Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MIDDLE EAST
PROGRAM
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
WINTER
2017
1
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES WINTER 2017
Director The Middle East Program was launched in February 1998 in light of
Henri J. Barkey increased U.S. engagement in the region and the profound changes sweep-
ing across many Middle Eastern states. In addition to spotlighting day-to-day
Associate issues, the Program concentrates on long-term economic, social, and political
developments, as well as relations with the United States.
Kendra Heideman
The Middle East Program draws on domestic and foreign regional experts
Assistant for its meetings, conferences, and occasional papers. Conferences and meet-
Julia Craig Romano ings assess the policy implications of all aspects of developments within the
region and individual states; the Middle Easts role in the international arena;
American interests in the region; the threat of terrorism; arms proliferation; and
Special thanks
strategic threats to and from the regional states.
Special thanks to Kendra
Heideman and Julia Craig The Program pays special attention to the role of women, youth, civil society
Romano for coordinating institutions, Islam, and democratic and autocratic tendencies. In addition, the
Middle East Program hosts meetings on cultural issues, including contempo-
and editing this publication;
rary art and literature in the region.
Selin Aksoy for editing this
publication; and the Design Current Affairs: The Middle East Program emphasizes analysis of current
staff for designing the issues and their implications for long-term developments in the region, includ-
ing: the events surrounding the uprisings of 2011 in the Middle East and its
Occasional Paper Series.
effect on economic, political, and social life in countries in the region; the
increased use of social media; the role of youth; Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy;
Author acknowledgement Irans political and nuclear ambitions; the drawdown of American troops in
I would like to thank the Afghanistan and Iraq and their effect on the region; human rights violations;
Middle East Program at the globalization; economic and political partnerships; and U.S. foreign policy in
Woodrow Wilson International the region.
Center for Scholars for a most Gender Issues: The Middle East Program devotes considerable attention
timely opportunity to explore to the role of women in advancing civil society and to the attitudes of govern-
American policy in Syria. The ments and the clerical community toward womens rights in the family and
society at large. The Program examines employment patterns, education, legal
Center offers a rich variety of
rights, and political participation of women in the region. The Program also
resources for research, none
has a keen interest in exploring womens increasing roles in conflict prevention
more valuable than an atmo- and post-conflict reconstruction activities.
sphere that prizes free debate
Islam, Democracy and Civil Society: The Middle East Program monitors the
and a diversity of perspectives. growing demand of people in the region for the transition to democratization,
political participation, accountable government, the rule of law, and adher-
ence by their governments to international conventions, human rights, and
womens rights. It continues to examine the role of Islamic movements and the
role of Islamic parties in shaping political and social developments and the
variety of factors that favor or obstruct the expansion of civil society.
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect
those of the Woodrow Wilson Center.
2
image of America as an enlightened global leader It has the capacity to set the whole region on fire.
destined to lead for the good of all humanity. Thats why we have to fight it.
Trump appealed to nationalismpure and simple. Much of the handwringing about Obamas ISIS
Amid their historic duel, the two men appeared policy seems to unwittingly point to his success. One
to be in agreement on one thing, in substance if not idea mainstreamed by some of his critics is that the
in style. fight against ISIS has become a vehicle and a guise
We have taken out tens of thousands of ter- for all actors to pursue their competing interests,
roristsincluding Bin Laden, said Obama. The and that the weakening of ISIS is accompanied by
global coalition were leading against ISIL has taken the resurfacing, often in more potent ways, of past
out their leaders and taken away about half their fault lines.6
territory. ISIL will be destroyed, and no one who But that is precisely the point as far as Obama
threatens America will ever be safe. was concerned. The problem ISIS posed to him was
With a measure of stylistic innovation and that it upset the past fault lines: Everyone had his
a minor policy tweak, Trump picked up where turf. And then the Joker comes in and lights the
Obama left off: We will reinforce old alliances whole city on fire.7
and form new onesand unite the civilized world Furthermore, the regional competition seemed
against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will to have served U.S. purposes, not obstructed them,
eradicate completely from the face of the earth. and fit well with Obamas views on the efficient use
of power.
Obama seemed to see himself as something of
a shadow operator. In Libya, he let Sarkozy brag
Obama in Syria about his role in the war, while he would purchase
Frances involvement in a way that made it less
Under Barack Obama, the United States launched expensive for us and less risky for us.8
two wars in Syria: a proxy war against the Syrian If he can do it to friends, better still to opponents
regime and a direct war against ISIS and other trans- and enemies. Let Iran and Russia take as much of the
national jihadists. When it came to ISIS, Obama burden as possible; he wanted to minimize expense
articulated his policy relatively bluntly and with and avoid taking the brunt of a ground operation.9
less contradiction than his statements about Syrian Real power, he told Goldberg, means you
President Bashar al-Assad. can get what you want without having to exert
One of the best examples emerges from Jeffrey violence.10
Goldbergs piece The Obama Doctrine for The But realists, too, are unsure what to make of
Atlantic. Goldberg cites Obama using a Batman Obama. Some seem happy that he articulated ideas
movie analogy to explain his problem with ISIS:5 that they see fit into a realist school of foreign pol-
Theres a scene in the beginning in which the icy,11 while others are disappointed that he neither
gang leaders of Gotham are meeting, the President articulated them enough nor succeeded in putting
would say. These are men who had the city divided them into practice.
up. They were thugs, but there was a kind of order. Stephen Walt is vocal among the latter, and he
Everyone had his turf. And then the Joker comes in pays particular attention to Obamas rhetoric. This
and lights the whole city on fire. ISIL is the Joker. most articulate of presidents, he said, never articu-
3
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES WINTER 2017
lated a clear and coherent framework identifying ruled by European powers. But soon enough after
vital U.S. interests.12 the King-Crane Commission, Faisal met with real-
Obamas belief in American exceptionalism and ity18 when he realized that despite all efforts at
his tendency to recite the familiar rhetoric of liberal pleasing Wilson he [Faisal] was going to lose both
hegemony, according Walt, made him more liable Palestine and Syria.19
to intervene where U.S. interests were not at stake.13 The Syrian historian Sami Moubayed offers a
It seemed easily predictable Obama would not less-known sequel to the famous storyan unin-
dwell on Syria in a farewell speech meant in large tended but telling episode that would display the
part to imprint his legacy. Syria does not seem to fit enduring power of the Wilsonian pull.
in his stories about American exceptionalism, and Just three years later, in 1922, Crane decided to
there is little about it to inspire on an occasion that return to Syria. Although it was a private visit, Abd
demanded nothing but inspiration. al-Rahman Shahbandar, who used to be Faisals
But exceptionalism is more than just a mask; it right-hand man, was filled with hope again.
is a national faith that extends beyond the president He has the ear of influential members of
and the foreign policy establishment and often per- Congress, Shahbandar would tell skeptics who were
meates Western institutions of knowledge. suspicious and fearful they would be sold another
As America offered a hand to the Syrian uprising, illusion. We must show him around, and he must
a lot of mainstream media would mistake the pos- see the damage done by the French, to convey it to
ture for policy and entire narratives would be built the US government!20
about a heartbroken United States facing another Crane had nothing to offer to Syria, but he
moral dilemma. A familiar kind of angst would entrusted Shahbandar with money to give to two
resurface in the collective imagination: A lament that Syrian activists should they accept an offer for
Americas idealistic aspirations for a better global scholarships in the United States. Shahbandar was
order have been thwarted, and the faith of American clapped in chains the minute Crane left Damascus,
exceptionalism has not been upheld. And if the goals accused of receiving money from the United States
are so sublime and the result so tragic, the only con- to topple the French mandate, and sentenced to 20
clusion is that American policymakers do not know years of hard labor.21
what they are doing.14 In search of one of the activists, the French
arrested a student and locked her up for two hours
in an empty tomb to get information, took her to
The Outstretched Hand a prison in a state of collapse, and then proceeded
to arrest dozens of Syrians active in opposing French
Syria had its first encounter with American excep- rule who had taken to the streets in protest.22
tionalism during Woodrow Wilsons presidency. If By virtue of his association with U.S. power, and
the people truly want independence, he was said the perception that he had access, Crane set off an
to have told King Faisal in 1919,15 then I will not unforeseen chain of events. Although we can rule
allow any country in the world to control Syria!16 out intent of influence with near certainty, inten-
Wilson sent Charles Crane and Henry King17 tions in this case did not really matter.
to gauge the public mood in Syria, in line with his Fast forward to August 18, 2011. Unlike Wilsons
new idea of national self-determination for people America, the United States had been for a long time
4
the dominant world power with global interests and increasingly counting on U.S. support, and acting
long-standing intent to shape events in line with its on the expectation that Washington would deliver
interests. The intoxicating effect of a string of revolts the needed help to overthrow the regime and seize
against life-long dictators in Arab countries was power in Syria. Back in 2011, this would not neces-
fresh, the United States was militarily involved in a sarily have been a stupid calculation.
new, thinly veiled regime-change venture in Libya, Of the Crane episode in 1922, Moubayed writes
and a popular uprising was underway in Syria. that it reveals how Syrians saw the United States
For the sake of the Syrian people declared then as a mystical, distant country that could somehow
U.S. President Barack Obama, the time has come miraculously end all their troubles, and Crane as
for President Assad to step aside.23 a knight in shining armor, coming to the Oriental
East to save the Arabs from European colonialism,
seemingly wanting nothing in return.26
Into Americas Orbit It would be a step too far to imagine that Syrian
politicians and activists in 2011 had similar illu-
This time the pull was deliberately sustained. After sions. It is more likely that they made calculations
Obamas declaration came a string of high-profile based not just on statements and conferences and
international conferences under the enticing head- other displays of intent to remove Assad, but also on
line Friends of Syria, announcements and anony- readings of long-standing U.S. policy toward Syria
mous leaks of overt and covert support, and continu- and Iran.
ous moral proclamations about legitimacy. The undercurrent of hostility to Irans region-
With hindsight, all this may appear hollow, al influence and Syrias role in enabling it was
but hindsight can deceive. still potent in
Not knowing how it is all Washington, even
going to end is the mark For the sake of the Syrian after the exit of
of living through events, Obamas prede-
writes the American people declared then U.S. cessor, President
philosopher Arthur George W. Bush.
Danto, in Narration and
President Barack Obama, the Early on in
Knowledge.24 These state- time has come for President the uprising, in
ments and conferences November 2011,
may have turned out to Assad to step aside. then-Assistant
be hollow, but that was Secretary of State
not apparent at the time. Jeffrey Feltman told
Obama later described his statement as nothing senators that a new government in Syria is not
more than a moral judgment about how leaders going to be the asset for Iran that Syria is today,
should treat their people. But he was neither a parish adding, [i]t is in our strategic interest to see that
priest nor a professor of ethics when he made it, and this change takes place quickly. 27
it was bound to have an effect on the calculations of In the same hearing, Senator Marco Rubio twice
all actors in the region.25 A significant segment of the asked Feltman whether he thought that the loss of
Syrian uprising was gravitating into Americas orbit; the Assad regime would be a devastating blow to
5
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES WINTER 2017
Iran, and Feltman assured him that he thought it Correct. Im surprised thats not already clear
would.28 from the record, said Ford.34
Ford stresses the record on negotiations, as well
as on the start of U.S. aid, which he says was too
On and Off the Record little too late.35 But everyone knows that there was
a covert operation that was not on the record.36 And
There will be increasingly capable opposition forc- even on the record, things do not seem as clear as
es. They will from somewhere, somehow, find the Ford implies. While it is true that in many official
means to defend themselves as well as begin offensive public statements, U.S. officials emphasized a nego-
measures. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, tiated political solution, this was always a phrase
February 23, 2012.29 of such elasticity that
A sense of inevitability it was almost meaning-
grew that Assad was on his As they calculated the flow less.37
way out, and the CIA set of arms, the Americans And American offi-
up two operations rooms cial statements were
kept one eye on Iran often phrased to imply
in Jordan and Turkey. 30
6
and indicated he would change tactics when dealing Hezbollah and the Iranians, Iraqi militias aligned to
with Iran.40 Iran, as well as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and a pool of
But while presidents can change direction, they international jihadists, all fighting in one place. Even
do not re-author policy from scratch; the uprising united, it was not clear the rebels could win; without
in Syria breathed new life into the policy that had unity, they stood little chance of survival.
lain dormant even as Obama made moves to change The American dilemma lay in the overlap
it. Although advocating Bush-style regime change between the rebel factions they supported and the
was almost politically impossible in Washington transnational jihadist factions, especially but not
throughout Obamas two terms,41 the uprising pre- exclusively ISIS. Unlike nationalist rebel proxies and
sented an opportunity for a proxy war on the cheap. some other Salafi groups, the transnational jihadists
Obama chose his battles on foreign policy care- could not be co-opted by the United States or even
fully and pragmatically. When it came to what he its Gulf allies.
perceived as threats and interests, such as the prolif- The dilemma for the opposition was to manage
eration of chemical weapons in Syria and the nuclear the fault-lines in such a way to achieve rebel unity in
deal with Iran, he would face down the various forces the middle of the war. The task was complicated by
hostile to Iran in Washington and deal with the issue the nature of the broader division between seculars
his own way. But a proxy war was differentthere and Islamists, which is often woven into the fabric of
were no American lives at stake and no costly no-fly society,46 with vaguely defined contours.
zones to pay for, just a flow of mostly Gulf-funded The United States resolved its dilemma by
weapons into Syria, under the gaze of the CIA. applying a peeling policy to its proxies,47 margin-
Although Obama later indicated he did not think it alizing fighters it deemed undesirable or a threat. It
was going to change the equation on the ground, would exert constant pressure on its loyal factions
he decided to let them have it.42 to separate from other groups. The United States
But even if all of Obamas intentions were to distrust of the rebels and their base would color the
be somehow magically revealed, we still would not relationship from the start and highlight an appar-
be able to appreciate the historical significance of ent contradiction in U.S. policy. To ensure loyalty
his actions.43 In history, more than anything, our in their proxies, the Americans sacrificed rebel unity
criteria for assessing performances are by and large and encouraged rebel infighting.48
behavioristic.44 What Obama intended to do would The Americans also monitored the race between
certainly enrich the record,45 but a question of higher different rebel groups to provide services, as a mea-
historical interest is what America ended up doing. sure of local support, and steered aid to balance it in
favor of its chosen factions.49
The opposition body recognized by the West
Civil War within a Civil War and Gulf states as representatives of the Syrian
people would play a helping role, while maintaining
(within a Civil War) an indignant posture.50 In public, a now-familiar
dynamic unfolded: The United States was constantly
There they were: the Syrian rebel factions America concerned, donor nations would continuously press
had pulled into orbit, at war with the unrestrained the rebel groups to separate themselves from what
machinery of the Syrian state. And there, too, were some of the extreme elements are doing,51 and the
7
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES WINTER 2017
opposition would perpetually plead for weapons, port, would tell me as the Americans started bomb-
promising not to misuse them.52 ing in northern Syria. We cannot be distracted
But as the Americans armed the rebels to coun- by the Daesh [ISIS] front and allow the regime to
ter Iran and Hezbollah, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS advance.
were proving more effective on the ground. Little The alluring Wilsonian pull had turned into a
by little, the United States shifted its balancing grip of steel, and U.S. help was becoming condition-
strategy toward a stronger focus on weakening the al on surrendering the very aim for which the rebels
transnational jihadists, effectively taking a load off had risked, and perhaps lost, almost everything.
the regime and its allies. And in 2014, the strategy Russia entered the battleground directly in 2015
would swing almost full force as ISIS advanced and and let loose an aerial campaign against rebel-held
America decided to step in directly. areas in its own War on Terror. As mass misery
unfolded in its wake, the United States would pres-
ent an indignant posture.56 But the main dynamic
The War on Terror Prolifer- of the new global War on Terror was clear:
Between the Russian and Syrian governments and
ates the Western-led coalition, it was open season from
the skies on the fractured rebel base.
Only one year had passed since Obamas sudden
and dramatic turnabout on striking Assad, which
interventionists lamented as a crippling blow to U.S.
power and credibility.53 Yet at the first sign that U.S. Off and Onshore Balancing
power was about to be deployed in Syria as a new
extension of Americas War on Terror, the Syrian Writing in nostalgic praise of the realist creed, Paul
regime would promptly signal to America that it Pillar looks back to the time when the United States
would like cooperate.54 practiced offshore balancing during the Iran-Iraq
Officially, the Americans rejected the offer. But War of the 1980s.57
even as the rebels, plagued by infighting, were pulled When it appeared that Iraq would have difficul-
further apart, the United States, Syria, Jordan, Saudi ty keeping up the fight, the Reagan administration
Arabia and other Gulf countries, a collection of tilted toward Baghdad, he recalled. It would be
Western countries, and later, Russia, were all sharing better from the standpoint of U.S. interests and the
the skies over rebel-held areas and conducting their prevention of anyone gaining regional hegemony to
respective Wars on Terror. have both sides suffer from an exhausting stalemate.
Battered and besieged, U.S. proxies would now It was offshore because the United States
be reconfigured for the United States new fight; tilted the balance by means other than direct military
the Americans started steering55 them from fighting intervention. But the policy is flexible; Pillar suggests
the regime to fighting transnational jihadists, par- that George H.W. Bush was still broadly within off-
ticularly ISIS. Some rebels were suspicious, but their shore balancing when he went to war with Iraq over
margin of choice was getting narrower and narrower. its invasion of Kuwait. The war was simply recogni-
We need more focus on our fronts with the tion that occasionally even an offshore balancer has
regime, one rebel, who was not receiving U.S. sup- to come onshore to do the balancing.58
8
Obama appears to have practiced some such balance was actually threatened, and then only long
blend of onshore and offshore balancing policy in enough to remove the threat. The other argued for
Syria and Iraq, drawing insight from the Iran-Iraq a more aggressive policy, that Great Britains main
War itself. The ISIS advance, he told the New York duty was to shape and not simply to protect the bal-
Times in July 2015, makes it difficult for Iran to ance of power.64
sustain a buffer, which has always been a significant Walter Russell Mead offers a livelier, more
motivator for them since the Iraq-Iran War.59 graphic description. As seen from the British Isles,
Irans sphere of influence in Iraq and perhaps its continental Europe was a bottle, and European pow-
internal security were at ers were scorpions inside
threat, and Obama knew the bottle, fighting each
...in 2014, the strategy
it; he would benefit from other.65 One view was
Iranian blood and trea- would swing almost full to maintain a strong
sure to minimize his own navy and simply cork
intervention so that ISIS force as ISIS advanced the bottle so that none
can be contained at mini- of the scorpions could
mum cost, risk, and vis- and America decided crawl out, and Britain
ibility for America, and would be secure. The
with maximum impact.60
to step in directly. other was that Britain
Pillar says that instead needed to maintain the
of fretting about Irans role in the region, critics of capacity to intervene in the Continental wars, to
Obama should quietly welcome the expenditure prevent any scorpion from devouring the rest and
of blood and treasure by Iran as it does heavy lift- growing strong enough to push the cork out of the
ing in combating someone like ISIS.61 way and climb out of the bottle.66
The key word is quietly. Realism guides the Henry Kissinger points out that these differences
practice of policy, not its articulationthis is a were practical, not philosophical; tactical, not stra-
sacred rule adhered to even by Americas most realist tegic.67
of presidents.62 The same might be said of the different varieties
of balancing America applied in the region. Pillar
says that offshore balancing died in stages after
Corks and Scorpions the Iran-Iraq War. President George H.W. Bushs
war on Iraq was an act of onshore balancing within
Americas balancing games across the Middle East a broader offshore policy, President Bill Clintons
echo an older tradition of balancing rooted in its dual containment of Iraq and Iran was also a step
mother country. In centuries past, Great Britain away from offshore balancing, and President George
would aim to balance the European powers against W. Bush would discard the notion of balancing
each other in order to maintain supremacy at sea altogether and send the army to impose an American
and ensure no European power could challenge it.63 order directly.
Two schools of thought on how to achieve the bal- It appears Obama attempted to take a step
ance would fight it out in London. One argued that back from George W. Bush to George H.W. Bush,
Great Britain should engage itself only when the perhaps ending up somewhere between George
9
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES WINTER 2017
W. Bush and Bill Clinton. But why did Americas It might be said that the United States lost its
balance tilt so drastically from targeting the Syrian proxy war against the Syrian regime and won its
regime, Hezbollah, and Iran to targeting ISIS and open war against ISIS. The various coalitions that
the pool of international jihadists who came to Syria fought ISIS have indeed managed to contain it into a
to fight Assad? smaller area than that it had expanded to in summer
Many labels have 2014, which Obama
been attached to can claim for his
Syrian rebel groups as record as commander-
the war dragged on; It was a cheap, opportunis- in-chief. But ISIS and
secular and Islamist, tic gamble for America and its predecessors have
extremist and mod- a long, bloody war for the survived tough con-
erate, sectarian and ditions before, long
inclusive. But none
regime, the rebels, and the enough to pounce on
of the above explains rest of Syria. the opportunity that
Americas standards as presented itself after
it weighed its peeling the Syrian uprising and
policy.68 A more useful distinction to understand then expand exponentially. That does not necessarily
U.S. behavior is that between national and trans- mean it will happen again, but it might.
national rebels. ISIS sought to destroy borders and On Assad, let us assume that some of those in
create a larger entity; if it were to keep expanding, Washington who pushed for action intended to
or even consolidate its territorial gains, it would not swiftly knock down his regime, while others envis-
only have threatened Damascus and Baghdad, but aged an open-ended war of attrition that draws
possibly Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf, not in the Iranians and Hezbollah and bleeds them in
to mention North Africa. Syria.70
In other words, ISIS made a dash for the cork, The most likely long-term intention in both cases
pulling America onshore to knock it back into the would have been to strike a blow at the links that
bottle. bind Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria, and to weaken the
entire alliance, an enduring U.S. purpose. So to the
extent that Iran ended up more entrenched in Syria
Obama in History after the proxy war, the outcome would signal a loss
for America. But here, too, the outcome is not final,
not just because the war has not necessarily ended,
The whole truth concerning an event can only
but also because it must have already transformed
be known after, and sometimes only long after the
the regime in ways we cannot understand now.
event itself has taken place, and this part of the story
But to speak of victory and defeat in the proxy
historians alone can tell.69 Arthur Danto, Narration
war is to neglect a glaring asymmetry of interests71
and Knowledge
and investments in Syria. While the United States
10
invested very little in the war, Damascus and its that it has indeed put some idea of global welfare
allies sustained vast losses. Obama made two major ahead of consolidating and expanding its power.
inputs into the covert operation against Assad that Beyond a certain point, the labels stop making
seem to have significantly affected events in Syria sense; they imply contradictiona continuum with
after the uprising; he authorized it, and then he set two polar opposites that never meet and are always
about making sure it never developed into a costlier in conflict. But in the long sweep of the United
entanglement. It was a cheap, opportunistic gamble States, realism and idealism have marched together,
for America and a long, bloody war for the regime, gracefully intertwined as the former guides the coun-
the rebels, and the rest of Syria. try in action and the latter bestows a saintly glitter on
The Syrian war remains an unfolding story, a everything she does.
story that awaits completion. In Syria we are dealing
not only with events, but with fragments of events
that occupy a most mysterious space in time;72 we
cannot fully know the fragments that are past before The Future
knowing the fragments that are still to pass. But
Obama seemed impatient; he had his eyes set on On February 10 and 11, 2017, two rival Syrian
his history even before he started making it. As he coalitions laid out their positions on upcoming talks
entered office, he invited presidential historians to in Geneva; one group, meeting in Riyadh, wants
the White House for dinner, and three years into Assad to go, while the other announced from Beirut
his first term, he was already rating himself against that the Syrian presidency is not up for discussion at
other presidents.73 the conference.
Although his second term is over, the historical The newly formed Beirut group appears to be
contest is only just starting. At times, Barack Obama a facade for the Syrian regime and the Russians; it
was Woodrow Wilson, speaking of morals and ide- seems to be aimed at reinforcing the regimes talking
als, the arc of history, and Americas forward motion. points from a nominally independent standpoint.
At others, he was Ronald Reagan and George H.W. The Riyadh group is an extension of the opposition
Bush, playing a balancing game. But even George coalition that has served as a front for Gulf Arab
H.W. Bush was sometimes Wilsonian,74 and Reagan monarchies and Western countries throughout the
sounded so idealistic that he had his own unique war, targeting Hezbollah and, later, al-Nusra and
variant of American exceptionalism.75 ISIS.
In a way, even the rise of Donald Trump, whose They may all be just puppets on a string, but they
rhetoric borders on heresy from various standpoints reflect a real struggle involving Russia, Iran, the Gulf
of U.S. exceptionalism, testifies to the reach of monarchies, and Turkey over who controls Syria.
the exceptionalist faith. After all, some of those The positions are constantly shifting, with Russia
Americans who so desperately wanted to hear their and Turkey momentarily closer than ever before,
president say America first might have thought and Iran slightly further from Russia than it was in
that the United States has not been first in the past; the past.
11
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES WINTER 2017
Meanwhile, somewhere in Syria, Hashem al- Obama, it was the former more than the latter.
Sheikh announced the formation of a new group, Under Trump, it is too early to tell, but he appears
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (the committee for the libera- to be taking a more aggressive stance toward Iran,
tion of Syria/the Levant), a merger between Jabhat especially as the scope of ISISs territorial control,
Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) and other a main driver of tacit coordination between the
groups.76 United States and Iran, diminishes.
The page shall not turn upon al-Sham (Syria or Be that as it may, Washingtons enemies remain
the Levant), he declared, not through negotiations, locked in mortal combat, a condition which lends
nor through some conference that aborts the revolu- itself to more balancing games. In a way, Obama has
tion and crowns the butcher. handed Trump a situation that reflects his own pre-
Although al-Nusra started as a proxy of what ferred scenarioone in which minimal investment
used to be the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), the two is required to achieve American purposes.
diverged more than anything over priorities, with It remains to be seen whether the current admin-
al-Nusra maintaining a fierce, unflinching focus istration is as inclined to that approach as the former
on toppling the regime. In that sense, the fighters was, but as long as the region-wide sectarian split
of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham are today the last rebels endures, Washington will have ample opportunity
standing. to maintain control from a comfortable distance,
The Americans remain focused on the trans- with just enough intervention to keep its enemies
national jihadists and Irans regional reach. Under contained as they bleed each other.
12
policy, as well as a growing desire to focus away from the
Endnotes world stage. Fisher, Max. American isolationism just hit
a 50-year high. Why that matters. The Washington Post.
1 President Barack Obama. Farewell address. McCormick December 4, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/
Place, Chicago. January 10, 2017. https://www.nytimes. news/worldviews/wp/2013/12/04/american-isolationism-
com/2017/01/10/us/politics/obama-farewell-address- just-hit-a-50-year-high-why-that-matters/?utm_term=.
speech.html. f2b58689d722.
2 In Wilsons first State of the Union Address, on 10 Goldberg, Jeffrey. The Obama Doctrine.
December 2, 1913, he laid down the outline of what later 11 Pillar, Paul. Obama the Realist. The National Interest.
came to be known as Wilsoniansim. Universal law and March 12, 2016.
not equilibrium, national trustworthiness and not national http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/obama-the-
self-assertion were, in Wilsons view, the foundations realist-15479. See also Pillar, Paul. The Forgotten Benefits
of international order. Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. of Offshore Balancing. The National Interest. January 27,
Touchstone, 1995. p.44. 2016.
3 President Barack Obama. Farewell address. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/the-forgotten-
4 President Donald Trump. Inaugural address. The benefits-offshore-balancing-15035.
United States Capitol, Washington, D.C. January 20, 12 Walt, Stephen. Obama was not a realist President.
2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/ Foreign Policy. April 7, 2016.
wp/2017/01/20/donald-trumps-full-inauguration-speech- http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/obama-was-not-a-
transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.a7fca723e053. realist-president-jeffrey-goldberg-atlantic-obama-doctrine/.
5 According to Goldberg, Obama made the comparison 13 Ibid.
in conversations with advisers. Goldberg, Jeffrey. The 14 Some commentators seem to assume Obama
Obama Doctrine. The Atlantic 10 (2016). April 2016. administration policymakers do not understand such
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/ basic things as other nations acting in defense of their
the-obama-doctrine/471525/. geopolitical interests: The belief that Russia valued U.S.
6 Hokayem, Emile. The end of the Islamic State will make and international good will more than its hard geopolitical
the Middle East worse. The Washington Post. October 28, interests, wrote the Atlantic Council, turned out to be
2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/ wrong. Itani, Faysal, and Hossam Abouzhahr. Lessons
wp/2016/10/28/the-end-of-the-islamic-state-will-make-the- from Russias Intervention in Syria. Atlantic Council.
middle-east-worse/?utm_term=.13455c4ebbc7. Similarly, October 26, 2016. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
Joseph Micalle said that Byzantine political maneuvering syriasource/lessons-from-russia-s-intervention-in-syria.
is set to continue. Micalle, Joseph. The Race to Raqqa: 15 Sharif Faisal, son of Sharif Hussein, the leader of the
The Next Russian-American Proxy Battle? The Huffington Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in 1916-1918, had
Post. May 29, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ been proclaimed the first Arab ruler of Syria after 400
joseph-v-micallef/the-race-to-raqqa-the-nex_b_10193766. years of Ottoman rule. Moubayed, Sami. Syria and the
html. Notice the bar for success implied by such attacks USA: Washingtons Relations with Damascus From Wilson to
on Obamas strategy; Obama was supposed not just to Eisenhower. IB Tauris, 2012. p. 14.
fight IS, and get other powers to fight IS, but to get these 16 Ibid. p. 14.
powers to love one another first. These are examples of how 17 Ibid.: King was an educator who taught theology and
the assumptions underlying American exceptionalism seep philosophy at Oberlin College, while Crane was a wealthy
into analysis; the implication is that America is a force of philanthropist who knew the Middle East.
such inherent goodness that its military interventions must 18 Ibid.
lead to positive transformation in order to be counted as 19 Ibid. pp. 16-19. Moubayed writes that Faisal had hoped to
successful. This kind of analysis is pervasive even in some win Syria by compromising on Palestine: Arab Historians
Arab media, testifying to the global reach of American who have tackled Wilsons relationship with Emir Faisal
exceptionalism. have often glossed over the US presidents unwavering
7 Goldberg, Jeffrey. The Obama Doctrine. support for Zionism. Shahbandar, well-versed in
8 Ibid. American politics, knew Wilson presented a double-edged
9 For Obama as well as Congress, a military entanglement, sword for the Arabs. His support did not come in one
even without boots on the ground, could have been piece- sovereignty in Syria had to be at the expense of the
politically damaging. In December 2013, the Washington future of Palestine. This was a price both Shahbandar and
Post reported: Americans appear to be less interested Faisal seemed willing to pay for the sake of establishing
in U.S. foreign engagement that at any other time over a Hashemite monarchy in Damascus. [] Shahbandar
the last half-century, judging by a Pew poll that has been tried to tell the Emir that he must push for Syria first,
measuring U.S. public opinion since 1964. The poll found and let the Palestinians worry about Palestine. Opposing
an all-time low in public support for an active U.S. foreign the Balfour declaration was unwise, he claimed, calling
13
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES WINTER 2017
on the Emir to reach a deal with the Zionist Commission 27 Jeffrey Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
President, Chaim Weizmann, who was representing Eastern Affairs at the Hearing Before the Subcommittee
the Zionists in Paris. But just weeks after signing the on the Near Eastern and South Central Asian Affairs
agreement with Weizmann, Faisal met with reality in Paris, of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States
when he realized that no matter how hard he tried, both Senate. November 9, 2011. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot Agreement pkg/CHRG-112shrg73917/pdf/CHRG-112shrg73917.
were going ahead. Despite all efforts at pleasing Wilson, pdf. He added: What is happening on the ground in Syria
he was going to lose both Palestine and Syria and nobody is quite interesting because as our Embassyand I thank
neither Wilson nor Weizmann were seriously going to you all for the comments on Ambassador Ford which, of
challenge the agreement that gave the French government a course, we certainly all endorse. Our Embassy reports
mandate in Syria. it also comes in through other channelsthat these
20 Ibid. p. 24. demonstrations across Syria have, among other demands,
21 Ibid. pp. 28; 30. Shahbandar served 17 months in jail, an anti-Hezbollah, anti-Iran flavor to them.
along with all those who had facilitated Cranes visit. 28 Senator Marco Rubio. In Ibid. The exchange between
22 Ibid. Regardless of Cranes visit, the conditions for these Rubio and Feltman further reads: Secretary Feltman, I
clashes were there. To the extent that Syrians were opposed want to continue to explore the Iran aspect of it. If you
to French rule, they had cause to resist it, and to the extent could elaborate a little bit more as to how important Syria
that the French wished to maintain their rule, they had is to Iran and how devastating it would be to them
cause to oppress them. But the trigger for these specific if, indeed, Syria were outside their sphere. Feltmans
events was Cranes visit (and the subsequent arrest of response: Syria is, I would say, essential to the extremely
Shahbandar). Here we can distinguish underlying causes negative role that Iran has been able to play in the region.
from causes of the more immediate kind. Take Hezbollah. The transit routes for the arms to
23 Goldberg, Jeffrey. The Obama Doctrine. Hezbollah are via Syria. The facilitation that Iran gives to
24 Danto, Arthur. Narration and Knowledge. Colombia Hezbollah to undermine the state of Lebanon, to put Israel
University Press, 2007. p. 294. Here, Danto further writes: at risk, to basically destabilize the region comes via Syria.
Sympathetically to try to attain an internal understanding Senator Rubio further asked: Just in terms of the general
of those events requiresin effect, an erasure of the policy goal of limiting and containing and defeating Irans
subsequent record (forgetting the future, as it were), a ambitions, violent ambitions, for the region and the world,
deliberate holding of it in abeyance; therefore, this is an the loss of the Assad regime would be a devastating blow
impossible demand. We simply know too much to be able to Iran. Is that accurate? Secretary Feltman ultimately
to attain that state of innocence of the future and hence responded: Yes. I wouldyes, yes
of the present, since it is the future that will retroactively 29 Mohammed, Arshad. Clinton suggests Syrian rebels
give a shape and color to the present which those who will get arms. Reuters. Febraury 23, 2012. http://
lived through events must be supposed to have had. Not www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-conference-challenge-
knowing how it is all going to end is the mark of living idUSTRE81M23R20120224.
through events. Although he was discussing the possibility 30 Lund, Aaron. Media Maskirovka: Russia and the Free
of historical understanding of other periods we have not Syrian Army. Syria Comment. November 8, 2015. http://
lived through, the point that holds here is that our view www.joshualandis.com/blog/media-maskirovka-russia-and-
of the events as they were unfolding in 2011 is different the-free-syrian-army/. Here it reads on the two operation
from our view now, when the erasure of the subsequent rooms: Thousands of rebel fighters have by now been
record, of what we know now, has become impossible. vetted, trained, and approved for material support via two
25 He also seemed to imply, unconvincingly, that the Military Operations Centers, which feed the insurgency
only possible critique of his statement is the hyper- from across the Turkish and Jordanian borders. The one in
interventionist critique: Oftentimes when you get critics Turkey is colloquially known as the MOM, for Mterek
of our Syria policy, one of the things that theyll point Operasyon Merkezi, while its Jordanian counterpart is
out is You called for Assad to go, but you didnt force called the MOC, after its English initials. Apart from
him to go. You did not invade. And the notion is that if Turkey and Jordan, these centers gather representatives
you werent going to overthrow the regime, you shouldnt of the United States, Saudi Arabia, France, and a bunch
have said anything. Thats a weird argument to me, the of other governments. Their role is to coordinate and
notion that if we use our moral authority to say This is a supervise the flow of arms and ammunition to a select
brutal regime, and this is not how a leader should treat his number of rebel groups. Foreign intelligence services, chief
people, once you do that, you are obliged to invade the among them the CIA, collaborate through these centers
country and install a government you prefer. Goldberg, to pick which groups should be eligible for support. They
Jeffrey. The Obama Doctrine. will not receive a stamp of approval until their members
26 Moubayed, Sami. Syria and the USA: Washingtons Relations have been vetted for suspicious contacts, declared that they
with Damascus From Wilson to Eisenhower. p.31. will stay away from alliances with al-Qaeda, and showed
14
some interest in a negotiated solution to the conflict. The opportunity to get good solutions. For example, if they
groups involved enjoy different levels of trust and approval, had helped moderate rebel fighters in 2012 and early 2013
but many also receive unofficial support on the side from, with money it would have been much easier to slow the
for example, Turkey, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia, or various recruitment into the ranks of al Qaida and later Tantheem
private funders. So far, this arrangement has been accepted al Dawla [ISIS]. But they waited. Its a matter of record
by something like a hundred rebel factions all in all now, they started second half of 2013 but by then, say
These groups are what the U.S. government typically refers August, September, October 2013, Nusra was already quite
to when it talks about the FSA and there is indeed a very strong. By then they had Tantheem al Dawla, they were
considerable overlap between MOM/MOC-backed factions already taking over places in the east. And the groups in
and factions that self-designate as FSA. This crude the east were already severely weakened.The American
definition (MOM + MOC = FSA) is also increasingly used assistance was too little too late. Thats because the White
by the Syrian exile opposition, the rebels themselves, and House waited. Remember when Obama said I dont think
others who follow this conflict. See also Syria rebels get these farmers and doctors and dentists can fight very well?
arms from abroad -opposition source. Reuters. February Well, that was his attitude. Whats funny is the farmers,
24, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/syria-opposition- doctors and dentists have now been fighting Hezbollah
arms-idAFL5E8DO4PO20120224. and Quds force and Syrian government pretty hard for
31 Chivers, C.J. and Eric Schmittmarch. Arms Airlift to four years. When asked how Obamas statement differed
Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid From C.I.A. The New from his own contention that it was always impossible
York Times. March 24, 2013. http://www.nytimes. for the rebels to achieve victory without direct military
com/2013/03/25/world/middleeast/arms-airlift-to-syrian- intervention from the United States, Ambassador Ford
rebels-expands-with-cia-aid.html. responded: Theres a difference between arming them in
32 Ibid. The former American official said David H. order to get them and the regime to go to a negotiating
Petraeus, the C.I.A. director until November, had been table and arming them in such a way that they cant in the
instrumental in helping to get this aviation network end prevail enough on the battlefield to put pressure on
moving and had prodded various countries to work the regime. What the American limited position did by
together on it. Mr. Petraeus did not return multiple e-mails basically sending in small amounts of weapons instead of
asking for comment. larger amounts is they enabled extremist groups to occupy
33 Baker, Peter. Heavy Pressure Led to Decision by Obama more space and they never put pressure on the regime to
on Syrian Arms. The New York Times. June 14, 2013. negotiate.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/15/us/politics/pressure- 36 Hosenball, Mark. Obama authorizes secret support
led-to-obamas-decision-on-syrian-arms.html. Here it for Syrian rebels. Reuters. August 1, 2012. http://
further reads: But the move also reflects nervousness in www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-syria-obama-order-
the White House about the increased involvement of Iran idUSBRE8701OK20120802. Here it reads: President
and its proxy group, Hezbollah, in the fight on Mr. Assads Barack Obama has signed a secret order authorizing U.S.
behalf... The president wants to avoid sending heavier support for rebels seeking to depose Syrian President
weapons systems, Mr. Rhodes said, recognizing that they Bashar al-Assad and his government, sources familiar with
might fall into the hands of Al Nusra Front, an opposition the matter said. Obamas order, approved earlier this year
group affiliated with Al Qaeda. and known as an intelligence finding, broadly permits
34 Interview with Ambassador Robert Ford, November the CIA and other U.S. agencies to provide support that
2016. I asked Ambassador Ford whether he believed that could help the rebels oust Assad Precisely when Obama
this was always clear to people fighting Assad who were signed the secret intelligence authorization, an action
receiving American help. He responded: Of course it not previously reported, could not be determined. The
was. Absolutely. We never said to them youre going to full extent of clandestine support that agencies like the
win militarily. We never ever said that to them. I used to CIA might be providing also is unclear. Further, Erica
say to them, what, do you think youre going to have a Borghard says of the different shades of covert action:
victory parade down Share (street) Baghdad in Damascus? State-proxy alliances can be entirely covert, where neither
I said its not reasonable. I remember once Muath Khatib party acknowledges the alliances existence, or they can be
[leader of the Syrian opposition between November open secrets, where allies admit to the alliance but do not
2012 and March 2013] in early 2013 before Hezbollah reveal the particular nature of alliance commitments. The
intervened said Oh the next time we see you we might be alliance between the United States and the Syrian rebels
in Damascus and I looked at him and said I dont think so. falls into the category of open secrets. Borghard, Erica.
I said I think we need to see you in Geneva. They wanted Arms and Influence in Syria. The Pitfalls of Greater U.S.
to win a military victory that wasnt what the American, we Involvement. Policy Analysis No. 734. August 7, 2013.
didnt think it was possible. Its not possible today either. p. 13. https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/
35 Ibid. During the same interview Ambassador Robert Ford pa734_web_1.pdf.
explained: By waiting for a perfect solution, they lost the 37 The hollowness of the phrase was on display at various
15
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES WINTER 2017
16
It will then not be enough simply to be able to predict 50 Over time, the opposition would develop a rhetoric that
future events. It will be necessary to know which future combined grateful praise with bitter criticism of U.S.
events are relevant, and this requires predicting the interests policy, and constant pleas for more help. Time and again,
of future historians. Ibid. p. 169. their hopes would fade, and new hope would arise.
44 Ibid. p. 183. Meanwhile at the second Geneva conference, Anas al
45 It is important to note that Danto does not discard Abdeh, a senior member of the opposition delegation who
intentions altogether: frequently and almost typically, is currently its leader would say that the FSA will break
the actions of men are not intentional under those al-Nusras head. Al Omar, Mousa. Breaking: Anas al
descriptions given of them by means of narrative sentences. Abdeh explains what he said about breaking al-Nusras
This does not, of course, entail that reference to human head. February 18, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/
purposes are historically unimportant. Ibid. p. 182. watch?v=1BcSAWTPlvA.
46 Such fault-lines have festered in the shadows of 51 De Young, Karen. Kerry says U.S. will expedite new
authoritarian states that closely police public debate, and aid to Syrian opposition. The Washington Post. April
surfaced where these states lost authority. But it is not 21, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
all about ideology; fighters often draw inspiration from middle_east/kerry-says-us-will-expedite-new-aid-to-
religion regardless of ideology, and there are complex and syrian-opposition/2013/04/21/91461f40-aa8f-11e2-a8b9-
interwoven reasons for rebels to choose factions and to 2a63d75b5459_story.html?utm_term=.702cca059a72.
move from one to another. More importantly, the Syrian 52 Our revolution is for the entire Syrian people, opposition
rebels were under immediate pressure to unite, or at least leader Moaz al-Khatib told reporters, standing alongside
co-ordinate in battle. Kerry and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.
47 The Center for a New American Security uses the phrase in We will guarantee that weapons will be used in accordance
a piece about the limits of proxy warfare. While peeling with the specific purpose that they were supplied for, and
the onion of jihadist sympathizers and cobelligerents away that these weapons will not fall in the wrong hands. These
is important, it is a means to the end of more effectively weapons and military equipment will be returned to the
targeting and dismantling hardcore Islamists and jihadist relevant and appropriate institutions upon the conclusion
groups. Without that, the policy provides an anvil but of the revolution. Associated Press. US doubles aid to
no hammer. Trying to shorten the Syrian civil war is a Syrian rebels, who want more. The Journal.ie. April 21,
noble intention, but doing so while pushing out jihadists 2013. http://www.thejournal.ie/us-doubles-syrian-rebels-
invites and likely even requires prolonging its second phase. aid-878583-Apr2013/?amp=1.
Scaling up our efforts will not solve the practical or moral 53 The most concise rebuttal of that idea was offered by
dilemmas with proxy warfare. Center for a New American Tim Kaine, a Democratic senator from Virginia: We
Security. The Limits of Proxy Warfare in Syria. March threatened military action and they responded. Thats
26, 2013. https://www.cnas.org/publications/blog/the- deterrent credibility. Goldberg, Jeffrey. The Obama
limits-of-proxy-warfare-in-syria. Doctrine.
48 Ibid. The infighting, said CNAC, should not be hard to 54 Syrian FM Waleed al Moallem said in August 2014:
predict: It is not surprising Syrian infighting is occuring, Relating to airstrikes on Syrian territory, I said we are
as there have been signs of it brewing for months. More ready to coordinate and cooperate because we are the
confusing would be trying to marginalize large swathes sons of the land and we know how to identify useful
of rebel forces while simultaneously stepping up arms strikes. Those who wish to launch aggression on Syria
provisions, and expecting unity, rather than heightened have no justification except in coordination with us, if
infighting, to be the result. Marginalization of dedicated they want to fight terrorism. Anything else is aggression.
insurgents in an ongoing civil war involves violence. Syrian4allNews. Waleed al Moallem: Those who
49 Londoo and Miller note: Wards team working wish to launch aggression in Syria has to coordinate
primarily out of hotel lobbies has spent the past with us. August 26, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/
few months studying the demographics and dynamics watch?v=QQhmaKfsi1A.
of communities where extremists are making inroads. 55 Mustapha Sejari, one of the rebels who says hes approved
Targeted U.S. aid, he said, can be used to empower for the U.S. training program, told The Daily Beast that
emerging local leaders who are moderate and to he and his 1,000 men are on the verge of withdrawing
jump-start basic services while dimming the appeal their candidacies. The issue: the American governments
of extremists. Londoo, Ernesto and Greg Miller. demand that the rebels cant use any of their newfound
CIA begins weapons delivery to Syrian rebels. The battlefield prowess or U.S.-provided weaponry against the
Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ army of Bashar al-Assad or any of its manifold proxies and
world/national-security/cia-begins-weapons-delivery-to- allies, which include Iranian-built militias such as Lebanese
syrian-rebels/2013/09/11/9fcf2ed8-1b0c-11e3-a628- Hezbollah. They must only fight ISIS, Washington
7e6dde8f889d_story.html?utm_term=.dccd58e29c23. insists. Weiss, Michael. Exclusive: Syrian Rebels Backing
Out of U.S. Fight Vs. ISIS. The Daily Beast. May 31,
17
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES WINTER 2017
18
well as events. With this lame addendum, we may continue say-he-ranked-in-the-top-four-presidents/2012/02/29/
to employ the model, for what it is worth. Danto, Arthur. gIQA3ac3iR_blog.html?utm_term=.a9490ac105dc.
Narration and Knowledge. p. 147. 74 Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. p. 53.
73 Walsh, Kenneth T. Obamas Secret Dinner With 75 Ibid. p. 767.
Presidential Historians. U.S. News. July 15, 2009. http:// 76 Tahrir al-Sham. The first speech of Hashem al-Sheikh,
www.usnews.com/news/obama/articles/2009/07/15/ General Commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
obamas-secret-dinner-with-presidential-historians. February 9, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/
Kessler, Glenn. Did Obama say he ranked in the top four watch?v=KAPfjaNvTJ0&sns=em.
presidents? Washington Post. March 1, 2012. https://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/did-obama-
19
ONE WOODROW WILSON PLAZA, 1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20004-3027
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300