FIXING AND DETERMINATION OF FEES (FEE IS BASED ON WRITTEN On March 5, 1957, in the same proceedings, a petition was filed
ceedings, a petition was filed stating that the
CONTRACT)
1. Martinez v Banogon
The above-entitled case was instituted by the former administrator
(deceased Emiliano S. Arnaiz) for and in behalf of the heirs of the deceased
Alejandro Somoza, on February 1, 1946. Since then, up to the termination
of the case, Atty. Leonardo P. Martinez appeared as counsel, first for the
probate of the will of the decedent, and later for the administration of the
estate left by him. Sometime on November 19, 1956, Messrs. Alejandro
Somoza, Jr. and Francisco Banogon, in representation of all the heirs,
entered into a contract with Atty. Martinez, for professional services,
whereby it was agreed
(a) The Party of the Second Part shall handle all legal matters in
connection with this administration case No. 476 and to prepare the
necessary papers or documents legitimately belonging to said special
case up to its termination.
(b) All other cases, which may come up during the continuance of this
Special Case No. 476 involving the property, rights or interests of the
testator or his heirs and requiring appearance of attorney in any courts
of justice, are EXCLUDED from this contract. Should the Party of the
First Part or their co-heirs desire to utilize the services of the Party of
the Second Part in such cases, another contract concerning fees shall
be entered into between them.
(c) That, for and in consideration of the services which the Party of the
Second Part may have rendered or may render in connection with this
Special Case No. 476, the Party of the First Part agrees to pay him the
sum of EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P800.00), Philippine Currency.
4. That it is the intention of the Party of the First Part and their co-heirs
to terminate this Special Case as soon as possible by paying in full,
within the shortest period possible, the account of the estate to the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank or by subrogating themselves in place
of the deceased father.
For one reason or another, the case was not closed and terminated as
expected. Up to the filing of his claim for Attorney's fees, Atty. Martinez
had already received P1,320.00 as compensation for the services
rendered by him as counsel in this case.
reasonable value of all the services rendered by him up to the termination of
the case is P6K; that this amount be taken and considered as part of the
expenses of administration minus the amount of P1,320.00 already paid out of
the proceeds of the product of the estate and duly approved by the court; and
that the said amount of P1,320.00 is not a reasonable compensation. In support
of his claim, Atty. Martinez made an itemization of the services rendered by him,
together with an information as to the real worth and income of the estate, and
the length of time it took this case to be closed and terminated. While admitting
the existence of the contract for professional service above-mentioned, Atty.
Martinez now contends that the same is not binding for the reason that the
heirs were not duly authorized by the former administrator to enter into such
contract. On the other hand, the heirs allege that Atty. Martinez had been fully
paid for his services in accordance with the contract in question and that he had
also been paid an additional sum of P520.00, for other incidental services.
The lower court is denying the petition of Atty. Martinez for additional payment
of attorney's fees, in an order of Sept. 30, 1957, held
... The general rule is that a written contract for professional
services controls the amount to be paid therefor unless found by
the Court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 22, Rule
127). There is no doubt the relationship of attorney and client in this
particular case and what is important to determine now is whether the
fee as stipulated in the contract and paid is reasonable, considering the
importance of the subject matter of controversy, the extent of the
services rendered and the professional standing of the attorney. It
would be idle to impugn the contract movant entered into with the heirs
of the estate and by which he benefited. As a lawyer, he knows its
validity and the obligation thereunder was enforced. The act of the heirs
were impliedly ratified by the administrator when periodical payments
were made to him. To determine the reasonableness of the claim, we
should not necessarily lay importance to the delayed period of the
proceedings where there was no continuous service rendered or
shown. Rather, we should take into account the nature of the work
done. (Arce v. National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The specification of
services submitted by movant shows the ordinary preparation of initial
papers connected with testate proceedings, the appointment of
administrator, non-controversial motions, opposition, reports of
accounts, appearance in court for their approval, negotiations for loans
and other matters. For these services, he received, according to the
contract, P800.00 and for other incidental services, P520.00 or it total
 of P1,320.00 which, considering all factors in this case, we believe is
fair and reasonable compensation for services rendered by movant
attorney".
Petitioner Martinez appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to
Us, it appearing that only questions of law are involved.
"... A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable" (Sec. 22,
Rule 127) Whether the fees as provided in the contract was unconscionable or
unreasonable will have to be determined, in accordance with some guiding
principles announced by this Court, in already familiar cases, one of which is
the Delgado v. De la Rama, 43 Phil. 419, where We held
... The circumstances to be considered in determining the
compensation of an attorney are: (1) the amount and character of the
services rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature
and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were
rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or
the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the
employment: (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance
of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the
attorney; (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an
attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent
than when it is not.
We have gone over the records of the case and We find no plausible reason to
alter or modify the factual findings and legal conclusions reached by the trial
court in the above quoted decision. His Honor had considered all the factors
and circumstances of the claim, and gave the opinion, in which We concur, that
the guiding principles heretofore recited, are not, obtaining in this particular
case. It may be added, in this connection, that the petitioner being a lawyer,
apparently of long experience and good standing, is presumed to have sized up
the entire situation before entering into the contract, portions of which are
above quoted. Emphasis is laid on the fact that petitioner-attorney had been
rendering services for almost 11 years, before he entered into the said contract.
It must be stated, however, that even the time employed is not an appropriate
basis for fixing the amount of compensation De Guzman v. Visayan Transit Co.,
68 Phil. 643).
2. Paterno Canlas v CA & Francisco Herrera (WORK AND FEE
SHOULD BE CORRELATIONAL)
Facts:
Francisco Herrera executed a mortgage over his 8 parcels of land in favor of
L&R Corporation as a security for the several loans which he obtained from the
financing institution. Upon his failure to pay, L&R Corporation extrajudicially
foreclosed the said lots. The lands were disposed of in a public auction and
L&R was the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, with Atty. Canlas as his counsel, Herrera was able to
obtain a preliminary injunction against L&R to prevent it from consolidating the
title in the corporations name.
Two years later, the parties entered into a compromise agreement where L&R
gave Herrera another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to
payment of P600,000. They also stipulated that Canlas shall be entitled to
attorneys fees of 100k. The court approved the compromise.
However, Herrera, due to his financial difficulties, was still unable to pay neither
the several loans nor the attorneys fees which he owed to Canlas. Canlas
moved for execution insofar as his fees were concerned which the court
granted although he was not really able to collect the fees.
Subsequently, Canlas and Herrera met to discuss the relief for Herrera with
respect to his liability to L&R on the one hand, and his obligation to Canlas on
the other. Canlas contends that Herrera earnestly begged him to redeem the
properties. However, Herrera maintains that it was Canlas who offered to
advance the money provided that they executed a transfer of mortgage over the
properties in Canlas favor. (SC believes Herreras contention more)
They executed a Deed of Sale, and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to
Redeem, a document that enabled Canlas to redeem the parcels of land and to
register the same in his name. Herrera only discovered that the said lawyer
registered the lots under his name when he was about to secure a loan from a
bank to finance a wet market project. Herrera contends that the said document
was falsified. The original document only transferred the rights of Herrera to
redeem the property whereas the falsified document stated that he was
transferring all of his rights of the real properties.
Herrera filed for an action for reconveyance of the said lots and a petition to
reform the said document to reflect the true agreement between him and
Canlas. TC ruled in favor of Canlas. CA reversed.
Issue:
1. W/N Herrera should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than a
pleading for annulment of judgment

2. W/n the attorneys fees that Canlas charged Herrera was reasonable
Held:
1. Yes. Judgments can only be annulled if there was a showing that there
is extrinsic fraud. In the case at bar, extrinsic fraud was not proved.
(Herrera contends that the judge in the trial court colluded with Canlas
in order for him to sell his land to Canlas.)
However, the Court was still unable to find merit in his petition. The
court cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding in which a
member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law to score
a technical knockout over his client, of all people.
2. No. Even Canlas himself admitted that his client lacks paying
capacity and no financing entity wanted to extend him a loan. This
circumstance should have tempered his demand for his fees.
Lawyering is not a money-making venture and lawyers are not
merchants. Canlas claim of attorneys fees in the sum of P100,000
was unreasonable. The extent of the services he rendered in the
case is not impressive to justify payment of such amount. The
case itself did not involve complex question fact or law that would have
required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the Canalas to
support his demand. The fact that the properties subject thereof
commanded quite handsome prices in the market should not be a
measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. The
petitioners stature does not support such claim. The Court reduced the
petitioners fees on a quantum merit basis, to P20,000.00
***the contract is not void for it is not covered by the ban (remember sales?) but
it is voidable because Canlas exerted undue influence over Herrera (moral
ascendancy of the attorney.)
***however, the property was already in the possession of an IPFV so Canlas
was only held liable for actual damages. BUTHerrera should still pay for the
redemption price that Canlas paid plus attorneys fees so this will be set-off
against the damages that Canlas has to pay.
3. Taganas v NLRC (CONTINGENT FEE)
Petitioner Atty. Wilfredo E. Taganas represented herein private respondents in a
labor suit for illegal dismissal, underpayment and non-payment of wages,
thirteenth-month pay, attorney's fees and damages conditioned upon a
contingent fee arrangement granting the equivalent of fifty percent of the
judgment award plus three hundred pesos appearance fee per hearing. 1 The
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered Ultra Clean
Services (Ultra) and the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., (PTSI)
respondents therein, jointly and severally, to reinstate herein private
respondents with full backwages, to pay wage differentials, emergency cost of
living allowance, thirteenth-month pay and attorney's fee, but disallowed the
claim for damages for lack of basis. 2 This decision was appealed by Ultra and
PTSI to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and subsequently
by PTSI to the Court but to no avail. During the execution stage of the decision,
petitioner moved to enforce his attorney's charging lien. 3 Private respondents,
aggrieved for receiving a reduced award due to the attorney's charging lien,
contested the validity of the contingent fee arrangement they have with
petitioner, albeit four of the fourteen private respondents have expressed their
conformity thereto. 4
Finding the arrangement excessive, the Labor Arbiter ordered the reduction of
petitioner's contingent fee from fifty percent of the judgment award to ten
percent, except for the four private respondents who earlier expressed their
conformity. 5 Petitioner appealed to NLRC which affirmed with modification the
Labor Arbiter's order by ruling that the ten percent contingent fee should apply
also to the four respondents even if they earlier agreed to pay a higher
percentage. 6Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition for certiorari.
The sole issue in this petition is whether or not the reduction of petitioner's
contingent fee is warranted. Petitioner argues that respondent NLRC failed to
apply the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the factors to be considered in
determining whether or not the stipulated amount of petitioner's contingent fee
is fair and reasonable. Moreover, he contends that the invalidation of the
contingent fee agreement between petitioner and his clients was without any
legal justification especially with respect to the four clients who manifested their
conformity thereto. We are not persuaded.
A contingent fee arrangement is an agreement laid down in an express
contract between a lawyer and a client in which the lawyer's professional
fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is
made to depend upon the success of the litigation. This arrangement is
valid in this jurisdiction. 8 It is, however, under the supervision and scrutiny of
the court to protect clients from unjust charges. 9 Section 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics states that "[a] contract for a contingent fee, where
sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the
case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always
be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness". Likewise,
Rule 138, Section 24 of the Rules of Court provides:
 Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. contingent fee contract being unreasonable and unconscionable the same was
An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client correctly disallowed by public respondent NLRC even with respect to the four
no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with private respondents who agreed to pay higher percentage. Petitioner is
a view to the importance of the subject-matter of the reminded that as a lawyer he is primarily an officer of the court charged with the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties.
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound When he takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and
by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper subjects his professional fees to judicial control.
compensation but may disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.

When it comes, therefore, to the validity of contingent fees, in

large measure it depends on the reasonableness of the stipulated
fees under the circumstances of each case. The reduction of
unreasonable attorney's fees is within the regulatory powers of the
courts.

We agree with the NLRC's assessment that fifty percent of the judgment
award as attorney's fees is excessive and unreasonable. The financial
capacity and economic status of the client have to be taken into account
in fixing the reasonableness of the fee. 11 Noting that petitioner's clients were
lowly janitors who receive miniscule salaries and that they were precisely
represented by petitioner in the labor dispute for reinstatement and claim for
backwages, wage differentials, emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth-
month pay and attorney's fees to acquire what they have not been receiving
under the law and to alleviate their living condition, the reduction of petitioner's
contingent fee is proper. Labor cases, it should be stressed, call for
compassionate justice.

Furthermore, petitioner's contingent fee falls within the purview of Article 111 of
the Labor Code. This article fixes the limit on the amount of attorney's fees
which a lawyer, like petitioner, may recover in any judicial or administrative
proceedings since the labor suit where he represented private respondents
asked for the claim and recovery of wages. In fact, we are not even precluded
from fixing a lower amount than the ten percent ceiling prescribed by the
article when circumstances warrant it. 12 Nonetheless, considering the
circumstances and the able handling of the case, petitioner's fee need not be
further reduced.

The manifestation of petitioner's four clients indicating their conformity

with the contingent fee contract did not make the agreement valid. The
 4. Traders Royal Bank Employees Union v NLRC
Facts:
Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent (UNION) and Atty.
Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz (ATTY. CRUZ) entered into a retainer agreement
whereby the Union obligated itself to pay Atty. Cruz a retainer fee of P3K in
consideration of his firms undertaking to render the services. During the
existence of the agreement, the Union referred to Atty. Cruz the claim of its
members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against Traders Royal
Bank (TRADERS) which was filed with the NLRC. The Union obtained a
favorable judgment from the NLRC and was challenged before the SC by
Traders. The SC modified the decision, deleting the award for mid-year and
year-end bonuses but affirmed the award for holiday pay differential amounting
to P175,794.32. When he received the order of the SC, Atty. Cruz notified the
Union, Traders and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorneys
lien over the award for the holiday pay differential. He filed a motion with the
labor arbiter for determining attorneys fees in and prayed the amount of 10% of
the total award (P17,579.43) be given. The labor arbiter granted his petition
which led the Union to appeal to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the decision of
the labor arbiter and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Union argues that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award
for attorneys fees and argues that the said fees should have been incorporated
in the main case and not after the SC has already reviewed and passed upon
the decision of the NLRC. Also, there shouldnt be payment of attorneys fees
anymore because of anything due to Atty. Cruz is already covered by the
P3,000.00 retainer.
On the other hand, Atty. Cruz argues that attorneys fees are mere incidents of
the main case where the Union was awarded its money claims and to include
such fees in the case would presuppose that the fees will be paid by Traders to
the Union. Also, according to him, the P3000.00 retainer fee is not the
attorneys fees contemplated for.
Issue: W/N Atty. Cruz is entitled to attorneys fees from the award despite the
P3,000.00 retainer fee?
Held: YES, but only to the extent of P10,000.00. The P3,000.00 retainer fee
doesnt cover the services that Atty. Cruz rendered before the labor
arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the Union. It was intended merely as a
consideration for the law firms commitment to render services in Part A and
Part B of the retainer agreement (see NB).
The SC had a lengthy discussion to make the judgment clear regarding the
types of attorneys fees, retainer fees and the basis of whats supposed to be
reasonable compensation and will be dealt with here in seriatim.
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the so-
called ordinary and extraordinary.
In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid
to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The
basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement
with the client. In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity
for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in litigation. The
basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be
made, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client unless they have
agreed otherwise. It is the first type of attorneys fees which Atty. Cruz
demanded before the labor arbiter.
The Court said that it was within Atty. Cruz right to make his claim for
attorneys fees only after the judgment has been deemed final by the SC.
In such a case, lawyers have two options, either to file it before judgment is
rendered with the award being held in abeyance until the main case from which
the attorneys fees has become final, or wait for the final judgment just as Atty.
Cruz did.
As regards the concept of retainer, there are also two types of retainer, a
general retainer/retaining fee and a special retainer.
A general retainer is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as
general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary
business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The reason for this is
that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to
the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost
opportunity.
A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service
rendered by the lawyer for a client.
In Hilado, in reference to general retainer, the Court said that the payment of
retainer has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the
services for which he has retained him to perform. In the case at bar, the SC
said that the P3,000.00 fee is not a payment for Atty. Cruzs execution or
performance of the services listed in the contract, that the fee was independent
and different from the compensation which Atty. Cruz should receive.
Finally, with respect to what the Court deems as reasonable compensation,
the Court surrenders that such is a question of fact. However, it said that in
numerous decisions, it has applied the doctrine of quantum meruit to prevent
unjust enrichment.

Based on such guideline, which was already codified in Rule 20.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the factors to be considered in determining
the amount of attorneys fees are:
1) time spent and the extent of services rendered and required;
2) novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
3) importance of the subject matter;
4) skill demanded;
5) probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proferred case;
6) customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which the lawyer belongs;
7) amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the services;
8) contingency or certainty of compensation;
9) character of the employment, whether occasional or established;
10) professional standing of the lawyer.
In the case at bar, Atty. Cruz based his demand for attorneys fee on the
maximum amount that he can ask in accordance with Art. 111 of the Labor
Code but such fact doesnt preclude the Court in lessening the amount given
that what was stated in the law was the maximum amount.
Attys fees in a judgment is part of the award that goes to the client. It doesnt
reimburse the client for the amount spent to litigate.
5. Padillo v CA
Facts:
Veronica Padillo, in a petition filed against Averi and Casilang, alleged that she
is the owner of the 251 square meter land area located in Quezon Avenue,
Lucena City, Quezon Province, which was purchased from Marina M. de Vera-
Quincho and Margarite de Vera, and that Averia and Casilang unlawfully
refused to turn over the property in her favor.
Padilla petitioned for a court order to place her in the possession of the
property, and prohibit the respondents from disturbing the same, and order the
respondents Averia and Casilang to pay jointly and severally to petitioner
Padillo: a) P150,000 for the use of her property from January 4, 1982, b) moral
and exemplary charges determined by the Court, and c) attorneys fees of
P80,000 plus P600 per appearance in court.
Casilang denied the material allegations, and claimed that he vacated the
property as early as June 1982, thus the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, Averia invoked the decision rendered in Civil Case No.
1620-G, a suit against Quincho. Prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 9114, 3
actions were concerned on the property.
a) Civil Case No. 1620-G was a case filed by Averia against Quincho and
the Register Deeds of Lucena City. The RTC ordered Quincho to
execute necessary documents over the property. The decision became
final and executory as no appeal was filed.
b) M.C. No. 374-82 was filed by Padillo to compel the Register of Deeds
of Lucena City to register the deed of sale wherein de Vera sold of
the property to Padillo. The petition was opposed by Averia.
c) Civil Case No. 1690-G was filed by Averia against Padillo and her
spouse. The case was dismissed by Branch 61 of RTC of Gumaca,
Quezon, for improper venue.
Averia appealed to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, M.C. No. 374-82
was ruled in favor of Padillo. RTC ordered for the registration of the deed of
sale. Respondent Averia filed a petition to the Supreme Court (SC) claiming
that the trial court has no jurisdiction. The SC declared that the trial court has a
jurisdiction, and set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered a new trial.
The trial court declared Padillo as sole and exclusive owner of the property and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to register the deed of sale.
The decision of RTC in M.C. No. 374-82 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), which sustained the decision of the trial court. Averia appealed
to the SC, which was then denied. The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 1690-G for improper venue, the hearing Civil Case No. 9114 was
resumed, but the resolution of Averias Motion to Dismiss was deferred in
view of pendency of M.C. No. 374-82. The M.C. No. 374-82 was resolved in
the decision denying Averias Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suspend Further
Proceeding in Civil Case No. 9114. Averia assailed his denial of motion to
dismiss in a petition, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 15356, before the CA, which
suspended the proceedings of Civil Case No. 9114 to await the final termination
of M.C. No. 374-82. No appeal was filed, so the decision of the CA in CA G.R.
SP No. 15356 became final. The SC denied the petition to challenge the CAs
affirmance of the decision in M.C. No. 374-82, and rendered the decision in
Civil Case No. 9114 which favored petitioner Padillo.
But, on appeal to the CA, CA-G.R. No. 40142 reversed the trial courts
decision on the ground of res judicata. The petitioner sought for
reconsideration but was denied.
Hence this petition.

Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals overlook the significance of the principle of the law of
the case?
Held:
Yes. The appellate court apparently overlooked the significance of the principle
of law of the case which is different from the concept of res judicata. In the
petition, the law of the case on the matter of the pendency of M.C. No. 374-82
to bar Civil Case No. 9114 has been settled in CA G.R. SP No. 15356. When
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9114 on the ground of pendency of M.C. No.
372-83 was raised before the trial court the trial court chose to defer the
resolution. When the issue of pendency was raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356,
the Court of Appeals incorrectly ordered the mere suspension of Civil Case No.
9114 to await the final termination of M.C. No. 374-82, instead of dismissing the
case and/or filling the claim for damages in M.C. No. 374-82.
Law of the case does not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata, and
applies only to one case. It is defined as the opinion delivered on a former
appeal. As a general rule, a decision prior appeal of the same case is held to be
the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, as long as the facts
of the predicated case continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
With respect to attorney's fees, the award thereof is the exception rather
than the general rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party
prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate. Attorney's fees as part of damages are not the same as
attorney's fees in the concept of the amount paid to a lawyer. In the
ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to
a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter, while
in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for
damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party.
Attorney's fees as part of damages is awarded only in the instances
specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the
court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the
exception and justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be
reasonable. Thereunder, the trial court may award attorney's fees where it
deems just and equitable that it be so granted. While we respect the trial court's
exercise of its discretion in this case, we find the award of the trial court of
attorney's fees in the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos
(P107,000.00) plus One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per appearance in the
hearing of the case and litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00), to be unreasonable and excessive. Attorney's fees as part of
damages is not meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the
losing litigant. Thus, it should be reasonably reduced to Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
Thus, even if erroneous, the ruling of CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 became
the law of the case, and may no longer be disturbed or modified. The CAs
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 on the matter of the issue of existence of
M.C. No. 374-82 as a bar to Civil Case No. 9114 should dictate all further
proceedings.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
1. PCGG v Sandiganbayan
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered
financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to
Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on
its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed
to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A
public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held where Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid.
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated
by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to
recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and
cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio
Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence
with former Pres. Marcos.
The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel,
former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was
alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in the said service.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendozas former function as SolGen and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court
assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when
he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the
Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of matter
and the metes and bounds of intervention that he made on the matter.
Beyond doubt that the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as
SolGen involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how
to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for
its liquidation in CFI of Manila.
The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure
to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in
stressing that drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank
to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank.
The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include
the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from
the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds
of the intervention.
The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics
is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where
the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous
such as drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law. The court rules that
the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely
petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the
Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the
role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics:
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ,
should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office
or employ.
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a
vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure
on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes
this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public
office.
A plain reading shows that the interdiction applies to a lawyer who once served
in the government and relates to his accepting engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
 2. Gamaliel Abaqueta v Bernardito Floredo
This is an administrative complaint against Atty. Bernardito A. Florido filed
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
praying that appropriate sanctions be imposed on respondent for representing
conflicting interests.
Complainant is a Filipino by birth who had acquired American
citizenship. He resides at 15856 N. 15th Way, Phoenix, Arizona 85022,
U.S.A. Respondent is a practicing lawyer based in Cebu City.
On November 28, 1983, complainant engaged the professional services of
respondent through his attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, to represent him
in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Deceased Bonifacia Abaqueta,[2] Susana Uy Trazo, petitioner before
the Regional Trial court of Cebu.[3]
Accordingly, respondent entered his appearance in Special Proceedings
No. 3971-R as counsel for herein complainant.[4] Subsequently, he filed
complainants Objections and Comments to Inventory and Accounting,
registering complainants objection
. . . to the inclusion of the properties under Items 1 to 5 contained in the
inventory of the administratrix dated November 9, 1983. These properties are
the sole and exclusive properties of the oppositor per the latest tax declarations
already marked as Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the Formal Offer of Exhibits by
oppositor in writing dated August 17, 1983 xxx. [5]
Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of
money against complainant, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11453 and
entitled, Milagros Yap Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel Abaqueta and Casiano Gerona.
[6]
Respondent signed the Complaint as counsel for plaintiff Milagros Yap
Abaqueta, averring, inter alia, that:
Plaintiff and defendant Gamaliel Abaqueta are the conjugal owners of those
certain parcels of land, more particularly as follows
The parcels of land referred to as conjugal property of complainant and
Milagros Yap-Abaqueta are the very same parcels of land in Special
Proceedings No. 3971-R which respondent, as lawyer of complainant, alleged
as the sole and exclusive properties of complainant. In short, respondent
lawyer made allegations in Civil Case No. CEB-11453 which were contrary
to and in direct conflict with his averments as counsel for complainant in
Special Proceedings No. 3971-R.
Complainant further averred that respondent admitted he was never
authorized by the former to appear as counsel for complainants ex-wife in Civil
Case No. CEB-11453; that respondent failed to indicate in the Complaint the
true and correct address of herein complainant, which respondent knew as far
back as August 2, 1990, when he wrote a letter to the complainant at the said
address.[7] Consequently, complainant failed to receive summons and was
declared in default in Civil Case No. CEB-11453. While the order of default was
eventually set aside, complainant incurred expenses to travel to the Philippines,
which were conservatively estimated at $10,000.00. He argues that
respondents conduct constitute professional misconduct and malpractice as
well as trifling with court processes.
In his defense, respondent claims in his Answer[8] that he always acted in
good faith in his professional relationship with complainant in spite of the fact
that they have not personally met. He based the matters he wrote in the
Complaint on information and documents supplied by Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig,
complainants sister-in-law and attorney-in-fact, indicating that he was sole and
exclusive owner of the properties. This was sometime in November 1983. No
affidavit of adjudication was ever furnished respondent by complainant and this
was apparently suppressed because it would show that the properties formed
part of the estate.
Eight years later, in November 1991, long after Special Proceedings No.
3971-R was settled and the attorney-client relationship between complainant
and respondent was terminated, Mrs. Milagros Abaqueta through Mrs. Baclig,
engaged his services to file Civil Case No. CEB-11453. Mrs. Baclig presented
to him a deed of absolute sale dated July 7, 1975, [9] showing that the properties
subject hereof were not complainants exclusive property but his conjugal
property with his wife, the same having been acquired during the subsistence of
their marriage. Thus, in all good faith, respondent alleged in the complaint that
said properties were conjugal assets of the spouses.
Respondent further pointed out that his law firm handles on the average
eighty new court cases annually and personally interviews four or five clients,
prospective clients and/or witnesses daily except Saturdays and Sundays. It
regularly closes to the public at 7:00 p.m., but work continues sometimes until
8:30 p.m. This has been going on for the last twenty-five years out of
respondents thirty-three years of private practice. The absence of personal
contact with complainant and the lapse of eight years resulted in the oversight
and/or lapse of respondents memory that complainant was a former
client. Furthermore, the caption of the Special Proceeding was not in the name
of complainant but was entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Bonifacia Payahay Abaqueta.
Respondent expressed regret over the oversight and averred that
immediately after discovering that he formerly represented complainant in
Special Proceeding No. 3971-R, he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for
plaintiff, which was granted by the trial court.[10] He denied any malice in his acts
and alleged that it is not in his character to do malice or falsehood particularly in
the exercise of his profession.
In his Comments/Observations on Respondents Answer,[11] complainant
averred that respondents conduct was geared towards insuring a court victory
for Milagros Yap in Civil Case No. CEB-11453, wherein he deliberately stated
that complainants address was 9203 Riverside Lodge Drive, Houston, Texas,
77083, U.S.A., when he knew fully well that complainants true and correct
address was c/o V.A. Hospital, 7 th Street & Italian School Road, Phoenix,
Arizona, 85013, U.S.A. By falsely stating and concealing his true and correct
address, respondent eventually succeeded in obtaining a default judgment in
favor of his client.
During the pendency of these proceedings before the IBP, it appeared that
respondents son got married to the daughter of IBP National President Arthur
D. Lim. Thus, Atty. Lim inhibited himself from participating in the resolution of
the case.[12] Subsequently, a Resolution was issued requiring the IBP to elevate
the entire records of the case within thirty (30) days from notice. [13]
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not
respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
investigating commissioner found that respondent clearly violated the
prohibition against representing conflicting interests and recommended that he
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.
We find the recommendation well-taken.
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides
that: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is
his duty to oppose it for the other client. [14] In short, if he argues for one client,
this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.
There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect
his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection.[16]
As pointed out by the investigating commissioner, respondent does not
deny that he represented complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R. He
also does not deny that he is the lawyer of Milagros Yap Abaqueta in Civil Case
No. CEB-11453, filed against complainant and involving the same properties
which were litigated in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R. Respondent also
admitted that he did not secure the consent of complainant before he agreed to
act as Milagros Yap Abaquetas lawyer in Civil Case No. CEB-11453.
The reasons proffered by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his
clear representation of conflicting interests in this case. First, the investigating
commissioner observed that the name Gamaliel Abaqueta is not a common
name. Once heard, it will surely ring a bell in ones mind if he came across the
name again. In this case, respondent actively prosecuted the cause of
complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, such that it would be
impossible for respondent not to have recalled his name.
Second, assuming arguendo that respondents memory was indeed faulty,
still it is incredible that he could not recall that complainant was his client,
considering that Mrs. Charito Baclig, who was complainants attorney-in-fact
and the go-between of complainant and respondent in Special Proceedings No.
3971-R, was the same person who brought Milagros Yap Abaqueta to
him. Even a person of average intelligence would have made the connection
between Mrs. Baclig and complainant under such circumstances.
Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 and
Special Proceedings No. 3971-R are the same properties could not have
escaped the attention of respondent. With such an abundance of
circumstances to aid respondents memory, it simply strains credulity for him to
have conveniently forgotten his past engagement as complainants
lawyer. What rather appears, given the prevailing facts of this case, is that he
chose to ignore them on the assumption that the long period of time spanning
his past and present engagement would effectively blur the memories of the
parties to such a discrepancy.
 It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the
right to decline such employment,[17] subject, however, to Canon 14 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[18] Once he agrees to take up the cause
of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.[19] He must serve the
client with competence and diligence [20] and champion the latters cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.[21]
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client.
[22]
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client
which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [23] Indeed, as we
stated in Sibulo v. Cabrera,[24] The relation of attorney and client is based on
trust, so that double dealing, which could sometimes lead to treachery,
should be avoided.[25]
Credence cannot, however, be given to the charge that respondent
fraudulently and maliciously falsified the true and correct address of the
complainant notwithstanding respondents knowledge thereof. Lawyers normally
do not have knowledge of the personal circumstances of a party in a case and
usually rely on the information supplied by their clients. The fact that
respondent sent a letter to complainant at the latters correct address [26] sixteen
months before the filing of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 does not by itself prove
malice on the part of respondent. A new address was furnished by Milagros Yap
Abaqueta days before the complaint was filed. Respondent had no reason to
doubt the correctness of the address of the complainant given to him by
Milagros Yap Abaqueta considering that she was complainants wife.
3. Artuzuela v Maderazo
FACTS
On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint
for disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly
neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to represent her interests with zeal
and enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil Case No. 13666 was scheduled
for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, respondent asked for its
postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding
complainant's persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do
anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining
complainant's consent.10
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her
interests. While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia's Answer
to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in
respondent's office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent who
sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the
dismissal was with her consent.11
Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred that he
conscientiously did his part as the complainant's lawyer in Civil Case No.
13666. He withdrew as counsel because the complainant was uncooperative
and refused to confer with him. He also gave several notices to the complainant
and made known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to withdraw as
counsel. Because of the severed relationship, the lower court, after holding a
conference, decided to grant respondent's manifestation and advised the
complainant to secure the services of a new lawyer. Complainant, however,
refused and instead, sought the dismissal of the case.
Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial
Conference scheduled on August 20, 1993 so that he could file the Amended
Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint was
printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and having acted
as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested him to prepare
Echavia's Answer but he declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office
and asked respondent's secretary to print the document. Respondent intimated
that the complainant and Echavia have fabricated the accusations against him
to compel him to pay the amount of P500,000.00.13
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint and therefore guilty of conflicting interests?
HELD:
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one
party need not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not
have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his
efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting interests of record--- although
these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge.
It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the
pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that
of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse
party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with
impunity, the highest form of disloyalty
As pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo, introduced
himself as his lawyer and after some sessions in the latter's office, asked him to
return and sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the
Amended Complaint.
The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak. Respondent
did not bother to present his secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to
prove his allegations. Instead, he offered a convenient excuse--- that he cannot
anymore locate his secretary.
Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare
Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint, after reaching an agreement
whereby Echavia would testify in favor of the complainant. After he declined the
request, he claimed that it was the complainant who prepared the document
and asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavia's Answer to
the Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant.
With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook.
We cannot find any reason why Echavia would commit perjury and entangle
himself, once again, with the law. He does not stand to profit at all by accusing
the respondent falsely.
Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of legal education, we
can not see how she could have prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended
Complaint and device a legal maneuver as complicated as the present case.
Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to
render an impartial decision, having been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-
33277, does not convince us to grant new trial. This is the first time that
respondent questions the membership of Commissioner Ingles in the
Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in good faith that
Commissioner Ingles would be biased and prejudiced, he should have asked
for the latter's inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we could not find any
hint of irregularity, bias or prejudice in the conduct of the investigation that
would lead us to set it aside
4. Abragan v Rodriguez
FACTS
That sometime in 1986, the petitioners hired the services of the respondent and
the latter, represented the former in the case entitled PABLO SALOMON et al
vs. RICARDO DACALUZ et al., before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3 docketed as Civil Case No. 11204, for Forcible
Entry with Petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages, [and] a
Certified True and Correct Copy of the COMPLAINT by Clerk of Court III
Gerardo B. Ucat of the said Court, is herewith attached to the original of this
PETITION, while photocopies of the same are also attached to the duplicate
copies of this same Petition and marked as Annex A hereof;
3. That after the Case No. 11204 was finally won, and a Writ of Execution was
issued by the Honorable Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 3, the same respondent lawyer represented the petitioners herein;
4. That when respondent counsel disturbed the association (Cagayan de Oro
Landless Residents Association, Inc.), to which all the complainants belong, by
surreptitiously selling some rights to other persons without the consent
of the petitioners herein, they decided to sever their client-lawyer
relationship;
5. That in fact, the National Bureau of Investigation of Cagayan de Oro City, is
presently undertaking an investigation on the illegal activities of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez pertaining to his express involvement in the illegal and unauthorized
apportionment, assignment and sale of parcels of land subject to the Case No.
11204, where he represented the poor landless claimants of Cagayan de Oro
City, which include your petitioners in this case;
6. That petitioners herein later filed an indirect contempt charge under Civil
Case No. 11204 against Sheriff Fernando Loncion et al., on August 2, 1991
engaging the services of Atty. LORETO O. SALVA, SR., an alleged former
student of law of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, [and a] certified true and correct copy
of the complaint thereat consisting of four (4) pages is herewith attached and
photocopies of which are also attached to the duplicates hereof, and
correspondingly marked as their Annex B;
7. That respondent lawyer, Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, (in the Indirect Contempt
Case under the same Civil Case No. 11204,) REPRESENTED and actively took
up the defense of FERNANDO LONCION et al. much to the dismay, damage
and prejudice of the herein petitioners, [and] a copy of Atty. Rodriguezs Answer,
which is also certified true and correct by Clerk of Court III Gerardo Ucat of
Branch 3 of MTCC Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of three (3) pages, is
attached to the original of this Petition, while photocopies of the same are
attached to the other copies hereof and accordingly marked as Annex C;
8. That the records will bear the petitioners out that their counsel, Atty. SALVA
SR. later on withdrew the case of Indirect Contempt upon the suggestion of
Atty. Maximo Rodriguez; and instead, filed the Motion for the Issuance of an
Alias Writ of Execution;
9. That on January 12, 1993, the herein respondent, without consulting the
herein Petitioners who are all poor and ignorant of court procedures and the
law, filed in behalf of the plaintiffs (which include the herein Petitioners) in Civil
Case No. 11204, a Motion to Withdraw Plaintiffs Exhibits, [and] a certified true
and correct copy of said Motion by Mr. Gerardo Ucat of MTCC Branch 3,
Cagayan de Oro City is herewith attached to the original of this Petition, while
photocopies of the same are also attached to the rest of the copies of this same
Petition, and are correspondingly marked as their Annex D.
10. That the illegal and unethical actions of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez are most
obnoxious, condemnable, and highly immoral, to say the least, more so if we
consider his social standing and ascendancy in the community of Cagayan de
Oro City;
11. That the records of Civil Case No. 11204 which are voluminous will bear the
petitioners allegations against the herein respondent, who, after representing
them initially, then transferring allegiance and services to the adverse parties
(Lonchion, Palacio and NHA Manager), came back to represent the herein
petitioners without any regard [for] the rules of law and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, which is highly contemptible and a clear violation of his
oath as a lawyer and an officer of the courts of law;
12. That these acts are only those that records will bear, because outside of the
court records, respondent, without regard [for] delicadeza, fair play and the rule
of law, has assigned, apportioned and sold parcels of land[,] subject matter in
Civil Case No. 11204 which legally have been pronounced and decided to be in
the possession of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11204, who are partly the
petitioners herein. Thus, they cannot yet enjoy the fruits of the tedious and
protracted legal battle because of respondents illegal acts, which have instilled
fear among the plaintiffs and the petitioners herein;
13. That respondent lawyer even represented ERLINDA ABRAGAN, one of the
herein petitioners, in a later proceedings in Civil Case No. 11204 wherein the
apportionment of parcels of land was erroneously, unproceduraly and illegally
submitted to a commissioner, and that ERLINDA ABRAGAN, after winning in
the said Civil Case was later on dispossessed of her rights by respondent
counsels maneuver, after the decision (in Civil Case No. 11208) became final
executory;
14. That to make matters worse, respondent Atty. Rodriguez eventually fenced
an area consisting of about 10, 200 square meters within Lot No. 1982[,] the
subject matter in Civil Case No. 11204 without the consent of the herein
petitioners. He even openly and publicly proclaimed his possession and
ownership thereof, which fact is again and also under NBI investigation;
15. That all the foregoing acts of respondent lawyer plus his continuing and
ongoing illegal and unethical maneuvers have deprived the herein petitioners of
their vested rights to possess and eventually own the land they have for
decades possessed, and declared as such by final judgment in Civil Case No.
11204.
In his Comment,[2] respondent flatly denied the accusations of
petitioners. He explained that the withdrawal of the exhibits, having been
approved by the trial court, was not illegal, obnoxious, undesirable and highly
immoral. He added that he took over the 8,000 square meters of land only after
it had been given to him as attorneys fees. In his words:
14. Respondent ADMITS that he fenced an area of about 8,000 sq. [m]. after
the association had awarded the same as attorneys fees in Civil Case Number
11204, the dismissal of the appeal by the NHA, the successful handling of three
(3) cases in the SUPREME COURT, the pending case of QUIETING OF TITLE
filed by the NHA, and for the pending reconveyance case, Civil Case No. 93-
573, supra. These area of 8,000 sq. [m]., was awarded as attorneys fees, which
[were] supposed to be ten percent of the 22 hectares, Lot No. 1982, the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 11204, but the association and its members were able
to take actual possession by judgment of the courts only o[f] the twelve (12)
hectares. [This] area consisting of 8,000 sq. [m]., and consisting of two (2) lots
[was] fenced by the respondent to prevent squatters from entering the
area. The rights of possession and ownership o[f] this area by the respondent
depends upon the outcome of Civil Case No. 93-573, supra, for reconveyance
of title by the association and its members versus the NHA, et. al. If it is true
that this is under investigation by the NBI, then why, not wait and submit the
investigation of the NHA, instead of filing this unwarranted, false and fabricated
charge based on preposterous and ridiculous charges without any proof
whatsoever, except the vile [language] of an irresponsible lawyer.[3]
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Reply [4] in which they reiterated their
allegations against respondent and added that the latter likewise violated Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and/or
decision.[5]
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
 In her Report and Recommendation dated January 23, 2001, Investigating
IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule 15.03
of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her report reads in part
as follows:
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent represented conflicting
interest considering that the complainants were the same plaintiffs in both
cases and were duly specified in the pleadings particularly in the caption of the
cases. Under the said predicament even if complainants were excluded as
members of the Association represented by the respondent; the latter should
have first secured complainants written consent before representing defendants
in the Indirect Contempt case particularly Macario Palacio, president of the
Association, or inhibited himself.
It is very unfortunate that in his desire to render service to his client, respondent
overlooked the fact that he already violated Rule 15.03 of [C]anon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
We have no alternative but to abide by the rules. [6]
IBP Board of Governors Resolution
Upholding the above-quoted Report, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended via its May 26, 2001 Resolution
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) months for
violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors, but hold that the penalty should be six-month suspension as
recommended by the investigating commissioner.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
At the outset, we agree with Commissioner Navarros conclusion that apart
from their allegations in their various pleadings, petitioners did not proffer any
proof tending to show that respondent had sold to other persons several rights
over the land in question; and that he had induced the former counsel for
petitioners, Atty. Salva Jr., to withdraw the indirect contempt case that they had
filed. Neither did the IBP find anything wrong as regards the 8,000 square
meters awarded to respondent as payment for his legal services. Petitioners
bare assertions, without any proof to back them up, would not justify the
imposition of a penalty on respondent.
Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. They are expected
to uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The trust and
confidence clients repose in them require a high standard and appreciation of
the latters duty to the former, the legal profession, the courts and the public.
Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealings. To this end, lawyers should refrain from doing
anything that might tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of their profession.[7]
In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after full disclosure of the facts.
The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando:[8]
[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge
his secrets or confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers
or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.[9] (Italics in the
original)
In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect
contempt case and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 11204.
[10]
Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be
counsel for the defendants in the indirect contempt proceedings. Attorneys owe
undivided allegiance to their clients, and should at all times weigh their actions,
especially in their dealings with the latter and the public at large. They must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times.
 The Court will not tolerate any departure from the straight and narrow path
demanded by the ethics of the legal profession.
In Hilado v. David,[11] which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers to
be like Caesars wife to be pure and to appear to be so.
This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well as to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy,
on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing.
Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than
enhanced, the public perception of the legal profession. His divided loyalty
constitutes malpractice for which he may be suspended, following Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. Any member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
to do. x x x.
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. We find however that
suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law, as recommended by
Commissioner Navarro, is sufficient to discipline respondent.
A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel
reveals that the Court has imposed on erring attorneys [12] either a reprimand, or
a suspension from the practice of law from five (5) months [13] to as high as two
(2) year
5. Pasay Law and Conscience Union Inc v Paz
On June 5, 1971, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (PLACU) filed this
disbarment case against David D.C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar. The
complainant charged the respondent with malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, gross immoral conduct and/or disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. 1
In a resolution dated June 22, 1971, this Court required the respondent to file
an answer to the complaint against him. 2
After the respondent had filed his answer 3 and the complainant had submitted
a reply, 4 this administrative case was referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 5
On January 23, 1973, the Solicitor General, having found sufficient grounds to
proceed against the respondent after due investigation of the administrative
case against him, submitted, among others sixteen copies, in a sealed
envelope, of his complaint against the respondent, together with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during the investigation of the case, the folder of
exhibits, the record of the investigation not the case and the original Supreme
Court record. 6
The Solicitor General charged Atty. D.C. Paz with representing clients with
conflicting interests and gross misconduct in office.
Regarding the charge of representing clients with conflicting interests, the
complainant alleged that in 1969, in the course of the investigation then being
conducted by the "Charlie Division" of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations, otherwise known as the PARGO, on the complaint of
Dr. Irineo P. Sia for anti-graft against the then ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta of Pasay
City, the respondent, David D.C. Paz, was then PARGO's Legal Officer and
Chief Prosecutor, as well as the head of the aforesaid "Charlie Division"; that in
the series of follow-ups made with PARGO by Dr. Irineo P. Sia himself and at
times in company of Atty. Galileo P. Brion, President of the complainant,
PLACU, of the aforesaid anti-graft complaint against the then ex-Mayor Pablo
Cuneta, the respondent enlisted the help of Dr. Irineo P. Sia and Atty. Galilee P.
Brion in the gathering of evidence which included PLACU's copies of the
records of Civil Case No. 72967 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
"Vicente D. Isip vs. The Pasay City Government, et al."; that in the course of the
investigation by the PARGO of the aforesaid anti-graft complaint, but prior to
September 10, 1969, the respondent even administered oaths to some persons
who had given written statements before the PARGO investigators; that on
September 10, 1969, the respondent was detailed by the then PARGO
Secretary Ramon D. Bagatsing as Executive and Police Adviser to the Mayor of
Makati, Rizal;
On the same day, the respondent designated as division-in-charge Atty. Rodolfo
Navarro, who was then Team Leader of Charlie-two under PARGO's "Charlie
Division" to act for and in respondent's behalf while not in office and while
performing his duties and functions as such adviser in Makati, Rizal;
Later on, after respondent had resigned from the PARGO sometime in January
1970 and on the basis of the investigation conducted by the PARGO on the
aforementioned anti-graft complaint of Dr. Sia, the PARGO's successor, the
Complaints and Investigation Office (CIO) filed an anti-graft charge and another
charge for technical malversation both against Pablo Cuneta and others with
the Pasay City Fiscal's Office, docketed therein as I.S. Nos. 71712 and 71712-
A. respectively; that on November 13 and 23, 1970, during the preliminary
investigation by the Pasay City Fiscal's Office of I.S. Nos. 71712 and 71712-A,
the respondent entered his appearance, participated and orally argued therein
as one of the counsels of Pablo Cuneta; that while in subsequent hearings
thereof, the respondent no longer appeared as counsel for Cuneta, it was only
after his appearance had been questioned by Atty. Brion;
Up to September 10, 1969, the respondent was then PARGO's Legal Officer
and Chief Prosecutor, as well as head of PARGO's "Charlie Division", he had
access to, and necessarily acquired, directly or indirectly, knowledge of the
facts of the said anti-graft case, its weak as well as its strong points, and such
knowledge is confidential and should be guarded with great care, lest it
jeopardizes PARGO, an agency and instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines whose interest respondent swore to serve and protect without any
mental reservation, in the ultimate prosecution of the said case; that there was
a relationship of attorney and client between respondent and the government;
that for having appeared twice, participated and orally argued as counsel for
Pablo Cuneta during the preliminary investigation of the charges for anti-graft
and technical malversation filed by the CIO, successor of PARGO, against said
Pablo Cuneta and others before the Pasay City Fiscal's Office, the respondent
violated Section 6 of the Canons of Legal Ethics and Section 20 (e) of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court; and that the alleged withdrawal of the
respondent as counsel for Pablo Cuneta, although in this connection there is
nothing reflected in the records of the preliminary investigation, is of no moment
for he had already violated the aforesaid Canons of Legal Ethics and that
respondent's having appeared twice as Counsel for Cuneta in the preliminary
investigation of the aforesaid charge constitutes clear attempts on respondent's
part to damage CIO's cause against Cuneta.
On the charge of gross misconduct in office, the complaint stated that in the
course of the investigation by the PARGO of Dr. Sia's anti-graft complaint
against the then ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta of Pasay City, but prior to September
10, 1969, the respondent borrowed and received from Atty. Brion the PLACU's
copies of the record or expedients of Civil Case No. 72967 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila entitled Vicente D. Isip vs. The Pasay City Government, et
al.," in the presence of Dr. Sia and Atty. Alidio for the purpose of making xerox
copies of such relevant documents therein to be utilized as evidence in the said
anti-graft case; that notwithstanding repeated requests by Atty. Brion, the
respondent never returned to the former the aforesaid PLACU's copies of the
record or expedients, and when Atty. Brion manifested before Pasay City Fiscal
Pineda during the preliminary investigation on November 13, 1970 of the anti-
graft and technical malversation charges against Pablo Cuneta and others
about the non-return to him of said expediente, respondent denied having
borrowed and received the same, to the prejudice of PARGO's prosecution of
the said charges, so that PARGO, through Atty. Brion, had to reconstitute the
answer and its seventeen annexes which formed part of the said record or
expedients, and it was only then that these documents were presented in the
aforementioned preliminary investigation; and that the respondent's conduct in
this regard tended to prevent and obstruct the administration of justice by
concealing evidence, thus constituting gross misconduct in office. 7
In his answer filed on February 24, 1973, respondent, David D.C. Paz,
specifically denied the allegation contained in paragraphs 1 to 9 of the
complaint on representing clients with conflicting interests, the same being
contrary to the evidence of record submitted to the investigation conducted by
Solicitor Eulogio Racquel Santos and averred that the respondent, Paz did not
participation the investigation of the Cuneta anti-graft case except to swear the
witnesses; that the Secretary of PARGO issued Mission Order No. 362 directing
Atty. Rodolfo Navarro and Engineers Platon Chaves, Ventura Villarosa, Gabriel
Abellada, Jr. and agents Lysias G. Manalo and Edilberto Arguelles, Jr. and
Henry C. Consina to undertake a special mission and carry out instructions
given by the Secretary in connection with the confidential investigation being
undertaken by PARGO; that a g to the affidavit Of Lysias Manalo of the
Philippine Constabulary, the Secretary of PARGO, by virtue of Mission Order
No. 362, the continuance of the re-investigation of the complaint of Dr. Irineo P.
Sia, against the ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta and they for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act; that in fact, in 1969, the respondent Paz was on
detail as police ad. viser of the Mayor of Makati, Rizal and in 1970, he from
PARGO and transferred to Congress; that except for the self-serving
declarations of Atty. Brion and Dr. Irineo Sia, no other evidence was presented
to prove that the respondent Paz investigated the said anti-graft case in the
PARGO; that it is true that respondent Paz appeared among a battery of
lawyers for Mayor Cuneta but when his appearance was questioned by Atty.
Brion, it was withdrawn; and that the anti-graft case against Mayor Cuneta was
finally dismissed.
Anent the charge of gross misconduct in office, the respondent denied the
allegation in paragraphs 1 to 6 of the second count, the same being contrary to
the evidence of record and alleged that the charge is a fabrication; that Atty,
Brion was also a special assistant in the PARGO; that when the respondent
Paz resigned from the PARGO, he was granted a clearance dated January 2,
1970 clearing him from any record or money accountability; that Hector Lumba,
Docket Officer of PARGO who was presented by Atty. Brion as a witness,
admitted on cross-examination that the respondent Paz had been cleared of
accountabilities by the Docket Section; and that at the time the clearance was
granted, the respondent had no pending cases in his possession that Atty. Brion
admit" that the alleged expediente supposedly borrowed by the respondent Paz
was merely his lawyer's file as intervenor in Civil Case No. 72967; that his
motion for intervention was, however, denied; that the lawyer's file was
allegedly finally reconstituted and presented in the preliminary investigation of
the anti-graft case against Pablo Cuneta; and Atty. Brion declared that the
respondent Paz "receipted" for the same expediente but during the
investigation conducted by Solicitor Racquel Santos, Atty. Brion could not
produce any receipt; that neither could Atty. Brion present any proof that he
addressed a written complaint or demand to PARGO for the return of the
alleged expediente and Dr. Sia admitted that the evidence gathered were
turned over to Atty. Cuaresma and Mangase, not to respondent Paz.
On the charge representing clients with conflicting interests, the evidence has
duly established that the respondent, David D.C. Paz, as PARGO's Legal
Officer and Legal Prosecutor and head of the "Charlie Division", took part in the
investigation of the anti-graft case against ex-Mayor Cuneta by administering
oaths to witnesses and gathering evidence. He acquired knowledge of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the anti-graft case. The respondent obtained
confidential information and learned of the evidence of the PARGO against ex-
Mayor Cuneta. There was undoubtedly a relationship of attorney and client
between the respondent David D.C. Paz and the PARGO.
It is also a fact that at the early stages of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the City Fiscal of Pasay of the anti-graft case against ex-Mayor
Pablo Cuneta, the respondent appeared as counsel for said Cuneta. This is the
same anti-graft case investigated by the PARGO when the respondent was
head of the "Charlie Division" thereof. That the respondent later withdrew his
appearances as counsel of Cuneta is of no moment. He had already violated
the Canons of Legal Ethics and Sec. 20(e) of Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court
which provides:
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at a every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval;
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent has displayed a lack concern for his duties as a lawyer and an
office of the court. In Nombrando vs. Hernandez, 8 this court said:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason
to disagree with him, that even if respondent did not use
against his client any information or evidence acquired by ham
as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to
information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which
was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the
dispute over the land that triggered the mauling incident which
gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This
Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts.
In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings
between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested
would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial of other
matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's
cause
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized
against his former client information given to him in a
professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from appearing as
counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the
same cast of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:
 Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare
relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interest. This stern rule is designed not alone
to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct,
but as wok to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. ... It is founded on
principles of public policy of good taste. As has been said in
another case, the n 43 not necessarily one of the rights of the
parties, but as to whether attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorneys, like 's Ceasar's wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice. 9
Under the circumstances, the respondent should be punished by suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) months, 10 with a warning that a repetition of
the same offense wig be dealt with more drastically.
There is no sufficient evidence that the respondent had borrowed the record of
Civil Case No. 72967 of the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled "Vicente
D. Isip vs. The Pasay City Government, et al. According to Atty. Galilee Brion,
the respondent issued a receipt for the record. However, no such receipt could
be presented at the investigation. Moreover, Dr. Irineo Sia admitted that the
evidence in connection with the Cuneta anti-graft case was turned over to Attys.
Mangase and Cuaresma, both of the PARGO. In view thereof, the respondent
cannot be held guilty of the charge of serious misconduct.
6. Gesuden v Ferrer
YDIA JAMERO GESUDEN, in her verified complaint, accuses Atty. EDWIN Z.
FERRER of dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar. She
states that her mother, Lucia Jamero Gesuden and her mothers co-heirs
engaged the services of Atty. Ferrer who prepared an Extra-Judicial Partition of
Property left by their deceased parents; that her mother was to receive 7,154
sq. m. of the land which was partitioned but she actually received only 4,359 sq.
m. because Atty. Ferrer acquired the difference by means of deceit.
Required to answer the complaint, Atty. Ferrer denied the imputation. The case
was then referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Solicitor General has reported that:
"An examination of the evidence presented by the complainant does not
support her allegation that respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer had acquired, by
deceit, a portion of the real estate subject of the extra-judicial partition. That
particular portion of real estate referred to by the complainant was, in fact, sold
to Edwin Z. Ferrer by complainants mother as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale (Exhibit "G" for complainant; Exhibit "1" for respondent). This
was confirmed by complainant herself when she testified . . ." (Rollo, p. 72.)
However, the Solicitor General asserts that Atty. Ferrer violated Section 20 (e)
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which requires attorneys "To maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of
his client . . ." in that "after initially having been retained by the heirs of Doroteo
Jamero to prepare the documents for the extra-judicial partition of the property
left by the decedent, later became the counsel of one of the heirs
(complainants mother, Lucia Gesuden) in a case designated as Recovery of
Hereditary Shares with Damages (Exhibit "C")." (Rollo, p. 74.) Exhibit C is the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2676 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Norte for "Recovery of Hereditary Shares with Damages" filed by Lucia Jamero
Gesuden against Agapito Jamero, Et. Al.
According to the Solicitor General:
"When respondent was hired to prepare the documents for the partition of the
property, he became, for all intents and purposes, the lawyer of all the heirs. In
this situation, he was in a position to know the relevant and irrelevant, secret
and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the
preparation of the documents, an attorney acquires data and/or information that
might prejudice one or all of the heirs.
"In later becoming a counsel for one of the heirs in a case filed against the
other heirs, and in disputing the division or partition which he himself devised in
the extra-judicial partition, respondent Edwin Z. Ferrer failed to adhere to
proper professional standard and to comply with the duties imposed upon him
as a lawyer. Thus, even without impugning respondents good faith, his taking
up the cause of one of the heirs in a case filed against the other heirs, should
not be sanctioned. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a
distinguished member, into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the
integrity of justice." (Rollo, p. 75.)

In the light of the foregoing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint against Atty.
Ferrer for violation of Rule 138, Section 20(e) of the Rules of Court. In his
answer, the respondent could only say that he had advised against the filing of
the complaint and that he "withdrew from said case even before it had been
tried on the merits."
Assuming for the sake of argument that the respondent did advise against the
filing of the complaint, the proper thing for him to do was not to involve himself
in it. As to his withdrawal therefrom, the order of the court allowing him to do so
shows that he withdrew after he had presented the principal evidence for the
plaintiff.
We hold that the respondent violated his duty as a lawyer when he appeared as
counsel for one of the heirs in her suit against the other heirs over a matter
which the respondent had handled for all of them
7. Tiana v Ocampo
FACTS
First case:
Maria Tiania claims in her verified complaint that respondent Amado Ocampo
who has been her "retaining counsel" in all her legal problems and court cases
as early as 1966, has always had her unqualified faith and confidence. One
Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock sued Tiania for ejectment 2 from a parcel of land.
Ocampo appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock.
Tiania confronted Ocampo about this but the latter reassured Tiania that he will
take care of everything and that there was no need for Tiania to hire a new
lawyer since he is still Tiania's lawyer. Ocampo prepared the answer in the said
ejectment case, which Tiania signed. Then Ocampo made Tiania sign a
Compromise Agreement which the latter signed without reading.
Tiania was shocked when she received an order to vacate the property in
question. To hold off her ejectment for another two years, Ocampo advised
Tiania to pay him a certain amount for the sheriff. Ocampo denied the charges
in detail. Although he handled some legal problems and executed some notarial
deeds for Tiania from 1966-1971, Tiania had also engaged the services of
various counsel to represent her in several criminal and civil cases, involving
violations of municipal ordinances and estafa. Thus, he could not be the
complainant's "retaining counsel" in all her legal problems and court cases.
Ocampo then insisted that he appeared on behalf of Mrs. Blaylock, and not as
counsel of Tiania. He never saw or talked to Tiania from the time the said civil
case was filed up to the pre-trial and as such could not have discussed with her
the complaint, the hiring of another lawyer, and more so the preparation of the
answer in the said case.
He admitted that during the pre-trial of the said case, Tiania showed to him a
document which supported her claim, over the property in question. Ocampo,
after going over the document, expressed his doubts about its authenticity.
This convinced Tiania to sign a Compromise Agreement and to pay the
acquisition cost to Blaylock over a period of six (6) months. But Tiania never
fulfilled any of her obligations. She moreover made the situation worse by
selling the contested property to a third party even after an alias writ of
execution had ordered the transfer of the possession of the disputed property to
Blaylock.
Citing Arboleda v. Gatchalian, Ocampo said that the overdue filing of a
complaint against a lawyer should already create a suspicion about the motives
of the complainant or the merit of the complaint.
Second Case:
The Angel spouses, complainants in this case, allege that sometime in 1972,
they sold their house in favor of Blaylock for the amount of seventy thousand
pesos, (P70,000.00). Ocampo (the same respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo),
acted as their counsel and prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House
and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot.
With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses bought another parcel of
land. Again, Ocampo prepared the Deed of Sale which was signed by the
vendor, a certain Laura Dalanan, and the Angel spouses, as the vendees. In
addition, Ocampo allegedly made the Angel spouses sign two (2) more
documents which, accordingly, were made parts of the sale transaction.
Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real Estate Mortgage of the
same property purchased from Laura Dalanan and a Promissory Note, both in
favor of Blaylock. The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said
documents until they received a complaint naming them as defendants in a
collection suit. The Angel spouses added that Ocampo reassured them that
there was no need for them to engage the services of a new lawyer since he
will take care of everything.
These acts, the complainants charge, violate the ethics of the legal profession.
They lost their property as a result of the respondent's fraudulent manipulation,
taking advantage of his expertise in law against his own unsuspecting and
trusting clients.
As in the first case, Ocampo presented an elaborate explanation.
Ocampo alleged that it was his client, Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock, who
introduced to him the Angel spouses in 1972. Blaylock wanted Ocampo to
check the background of the Angel spouses in connection with the loan they
were seeking from Blaylock.
The Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo with
malpractice and gross misconduct punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court of the Philippines and violation of his oath of office as an
attorney
Issue: WON respondent Atty. Ocampo is guilty of representing conflicting
interests?
Held: Yes. The specific law applicable in both administrative cases is Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The Court
prohibits the representation of conflicting interests not only because the relation
of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but
also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has
the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers.
The aforementioned acts of the respondent in representing Blaylock, and at the
same time advising Tiania, the opposing party, as in the first administrative
case, and once again representing Blaylock and her interest while handling the
legal documents of another opposing party as in the second case, whether the
said actions were related or totally unrelated, constitute serious misconduct.
However, taking into consideration the advanced age of the respondent, who
would have reached seventy three (73) years, as of this date, the Court, while
uncompromisingly firm in its stand against erring lawyers, nonetheless
appreciates the advance years of the respondent in his favor.
Wherefore, respondent is suspended for a period of one year.
8. Dee v Mutuc
FACTS
In January of 1981 petitioner Donald Dee and his father went to seek the
advice of Respondent Atty. Mutuc regarding the problem of the alleged
indebtedness of petitioners brother Dewey to Caesars Palace and the
possibility that Dewey might be harmed by the local mafias at the order or
request of the casino.
Thereafter Atty. Mutuc assured the petitioners that he would look into the
matter, for which his services were allegedly contracted for the amount of
P100,000. Mutuc then proceeded to make calls and visit to elicit additional
information into the matter. The initial finding was that the outstanding balance
of Deweys account amounts to one billion dollars. However after further
investigation by Mutuc, it was found out that the debt was actually incurred by a
certain Ramon Sy, and that Dewey merely signed the chits. Petitioners were
then informed of the findings and were also assured that Dewey would not be
harmed by the alleged mafias.
By June of the same year, respondent went to the casino to negotiate with its
president to let Dewey off the hook, and go after the real debtor Ramon Sy. The
president of the casino then told Mutuc that if he can make Ramon Sy
acknowledge the debt, then Dewey would be exculpated. Thereafter Mutuc was
able to convince Ramon Sy tro acknowledge the debt and brought a letter to
the casino asking for a discount, which resulted to the clearing of Deweys
name in the casino.
Having resolved the problem, Mutuc proceeded to collect from petitioner the
remaining balance of their agreed professional fee. However despite several
letter of demand respondent Mutuc never received his fees. This prompted
respondent to file an action for collection of the fees and other relevant
expenses incurred.
The lower court in resolving the case, ruled in favor of Mutuc ordering petitioner
Dee to pay the amount of P50,000. On appeal the CA initially affirmed the
decision of the lower court, but was subsequently abandoned when petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that Mutuc at the time when he was
rendering the alleged services for the petitioner was actually working for the
interest and to the advantage of the casino, and that Mutuc is not justified to
claim professional fees considering that there was conflict of interest involved.
Therefore the CA found that the amount of P50,000 already received by
MUTUC is commensurate of the work he provided for petitioner. However this
decision was later on reversed and the intial decision was reinstated by CA
upon the motion of Mutuc. Hence the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Mutuc is entitled to the balance of the agreed professional
fee in light of the fact that he was allegedly working for the interest and
advantage of the Casino. YES
2. Whether or not there was Attorney-Client relationship between the parties.
HELD:
The Court ruled that Mutuc is entitled to the balance of the agreed fees, and
that at the time he rendered services for petitioner he was not employed by the
casino. The Court held that the conclusion of CA in finding that Mutuc was
employed by the casino during the period when Mutuc provided services to
petitioner was erroneous.
Additionally, the court found that the contention that the Casino only agreed to
the suggestion or advice of Mutuc is due to the fact that there was an existing
Atty.-Client relationship between the two. According to the Court even without
any Atty-Client relationship a good lawyer who knows his craft even without any
atty-client relationship can convince the opposing party by mere negotiations.
Furthermore even assuming that Mutuc was indeed employed by the casino,
the only reason that the CA denied additional compensation was that it alleged
that since Mutuc was already employed by the casino, he was already receiving
compensation from the casino. However there were no evidence to prove such
allegation, and in fact the Court already stated that CA was erroneous in finding
that Mutuc was under the employment of the casino when he provided service
for the Dees.
Lastly, the Court held that the petitioners are estopped from alleging dual
representation, since at the time they seek the services of Mutuc, petitioners
were not aware of the fact that Mutuc was employed by the casino, and gave
their consent to be represented by Mutuc. Mutuc having resolved the issue, the
petitioners may not question the validity of Mutucs act anymore.
As to whether there exists an atty-client relationship, the court held that the lack
of a written contract or agreement does not prevent the creation of the
relationship. The court state that documentary formalism is not an essential
element to create the relationship, that to establish such relationship it is
sufficient that advice and assistance of an atty is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession. That an acceptance may be express or
implied.
9. Nakpil v Valdes
FACTS:
Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He
went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for the latter to buy the
property in trust for Nakpil. Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans.
The lands titles were transferred to his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda
Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of Valdes and his accounting and law
firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil.
What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of
Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his company, the Caval
Realty Corporation) while including the loans he contracted.
What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI. While the case
was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against Valdes.
The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI. The
complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of
Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held the lots in trust for Nakpil.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts, namely:
o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil;
o Including his loans as claims on the estate; and
o Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting
firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN
against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law
firm.
Held:
The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year. The
Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust
reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his professional
services as a lawyer and an accountant. It was clear that Jose Nakpil and Atty.
Came to an agreement that the latter would be buying the property in trust for
Jose. By his act of excluding the property from the estate and including the
loans he contracted (and used for his own benefit) as claims, Valdes took for
granted the trust formed between Jose and him (they had a close relationship
since the 50s), which was the basis for Imeldas decision to use his services.
As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03. In the case at bar, there
is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are
adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets
and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two
creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the
estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are
creditors of the estate.
CONFIDENTIALITY
1. Regala v Sandiganbayan (check out digest)
FACTS
Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure
and financial matters upon which legal advice were given by petitioners. Said
corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG involving ill gotten wealth.
Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it may implicate them in
the very activity from which legal advice was sought from them and it may
breach the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with their client.
ISSUE: WON fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to disclose
names of their clients (privilege information)
HELD: SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their
clients under the pain of breach of fiduciary relationship with their client.
As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE:
1. The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought
to be protected is flesh and blood.
2. Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been
established.
3. Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.
4. With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his
adversary.
EXCEPTION: LAWYERS MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE WHEN:
1. Strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would
implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers
advice.
2. Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case)
3. Government lawyers have no case against the lawyers client unless by
revealing the clients name it would provide them the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of
a crime. (present in this case)
4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client
seeks legal assistance. (present in this case)
5. Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is
the identity which is intended to be confidential.
Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August
7, 1901: Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority
of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his
advice given thereon in the course of professional employment."
Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client
privilege, as currently worded provides: Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication.
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases: An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can
an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity.
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of an
attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself,
to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and
approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that: Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's
fidelity to client: The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld
from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or
public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the
judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer
to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in
mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without
the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it
demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
2. Lorenzana Food Corp v Atty. Francisco Daria
FACTS
Atty. Daria was hired by Lorenzana Food Corporation as its legal counsel and
was eventually designated as its personal manager. In the course of his
employment with the corp he was involved in two labor cases:
Hanopol case - A certain Veronica Hanopol who was allegedly illegally
dismissed, filed a case against him. During the initial hearing, Daria and
Hanopol agreed to an amicable settlement and set a date for the next meeting.
This was reset after Hanopol did not show up and the Labor Arbiterreset the
date further to June 20, 1983. On that date, Daria was in another hearing and
he moved to postpone the Hanopol hearing through a phone message but the
Labor Arbiter did not receive it, hence he considers the case as submitted for
decision based on Hanopols complaint and affidavit.
Daria appealed to the NLRC and the case was remanded to the
Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. Attempts to have an amicable settlement
proved futile. By the time the final hearing was set, Dariahad already resigned
from the company and no one appeared for the corp during the Hanopol
hearing. Labor arbiter revived his earlier decision awarding Hanopol with sum
of P6,469.80 in labor benefits. New counsel for the corp appealed to the
judgment and this was remanded for further proceedings.
San Juan case - Roberto San Juan is an employee of the corp who was
accused of double liquidation and unliquidated cash advances. He was asked
to submit a written explanation and was placed on preventive suspension. He
was required to restitute said amount to the company but upon failure to do so,
a complaint of estafa was filed against him. San Juan resigned and sought the
assistance of Daria in preparing his counter affidavit.
Because of these incidents, LFC files an administrative charge against Daria for
negligence and betrayal of former clients confidences.
Issue: Do the acts of Atty. Daria constitute negligence and betrayal of his
former clients confidence?
Held: Yes, Daria violated Code of Professional Responsibility and betrayed
the confidences of his former client. He is suspended from the practice of law
for 6 months.
Canon 18 provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence; Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Because Daria had a responsibility to attend the two scheduledhearings he
missed and had he filed the required position paper for the corporation then at
least there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case which the
court states could have been in favor of the corporation. The delay was
prejudicial to LFC because it deprived successor counsel of the time which he
should be devoting to other cases of LFC instead of the work left by Daria. The
respondents claim that he was able to persuade NLRC on appeal to set aside
the first decision is no matter. Negligence is apparent in the conduct of Daria.
As for preparing the counter-affidavit of San Juan, the court is not convinced
with his denial of his participation in the preparation. His signature was placed
on the document and it is clear that the contention of Daria is a mere
afterthought.
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also for the relation of attorney and client has terminated. It
is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other
persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct and
independent of the former case.
3. William Genato v Atty. Essex Silapan
FACTS
(Complainants side)
-July 1992, respondent allegedly asked the complainant if he could rent a small
office space in complainants building in Quezon City for his law practice.
Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay,
complainants retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building
and made him handle some of complainants cases.
-Respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from
complainant which he intended to use as down payment for the purchase of a
new car. In return, respondent issued to complainant a postdated check in the
amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan.
He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did
not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution
proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
-The respondent bought the car but the document of sale was issued in the
complainants name and financed through City Trust Company.
-January 1993: respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel
Romero who wanted to borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent
Romero the money and, from this transaction, respondent earned commission
in the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay
respondents arrears with the car financing firm.
-Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the
financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash
respondents postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as
respondents account therein was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainants repeated demands for payment.
Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage.
-In the foreclosure case, the respondent alleged that the complainant is
engaged in buy and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and
shady deals, and has many cases pending in court, which the complainant
denied, adding that the allegations were libelous and were irrelevant to the
foreclosure case. A particular allegation states that in one case, the
complainant would only give the respondent the document of sale of the car if
the latter would bribe the review committee of the DOJ for a case of the
complainant. According to the complainant, the allegation was, aside from
being false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to
defame him, the respondent was also guilty of breaking their confidential
lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively liable.
- the complainant then filed this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an
administrative sanction be meted against respondent for his issuance of a
bouncing check
(Respondents side)
-It was complainant who offered him an office space in his building and retained
him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22
case filed against complainant.
-There was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices
to complainant and his revelation of complainants desire to bribe government
officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made
these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and
discredit complainants credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to
commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of
breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made
the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.
-Respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of
complainant without consideration and only as a formal requirement so he
could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not surrender his
title over the mortgaged property to complainant.
-Respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for
value, but only: (a) to serve as some kind of acknowledgment that he already
received in advance a portion of his attorneys fees from the complainant for the
legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not
abandon the cases he was handling for complainant.
-Respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romeros
loan which he allegedly helped facilitate, alleging that the amount paid to him
was for attorneys fees. He used this amount to pay his arrears with the car
financing firm. On January 29, 1993, before paying the next amortization on
the car, he asked complainant to execute a deed of sale transferring ownership
of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted that he would transfer
ownership of the car only after the termination of his criminal case which
respondent was handling as his defense lawyer. Consequently, respondent
stopped paying the amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged that he
filed a perjury case against complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel
against him.
-October 27, 1993: the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
-August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the
investigating commissioner finding the respondent guilty as charged and
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
ISSUES
1. WON the court has the jurisdiction to sanction respondent for his issuance of
the bouncing check.
2. WON the respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by
imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainants alleged
intention to bribe government officials in connection with a pending case, and
thus would be sanctioned.
HELD
1. NO, it is not for the Court to sanction respondent for his issuance of a
bouncing check, which would be determined by the trial court.
Ratio We shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and civil cases
pending between the parties. It is for the trial courts handling these cases to
ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations made therein.
2. YES, respondents allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case
amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary
sanction against him.
Ratio A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients,
with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his
clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and
fairness.
Reasoning Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is
not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional
character by a client, unless the latter consents.
-The obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the
inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and
does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the
partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
-However, the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or
information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and
properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not
extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If
the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainants alleged
intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication
is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer
professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to
how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the
attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional
employment in the strict sense.
-The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not
pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it
against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter
of litigation therein and respondents professional competence and legal advice
were not being attacked in said case.
Disposition IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon
receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court
Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.