Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 116617 November 16, 1998

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A. MUSA, CONRADO

TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. RODOLFO V. ROSALES and LILY R. ROSALES, respondents.

G.R. No. 126395 November 16, 1998

RODOLFO V. ROSALES, and LILY R. ROSALES, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, (MMTC) PEDRO A.
MUSA, CONRADO TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

These are appeals brought, on the one hand, by the Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) and
Pedro Musa and, on the other, by the spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales from the
decision, 1 dated August 5, 1994, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City holding MMTC and Musa liable to the spouses
Rosales for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit for the
death of the latter's daughter. MMTC and Musa in G.R. No. 116617 appeal insofar as they are
held liable for damages, while the spouses Rosales in G.R. No. 126395 appeal insofar as the
amounts awarded are concerned.

The facts are as follows:

MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area. Musa was its
driver assigned to MMTC Bus No. 27. The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-
year high school student at the University of the Philippines Integrated School.

At around a quarter past one in the afternoon of August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which was
driven by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. An eye
witness said the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus, then bound for the
south, hit her. 2 She fell to the ground upon impact, rolled between the two front wheels of the
bus, and was run over by the left rear tires thereof. 3 Her body was dragged several meters away
from the point of impact. Liza Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center, 4 but efforts to
revive her proved futile.
Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of 2 years and 4 months, as minimum, to 6 years, as maximum, by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. 5 The trial court found:

All told, this Court, therefore, holds that the accused, who was then, the driver of MMTC Bus No.
027, is criminally responsible for the death of the girl victim in violation of Article 365 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. For, in the light of the evidence that the girl victim was already at the center
of the Katipunan Road when she was bumped, and, therefore, already past the right lane when
the MMTC Bus No. 027 was supposed to have passed; and, since the said bus was then running
at a speed of about 25 kilometers per hour which is inappropriate since Katipunan road is a busy
street, there is, consequently, sufficient proof to show that the accused was careless, reckless
and imprudent in the operation of his MMTC Bus No. 027, which is made more evident by the
circumstance that the accused did not blow his horn at the time of the accident, and he did not
even know that he had bumped the girl victim and had ran over her, demonstrating thereby that
he did not exercise diligence and take the necessary precaution to avoid injury to persons in the
operation of his vehicle, as, in fact, he ran over the girl victim who died as a result thereof. 6

The spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC
Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS). They subsequently amended their complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher
of the MMTC, as a defendant therein. The counsel of MMTC and Musa attempted to introduce
testimony that Musa was not negligent in driving Bus No. 27 but was told by the trial judge:

COURT:

That is it. You can now limit your question to the other defendant here but to re-try again the
actual facts of the accident, this Court would not be in the position. It would be improper for this
Court to make any findings with respect to the negligence of herein driver. You ask questions only
regarding the civil aspect as to the other defendant but not as to the
accused. 7

The counsel submitted to the ruling of the court. 8

In a decision rendered on March 6, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City found MMTC and
Musa guilty of negligence and ordered them to pay damages and attorney's fees, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant

Metro Manila Transit Corporation primarily and defendant Pedro Musa subsidiarily liable to
plaintiffs-spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales as follows:

1. Actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00;

2. Moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00;

3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00;

4. Attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00; and

5. Costs of suit. 9

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 5, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court with the following modification:

WHEREFORE, except for the modification deleting the award of P150,000.00 as actual damages
and awarding in lieu thereof the amount of P30,000.00 as death indemnity, the decision
appealed from is, in all other aspects, hereby AFFIRMED. 10

The spouses Rosales filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court, in a resolution,
dated September 12, 1996, partly granted by increasing the indemnity for the death of Liza
Rosalie from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. Hence, these appeals.

In G.R. No. 116617, MMTC and Musa assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the following
grounds:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A QUO'S DECISION
PARTICULARLY IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPELLANT MMTC EXERCISED THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
FATHER OF A FAMILY IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS DRIVERS. THIS BEING THE
CASE, APPELLANT MMTC IS ENTITLED TO BE ABSOLVED FROM ANY LIABILITY OR AT LEAST TO A
REDUCTION OF THE RECOVERABLE DAMAGES.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, JUST LIKE THE COURT A QUO, OVERLOOKED THE
FACT THAT PETITIONER MMTC, A GOVERNMENT-OWNED CORPORATION, COMMITTED NO FRAUD,
MALICE, BAD FAITH, NOR WANTON, FRAUDULENT, OPPRESSIVE AND MALEVOLENT ACTUATIONS
AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A QUO'S
DECISION TO HOLD PETITIONER-APPELLANT MMTC PRIMARILY LIABLE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS-
APPELLEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P500,000 AS MORAL DAMAGES, P100,000 AS EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND P30,000 BY WAY OF DEATH INDEMNITY.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A QUO'S
DECISION IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00 IN
FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 126395, the spouses Rosales contend:

The Court of Appeals erred in:

First, considering that death indemnity which this Honorable Court set at P50,000.00 is akin to
actual damages;

Second, not increasing the amount of damages awarded;

Third, refusing to hold all the defendants, now private respondents, solidarily liable.

MMTC and Musa do not specifically question the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City that Liza Rosalie was hit by MMTC Bus No. 27. Nonetheless, their
petition contains discussions which cast doubts on this point. 11 Not only can they not do this as
the rule is that an appellant may not be heard on a question not specifically assigned as error,
but the rule giving great weight, and even finality, to the factual conclusions of the Court of
Appeals which affirm those of the trial court bars a reversal of the finding of liability against
petitioners MMTC and Musa. Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious,
and arbitrary can they be overturned. To the contrary, the findings of both the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Court are solidly anchored on the evidence submitted by the parties. We,
therefore, regard them as conclusive in resolving the petitions at bar. 12 Indeed, as already
stated, petitioners' counsel submitted to the ruling of the court that the finding of the trial court
in the criminal case was conclusive on them with regard to the questions of whether Liza Rosalie
was hit by MMTC Bus No. 27 and whether its driver was negligent. Rather, the issue in this case
turns on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides that "employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry." The
responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their
duties is primary, that is, the injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless
of the solvency of their employees. 13 The rationale for the rule on vicarious liability has been
adumbrated thus:

What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a
deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical
matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are placed upon that
enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer
because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve
harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather
than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb
them, and to distribute them, through prides, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to
shift them to society, to the community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that
an employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the
selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that
the enterprise is conducted safely. 14

In Campo v. Camarote, 15 we explained the basis of the presumption of negligence in this wise:

The reason for the law is obvious. It is indeed difficult for any person injured by the carelessness
of a driver to prove the negligence or lack of due diligence of the owner of the vehicle in the
choice of the driver. Were we to require the injured party to prove the owner's lack of diligence,
the right will in many cases prove illusory, as seldom does a person in the community, especially
in the cities, have the opportunity to observe the conduct of all possible car owners therein. So
the law imposes the burden of proof of innocence on the vehicle owner. If the driver is negligent
and causes damage, the law presumes that the owner was negligent and imposes upon him the
burden of proving the contrary.

Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees within the
scope of their assigned tasks only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent
damage." 16 For this purpose, they have the burden of proving that they have indeed exercised
such diligence, both in the selection of the employee who committed the quasi-delict and in the
supervision of the performance of his duties.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. 17 On the other hand, with respect to the
supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating, procedures, monitor
their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. 18 To establish
these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence. 19

In this case, MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
with respect to the selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial evidence on its
hiring procedure. According to MMTC, applicants are required to submit professional driving
licenses, certifications of work experience, and clearances from the National Bureau of
Investigation; to undergo tests of their driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision; and, to
complete training programs on traffic rules, vehicle maintenance, and standard operating
procedures during emergency cases. 20

MMTC's evidence consists entirely of testimonial evidence (1) that transport supervisors are
assigned to oversee field operations in designated areas; (2) that the maintenance department
daily inspects the engines of the vehicles; and, (3) that for infraction of company rules there are
corresponding penalties. 21 Although testimonies were offered that in the case of Pedro Musa all
these precautions were followed, 22 the records of his interview, of the results of his
examinations, and of his service were not presented.

MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on vehicle
maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants are given tests to
determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, 23 but there is no record that Musa
attended such training programs and passed the said examinations before he was employed. No
proof was presented that Musa did not have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of
daily inspections, allegedly conducted by supervisors, ever presented.

Normally, employers' keep files concerning the qualifications, work experience, training
evaluation, and discipline of their employees. The failure of MMTC to present such documentary
proof puts in doubt the credibility of its witnesses. What was said in Central Taxicab Corporation
v. Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Corporation 24 applies to this case:

This witness spoke of an affidavit of experience which a driver-applicant must accomplish before
he is employed by the company, a written time schedule for each bus, and a record of the
inspections and thorough checks pertaining to each bus before it leaves the car barn; yet no
attempt was ever made to present in evidence any of these documents, despite the fact that
they were obviously in the possession and control of the defendant company.

....

Albert also testified that he kept records of the preliminary and final tests given by him as well as
a record of the qualifications and experience of each of the drivers of the company. It is rather'
strange, therefore, that he failed to produce in court the all important record of Roberto, the
driver involved in this case.

The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other documentary proof
tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the
trial court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.

It is noteworthy that, in another case involving MMTC, testimonial evidence of identical content,
which MMTC presented to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of employees and thus avoid vicarious liability for the negligent acts of
its employees, was held to be insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against it.
In Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court said:

Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to
hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even object evidence for that
matter, inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider
the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees. Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris
familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was
unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might
obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.

Having found both MMTC and its driver Pedro Musa liable for negligence for the death of Liza
Rosalie on August 9, 1986; we now consider the question of damages which her parents, the
spouses Rosales, are entitled to recover, which is the subject of the appeal in G.R. No. 126395.

Indemnity for Death. Art. 2206 provides for the payment of indemnity for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict. Initially fixed in said article of the Civil Code at P3,000.00, the amount of
the indemnity has through the years been gradually increased based on the value of the peso. At
present, it is fixed at P50,000.00. 26 To conform to this new ruling, the Court of Appeals correctly
increased the indemnity it had originally ordered the spouses Rosales to be paid from P30,000.00
to P50,000.00 in its resolution, dated September 12, 1996.

Actual Damages. Art. 2199 provides that "except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved." The spouses Rosales are claiming actual damages in the amount of P239,245.40.
However, during the trial, they submitted receipts showing that expenses for the funeral, wake,
and interment of Liza Rosalie amounted only to P60,226.65 itemized as follows: 27

Medical Attendance P 739.65

Funeral Services 5,100.00

Wreaths 2,500.00

Embalment 1,000.00

Obituaries 7,125.00

Interment fees 2,350.00

Expenses during wake 14,935.00

Mourning clothes 5,000.00

Photography 3,500.00

Video Coverage 10,000.00

Printing of invitation cards 7,977.00

TOTAL60,226.65

Hence, apart from the indemnity for death, the spouses Rosales are entitled to recover the above
amount as actual damages.

Moral Damages. Under Art. 2206, the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased." The reason for the grant of moral damages has been explained thus:

. . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The
intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of
affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender. 28

In the instant case, the spouses Rosales presented evidence of the intense moral suffering they
had gone through as a result of the loss of Liza Rosalie who was their youngest child. Rodolfo
Rosales recounted the place of Liza Rosalie in the family and their relationship with her in the
following words:

Q: Mr. Rosales, how was Liza to you as a daughter?

A: Well, Liza as a daughter was the greatest joy of the family; she was our pride, and
everybody loved her all her brothers and sisters because she was sweet and unspoiled. . . .
She was soft-spoken to all of us; and she still slept with us at night although she had her own
room. Sometimes in the middle of the night she would open our door and ask if she could sleep
with us. So we let her sleep with us, as she was the youngest. 29

The death of Liza Rosalie left a void in their lives. Rodolfo Rosales testified on the devastating
effect of the death of Liza Rosalie:

Q: And after she died, what changes, if any, did you feel in your family?

A: Well, there is something hollow in our family, something is missing. She used to greet me
when I came home and smell if I was drunk and would tell me to dress up and take a shower
before her mommy could see me. She would call me up at the office and say: "Daddy, come
home, please help me with my homework." Now, all these things, I am missing, you know. . . I do
not feel like going home early. Sometimes my wife would complain and ask: "Where did you go?"
But I cannot explain to her how I feel. 30

Lily Rosales described life without Liza Rosalie thus:

Q: Now, your life without Liza, how would you describe it, Dr. Rosales?

A: You know it is very hard to describe. The family was broken apart. We could not go
together because we remember Liza. Every time we go to the cemetery we try as much as
possible not to go together. So, we go to the cemetery one at a time, sometimes, my husband
and I, or my son and another one, but we never go together because we remember Liza. But
before her death we would always be together, the whole family on weekends and on our days
off. My husband works very hard, I also work very hard and my children go to school. They study
very hard. Now we cannot go together on outings because of the absence of Liza. 31

The spouses Rosales claim moral damages in the amount of P5,000,000.00. In People v.
Teehankee, Jr., 32 this Court awarded P1 million as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-
year-old girl who was murdered. This amount seems reasonable to us as moral damages for the
loss of a minor child, whether he or she was a victim of a crime or a quasi-delict. Hence, we hold
that the MMTC and Musa are solidarily liable to the spouses Rosales in the amount of
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages for the death of Liza Rosalie.

Exemplary Damages. Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in cases
involving quasi-delicts if "the defendant acted with gross negligence." This circumstance obtains
in the instant case. The records indicate that at the time of the mishap, there was a pending
criminal case against Musa for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries with
another branch of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City. 33 The evidence also shows that he
failed to stop his vehicle at once even after eye witnesses shouted at him. The spouses Rosales
claim exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000,000.00. Under the circumstances, we deem it
reasonable to award the spouses Rosales exemplary damages in the amount of five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

Attorney's Fees. Pursuant to Art. 2208, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant
case, exemplary damages are awarded. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 34 which involved the death of a minor child in the sinking of a vessel, we held an
award of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees to be reasonable. Hence, we affirm the award of
attorney's fees made by the Court of Appeals to the spouses Rosales in that amount.

Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 2206 of the Civil Code provides that in addition
to the indemnity for death caused by a crime or quasi delict, the "defendant shall be liable for
the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of
the latter; . . ." Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of
capacity to earn money. 35 Evidence must be presented that the victim, if not yet employed at
the time of death, was reasonably certain to complete training for a specific profession. 36 In
People v. Teehankee 37 no award of compensation for loss of earning capacity was granted to the
heirs of a college freshman because there was no sufficient evidence on record to show that the
victim would eventually become a professional pilot. 38 But compensation should be allowed for
loss of earning capacity resulting from the death of a minor who has not yet commenced
employment or training for a specific profession if sufficient evidence is presented to establish
the amount thereof. In the United States it has been observed:

This raises the broader question of the proper measure of damages in death cases involving
children, housewives, the old, and others who do not have market income so that there is no
pecuniary loss to survivors or to the estate of the decedent. The traditional approach was to
award no or merely nominal damages in such cases. . . . Increasingly, however, courts allow
expert testimony to be used to project those lost earnings. 39

Thus, in Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 40 the court allowed the heirs of a seven-year-old boy who
was killed in a car accident to recover compensation for loss of earning capacity:

Considerable evidence was presented by plaintiffs in an effort to give the jury a foundation on
which to make an award. Briefly stated, this evidence showed Charles Haumersen was a seven-
year-old of above average characteristics. He was described as "very intelligent" and "all-
American." He received high marks in school. He was active in church affairs and participated in
recreational and athletic events, often with, children older than himself. In addition, he had an
unusual talent for creating numerous cartoons and other drawings, some of which plaintiffs
introduced at trial.

The record does not disclose passion and prejudice. The key question is whether the verdict of
$100,000 has support in the evidence.

Upon analysis of the record, we conclude that we should not disturb the award.

The argument for allowing compensation for loss of earning capacity of a minor is even stronger
if he or she was a student, whether already training for a specific profession or still engaged in
general studies. In Krohmer v. Dahl, 41 the court, in affirming the award by the jury of
$85,000.00 to the heirs of an eighteen-year-old college freshman who died of carbon monoxide
poisoning, stated as follows:

There are numerous cases that have held admissible evidence of prospective earnings of a
student or trainee. . . . The appellants contend that such evidence is not admissible unless the
course under study relates to a given occupation or profession and it is shown that the student is
reasonably certain to follow that occupation or profession. It is true that the majority of these
decisions deal with students who are studying for a specific occupation or profession. However,
not one of these cases indicate that evidence of one's education as a guide to future earnings is
not admissible where the student is engaged in general studies or whose education does not
relate to a specific occupation.

In sharp contrast with the situation obtaining in People v. Teehankee, where the prosecution
merely presented evidence to show the fact of the victim's graduation from high school and the
fact of his enrollment in a flying school, spouses Rosales did not content themselves with simply
establishing Liza Rosalie's enrollment at UP Integrated School. They presented evidence to show
that Liza Rosalie was a good student, promising artist, and obedient child. She consistently
performed well in her studies since grade school. 42 A survey taken in 1984 when Liza Rosalie
was twelve years old showed that she had good study habits and attitudes. 43 Cleofe Chi,
guidance counselor of the University of the Philippines Integrated School, described Liza Rosalie
as personable, well-liked, and with a balanced personality. 44 Professor Alfredo Rebillon, a faculty
member of the University of the Philippines College of Fine Arts, who organized workshops which
Liza Rosalie attended in 1982 and 1983, testified that Liza Rosalie had the potential of eventually
becoming an artist. 45 Professor Rebillon's testimony is more than sufficiently established by the
51 samples of Liza Rosalie's watercolor, charcoal, and pencil drawings submitted as exhibits by
the spouses Rosales. 46 Neither MMTC nor Pedro Musa controverted this evidence.
Considering her good academic record, extra-curricular activities, and varied interests, it is
reasonable to assume that Liza Rosalie would have enjoyed a successful professional career had
it not been for her untimely death. Hence, it is proper that compensation for loss of earning
capacity should be awarded to her heirs in accordance with the formula established in decided
cases 47 for computing net earning capacity, to wit:

Net Earning = Life [GrossNecessary

Capacity Expectancy x [Annual Living

[Income Expenses

Life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference of eighty (80) and
the age of the deceased. 48 Since Liza Rosalie was 16 at the time of her death, her life
expectancy was 44 more years. 49 Her projected gross annual income, computed based on the
minimum wage for workers in the non-agricultural sector in effect at the time of her death, 50
then fixed at P37.00, 51 is P14,630.46. 52 Allowing for necessary living expenses of fifty percent
(50%) of her projected gross annual income, 53 her total net earning capacity amounts to
P321,870.12. 54

Finally, the spouses Rosales argue that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Conrado
Tolentino, Feliciana Celebrado, and the GSIS of liability. The Spouses Rosales alleged that
Tolentino, as Acting General Manager of the MMTC, and Celebrado, as a dispatcher thereof, were
charged with the supervision of Musa and should, therefore, be held vicariously liable under Art.
2180 of the Civil Code. With respect to the GSIS, they contend that it was the insurer in a
contract for third party liability it had with the MMTC.

Although the fourth paragraph of Art. 2180 mentions "managers" among those made responsible
for the negligent acts of others, it is settled that this term is used in the said provision in the
sense of "employers." 55 Thus, Tolentino and Celebrado cannot be held liable for the tort of Pedro
Musa.

In Vda. de Maglana v. Consolacion, 56 it was ruled that an insurer in an indemnity contract for
third party liability is directly liable to the injured party up to the extent specified in the
agreement, but it cannot be held solidarily liable beyond that amount. The GSIS admitted in its
answer that it was the insurer of the MMTC for third party liability with respect to MMTC Bus No.
27 to the extent of P50,000.00. 57 Hence, the spouses Rosales have the option either to claim
the said amount from the GSIS and the balance of the award from MMTC and Musa or to enforce
the entire judgment against the latter, subject to reimbursement from the former to the extent of
the insurance coverage. 58

One last word. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City erred in holding MMTC primarily and Musa
secondarily liable for damages arising from the death of Liza Rosalie. It was error for the
appellate court to affirm this aspect of the trial court's decision.

As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee in
view of Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may pay. This
does not make the employee's liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for damages
is satisfied by the common carrier, the latter has a right to recover what it has paid from its
employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-
delict. 59 Hence, the spouses Rosales have the option of enforcing the judgment against either
MMTC or Musa.

From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that "the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary." We ruled in Gelisan v. Alday 60 that "the registered
owner/operator of a public service vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for
damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the
operation of said vehicle." In Baliwag Transit Inc. v. Court of Appeals 61 it was held that "to
escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce
sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care." Finally, we held in the recent case of
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 62 that "the liability of the registered
owner of a public service vehicle . . . for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is
primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED
holding the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and Pedro Musa jointly and severally liable for the
death of Liza Rosalie R. Rosales and ORDERING them as such to pay to the spouses Rodolfo V.
Rosales and Lily R. Rosales the following amounts:

1) death indemnity in the amount of fifty-thousand pesos (P50,000,00);

2) actual damages in the amount of sixty thousand two hundred twenty six pesos and sixty
five centavos (P60,226.65);

3) moral damages in the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00);

4) exemplary damages in the amount of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00);

5) attorney's fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);

6) compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of three hundred twenty-one
thousand eight hundred seventy pesos and twelve centavos (P321,870.12); and

7) the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Melo and Puno, JJ., concur.

Martinez, took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.

Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners.

Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because she was
bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had nothing to do with
the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision
of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before us. They ask us to
set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court.

On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street
in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple
lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio
Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting
of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was
certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as
the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils
rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was
a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose
R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the
complaint. 4

The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. 5 It found
that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under
Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had
died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the
appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of
the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to
the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be
held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However,
that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly
was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage
which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in
case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.

Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his
heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one,
including himself.

Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly credible. She
said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him ("one way or the
other") and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on
which, however, she did not elaborate ). 7 She mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who
had stayed in the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be close kin. 8
She at least implied that they did not pay any rent, presumably because of their relation with
Vicente Miranda notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to know them very well.

There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were boarders (or more of boarders
than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and accommodations. It
also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and
cleaning in the said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita
herself, categorically declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where
Theness was bitten by a dog. 10 Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a
boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And although
Purita denied paying the water bills for the house, the private respondents submitted
documentary evidence of her application for water connection with the Cebu Water District,
which strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question. 12

While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente
Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of
the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person
to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover,
there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice
weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house.
Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was
bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente
Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy
that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita
said she knew them only casually. 16

The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit
Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the death
certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the
dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an
extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified
cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies,
as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately
caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she
was bitten by the dog is established by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo:

COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the second admission?

A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I referred to Dr. Co earlier in the
morning and then the father, because the child was asking for water, the father tried to give the
child water and this child went under the bed, she did not like to drink the water and there was
fright in her eyeballs. For this reason, because I was in danger there was rabies, I called Dr. Co.

Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia?

A: Yes, sir. 18

As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the following to say under
oath:

A: Now, as 1 said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from physical, chemical and
bacterial means. ... It can be the result of infection, now, so if you have any other disease which
can lower your resistance you can also get pneumonia.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of complication which is broncho-
pneumonia?

A: Yes.

Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the witness is know as CURRENT
DIANOSIS & TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon Margen and Milton Chaton. Now, I
invite your attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book under the title "Rabies." There is on this
page, "Prognosis" as a result of rabies and it says: Once the symptoms, have appeared death
inevitably occurs after 2-3 days as a result of cardiac or respiratory failure or generalized
paralysis. After a positive diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a suspected animal if the animal
cannot be observed or if the bite is on the head, give rabies vaccine (duck embryo). Do you
believe in this statement?

A: Yes.

Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may die of respiratory failure which
leave in the form of bronco-pneumonia?

A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies. 19

On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites
and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling
in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive
proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if
the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could
not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of
the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be
removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the
dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only
of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged
provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection of their
original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their father's house that bit
Theness.

According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on
the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he
who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which
such animal may cause. 21

We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as
to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in
the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the
child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which they
are entitled.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is DENIED,
with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193861 March 14, 2012
PAULITA "EDITH" SERRA,1 Petitioner,
vs.
NELFA T. MUMAR, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the
31 July 2009 Decision2 and 27 July 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00023-MIN.
The Facts

At around 6:30 in the evening of 3 April 2000, there was a vehicular accident along the National
Highway in Barangay Apopong, General Santos City, which resulted in the death of Armando
Mumar (Mumar), husband of respondent Nelfa T. Mumar (respondent).

Based on the evidence presented before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City,
one Armando Tenerife (Tenerife) was driving his Toyota Corolla sedan on the National Highway
heading in the direction of Polomolok, South Cotabato. Tenerife noticed the van owned by
petitioner Paulita "Edith" Serra (petitioner) coming from the opposite direction, which was trying
to overtake a passenger jeep, and in the process encroached on his lane. The left side of the
sedan was hit by the van, causing the sedan to swerve to the left and end up on the other side of
the road. The van collided head on with the motorcycle, which was about 12 meters behind the
sedan on the outer lane, causing injuries to Mumar, which eventually led to his death.

On the other hand, petitioner denied that her van was overtaking the jeepney at the time of the
incident. She claimed that the left tire of Tenerifes sedan burst, causing it to sideswipe her van.
Consequently, the left front tire of the van also burst and the vans driver, Marciano de Castro
(de Castro), lost control of the vehicle. The van swerved to the left towards Mumars motorcycle.
The impact resulted in the death of Mumar.

Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for Damages by Reason of

Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide and Attachment before the General Santos City RTC.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On 20 November 2003, the General Santos City RTC promulgated a judgment,4 the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against defendant Paulita Sierra, her co-defendant
not having been served with summons because he could no longer be found, finding her liable
for damages by reason of reckless imprudence, and she is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the
sum of:

1. P65,000.00 for burial damages;

2. P300,000.00 for loss of income;
3. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.5

The RTC found that, based on the evidence presented at the trial, at the time of impact "the van
was overtaking another vehicle without due regard for the safety of others, bumped the Toyota
Car (sic) and the motorcycle traveling in the right lane going to Polomolok, South Cotabato." The
RTC noted that the damage to the van was located at the bumper, evincing a frontal collision,
while the damage to the sedan was on the left side door and window, evincing that the van
sideswiped the sedan. Likewise, the RTC found that the van encroached on the sedan and
motorcycles lane, in the process hitting the motorcycle, causing the injuries and subsequent
death of Mumar.6
As to the claim for damages, the RTC said that Nelfa testified that her husband was earning
about P6,000.00 a month without presenting any documentary evidence to prove her claim, but
nonetheless awarded her P300,000.00 for damages due to loss of income.

Petitioner appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 31 July 2009 Decision, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTCs
ruling:

FOR REASONS STATED, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. 6764 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the appellant is ordered to pay appellee the following:

1. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00;

2. Indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of P1,224,000.00;
3. Temperate damages amounting to P25,000.00 in lieu of the award for burial expenses;
4. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
5. The total amount of damages shall bear an interest of 12% per annum from the finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

The awards for burial expenses and exemplary damages are deleted.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA adopted the factual findings of the RTC. It also ruled that the RTC erred in awarding burial
expenses and actual damages for loss of earning capacity despite lack of proof. Based on the
wifes claim that the victim earned not less than P6,000.00 a month and his age at the time of
death, based on his birth certificate (29), the CA applied the formula:

Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of the victim at time of death) x [Gross Annual
Income less the Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses (50% of gross income)]

Using the foregoing formula, the CA awarded damages due to loss of earning capacity in the
amount of P1,224,000.00.8

Likewise, the CA said that the RTC erred in not awarding civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00. The CA also awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00 finding that respondent
spent for her husbands burial although the exact amount could not be proven.

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioner raises the following issues:

I. Whether or not the (sic) both the lower court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in finding that the incident which killed Armando Mumar was not purely accidental for which
defendants may not be held liable[;]
II. Whether or not both the lower court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
holding Editha Serra as liable for damages and in not appreciating that she was not negligent in
the selection and supervision of the driver of the van, Marciano de Castro[;]

III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding to herein respondent "loss of earning
capacity" despite complete absence of documentary evidence that the deceased Mumar was
self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws in force at the
time of his death, following the ruling in People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 145993, June 17, 2003[.]9

Petitioner maintains that it was Tenerifes sedan that encroached on the lane of the van after the
sedans left front tire blew out. Petitioner points out that Tenerife himself admitted that what
happened was merely a "sliding collision."10 She points out that the sedan not only cut across
two lanes headed in the opposite direction, it also made a half-circle such that it stopped on the
shoulder of the left side of the road (opposite its original lane), and then faced towards its origin,
General Santos City. This could be for no other reason than that Tenerife completely lost control
of his vehicle because the tire burst. Then, the sedan rammed into the van causing the latters
front tire to tear; thus, the vans driver also lost control of the vehicle and headed towards the
opposite lane and hit Mumar. Yet, the van was still facing its destination General Santos City.
The greater damage to the van was from hitting the signboard on the side of the road and not
from hitting the sedan.

Petitioner argues that the foregoing description of the events proves that it is purely accidental
and without negligence on her drivers part.

Petitioner also insists that she was not negligent in the selection and supervision of the driver of
the van. Respondent had the burden to prove that petitioner was negligent but failed to do so,
petitioner claims.

As to the CAs award of damages due to loss of earning capacity, petitioner argues that the same
has no basis. She points out that there was no documentary evidence presented or formally
offered at the trial to substantiate the claim for damages due to loss of earning capacity.
Likewise, petitioner further argues that, based on Nelfas testimony that her husband was
earning "not less than P6,000 a month," the conclusion was that he was earning not less than the
minimum wage at the time of the accident.

Petitioner counters that in 2005 the minimum wage in Region XII, where the accident occurred,
was P200.00 per day plus a cost of living allowance of P13.50, or P5,558.00 per month. Petitioner
posits that it was safe to assume that at the time of the accident on 3 April 2000, the minimum
wage was lower than the rate in 2005.

Petitioner also argues that in Mumars line of work contracting and manufacturing steel grills,
fences and gates some form of documentary evidence would be available to support his
widows claim. That these were not presented in evidence would remove the claim from the
exceptions to the requirement that the amount of actual damages must be duly proved.11

Thus, petitioner prays that the assailed CA decision and resolution be reversed and set aside. In
the alternative, petitioner prays that, should the Court sustain the finding of negligence, that the
award of damages for loss of earning capacity in the sum of P1,224,000.00 be completely
deleted for lack of evidentiary basis.12

Respondents Argument

In her Comment, respondent counters that petitioner raises no new matter, and the arguments
are merely a rehash of those raised before the lower courts, which had already ruled on these.13

The Courts Ruling

The petition is partly granted. The Court affirms the decision of the CA, but modifies the award
for damages.

Uniform Findings of Fact by the RTC and CA

A petition for review on certiorari should raise only questions of law. In resolving a petition for
review, the Court "does not sit as an arbiter of facts for it is not the function of the Supreme
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below."14

When supported by substantial evidence, the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the
trial court15 are final and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal,16 unless
petitioner can show compelling or exceptional reasons17 for this Court to disregard, overturn or
modify such findings.

In the present case, the Court notes the uniform factual findings by the RTC and CA, and
petitioner has not shown compelling or exceptional reasons warranting deviation from these
findings.

Both the trial court and the CA found that it was petitioners van, then being driven by de Castro,
that encroached on the sedans lane, then hit the latter and, eventually, Mumars motorcycle.

The Court has previously held that evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a
credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. The evidence must be natural,
reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe. No better test has yet been found to
determine the value of the testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and
common experience of mankind.18

Petitioners testimony is not credible considering that she admitted that she did not see the
actual bumping of the van with the sedan because "it was dark and showering."19 When she
came out of the van, she said she did not notice the sedan. She then left the scene to ask help
from her brother, without even coming to the aid of her driver.20

Moreover, the traffic investigators findings are more consistent with human experience.

As found by the investigator, the van ended up on the other side of the road, opposite the lane it
was originally traversing. The vans forward momentum was going towards the opposite side. If
indeed the van stayed on its proper lane when the sedans tire blew out and lost control, the
sedan would have bumped into the van on the latters lane and the van would have ended up on
the side of the road with the sedan. Likewise, if the van had stayed on its lane, and the impact of
the sedan propelled it forward, the van would have hit the jeepney in front of it, not Mumars
motorcycle, which was on the opposite lane to the right of the sedan. The only plausible
explanation is it was the van, while trying to overtake the jeepney in front of it at a fast speed,
that bumped into the sedan and subsequently, Mumars motorcycle.

Petitioner insists that the traffic investigator SPO3 Haron Abdullatips report should be
disregarded because he was not at the scene when the accident happened.

Rarely does it happen that the investigating officer personally witnesses an accident that he
investigates, yet this does not mean that his observations are not valid. A traffic investigators
training and experience allow him to determine how an accident occurred even without
witnessing the accident himself.

In this case, Abdullatip had been a traffic investigator for nine years.21 Even if he arrived at the
scene after the accident, he saw the vehicles in their relative positions as a result of the
accident. His experience, as well as his evaluation of the statements from various witnesses,
guided him in assessing who was at fault. In any case, the presumption of regularity in the
exercise of functions is in his favor and therefore his report must be given credence.

Liability for Damages of Petitioner

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Whenever an employees negligence
causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer
failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision
of its employees.22 The liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee.23

Moreover, under Article 2184 of the Civil Code,24 if the causative factor was the drivers
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have
prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.

Petitioner failed to show that she exercised the level of diligence required in supervising her
driver in order to prevent the accident. She admitted that de Castro had only been her driver for
one year and she had no knowledge of his driving experience or record of previous accidents.
She also admitted that it was de Castro who maintained the vehicle and would even remind her
"to pay the installment of the car."25

Petitioner also admitted that, at the time of the accident, she did not know what was happening
and only knew they bumped into another vehicle when the driver shouted. She then closed her
eyes and a moment later felt something heavy fall on the roof of the car. When the vehicle
stopped, petitioner left the scene purportedly to ask help from her brother, leaving the other
passengers to come to the aid of her injured driver.

Damages for Loss of Earning Capacity

Next, the Court holds that the CA erred in awarding damages for loss of earning capacity in the
absence of documentary evidence to support the claim.
Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages,26 which as a rule must
be duly proven27 by documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of the
widow.

By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence
of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed
as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.28

Based solely on Nelfas testimony, the CA determined that the deceased falls within one of these
exceptions. Nelfa testified that her husband was in the business of contracting and
manufacturing grills, fences and gates,29 and his earnings "exceed P6,000.00"30 per month
prior to his death. She presented no documentary proof of her claims.

It was error for the CA to have awarded damages for loss of earning capacity based on Nelfas
testimony alone.

First, while it is conceded that the deceased was self-employed, the Court cannot accept that in
his line of work there was no documentary proof available to prove his income from such
occupation. There would have been receipts, job orders, or some form of written contract or
agreement between the deceased and his clients when he is contracted for a job.

Second, and more importantly, decedent was not earning "less than the minimum wage" at the
time of his death.
Wage Order No. RTWPB-XI-07,31 issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-
XI of the National Wages and Productivity Commission, under the Department of Labor and
Employment, took effect on 1 November 1999 and mandated the minimum wage rate in Region
XI, including General Santos City, at the time of the accident. Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. NEW MINIMUM WAGE RATES. Effective November 1, 1999, the new minimum wage
rates in Region XI shall be as follows:

SECTOR/INDUSTRY Davao City

General Santos City
Island Garden City of Samal
Tagum City Provinces of:
Davao del Norte
Davao del Sur
Davao Oriental
Compostela Valley
South Cotabato
NON-AGRICULTURE
AGRICULTURE
- Plantation (i.e. more than 24 Hectares or employing at least
20 workers)
- Non-Plantation
RETAIL/SERVICE
- Employing more than 10 workers
- Employing not more than 10 workers 148.00

138.00
117.00
148.00
117.00 146.00
136.00
115.00
146.00
115.00
Respondent testified that her husband was earning not less than P6,000.00 per month.1wphi1
On the other hand, the highest minimum wage rate at the time of the accident, based on Wage
Order No. RTWPB-XI-07, was P148.00. At that rate, the monthly minimum wage would be
P3,256.00,32 clearly an amount less than what respondent testified to as her husbands monthly
earnings. The deceased would not fall within the recognized exceptions.

There is therefore no basis for the CAs computation for Mumars supposed net earning capacity
and the subsequent award of damages due to loss of earning capacity.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT IN PART the petition. We AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 31 July 2009 and Resolution dated 27 July 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00023-
MIN. We ORDER petitioner to pay respondent the following:

1. Civil indemnity of P50,000.00;

2. Temperate damages of P25,000.00, in lieu of the award for burial expenses;
3. Moral damages of P50,000.00; and
4. Interest on the total monetary award at the rate of 12% per annum from the finality of this
decision until the award is fully satisfied.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 164012 June 8, 2007

FLORDELIZA MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
MUTYA SORIANO and Minor JULIE ANN SORIANO duly represented by her natural
mother and guardian ad litem MUTYA SORIANO, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner asks this Court to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated November 17, 2003 and the Resolution2 dated May
24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69037. The appellate court found petitioner,
as employer of Lomer Macasasa, liable for damages.

The facts are as follows:

At around 1:00 a.m., July 14, 1997, Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue near
Luzon Avenue in Quezon City, was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa.
Soriano was thrown five meters away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from the
point of impact. Gerard Villaspin, one of Sorianos companions, asked Macasasa to bring Soriano
to the hospital, but after checking out the scene of the incident, Macasasa returned to the FX,
only to flee. A school bus brought Soriano to East Avenue Medical Center where he later died.
Subsequently, the Quezon City Prosecutor recommended the filing of a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide against Macasasa.3

On August 20, 1997, respondents Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano, Sorianos wife and
daughter, respectively, filed a complaint for damages against Macasasa and petitioner Flordeliza
Mendoza, the registered owner of the vehicle. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. C-
18038 in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121. Respondents prayed that
Macasasa and petitioner be ordered to pay them: P200,000 moral damages; P500,000 for lost
income; P22,250 for funeral services; P45,000 for burial lot; P15,150 for interment and lapida;
P8,066 for hospitalization, other medical and transportation expenses; P28,540 for food and
drinks during the wake; P50,000 exemplary damages; P60,000 indemnity for Sorianos death;
and P25,000 for attorneys fees plus P500 per court appearance.4

In her answer, petitioner Mendoza maintained that she was not liable since as owner of the
vehicle, she had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family over her employee,
Macasasa.

Upon respondents motion, the complaint for damages against Macasasa was dismissed.

After trial, the trial court also dismissed the complaint against petitioner.5 It found Soriano
negligent for crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a small gap in the islands fencing rather
than the pedestrian overpass. The lower court also ruled that petitioner was not negligent in the
selection and supervision of Macasasa since complainants presented no evidence to support
their allegation of petitioners negligence.6

Respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The dispositive portion of
the appellate courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED, and another one is hereby rendered
ordering [petitioner] Flordeliza Mendoza to pay [respondents] Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann
Soriano the following amounts:

1. Hospital and Burial Expenses P80,926.25

2. Loss of earning capacity P77,000.00
3. Moral Damages P20,000.00
4. Indemnity for the death of Sonny Soriano P50,000.00
Actual payment of the aforementioned amounts should, however, be reduced by twenty (20%)
per cent due to the presence of contributory negligence by the victim as provided for in Article
2179 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.7

While the appellate court agreed that Soriano was negligent, it also found Macasasa negligent for
speeding, such that he was unable to avoid hitting the victim. It observed that Sorianos own
negligence did not preclude recovery of damages from Macasasas negligence. It further held
that since petitioner failed to present evidence to the contrary, and conformably with Article
21808 of the Civil Code, the presumption of negligence of the employer in the selection and
supervision of employees stood.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution9 dated
May 24, 2004.

Hence, this appeal where petitioner alleges that:

I.
THE TOTAL AMOUNT PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT IS NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
II.
[COROLLARILY], THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS [HAS] NO BASIS IN
LAW.10

The issues are simple: (1) Did the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to try the case? and (2)
Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?

Petitioner argues that the amount claimed by respondents is within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. She posits that to determine the jurisdictional amount, what should only
be considered are the following: P22,250 for funeral services; P45,000 for burial lot; P15,150 for
interment and lapida; P8,066 for hospitalization and transportation; P28,540 for food and drinks
during the wake; and P60,000 indemnity for Sorianos death. She maintains that the sum of
these amounts, P179,006, is below the jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial Court. She
states that under Section 19(8) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the following claims
of respondents must be excluded: P200,000 moral damages, P500,000 for lost income; P50,000
exemplary damages; P25,000 attorneys fees plus P500 per court appearance. Petitioner thus
prays that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and the dismissal of the case by the
trial court be affirmed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,11 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states the
pertinent law.

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

xxxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00).

But relatedly, Administrative Circular No. 09-9412 expressly states:

xxxx

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court. (Underscoring supplied.)

Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, are primarily and effectively actions
for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages for tortious acts.13 In this case,
respondents claim of P929,006 in damages and P25,000 attorneys fees plus P500 per court
appearance represents the monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. These
money claims are the principal reliefs sought by respondents in their complaint for damages.14
Consequently then, we hold that the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City possessed and properly
exercised jurisdiction over the case.15

Petitioner further argues that since respondents caused the dismissal of the complaint against
Macasasa, there is no longer any basis to find her liable. She claims that "no iota of evidence"
was presented in this case to prove Macasasas negligence, and besides, respondents can
recover damages in the criminal case against him.

Respondents counter that as Macasasas employer, petitioner was presumed negligent in

selecting and supervising Macasasa after he was found negligent by the Court of Appeals.

The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering lives.16 Both the trial
and the appellate courts found Macasasa overspeeding.17 The records show also that Soriano
was thrown five meters away after he was hit.18 Moreover, the vehicle stopped only some 25
meters from the point of impact.19

Both circumstances support the conclusion that the FX vehicle driven by Macasasa was
overspeeding. Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident victim, in
violation of Section 55,20 Article V of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. While Macasasa
at first agreed to bring Soriano to the hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. Contrary to
petitioners claim, there is no showing of any factual basis that Macasasa fled for fear of the
peoples wrath. What remains undisputed is that he did not report the accident to a police officer,
nor did he summon a doctor. Under Article 218521 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations.

While respondents could recover damages from Macasasa in a criminal case and petitioner could
become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as owner and employer, is directly and separately
civilly liable for her failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa.22 We must
emphasize that this damage suit is for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and employer, and
not for the delict of Macasasa, as driver and employee.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the
presumed negligence of the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable for the damages caused by
Macasasa.23 Respondents could recover directly from petitioner24 since petitioner failed to
prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa.25
Indeed, it is unfortunate that petitioner harbored the notion that the Regional Trial Court did not
have jurisdiction over the case and opted not to present her evidence on this point.

Lastly, we agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano was guilty of
contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass while crossing Commonwealth
Avenue. We even note that the respondents now admit this point, and concede that the appellate
court had properly reduced by 20% the amount of damages it awarded. Hence, we affirm the
reduction26 of the amount earlier awarded, based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads:

When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit and hereby AFFIRM the Decision dated
November 17, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 69037.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 125078 May 30, 2011

BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A.
ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA,
NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I.
ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. ANCORDA,
TRIFINO F. ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D. ANTINO,
DOMINGO ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO, MARCELO S.
AQUINO, JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO G.
ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO D.R. ASTRALABIO,
RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO BALMONTE,
MAXIMO M. BANGI, SALVADOR M. BANGI, HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ARSENIO B.
BARBERO, DIOSDADO BARREDO, VIRGILIO BASAS, ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DOMINGO
A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A.
BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN, FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO,
TOMAS P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. BURDEOS, VICENTE P. BURGOS, MARCELINO J.
CABALUNA, DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. CACHUELA, BRAULIO B. CADIVIDA, JR.,
SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A. CALISO, NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG,
CELESTINO CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO, VICTORIANO CANETE, DOMINADOR P.
CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA, VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR CARLOS, GEORGE
M. CASSION, JAIME S. CASTAARES, FLAVIANO C. CASTAARES, ELPIDIO CATUBAY,
NATHANIEL B. CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO G. CERERA,
SR., CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR CORTES,
NOEL Y. CORTEZ, SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX CRUZ, ROGER CRUZ,
RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M. DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE, ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO
DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS, GAMALLER P. DEANG,
CARMELINO P. DEANG, DIOSDADO P. DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG,
JR., JULIETO S. DELA CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL
DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE P. DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY, RODRIGO M. DERMIL,
ROLANDO B. DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO, SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO
DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, FE DIZON, VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO,
DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG, FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C.
ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M. EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE, RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS,
ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D. ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO,
FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY, RODOLFO M. ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C.
ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A. ESPAOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA, PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ,
EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO, GREGORIO S. FERNANDO, VICENTE P. FERRER, MARCELO T.
FLOR, ANTONIO M. FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA, NORBERTO J. FUENTES, RICARDO
C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS, ARNULFO F. GALEOS, EDGARDO V. GARCESA,
BERNARDO P. GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO B. GIDO, ROLANDO V.
GIMENA, EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO GOLEZ, JUANITO G. GONZAGA, ONOFRE
GONZALES, AMADO J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO, ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, NOEL H.
HERCEDA, EMILIO V. HERMONDO, CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S ILLUSORIO, TEODURO
G. IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA, HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN, NARCISO
JAPAY, LIBURO C. JAVINAS, ALEJANDO S. JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR, NAPOLEON T.
JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D. LABANA, CARLOS C. LABAY, AVELINO L.
LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY, NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS, ROLANDO J. LAS PEAS,
ISMAEL LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, CAMILO G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO LLANOS,
ARMANDO A. LLIDO, CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS BAEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS,
ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN, PRIMITIVO LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S.
MABASA, JR., JUANITO A. MACALISANG, TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D. MAGALLON,
PEDRO P. MAGLASANG, MARIO G. MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. MAMARADLO, PANFILO A.
MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI, ALBERTO T. MANGGA,
ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RUFINO T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P. MANSANES, ALCIO P.
MARATAS, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO R. MASIGLAT, DENDERIA MATABANG,
ARNELO N. MATILLANO, HERNANI C. MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, GREGORIO R.
MESA, RENATO N. MILLADO, ANTONIO L. MOCORRO, ALBERTO M. MOLINA, JR.,
DOMINGO P. MONDIA, JUANITO P. MONDIA, RICARDO MONTAO, RAUL T. MONTEJO,
ROGELIO MUNAR, RODOLFO E. MUEZ, CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C. NARCISO,
BRICS P. NECOR, MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G. NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX T.
NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL, SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO, BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M.
OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO M. ORACION, ALAN E. ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS,
ERNESTO M. PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA, NELSON G. PADIOS, SR., FRNACISCO G.
PAGUNTALAN, RENE B. PALENCIA, MICHAEL P. PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. PANILAGAO,
NOLITO C. PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B. PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO,
EDGAR M. PEARANDA, ILUMINIDO B. PERACULLO, ANTONIO C. PEREZ, DOMINGO
PEREZ, OSCAR C. PLEOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN G. PRIETO, ZENAIDA
PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO QUERO, ELEAZAR QUIJARDO, WILLIAM U.
QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO RABADON, MARCELINO M. RELIZAN, RAUL A.
REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES, EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, RODULFO RIVAS,
BIENVENIDO C. ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO
ROSARIO, ROMEO L. SABIDO, SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMAN G. SALIGONAN,
VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO J. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. SALVANI, JIMMY A.
SAMELIN, EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN, GEORGE SAMELIN, ROMEO A.
SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO
SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C. SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA, SIMEON F. SIMBA,
CATALINO S. SIMTIM, SERAFIN T. SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M.
SOLOMON, JAIME B. SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L.
SUMAJIT, PEDRO A. SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL T.
SUPAS, WILFREDO A. TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A. TAGOTO, JR.,
SERAPIO TAHITIT, PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO TARRE, MAGNO E. TATOY, AVELINO
TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S. TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO, ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G.
TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO, ANTONIO M. TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C.
TORRIBIO, EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD, JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. URBANO, ERNESTO G.
VAFLOR, FILOMENO E. VALENZUELA, SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL, WALTER
VILLAFAE, DANTE VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P. VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, ELEAZAR D.
VILLARBA, JENNY T. VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG, RODOLFO
YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE, MANSUETO M. YBERA, EDUARDO G. YUMANG, HENRY R.
YUNGOT, ROMEO P. YUSON, ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N. ZABALA and GRACIANO
ZAMORA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. DIZON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
General Santos City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
CORP., STANDARD FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO.,
INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL
FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC.,
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 125598

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY and OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION,

Petitioners,
vs.
BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A.
ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA,
NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I.
ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. ANCORDA,
TRIFINO F. ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D. ANTINO,
DOMINGO ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO, MARCELO S.
AQUINO, JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO G.
ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO D.R. ASTRALABIO,
RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO BALMONTE,
MAXIMO M. BANGI, SALVADOR M. BANGI, HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ARSENIO B.
BARBERO, DIOSDADO BARREDO, VIRGILIO BASAS, ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DOMINGO
A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A.
BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN, FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO,
TOMAS P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. BURDEOS, VICENTE P. BURGOS, MARCELINO J.
CABALUNA, DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. CACHUELA, BRAULIO B. CADIVIDA, JR.,
SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A. CALISO, NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG,
CELESTINO CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO, VICTORIANO CANETE, DOMINADOR P.
CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA, VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR CARLOS, GEORGE
M. CASSION, JAIME S. CASTAARES, FLAVIANO C. CASTAARES, ELPIDIO CATUBAY,
NATHANIEL B. CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO G. CERERA,
SR., CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR CORTES,
NOEL Y. CORTEZ, SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX CRUZ, ROGER CRUZ,
RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M. DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE, ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO
DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS, GAMALLER P. DEANG,
CARMELINO P. DEANG, DIOSDADO P. DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG,
JR., JULIETO S. DELA CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL
DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE P. DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY, RODRIGO M. DERMIL,
ROLANDO B. DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO, SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO
DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, FE DIZON, VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO,
DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG, FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C.
ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M. EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE, RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS,
ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D. ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO,
FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY, RODOLFO M. ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C.
ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A. ESPAOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA, PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ,
EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO, GREGORIO S. FERNANDO, VICENTE P. FERRER, MARCELO T.
FLOR, ANTONIO M. FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA, NORBERTO J. FUENTES, RICARDO
C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS, ARNULFO F. GALEOS, EDGARDO V. GARCESA,
BERNARDO P. GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO B. GIDO, ROLANDO V.
GIMENA, EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO GOLEZ, JUANITO G. GONZAGA, ONOFRE
GONZALES, AMADO J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO, ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, NOEL H.
HERCEDA, EMILIO V. HERMONDO, CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S ILLUSORIO, TEODURO
G. IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA, HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN, NARCISO
JAPAY, LIBURO C. JAVINAS, ALEJANDO S. JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR, NAPOLEON T.
JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D. LABANA, CARLOS C. LABAY, AVELINO L.
LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY, NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS, ROLANDO J. LAS PEAS,
ISMAEL LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, CAMILO G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO LLANOS,
ARMANDO A. LLIDO, CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS BAEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS,
ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN, PRIMITIVO LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S.
MABASA, JR., JUANITO A. MACALISANG, TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D. MAGALLON,
PEDRO P. MAGLASANG, MARIO G. MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. MAMARADLO, PANFILO A.
MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI, ALBERTO T. MANGGA,
ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RUFINO T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P. MANSANES, ALCIO P.
MARATAS, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO R. MASIGLAT, DENDERIA MATABANG,
ARNELO N. MATILLANO, HERNANI C. MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, GREGORIO R.
MESA, RENATO N. MILLADO, ANTONIO L. MOCORRO, ALBERTO M. MOLINA, JR.,
DOMINGO P. MONDIA, JUANITO P. MONDIA, RICARDO MONTAO, RAUL T. MONTEJO,
ROGELIO MUNAR, RODOLFO E. MUEZ, CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C. NARCISO,
BRICS P. NECOR, MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G. NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX T.
NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL, SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO, BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M.
OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO M. ORACION, ALAN E. ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS,
ERNESTO M. PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA, NELSON G. PADIOS, SR., FRANCISCO G.
PAGUNTALAN, RENE B. PALENCIA, MICHAEL P. PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. PANILAGAO,
NOLITO C. PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B. PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO,
EDGAR M. PEARANDA, ILUMINIDO B. PERACULLO, ANTONIO C. PEREZ, DOMINGO
PEREZ, OSCAR C. PLEOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN G. PRIETO, ZENAIDA
PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO QUERO, ELEAZAR QUIJARDO, WILLIAM U.
QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO RABADON, MARCELINO M. RELIZAN, RAUL A.
REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES, EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, RODULFO RIVAS,
BIENVENIDO C. ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO
ROSARIO, ROMEO L. SABIDO, SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMAN B. SALIGONAN,
VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO M. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. SALVANI, JIMMY A.
SAMELIN, EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN, GEORGE SAMELIN, ROMEO A.
SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO
SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C. SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA, SIMEON F. SIMBA,
CATALINO S. SIMTIM, SERAFIN T. SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M.
SOLOMON, JAIME B. SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L.
SUMAJIT, PEDRO A. SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL T.
SUPAS, WILFREDO A. TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A. TAGOTO, JR.,
SERAPIO TAHITIT, PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO TARRE, MAGNO E. TATOY, AVELINO
TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S. TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO, ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G.
TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO, ANTONIO M. TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C.
TORRIBIO, EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD, JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. URBANO, ERNESTO G.
VAFLOR, FILOMENO E. VALENZUELA, SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL, WALTER
VILLAFAE, DANTE VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P. VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, ELEAZAR D.
VILLARBA, JENNY T. VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG, RODOLFO
YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE, MANSUETO M. YBERA, EDUARDO G. YUMANG, HENRY R.
YUNGOT, ROMEO P. YUSON, ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N. ZABALA, and GRACIANO
ZAMORA, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 126654

CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN,
FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO
AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO
APRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN
AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L.
BALDAGO, CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL,
MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO,
CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO,
EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES,
CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R.
CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F.
COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME,
FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G.
DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE
DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG,
JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA,
RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M.
GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E.
IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO
JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO
M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO
LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO
LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE,
RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP,
AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO,
EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS,
EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ,
JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO OMOSURA,
MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. PALASPAS,
CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG, RESURRECCION PENOS,
PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D.
QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA,
RODRIGO REQUILMEN, ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, TINOY
G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA
SUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO
TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B.
TIMA, HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B.
TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO
VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ROMEO D. MARASIGAN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
Davao City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP.,
STANDARD FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC.,
DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL
FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC.,
Respondents.

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G.R. No. 127856

DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A. and DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., Petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DAVAO CITY, BRANCHES 16 AND 13, CORNELIO
ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL
ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO
AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO
APRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN
AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L.
BALDAGO, CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL,
MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO,
CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO,
EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES,
CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R.
CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F.
COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME,
FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G.
DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE
DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG,
JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA,
RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M.
GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E.
IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO
JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO
M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO
LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO
LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE,
RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP,
AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO,
EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS,
EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ,
JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO OMOSURA,
MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. PALASPAS,
CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG, RESURRECCION PENOS,
PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D.
QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA,
RODRIGO REQUILMEN, ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, TINOY
G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA
SUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO
TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B.
TIMA, HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B.
TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO
VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 128398

CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., and CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANITA ALFELOR-ALAGABAN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 13, CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU,
PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO,
CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT,
JORGE ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO,
BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J.
BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO
A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL, MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO
BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA,
ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO
CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO
CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA,
FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO
COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME,
GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO,
JR., CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO
ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G.
GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO GONZAGA,
ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M. GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG,
LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA,
DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON, ROLANDO
LACNO, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE
LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN,
FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO
LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO,
CARLITO MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR MONAPCO,
SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO,
RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA,
TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE,
TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA,
ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG,
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO,
ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO
RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO
ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO
SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD,
ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E.
TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO
TIRO, PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA,
ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, which arose out of two civil cases that were filed in different courts but whose factual
background and issues are closely intertwined.

The petitions in G.R. Nos. 1250781 and 1255982 both assail the Order3 dated May 20, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617. The said
Order decreed the dismissal of the case in view of the perceived lack of jurisdiction of the RTC
over the subject matter of the complaint. The petition in G.R. No. 125598 also challenges the
Orders dated June 4, 19964 and July 9, 1996,5 which held that the RTC of General Santos City no
longer had jurisdiction to proceed with Civil Case No. 5617.

On the other hand, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 126654,6 127856,7 and 1283988 seek the reversal
of the Order9 dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, in Civil Case No.
24,251-96, which also dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398 were consolidated in the Resolutions
dated February 10, 1997,10 April 28, 199711 and March 10, 1999.12

The factual antecedents of the petitions are as follows:

Proceedings before the Texas Courts

Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by
citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought
damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane
(DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign
countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The cases therein that involved
plaintiffs from the Philippines were "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which
was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et
al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The defendants in the consolidated cases
prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionally granted
the defendants motion to dismiss. Pertinently, the court ordered that:

Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez and Isae Carcamo will be dismissed 90 days after the entry of
this Memorandum and Order provided that defendants and third- and fourth-party defendants
have:

(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States xxx;

(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional defense
within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order in any action commenced by a
plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which his injury occurred. Any
plaintiff desiring to bring such an action will do so within 30 days after the entry of this
Memorandum and Order;

(3) waived within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order any limitations-based
defense that has matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;
(4) stipulated within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order that any discovery
conducted during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the
same extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and

(5) submitted within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order an agreement
binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.

xxxx

Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result from this Memorandum and Order, in the event
that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of
an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which
he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will
resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for [forum non
conveniens].13

Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General Santos City and G.R. Nos. 125078 and 125598

In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General
Santos City (the petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed a
Joint Complaint14 in the RTC of General Santos City on August 10, 1995. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 5617. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical
Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co.,
Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as
DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh
Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE);
Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical
Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant
companies.)

Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the
reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They
claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s up to
the early 1980s when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at;
and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. Navida, et
al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the
defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of
commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be
exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known,
were highly injurious to the formers health and well-being.

Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies respectively filed their
Motions for Bill of Particulars.15 During the pendency of the motions, on March 13, 1996,
NAVIDA, et al., filed an Amended Joint Complaint,16 excluding Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.,
Ameribrom, Inc., Bromine Compounds, Ltd. and Amvac Chemical Corp. as party defendants.

Again, the remaining defendant companies filed their various Motions for Bill of Particulars.17 On
May 15, 1996, DOW filed an Answer with Counterclaim.18
On May 20, 1996, without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos
City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case, to wit:

THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE DISMISSED
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

xxxx

The substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign
companies cites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and
beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaint
included the manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through
sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce.

Accordingly, the subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the
present case, consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside
Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the
present Regional Trial Court.19

Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged by Navida, et al., in their
complaint is a tort category that is not recognized in Philippine laws. Said the trial court:

THE TORT ASSERTED IN THE PRESENT COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT FOREIGN COMPANIES IS
NOT WITHIN THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BECAUSE IT IS
NOT A TORT CATEGORY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW

The specific tort asserted against defendant foreign companies in the present complaint is
product liability tort. When the averments in the present complaint are examined in terms of the
particular categories of tort recognized in the Philippine Civil Code, it becomes stark clear that
such averments describe and identify the category of specific tort known as product liability tort.
This is necessarily so, because it is the product manufactured by defendant foreign companies,
which is asserted to be the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the plaintiff workers,
and the liability of the defendant foreign companies, is premised on being the manufacturer of
the pesticides.

It is clear, therefore, that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present case, if and
only if the Civil Code of the Philippines, or a suppletory special law prescribes a product liability
tort, inclusive of and comprehending the specific tort described in the complaint of the plaintiff
workers.20

Third, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that Navida, et al., were coerced into submitting
their case to the Philippine courts, viz:

FILING OF CASES IN THE PHILIPPINES - COERCED AND ANOMALOUS

The Court views that the plaintiffs did not freely choose to file the instant action, but rather were
coerced to do so, merely to comply with the U.S. District Courts Order dated July 11, 1995, and
in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.21
Fourth, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant
companies therein, thus:

THE DEFENDANTS SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION IS CONDITIONAL AS IT IS ILLUSORY

Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in

the Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over
persons of the defendants through their voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary
appearance of the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the "Defendants Amended
Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens" (Annex to the
Complaint) filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that "(t)he authority of each
designated representative to accept service of process will become effective upon final dismissal
of these actions by the Court". The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is not
yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom (par. 3(h),
3(i), Amended Complaint). Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the defendants in
the Philippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts,
the acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is also conditional.
x x x.

The appointment of agents by the defendants, being subject to a suspensive condition, thus
produces no legal effect and is ineffective at the moment.22

Fifth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the
Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. The trial court
expounded:

THE JURISDICTION FROWNS UPON AND PROHIBITS FORUM SHOPPING

This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal
of the decision of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to
litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases in another forum, violates
the rule on forum shopping so abhorred in this jurisdiction. x x x.

xxxx

THE FILING OF THE CASE IN U.S. DIVESTED THIS COURT OF ITS OWN JURISDICTION

Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This
court takes note that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action.
The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of
venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent
jurisdiction with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial acquisition
of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction. x x x.

xxxx

THIS CASE IS BARRED BY THE RULE OF "LITIS PENDENCIA"

Furthermore, the case filed in the U.S. court involves the same parties, same rights and interests,
as in this case. There exists litis pendencia since there are two cases involving the same parties
and interests. The court would like to emphasize that in accordance with the rule on litis
pendencia x x x; the subsequent case must be dismissed. Applying the foregoing [precept] to the
case-at-bar, this court concludes that since the case between the parties in the U.S. is still
pending, then this case is barred by the rule on "litis pendencia."23

In fine, the trial court held that:

It behooves this Court, then to dismiss this case. For to continue with these proceedings, would
be violative of the constitutional provision on the Bill of Rights guaranteeing speedy disposition
of cases (Ref. Sec. 16, Article III, Constitution). The court has no other choice. To insist on further
proceedings with this case, as it is now presented, might accord this court a charming
appearance. But the same insistence would actually thwart the very ends of justice which it
seeks to achieve.

This evaluation and action is made not on account of but rather with due consideration to the
fact that the dismissal of this case does not necessarily deprive the parties especially the
plaintiffs of their possible remedies. The court is cognizant that the Federal Court may resume
proceedings of that earlier case between the herein parties involving the same acts or omissions
as in this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this case is now considered DISMISSED.24

On June 4, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City likewise issued an Order,25 dismissing DOWs
Answer with Counterclaim.

CHIQUITA, DEL MONTE and SHELL each filed a motion for reconsideration26 of the RTC Order
dated May 20, 1996, while DOW filed a motion for reconsideration27 of the RTC Order dated June
4, 1996. Subsequently, DOW and OCCIDENTAL also filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration28 of
the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996.

In an Order29 dated July 9, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City declared that it had already lost
its jurisdiction over the case as it took into consideration the Manifestation of the counsel of
NAVIDA, et al., which stated that the latter had already filed a petition for review on certiorari
before this Court.

CHIQUITA and SHELL filed their motions for reconsideration30 of the above order.

On July 11, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to assail the RTC
Order dated May 20, 1996, which was docketed as G.R. No. 125078.

The RTC of General Santos City then issued an Order31 dated August 14, 1996, which merely
noted the incidents still pending in Civil Case No. 5617 and reiterated that it no longer had any
jurisdiction over the case.

On August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari,32
challenging the orders of the RTC of General Santos City dated May 20, 1996, June 4, 1996 and
July 9, 1996. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 125598.

In their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL aver that the RTC of General Santos City erred in ruling
that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as the persons of the
defendant companies.

In a Resolution33 dated October 7, 1996, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 125598 with
G.R. No. 125078.

CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari,34 which sought the reversal of the RTC Orders
dated May 20, 1996, July 9, 1996 and August 14, 1996. The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
126018. In a Resolution35 dated November 13, 1996, the Court dismissed the aforesaid petition
for failure of CHIQUITA to show that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. CHIQUITA filed
a Motion for Reconsideration,36 but the same was denied through a Resolution37 dated January
27, 1997.

Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the RTC of Davao City and G.R. Nos. 126654, 127856, and
128398

Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and
CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City.
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 24,251-96. These plaintiffs (the petitioners in G.R. No.
126654, hereinafter referred to as ABELLA, et al.) amended their Joint-Complaint on May 21,
1996.38

Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA, et al., ABELLA, et al., alleged that, as workers in the banana
plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were
exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such
exposure resulted in "serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to,
sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities."39 ABELLA, et al., claimed that the
defendant companies manufactured, produced, sold, distributed, used, and/or made available in
commerce, DBCP without warning the users of its hazardous effects on health, and without
providing instructions on its proper use and application, which the defendant companies knew or
ought to have known, had they exercised ordinary care and prudence.

Except for DOW, the other defendant companies filed their respective motions for bill of
particulars to which ABELLA, et al., filed their opposition. DOW and DEL MONTE filed their
respective Answers dated May 17, 1996 and June 24, 1996.

The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Case No. 24,251-96 in its Order dated October 1,
1996, which, in its entirety, reads:

Upon a thorough review of the Complaint and Amended Complaint For: Damages filed by the
plaintiffs against the defendants Shell Oil Company, DOW Chemicals Company, Occidental
Chemical Corporation, Standard Fruit Company, Standard Fruit and Steamship, DOLE Food
Company, DOLE Fresh Fruit Company, Chiquita Brands, Inc., Chiquita Brands International, Del
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruits Co., all foreign corporations with
Philippine Representatives, the Court, as correctly pointed out by one of the defendants, is
convinced that plaintiffs "would have this Honorable Court dismiss the case to pave the way for
their getting an affirmance by the Supreme Court" (#10 of Defendants Del Monte Fresh Produce,
N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co., Reply to Opposition dated July 22, 1996). Consider these:

1) In the original Joint Complaint, plaintiffs state that: defendants have no properties in the
Philippines; they have no agents as well (par. 18); plaintiffs are suing the defendants for tortuous
acts committed by these foreign corporations on their respective countries, as plaintiffs, after
having elected to sue in the place of defendants residence, are now compelled by a decision of a
Texas District Court to file cases under torts in this jurisdiction for causes of actions which
occurred abroad (par. 19); a petition was filed by same plaintiffs against same defendants in the
Courts of Texas, USA, plaintiffs seeking for payment of damages based on negligence, strict
liability, conspiracy and international tort theories (par. 27); upon defendants Motion to Dismiss
on Forum non [conveniens], said petition was provisionally dismissed on condition that these
cases be filed in the Philippines or before 11 August 1995 (Philippine date; Should the Philippine
Courts refuse or deny jurisdiction, the U. S. Courts will reassume jurisdiction.)

11. In the Amended Joint Complaint, plaintiffs aver that: on 11 July 1995, the Federal District
Court issued a Memorandum and Order conditionally dismissing several of the consolidated
actions including those filed by the Filipino complainants. One of the conditions imposed was for
the plaintiffs to file actions in their home countries or the countries in which they were injured x x
x. Notwithstanding, the Memorandum and [O]rder further provided that should the highest court
of any foreign country affirm the dismissal for lack of jurisdictions over these actions filed by the
plaintiffs in their home countries [or] the countries where they were injured, the said plaintiffs
may return to that court and, upon proper motion, the Court will resume jurisdiction as if the
case had never been dismissed for forum non conveniens.

The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above
but because it shares the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in
its Special report "Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility," to wit:

1. Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines
should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since
the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws. There has been no
decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This
means there is no available evidence which will prove and disprove the relation between sterility
and DBCP.

2. Retired Supreme Court Justice Abraham Sarmiento opined that while a class suit is allowed in
the Philippines the device has been employed strictly. Mass sterility will not qualify as a class suit
injury within the contemplation of Philippine statute.

3. Retired High Court Justice Rodolfo Nocom stated that there is simply an absence of doctrine
here that permits these causes to be heard. No product liability ever filed or tried here.

Case ordered dismissed.40

Docketed as G.R. No. 126654, the petition for review, filed on November 12, 1996 by ABELLA, et
al., assails before this Court the above-quoted order of the RTC of Davao City.

ABELLA, et al., claim that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

According to ABELLA, et al., the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case since Articles 2176 and 2187 of the Civil Code are broad enough to cover the acts
complained of and to support their claims for damages.

ABELLA, et al., further aver that the dismissal of the case, based on the opinions of legal
luminaries reported in a newspaper, by the RTC of Davao City is bereft of basis. According to
them, their cause of action is based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. They
also maintain that the absence of jurisprudence regarding the award of damages in favor of
those adversely affected by the DBCP does not preclude them from presenting evidence to prove
their allegations that their exposure to DBCP caused their sterility and/or infertility.

SHELL, DOW, and CHIQUITA each filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Order
dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. DEL MONTE also filed its motion for
reconsideration, which contained an additional motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge.

The presiding judge of Branch 16 then issued an Order41 dated December 2, 1996, voluntarily
inhibiting himself from trying the case. Thus, the case was re-raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of
Davao City.

In an Order42 dated December 16, 1996, the RTC of Davao City affirmed the Order dated
October 1, 1996, and denied the respective motions for reconsideration filed by defendant
companies.

Thereafter, CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review dated March 5, 1997, questioning the Orders
dated October 1, 1996 and December 16, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. This case was docketed
as G.R. No. 128398.

In its petition, CHIQUITA argues that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing the case motu
proprio as it acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as over the persons
of the defendant companies which voluntarily appeared before it. CHIQUITA also claims that the
RTC of Davao City cannot dismiss the case simply on the basis of opinions of alleged legal
experts appearing in a newspaper article.

Initially, this Court in its Resolution43 dated July 28, 1997, dismissed the petition filed by
CHIQUITA for submitting a defective certificate against forum shopping. CHIQUITA, however, filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by this Court in the Resolution44 dated October
8, 1997.

On March 7, 1997, DEL MONTE also filed its petition for review on certiorari before this Court
assailing the above-mentioned orders of the RTC of Davao City. Its petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 127856.

DEL MONTE claims that the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 24,251-96, as
defined under the law and that the said court already obtained jurisdiction over its person by its
voluntary appearance and the filing of a motion for bill of particulars and, later, an answer to the
complaint. According to DEL MONTE, the RTC of Davao City, therefore, acted beyond its authority
when it dismissed the case motu proprio or without any motion to dismiss from any of the parties
to the case.

In the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, April 28, 1997, and March 10, 1999, this Court
consolidated G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398.

The Consolidated Motion to Drop DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL as Party-Respondents filed by
NAVIDA, et al. and ABELLA, et al.

On September 26, 1997, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed before this Court a Consolidated
Motion (to Drop Party-Respondents).45 The plaintiff claimants alleged that they had amicably
settled their cases with DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL sometime in July 1997. This settlement
agreement was evidenced by facsimiles of the "Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold
Harmless Agreement," which were attached to the said motion. Pursuant to said agreement, the
plaintiff claimants sought to withdraw their petitions as against DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.

DOLE, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA, however, opposed the motion, as well as the settlement
entered into between the plaintiff claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.

The Memoranda of the Parties

Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced by the parties, this Court, in a
Resolution dated June 22, 1998,46 required all the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

CHIQUITA filed its Memorandum on August 28, 1998;47 SHELL asked to be excused from the
filing of a memorandum alleging that it had already executed a compromise agreement with the
plaintiff claimants.48 DOLE filed its Memorandum on October 12, 199849 while DEL MONTE filed
on October 13, 1998.50 NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed their Consolidated Memorandum
on February 3, 1999;51 and DOW and OCCIDENTAL jointly filed a Memorandum on December 23,
1999.52

The Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in G.R. No. 125598

On July 13, 2004, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in G.R.
No. 125598, 53 explaining that the said petition "is already moot and academic and no longer
presents a justiciable controversy" since they have already entered into an amicable settlement
with NAVIDA, et al. DOW and OCCIDENTAL added that they have fully complied with their
obligations set forth in the 1997 Compromise Agreements.

DOLE filed its Manifestation dated September 6, 2004,54 interposing no objection to the
withdrawal of the petition, and further stating that they maintain their position that DOW and
OCCIDENTAL, as well as other settling defendant companies, should be retained as defendants
for purposes of prosecuting the cross-claims of DOLE, in the event that the complaint below is
reinstated.

NAVIDA, et al., also filed their Comment dated September 14, 2004,55 stating that they agree
with the view of DOW and OCCIDENTAL that the petition in G.R. No. 125598 has become moot
and academic because Civil Case No. 5617 had already been amicably settled by the parties in
1997.
On September 27, 2004, DEL MONTE filed its Comment on Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review Filed by Petitioners in G.R. No. 125598,56 stating that it has no objections to the
withdrawal of the petition filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL in G.R. No. 125598.

In a Resolution57 dated October 11, 2004, this Court granted, among others, the motion to
withdraw petition for review filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL.

THE ISSUES

In their Consolidated Memorandum, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., presented the following
issues for our consideration:

IN REFUTATION

I. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.

a) The court did not simply dismiss the case because it was filed in bad faith with petitioners
intending to have the same dismissed and returned to the Texas court.

b) The court dismissed the case because it was convinced that it did not have jurisdiction.

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

II. THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.

a. The acts complained of occurred within Philippine territory.

b. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is broad enough to cover the acts complained of.

c. Assumption of jurisdiction by the U.S. District Court over petitioner[s] claims did not divest
Philippine [c]ourts of jurisdiction over the same.

d. The Compromise Agreement and the subsequent Consolidated Motion to Drop Party
Respondents Dow, Occidental and Shell does not unjustifiably prejudice remaining respondents
Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita.58

DISCUSSION

On the issue of jurisdiction

Essentially, the crux of the controversy in the petitions at bar is whether the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96,
respectively, for lack of jurisdiction.

Remarkably, none of the parties to this case claims that the courts a quo are bereft of jurisdiction
to determine and resolve the above-stated cases. All parties contend that the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over the action for damages, specifically
for approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of
defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Specifically, the use of and exposure to
DBCP that was manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into the stream of commerce by
defendant companies happened in the Philippines. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable
basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., assert that the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, as
well as Article 2176 thereof, are broad enough to cover their claim for damages. Thus, NAVIDA,
et al., and ABELLA, et al., pray that the respective rulings of the RTC of General Santos City and
the RTC of Davao City in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 be reversed and that the said cases
be remanded to the courts a quo for further proceedings.

DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-
delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In addition, DOLE states that if there were
no actionable wrongs committed under Philippine law, the courts a quo should have dismissed
the civil cases on the ground that the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,
et al., stated no cause of action against the defendant companies. DOLE also argues that if
indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable
wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a decision on the
ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying the customs of
the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. DOLE posits that the
Philippines is the situs of the tortious acts allegedly committed by defendant companies as
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to their alleged exposure to DBCP which occurred in the
Philippines, as the cause of the sterility and other reproductive system problems that they
allegedly suffered. Finally, DOLE adds that the RTC of Davao City gravely erred in relying upon
newspaper reports in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 given that newspaper articles are
hearsay and without any evidentiary value. Likewise, the alleged legal opinions cited in the
newspaper reports were taken judicial notice of, without any notice to the parties. DOLE,
however, opines that the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 was proper, given that
plaintiff claimants merely prosecuted the cases with the sole intent of securing a dismissal of the
actions for the purpose of convincing the U.S. Federal District Court to re-assume jurisdiction
over the cases.

In a similar vein, CHIQUITA argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the cases filed before them. The Amended Joint-Complaints sought approximately P2.7 million
in damages for each plaintiff claimant, which amount falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the
place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in
consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which
states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action.
CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the RTC by making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of
the proceedings. None of the defendant companies ever objected to the exercise of jurisdiction
by the courts a quo over their persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the remand of Civil Case Nos.
5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively.

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over Civil Case Nos.
5617 and 24,251-96, respectively

The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.59
Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the
enactment of a law.

At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

xxxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00).60

Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.

Here, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., sought in their similarly-worded Amended Joint-
Complaints filed before the courts a quo, the following prayer:

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants:

a) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF moral damages in the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P1,500,00.00);
b) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF nominal damages in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00) each;
c) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF exemplary damages in the amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P600,000.00);
d) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF attorneys fees of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and
e) TO PAY THE COSTS of the suit.61

From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the
total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff
claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City
and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of
the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Moreover, the allegations in both Amended Joint-Complaints narrate that:

THE CAUSES OF ACTION

4. The Defendants manufactured, sold, distributed, used, AND/OR MADE AVAILABLE IN

COMMERCE nematocides containing the chemical dibromochloropropane, commonly known as
DBCP. THE CHEMICAL WAS USED AGAINST the parasite known as the nematode, which plagued
banana plantations, INCLUDING THOSE in the Philippines. AS IT TURNED OUT, DBCP not only
destroyed nematodes. IT ALSO CAUSED ILL-EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH OF PERSONS EXPOSED TO
IT AFFECTING the human reproductive system as well.

5. The plaintiffs were exposed to DBCP in the 1970s up to the early 1980s WHILE (a) they used
this product in the banana plantations WHERE they were employed, and/or (b) they resided
within the agricultural area WHERE IT WAS USED. As a result of such exposure, the plaintiffs
suffered serious and permanent injuries TO THEIR HEALTH, including, but not limited to,
STERILITY and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.

6. THE DEFENDANTS WERE AT FAULT OR WERE NEGLIGENT IN THAT THEY MANUFACTURED,

produced, sold, and/or USED DBCP and/or otherwise, PUT THE SAME into the stream of
commerce, WITHOUT INFORMING THE USERS OF ITS HAZARDOUS EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND/OR
WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON ITS PROPER USE AND APPLICATION. THEY allowed Plaintiffs to be
exposed to, DBCP-containing materials which THEY knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care and
prudence ought to have known, were highly harmful and injurious to the Plaintiffs health and
well-being.

7. The Defendants WHO MANUFACTURED, PRODUCED, SOLD, DISTRIBUTED, MADE AVAILABLE OR

PUT DBCP INTO THE STREAM OF COMMERCE were negligent OR AT FAULT in that they, AMONG
OTHERS:

a. Failed to adequately warn Plaintiffs of the dangerous characteristics of DBCP, or to cause their
subsidiaries or affiliates to so warn plaintiffs;

b. Failed to provide plaintiffs with information as to what should be reasonably safe and sufficient
clothing and proper protective equipment and appliances, if any, to protect plaintiffs from the
harmful effects of exposure to DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;

c. Failed to place adequate warnings, in a language understandable to the worker, on containers

of DBCP-containing materials to warn of the dangers to health of coming into contact with DBCP,
or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;

d. Failed to take reasonable precaution or to exercise reasonable care to publish, adopt and
enforce a safety plan and a safe method of handling and applying DBCP, or to cause their
subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;

e. Failed to test DBCP prior to releasing these products for sale, or to cause their subsidiaries or
affiliates to do so; and
f. Failed to reveal the results of tests conducted on DBCP to each plaintiff, governmental agencies
and the public, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliate to do so.

8. The illnesses and injuries of each plaintiff are also due to the FAULT or negligence of
defendants Standard Fruit Company, Dole Fresh Fruit Company, Dole Food Company, Inc.,
Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. in that they failed to exercise
reasonable care to prevent each plaintiffs harmful exposure to DBCP-containing products which
defendants knew or should have known were hazardous to each plaintiff in that they, AMONG
OTHERS:

a. Failed to adequately supervise and instruct Plaintiffs in the safe and proper application of
DBCP-containing products;

b. Failed to implement proper methods and techniques of application of said products, or to

cause such to be implemented;

c. Failed to warn Plaintiffs of the hazards of exposure to said products or to cause them to be so
warned;

d. Failed to test said products for adverse health effects, or to cause said products to be tested;

e. Concealed from Plaintiffs information concerning the observed effects of said products on
Plaintiffs;

f. Failed to monitor the health of plaintiffs exposed to said products;

g. Failed to place adequate labels on containers of said products to warn them of the damages of
said products; and

h. Failed to use substitute nematocides for said products or to cause such substitutes to [be]
used.62 (Emphasis supplied and words in brackets ours.)

Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,
et al., attribute to defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which led to their exposure
to nematocides containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
such exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their
reproductive system.

Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants a
quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point
to the acts and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling,
using, and/or otherwise putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP,
"without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions on its
proper use and application." 63

Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals,64 this Court has always reminded that jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set
up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments
therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-
delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously
falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.

Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered
resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations
located in the Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in
the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of
action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC
of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.

It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the
territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., "the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging
in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part
of the stream of commerce,"65 and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.

Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act
complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal
civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be
commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.66

In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of
the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where
they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the
courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages.
Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-
workers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the
Philippines. Considering the great number of plaintiff claimants involved in this case, it is not far-
fetched to assume that voluminous records are involved in the presentation of evidence to
support the claim of plaintiff claimants. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that
the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., against the defendant
companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of
General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter in the
instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases.67

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of all the defendant companies

It is well to stress again that none of the parties claims that the courts a quo lack jurisdiction
over the cases filed before them. All parties are one in asserting that the RTC of General Santos
City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendant companies in the action below. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly
appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo.

Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he defendants
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons." In this
connection, all the defendant companies designated and authorized representatives to receive
summons and to represent them in the proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant
companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several
voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating
during the course of the proceedings below.

In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,68
held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons.
Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation
of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar
said party from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction.69

Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendant companies, as well as over the subject matter of the instant
case. What is more, this jurisdiction, which has been acquired and has been vested on the courts
a quo, continues until the termination of the proceedings.

It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise of
jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants
and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising
therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to
decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.70

Plaintiffs purported bad faith in filing the subject civil cases in Philippine courts

Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad faith merely to
procure a dismissal of the same and to allow them to return to the forum of their choice, this
Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported by
evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as
these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances.
When this Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-lived.71
This is especially true with respect to allegations of bad faith, in line with the basic rule that good
faith is always presumed and bad faith must be proved.72

In sum, considering the fact that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints filed by NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., and that the courts a quo have also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all
the defendant companies, it therefore, behooves this Court to order the remand of Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City,
respectively.

On the issue of the dropping of DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL as respondents in view of their
amicable settlement with NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.

NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are further praying that DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL be
dropped as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96. The non-settling defendants allegedly manifested that they intended to file their
cross-claims against their co-defendants who entered into compromise agreements. NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the non-settling defendants did not aver any cross-claim in
their answers to the complaint and that they subsequently sought to amend their answers to
plead their cross-claims only after the settlement between the plaintiff claimants and DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL were executed. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., therefore, assert that
the cross-claims are already barred.

In their Memoranda, CHIQUITA and DOLE are opposing the above motion of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., since the latters Amended Complaints cited several instances of tortious conduct
that were allegedly committed jointly and severally by the defendant companies. This solidary
obligation on the part of all the defendants allegedly gives any co-defendant the statutory right
to proceed against the other co-defendants for the payment of their respective shares. Should
the subject motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., be granted, and the Court subsequently
orders the remand of the action to the trial court for continuance, CHIQUITA and DOLE would
allegedly be deprived of their right to prosecute their cross-claims against their other co-
defendants. Moreover, a third party complaint or a separate trial, according to CHIQUITA, would
only unduly delay and complicate the proceedings. CHIQUITA and DOLE similarly insist that the
motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., to drop DOW, SHELL and OCCIDENTAL as
respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96,
be denied.

Incidentally, on April 2, 2007, after the parties have submitted their respective memoranda, DEL
MONTE filed a Manifestation and Motion73 before the Court, stating that similar settlement
agreements were allegedly executed by the plaintiff claimants with DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA
sometime in 1999. Purportedly included in the agreements were Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96. Attached to the said manifestation were copies of the Compromise Settlement,
Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement between DEL MONTE and the settling plaintiffs, as well
as the Release in Full executed by the latter.74 DEL MONTE specified therein that there were
"only four (4) plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617 who are claiming against the Del Monte parties"75
and that the latter have executed amicable settlements which completely satisfied any claims
against DEL MONTE. In accordance with the alleged compromise agreements with the four
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617, DEL MONTE sought the dismissal of the Amended Joint-
Complaint in the said civil case. Furthermore, in view of the above settlement agreements with
ABELLA, et al., in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, DEL MONTE stated that it no longer wished to pursue
its petition in G.R. No. 127856 and accordingly prayed that it be allowed to withdraw the same.

Having adjudged that Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 should be remanded to the RTC of
General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively, the Court deems that the
Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
should likewise be referred to the said trial courts for appropriate disposition.

Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, "[a] compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Like
any other contract, an extrajudicial compromise agreement is not excepted from rules and
principles of a contract. It is a consensual contract, perfected by mere consent, the latter being
manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which
are to constitute the contract.76 Judicial approval is not required for its perfection.77 A
compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata78 and this holds true
even if the agreement has not been judicially approved.79 In addition, as a binding contract, a
compromise agreement determines the rights and obligations of only the parties to it.80

In light of the foregoing legal precepts, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City
should first receive in evidence and examine all of the alleged compromise settlements involved
in the cases at bar to determine the propriety of dropping any party as a defendant therefrom.

The Court notes that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) that was filed by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., only pertained to DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL in view of the
latter companies alleged compromise agreements with the plaintiff claimants. However, in
subsequent developments, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA supposedly reached their own amicable
settlements with the plaintiff claimants, but DEL MONTE qualified that it entered into a
settlement agreement with only four of the plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No. 5617. These four
plaintiff claimants were allegedly the only ones who were asserting claims against DEL MONTE.
However, the said allegation of DEL MONTE was simply stipulated in their Compromise
Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement and its truth could not be verified with
certainty based on the records elevated to this Court. Significantly, the 336 plaintiff claimants in
Civil Case No. 5617 jointly filed a complaint without individually specifying their claims against
DEL MONTE or any of the other defendant companies. Furthermore, not one plaintiff claimant
filed a motion for the removal of either DEL MONTE or CHIQUITA as defendants in Civil Case Nos.
5617 and 24,251-96.

There is, thus, a primary need to establish who the specific parties to the alleged compromise
agreements are, as well as their corresponding rights and obligations therein. For this purpose,
the courts a quo may require the presentation of additional evidence from the parties.
Thereafter, on the basis of the records of the cases at bar and the additional evidence submitted
by the parties, if any, the trial courts can then determine who among the defendants may be
dropped from the said cases.

It is true that, under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for the same quasi-delict is solidary. A solidary obligation is one in which each of the
debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the
satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors.81

In solidary obligations, the paying debtors right of reimbursement is provided for under Article
1217 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or
more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.

He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to
each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is
due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded.

When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the
debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the
debt of each.1avvphil

The above right of reimbursement of a paying debtor, and the corresponding liability of the co-
debtors to reimburse, will only arise, however, if a solidary debtor who is made to answer for an
obligation actually delivers payment to the creditor. As succinctly held in Lapanday Agricultural
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,82 "[p]ayment, which means not only the delivery
of money but also the performance, in any other manner, of the obligation, is the operative fact
which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which
corresponds to each of the [other] debtors."83

In the cases at bar, there is no right of reimbursement to speak of as yet. A trial on the merits
must necessarily be conducted first in order to establish whether or not defendant companies
are liable for the claims for damages filed by the plaintiff claimants, which would necessarily give
rise to an obligation to pay on the part of the defendants.

At the point in time where the proceedings below were prematurely halted, no cross-claims have
been interposed by any defendant against another defendant. If and when such a cross-claim is
made by a non-settling defendant against a settling defendant, it is within the discretion of the
trial court to determine the propriety of allowing such a cross-claim and if the settling defendant
must remain a party to the case purely in relation to the cross claim.

In Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,84 the
Court had the occasion to state that "where there are, along with the parties to the compromise,
other persons involved in the litigation who have not taken part in concluding the compromise
agreement but are adversely affected or feel prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from
invoking in the same proceedings an adequate relief therefor."85

Relevantly, in Philippine International Surety Co., Inc. v. Gonzales,86 the Court upheld the ruling
of the trial court that, in a joint and solidary obligation, the paying debtor may file a third-party
complaint and/or a cross-claim to enforce his right to seek contribution from his co-debtors.

Hence, the right of the remaining defendant(s) to seek reimbursement in the above situation, if
proper, is not affected by the compromise agreements allegedly entered into by NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., with some of the defendant companies.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125078,
126654, and 128398. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated May 20, 1996 of the Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617, and the Order dated
October 1, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, and its subsequent Order
dated December 16, 1996 denying reconsideration in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, and REMAND the
records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and appropriate
proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the amended complaints in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.

The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte to withdraw its petition in G.R. No.
127856. In view of the previous grant of the motion to withdraw the petition in G.R. No. 125598,
both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598 are considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice