POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: IMPLIED

Smart Communications Inc. (SMART) vs. National Telecommunication Commissions (NTC)

Story:

1. On January 16, 2000, NTC issued Memorandum Circular 13-6-2000 (Billing Circular) announcing
rules on the billing of telecommunications services. (See actual copy of case for the rule details.)

2. On August 30, 2000, NTC issued another memo to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS)
operators ordering them to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone
units.

3. October 6, another memo, this time ordering them make the prepaid cards sold on October 7
be valid for at least two years from date of first use.

4. Isla Comm. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed an action for declaration of nullity of
Memo Circular and October 6 memo asking for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order because the Billing Circular is oppressive, and deprives property without due process of Law. Also,
the regulation of the sale of consumer goods is not in the jurisdiction of NTC but of the DTI.

5. After that, Globe Telecommunications and Smart Communications filed a joint motion for
Leave-to-Intervene and Admit-Complaint-in-Intervention which was granted by the TC.

6. On October 27, trial court issued a temporary restraining order on Memo Circular and Memo
dated October 6.

7. NTC filed a motion to dismiss the case because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. Petition to dismiss was denied, but petition for preliminary injunction granted.

8. NTC filed for a motion for reconsideration to the RTC but was denied. With that, it filed a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.

9. Court of Appeals took over and declared that what has been pronounced by the trial court are
anulled and set aside. Globe and Smarts petition for complaint were also dismissed. It then granted the
NTC the petition for certiorari (dadalin sa higher court or SC) and prohibition.

10. After this, Smart and Piltel then filed an instant petition for review on the grounds that see
actual case. Globe and Islacom filed too for a petition for review. SC found merit in these petitions.

Ratio Decidendi:

* Administrative Agencies possess quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers.

Quasi-Legislative: power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislations that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.
- The rules they make must conform, not contradict with the standards prescribed by law, more
particularly a statute that created it. If there is a conflict between statute and administrative order, the
statute must prevail.
Quasi-Judicial: power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply,
and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law.

- The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner
an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative in nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative
duty entrusted to it.

- In carrying out quasi-judicial functions, administrative oicers or bodies are required to

investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions
from them as basis for their oicial action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

- NOTE: In questioning the validity or constitutionality of an administrative order, a party need

not exhaust administrative remedy before going to court. Exhaustion of administrative remedy only
applies when the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed in pursuant to its quasi-
judicial function, and not when the attacked act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative powers.
In other words, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.

* In this case, even if we are to observe the exhaustion doctrine, we can say that the private
petitioners complied with the requirement. They were able to register their protests to the proposed
billing guidelines, and wrote successive letters on July 3 and July 5 asking for reconsideration on the
Billing Circular but were not acted upon until October 6 by NTC. This was seen as a clear denial of
requests in the previous letters. Thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.

* In cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer those disputes to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The
court will not act on it until the administrative agency resolves it, or looks at it.

- NOTE: The objective of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determine some question
or some aspect of question arising in the proceeding before the court.

- If the assailed is the validity or constitutionality of an order from an administrative agency, in

the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction. The determination
of whether or not issuances by administrative agencies conform with the constitution lies with the
jurisdiction of regular courts.

- NOTE: The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in
the courts, including the regional trial courts.

Judicial Power includes

1. duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable;
2. determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Decision:
 - In this case, the assailed Memorandum Order 13-6-2000 and Memo ordered October 6 was
pursuant to its quasi-legislative function. Thus, it is justified for the petitioners to seek judicial power of
the RTC to assess the constitutionality of the two memos.

- Issues were if the memos violated the Civil Code provisions on sales, and violated constitutional
prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law.

- The holding of the COA that the issue at hand are technical matters is wrong. And so it erred in
setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.

- In turn, the decision of the COA are reversed and set aside. The order of the RTC is reinstated.
Petitions for review are granted.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals

Story:

1. Republic Act 4850 created LLDA. PD 813 of Marcos amended certain sections of it seven
paragraphs, see the actual copy of the case. Furthermore, EO 927 further defined and enlarged the
function and powers of LLDA, and named and enumerated the towns, cities, and provinces encompassed
by the term Laguna de Bay Region. Also in 927, the LLDA is granted exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit
for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or aecting the said region. They will also
collect fees for the use of the lake water and activities related to it. See division of percentages in the
actual case.

2. The conflict arose when the Local Government Code, RA 7160, came in 1991. The municipalities
of the Laguna de Bay Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that it gave the municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing priveleges within their municipal waters, also
included was to impose rental fees and charges therefore.

3. LLDA was shocked because almost one third of the lake was occupied by unregulated fishpen
and fishcages. The LG Code was used to take advantage of the occasion, they assumed authority to issue
fishing priveleges and fishpen permit. Mayors permit to construct fishpens were undertaken in violation
of policies adopted by the LLDA. It aggravated the current environmental problems and ecological stress
of Laguna Lake.

4. As such, LLDA served notice to the general public that those who were not registered or did not
apply for registration to LLDA are outrightly illegal. They shall be subject to demolition and will be
criminally charged for the violation of the law 4850 as amended by PD 813. All operators of fishpens and
fish cages were given one month to show cause why they should not be demolished.

5. After one month thereafter, LLDA issued notices to owners that they should dismantle their
structures within 10 days upon receipt, otherwise, demolition will be eected.

6. As reaction, fishpen owners filed injunction cases against LLDA to regional trial courts. LLDA
filed then motion to dismiss because of jurisdictional grounds, these motions were denied.

7. Restraining orders were issued by the courts stopping LLDA from demolishing the fishpens and
fish cages.

8. LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction before the Supreme Court.
 9. The Court referred the petitions to the Court of Appeals.

COA on June 29, 1995 dismissed the LLDAs consolidated petitions because, holding:

1. LLDA is not among those exercising quasi-judicial functions which is

appealable to only to the COA
2. LLDAs quasi-judicial function is with matters regarding fishpens only
3. LLDA charter has been repealed by the 1991 LG Code
4. the power to grant permits is now vested to the LG units

10. LLDA is not satisfied with this decision of the COA their reasons on why COA erred is in the
actual case, refer.

MAIN ISSUE: Which agency of the Government LLDA or the LGUs comprising the region should
exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake in so far as the issuance of fishery priveleges is concerned?

DECISION:

First issue: Whether or not 4850 was repealed by 7160.

- RA 7160 does not necessarily repeal 4850. It (LG Code) does not contain any express provision
which categorically expressly repeal 4850 and its amendments. It has to be conceded that there was no
intent on the part of the legislature to repeal 4850.

- The charter of LLDA constitutes a special law. The LG code is a general law. It is basic statutory
construction that the enactment of a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law.
A special statute provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,
general in its terms, provisions, and applications unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although
the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law.

- NOTE: When there is a conflict between a special statute and a general law, the special statute
shall prevail because it states the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. Special law
cannot be repealed by general law BY MERE IMPLICATION.

- The power of the LG units to issue fishing priveleges are granted for revenue purposes.
Meanwhile, LLDA has it for the purpose of eectively regulating and monitoring activities to ensure
environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development.

* LLDA partakes of the nature of police power the most pervasive, the least limitable, and most
demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation.

Second issue: quarrel over where permit fees for fishpens would go.

- There must be no issue here because it is indicated in EO 927, the proper sharing of fees
collected.

Third issue: Whether or not it is a quasi-judicial agency.

- Yes, its is. And in the exercise of its express power, the authority to issue a cease and desist
order is implied. Otherwise, it will be a toothless paper agency.
 * Removal from the LLDA the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory (worthless) its
avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Region. Repealing of this power would mean
abolishment of LLDA something the LG code did not intend to do.
- Restraining orders (issued to LLDA) by the RTC is hereby declared null and void. Mayors
prohibited from issuing permits, previous issuances are null and void. Fishpens, fish cages, and other
structures are subject to demolition.

- Petition of LLDA for prohibition, certiorari, and injunction are hereby granted.

Gordon vs. Veridiano II

Story:

1. March 21, 1980, 5:00 PM, a test buy was conducted by FDA and Philippine Constabulary at
San Sebastian Drug Store. The store sold 200 tablets of Valium without doctors prescription.

2. It was reported to Mayor Gordon via report, and he revoked the Mayors Permit for violation of
RA 5921 (Pharmacy Law) and RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).

3. Mayor Gordon went to Singapore, and while he was there, his Vice de Perio Jr. caused the
posting of a signboard at San Sebastian Drug announcing its permanent closure.

4. Acting on the same investigation, FDA Admin Regala directed the closure of the drugstore for
only three days and a fine of 100.00, violation of RA 3720. After three days, FDA lifted its closure order and
allowed the drugstore to resume operations.

5. April 30, 1980, Yambao (owner of the drugstore) wrote to Mayor Gordon seeking
reconsideration of the revocation of Mayors Permit. One week after (April 7), they received no reply. They
then filed to the RTC of Olongapo a complaint for mandamus (writ issued by a superior ordering an
oicial to perform his duty or oicial act) and damages.

6. On the same date, Yambao asked FDA to exchange locations of the San Sebastian Drug Store
and Olongapo City Drug Store for business preference. Some meters lang naman ang layo. It was
granted.

7. Gordon heard of this grant and disapproved the transfer and suspended Mayors Permit too, for
Olongapo City Drug Store. Dati sa San Sebastian lang. So dalawa na ngayon ang walang Mayors Permit.
LOL.

8. May 15, a complaint was filed questioning the suspension. Asked for writ for prohibitory
injunction. The judge ordered maintenance of the status quo how things are.

9. May 21, Mayor Gordon wrote to FDA asking it to reconsider its order of allowing San Sebastian
to resume operations. Request was denied by FDA in May 27.

10. Earlier, May 1, Gordon filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Status Quo order. Judge
wrote on July 16, he denied the motion of reconsideration for the status quo order. And that his
revocation of Mayors Permit for San Sebastian is null and void.

11. The order of the judge was asked again by Gordon to be reconsidered, but it was denied.
 12. Gordon then came to the SC asking for a certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
to challenge orders of the judge. SC issued a temporary restraining order to the judge on October 27, but
lifted it on December 10 because Mayor Gordon failed to comment on private respondents motion to lift
the said order and issuance of counter restraining order.
Powers and Functions of Both Parties, Ratio Decidendi:

FDA: created under 3720 (Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) vested with all drug inspection
functions in line with the policy of the State to insure safe and good quality supply of food, drug, and
cosmetics, and to regulate the production, sale and traic of the same to protect the health of the
people.

For more eective exercise of this function, DOH issued AO 60 laying down the requirements for the
application to be filed with the FDA for authorization to operate or establish a drug establishment.
Upon approval, the FDA will issue License to Operate which shall be renewed within the first three
months of each year upon payment of required fees.

Time came drug addiction aggravated, PD 280 was promulgated, giving more teeth to the FDA
authorizing FDA to order closure, or suspend, or revoke the license of any drug establishment which have
been found guilty of selling drugs, medicines, and other similar substances in violation of FDA Act and
Dangerous Drug Act of 1972.

Mayor of Olongapo: See page 58. In short, recommend the revocation or suspension of the
permits of the dierent establishments to the City Mayor for violation of health laws, ordinances, and
regulations.

Mayors Permit will be given if applicant has complied with existing ordinances on health and
sanitation, location or zoning, fire or building, and other local requirements. The MP is valid only at the
place stated above and until the date, unless sooner revoked for a cause.

* Study of the law shows that License to Permit (given by the FDA) is condition precedent to the
issuance of a Mayors Permit it is imperative. Conformity to the laws on regulation of drug sales
belongs to the FDA. A permit issued by the mayor, BUT NOT CHECKED BY THE FDA, is NULL.

* It does not follow however, that issuance of the mayors permit is mandatory once the FDA has
given the License to Operate. The License to operate is just for complying with national laws and policies
on drugs. The Mayors Permit is for following the particular conditions laid down by the local authorities
zoning, building, health, sanitation, and safety regulations. If these are followed, then they grant the
Mayors Permit.

- It is implied that the power to approve a license includes the power to revoke it. It is only for the
reason they have granted the license, could they revoke it. Say, you granted it for following the national
laws, then you can revoke it if they violate those laws. If you granted it for complying to the particular
conditions provided by the LG, then you can revoke it by grounds of violating that conditions. The Mayor
cannot revoke his permit because the drugstore violated FDA rules.

Decision:

- The mayor was reversing the decision of the FDA on a matter that came under FDAs jurisdiction.
He had no authority to substitute his judgment for the decision already made by the FDA. Ang na-violate
ay batas ng FDA, hindi batas ng LGU, kaya ang in charge dito ay FDA.

* Valium is not even a prohibited drug kaya 3 days and 100 pesos lang.
 - Meanwhile, for the case of Olongapo Drug and the exchanging of positions, the mayor had
jurisdiction here. And FDA intervened for approving the request without approval from the mayor. It is
related to location (zoning ordinance), vis-a-vis regulation of drug stores in particular, thats why.
- Revocation of MP for the second drug store is valid because it is stated in the MP that is valid
only at the place stated therein. If owner wanted transfer, she should have consulted not only with FDA
but more specially with the Mayor.

- Mayor acted invalidly in revoking permit for San Sebastian, but did just correctly in Olongapo
City Drug.

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: MINISTERIAL VS. DISCRETIONARY

Symaco vs. Hon Aquino

Story:

1. November 4, 1957, petitioner Symaco filed a writ of mandamus to force respondent Mayor
Aquino to issue him a building permit. Mayor responded on December 3.

Facts:

- May 22, Symaco was an owner of a certain lot. He filed an application for building permit,
particularly asking for authority to repair roof and walls of Symacos house. May 23, Mayor granted the
permit. July 2, Mendoza, duly appointed building inspector, acting in the orders of the Mayor, wrote to
Symaco that he should apply for the construction of a building and not only repair, because the building
was demolished and a new one was being contructed instead of mere repair. Symaco applied for permit
for construction of a new building. Acting on the new application, An investigated the application and
submitted findings to the Mayor.

- On July 1, there was a filed civil action for forcible entry with prayer for preliminary injunction
against Symaco by AM Raymundo and Company because a portion of the parcel of land on which Symaco
applied for a permit, concerned his property.

- August 6, attorney of AM Raymundo sent a letter to Mayor asking to withhold the issuance of a
building permit.

- September 23, Mayor wrote to Symaco that the issuance of the building permit was being held
in abeyance pending final determination of the ownership of a portion of the lot where the building is
being constructed.

- July 11 1958, Court rendered a decision saying that the Mayors act was without any basis in law
because once the applicant has fulfilled the requirement, it is mandatory upon the Mayor to issue the
permit. The facts say that the applicant is the owner of the property, and AM Raymundo only questions
the ownership of a portion of land and the Court believes that this should not be ground for the Mayor to
refuse issuance of the permit. Anyways, the applicant has the torrens title of the land. The writ of
mandamus is thereby issued, commanding the Mayor to issue the permit immediately.

Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in granting the writ of mandamus to Symaco.

Ratio Decidendi:
 - Said requirement was complied by the applicant Symaco. Having thus complied, was it a
discretionary or ministerial duty on the Mayor to issue the permit?

Definition:

Purely Ministerial Act or Duty - one which an oicer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If it does not require exercise of
oicial discretion or judgment, it is ministerial.

- It was not enough to suspend the issue of permit based on the premise that a portion of lot was still
subject to forcible entry. This is because the matter was purely private between Symaco and AM
Raymundo, and it did not in any way concern the Mayor.

* Respondent was not entitled to a mandamus daw because he had other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law appeal to the provincial governor who shall receive and
investigate complains against municipal oicers for neglect of duty, or for minor deliquency, reprimand
the oender.

- Court says that the proposed provision is not plain, speedy, nor adequate. The primary object of the
above mentioned is the removal, suspension, or other disciplinary action NOT TO COMPEL THE
PERFORMANCE OF A LEGAL DUTY.

- It will only be adequate if:

1. it is commensurate with the necessities and rights of the complaining party under all the
circumstances of the cases;
2. reaches the end intended;
3. actually compels the performance of a duty

- The remedy must be eective, beneficial, and as speedy as a mandamus to prevent material injury.

- Court did not err in granting the mandamus.

Calderon vs. Solicitor General

Story:

** Joint petition for certiorari and mandamus to review the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.

Facts:

- January 29, 1990 Oice of the Provincial Prosecutor filed three separate informations on the violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to the RTC with accused 114, 902, 110, 923, and 141, 710.

- Provincial Prosecutor recommended bail of 1,000 each case and private respondent filed three
separate bail bonds, 1,000 each as compliance.

- April 29, Judge issued an order increasing the bail bonds 25,000, 35,000, and 25,000 after knowing
that only 1,000 was given each for the case.
- May 9, 1991 private respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, because said bail of 1,000
is in accordance to Bail Bond Guide.
- August 23 , 1991, Judge denied the motion and issued a warrant of arrest to the private respondent.
- August 27, 1991 respondent filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to
nullify and set aside the orders of the judge, saying increase of the bail bond was violative of
constitutional right against excessive bail.
- September 4, CA required SG to comment on the petition by private respondent, and show cause why
the preliminary injunction should not be issued.
- December 17, Court nullified orders of the judge because the judge failed to show the reasons for the
increase of the bail. More so, it violated constitutional right against excessive bail.
- January 13, 1992, Judge filed for a motion for reconsideration after Solicitor General refused to
represent him.
- Janurary 28, CA denied the Judges motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the judge has standing to file instant petition for certiorari.
2. Whether or not a writ for mandamus may issue commanding the SG to appear in behalf of the
judge.

Decision:

- Judge has no standing to file instant petition because he is merely a nominal party in here (case
originally was People vs. Mauro Dionisio).

- NOTE: A Judge should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher
court for review. The reason is that the judge is not an active combatant in that proceeding and must
leave the opposing parties alone to contend their positions to the higher court. By filing this case, Judge
stopped being judicial and became adversarial instead.

- Considering he has no right to file for a certiorari, then it is automatic that his appeal for
mandamus should also not be entertained.

- QUESTION: Whether or not mandamus will lie to force the SG to represent a judge whose
decision has been nullified by the Court of Appeals.
- He cannot compel the SG to represent him. As a special civil action, mandamus lies only
to compel an oicer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.

- The SG may not just drop a case without any legal and valid reason because his discretion is not
unlimited. But, SG can dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suits either with or without
stipulation (coordinating) with the other party. He may opt not to file at all. SG has the right to decide
when and how to defend or prosecute a case therefore discretionary.

- In other words, there is no clear legal right to what he demands, and it is not the SGs imperative
duty to defend him on the sole ground that he is a public oicer.

- Petition for certiorari dismissed, mandamus applied for is denied.

 EFFECT OF UNLAWFUL EXERCISE

Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Viron Transport Inc.

Declaratory Relief
- refers to a judgment of a court which determines the rights of parties without ordering anything
be done or awarding damages. By seeking a declaratory judgment, the party making the request is
seeking for an oicial declaration of the status of a matter in controversy. Optimally, the resolution of the
rights of the parties involved will prevent further litigation. For example, a party to a contract may seek
the legal interpretation of a contract to determine the parties' rights, or an insured may seek a
determination of insurance coverage under a policy.

* Ask Maam what is the requirement of justiciability, justiciable controversy.

Story:

* Petition for a review on certiorari on the Orders of RTC.

It questions the authority of the MMDA on whether it has the power to direct provincial buses owners to
close their terminals.

The challenged are the two (2) Orders of the RTC saying that (1) EO 179 is unconstitutional because it
constitutes an unreasonable exercise of police power, and (2) the denied motion for reconsideration by
the petitioners.

February 24, 2003, Viron filed a petition for declaratory relief on the RTC of Manila deprives them of the
use of their property, Viron asked the Court to clear what the MMDAs limitations of powers are. Also, if the
ruling of the MMDA will contravene the Public Service Act mandates them to provide and maintain
their own terminals. Mencorp Transportation System also filed for the same declaratory relief on the
matter. Mencorp asked for a temporary restraining order on the MMDA because they have begun
implementing the project and a preliminary injunction both denied.

In the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs
power to regulate traic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to
abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a
common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3)
provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should
they be required to use the common bus terminals.

By Decision of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of
the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manilas basic
services including those of transport and traic management.

The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State as it
satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter and lawful means, hence, Virons and Mencorps property
rights must yield to police power.

On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial court, by Order of
September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was an unreasonable exercise of
police power; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the
power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2005.

MMDAs side: Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court for failing to rule that: (1) the
requisites of declaratory relief are not present, there being no justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos.
03-105850 and 03-106224; and (2) the President has the authority to undertake or cause the
implementation of the Project this fails.

In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the existence of the
essential requisites for their respective petitions for declaratory relief, and refuted petitioners contention
that a justiciable controversy was lacking.There can be no denying, therefore, that the issue was raised
and discussed by the parties before the trial court.

The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked
must be ripe for judicial determination.25

The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual

controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before
the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.26 A question becomes
justiciable when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.

It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is merely
conjectural or anticipatory.

Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the MMDA of an
order for the closure of respondents bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to
bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which, under Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, must
be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.

E.O. which, they argue, is unconstitutional because it violates both the Constitution and the
Public Service Act; and that neither is the MMDA clothed with such authority under R.A. No. 7924.
Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances
as may be necessary to ensure the eective implementation of the law.

Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the
good and welfare of the people.This power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus
populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in
fact increasingly being delegated.By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the
President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of 1991.

The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the
designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra
vires, there being no legal basis therefor.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the
MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at
bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project,
must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary
implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in
question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the
elimination of respondents terminals.

Even the MMDAs claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance
with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Courts subsequent ruling
in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power.

Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such
power does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.Stated dierently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.

As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traic congestion is a public, not
merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute
authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control
traic on national roads.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development authority. It is an agency created
for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the eicient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in
nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself.

Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of
the Public Service Act.

Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 of Executive
Order No. 202, creating the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the
Public Service Commission (PSC, now the LTFRB) with jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public
services and their franchises, equipment and other properties .

The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger

terminals, is generally considered a necessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators like
respondents, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal
sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Public Service Act.