoing disposition is in accord with the Court's November 25, 2005 Decision in Honrado v. Court of Appeals, 25 where it was
categorically stated that at no other time can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its
exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction:

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for
 exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to
do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:

Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule
is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment
debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the
levy or within a reasonable period thereafter;

"In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption) must be
made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable
time, or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step involving further costs, or before
advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale,
or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority."

In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that appellants did not assert their claim of
exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption,
does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it
would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of execution to
put an end to litigation. We said before, and We repeat it now, that litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits
of the verdict. We now rule that claims for exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff. 26(citations
omitted)

Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v. Court of Appeals, 27 this Court stated that: TcEAIH

Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor
himself before the sale of the property at public auction.It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff. . . . . 28 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at public
auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.
Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one's
lifetime. 29 It is likewise without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. 30

The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases. 31However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the
property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject property is a
family home and its exemption from execution and forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject property
to be levied upon and the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property was sold until a Final Deed
of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli's Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued under Claudio's name, still, the
petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately four
(4) years from the time of the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that the subject property is a family home, thus, exempt
from execution.

For all intents and purposes, the petitioners' negligence or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the
presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is
a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the
sheriff's duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home. DcSTaC

The petitioners' negligence or omission renders their present assertion doubtful; it appears that it is a mere afterthought and artifice
that cannot be countenanced without doing the respondents injustice and depriving the fruits of the judgment award in their favor.
Simple justice and fairness and equitable considerations demand that Claudio's title to the property be respected. Equity dictates
that the petitioners are made to suffer the consequences of their unexplained negligence.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, in
Civil Case No. 1058-M-99 and dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT No. 221755 (M) and other documents, and
the October 23, 2008 Resolution denying reconsideration, areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

XII. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
1987 Constitution
Article III

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it.

1987 Constitution
Article VII

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing
to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.

Rule 102
Habeas Corpus

Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Section 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof in
the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable
before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for the hearing and decision on the
merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before
himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

Section 3. Requisites of application therefor. Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by the party for
whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained on his liberty;
(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such
officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed
the person intended;
 (c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of
the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear.

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if
the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Not shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

Section 5. When the writ must be granted and issued. A court or judge authorized to grant the writ must, when a petition therefor
is presented and it appears that the writ ought to issue, grant the same forthwith, and immediately thereupon the clerk of the court
shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of emergency, the judge may issue the writ under his own hand, and may
depute any officer or person to serve it.

Section 6. To whom writ directed, and what to require. In case of imprisonment or restraint by an officer, the writ shall be
directed to him, and shall command him to have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge
designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified. In case of imprisonment or restraint by a person not an officer, the
writ shall be directed to an officer, and shall command him to take and have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before
the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to summon the person by whom he is
restrained then and there to appear before said court or judge to show the cause of the imprisonment or restraint.

Section 7. How prisoner designated and writ served. The person to be produced should be designated in the writ by his name, if
known, but if his name is not known he may be otherwise described or identified. The writ may be served in any province by the
sheriff or other proper officer, or by a person deputed by the court or judge. Service of the writ shall be made by leaving the original
with the person to whom it is directed and preserving a copy on which to make return or service. If that person cannot be found, or
has not the prisoner in his custody, then the service shall be made on any other person having or exercising such custody.

Section 8. How writ executed and returned. The officer to whom the writ is directed shall convey the person so imprisoned or
restrained, and named in the writ, before the judge allowing the writ, or in case of his absence or disability, before some other judge
of the same court, on the day specified in the writ, unless, from sickness or infirmity of the person directed to be produced, such
person cannot, without danger, be bought before the court or judge; and the officer shall make due return of the writ, together with
the day and the cause of the caption and restraint of such person according to the command thereof.

Section 9. Defect of form. No writ of habeas corpus can be disobeyed for defect of form, if it sufficiently appears therefrom in
whose custody or under whose restraint the party imprisoned or restrained is held and the court or judge before whom he is to be
bought.

Section 10. Contents of return. When the person to be produced is imprisoned or restrained by an officer, the person who makes
the return shall state therein, and in other cases the person in whose custody the prisoner is found shall state, in writing to the court
or judge before whom the writ is returnable, plainly and unequivocably:

(a) Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or under restraint;
(b) If he has the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, the authority and the true and whole cause thereof, set
forth at large, with a copy of the writ, order execution, or other process, if any, upon which the party is held;
(c) If the party is in his custody or power or is restrained by him, and is not produced, particularly the nature and gravity of
the sickness or infirmity of such party by reason of which he cannot, without danger, be bought before the court or judge;
(d) If he has had the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, and has transferred such custody or restraint to
another, particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by what authority such transfer was made.

Section 11. Return to be signed and sworn to. The return or statement shall be signed by the person who makes it; and shall also
be sworn by him if the prisoner is not produced, and in all other cases unless the return is made and signed by a sworn public officer
in his official capacity.

Section 12. Hearing on return. Adjournments. When the writ is returned before one judge, at a time when the court is in session,
he may forthwith adjourn the case into the court, there to be heard and determined. The court or judge before whom the writ is
returned or adjourned must immediately proceed to hear and examine the return, and such other matters as are properly submitted
for consideration, unless for good cause shown the hearing is adjourned, in which event the court or judge shall make such order for
the safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the case requires. If the person imprisoned or restrained is
not produced because of his alleged sickness or infirmity, the court or judge must be satisfied that it is so grave that such person
cannot be produced without danger, before proceeding to hear and dispose of the matter. On the hearing the court or judge shall
disregard matters of form and technicalities in respect to any warrant or order of commitment of a court or officer authorized to
commit by law.

Section 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of
commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facieevidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained
of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the
party claiming the custody must prove such facts.

Section 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully
committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not
be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so
punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to
bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner
and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to
abide its order of judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper
court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement.

Section 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. When the court or judge has examined into the cause of caption and restraint
of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order his discharge from
confinement, but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been served on the officer or person detaining
the prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released.

Section 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. A clerk of a court who refuses to issue the writ after
allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a person to whom a writ is directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make return of
the same according to the command thereof, or makes false return thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the
prisoner, refuses to deliver to the person demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand therefor, a true copy of the warrant or
order of commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recorded in a proper action, and
may also be punished by the court or judge as for contempt.

Section 17. Person discharged not to be again imprisoned. A person who is set at liberty upon a writ of habeas corpus shall not be
again imprisoned for the same offense unless by the lawful order or process of a court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense;
and a person who knowingly, contrary to the provisions of this rule, recommits or imprisons, or causes to be committed or
imprisoned, for the same offense, or pretended offense, any person so set at liberty, or knowingly aids or assists therein, shall forfeit
to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, notwithstanding any colorable pretense
or variation in the warrant of commitment, and may also be punished by the court or judge granting the writ as for contempt.

Section 18. When prisoner may be removed from one custody to another. A person committed to prison, or in custody of an
officer, for any criminal matter, shall not be removed therefrom into the custody of another unless by legal process, or the prisoner
be delivered to an inferior officer to carry to jail, or, by order of the proper court or judge, be removed from one place to another
within the Philippines for trial, or in case of fire epidemic, insurrection, or other necessity or public calamity; and a person who, after
such commitment, makes signs, or counter-signs any order for such removal contrary to this section, shall forfeit to the party
aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action.

Section 19. Record of writ, fees and costs. The proceedings upon a writ of habeas corpus shall be recorded by the clerk of the
court, and upon the final disposition of such proceedings the court or judge shall make such order as to costs as the case requires.
The fees of officers and witnesses shall be included in the costs taxed, but no officer or person shall have the right to demand
payment in advance of any fees to which he is entitled by virtue of the proceedings. When a person confined under color of
proceedings in a criminal case is discharged, the costs shall be taxed against the Republic of the Philippines, and paid out of its
Treasury; when a person in custody by virtue or under color of proceedings in a civil case is discharged, the costs shall be taxed
against him, or against the person who signed the application for the writ, or both, as the court shall direct.




 A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC September 25, 2007
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO

R E S O L U T I O N
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court's
consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. aEHASI
This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
September 25, 2007.

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security
is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

SECTION 2. Who May File. The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following
order:

(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity,
in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of
the aggrieved party.

The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the
filing of the petition by an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order
established herein. TsaEcH

SECTION 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court of the place where
the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court or judge.

When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it may be returnable before such court or any
justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements
occurred.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the
Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or
omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.

SECTION 4. No Docket Fees. The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of the docket and other lawful fees when filing
the petition. The court, justice or judge shall docket the petition and act upon it immediately.

SECTION 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown
or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; EIAScH
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity
of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
SECTION 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of
the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent
necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the
date of its issuance.

SECTION 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a
deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to
other disciplinary actions.

SECTION 8. How the Writ is Served. The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by
the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally
on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.

SECTION 9. Return; Contents. Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written
return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:

(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of
the aggrieved party, through any act or omission; AHTICD
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or
persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party;
and
(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken:

(i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(ii) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the
petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(iii) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
(iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
(vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.

The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

SECTION 10. Defenses Not Pleaded Deemed Waived. All defenses shall be raised in the return, otherwise, they shall be deemed
waived.

SECTION 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:

(a) Motion to dismiss; SDHAEC
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.

SECTION 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to
hear the petition ex parte.
SECTION 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a
preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as petitions for habeas corpus.

SECTION 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant
any of the following reliefs:

(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or
private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred
to in Section 3 (c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved. IaEScC

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice
or judge.

(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession
or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses
having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge
may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened
or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of
making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire
five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(c) Production Order. The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to
produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the
court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. SCHTac

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.

(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private
institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.

SECTION 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. Upon verified motion of the respondent and after due hearing, the
court, justice or judge may issue an inspection order or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section.
A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal
knowledge of the defenses of the respondent.

SECTION 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses to make a return, or who makes a false
return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The
contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine.
SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade
responsibility or liability. aTADcH

SECTION 18. Judgment. The court shall render within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision If the
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may
be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.

SECTION 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may
raise questions of fact or law or both.

The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases.

SECTION 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination
it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.

A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party,
order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the
case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case.

The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later
than the first week of January of every year.

SECTION 21. Institution of Separate Actions. This Rule shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative
actions.

SECTION 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ
shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo.

SECTION 23. Consolidation. When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be
consolidated with the criminal action.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be
consolidated with the criminal action. cDCEIA

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.

SECTION 24. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights recognized and protected the
constitution.

SECTION 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is no inconsistent
with this Rule.

SECTION 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases involving extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof pending in the trial and appellate courts.

SECTION 27. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of
general circulation.
ANNOTATION TO THE WRIT OF AMPARO

The Writ of Amparo. The nature and time-tested role of amparo has shown that it is an effective and inexpensive instrument for the
protection of constitutional rights. 1 Amparo, literally "to protect," originated in Mexico and spread throughout the Western
Hemisphere where it has gradually evolved into various forms, depending on the particular needs of each country. 2 It started as a
protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights. Later, however, the writ evolved for
several purposes: 3

(1) For the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ (called amparo libertad);
(2) For the judicial review of the constitutionality statutes (called amparo contra leyes);
(3) For the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision (called amparo
casacion); DTEIaC
(4) For the judicial review of administrative actions (called amparo administrativo); and
(5) For the protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process (called amparo agrario).

The writ of amparo has been constitutionally adopted by Latin American countries, except Cuba, to protect against human rights
abuses especially during the time they were governed by military juntas. Generally, these countries adopted the writ to provide for a
remedy to protect the whole range of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.

In the Philippines, the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo. However, several of the amparo protections
are available under our Constitution. Thus, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the definition of
judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The second clause, otherwise known as
the Grave Abuse Clause, accords the same general protection to human rights given by the amparo contra leyes, amparo
casacion and amparo administrativo.

Amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion and amparo administrativo are also recognized in form by the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Specifically, under Article VIII, Section 5, the Supreme Court has explicit review powers over judicial decisions akin to amparo
casacion. To wit, Section 5 (2) provides that the Supreme Court shall have power to "[r]eview, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts." 4 And in paragraph
(a) of Section 5 (2) it is also explicitly provided that the Supreme Court shall have, like amparo contra leyes, the power to review ". .
.[a]ll cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question." 5

Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus. Our Rules of Court has adopted the old English rule on the writ
of habeas corpus to protect the right to liberty of individuals. There are also constitutional provisions recognizing habeas corpus,
i.e. Article III, Sections 13 and 15; 6 Article VII, Section 18; 7 and Article VIII, Section 5, Paragraph 1. 8

The Rules of Court provide the procedure to protect constitutional rights. Rule 65 embodies the Grave Abuse Clause, while Rule 102
governs petition forhabeas corpus. Notably, the various socio-economic rights granted by the Constitution are enforced by specific
provisions of the Rules of Court, such as the rules on injunction, prohibition, etc. TADIHE

The 1987 Constitution enhanced the protection of human rights by giving the Supreme Court the power to "[p]romulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. . ." 9 This rule-making power unique to the present
Constitution, is the result of our experience under the dark years of the martial law regime. Heretofore, the protection of
constitutional rights was principally lodged with Congress through the enactment of laws and their implementing rules and
regulation. The 1987 Constitution, however, gave the the Supreme Court the additional power to promulgate rules to protect and
enforce rights guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land.

In light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances, the Supreme Court resolved to exercise for the first time
its power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights. Its Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court agreed
that the writ of amparo should not be as comprehensive and all-encompassing as the ones found in some American countries,
especially Mexico. These nations are understandably more advanced in their laws as well as in their procedures with respect to the
scope of this extraordinary writ. The Committee decided that in our jurisdiction, this writ of amparo should be allowed to evolve
through time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws as they may be promulgated by Congress.

The highlights of the proposed Rule, section by section, are as follows:
 SEC. 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Philippine Version. Since the writ of amparo is still undefined under our Constitution and Rules of Court, Section 1 enumerates the
constitutional rights protected by the writ, i.e., only the right to life, liberty and security of persons. In other jurisdictions, the writ
protects all constitutional rights. The reason for limiting the coverage of its protection only to the right to life, liberty and security is
that other constitutional rights of our people are already enforced through different remedies.

Be that as it may, the Philippine amparo encapsulates a broader coverage. Whereas in other jurisdictions the writ covers only actual
violations, the Philippine version is more protective of the right to life, liberty and security in the sense that it covers both actual
and threatened violations of such rights. Further, unlike other writs of amparo that provide protection only against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials or employees, our writ covers violations committed by private individuals or entities. "Entities" refer to
artificial persons, as they are also capable of perpetrating the act or omission. DaESIC

The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" 10 are killings committed
without due process of law,i.e. without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. As such, these will include the illegal taking of life
regardless of the motive, summary and arbitrary executions, "salvagings" even of suspected criminals, and threats to take the life of
persons who are openly critical of erring government officials and the like. 11 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" 12 are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose
the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.

SEC. 2. Who May File. The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in
the following order:

(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate
family or relative of the aggrieved party.

The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized parties to file similar
petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends
the right of all others, observing the order established herein.

Who May File. This section provides the order which must be followed by those who can sue for the writ. It is necessary for the
orderly administration of justice. First, the right to sue belongs to the person whose right to life, liberty and security is being
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity (the aggrieved party).
However, in cases where the whereabouts of the aggrieved party is unknown, the petition may be filed by qualified persons or
entities enumerated in the Rule (the authorized party). A similar order of priority of those who can sue is provided in our rules
implementing the law on violence against women and children in conflict with the law. IcacDE

The reason for establishing an order is to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions far amparo which may even
prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. For instance, the immediate family may be nearing the point of
successfully negotiating with the respondent for the release of the aggrieved party. An untimely resort to the writ by a non-member
of the family may endanger the life of the aggrieved party.

The Committee is aware that there may also be instances wherein the qualified members of the immediate family or relatives of the
aggrieved party might be threatened from filing the petition. As the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, this
section shall not preclude the filing by those mentioned in paragraph (c) when authorized by those mentioned in paragraphs (a) or
(b) when circumstances require.

SEC. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court of the
place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the
 Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court or
judge.

When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it may be returnable before
such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission
was committed or any of its elements occurred.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice
thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial
Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.

Day and Time of Filing. Due to the extraordinary nature of the writ which protects the mother of all rights the right to life the
petition may be filed onany day, including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays; and at any time, from morning until evening.

Courts Where Petition May Be Filed. This section is basically similar to the Rule on petitions for the wait of habeas corpus. It is,
however, different because it includes the Sandiganbayan for the reason that public officials and employees will be respondents
in amparo petitions. It will be noted that the amparopetition has to be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the act or omission
was committed or where any of its elements occurred. The intent is to prevent the filing of the petition in some far-flung area to
harass the respondent. Moreover, allowing the amparo petition to be filed in any Regional Trial Court may prejudice the effective
dispensation of justice, as in most cases, the witnesses and the evidence are located within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court where the act or omission was committed. SEAHcT

Designation. Originally, the draft Rule required the petition to be filed in the RTC that had "jurisdiction" over the offense. However,
the Committee felt that the use of the word "jurisdiction" might be construed as vesting new jurisdiction in our courts, an act that
can only be done by Congress. The use of the word "jurisdiction" was discontinued, for the Rule merely establishes a procedure to
enforce the right to life, liberty or security of a person and, undoubtedly the Court has the power to promulgate procedural rules to
govern proceedings in our courts without disturbing their jurisdiction.

SEC. 4. No Docket Fees. The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of the docket and other lawful
fees when filing the petition. The court, justice or judge shall docket the petition and act upon it immediately.

Liberalized Docket Fees. The Committee exempted petitioners from payment of docket and other lawful fees in filing
an amparo petition, for this extraordinary writ involves the protection of the right to life, liberty and security of a person. The
enforcement of these sacrosanct rights should not be frustrated by lack of finances.

SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the
name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for. CTSAaH

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

Contents of the Petition. The petition should be verified to enhance the truthfulness of its allegations and to prevent groundless
suits.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are necessary to identify the petitioner and the respondent. The respondent may be given an assumed
appellation such as "John Doe," as long as he or she is particularly described (descriptio personae). Paragraph (c) requires the
petitioner to allege the cause of action in as complete a manner a possible. The requirement of affidavit was added, and it can be
used as the direct testimony of the affiant. Affidavits can facilitate the resolution of the petition, consistent with the summary
nature of the proceedings. Paragraph (d) is necessary to determine whether the act or omission of the respondent satisfies the
standard of conduct set by this Rule. Paragraph (e) is intended to prevent the premature use, if not misuse, of the writ for a fishing
expedition.

SEC. 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order
the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the
court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ in his or her own hand, and may
deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven
(7) days from the date of its issuance.

Issuance. The writ isissued as a matter of course when on the face of the petition it ought to issue. The writ will require respondent
to file his return, which is the comment or answer to the petition. If the petitioner is able to prove his cause of action after the
hearing, the privilege of the writ of amparo shall be granted, i.e., the court will grant the petitioner his appropriate reliefs.

The provision requires that the writ should set the date of hearing of the petition to expedite its resolution. The amparo proceedings
enjoy priority and cannot be unreasonably delayed.

SEC. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its
allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge
for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions. TaCSAD

Penalties. The provision is a modified version of a similar provision in Rule 102, governing petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.

SEC. 8. How the Writ is Served. The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a
person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In
case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules of substituted service shall apply.

Manner of Service. The writ should be served against the respondent, preferably in person. If personal service cannot be made, the
rules on substituted service shall apply. This will avoid the situation where the respondent would be conveniently assigned on a
"secret mission to frustrate personal service.

SEC. 9. Return; Contents. Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a
verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the
following:

(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against
the aggrieved party; and
(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or
will still be taken;

(i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(ii) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in
the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; cCSDaI
(iii) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
(iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern
or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
(vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
 The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the
case.

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

Contents of the Return. The section requires a detailed return. The detailed return is important, for it will help determine whether
the respondent fulfilled the standard of conduct required by the Rule. It will also avoid the ineffectiveness of the writ of habeas
corpus, where often the respondent makes a simple denial in the return that he or she has custody over the missing person, and the
petition is dismissed. The requirements under paragraph (d) are based on United Nations standards. 13

No General Denial. No general denial is allowed. The policy is to require revelation of all evidence relevant to the resolution of the
petition. A litigation is not a game of guile but a search for truth, which alone is the basis of justice.

SEC. 10. Defenses Not Pleaded Deemed Waived. All defenses shall be raised in the return, otherwise, they
shall be deemed waived.

Waiver. This section is in consonance with the summary nature of the proceedings and to prevent its delay. cHaDIA

SEC. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:

(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.

Prohibited Pleadings. The enumerated pleadings and motions are prohibited, so that the proceedings in the hearing shall be
expedited. The Committee noted that since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not
be delayed.

This section is similar to that found in the Rule on Violence Against Women and Children in Conflict with the Law
(VAWC). 14 However, unlike in VAWC, this Rule allows the filing of motions for new trial and petitions for relief from judgment. The
Committee decided that the denial of these remedies may jeopardize the rights of the aggrieved party in certain instances and
should not be countenanced.

No Motion to Dismiss. The filing of a motion to dismiss even on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties is proscribed. The reason is to avoid undue delay. The grounds of a motion to dismiss should be included in the return and
resolved by the court, using its reasonable discretion as to the time and merit of the motion. aHECST

SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge
shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.

Ex Parte Hearing. The Committee decided that the hearing should not be delayed by the failure of the respondent to file a return,
otherwise the right to life, liberty and security of a person would be easily frustrated.

SEC. 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge
may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining
stipulations and admissions from the parties.

The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as petitions for habeas corpus.
Summary Nature. The amparo hearing is summary in nature and held from day to day until completed, for time cannot stand still
when life, liberty or security is at stake. Be that as it may, the court, justice or judge, using reasonable discretion, may conduct a
preliminary conference, if such conference will aid in the speedy disposition of the petition:

SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at any time before final judgment, the court, justice or
judge may grant any of the following reliefs:

Interim Reliefs. The interim reliefs available to the parties are distinct features of the writ of amparo. Some of these reliefs can be
given immediately after the filing of the petition motu proprio or at any time before final judgment.

(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency
or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is
an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3 (c) of this Rule, the protection may be
extended to the officers concerned.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to
the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines
which it shall issue. HASTCa

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed
by the court, justice or judge.

Temporary Protection Order. The grant of a temporary protection order to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of
the immediate family is essential because their lives and safety may be at higher risk once they file the amparo petition.

The temporary protection order and witness protection order are distinguishable from the inspection order and production order in
that there is no need for verification of these motions. Moreover, unlike the latter, the temporary protection order and witness
protection order may be issued motu proprio orex parte, without need of a hearing in view of their urgent necessity.

To make the temporary protection order as broad and as effective as possible, the Committee decided to include not only
government agencies, but also accredited persons and private institutions. For reasons of their own, some aggrieved persons refuse
to be protected by government agencies; hence, the need to add persons and private institutions. To ensure their capability, the
Supreme Court shall accredit these persons and private institutions.

(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any
person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the
court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party
alleged to be threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time,
place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for
justifiable reasons. IcSEAH

Inspection Order. The sensitive nature of an inspection order requires that it shall be the subject of a motion and shall be duly heard.
It may be availed of by both the petitioner and the respondent. To prevent its misuse, the Rule requires that the motion also state in
sufficient detail the place or places to be inspected. It should also be under oath and should have supporting affidavits. The
inspection order shall specify the persons authorized to make the inspection as well as the date, time, place and manner of making
the inspection. Other conditions may be imposed to protect the rights of the parties. The order has a limited lifetime of five days,
but can be extended under justifiable circumstances.
If the court, justice or judge gravely abuses his or her discretion in issuing the inspection order, as when it will compromise national
security, the aggrieved party is not precluded for filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which, under the
Constitution, may not be deprived of its certiorarijurisdiction.

(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due heating, may order any
person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in
which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.

Production Order. Like the inspection order, the production order is available to both the petitioner and respondent and, considering
its sensitive nature, is only granted upon motion and after hearing. The phrase "objects in digitized or electronic form" was added to
cover electronic evidence, since the documents involved may be stored in digital files.

(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the
witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security Land Benefit Program,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.

The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons
or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. ESHAcI

Witness Protection Order. The witness protection order may be issued upon motion or motu proprio. The witness may be referred to
the DOJ pursuant toRepublic Act No. 6981. If the witness cannot be accommodated by the DOJ or the witness refuses the protection
of the DOJ, the court, justice or judge may refer the witness to another government agency or to an accredited person or private
institution.

SEC. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. Upon verified motion of the respondent and after due
hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue an inspection order or production order under paragraphs (b) and
(c) of the preceding section.

A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses
having personal knowledge of the defenses of the respondent.

Interim Reliefs of Respondent. This section enumerates the interim reliefs that may be availed of by the respondent, which are the
inspection and production orders.

The interim reliefs will ensure fairness in the proceedings, since there may be instances in which the respondents would need to
avail themselves of these reliefs to protect their rights or to prove their defenses, i.e., when they allege that the aggrieved party is
located elsewhere, or when vital documents proving their defenses are in the possession of other persons.

SEC. 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses to make a return, or
who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court,
to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine.

Contempt. The power to cite for contempt is an inherent power of a court to compel obedience to its orders and to preserve the
integrity of the judiciary. A finding of contempt of court may result from a refusal to make a return; or, if one is filed, it is false and
tantamount to not making a return; disobedience to a lawful order; and resistance to a lawful process. A fine of an imprisonment
may be imposed on a person found guilty of contempt of court in accordance with the Rules of Court.

SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by
substantial evidence.
 The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable
laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. DtcHaA

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed to evade responsibility or liability.

Diligence Standard. The distinction is made between a private and a public respondent to highlight the difference in the diligence
requirement for a public official or employee. Public officials or employees are charged with a higher standard of conduct because it
is their legal duty to obey the Constitution, especially its provisions protecting the right to life, liberty and security. The denial of the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is in accord with current jurisprudence on custodial interrogation and
search warrant cases.

SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant
the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be
denied.

Speedy Judgment. The court, justice or judge is obliged to render judgment within ten (10) days after submission of the petition for
decision. The short period is demanded by the extraordinary nature of the writ.

SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.

The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as habeas corpus cases.

Appeal. The provision allows an appeal from final judgments or orders through Rule 45. The Committee considered Rule 41 as a
mode of appeal, but a consensus was reached that Rule 45 would best serve the nature of the writ of amparo. The Rule 45 appeal
here, however, is different, because it allows questions not only of law but also of fact to be raised. The Committee felt that
an amparo proceeding essentially involves a determination of facts considering that its subject is extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, hence, a review of errors of fact should be allowed. The disposition of appeals dealing with amparo cases shall be
prioritized like habeas corpus cases. DecSaI

SEC. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its
determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to
threats on their lives.

A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon
motion by any party, order their revival when ready for farther proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with
prejudice, upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the
order archiving the case.

The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases
under this Rule, not later than the first week of January of every year.

Liberalized Rule on Dismissal. The rule on dismissal due to failure to prosecute is liberalized. If petitioners cannot proceed to prove
their allegations for a justifiable reason like the existence of a threat to their lives or the lives of their witnesses, the court will not
dismiss the petition but will archive it. The parties will be notified before a case is archived, as the order has to be justified by a good
reason, to be determined after hearing. Archiving can be ordered only during the pendency of the case. The case may be revived
within two years from its archiving. After two years, it may be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Since it is the petitioner who would
be prejudiced by its final dismissal, the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the date of notice to the petitioners of the
order of archiving. Two years is deemed a reasonable time for the aggrieved parties to prosecute their petition.

 SEC. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. This Rule shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or
administrative actions.

Prerogative Writ. The writ of amparo partakes of the nature of a prerogative writ. It is not a criminal, civil, or administrative suit.
Hence, it does not suspend the filing of criminal, civil or administrative actions.

Originally, the Committee included a provision allowing a claim for damages. It dropped the provision for fear that such a claim
would unduly delay the proceeding, considering the possibility of counterclaims and cross-claims being set up. Delay would defeat
the summary nature of the amparo proceeding. It was decided, that the aggrieved party should instead file in a claim in a proper civil
action.

Similarly, the amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature and will not determine the criminal guilt of the respondent. However, if
the evidence so warrants, the amparo court may refer the case to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.

SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate
petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal
case. TaDAIS

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo.

Effect of Criminal Proceeding. This section contemplates the situation where a criminal action has already been filed, in which case
the commencement of the amparo action is barred. This is to avoid the difficulties that may be encountered when
the amparo action is allowed to proceed separately from the criminal action. Two courts trying essentially the same subject may
issue conflicting orders.

The amparo reliefs, however, are made available to the aggrieved party through motion in the court where the criminal case is
pending. The disposition of such reliefs shall continue to be governed by this Rule.

SEC. 23. Consolidation. When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the
latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of amparo, the
latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the
petition.

Consolidation. In case a petition for the writ of amparo is filed prior to the institution of a criminal action, or prior to a criminal action
and a separate civil action, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action. This Rule shall continue to govern the
disposition of the reliefs for amparo after consolidation.

SEC. 24. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights recognized and
protected by the Constitution.

No Diminution, Increase or Modification of Substantive Rights. The rule-making power of the Supreme Court has been expanded in
Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution. It provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to "[p]romulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights [which] shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive,
rights. . ." 15 caIDSH

The Supreme Court clarified what constitutes procedural rules in Fabian v. Desierto, viz:

[T]he test whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an existing right, then the rule deals merely with procedure. 16

SEC. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is
not inconsistent with this Rule.
Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall supplement the Rule on amparo as far as it is applicable. This
new Rule will prevail and will not be affected by prior inconsistent rules, resolutions, regulations or circulars of the Supreme Court.

SEC. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases involving extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial and appellate courts.

Remedial Nature of the Writ. Since the writ is remedial in nature, it is applicable to pending cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof, both in the trial and the appellate courts.

SEC. 27. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007, following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.

Date of Effectivity. The last section marks the date of effectivity of the Rule and its publication requirement. The Committee deemed
it proper that the birth of the Rule in the Philippines should coincide with our celebration of United Nations Day, to manifest a
strong affirmation of our commitment towards the internationalization of human rights.

A.M. NO. 08-1-16-SC, January 22, 2008
RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson and Members of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, the Court Resolved to
APPROVE the same.

This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general
circulation.

January 22, 2008.

SECTION 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.

SECTION 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

SECTION 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent
resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the
option of the petitioner.

The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action
concerns public data files of government offices.

SECTION 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it
shall be returnable before such court or judge.

When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such court
or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof,
or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the
petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,
collected or stored.

The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

SECTION 5. Docket Fees. No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition
of the indigent shall be docketed and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of
indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition.

SECTION 6. Petition. A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security
of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

SECTION 7. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order
the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and
cause it to be served within three (3) days from its issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the
writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work
days from the date of its issuance.

SECTION 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its
allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt
without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.

SECTION 9. How the Writ is Served. The writ shall be served upon the respondent by the officer or person deputized
by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served
personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.

SECTION 10. Return; Contents. The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits
within five (5) work days from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons.
The return shall, among other things, contain the following:

(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communication, confidentiality of the
source of information of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject of the petition:

(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information,
and the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or
information; and
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and

(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

 SECTION 11. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits
contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful
process or order of the court.

SECTION 12. When Defenses may be Heard in Chambers. A hearing in chambers may be conducted where the
respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall compromise national security or
state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character.

SECTION 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:

(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.

SECTION 14. Return; Filing. In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to
hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion
requires the petitioner to submit evidence.

SECTION 15. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge
may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and
admissions from the parties.

SECTION 16. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted
for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or
order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be
just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.

Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officer as may be designated by the court,
justice or judge within five (5) work days.

SECTION 17. Return of Service. The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from its
enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under the writ
and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted,
with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent.

The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent, as well as all
objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ.

SECTION 18. Hearing on Officer's Return. The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties and
act accordingly.

SECTION 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the judgment or final order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.

The period of appeal shall be five (5) work days from the date of notice of the judgment or final order.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as habeas corpus and amparo cases.

 SECTION 20. Institution of Separate Actions. The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the
filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.

SECTION 21. Consolidation. When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the
latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the
petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.

SECTION 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition
for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case.

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas data.

SECTION 23. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

SECTION 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is
not inconsistent with this Rule.

SECTION 25. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008 following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.

Published in The Philippine Star on January 25, 2008.



 [G.R. No. L-63345. January 30, 1986.]
EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner, vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO
GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO

D E C I S I O N - GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:

"A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom
of action is sufficient . . ."

This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas corpus has, in law, remained undiminished up to the present. The respondents'
contention that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied. Efren C. Moncupa may have been released
from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his temporary release, however, preclude freedom of action and under
the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule warrant this Court's inquiry into the nature of his involuntary restraint and our relieving him of such
restraints as may be illegal.

Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Tuazon
Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained.
On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons.

After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa
Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that the petitioner was
not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal
possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.

Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. against the other accused, however,
the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the
Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have
not been pursued. and yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court. Llphil

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ
had been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on
May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister of National Defense with the
approval of the President. The respondents stated "Since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the
respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases."

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary
release.

It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. These are:

1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for
any travel outside Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner
wants to change his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview
conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to
the interest of national security."
4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.

The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions
imposed by the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.

The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely
shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents."
We agree with the petitioner.

The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on
the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone
which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.

In Villavicencio vs. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and transported against their will to Davao were no longer
under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile without asking for official
permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the
official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and oppressed the hope that its "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment."

In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. Other precedents for
such a conclusion are not wanting. prLL

The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:

"An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has
absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to
keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of
movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one's residence. Freedom may
be lost due to external moral compulsion to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of
the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is
entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion."

In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:

"Although the release in the custody of the Deputy Minister did not signify that petitioners could once again
enjoy their full freedom, the application could have been dismissed, as it could be withdrawn by the parties
themselves. That is a purely voluntary act. When the hearing was held on September 7, 1978, it turned out that
counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz could have acted in a hasty manner when he setforth the above
allegations in his manifestation of August 30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for petitioners,
while conceding that there was such a release from confinement, also alleged that it was conditioned on their
restricting their activities as labor union leaders to the premises of the Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied
Services, presumably in Manila, as well as the Ministry of Labor. As the voting was to take place in the business
firm in Bataan, the limits set would nullify whatever efforts they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the
prohibition against their going to Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the moot and academic
character of the petition was far from clear."

More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a temporary release from detention renders the petition for writ
of habeas corpus moot and academic. As in this case of Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et al. v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al., G.R. No.
69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily released from detention. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that the petitioners had been temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become moot and
academic. The petitioners insisted, however, that their case may be considered moot and academic only "if their release would be
permanent." In ruling for the petitioners, we said: Lljur

"Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the
petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant
case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-
arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An
affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely
'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent
 jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle.
Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-
arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration."

In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is
free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms,
where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person
concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement
should not be lifted.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and
void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No costs. Llphil

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 118644. July 7, 1995.]
DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP (SOG), SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS III FLOR L. RESURRECCION
and ANTONIO M. ERUM, JR., and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
FELICITAS S. CUYAG, for and in behalf of LAWRENCE A. LARKINS, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS; WHO MAY FILE. The private respondent has the
personality to institute on behalf of her common-law spouse, Lawrence Larkins, the habeas corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls
within the purview of the term "some person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a
legally justified interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who shows some authorization to make the
application.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY WILL NOT BE GRANTED WHEN THERE IS AN ADEQUATE REMEDY BY WRIT OF ERROR OR APPEAL OR BY
WRIT OF CERTIORARI; EXCEPTION. Only Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his motions
for bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him. It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an
application for a writ of habeas corpus will absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted
when there is an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may, nevertheless, be available in exceptional
cases, for the writ should not be considered subservient to procedure limitations which glorify form over substance. It must be kept
in mind that although the question most often considered in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior
court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches the body but not the
record," while the latter assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record but not the body."

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY NOT BE GRANTED EVEN IF THE DETENTION IS AT ITS INCEPTION ILLEGAL IF BY REASON OF SOME SUPERVENING
EVENT SUCH DETENTION IS NO LONGER ILLEGAL AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE APPLICATION. The Court of Appeals granted
the writ of habeas corpus because it found that the warrantless arrest of Larkins for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal
requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court." It could have in mind Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into
is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention
is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be
no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process
preventing the discharge of the detained person. Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the
accused is detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and,
therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in this
rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with . . . an offense in the Philippines."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY NOT BE GRANTED IN CASE COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT BY FILING OF
MOTION FOR BAIL. It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the
court and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero, this Court stated: De Asis could have, right after
his arrest, objected to the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail
with the lower court, thereby accepting the court's jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on arraignment, to the
information filed against him. (Emphasis supplied) The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended
has the same legal import and effect as the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting
of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case of Carrington
vs. Peterson, this Court declared: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of
arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the
court' s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea
or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn.,
534)

5. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS ARREST; ARRESTING OFFICERS MUST COMPLY WITH ALL PROCEDURES TO SAFEGUARD
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are,
nevertheless, disturbed by certain incidents relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the facts
before us disclose that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and (2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within thirty-six hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged
being punishable by an afflictive penalty. Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is a police station and a municipal
(now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell at Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended party
was executed on 23 November 1994, it was not until 2 December 1994 that the said complaint was actually filed in court. Unless
satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the said provisions merits nothing but disapproval from
the Court. In the performance of their duty and in their commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes and bring criminals to the bar of
justice, law enforcement authorities should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to safeguard the constitutional
and statutory rights of accused persons. The rule of law must always be upheld.

6. ID.; ID.; BAIL; ORDER TO GRANT OR REFUSE THE MOTION MUST CONTAIN A SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
FOLLOWED BY ITS CONCLUSION WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG. We note that the trial court did not
conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail, as required under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of
bail must be based upon the court's determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be
exercised after evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for that purpose. The court's order granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong;
otherwise, the order would be defective and voidable. In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the State's
evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. It was thus incumbent upon the trial court to receive the evidence for the
prosecution on the urgent motion for bail. For this procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did not press
for a hearing after the scheduled hearing on 5 December 1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of
the country.

D E C I S I O N - DAVIDE, JR., J p:

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is lost in antiquity, 1 was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. 2 More specially, its vital purposes are to obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may
be imprisoned without sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is then essentially a writ of inquiry and is
granted to test the right under which a person is detained. 3

Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion or

rebellion when the public safety requires it. 4 Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, it extends, except as

otherwise provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by

which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. It is not available, however, under the

instances enumerated in Section 4 of the Rule which reads:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.


In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to set aside and reverse the decision of 1 February 1995 of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273, 5 a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order,
ordering the herein petitioners to immediatelyrelease Lawrence A. Larkins from their custody and declaring moot

the alternative relief of certiorari.


The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the challenged decision and the pleadings of the parties are

neither complicated nor disputed.

On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina of Branch 162 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92 for violations of B.P. Blg.
22.
On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a
complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against her on 19 November 1994 at 2:00 a.m. in
Victoria Valley Subdivision, Valley Golf, Antipolo, Rizal.6

 Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators Flor. L. Resurreccion and Antonio M.
Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21 November 1994 and arrested the latter, who was

thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her rapist. 7Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue,
Manila.

On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92. Judge Padolina forthwith
issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued on 16 September 1993 and directing the Jail Warden of
the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement "unless otherwise detained for some other cause."

Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for another cause,
specifically for the crime of rape for which he could be held for inquest.


On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea. 8 It contains a certification by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Yson that it is "filed pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail if his right to preliminary investigation and not having executed a
waiver pursuant to Article 125 of the RPC . . . ." The complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo on 2 December 1994, docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 94-11794, and assigned to Branch 71 of the court, presided by Judge Felix S. Caballes.


On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail 9 wherein he
alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he had no carnal knowledge of the
complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither lacerated nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter
of right to bail; and that he has no intention of going out of the country or hiding away from the law.

On 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore O. Te, filed in Criminal Case No. 94-11794 an
Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release, 10 principally based on the alleged
illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion met vigorous opposition from the private complainant. 11

In the order of 5 January 1995, 12 the trial court denied the aforesaid motions, thus:

After a careful appreciation of the arguments of the prosecution and the defense, the Court finds no
legal or valid grounds to dismiss the complaint or release the accused, or to grant him bail. The filing of this case
against the accused, which is [a] very serious offense, justifies the grant of the motion of the prosecution for the
issuance of a hold departure order.

WHEREFORE, the motions of the accused are hereby denied for lack of merit, and as prayed for by the
prosecution the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to include the name of the accused,
Lawrence A. Larkins, in its hold order departure list until further order from this Court.

Unable to accept the ruling, Larkin's common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus withcertiorari. Impleaded as respondents were the herein petitioners and Judge Felix S. Caballes.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution 13 ordering the respondents therein to appear and produce
Lawrence A. Larkins before the court on 31 January 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show cause why Larkins' liberty is being
restrained.

On the said date, Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared and produced Larkins at the hearing. Atty.
Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their counsel. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General representing the People of the Philippines
made no appearance. 15 Neither did Judge Caballes, for he had not received a copy of the resolution. On the other hand, the
petitioner therein, Felicitas S. Cuyag, appeared with her counsel, who manifested that should the court order the release of
Larkins the alternative prayer for certiorari would be deemed abandoned. 16

After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged decision, holding that:
From the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to order the immediate release of Larkins from his
present confinement on the ground that the complaint presented to the NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on
the basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for rape did not meet the legal requirements
provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

 Furthermore, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced, i.e., immediately after the NBI was served with
the Order of the Pasig RTC for his release on bail in connection with the BP 22 cases, no other criminal complaint
or information had been filed or pending in any court. It was only sometime between November 25, 1994 (when
filing of the complaint was approved by the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor) and November 29, 1994 (the date
appearing on the Urgent Motion for Bail filed by Larkin's former counsel, said Atty. Ulep) that the complaint for
rape was filed with the Antipolo RTC.

The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus because Larkins had
already been charged with the crime of rape and the trial court had denied his application for bail. They further claim that the
warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

On the other hand, the private respondent contends that habeas corpus is rendered unavailing not by the mere filing of
an information, but by the issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of commitment, which are the only two processes
recognized by law to justify deprivation of liberty, and the order of Judge Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying the petition for bail
does not qualify as such. She asserts that the petitioners have miscomprehendedParedes vs. Sandiganbayan 17 because that
case did not rule that the writ is no longer available after an information (or criminal complaint for rape as in this case) is filed
against the person detained; what it stated is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue when the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. 'She
submits that the controlling doctrine is that enunciated in Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 18 adverted to in Sanchez vs.
Demetriou, 19 that "[t]he filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly
detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect."

We find for the petitioners.

But, before we take up the substantive merits of this petition, we shall first delve into propriety of the petition
for habeas corpus and certiorarifiled by private respondent Cuyag with the Court of Appeals.

Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute on behalf of her common- law spouse, Lawrence
Larkins, the habeas corpusaspect of the petition, as she falls within the purview of the term "some person" under Section 3,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally justified interest in the freedom of the person whose
liberty is restrained or who shows some authorization to make the application. 20 She is not, however, the real party in interest
in the certiorari aspect of the petition. Only Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his
motions for bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him.

It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application for a writ of habeas corpus will
absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there is an adequate remedy by writ
of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may, nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for the writ should not be
considered subservient to procedural limitations which glorify form over substance. 21 It must be kept in mind that although
the question most often considered in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded
its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches the body but not the record," while the
latter assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record but not the body." 22

And now on the merits of the petition.

The Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that the warrantless arrest of Larkins for the
crime of rape "did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court." It could have in mind Section
5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even
if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in
Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening events in the
issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person. Thus, in Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila, 23 this
Court held:

[W]e hold that petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless
they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. (Emphasis supplied)
 Another is the filing of a complaint of information for the offense for which the accused is detained, as in the instant
case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas
corpus is no longer available Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize
the discharge of a person charged with . . . an offense in the Philippines."

Thus, in Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 24 where petitioners Macario Herce and Celso Almadovar claimed to have
been illegally detained for more than one year without any complaint or information filed against them, this Court denied the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for at the time they filed the petition they had already been charged with the crime of
treason and confined by reason thereof. Harvey vs. Defensor Santiago 25 reiteratesMatsura.

In Cruz vs. Montoya,26 this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for having become academic because the
information for estafa against the party whose liberty was allegedly illegally restrained had already been filed and a warrant for
his arrest had been issued, and whatever illegality might have originally infected his detention had been cured.

In Umil vs. Ramos 27 this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102, held that the writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. Thus:

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court of judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process
or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:

Sec. 4. . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering from imprisonment under lawful
judgment. 28 (Emphasis supplied)

It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the court and
voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero, 29 this Court stated:

De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest in
question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail with the lower court, thereby accepting the court's
jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on arraignment, to the information filed against him. (Emphasis
supplied)

The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended has the same legal import and effect
as the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case of Carrington vs. Peterson, 30 this Court
declared:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or
otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question
of the court's jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the
complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his
person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

In United States vs. Grant, 31 this Court held:

Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was avoid for the reason that no probable cause was found
by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving
bond.

While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of the Urgent Motion for Bail, Larkins, thru a
new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release based on the alleged
illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was a mere afterthought which came too later in the day. By then, the trial
court had firmly acquired jurisdiction over his person.

 Moreover, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent motion for bail was an unequivocal assertion of
its authority to keep in custody the person of Larkins. This order comes under the purview of the word order under the first
sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer . . . by virtue of [an] order of a court of record and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to . . . make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed. . . ."

The foregoing renders untenable the private respondent's claim that it is the rule in Ilagan vs. Enrile 32 which must
govern, that the writ may not be allowed only where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by the court or judge, and that there are only two recognized processes which justify deprivation of
liberty, viz., (1) commitment order and (2) warrant of arrest. The contention is not only a deliberate misreading of Section 4 of
Rule 102 limiting its application to the first part of the first sentence and disregarding the rest, but is also an undue and
unwarranted restriction of the term process. A commitment order and a warrant of arrest are but species of judicial process.
In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 this court stated:

Invariably a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority
of law; also, the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs warrants, summonses
and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons or order issued in
a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the
judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate or other process issuing from a court of justice.

In Macondray & Co., vs. Bernabe, 34 this court quoted Corpus Juris' definition of the term "process," to wit:

As a legal term, process is a generic word of very comprehensive signification and many meanings. In its
broadest sense, it is equivalent to, or synonymous with 'proceedings' or procedure and embraces all the
steps and proceedings in a cause from its commencement to its conclusion. Sometimes term is also
broadly defined as the means whereby a court compels a compliance with its demands. (50 C.J. 441)

We thus rule that the order of 5 January 1995 of the trial court also qualifies as a process within the meaning of Section
4 of Rule 102.

Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not prosper
because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the complaint against him and by the
issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.

Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed by certain incidents relative to the
warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose that the arresting officers failed to
strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested
without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Section 7, Rule 112; and (2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to the
proper judicial authorities within thirty-six hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable by an affective
penalty. Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is a police station and a municipal (now city) jail, Larkins was
brought to the NBI Detention Cell at Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended party was executed on 23
November 1994, it was not until 2 December 1994 that the said complaint was actually filed in court.

Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the said provisions merits nothing but
disapproval from the Court. In the performance of their duty and in their commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes and bring
criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement authorities should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to
safeguard the constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons. The rule of law must always be upheld. What this Court
said in Beltran vs. Garcia 35 needs to be repeated:

It certainly does not speak well of officialdom, whether civilian or military, if a person deprived of his liberty had
to go to court before his rights are respected. The good name of the administration is jeopardized, without any
fault on its part, by such inefficiency or inattention to duty. Every precaution should taken against its repetition.
Otherwise, the parties responsible for this state of affairs would justly lay themselves open to the accusation
that the greatest danger to constitutional rights comes from public officials, men of zeal, concededly well-
meaning, but without sufficient understanding of the implication of the rule of law.

 We also note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail, as required under Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of bail must be based upon the court's determination as to whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised after evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for
that purpose. 36 The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order would be defective and
voidable. 37 In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the
court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of
the amount of bail. 38 It was thus incumbent upon the trial court to receive the evidence for the prosecution on the urgent
motion for bail. For this procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the
scheduled hearing on 5 December 1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of the country. 39

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of 1 February 1995 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 36273 is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 137560. January 19, 2000.]
IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DAVID CRUZ y GONZAGA
MARIA CRUZ y GONZAGA and DAVID CRUZ y GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE NATIONAL PENITENTIARY, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, respondents.

SYNOPSIS
David Cruz was convicted for violation of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) for the illegal sale of 2.70 grams dried marijuana.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment and committed to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993. His counsel on record filed
his appeal to this Court. It was referred to the Court of Appeals when, on December 31, 1993, Republic Act No. 7659 took effect
amending, among others, R.A. 6425. The new penalty, prision mayorto reclusion perpetua, is determined by the quantity of drugs
subject of the offense. When David's counsel on record failed to file appellant's brief despite two notices, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal. The same became final and executory. David's mother, the other petitioner, sought the assistance of the
Office of the Legal Aid of UP which filed this petition questioning the dismissal of the appeal, the continued imprisonment of
accused, and sought a new trial to determine the penalty imposable on the accused.

It has been held that an appeal may be dismissed for failure to file brief within the prescribed time except when appellant is
represented by a counsel de officio. Appellant in this case was represented by counsel of his own choice, hence, the Court of Appeals
acted within its discretion in dismissing his appeal.

A new trial is not necessary to determine the correct imposable penalty based on the new law as such is not a newly discovered
evidence material to the accused's defense.

Under R.A. No. 7659 and pursuant to the doctrine laid down in People vs. Simon y Sunga, the imposable penalty on appellant
was prision correccionalwhich has a duration from 6 months and one day to six years. Appellant, who had already served 6 years and
3 months, a period beyond that prescribed by law, should now be released. His continued detention is illegal.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; APPEAL MAY BE DISMISSED BY COURT OF APPEALS IF APPELLANT FAILS TO FILE BRIEF
WITHIN PRESCRIBED TIME EXCEPT WHEN APPELLANT IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL DE OFFICIO. An appeal may be dismissed by
the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the appellee or upon the court's own motion, if the appellant fails to file his brief within the
prescribed time. The only exception is when the appellant is represented by counsel de officio. (Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPELLANT IN CASE AT BAR REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL DE PARTE. Petitioner David Cruz was represented not
by counsel de officio,but by counsel of his own choice. His lawyer, Atty. Carmelo Arcilla, was counsel de parte before the trial court,
before this Court on appeal, and before the Court of Appeals. There is nothing in the records that would show that Atty. Arcilla
withdrew his representation of petitioner. On the contrary, the notice from the Court of Appeals requiring the filing of the
appellant's brief was received by Atty. Arcilla. And despite this receipt, still no appellant's brief was filed. It was more than three (3)
months later that the appellate court issued the questioned Resolution. By dismissing David Cruz's appeal, the Court of Appeals
acted within its discretion.

3. ID.; ID.; NEW TRIAL; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE MATERIAL TO ACCUSED'S DEFENSE; IMPOSITION OF CORRECT PENALTY, NOT
MATERIAL TO ACCUSED'S DEFENSE. A new trial to determine his penalty cannot be granted petitioner. A motion for new trial may
be granted by the Court of Appeals only on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to the accused's defense. This is clear
from Section 14, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

4. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT (RA 6425 AS AMENDED BY RA 7659); PENALTY FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF MARIJUANA.
The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was "life imprisonment to death." Under R.A. 7659, the penalty
depended on the quantity of the drug. The sale of "750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana" became punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. The penalty for the sale of less than 750 grams of marijuana was reduced to a range "from prision
correctional to reclusion perpetua, depending upon the quantity" of the drug. In the 1994 case of People v. Simon y Sunga, we held
that for drugs with quantities weighing 750 grams or more, and for drugs with quantities weighing below 750 grams, reclusion
perpetua could not be imposed twice. The penalty of "prision correccional to reclusion perpetua" for drug offenses where the
quantity involved is less than those enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 17 of R.A. 7659 was construed as "prision
correccional to reclusion temporal." This was the range of the imposable penalty for drugs weighing less than 750 grams and the
proper penalty depended on the quantity of the drug involved. If the drug weighs less than 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed
is prision correccional; from 250 grams to 499 grams, prision mayor; and from 500 grams to 749 grams,reclusion temporal.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTINUED DETENTION OF APPELLANT AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE, ILLEGAL. Maria Cruz's petition for habeas
corpus, on the other hand, must be granted. Her son, David, was tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Article II,
Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He was convicted on September 27, 1993 and sentenced to life imprisonment and its
accessory penalties. He was committed to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993. On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7659 took effect. This law amended provisions of several penal laws, including theDangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In the instant
case, the amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was convicted is 2.70 grams. The imposable penalty for this amount under
the Simon ruling is prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Presently, David Cruz
has already served six (6) years and three (3) months of his sentence which is way beyond the last day of prision correccional. The
continued detention of Cruz at the National Penitentiary has been admitted by the Solicitor General as already illegal. David Cruz
should therefore be released form prison without further delay.

6. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS; CONTENTS OF VERIFIED PETITION. An application for the writ of habeas corpus is
made upon verified petition setting forth: (1) that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of
his liberty; (2) the officer or name of the person by whom he is imprisoned or restrained; (3) the place where he is imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty; and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person. The writ of habeas corpus extends
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.

D E C I S I O N - PUNO, J p:
This is a consolidated petition for certiorari and habeas corpus. The petition for certiorari was filed by David Cruz y Gonzaga
questioning the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 16944 which dismissed his appeal from the judgment of
conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig, Metro Manila for failure to file appellant's brief. The petition for habeas
corpus was filed by David Cruz's mother, Maria Cruz y Gonzaga, against respondents Superintendent of the National Penitentiary and
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections. 1

Petitioner David Cruz y Gonzaga was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig, Metro Manila with a violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He allegedly sold to another person on April 11, 1992 dried
marijuana fruiting tops weighing 2.70 grams. On September 23, 1993, the trial court found David Cruz guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment with all the accessory penalties of the law and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and the
costs. Cdtai

David Cruz seasonably appealed to this Court. The First Division accepted his appeal and the case was docketed as G.R. No. 113390.
Meanwhile, David Cruz was transferred from the Municipal Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons. His counsel of record, Atty. Carmelo L.
Arcilla, was notified and required to file the appellant's brief within thirty (30) days from notice. The notice was, however, returned
unserved. Cda

On October 3, 1994, we issued a Resolution referring the appeal to the Court of Appeals in view of the effectivity of Republic Act No.
7659 and the promulgation of the case of People v. Martin Simon y Sunga. 2 We noted that as the quantity of the marijuana involved
in the case was less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty on the appellant was not life imprisonment but one within the range
of prision correccional to reclusion temporal, in accordance with the People v. Simon y Sunga ruling.

A second notice to file appellant's brief was sent to the new address of David Cruz's counsel, as furnished by Cruz. The notice was
again returned unserved.

On September 19, 1995, David Cruz filed with us an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal." Attached to the motion was the
Indorsement of Assistant Director Jesus P. Villanueva, Bureau of Corrections, stating that the legal effects of the Motion were
adequately explained to Cruz. The motion was referred to the Court of Appeals.

On October 24, 1995, the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, issued a Resolution holding in abeyance its resolution on the motion to
withdraw appeal "until the situation is explained to him by the Director, National [sic] Bilibid Prison." The Director was ordered to
submit a written report, together with the reply of David Cruz, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. In the same Resolution, the
Court of Appeals also noted that:

"The penalty imposable for the offense charged against David Cruz, considering the quantity of the prohibited
drug involved, is 6 months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as the maximum, pursuant to the Sunga case.

"By 1996, David Cruz shall have served the maximum penalty imposable. We seriously doubt if this was
explained to him. prLL
 xxx xxx xxx.
"SO ORDERED." 3

No report was submitted by the Director, New Bilibid Prisons. 4

A third notice to file appellant's brief was sent to David Cruz's counsel which he received on June 8, 1996. Despite this receipt, no
appellant's brief was filed.

On September 18, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued another Resolution declaring David Cruz's appeal as abandoned and dismissed
the same. The dispositive portion of this Resolution reads as follows:

"For failure to file appellant's brief despite receipt by accused-appellant's counsel on June 8, 1996 of the notice
to do so, the court resolved to consider the appeal ABANDONED and accordingly DISMISSED pursuant to Section
8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure." 5

This Resolution became final and executory on October 14, 1996. Judgment was entered on April 1, 1997. 6 In 1998, petitioner Maria
Cruz sought the assistance of the Office of Legal Aid of the University of the Philippines College of Law. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners claim that:

"I. The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in considering petitioner's appeal abandoned
despite its October 24, 1995 Resolution.
"II. The correct penalty to be imposed should be determined in a new trial.
"III. There is no lawful writ or process which justifies petitioner's restraint of liberty." 7

The petition for certiorari must be dismissed.

Respondent Court of Appeals did not err in declaring the appeal of petitioner David Cruz as abandoned and dismissed. Section 8 of
Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

"Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The appellate court may, upon motion of
the appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de
officio. Prcd

"The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal." 8

An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the appellee or upon the court's own motion, if the appellant
fails to file his brief within the prescribed time. The only exception is when the appellant is represented by counsel de officio.

Petitioner David Cruz was represented not by counsel de officio, but by counsel of his own choice. His lawyer, Atty. Carmelo Arcilla,
was counsel de partebefore the trial court, before this Court on appeal, and before the Court of Appeals. There is nothing in the
records that would show that Atty. Arcilla withdrew his representation of petitioner. On the contrary, the notice from the Court of
Appeals requiring the filing of the appellant's brief was received by Atty. Arcilla. And despite this receipt, still no appellant's brief was
filed. It was more than three (3) months later that the appellate court issued the questioned Resolution. By dismissing David Cruz's
appeal, the Court of Appeals acted within its discretion.

A new trial to determine his penalty cannot be granted petitioner. A motion for new trial may be granted by the Court of Appeals
only on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to the accused's defense. This is clear from Section 14, Rule 124 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

"Sec. 14. Motion for new trial. At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and
before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may move for a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to his defense, the motion to conform to the
provisions of Section 4, Rule 121."

Maria Cruz's petition for habeas corpus, on the other hand, must be granted. Her son, David, was tried and convicted by the trial
court for violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He was convicted on September 27, 1993 and
sentenced to life imprisonment and its accessory penalties. He was committed to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993. On
December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 took effect. This law amended provisions of several penal laws, including
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Cdphil

Before R.A. No. 7659, Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 provided:

"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."

With the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, Section 4, Article II now reads:

"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor,
or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."

R.A. No. 7659 also added the following provision:

"Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the
Crime. The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:

"1. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana; . . . ."
"Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetuadepending upon the quantity. Cdpr
"xxx xxx xxx."

The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was "life imprisonment to death." Under R.A. 7659, the penalty
depended on the quantity of the drug. The sale of "750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana" became punishable by reclusion
perpetua, to death. 9 The penalty for the sale of less than 750 grams of marijuana was reduced to a range "from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua, depending upon the quantity" of the drug.

In the 1994 case of People v. Simon y Sunga, 10 we held that for drugs with quantities weighing 750 grams or more, and for drugs
with quantities weighing below 750 grams, reclusion perpetua could not be imposed twice. 11 The penalty of "prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua" for drug offenses where the quantity involved is less than those enumerated in the first
paragraph of Section 17 of R.A. 7659 was construed as "prision correccional to reclusion temporal." This was the range of the
imposable penalty for drugs weighing less than 750 grams and the proper penalty depended on the quantity of the drug involved. If
the drug weighs less than 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional; from 250 grams to 499 grams, prision mayor;
and from 500 grams to 749 grams, reclusion temporal. 12

In the instant case, the amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was convicted is 2.70 grams. The imposable penalty for this
amount under the Simonruling is prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Presently, David Cruz has already served six (6) years and three (3) months of his sentence which is way beyond the last day
of prision correccional. The continued detention of Cruz at the National Penitentiary has been admitted by the Solicitor General as
already illegal. 13 David Cruz should therefore be released from prison without further delay.

An application for the writ of habeas corpus is made upon verified petition setting forth: (1) that the person in whose behalf the
application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the officer or name of the person by whom he is imprisoned or
restrained; (3) the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention
of such person. 14 The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty. 15

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas corpus issue immediately. The Director, Bureau of Corrections, is
commanded to forthwith execute the writ for the discharge of DAVID CRUZ y GONZAGA from confinement and RELEASE him, unless
he is being detained for some other lawful cause, and to make due return of the writ. With costs de officio. cdphil

FURTHER, in view of the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioner's appeal on the ground of abandonment for failure to file
appellant's brief, Atty. Carmelo L. Arcilla is hereby ordered to explain within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this decision why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him by this Court.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 190108. October 19, 2010.]
DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE, petitioner, vs. HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA,
JR., Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and DR. BERNARDO A. VICENTE, National Center
for Mental Health, respondents.

[G.R. No. 190473. October 19, 2010.]
HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO
GUISANDE, respondent.

RESOLUTION - NACHURA, J p:
Before us are consolidated petitions:

(1) A petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo against Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. (Judge Tacla) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 208, Mandaluyong City, and Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente (Dr. Vicente) of the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH), docketed as G.R. No. 190108; and

(2) G.R. No. 190473, which is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente of the NCMH, assailing the Resolution 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) rendered in open court on December 3, 2009, in the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039.

The antecedents are:

Petitioner David E. So (So) in G.R. No. 190108 filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of
his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla.
Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the
government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who was
being charged with a non-bailable offense.

Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric
treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by
Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge,"
as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan. EcDSTI

Acting on the prosecution's Urgent Motion to Refer Accused's Illness to a Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered
Guisande's referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande's mental health to determine if she would
be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.

Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the
NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue
the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMH's determination that she was ready
for trial.

Accused Guisande was confined at the NCMH Payward, Pavilion 6-I-E, instead of Pavilion 35, Forensic Psychiatric
Section, where female court case patients are usually confined at the NCMH. In connection therewith, Dr. Vicente issued a
special Memorandum on November 9, 2009, reiterating existing hospital policies on the handling of court case patients
undergoing evaluation procedures to foreclose any possibility of malingering 2 on the patient's part, specifically patients
accused of a non-bailable crime.

Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which supposedly
worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel,
accused Guisande and her father simultaneously, albeit separately, filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement before
the RTC Mandaluyong City, and the present petition in G.R. No. 190108 for the issuance of the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo.

On the Motion for Relief filed with RTC Mandaluyong City, Judge Tacla issued the following Order:
 The Court rules to Grant accused's [Guisande's] motion subject to the condition that only the accused's counsel
and the accused' physician on her hypothyroid condition are allowed to visit the accused in coordination with
the respective psychiatrist/doctor of the NCMH taking charge of the psychiatric examination upon accused. 3

On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, this Court issued a Resolution on November 24, 2009, to wit:

G.R. No. 190108 (David E. So, in Behalf of his Daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr.,
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 208, Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente, National Center for Mental Health).
Acting on the Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, the Court Resolved to:

(a) ISSUE a JOINT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND AMPARO;
(b) REFER the petition to the Court of Appeals, Manila, for (i) IMMEDIATE RAFFLE among the Members of the
said Court; (ii) HEARING on December 3, 2009, Thursday, at 10:00 a.m.; and (iii) DECISION within ten (10) days
after its submission for decision; and aEcADH
(c) ORDER the respondents to make a verified RETURN of the Joint Writ of Habeas Corpus and Amparo before
the Court of Appeals, Manila, on December 1, 2009, and to COMMENT on the petition before said date. 4

As directed by this Court, Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente appeared before the CA on December 1, 2009 and, in the
afternoon, filed their Consolidated Return of the Writ.

On December 3, 2009, the NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report to the RTC Mandaluyong City:

ASSESSMENT AND REMARKS:
Review of the history and clinical reports from Makati Medical Center revealed that Ma. Elena So-Guisande was
diagnosed and managed as Bipolar I Disorder. On the other hand, based on a series of mental status
examinations and observations at our center, she is found not manifesting signs and symptoms of psychosis at
the present time. Neither a manic episode nor a severe depressive episode was manifested during her
confinement at our center, despite voluntarily not taking her medication is. Although she is complaining of mood
symptoms, these are not severe enough to impair her fitness to stand trial.

Ms. Guisande does have sufficient understanding of the nature and objective of the court proceedings and the
possible consequences of her cases. She is likewise capable of communicating with her counsels.

She is therefore deemed COMPETENT to stand the rigors of court trial. (Emphasis supplied.)

On even date, pursuant to the directive of this Court, the CA's Special Seventeenth Division held a hearing. Thereafter,
Justice Normandie B. Pizarro (Justice Pizarro), to whom the petition was raffled, disposed, in this wise:

JUSTICE PIZARRO:
The essence of the deliberation this morning is on the proceedings that obtained pursuant to the September 22,
2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City. The parties heard the arguments
of the Petitioner on the right of the subject patient, Ma. Elena, to avail of extended medical treatment
citing the Constitution and the Geneva Convention on Human Rights.

In the course of the proceedings this morning, Judge Tacla, Jr., informed this Court that the NCMH submitted to
him a report consisting of eight (8) pages at about 8:46 this morning. The parties, specifically the
petitioner, were shown the said report. Afterwards, Judge Tacla's opinion on the matter was heard and
he did not interpose any objection thereto. The Accused, subject of this case, Ma. Elena So-Guisande,
may now be discharged from the custody of the NCMH and is considered fit for the rigors of trial. The
parties were heard on the matter and all of them were in accord with the dispositive portion of the
aforesaid report. CacISA

After a prolonged discussion on the matter, and without objection on the part of the parties, as the Accused
should now proceed to trial in accordance with law, and at the same time recognizing the right of the
Accused to avail of further medication, this Court decrees the following set up that should cover this
proceedings: The trial of this case shall resume and the arraignment at the Court a quo shall push
through as originally scheduled on February 2, 2010. To balance the situation, the right to seek
medical treatment of the subject is hereby recognized by all and the patient shall be confined at the
 St. Clare's Medical Center, 1838 Dian St., Palanan, Makati City, her hospital of choice, under the
headship of Dr. Yat, subject to the twenty-four (24) hour custodial control of the NBI.

xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE PIZARRO:

Dr. Yat is directed to submit, again by agreement of the parties, a periodic report every fifteen days to the RTC,
Branch 208, for its evaluation. The first report shall be submitted on or before December 18, 2009.

In this regard, the Director Nestor M. Mantaring of NBI is politely DIRECTED to cause the transfer from NCMH to
the St. Clare's Medical Center of the subject Accused, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, and to provide two (2) or
three (3) security personnel to the Accused after making the proper coordination with the RTC, Branch
208. Director Mantaring is to submit a one (1) page compliance on the matter within three (3) days
from receipt of this Resolution furnishing Judge Tacla, Jr. a copy thereof.

xxx xxx xxx
It is understood that the case pending before RTC, Branch 208, involves a non-bailable offense where normally
the Accused should have been confined in jail. But considering the peculiarities of this case, the parties
have all agreed to the set up as provided in this Order. It is also understood by the parties that
henceforth the control of the trial proceedings as well as the control over the custody of the
accused/patient shall be in the hands of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City.

STATE SOL. DE VERA:
Your honor, the Hospital fees to be settled before the transfer, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PIZARRO:
As committed in open-Court, Atty. Carpio shall insure the settlement of the fees for the confinement of
Accused/patient at the NCMH, as a pre-condition for her release therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considering considered, this petition for Habeas Corpus and Amparo is
considered CLOSE and TERMINATED. All parties are notified in open court of this Order. DHITSc
xxx xxx xxx

JUSTICE PIZARRO:
Let copies of this Order be furnished the RTC, Br. 208, Mandaluyong City, the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation as well as the Supreme Court, and all the parties.

SO ORDERED. 5

Hence, the petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190473, filed by the OSG, which was consolidated
with G.R. No. 190108.

During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led to the incident before
this Court, i.e., a Manifestation and Motion 6 dated March 11, 2010, filed by the OSG on behalf of public respondents, Judge
Tacla and Dr. Vicente, to wit:

1. On February 4, 2010, acting on the City Prosecutor's January 25, 2010 Motion to Withdraw Information, public
respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281. Hence, their Urgent Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before this Honorable Court has been rendered moot and
academic. A copy of the February 4, 2010 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 is attached herewith
asAnnex "A."

2. Furthermore, in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 from which the Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 190108 and Court of
Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and the Petition for Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473) stemmed from,
these cases and pending incidents thereon should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.

 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed
before the Supreme Court as G.R. No.190108 and Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and the Petition for
Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473) and all other pending incidents thereon be DISMISSED for having been
rendered moot and academic.

Petitioner So filed a Comment 7 refuting the OSG's motion to dismiss G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473. Through counsel,
and using strong words, he vehemently opposed the dismissal of the petitions because they had filed criminal complaints and
an administrative case against respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, as well as the NCMH and an attending doctor thereat,
for purported violations of accused Guisande's rights during her confinement at the NCMH. Adding to the flurry of cases,
petitioner So filed a Verified Petition to cite Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in contempt before the CA for their supposed
submission of an altered and falsified document, which was attached to, and formed an integral part of, their Consolidated
Return of the Writ. cHSIAC

Posthaste, and even without us requiring the OSG to file one, it filed a Motion to Admit Reply 8 with its Reply 9 to the
Comment of petitioner So attached thereto. The OSG clarified and denied outright petitioner So's allegation in the Comment
that the criminal case for Qualified Theft against accused Guisande was a prevarication and concoction of private
complainant 10 and that Judge Tacla had conspired to falsely accuse petitioner So's daughter, Guisande. In all, the OSG
reiterated that G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 had been rendered moot and academic with the dismissal of the criminal case for
Qualified Theft against Guisande.

Significantly, on August 25, 2010, the OSG filed another Manifestation and Motion 11 informing this Court of the
following:

(1) Resolution dated June 7, 2010 issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa D. Escobar-Pilares (Assistant City
Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares), dismissing the charge of petitioner So against Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente and their counsels for
Falsification under Article 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as I.S. No. XV-07-INV-10B-01371, for insufficiency of
evidence; 12 and
(2) Resolution dated July 27, 2010 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, where petitioner So's verified petition for
contempt was dismissed for lack of merit, and where the CA ordered the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo closed and
terminated. 13

Likewise, the OSG reiterated its motion to dismiss the instant consolidated petitions.

We completely agree with the OSG. Accordingly, we deny the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for having been
rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC09-12281 for Qualified Theft pending before the RTC
Mandaluyong City.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the criminal
case for Qualified Theft against petitioner So's daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and
circumstances of his daughter's, accused Guisande's, confinement at the NCMH was "life threatening"; although Guisande was
accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat Guisande's mental condition. Thus, to balance the
conflicting right of an accused to medical treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused
charged with a non-bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clare's Medical Center,
while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation from the regular course of procedure, since
accused Guisande should have been confined in jail because she was charged with a non-bailable offense. DEIHAa

Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by
Justice Pizarro, is there an affirmation of petitioner So's claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was
illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental
condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government
forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner So's and accused Guisande's family, had assessed Guisande fit for
trial.

The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission
complained of confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person's life, liberty, and
security for amparo cases should be illegal or unlawful.

Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:
 Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:

Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules. InLourdes D. Rubrico, Jean
Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino
Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain Jonathan, P/Supt.
Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman, 14 we qualified:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought
by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes
less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations. 15 cHSIDa

In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila, Branch 37, Director General Avelino
Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson, 16 we intoned:

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is
restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the
grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally
held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and
not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. . . . The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is
being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will
proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ
should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory
operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the
judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the
court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition forhabeas
corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose
behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. 17

In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility
of accused's own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition. 18 In addition,
we note that it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused's mental fitness to be
arraigned and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clare's Medical Center under the
custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically to report on his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC
Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath, the CA also ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the
accused for Qualified Theft before the same trial court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for
the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a
doctor of her choice. IcTaAH

Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be
confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande's person, and treatment of any medical and
mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In
short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often citedDavid v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 19 is defined
as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be
of no practical use or value."

Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares, unmistakably foreclose the justiciability
of the petitions before this Court.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA said:

We are also not swayed by [David So's] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this Court when they stated
in their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable offenses. During the hearing on the petition
for habeas corpus/writ of amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that Elena was facing only one (1) non-
bailable offense to which [petitioners] did not anymore object. Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is
not even material in the instant case for habeas corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here
was whether or not Elena's confinement at NCMH was lawful.

Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of court, is rendered moot
and academic considering that this Court had already rendered its open court Order on December 8, 2009, which
was favorable to [David So], and it was only later that the latter raised the issue of contempt.

Finding no merit in [David So's] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr. Vicente and the NCMH],
and there being no other objections made by the parties against Our March 17, 2010 Resolution, the instant
petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED. 20

In XV-07-INV-10B-01371 for Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the Assistant City
Prosecutor made the following findings:

. . . [T]he undersigned finds no probable cause that respondents committed the charges filed against them.

Examination of the Contract of Confinement which was claimed to have been falsified reveals that it was merely
a photocopy. The supposed full photocopy of the original copy of the subject contract did not contain any
alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) that could have changed its meaning or that could have made it
speak of something false. The contents of the contract depicting that [Guisande's] yaya (Ms. Galleto) was indeed
confined at the NCMH as claimed by respondents to accompany [Guisande], [So's] daughter who was confined
thereat remained the same. Respondents explained that they were unaware of the inadvertent partial
reproduction of the document and supported the same with an affidavit of good faith executed by an NCMH
clerk explaining why it was only partially reproduced. TCADEc

Likewise, respondents' statement that [Guisande] is "facing non-bailable offenses" is not absolutely false.
Respondents satisfactorily explained that at the time of the filing of their pleading, they believed in good faith
that she was facing more than one non-bailable offenses (sic) as she was charged with Qualified Theft before the
Mandaluyong City RTC, Branch 208 and Syndicated Estafa before the San Juan Prosecutor's office. While it may
be true that [Guisande] has only one (1) non-bailable offense pending in court, respondents proved with their
evidence that she had others pending at the time in other forum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the charges for Falsification under
Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code filed against all respondents namely: (1) Judge Esteban A. Tacla,
 Jr., (2) Dr. Bernardino A. Vicente, (3) ASG General Magtanggol M. Castro, SSS Diana H. Castaeda-de Vera, SS
Charina A. Soria and AS Jefferson C. Secillano, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. 21

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for the Writs
of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, and review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are DENIED for being moot and
academic. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 139789. July 19, 2001.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE
DOES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 139808. July 19, 2001.]
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.

SYNOPSIS
This case stemmed from a petition for habeas corpus filed by Erlinda K. Ilusorio before the Court of Appeals to have custody of her
husband Potenciano Ilusorio in consortium. The petition was dismissed by the appellate court for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject. The appellate court, however, gave visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio. The dismissal of the petition
for habeas corpus was affirmed by the Supreme Court. However, the appellate court's ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda K.
Ilusorio was nullified by the Court. CcAESI

Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

Erlinda contended that the facts mentioned in the decision of the Court of Appeals were erroneous and incomplete. She claimed
that Potenciano suffered from various ailments. Thus, he did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Erlinda argued that
Potenciano must be brought before the Court so that his mental state could be determined.

Erlinda sought custody of her husband contending, among others, that respondents Lin and Sylvia, her daughters, were illegally
restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed. She argued that since Potenciano
retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his
position and control. Yet Lina and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.

The Court denied the motion for reconsideration.

The Court was not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. This is a
question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.

As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporations, the Court held that these matters may be threshed out in
a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.

Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why it should not rely on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. The hornbook
doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court. It is not for the Court to weigh the
evidence all over again. Although there are exceptions to the rule, Erlinda failed to show that this was an exceptional circumstance.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER COURT ARE CONCLUSIVE ON THE SUPREME COURT. Petitioner
failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the
facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court of the land need go to such
length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court. We emphasize, it
is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again. Although there are exceptions to the rule, Erlinda failed to show that this is an
exceptional instance. EIASDT

2. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; MARITAL OBLIGATIONS. The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARITAL UNION IS A TWO-WAY PROCESS. Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.


R E S O L U T I O N - PARDO, J, p:
Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a
petition with the Court of Appeals 1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.

On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of
the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio. AcDaEH

Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have
custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. 2 This case was consolidated with another case 3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his
children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never
refused to see her.

On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus 4 for lack of merit, and granted the petition 5 to nullify the Court of
Appeals' ruling 6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio. 7

What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision. 8

On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring the
mandatory presence of the parties.

In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:

(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same. 9

The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, enjoined the parties and their lawyers to initiate steps
towards an amicable settlement of the case through mediation and other means.

On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the resolution of October 11,
2000. 10

On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced
before the Court and be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court. 11

On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of January 31 , 2001. 12

The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere reiterations of her arguments that have been
resolved in the decision.

Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:

First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental
state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her husband's custody. 13 Clearly,
Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.

Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally
restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed. 14 She claimed that her two children
were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She
also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees
Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the
CHTAIc
corporations. 15

The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999. 16 Potenciano
himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and
other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to
decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his
mental state.

We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a
question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.

As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate
proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.

Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda
claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court of the land
need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme
Court. 17 We emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again. 18 Although there are exceptions to the
rule, 19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.

Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as
spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. We agree.

The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. 20 The
sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to
enforce consortium. 21

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since
1972. We definedempathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.

Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and
a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. 22

On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his
survivors continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the case has been rendered moot by the death of
subject.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 141938. April 2, 2001.]
TUNG CHIN HUI, petitioner, vs. RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of Immigration and the BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, respondents.

D E C I S I O N - PANGANIBAN, J p:
The writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued in cases in which the Bureau of Immigration has duly ordered the deportation of
undocumented aliens, specifically those found guilty of illegally entering the Philippines with the use of tampered and previously
cancelled passports.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 30, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 51723. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. "SO ORDERED." 2

The CA reversed the January 7, 1999 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition, and as such, public
respondent, Hon. Rufus Rodriguez, Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, is hereby ordered to
immediately release the person of petitioner, Tung Chin Hui, from his official custody, upon receipt of this
Decision." 4

Also challenged by petitioner is the February 4, 2000 CA Resolution 5 denying his Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
Petitioner, a "Taiwanese national," 6 arrived in this country on November 5, 1998, as a temporary visitor. A few days later, he was
arrested by several policemen, who turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).

Petitioner was duly charged. In due course, the BID Board of Commissioners issued a Summary Deportation Order dated November
25, 1998, finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities.

On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground
that his detention was illegal. In their Return of Writ, respondents denied petitioner's claim. In a Decision dated January 7, 1999, the
trial court granted his Petition and ordered his release. In its January 29, 1999 Order, it denied respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondents, who received the trial court's January 29, 1999 Order on February 11, 1999, then filed a Notice of Appeal on February
16, 1999. In an Order dated February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected petitioner's Opposition and granted due course to the Notice of
Appeal.

Subsequently, the appellate court rendered its July 30, 1999 Decision, which as earlier mentioned reversed the trial court.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the proceedings before the CA, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari 7 before this Court,
docketed as GR No. 137571, contending that the RTC should have rejected the appeal for allegedly being filed late beyond the 48-
hour period provided under the pre-1997 Rules of Court. In its September 21, 2000 Decision which became final on October 31,
2000, 8 this Court denied the Petition.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appellate court held that petitioner was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, because the BID Board of Commissioners had
found him guilty of violating Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Citing documents from the
Taiwan Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO), the CA found that petitioner's passport had been cancelled by the Republic of China
on the ground that its holder was not the real Tung Chin Hui, but a fugitive from justice who had tampered the passport. The CA also
held that the TECO documents, being public in nature, need not be testified to by the persons who had issued them.
Hence, this Petition. 9

The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the consideration of this Court: 10
 "A. PRINCIPAL ISSUES:

(1) Is the reglementary period within which to appeal in habeas corpus cases forty-eight hours from
notice of the Decision appealed from? (as petitioner contends); or is it 15 days similar to other
cases, from notice of the Decision? (as contended by the respondents); EcIaTA
(2) Was the appeal taken by the respondents from the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 26, denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, proper? (as postulated by the
respondents) or improper and not allowable being violative of Sec. 1 (a), Rule 41, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure? (as comprehended by the petitioner)

A. SECONDARY ISSUES:
(1) Should the Court of Appeals give weight to findings of fact arrived at by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 26, based on the evidence presented or adduced during the trial of the case, in
keeping with established precedents?
(2) May the Honorable Court of Appeals consider extraneous facts brought out by the respondents in
their memorandum but are not supported by the evidence presented, identified and admitted
by the trial court during the hearing of the case?
(3) Did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction over the case when the appeal was filed out of time
and the Order appealed from is not appealable?"

In the main, this Court will resolve the propriety of issuing a writ of habeas corpus. As a preliminary matter, the Court will also
consider the propriety of the appeal before the CA.

The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.

Preliminary Matter:
Propriety of the Appeal
Petitioner contends that the appeal from the trial court to the CA was improper for two reasons: (1) it was filed beyond the
reglementary 48-hour period provided under the pre-1997 Rules of Court; and (2) it assailed not a judgment but a resolution
denying a motion for reconsideration, contrary to Section 111 of Rule 41. 12

This Court already rejected the same arguments in its earlier Decision in GR No. 137571, 13 which debunked petitioner's challenge
to the propriety of the appeal. Pertinent portions of that Decision are reproduced below:

"Clearly then, the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in
ordinary civil actions and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules, which provides:

'SECTION 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or
final order.

'The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.'

In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary period.

xxx xxx xxx
We agree with respondents. In referring to the trial court's 'judgment,' respondents were clearly appealing the
January 7, 1999 Decision. Had they thought otherwise, they would have referred to the 'Order.' Indeed,
'judgment' is normally synonymous with 'decision.'

Furthermore, the wrong date of the appealed judgment may be attributed merely to inadvertence. Such error
should not, by itself, deprive respondents of their right to appeal. . . .."



 Main Issue:
Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining another, commanding the former to produce the body of the latter at a
designated time and place. 14Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. 15 If it is, the writ cannot be issued.

In the present case, petitioner's confinement is in accord with Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,
which reads as follows:

"SECTION 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of another officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation
as charged against the alien:
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was
admitted as a non-immigrant;

xxx xxx xxx."
One such condition for the admission of aliens is found in Section 10 of the same law, which requires them to "present for admission
into the Philippines unexpired passports or official documents in the nature of passports issued by the governments of the countries
to which they owe allegiance or other travel documents showing their origins and identity as prescribed by regulations, . . .."

Herein petitioner was properly charged before the Bureau of Immigration for illegally entering the Philippines with the use of a
passport issued to another person and cancelled by the Taiwanese government in 1995. The Charge Sheet reads as follows:

"CHARGE SHEET

The undersigned Special Prosecutor charges for deportation CHEN KUAN-YUAN @ TUNG, CHIN-HUI @ DONG
TUNG, Taiwanese national for violation of Section 37 (a) (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, committed as follows:

'that on November 21, 1998, respondent was turned over by the Western Police District to immigration
authorities and upon investigation, it was found out that respondent [was] an undocumented alien it
appearing that respondent [was] in possession of a tampered Taiwanese passport which was cancelled
by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 19, 1995, in violation of Sec. 37 (a) (7) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.'"

Subsequently, on November 25, 1998, the BID Board of Commissioners issued the Summary Deportation Order, which is reproduced
in full as follows:

"SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER

Records show that on November 21, 1998, respondent was turned over by the WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT to
immigration authorities and upon investigation, it was found out that respondent [was] an undocumented alien,
it appearing that he [was] in possession of a tampered Taiwanese Passport which was cancelled by the
Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 10, 1995.

Accordingly, on November 25, 1998, deportation charges were filed against respondent with the Board of
Commissioners for violation of Sec. 37 (a) (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.

After a careful examination of the records, we determine that respondent has violated the above-cited
provision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board of Commissioners hereby orders that summary deportation of
respondent, CHEN KUAN-YUAN @ TUNG CHIN-HUI @ DONG TUNG to his country of origin subject to the
submission of the usual clearances.
 Include his name in the Blacklist upon implementation of this Order.

The Chief of the Civil Security Unit is hereby directed to implement this Order within three (3) days from receipt
hereof.

Give respondent a copy of this Order.
SO ORDERED."

Echoing the holding of the RTC, herein petitioner argues that no evidence was presented to prove that he was an "undocumented
alien"; that is, that he tampered with a passport that had already been cancelled by the Taiwanese government. He further contends
that he was in fact allowed to enter the Philippines seventeen times from 1995 to 1998, notwithstanding the alleged cancellation of
his passport in 1995. 16

These contentions are not meritorious. The Return of the Writ submitted by respondents before the trial court dearly shows that
petitioner had lawfully been charged and ordered deported for being an undocumented alien. Section 13, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court specifically provides that "the return [of the writ] shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of the restraint; . .
.." SIcEHC

Moreover, attached to the Return of the Writ were copies of official letters of the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Offices. These
documents show that petitioner, whose real name is Chen Kuan-Yuan, was using a passport that had already been cancelled by the
Taiwanese government in 1995 and previously issued to a man named Tung Chin Hui. The two letters are reproduced in full
hereunder:

"November 24, 1998
Honorable Rufus B. Rodriguez
Commissioner
Bureau of Immigration
Magallanes Drive, Intramuros
Manila

Attention: Chief, Intelligence Division

Sir:
In behalf of the Bureau of Immigration of the Republic of China, I would like to inform your good office that
Taiwanese fugitive MR. CHEN, KUAN-YUAN (D.O.B. October 12, 1956) tampered Republic of China passport
number M 9534820, issued to MR. TUNG, CHIN-HUI (D.O.B. November 26, 1956). The said passport was
cancelled by the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 19, 1995.

Very truly yours,
KUO, KUANG-KWO
Senior Assistant
Encl. Fingerprint of Mr. Tung, Chin-Hui"
"November 19, 1998
Honorable Rufus B. Rodriguez
Commissioner
Bureau of Immigration
Magallanes Drive, Intramuros
Manila

Attention: Chief, Intelligence Division
Sir:

In behalf of the Bureau of Immigration of the Republic of China, I have the honor to seek your kind assistance to
deport MR. CHEN, KUAN-YUAN (D.O.B. 12 October 1956). Mr. Chen was sentenced to 8 years and 2 months
imprisonment for drug trafficking and violation of controlling guns, ammunition and knives law. Mr. Chen was
arrested by the Western Police District Command last November 16, 1998 through the request of the Republic of
China International Police. According to the travel record of the said fugitive he has no record of leaving Taiwan.
Your immediate action and assistance in this matter will be highly appreciated.
 Very truly yours,
KUO, KUANG-KWO
Senior Assistant"

The above-quoted official letters demonstrate the speciousness of petitioner's contention that his passport could not have been
cancelled in 1995, inasmuch as he was allowed to enter the country as late as 1998. The letters show that the Philippine government
was informed about the cancellation only in 1998.

Furthermore, the foregoing letters of the official representative of the Taiwanese government belie petitioner's submission that
there was no evidence to prove the findings of the CA and the Board of Commissioners. 17 Verily, these documents constitute
sufficient justification for his deportation. As the Court held in the landmark case Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 18 "[t]he mere fact that a
citizen or subject is out of the territory of his country does not relieve him from that allegiance which he owes to his government,
and his government may, under certain conditions, properly and legally request his return." 19

Alleged Lack of Notice
We likewise reject petitioner's reliance on the ruling of the trial court that "[w]hile it may be true that there is a Summary
Deportation Order against the petitioner allegedly for being [an] undocumented alien, having used a passport which had already
been cancelled, there is no showing that he was informed about it." 20

Other than petitioner's bare allegations, however, we find no sufficient basis to overturn the presumption that the Bureau of
Immigration conducted its proceedings in accordance with law. 21

In any event, when petitioner filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus before the RTC, he was afforded ample opportunity to air his side
and to assail the legal and factual bases of the Board of Commissioners' Summary Deportation Order. Moreover, he could have
raised the same points in the proceedings before the CA and even before this Court. Indeed, an alien has the burden of proof to
show that he entered the Philippines lawfully. 22 Petitioner has not discharged this burden. He has not controverted either
before the RTC, the CA or this Court the Board of Commissioners' ruling that he was in fact Chen Kuan-Yuan, who was "sentenced
to 8 years and 2 months imprisonment for drug trafficking and violation of controlling guns, ammunition and knives law" and was
holding a passport cancelled by the Republic of China in 1995.

Just as unmeritorious is petitioner's contention that "at the time of his detention, there was no deportation charge filed against
him." 23 Assuming arguendo that his arrest was illegal, supervening events bar his subsequent release. 24 In this case, when the
Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed, petitioner had already been charged and ordered deported by the Board of Commissioners.
In sum, we hold that petitioner's confinement was not illegal; hence, there is no justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Moreover, he has not shown any cogent reason to warrant the nullification of the Board of Commissioners' Summary
Deportation Order.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001.]
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and
ANGELITA DIAMANTE,respondents.

D E C I S I O N - QUISUMBING, J p:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners. cITAaD

Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the
clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of
private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.

According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on
her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr.,
under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.

When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's
house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told
Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to
another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for
assistance.

Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react to the disappearance of their
youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and
together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.

Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law
husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.

Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four
years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already
named John Thomas Lopez. 1 She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To substantiate their
petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified
that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her
testimony with her clinical records. 2 The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could
not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his
private part against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin
further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not
blessed with children. 3

For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas
Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two other
children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez.4 She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband,
Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.

On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the alleged
birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. 5 The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial
similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child
of petitioners. The trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition for Habeas Corpus,
as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately release from her personal custody minor John
Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and
Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.
 Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the decision of this Court by
assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person
as John Thomas D. Lopez. CaAIES

SO ORDERED. 6

Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal. 7 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the order of the trial court
by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over
the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing. 8

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its
doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that
she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are
one and the same person, 9 and disposed of the case, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is hereby REVERSED, and a
new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and directing the custody of the minor
John Thomas Lopez to be returned to respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of
said respondent at the time of the filing of the petition herein.
SO ORDERED. 10

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied. Hence, the instant petition alleging:

I
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE PROVEN.

II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR "HABEAS CORPUS" AND DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO
THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. 11

In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of
petitioners?

We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. 12 Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may
even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying
rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over
a child. 13 It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the
usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person. HcaDIA

In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be
her offspring. We must first determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor's biological mother. Evidence must
necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one
and the same. 14 Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the
person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the
writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.

True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned
tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order. 15 But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals
contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which findings should be
preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.

A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John
Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her
second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child
between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No
clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez
declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas
Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost
fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and
on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance
at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of
his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth. 16 Significantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan,
which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife". 17 This false entry puts to doubt the
other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities
in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material
evidence to establish parentage. 18 Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the
opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private
respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners. cTECHI

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is
proper to regain custody of said child.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test 19 for identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. 20 Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. 21 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For
it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress. 22 Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all
concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues. HecaIC

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the
Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent. SO ORDERED.

 [G.R. No. 154598. August 16, 2004.]
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS RICHARD BRIAN
THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO
THORNTON, petitioner, vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.

D E C I S I O N - CORONA, J p:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth
Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of
substance. The dispositive portion 2 read:

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United
Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco
Thornton.

However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a
"guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the
country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001,
respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was
bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably
because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent
and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a
certification 3 that respondent was no longer residing there. IEaHSD

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent's cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as
Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the
Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that
since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it
impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9(1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue
a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-
stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its
procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to
issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because
there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court which
can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the
jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple
and clear wording of RA 8369.
 Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody
of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out
of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but
then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot
exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.

Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court or any court for that matter
to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When
there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought from the courts but only from the
legislature.

The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such
petitions. TicAaH

In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule
provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court, 4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if
so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. 5

The petition is granted.

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo,
the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any other way.

We disagree with the CA's reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would
be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a
habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when
they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General: aECSHI

Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights and promote the
welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues regarding
children's welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative
intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further
clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case
and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the
Solicitor General:

To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child
whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks
to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings
will not result in disruption of the child's privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate
court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child's welfare and well
being will be prejudiced.

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly
cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation, 6 the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were
allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:

While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar, it supports petitioner's submission that
the word "exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction
of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca
case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent.
The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other
hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with
certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in
Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day
and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law,
and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable
before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for
hearing and decision on the merits.It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial
district. (Emphasis supplied)

In ruling that the Commissioner's "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the
same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the
spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:

"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and
ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by
the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience
to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature
actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless,
lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction. 7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave
injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" 8 under the Constitution and the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle
in construing the provisions of RA 8369.

Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of
implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved
against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on
the subject." 9

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue
writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP
129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of
habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA
7029 and BP 129 that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for
habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
 Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody
of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family
Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found
for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts
in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved. IEAaST

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy
which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General: 10

That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty
of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the
Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.

SO ORDERED.