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1 Jan 85 Edition of 11 Dec 72 is obsolete.

if
A BRIEF HISTORY OF FLAK AND FLAK INTELLIGENCE
IN THE
NINTH AIR FORCE

Prepared by
Flak Section
H<i. Ninth Air Fore* (Adv.)
APO 696. U. S. Annv
Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Commanding
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY NINTH AIR FORCE > : < ' 7 / v
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
j 1

APO 6g6; U. S. Army

9 May 1945

With the successful accomplishment of complete and total victory in the

Ewopean campaigns comes the period for reflection on and analysis of the acti
vities of the. months past. This booklet is a brief record of the efforts of airmen
and flak officers to combat the major opponent of this air force German flak.
It must be remembered that the Ninth was a tactical air arm. After anni
hilation of the Luftwaffe, our schedule was mainly designed toward isolation
of the ground battle area and cooperation with the ground forces of the Twelfth
Army Group. In addition the situation frequently demanded air operations in
the area of and in cooperation with all Army Groups in Europe. These missions
defined all activities of the many staff sections of this complex air organization
including theflaksection. These pursuits constituted a great challenge to the Ninth.
In the final analysis this challenge was most important, not only to the flak
sections, which existed because of it, but to the tremendous striking force of the
Ninth the pilots and their aircraft. Flak intelligence was a part of the
insurance taken out for their protection. The flak officers' proudest claim is that
they were able to help assure this protection.
It is hoped that this record of their efforts, together with the lessons learned
by our airmen, may contribute to the great remaining task total defeat of
Japan.

HOTT S. VANDENBERG

Lieutenant General, USA

Commanding

FLAK IN THE NINTH

The Mission , i

Organization and Operation 3

Ninth Air Force 3

IX Bomber Command 9

IX Tactical Air Command 13

XIX Tactical Air Command 17

XXIX Tactical Air Command 21

Flak Analysis Developments 24

II

THE ENEMY-HIS EQUIPMENT AND METHODS

Flieger Abwehr Kanonen 31

Fire Control Equipment 43

Other Defenses 47

Flak Tactics . 52

Chain of Command 60

III

FLAK COUNTERMEASURES
Routing 65

Evasive Action 69

Counterflak (Air) 73

Counterflak (Ground) 77

Formations 79

Radio Countermeasures 83

IV

FLAK IN THE CAMPAIGNS

Pre-Invasion 87

Invasion and Normandy 89

Battle of France 93

Fall Campaign 95

German Counter-Offensive 97
Io1
March to the Rhine
I0
Battle of Germany 3
V
SUCCESS OF FLAK INTELLIGENCE
A Backward Glance 107

Proof of the Pudding 109

Brigadier General Robert M. Lee

Deputy Commanding General for Operations

 In the European Theatre of Operations flak reached its majority when the back
of the German Air Force was broken in the first months of 1944. Enemy antiaircraft
artillery replaced enemy aircraft as the major combat risk of Allied air fleets.
The Army Air Forces through the efforts of Gen. Arnold's AAA adviser, Maj.
Gen. H. R. Oldfield, were quick to note the growing importance of this menace from
the ground and to anticipate the developing destructive capabilities of flak weapons.
Immediately intelligence and analysis of German technique, equipment, tactics,
etc. were intensified, and trained personnel were assigned to all Air Forces to counter
the increasingly potent threat of the enemy's ground defenses.
Results of this counter-flak program were a major factor in enabling Allied
air power to retain complete supremacy of the skies.

To meet the ever-increasing threat of German
antiaircraft artillery, which was fast becoming of
age, flak intelligence sections were established
throughout the Ninth Air Force in all echelons
above group level during March and April of 1944.
The mission of these sections was to study and ana
lyze German flak defenses and to prescribe counter
measures which would defeat this enemy defense
a defense which had become capable of reaching
up and knocking our planes from the air or of
severely damaging these aircraft and of killing or wound
ing the men who manned them.
Specifically the mission above included, among
other vitally important tasks, the following:
a. Advising the Commanding General and his opera
tions staff on matters pertaining to enemy antiaircraft
defense as these matters affected current and future oper
ations.
b. Maintaining and disseminating to lower units
information regarding the position and strength of enemy
antiaircraft artillery defenses, materiel, tactics, techniques,
and capabilities.
c. Recommending routes of approach and withdraw
al and target attack technique to be employed by air
craft.
d. Training through lectures, memoranda and
inspection, of both ground and flying personnel in the
particulars of enemy antiaircraft defense measures.
Accomplishing this assigned mission was a major
task, fraught with the many difficulties incident to estab
lishing a new section in the Air Force, teaching a new
subject to new pupils, and producing results operation
ally valuable all in time to make the invasion dead
line which was less than two months away.
However, within a very short time after arrival in
the theatre flak analysis personnel were deep into the
many problems involved, and flak intelligence in the
Ninth was in full scale operation by D-Day.
 AND

Herein are contained brief histories of the developments and methods of opera
tions of major Ninth Air Force flak sections in combatting problems posed by the
German AA defenses. Though basically similar, all procedures varied slightly to
meet circumstances peculiar to each command.

Ninth Air Force (Advanced)

Main Function
As regards the flak section at Air Force level
the missions mentioned in the first chapter were
actually additional to the main function which con
cerned the collection, collation and speedy dissem
ination of basic flak location data and flak reac
tion in the tactical or battle area for all units of the
Ninth Air Force plus all other Allied air echelons
in the European Theatre of Operations.
The Ninth had been selected as the American
Air Force to play the role of closely supporting the
Allied ground armies in their continental attack
along with the British Second Tactical Air Force.
The nerve center of the air-ground team in England
was located at Uxbridge, Middlesex, and to this
spot key members of the operations and intelligence
staffs of both these headquarters came to operate
the pre-invasion and invasion period air missions
which proved so effective in sealing off the initial
battle area and in keeping the Hun continually
unbalanced throughout the whole European cam
paign. To this spot too came the Air Force flak
section to undertake its new tasks amid the secrecy,
the tenseness, the imminence, and the adventure
of the coming D-Day.
Organization
The very intimate structure of the Ninth and
the Second Tactical Air Forces demanded particu
larly close staff procedure; thus in endeavouring to
fulfill as completely as possible this requirement, the
flak intelligence sections of these two headquarters
amalgamated all flak information and procedures
even to the extent of occupying the same office space.
This close contact proved highly satisfactory and
was instrumental in the establishment of standard
flak procedures in all Allied flying units.
Certain procedures were duplicated under the
above plan so that when the Ninth Air Force and
Second TAF went their separate ways in July, 1944,
each flak section was able to function efficiently even
though widely separated. Relations established dur
ing our combined operational period served to
facilitate greatly the flow of information throughout
the entire campaign.
* Air Force Adv
\J
Personnel
In the beginning one officer
and one enlisted man (plotter)
carried on the function of the Air
Force flak section. However it
soon became apparent that, dur
ing this period prior to invasion
when target lay-on and initial
planning for eleven medium bomb
er groups and fifteen fighter-
bomber groups was accomplished
at Air Force level, one officer was
insufficient, and another officer
joined the section to allow more
detailed flak analysis of the tar
gets assigned.
Later when the Advanced sec
tion of the Air Force headquarters
moved to the continent, the mis
sion of providing information in Standing: ist Lt. E. G. Slaughter, Lt. Col. R. D. Curtin, ist. Lt. J. C. Gregg
the tactical area became a pri- Kneeling: S/Sgt. A. Alerriman, Sgt. P. E. Hughes
mary responsibility and an addi
tional enlisted plotter was added. Still later, in an Source Material
attempt to accomplish more in field of flak appre In accomplishing the missions outlined in pre
ciation and evaluations for other air and ground vious paragraphs the flak section at Air Force
commands, yet another officer was assigned to do operated under procedures which were developed
research and aid in the establishment of a more in the course of early operations. Because the whole
complete flak service. Thus throughout the entire structure of flak intelligence and analysis is based
period the maximum personnel engaged in flak on sound source material, much effort was expended
was three officers and two enlisted men. in the early stages in the establishment of these
The flak analysis officers at the various other sources so that usable data could be expected to
Air Force echelons were guided and administered flow automatically and continuously into the Air
under the senior flak officer who was directly re Force flak center for use at that level and for quick
sponsible for the operating policies and general guid dissemination to lower units.
ance of these officers. The chief of intelligence at Prior to the invasion of the continent source
each echelon however was in charge of each of the material was quite centralized in the British War
flak analysis officers, they being members of the Office flak intelligence center (M. I. 15). This office
intelligence staff of each headquarters. furnished six figure map coordinate locations of
 FLAK INFORMATION

n
I22U.S. ARMY 6P. 7V U.S. ARMY I'FRENCH ARMY
|v U.S. ARMY. 3 " U S . ARMY 9UUS. ARMY BRITISH
WAR OFFICE PHOTO INTERP. PHOTO INTERR
PHOTO INTCRP. PHOTO INTERP. PHOTO INTERP. PHOTO INTERP
K. M.I. 19

FIRST TACAF SECONO T A F v&m FORCE R.A.F. UNITS

NINTH AIR FORCE
UNITS
133
UNITS UNITS .I. 15
UNITS

67'-" TAC/RN

GROUP
\
I5-'CAN. ARMY
APIS.

GROUP
2BR. ARMY SECOND T . A . F . NINTH AIR FORCE
TH
20 P. 1.0 UNITS
.. A. P. I.S. FLAK SECTION KIMTH AIR FORCE 363"-5 TAC/RN

ADVANCED GROUP
2 1 " ARMY OP.
A.P.I.S.
912 TAC/RN.
GROUP
\, (PRN.)

1
9PVOM8 DIV.
|
IX T.A.C.
|
XIX T.A.C
|
XXIX T.A.C. IX T.C.C. HIALLIEO 8ISA.F. IX A.O.C. SECONO WAR
A/B ARMY T.A.F. OFFICE
UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS M.I. 16
1 :
!
F t t S . ARMY SeuS.ARMY &U.S.ARMY l2|gARMY OPT]

flak positions in addition to medium scale (i 1500,000) Reporting System

maps showing flak densities throughout the con It was apparent however that once the ground
tinent. These coordinates were plotted daily on battle was launched on the continent, flak defenses
large scale (1:50,000) maps, thus permitting rout in the tactical or battle area would become thorough
ing and flak analysis to be accomplished. Balloon ly confused if some method could not be designed
barrages, searchlights, railway flak, smoke defenses, to cope with the fluidity of flak defenses, especially
background material on weapons, organization, that flak with the German Army units (Heeres
tactics, etc. were also furnished units by this agency, flak) engaged in the battle. The answer to this
and all units were constantly informed of the latest situation was found in the establishment of a system
information available on German defenses, capa of reporting which had its center in the Ninth Air
bilities and tactical employment, as well as pinpoint Force section. With such an organization this flak
locations of all weapons. section, together with the Second TAF flak section,
 :
v

TT

'

Tactical Area Flak

This is an extracted sec

tion of the Ninth Air Force
I4FEB.I945
flak map of 14 Feb. 1945
at the start of the Rhine
Offensive. The gun count;
of 2 0 3 6 heavy and 4184
light guns in this small area
above indicate the enormity
of the German AA densities
along the Western Front.

3 # = Lt. Flak
7 =Hvy.Flak
Scale l"= 3.95 miles ei W ,
Hqs. Ninth Air Force
furnished to all European Theatre air and ground
echelons all flak information in the area approxi
mately one hundred miles east of the ground battle lines.
Jointly with the information gathered by the
extensive photographic sources was combined the
information derived from the mission reports of
flak fire received. It can be readily seen that when
the ground battle became a rout, as in the battle
of France, photographic coverage could not pos
sibly uncover the flak which was moving all over
the countryside. Thus was established a procedure
of analyzing combat crew reports of flak fire received
during missions over enemy territory. By plotting
this flak reaction on a 1:250,000 scale map of the
operational area, noting kind and intensity, and
combining these plots with a current knowledge of
the ground battle situation (lines of communica
tion, dumps, new airfields, vital communications
centers, ground topography, etc.), together with
the flak analysis officer's familiarity with the Ger
man capabilities of flak employment, a very reason
able answer was arrived at which would indicate
flak areas. These areas were disseminated along
with the photographic pinponts and their use by the
flying crews proved sound. Later photography of the
area concerned would often prove the method feas
ible by evidence of the presence of flak.
Dissemination
In the dissemination of flak intelligence speed
was of the essence since the entire operational area
was constantly changing and flak information arriv
ing late for briefing could result in the unneces
sary loss of men and aircraft. Thus all flak bulletins
in the Air Force were routed by speedy operational
priority teletype channels, with the time differen
tial of photography to pinpoint stage varying from
twelve to forty-eight hours a tremendous im
provement over the earlier intervals of one to two
weeks. This Air Force flak bulletin was sent out
many times daily and contained all of the collated
flak data from ground sources, prisoner of war inter
rogations, and other sources.
Operational Use
As in all of the lower echelons the flak section
at Air Force level worked in close conjunction with
the combat operations and target intelligence sec
tions. All targets, prior to selection for attack by
medium bombardment division, were checked to
determine that the target at the time was not too
heavily defended to make it impractical for medium
level bombardment. Such factors as sun, weather,
present situation regarding German flak tactics,
gun densities, etc. were considered, and in every
case the analysis and estimate of the flak officer was
weighed in the final selection or discarding of the
proposed target. Very often special coordinated
attacks on densely defended targets and target
systems were prepared by the flak section. Also the
G-2 (Air) section of 12th Army Group Headquar
ters received on request special studies on flak and
its capabilities in a ground role.
To facilitate flak presentation and quick ana
lysis the flak section after much experimentation
constructed and printed frequently editions of a
1:250,000 scale flak map containing actual pin
point locations of heavy flak guns plus area densities
of all known and suspected light flak areas from
both photographic and other sources. A previous
map (1:500,000) was constructed by this section
and issued frequently during the early stages of the
invasion to facilitate intelligence, especially rout
ing, on targets during the very mobile phases of the
campaign. These maps were kept current by changes
issued daily via the flak bulletin and proved parti
cularly valuable to fighter-bomber units employed
in close ground support roles.
 IX Bomber Command

The Beginning Command, and one to each of its three wings.

The Third Bombardment Wing, later to be Among the tasks confronting the new organization,
come IX Bomber Command, organized for operations one was to determine the altitude, routes and
early in 1943. In the absence of trained American bearings best calculated to enable the mediums to
flak personnel, the British War Office aided greatly defy the strong heavy flak concentrations defending
by assigning one of their their targets. When the
AA experts the mission study had been made,
of assisting in flak intel methods similar to those
ligence for the new two- previously developed by
engine bomber units. the Eight Air Force were
Among the first found to be adaptable,
operations conducted and an SOP of flak anal
during this early phase ysis for medium level
were low level attacks was formulated.
along the Holland coast
which proved to be very Flak Intelligence
disastrous, many ships As regards the col
being lost to the dense lection of flak intelligence
light flak concentrations. data, in this period the
Shortly afterwards the entire Command began
use of the B-26 and A-20 by using the 1:100,000
aircraft on very low level faded flak maps produced
missions was deemed not by the British War Office.
feasible in this theater Experience showed that a
and from that time these larger scale was prefer
aircraft were considered able, and the faded maps
and used as medium were replaced with over
level bombing aircraft. General Samuel E. Anderson
lays on a scale of 1 : 50,000.
The Third Wing All known enemy posi
was transformed into the IX Bomber Command in tions, whether occupied or unoccupied, possible,
October 1943, and in the early months of 1944, with dummy or decoy, were plotted on these overlays,
the arrival of Antiaircraft Artillery Officers from which were intended to present graphically at a
the States, the flak organization began to assume glance the actual configuration of the flak defenses.
its final shape. Two officers were assigned to the They were supplemented by a system of cards on
 L/. Co/. M. 7irr//, .SV/. Sammarco, Li. Col. E. E. Bellonby,
Sgt. Bruhn, isl Li. L W. Adams, ist Li. W. J. Whicker

ist Li. H. E. Gaillard isi Li. J. R. O'Donnell (Center)

10
which were entered six-figure coordinates of each action tests conducted by the Flak Section made
battery shown on the overlay, together with com use of captured enemy directors. The results formed
plete information on railway flak, balloon barrages the basis for all evasive action procedures in the
and naval AA defenses. Bomb Division. Additional tests were carried out
Flak intelligence was passed down to lower units on formation spacing from the standpoint of flak
by teletype. Pinpoint data was kept there on hazard. Later in the war anti-flak bombing by
1:250,000 maps, the scale best suited for operational mediums was experimented with.
planning. Range circles indicated the effective
range of the defenses. Card files again provided the A Job Well Done
necessary details. One of the most important missions of the
The operational units in their turn transmitted Command and Wing flak officers was discharged
to the Command the amount and intensity of flak by frequent visits to groups and squadrons for
fire actually encountered on missions over enemy discussions on flak with aircrews. New enemy flak
territory. The 323rd Group instituted and developed equipment and fire methods were constantly being
a trace showing the route briefed, route flown, flak reported. Throughout the air campaign flak officers
experienced en route and at target, aircraft damaged flew on numerous operational missions as observers.
and lost, phenomena observed and any other The result was that they themselves gained insight
pertinent information. This trace proved highly into the viewpoint of the combat crews, while the
satisfactory and became SOP in the Command for crews felt increased confidence in the words of the
reporting flak experience. flying flak officers. Flak officers throughout the
Command contributed much to the success of the
Countermeasures medium bomber operations.
During the course of the past year outstanding
contributions have been made in the field of flak Mission accomplished!
countermeasures. One of the greatest problems solved
was that of correct procedure in the use of chaff.
Much pioneering was done here by the 397th Group.
As the results are described elsewhere, it will suffice
to say that a proper chaff dispensing procedure
was quickly established and training begun in the
strict flying discipline it demanded. Shortly after the
invasion another countermeasure was instituted.
Flak officers of the Bomber Division and IX TAG
were instrumental in coordinating with the US
field artillery a procedure of counterfire against
flak batteries protecting targets chosen for attack
from the air. The technique was extremely effective
and continued in effect from the invasion of Nor
mandy until the end of the war in Europe. Evasive
 THE BELGIANS LOVEP 05

VERSAILLES AND , GERMAN OFFICER

CANDIDATE SCHOOJ.
GUMPSE OF PARIS
PANZER TRAINING
SCHOOU

- IX TAC

on \ia tonh'ncnr

 IX Tactical Air Command

Early in April 1944 flak intelligence and analy were constructed by the Command flak analysis
sis was established in the IX Tactical Air Command officer which indicated correct attack headings and
with the arrival of antiaircraft officers at Command also the relative hazard of various defended targets.
and Wing headquarters. These curves were pioneers in this field of flak anal
Flak intelligence in those early days at Com ysis, and proved a great aid in operational planning
mand, Wing and some for fighters and fighter-
of the Group flak sec bombers.
tions was kept current
by plotting heavy and D-Day Preparation
light positions on the Prior to D-Day flak
conventional 1:50,000 lectures had been made
scale overlaid maps, at all units with the
while the remaining officers of both Com
Groups depended on the mand and Wing expend
flak map and the speci ing much effort in this
fic information sent regard in an endeavor
down to them for each to familiarize the pilots
mission from the Wing with their most danger
headquarters. In this ous foe and ways of
stage of the war, a few defeating it. At that time
months before the inva all flak pin-points within
sion, information receiv 300 miles of the English
ed from Ninth Air coast had been recorded
Porce and MI 15, as throughout the TAC,
well as from photo inter and so the intelligence
pretation units attached stage was set for the big
to the IX TAG and gest show of the century.
First Army, was screen Major General Elwood R. Quesada IX TAC flak was
ed and collated at Com really in on the ground
mand and passed down to Wings and Groups floor of the invasion, as one of its Wing flak officers
rapidly via the teletype circuit. hit Omaha beach on D plus 2, and the Command
One of the first big problems attacked and flak section came in on D plus 10 and started its
-solved by the Command section was that of flak operations. Communication difficulties during the
analysis for light flak. Curves of relative damage initial invasion stages led to a change in the basic

13
 Maj. A. W. Haaland

ist Lt. F. R
Morrissey
reporting system. Verbal exchange of reported flak
fire was devised for more immediate dissemination
of the operationally important intelligence. This
was necessary because it was no longer possible
to contact the Group S-2's to brief on each individual
target. Complete flak traces were still kept at Com
mand and Wing levels, while the Groups main
tained the information only in their operational
area. As these areas changed, bulletins were sent
from Wing to cover the new area.
Studies For First Army
Several special tasks immediately presented
themselves, among which was a flak analysis made
for the final assault on Cherbourg. Another was an
analysis of enemy ground defenses using flak dis
positions to indicate main concentrations. This
second analysis was researched for First Army
before the St. Lo offensive.
The flak sections had so proven their worth
by this time that throughout the Command these
sections were a working partner of combat opera
tions on ever\- mission, a set-up which lasted through
out the European campaign.
With large volumes of photo and crew reports
pouring in to all flak sections, flak personnel were
bending under the strain. The ground battle situa
tion was so fluid that 84th Wing used a 1:250,000
scale map indicating crew experience for the last
48 hours only. Flak fire was so common an occur
rence that an analysis of even this short a period
gave a good picture of flak dispositions in the parti
cular operational area.
Flak Estimate at Remagen
On all occasions the Command flak section
worked very closely with the Army. When the
Remagen bridgehead was established, First Army
requested a complete analysis of enemy flak capa
bilities which the enemy could use in a ground role
to contain or counterattack the bridgehead. This
was completed and forwarded in three hours and
materially aided the Army G-2 in estimating the
enemy strength.
Throughout the war the flak officers continually
visited the Squadrons, as pilot turnover was high
and it was extremely essential to keep the pilots,
new and old, informed on the latest flak situation.
When the war drew to a close eleven months
later, IX TAG, the big brother of the tactical air
commands, could reflect with pride on its accom
plishments with the victorious First Army. No small
part of its operational success can be claimed by
its energetic and resourceful flak analysis section.
"Havoc' flying through flak
15
 i Leapfrog tli

LUftMBOUQfi
/'M !h beautiful
proved
XIX TAC favor,h.

Off LIMIT6
TO XIX TAC

Looks l'tk<L rhc

Is J>r/f^/t'n(f in