Eastern Partnership Countries In Ten Years Time

Essay by Serge Kharytonau

No need to say recurrence of Russian presence in former Soviet republics in Putin era affected
interests of the European Union in Eurasia and Mediterranea seriously and became a prerequisite for
announcing the Eastern Partnership - an implicit policy of counterbalancing Russia in Eastern Europe
and the Caucasus region. Defining action roadmap for in-between-lands of Eastern Europe and the
Caucasus (where the influence of the EU is not yet decisively fixed) was logical for the EU in the
raise of Russian dmocratie souveraine1 as non-objective being is a non-being(Mclean, 2000).

Probably, the vista of the Eastern Partnership zone in ten years time could have been pukka question
on the eve of 2004 expansion of the EU. But there are a number of self-existential questions high on
the agenda of European offices today - such as the ongoing Arab Spring and economic downturn in
Europe. Within the framework of unstable Eurozone economy and expectations of complete
disintegration of the EU in the nearest future, the Eastern Partnership concept might be of no use in
ten years time, right? One might wonder if theres any use of making predictions about the future of
the EaP zone in current circumstances. Definitely, there is to see what would happen to this part of
the world without European involvement. This prediction should be done contradictio in contrarium:
by 2023 the EU failed to engage the Eastern Partnership program, but still exists as the EU-27 squad
and finally managed to reconcile democracy with capitalism (Habermas, 2012).

Particular futurologists such as George Friedman and Robert D. Kaplan from Strategic Forecasting,
Inc. (more commonly known as Stratfor) suggest that forecasts tend to be more realistic if
geoconflict problem is stated as the following: people and ideas influence events, but geography
largely determines them (Kaplan, 2012; Friedman, 2009).

To understand Russian activity in Eastern Europe, it is necessary to clearly determine Russias

fundamental weakness in the region no physical anchor exists in the East European plain to protect
European Russia. The only signicant natural barrier from this side is anywhere on the plain. Pushing
its western border all the way to the West provides the depth that Russia needs to protect its capital
(Friedman, 2009).

Three motivations should be taken into consideration by European leaders while mapping the state of
play within the EaP zone to control it in a ten-year perspective and prevent new old division in
Eurasia.

Firstly, there is a paramount need to prevent reverse move of former Soviet republics for new Russo-
centric integration. In case the EU does not install target states as satellite-states, this would be done
by Moscow in a few next years and today it is more likely for the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and
Armenia than the first option.

Secondly, there is a need to stimulate European consumer market and production: 75 mio people
from EaP nations might noticeably cinch it the higher the demand, the higher the supply.

1 A term used to describe the opportunity for the Russian state not to obey other major centers of power. Was introduced
by Vladislav Surkov, the main architect of current political system in Russia.
Thirdly, Russian labour market still remains the most attractive for the nationals of target states
descent. United market of the EaP states and Russia is smaller than European, but in contrast to
protectionistic and highly competitive market of the EU, it is less competitive and grows at
significantly higher rates than European market does since 2001. Labour migration causes population
decline (which is up to 7.5% in the EaP area), at current rates the population in target states may
decrease by 5 to 6 mio people in 2023.

Assuming the existence of the EU-27 in early 2020s as leading regional player and recovered
Eurozone (Overtveldt, 2011; Lapavitsas, 2012) shall we consider the growth of geopolitical
investment into target states by Russia and the EU as equal to the baseline of 2013. In 2013 the EU
has ill-defined objectives of the initiative, unclear conceptualisation of partnership and value-laden
agenda. Moscow however lacks conceptualisation, but gives real financial profits, cheap energy,
investment and jobs yesterday yet.

The territory and markets are two stumbling-blocks of current geoconflict between Russia and the
EU. Not in favor of the EU, in 2013 (five years after the EaP was introduced) European neighbours
(Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) strike almost half of their import and export bargains with Russians
and this value increases by up to 25% annually as stated by National Departments of Statistics of
target countries. Economical future of Belarus is an example of the ultimate tendency. While being a
party to the Customs Union with a WTO member who is fully responsible for compliance with WTO
norms, Belarus will be forced to obey these rules and start privatization. State property will further be
privatized by Russian capital and the independence would, in fact, be lost.2

Within the next few years other former Soviet states will persistently be convinced there is no space
for their producers at European markets in most fileds (Landes, 1999), but there is huge potential for
business expansion in the East (in addition to subsidized Russian energy and preferential access to
Russian markets). The countries of the EaP will systematically be pushed into Russia-led Eurasian
Union and may join it in 3 to 10 years. Azerbaijan might remain the only independent player in this
league protecting its independence via hydrocarbons export.

Shall the emergence of Fukuyamas "post-political" states in the EaP target countries be expected by
2023 (Fukuyama, 1992)? I wouldnt be too positive about serene future of liberal paradigm in
Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus. Much of the destiny for the countries in the region will
follow the line of enlightened authoritarian rule in Russia. The EU avoids the controversial topic of
accession to the Union while European integration and EU membership mean the same for leaders in
Georgia. The Association Agreement (AA) is seen as direct way to membership which is not true.
Understanding this, Russia will intensify covert operations including financial support of opposition
movements and Russian minorities to pull the neighbours of Europe (Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan). Similar practice including energy chantage shall be expected against actual EU members
in the Baltics (Friedman, 2009).

Disappointed with European democracies, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and the
Ukraine - valuable geopolitical and infrastructural links between Russia and the rest of Europe - will
likely trend towards authoritarian consolidation within the Eurasian Union the EU-antagonistic bloc
with centralized, low-competitive politics. Standards regarding the rule of law and human rights are
2This construct was earlier analysed in my research on the Eurasian Union for Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian
Nationalbank, OeNB) in 2012.
lower in authoritarian Union and this fact consequently decreases the potential of legal claims
(considered as threats) against goverments.

There is hope for qualitative change of the Eastern Partnership with recent introduction of the
European Endowment for Democracy (EED) and mix-up in foundations of the Eurasian Union
(Stratfor, 2013). Nevertheless, lack of realistic look at target countries as the nations they really are
(not what the EU expects them to be) would produce more pan-Slavic anomalies such as modern
Belarus, Transdniester, South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Lucas, 2011; Karbovskiy, 2012).

Eastern Europe and the Caucasus might differ to the best in ten years if the EU acknowledges mental
difference between European East and West toponimically united into Europe as one geographical
area. If only the officials of the EU stop thinking of East and West in Europe as Eastern and Western
Berlin in 1961, it will succeed in gaining control over the region. But there is no use in an attempt to
integrate the East through replication of the experience in Central Europe struggling against
Communism in the 1980s.

Soft power is nothing without seeing things as they really are. Das ist brutale Realpolitik.
References

Friedman, G., 2009. The next 100 years: a forecast for the 21st century. NYC: Doubleday, p. 112-
199.

Fukuyama, F., 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Hamish Hamilton.

Habermas, J., 2012.The Crisis of the European Union: A Response. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kaplan, R.D., 2012. The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts
and the Battle Against Fate. New York: Random House, p. 60-78, 133-153.

Karbovskiy, A., 2012. The Eastern Partnerships Troubles: The End of Imitative Europeanization?
[online] Available at: http://www.brugesgroup.com/EasternPartnership.pdf [Accessed 30 May 2013].

Landes, D.S., 1999. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor.
New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Lucas, E., 2011. What the West Gets Wrong About Belarus [online]. Available at:
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Mclean, D. (ed.), 2000. Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 2000. UK: Oxford University Press, p.113.

Overtveldt, J., 2011. The End of the Euro: The Uneasy Future of the European Union. Chicago:
Agate Publishing, p. 147-182.

Stratfor, 2013. Russia Moves to Reinforce Its Alliances [online]. Available at:
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May 2013].