Klaus Hartmann: A Philosophical Appreciation

Author(s): Terry Pinkard

Source: Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung, Bd. 46, H. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1992), pp. 600-608
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 BERICHTEUND MITTEILUNGEN

Terry Pinkard, Washington

Klaus Hartmann: A Philosophical Appreciation

At his death in I99I, Klaus Hartmann left behind a very significant body of
work that belongs broadly to that tradition of modern German neo-Kantianism
that centered around figures such as Rickert and Cohen. Hartmann's thought
represented a revised and purified form of neo-Hegelianism that attempted to
respond to and complete the development of neo-Kantianism in modern Ger
man thought just as Hegel himself had attempted to complete the development
of Kantian idealism in his own day. Like the neo-Kantians, who wrote little on
Kant himself, Hartmann also wrote little on Hegel himself. Instead, he con
tentedhimselfwith developingneo-Hegelian responsesand reflectionsto the
movementsof his own day,particularly,existentialism,
major intellectual Marx
ism and, later in his career, developments in contemporary Anglo-American
analytic philosophy. Hartmann's thought always had one foot in the immediate
present and one foot in the neo-Kantian past. His neo-Hegelianism was always
attempting to answer the criticisms from both sides.
In I966, Hartmann published "On Taking the Transcendental Turn."' In
that paper (which with his characteristic modesty he disclaimed as not being a
piece of "research", but only a "series of reflections" on a "method"), Hartmann
outlined what he took to be the elements of transcendental philosophy, its
problems and the possible reasons for preferring it to other conceptions of phi
losophy. Many of the themes that were to resonate during his entire career as a
teacher and a writer are to be found in embryo in this piece. (The title of the
piece was also a humorous counterpoint to his friend Richard Rorty's book,
The Linguistic Turn.)
Hartmann argued for a distinct way of doing philosophy that was neither
the analysis of anything (ordinary language, logical form, whatever) nor was it
the rigorousdescriptionof anything (transcendental
consciousness,livedexpe
rience, whatever). This was amode of philosophy as explanatory and as founda
tional. It was moreover a mode of philosophy with an impressive pedigree:
Kant, Fichte, Hegel, even (on Hartmann's reading) large segments of Husserl,
Sartre and Heidegger themselves. It thus could claim to be more than a research
program; it was already a tradition that could point to some standard problems
and some impressive results.
1 Klaus Hartmann, "Taking the Transcendental Turn," Review ofMetaphysics, Vol. XX,
No. 2 (December I966).

Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung, Band 46 (I992), 4

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 KlausHartmann:A Philosophical
Appreciation 6oi

Hartmann characterizestranscendental philosophy as having severalaims.

First, it offersexplanations,not analysisor description.Second, it is concerned
with basic categories,not with individualpropositionsor ordinaryempirical
classifications.Third, it offersa kind of 'grounding'of a very generalclaim to
knowledgeof the real,although itmay be indifferenttomore particularknowl
edge claims.To take the transcendentalturn consists in being committed to
philosophical theorywith the above three aims. Such a theory,Hartmann
argues,has two distinguishingcharacteristics. These are,he says, (i) the circu
larityof theopening argument,and (2) a commitment to the two levelcharac
terof transcendental explanation:the levelof ordinaryclaims to knowledgeand
the levelof basic categoriesof experiencewhich arepresupposedby that level.2
The most basic categoriesexpressour ontology,our common-senseunderstand
ingof thebasickindsof things thereare.These problemsof justificationof the
ontologicalcategoriesare a priori problems,occurring in "thatdomainwhere
truth is available without an actually performed reference to a referent."3
The problem is to justify the categories.The usual transcendental
method
was to show that they are presupposed by the ordinary level. Hartmann argued
thatsuch amethod of lookingforpresuppositionsactuallybegged thequestion.
To look only for presuppositions is to fall back into what Kant called dogma
tism, since it must simply take as given whatever is on the ordinary level and
then move to the presuppositions of that level. On Hartmann's view, it was
Hegelwho firstrealizedthat for the transcendental
project to succeed,the ideal
formof explanationwould be purelyon the categoriallevel itself.Rather than
just granting the applications of the categories and reconstructing them on that
philosophytriesto operateentirelyon the categorial
basis, 'pure'transcendental
level itself.4 Once one is at the categorial level, one is in an autonomous domain
of thoughtinwhich the categoriesare to be justifiedby a self-validating
proce
dure that does not need to refer to the 'ordinary level' in order to be justified.
Hartmannnoted thatreachingthis transcendental
standpointwas difficult.If
the categorial, transcendental level really is different from the ordinary level, and
itsproceduresfor justifyingitselfreallyare independentof theproceduresof the
ordinary level, then how would we ever move from the ordinary level to the
more esoteric categorial level? Hartmann argued that there could be no princi
pled way to do this, since any argument to get us there would be circular. Of
course, ifwe assume that the distinction of levels is valid, and ifwe assume that
the categorial level may be reconstructed in terms appropriate to itself so that it
is self-justifying, then we have a reason for moving to the transcendental level;
but that assumption can be justified only on the transcendental level itself. If a
person rejectsthe transcendentallevel itself,finding, for example,Hegel'sLogic

2 See Klaus Hartmann, "Taking the Transcendental Turn," p. 234.

3 See "Taking theTranscendental Turn," ibid., p. 225.
4 See "Taking theTranscendental Turn," ibid., p. 238.

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602 Terry
Pinkard

or too esotericto be acceptable,then therecouldbe noth

just incomprehensible
ing at the ordinary level that would logically compel that person to move to the
transcendental level.While there may be many propaedeutical tricks to get us to
jump from one level to another, once we are at that level, we need not look
back. It would seem that transcendental philosophy must adhere toWittgen
stein's aphorism in the Tractatus that having climbed the ladder, we must throw
it awaybehind us.Hartmann ingeniouslyinterpreted
Hegel's Phenomenology
of
Spirit as such a propaedeutic; it leads us away from the ordinary level in order to
prepare us for the more esoteric transcendental level of the Science of Logic.5
In a later essay in I972, "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical Interpretation," Hart
mann elaborated on this notion of transcendental philosophy. In this essay (as
he had done in the original essay and two previous books), he extended the no
tion of categories to include what he called social categories.6 Here Hartmann
discusses the possibility of extending the transcendental categorial program in
itiated by Kant and purified by Hegel into the social realm. Although Hegel
himself does not use the term, Hartmann interprets the basic concepts of the
third section of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (the section on "Sittlichkei") as a
doctrineof socialcategories.
These social categories, like those relating to the objects of knowledge in
space and time, are developed and justified on the transcendental level. Tran
scendental philosophy, however, has no means of conceptualizing those types of
interrelationship that fall outside of the serial ordering that is inherent to tran
scendental procedure. It has been the great temptation on the part of transcen
dental philosophers to want to have things both ways in their theories: to have
a transcendental theory developed and refined exclusively on the transcendental
level and at the same time to include such interrelationships on the ordinary
level in their theory. Succumbing to this temptation is described by Hartmann
as "transcendental illusion." It is a special form of philosophical hubris, part of
the desire to legislate a priori for the world. The philosopher - at least the tran
scendental philosopher - must in Hartmann's view learn to be more humble.
He or she may not legislate categorially for more than their austere method al
lows,howevertemptingthatmight be.

5 See "Taking the Transcendental Turn," p. 237; see also his review of Jacob Loewen
berg, Hegel 'sPhenomenology:Dialogues on theLife of theMind in Journal of theHis
toryof Philosophy,Vol. VI, I968, pp. 92-95. In another piece, Hartmann claims that
"[C]ategorial theory answers only the peculiar questions a philosopher may have as to
what it is that a certain discipline is about. Categorial questions are luxury ques
tions." Klaus Hartmann, "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical Interpretation," in Alasdair
Maclntyre (ed.) Hegel.A Collection of Essays (Garden City: Doubleday, I972). pp. I12
113.
6 For example: "The price is, of course, circularity in the reconstruction of what is
granted. But reason is only satisfied if it can accept things on its own terms,within
the immanence of thought." "Hegel:A Non-Metaphysical Interpretation," p. 117.

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 KlausHartmann:A Philosophical
Appreciation 603

Hegel, Hartmann argued,himselfviolated thisbasic restrictionon transcen

dental theory-building(althoughHartmann argued in his books on them that
Marx and Sartreare the greateroffenders).Having introducedvia thedialectic
procedure)the categoriesof family,civil societyand state,
(his transcendental
Hegel wished to showwithin his dialectic thedevelopmentof themilitary, the
ways in which the social classes of civil society were to be taken up into the
constitutionof the state and so forth.Howevermuch practicalinsightHegel
may havedisplayedin thesematters,he oversteppedtheboundsof his theoryin
making those claims. Practicalinsight should not be confusedwith a priori
transcendentaltruth,and it is an illusionfor the transcendental
philosopherto
think that he or she can give theirvarious concreteopinions the backingof
transcendental Moreover, this inabilityto entertainthe interrelation
authority.
ships among the concrete is no doubt what Hartmann had in mind when he
spokeof "deficienciesthatmay be inherentin the speculative'ortranscendental
method as such."7 Hartmann argued in his three books on Marx and Sartre
thatboth thinkersmake argumentsthatpresupposethe practiceof transcen
dentalphilosophy (although,asHartmann acknowledges,neitheracknowledges
that it iswhat they are doing), and he accused both of them of falling prey (just
Hegel) to the temptationsof transcendental
like theirpredecessor, illusion.
In addition to a seriesof articlesand books dealingwith categorialtheory,
Hartmann has also given us an extended version of his chought on politics in
Here he presentedmost of the central issuesof
his book, PolitischePhilosophie.
classicalpoliticalphilosophyand partiallydefendedhis transcendentalmethod
againstthe alternatives.In PolitischePhilosophie,
Hartmann defended the claim
that only a transcendentally understoodHegelian theory can adequatelyac
count for the legitimacy of the state.
As Hartmann sees it, in Hegel's theory the state is conceived as a formation

7 "Hegel:A Non-Metaphysical Interpretation," p. I24.

8 "Hegel sees the determinations of thewill as free not in law (inmoral or civil law as a
rule) but rather in the object of the will and in the configurations or shapes consti
tuted by object and subject. This yields a series of different relations of will and ob
ject that can be normatively evaluated as to their dignity. Hegel thinks of an ordering
of objects of thewill according to categorial alienness or congeniality. If a relation to
a thing is not fitting to a subject, then a relation of the subject to its equal is a higher
relation, a coming to itself (Zusichkommen)of the will in the identical other. How
ever, relations or social formations that transcend such duality of particular subjects
can also be nominated for consideration: the particularity of only dual, finite particu
larpartners can be further conceived as less limited inmore universal, then plural and
finally all encompassing social formations. These universals appear as cases of the or
chestration (Einordnung) of individuals in a concrete rationality. It is a matter of a
world of freedom, aworld of relations of affirmation that cannot exist in relations of
subjects to the natural world or to things." Klaus Hartmann, "Moralitat und 'kon
kretesAllgemeines'," Archivfuir die Geschichteder PhilosophieVol. 6o (I978), p. 2.

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604 TerryPinkard

(Gestalt)that freedomtakes.Moreover, it is thehighest objectiveconfiguration

of freedom.Hegel demonstratesthis via a teleologicaldialecticaldevelopment
that begins with a concept of the will in relation to its opposite. The relation of
the will to its object is conceived in terms of its congeniality to the will.8
Through a seriesof dialecticalsteps thatprogressin termsof this congeniality,
we arrive at a conception of the state as a categorially higher social structure
thansociety.
This categorial conception of the state can be contrasted with the conception
of the state in terms of a social contract. In social contract theory, the state is
pictured as a structure resulting from a series of individual choices, analogous to
the way that an ordinary contractual relationship might be pictured as the out
come of a series of individual choices. But if the state was an achievement of so
ciety or individuals, itwould then be only a function of society.9 The resulting
state would be what Hartmann calls an abstract-universal, not the categorial
Novum (a category that is irreducible to other categories) forwhich Hartmann's
version of transcendental theory strives. At best, it would represent a particular
compromise among individual wills, not a genuinely new type of category.
The resulting conception is that of a dialectical unity of the universal final
end of the state (freedom), the particular interests of the individuals that are the
citizens of the state, and the subjective absoluteness of the individual. Since this
Hegelian theoryformsconceptionsof individualagents, the
transcendentalized
family, and the state from the perspective of a principle of objective and prac
tical spirit (i.e., freedom), it results in a view of the homogeneity of individual
freedom and state freedom. A conflict between the two cannot appear, at least
within the theory.
However, there can be two other types of conflict which are important for
transcendentaltheory.First, therecan be conflictsarisingfrompluralismwithin
the society - when, for example, the religious beliefs of a particular individual
conflict with the laws of a state. Second, there can be what we might call civil
rights conflicts, aswhen aminority is oppressed and denied certain basic rights
by the legitimate powers of the state. Hartmann argued that the second type of
problem iswell taken care of by Hegelian type of theory.10 Hartmann refers to
the first type of conflict as a conflict of ultimate ends between the individual

9 PolitischePhilosophie, p. 194.
10 In his article, "Moralitat und 'konkretesAllgemeines' ", Hartmann speaks of two
types of collisions between individuals and the state. "A solution must obviously
interpret the universal of the Hegelian theory so that it is normatively binding. To
that extent, in principle any collision of the individualwith itwould be an error: the
individual constitutes only a categorial abstraction as normative... However, it is only
a matter of an errorwhen the concrete universal is contested in its ideal-legal inter
pretation and not only in its positive-legal facticity. The individual could very well
play off his privilege of conscience against the positive formation of the community,
but only in the frarneworkof a project for thewhole" pp. 5-6.

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 KlausHartmann:A PhilosophicalAppreciation 605

and the state.How do we mediate conflictingultimate ends between entities

that are on differentcategoriallevels?This problem,Hartmannmaintains, is
both unexplainedand unexplainablebyHegel."1The Hegelian theorycanhap
pily develop theprogressionof categoriesat the transcendentallevel,but, since
it operatesat that rarifiedlevel, it cannot solve the existentialproblemsat the
lower level.The linearityof the theory in its relationto the coexistenceof the
differentlycategorizedconfigurationsturnsout to be a sharpshortcomingof
the theory.12
Hartmann was thus led to devise a conception of what he called "affirmativ
ity" in order to respond to this dilemma. InHartmann'sview, "affirmativity"
enters into the evaluationof political theoriesto the extent thatone theorycan
demonstratethepossibilityof amore morally attractivepoliticalor social state
of affairs. That theory is then more 'affirmative' than the others. To the extent
that one acceptsHartmann'sargumentsthat dialectical theoriesare the best
suited to demonstrateat the transcendentallevel the higher rationalityof cer
tain categories, one can see that such theories will always have a plus in terms of
affirmativity.
An example of this is found in Hartmann's criticism of Marx's political
scheme and his defense of Hegelian theory against it. Marx is interpreted by
Hartmann in terms of the basic ideas of transcendental theory. In Capital, for
example,Marx's basicquestion is, "How areprofitspossible,given that rational
agentswould only exchange itemsof equivalentvalue?"Marx comes to the
conclusion thatprofitscome about throughtheproductionof surplusvalue in
the exploitation of labor. The surplus value is the value of the product to the
capitalist which is left over after the capitalist pays the worker enough to repro
duce the labor power that made the product.
Hartmann argued thatMarx falls prey to "transcendentalillusion."'3Ad
equatedialecticalargumentsfollowHegel'smodel. They beginwith an abstract
categorythat becauseof its deficiency requiresupplementationby other cate
gories.Only the resultingwhole is concrete.InHegel's case, the deficiency lies
in the category'sentanglementin contradictions;thecontradictionsresultfrom
the fact that the reasons for positing one category are equally good reasons for
Marx's dialectic,however,is "nomina
positing another,contradictorycategory.
listic"in that it beginswith somethingconcrete (the commodity)and supple
ments it with other concretions. It is properly dialectical, however, in that the

II Klaus Hartmann. PolitischePhilosophie (Munich: Karl Alber Verlag, I98I), p. I96.

12 See Klaus Hartmann, "Reiner Begriff und Tatiges Leben" in Roman Schnur (ed.).
Staat und Gesellschaft:Studien iiberLorenz von Stein (Berlin:Duncker und Humblot,
1978), pp. 65-95. (The point is alsomade in his "Hegel:A Non-Metaphysical Inter
pretation.")
13Klaus Hartmann. Die Marxsche Theorie (Berlin:Walter de Gruyter, 1970). See
PP. 424-425.

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6o6 Pinkard
Terry

beginning is also something abstract, which requires further categories for its
completion in theconcrete.
A perfect example is Hegel's beginning his Science of Logic with the category
of pure indeterminate being, the category with which Parmenides ended his
thought. This is clearly an abstraction, since there is no such entity as 'pure
being'; any attempt to state what it is entangles one in contradiction. Indeed, it
is the very deficiency of this initial category that propels one to move on to
other more sophisticated categories. Marx's category of the commodity, how
ever, is not like 'pure being'. Unlike Hegel's pure being, which we never en
counter, commodities are things that we deal with every day. It is this inadmis
sible mixture of the concrete and the abstract that gives Marx's dialectic its
plausibility; after all, we all know what commodities are, and we all know that
their production and exchange involves a set of background operations. It is
also thismixture thatultimatelyunderminesMarx's dialectic.Marx introduces
the categories of surplus value and surplus labor, abstracted out of the industrial
process in which they occur, and derives the categories of capital out of these
earlier categories. Capital ends up necessarily therefore being interpreted in a
pejorative manner, as the result of the earlier categories of exploited labor.14
This "nominalism" (Hartmann's term) of Marx's dialectic necessarily leads to
his view of the state as only a function of a society ridden by irreconcilable class
conflict. This "nominalism" is a presupposition; it is not something which
Marx can demonstrate.
Hartmann also argued thatMarx's arguments are not only internally flawed,
but that Marx's procedure ignores the affirmative alternative, the Hegelian
method. Hegel's method is both self-generating (in the Logic) and demonstrates
the possibility of a better outcome. It shows that certain political configurations
are possible (that is, may be conceptualized without incoherence or contradic
tion) that include the possibility of affirmative political action. The fact that
such arguments can be given in a rigorous manner shows that the Marxian
theory has not exhausted the possibilities.15 Moreover, a theory that permits
such affirmativity is preferable to one that does not. Part of what is objection

14 See ibid., p. 427. "Exploitation is however a transcendental theorem in the theory: to

the abstraction from concrete circumstances (constant capital on the industrial
plane), a pejorative concept of the creation of value is attached that cannot exist
under such an abstraction, and out of which nonetheless the concrete corollaries -
constant capital, industry - are developed, indeed as a function of the abstract foun
dations."
15 "Transcendental linearity under conditions of nominalism determines the result as
negative. It is a function of the abstraction.A reflection on affirmativity is excluded by
themethodological perspective... However, the avoidance of affirmativity isgrounded
in an illusion. It is illusion and not just willful procedure because alternatives to a
negative processing of actuality appear to be excluded by the depicted means." Ibid.,
p. 425.

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 KlausHartmann:A Philosophical
Appreciation 607

able aboutMarx's 'nominalistic'dialectic is that it excludessuch affirmativity

from theoutset.An affirmativetheory isverymuch likeKant's defenseof rea
sonable faith: it tell us that we may rationally hope for more than Marx has
given us. We are not simply wishing for a different state of affairs or hoping
thatMarx iswrong. We are basing our hopes on a rationally defensible alterna
tive. 16
In order to treat problems such as the coexistence of the state and society
(which seemed to be ruledout in termsof the transcendentallinearityof the
theory),any adequate theorymust incorporate what Hartmann calls an ele
ment of facticityinto itself.Hartmann found a precedentfor such an integra
tionof Hegelian categorialtheoryand problemsof facticityin thework of Lo
renzvon Stein.17Von Stein conceivesof the stateand societyas two existences
that stand in a 'reflective'relationshipto each other.As two separateentities,
they coordinatewith each other; asmoments of an overall "essence,"society
stands in a relationshipof subordinationto the state.Hartmann expressesvon
Stein'spoint in termsof the differenceof "pureconcept"and "activelife".18
The constitutionof a given socialand politicalorder expressesthe "purecon
cept," the idealsof affirmativityfor that society.The given society,with its in
equalities,its classstructureand itshidden centersof power expressesthe "ac
tive life" in which the "pureconcept"must find instantiation.Overall, the
distinction is between the political ideals that are the stock and trade of the phi
losopher and the real day to day existence in which these ideals are realized and
sometimesbetrayed.
Hartmann thus came to argue that von Stein's accomplishmentwas his
pointingout that transcendental philosophy,if it is to be a "defenseof rational
faith,"must be double-sided:on theone hand, itmust develop itselfpurelyon
the transcendentallevel,while on theother hand itmust incorporateempirical
facts and historical reality if it is not to lapse into practical incoherence. An
affirmativetheory is thereforeone that is part transcendentaland part empiri
cal, that incorporatesboth "pureconcept"and "activelife"within itself. In
Hartmann'sdevelopmentof it, the originalausterityof transcendentaltheory
began to includewhat itscriticssaid it could not, namely,a theoreticallysound
attention to the sphereof "activelife."
At the time of his death, Hartmann was working on a foundational treatise
on Hegel's Logic in which many of these themes were to be given a more

16 "The critique of theMarxian theory surely requiresno developed philosophical coun

ter-position in order to be able to be given; it does however require an affirmative
conception, the affirmative dialectic." Ibid., p. 575.
17 See "Reiner Begriff und Tatiges Leben: Lorenz von Steins Grundkonzeption zum
Verhaltnis von Staat und Gesellschaft und von Rechtsphilosophie und Recht,"
pp. 65-95.
18 Ibid., p. 73.

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6o8 TerryPinkard

thoroughexplanation.The manuscriptwas virtuallyfinishedbeforehis death,

and, for all thosewho find a vitality in the traditionof neo-Kantianismin
which Hartmann elaboratedhis neo-Hegelianism,itspublicationwill be a sig
nificantevent. It is also to be hoped thathis lectureson thehistoryof philoso
phy, philosophyof history and the history of ethics, inwhich many of these
themeswere givenvery concreteelaborations, will also see the lightof day.

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