LAWYERS OATH

CHAPTER 1 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

MCLE
A.C. No. 11078

VERLITA V. MERCULLO and RAYMOND

VEDANO, complainants, vs.ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E.
RAMON, respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Marie
Frances E. Ramon for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibilityand the Lawyer's Oath for deceiving the
complainants in order to obtain the substantial amount of P350,000.00 on the
pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the latter's mother redeemed.
Antecedents
In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) sent several demand letters to Carmelita T.
Vedao 1regarding her unpaid obligations secured by the mortgage covering
her residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City. 2 To avoid the
foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita authorized her children, Verlita
Mercullo and Raymond Vedao (complainants herein), to inquire from the
NHMFC about the status of the obligations. Verlita and Raymond learned that
their mother's arrears had amounted to P350,000.00, and that the matter of
the mortgage was under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was
not around at that time.
On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Caloocan City, stating that her property would
be put up for auction in July 2013. Verlita and Raymond thus went to the
NHMFC to see the respondent, who advised them about their right to redeem
the property within one year from the foreclosure. 3
 In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the respondent, and
expressed their intention to redeem the property by paying the redemption
price. The latter agreed and scheduled an appointment with them on August
30, 2013.
On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the designated meeting
place at around 1:30 p.m., carrying the folder that Verlita and Raymond had
seen at the NHFMC when they inquired on the status of their mother's
property. After the respondent had oriented them on the procedure for
redemption, the complainants handed P350,000.00 to the respondent, who
signed an acknowledgment receipt. 4The respondent issued two
acknowledgment receipts for the redemption price and for litigation
expenses, 5 presenting to the complainants her NHMFC identification card.
Before leaving them, she promised to inform them as soon as the documents
for redemption were ready for their mother's signature. 6
On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita and handed a
letter 7that she had signed, along with the special power of attorney (SPA) for
Carmelita's signature. 8 The letter reads:
Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff
Regional Trial Court
Caloocan City
Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013
Dear Atty. Dabalos,
Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her Attorney-in-Fact in
redeeming the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013. Please
provide the necessary computation as to the full redemption amount in
order for Ms. Vedano to redeem the same.
Thank you.
Truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon

Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9, 2013 to

follow up on the redemption, but discovered that the respondent had already
ceased to be connected with the NHMFC. On September 20, 2013, they met
with her at Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City where she
was attending a hearing. She informed them that the redemption was under
process, and that the certificate of redemption would be issued in two to three
weeks time. 9 CAIHTE

After communicating through text messages with the respondent, Verlita

and Raymond finally went to see the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
in Caloocan City on November 27, 2013 to inquire on the status of the
redemption. There, they discovered that the respondent had not deposited the
redemption price and had not filed the letter of intent for redeeming the
property. 10
On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond again went to Branch 145
of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City where the respondent had a hearing,
and handed to her their demand letter requiring her to return the amount she
had received for the redemption. 11 She acknowledged the letter and promised
to return the money on December 16, 2013 by depositing the amount in
Verlita's bank account. However, she did not fulfill her promise and did not
show up for her subsequent scheduled hearings in Branch 145. 12
With their attempts to reach the respondent being in vain, Verlita and
Raymond brought their disbarment complaint in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
The respondent did not submit her answer when required to do so. She
also did not attend the mandatory conference set by the IBP despite notice.
Hence, the investigation proceeded ex parte. 13
IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano submitted his Report and
Recommendation, 14 whereby he found the respondent to have violated Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for engaging in deceitful
conduct, and recommended her suspension from the practice of law for two
years, and her return to the complainants of P350,000.00. with legal interest
from December 2, 2013.
 The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Adriano's
recommendation as stated in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-929, 15 viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws, and for
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Marie Frances E. Ramon is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return the amount of Three
Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.

Ruling of the Court

The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.
The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every
lawyer. Any violation of the oath may be punished with either disbarment, or
suspension from the practice of law, or other commensurate disciplinary
action. 16 Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber
which are not only conditions precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are
also essential for his continued membership in the Law Profession. 17 Any
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath.
The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving
money from the complainants after having made them believe that she could
assist them in ensuring the redemption in their mother's behalf. She was
convincing about her ability to work on the redemption because she had
worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform them soon enough, however, that
she had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It was her duty
to have so informed them. She further misled them about her ability to realize
the redemption by falsely informing them about having started the redemption
process. She concealed from them the real story that she had not even
initiated the redemption proceedings that she had assured them she would do.
Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part with
the substantial sum of P350,000.00. She took advantage of the complainants
who had reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability to perform the
task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations
inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.
As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in her dealings with others, especially
clients whom she should serve with competence and diligence. 18 Her duty
required her to maintain fealty to them, binding her not to neglect the legal
matter entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection therewith rendered
her liable. 19 Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning the money and her
refusal to communicate with the complainants on the matter of her
engagement aggravated the neglect and dishonesty attending her dealings
with the complainants.
The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.DETACa

Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or
omission of the respondent within the coverage of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 20 The Code exacted from her not only a firm
respect for the law and legal processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity
and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted by them
pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. 21
Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of
the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. Such disregard could
only be wrong because it reflected her undisguised contempt of the
proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the authority
to investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited her
irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the
Judiciary. It cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should comply
with the orders of the Court and of the Court's duly constituted authorities, like
the IBP, the office that the Court has particularly tasked to carry out the
specific function of investigating attorney misconduct. 22
 The respondent deserves severe chastisement and appropriate
sanctions. In this regard, the IBP Board of Governors recommended her
suspension for two years from the practice of law, and her return of the
amount of P350,000.00 to the complainants. The recommended penalty is not
commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct committed. She merited a
heavier sanction of suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her
professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the practice of
law because she had caused material prejudice to the clients' interest. 23 She
should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing with
trusting clients like the complainants and their mother, who were innocently
too willing to repose their utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her
trustworthiness as a legal professional. In this connection, we state that the
usual mitigation of the recommended penalty by virtue of the misconduct
being her first offense cannot be carried out in her favor considering that she
had disregarded the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. As to
the return of the P350,000.00 to the complainant, requiring her to restitute with
legal interest is only fair and just because she did not comply in the least with
her ethical undertaking to work on the redemption of the property of the
mother of the complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned against a similar
infraction in the future; otherwise, the Court will have her suffer a more severe
penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE FRANCES
E. RAMONguilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS EFFECTIVE FROM
NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future
will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants
the sum of P350,000.00 within 30 days from notice, plus legal interest of
6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment;
and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to this Court written proof of her
compliance within the same period of 30 days from notice of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon's personal record
as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the
 Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Mercullo v. Ramon, A.C. No. 11078, [July 19, 2016])

A.C. No. 8172

ALEX NULADA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO S.

PAULMA,respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for

disbarment by reason of dishonesty and conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude filed by complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in
his favor a check in the amount of P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's
debt. Because of respondent's standing as a respected member of the
community and his being a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Miagao, 2Province of Iloilo, complainant accepted the check
without question. 3
Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was
dishonored due to insufficient funds. Respondent failed to make good the
amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands,
prompting complainant to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22 4 against respondent, 5 before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo, docketed as I.S. No. 2006-
637, 6 which issued a Resolution 7 dated May 26, 2006 recommending the
filing of the appropriate information against respondent before the Municipal
Trial Court of Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC). 8 Subsequently, said
information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604. 9
After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision 10 dated October
30, 2008 finding respondent guilty of violation of BP 22 and ordering him to
pay the amount of P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of failure to pay. Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of
P650,000.00 representing the amount of the check with interest pegged at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time of the filing of
the complaint; (2) filing fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's
fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus appearance fees of P1,500.00 per
hearing. 11
Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional
Trial Court of Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as Criminal
Case No. 346. 12 In a Decision 13 dated March 13, 2009, the RTC affirmed in
toto the MTC ruling. On April 16, 2009, the RTC Decision became final and
executory. 14
Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009,
complainant filed this administrative complaint before the Court, through the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
In his defense, 15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty
against complainant, as prior to September 30, 2005, he informed the latter
that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the check.
Respondent claimed that he merely issued the check in order to
accommodate a friend in whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he
did not personally benefit from the proceeds thereof. 16 Unfortunately, said
friend had died and respondent had no means by which to pay for the amount
of the check. 17 He also claimed that complainant threatened him and used his
unfunded check to the latter's personal advantage. 18
Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14,
2011, 19 referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and recommendation.
 The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the IBP issued a Report and Recommendation 20 dated
June 26, 2013, recommending that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as for having been
found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude. 21
It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e.,
violation of BP 22, involved moral turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's
oath and the CPR when he committed the said offense. Stressing the
importance of the lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said
crime, respondent has shown that he is "unfit to protect the administration of
justice or that he is nolonger of good moral character" 22 which justifies either
his suspension or disbarment. 23 CAIHTE

Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors

issued a Notice of Resolution 24 adopting and approving with modification the
IBP's Report and Recommendation dated June 26, 2013, suspending
respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for having
violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well as for having been found guilty
of a crime involving moral turpitude. 25
The Issue Before the Court
The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not
respondent should be administratively disciplined for having been found guilty
of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP,
as approved, adopted, and modified by the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
 immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law . . . ." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian
of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of
justice. 26 As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional
or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the
court. 27
In Enriquez v. De Vera, 28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature
of a violation of BP 22 in relation to an administrative case against a lawyer, as
in this case, to wit:
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of
the banking system and the legitimate public checking account users.
The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by [BP] 22 [. . .] is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in
circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the
deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient
funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
xxx xxx xxx
Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and
coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to
know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His
issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated
[BP] 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of
his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept
 aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution
and obey the laws. 29

Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg.

22 indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action. 30
In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime
involving moral turpitude, had been indubitably established. Such conviction
has, in fact, already become final. Consequently, respondent violated the
lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the
IBP and, thus, must be subjected to disciplinary action.
In Heenan v. Espejo, 31 the Court suspended therein respondent from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years when the latter issued checks
which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial
Services, Inc. v. Valerio, 32 the same penalty was imposed by the Court to
respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan. Likewise,
in Dizon v. De Taza, 33 the Court meted the penalty of suspension for a period
of two (2) years to respondent for having issued bouncing checks, among
other infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II, 34 respondent was ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, because
aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, respondent
also breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and
had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its
proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing instances when the
erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same
violation, the Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to
respondent in this case.
As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege burdened with conditions. 35 A lawyer is required to
observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public
or private capacity. 36 Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only
diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in
 the legal profession as a whole. 37 In this case, respondent's conduct fell short
of the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the bar, for which
he must suffer the necessary consequences. DETACa

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is

hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of two (2) years,
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal
record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and copies be served to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Nulada v. Paulma, A.C. No. 8172 (Resolution), [April 12, 2016])

A.C. No. 9387

MILIA R. HERNANDEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. VENANCIO B.

PADILLA,respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J : p

This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her

lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law
Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.

The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in
an ejectment case filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(RTC). HDAECI
In a Decision 1 dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang
(Judge Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of
complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa
Duigan (Duigan), attorney's fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants' Brief.
They chose respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a
Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants' Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution 2 dated
16 December 2003.

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was
filed by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the
Resolution, he acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of
law." 3 Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent
never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she
asked respondent "several times" about the status of the appeal, but "despite
inquiries he deliberately withheld response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of
the spouses. 4

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was
informed of the Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC
came to her house and informed her of the Resolution.

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 5 with the

Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
seeking the disbarment of respondent on the following grounds: deceit,
malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages in the
amount of P350,000.

Through an Order 6 dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio

A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his
Counter-Affidavit/Answer, 7 respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the
Complaint.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that
prior to the mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had
never met complainant, because it was her husband who had personally
transacted with him. According to respondent, the husband "despondently
pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to him
the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days." 8 Thus,
respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly
believed that "it is this pleading which was required." 9

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainant's husband to

settle the case. The latter allegedly "gestured approval of the advice." 10
aACEID

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing,

respondent never saw or heard from him again and thus assumed that the
husband heeded his advice and settled the case. When respondent received an
Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss filed
by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available
means of communication, but to no avail." 11 Thus, when complainant's husband
went to the office of respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had
informed complainant of the CA's Resolution dismissing the case, respondent
was just as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO
NA KAYO." 12

In his 5 January 2009 Report, 13 IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.

Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that respondent be
suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.

The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28

August 2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for six months.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 14 He prayed for the relaxation of

the application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of
governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-17 15 partly granting his Motion and
reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline
Dennis A.B. Funa, through a letter 16 addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint
against respondent.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court,
however, disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month
suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally
imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.

Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory
conference set for the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a
perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that
he had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including
complainant and her husband. 17 The pleading starts with the following sentence:
"DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit
the Memorandum and further allege that: . . . ." 18 Nowhere does the document
say that it was filed only on behalf of complainant's husband. ScTaEA

It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and
complainant's husband cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz.:
It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared
by a lawyer for a fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it
could not be said that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling and
prosecution of his case that calls for the strict application of the
Code; . . . 19

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship,
he also alleges that complainant's husband never contacted him after the filing of
the Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior was "very
unusual if he really believed that he engaged" the former's services. 20

Complainant pointed out in her Reply 21 that respondent was her lawyer, because
he accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of P7,000.

According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainant's claim that he

charged P7,000 as acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation of the
pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: . . . ." 22
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. 23 Once a lawyer agrees to
handle a case, it is that lawyer's duty to serve the client with competence and
diligence. 24Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.

According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainant's

husband asked from him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of
Appeal, because he "honestly believed" that this was the pleading required,
based on what complainant's husband said.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner's observation on this matter, in the 5

January 2009 Report, is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client
may have believed to be necessary, it was respondent's duty to know the proper
pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz.:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court,
respondent should have known that the mode of appeal to the Court of
Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section 2(a) Rule
41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases, Rule
44 of the said Rules applies. 25

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of
Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases
or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant's
brief be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA.
Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the
Code reads: cdrep

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,

participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to
achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training
of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law
and jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty

have been expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz, 26 to wit:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
 maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to
be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that
they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently
and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may
become susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the
reason for his failure to file the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough
time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case." The IBP
reconsidered and thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Respondent's plea for leniency should not have been granted.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts
of the case does not excuse his negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not
complainant's lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not
excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he
felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he
was approached by complainant's husband only two days before the expiration of
the period for filing the Appellant's Brief, respondent should have filed a motion
for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he
could come up with, just to "beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals." 27

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he
filed the wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a
comment, as ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CA's Order.
He claims that he was under the presumption that complainant and her husband
had already settled the case, because he had not heard from the husband since
the filing of the latter's Memorandum of Appeal. ADaSET

This explanation does not excuse respondent's actions.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed
himself of, from the moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment
he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because of his
negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of
their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code,
which reads:
18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for
information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least
respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal
of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer
the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court
that he could nolonger contact them. 28 His failure to take this measure proves his
negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on
Duigan's Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a
lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the client's case, viz.:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their
negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action. 29

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates
his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for
which he should be held accountable. 30

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating

Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent
as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the
country for their information and guidance. AIDcTE

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Hernandez v. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387 (Resolution), [June 20, 2012], 688 PHIL
329-338)

A.C. No. 6368

This is a complaint 1 for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco

(Fidela) and Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo
Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.

The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as
follows:
That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22,
1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo with the help and in connivance and collusion
with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent
act with intent to defraud herein complainants Fidela G. Bengco and
Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect
that he would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda
family of Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of complainants herein
and they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and
deliver to him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money he would
expedite the titling of the subject land and further by means of other
similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William
Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject land, who is the owner
of Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is
the one handling William Gatchalian's business transaction and that he
has contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS
which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and were only
made to induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver the said amount
([P]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with his obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the
 subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the said amount to his personal use and
benefit and despite demand upon him to return the said amount, he
failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice,
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and
Oath as a lawyer. 2CIAcSa

In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions

dated December 7, 1998 3 and June 22, 1999 4 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding
probable cause for the filing of the criminal information 5 against both Atty.
Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them with the crime of Estafa
punishable under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The respondent was required to file his Comment. 6 On September 24, 2004, the
respondent filed an undated Comment, 7 wherein he denied the allegations
against him and averred the following:
2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April
15, 1997 to July 22, 1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount
of [P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in
turn sought the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who
received the said money from them.

3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and
respondent. The arrangement for titling of the land was made by Teresita
N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.

4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal

and allowed in law practice. 8

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. ACaDTH

On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified
comment pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared
that the respondent's undated comment filed with the Court was not verified. 9
On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional
fifteen (15) days from March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to
comply due to his medical confinement. 10

Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion 11 for

extension praying for another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was
still recovering from his illness.

On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference. 12 The
respondent failed to appear; thus, the IBP considered the respondent in default
for his failure to appear and for not filing an answer despite extensions granted.
The case was then submitted for report and recommendation. 13

Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca

Villanueva-Maala made the following findings:
[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent
with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres
Magat ("Magat"), by using false pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully]
and illegally committed fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent
would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of
Tagaytay City, who were the acquaintance of complainants.

Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and

deliver to them the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they
would expedite the titling of the subject land. Respondent represented
himself to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City
located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly
the buyer of the subject land once it has been titled. Respondent and
Magat also represented that they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR,
CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be
false, fraudulent and were only made to induce complainants to give and
deliver to them the amount of [P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the
said amount, far from complying with their obligation to expedite and
cause the titling of the subject land, respondent and Magat [wilfully],
unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
said amount to their personal use and benefit and despite demand upon
them to return the said amount, they failed and refused to do so.
TaISEH
In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants
filed a complaint for Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In
the preliminary investigation conducted by the said court, it finds
sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of
Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7
December 1998.

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial

Prosecutor of Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of the case.
During the re-investigation thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to
complainants the amount of [P]200,000.00 because according to him the
amount of [P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent
considering that the said amount was turned over to respondent for
expenses incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of the subject
land. Both respondent and Magat requested for several extensions for
time to pay back their obligations to the complainants. However, despite
extensions of time granted to them, respondent and Magat failed to fulfil
their promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the
offer of compromise was construed to be an implied admission of guilt.
The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no reason to
disturb the findings of the investigating judge and an Information for
Estafa was filed against respondent and Magat on 8 July 1999 before
the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.

The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite
due notice on several occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings
set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer which
deserves disciplinary sanction . . . .

From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that
respondent committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which he was bound to'obey the laws of the land.' The commission of
unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of
dishonesty in violation of the attorney's oath, grossly immoral conduct
 and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule
138, Section 27, RRC). ATHCac

The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed

the case only on 16 April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24
March 2004, "A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional
misconduct" (Section 1, Rule VIII). 14

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

. . . [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a
period ofTWO YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of his
profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar. 15

On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-
2007-065,viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVEDwith modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution of the
amount of [P]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice
with Warning that if he does not return the amount with in sixty days
from receipt of this Order then he will be meted the penalty
of Suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. 16

On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for

Reconsideration 17 of the aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The respondent
averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the rules considering that
the complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the alleged misconduct and
therefore, must have been dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any
misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him money to finance the titling of
the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer through Magat who transacted with
Teresita as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement 18 signed by the latter; (4)
he was denied due process when the Investigating Commissioner considered
him as in default after having ignored the representative he sent during the
hearing on August 3, 2005; and (5) he long restituted the amount of P225,000.00
not as an offer of compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due
to Teresita's declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime
in the third quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the admission made by
Fidela in her direct testimony before the RTC that she received the amount, as
evidenced by photocopies of receipts.

In an Order 19 dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was
required to comment within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. HAEIac

In her Comment, 20 Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the
administrative case because they took into consideration the possibility of an
amicable settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it would stain the
respondent's reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which
prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order
to trace the respondent's whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded
the opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no restitution of the P200,000.00 plus
corresponding interest has yet been made by the respondent.

On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation 21 stating that the RTC rendered a
decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and
Magat "guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2
(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and
one (1) day ofPrision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of Reclusion Temporalas maximum." 22

In a Letter 23 dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the
resolution of the present action as she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-
parte Motion to Resolve the Case 24 dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the
complainants. In another Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years
old, sought for Atty. Bernardo's restitution of the amount of P200,000.00 so she
can use the money to buy her medicine and other needs.

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.

It is first worth mentioning that the respondent's defense of prescription is

untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not
prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending
act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only
be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from
the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward,
they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative
liability they ought to answer for. 25
CITcSH

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for
several extensions of time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during
the mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is
considered as an officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court
processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous
affront on the court's authority which can not be countenanced.

It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of

justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. In so doing, the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their professional or in their
private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity
and good demeanor. 26

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He
himself admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the
complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly
purchased. While he begs for the Court's indulgence, his contrition is shallow
considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the
complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject
properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the
complainants in the amount of P495,000.00. IcCDAS

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public

service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant
to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests
or what they owe to themselves. 27

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a

criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of
facts. Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
the respondent's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively." 28

In Yu v. Palaa, 29 the Court held that:

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative
cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same
facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.
Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a
criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon;
otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on
admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during
the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when
the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford noredress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration
of persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. 30 (Citations omitted)
ETDAaC

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime
of Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced * to suffer six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day ofReclusion Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly
undermines the respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138,
Section 27 provides that:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,

grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing
as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the
punishment commensurate to all his acts and to accord the complainants,
especially the 88-year-old Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve. acAESC

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is

found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice
hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount
of P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10)
DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance
thereof to the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10)
DAYS therefrom; with aSTERN WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the
additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

||| (Bengco v. Bernardo, A.C. No. 6368, [June 13, 2012], 687 PHIL 7-18)
A.C. No. 4973
 SPOUSES MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and LOLITA B.
RAFOLS,complainants, vs. ATTY. RICARDO G. BARRIOS,
JR., respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only

to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to
safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the
public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal
profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer's oath has
proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Rivera v. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002, 384 SCRA 1.

By its Board Resolution No. 1 dated March 7, 1998, the South

Cotabato-Sarangani-General Santos City (SOCSARGEN) Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resolved to refer to the IBP Board of
Governors in Manila, for appropriate action and investigation, the purported
anomaly involving Judge Teodoro Dizon, Jr. and Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios,
Jr. 1 Thus, on March 24, 1998, Atty. Joeffrey L. Montefrio, the SOCSARGEN
IBP Chapter President, transmitted the referral to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).
The matter involving Judge Dizon, Jr., which was docketed as
Administrative Matter (AM) No. RTJ-98-1426 entitled Manuel C. Rafols and
Lolita C. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro Dizon, Jr., RTC, General Santos City,
Branch 37, 2 was resolved in a per curiam decision promulgated on January
31, 2006, 3 whereby the Court dismissedJudge Dizon, Jr. from the service,
with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice
 to re-employment in the government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned and government-
controlled corporations.
In the same per curiam decision, the Court reiterated its resolution of
October 21, 1998 for the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct an
investigation of the actuations of Atty. Barrios, Jr. (respondent), and to render
its report and recommendation. cdphil

Hence, this decision.

Antecedents
The anomaly denounced by the SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter was
narrated in the joint affidavit dated March 3, 1998 of Spouses Manuel C.
Rafols, Jr. and Lolita B. Rafols (complainants), 4 whose narrative was
corroborated by the affidavit dated March 11, 1998 of Larry Sevilla; 5 the
affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of Allan Rafols;6 and the affidavit dated March
16, 1998 of Daisy Rafols, 7 all of which were attached to the letter of the IBP
Chapter President. Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa, then Deputy Clerk of Court and
Bar Confidant, referred for appropriate action a copy of the letter and affidavits
to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo.
In turn, then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez
filed with the Court an Administrative Matter for Agenda, recommending in
relation to Atty. Barrios, Jr., as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

5. The Office of the Bar Confidant be FURNISHED with a copy of the

letter-note and its attachments so that it may conduct its own
investigation in the matter with respect to the actuations of Atty. Ricardo
Barrios, Jr. 8

xxx xxx xxx

In the resolution dated October 21, 1998, the Court approved the
recommendations, 9 and directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to investigate
the actuations of the respondent, and to render its report and recommendation
thereon.
 Proceedings of the OBC
Only the respondent appeared during the hearing before the OBC.
Denying the charges against him, he sought the dismissal of the complaint
and re-affirmed the contents of his comment. Despite notice, the complainants
did not appear before the OBC. However, the complainants and the
respondent had testified during the administrative hearing involving Judge
Dizon, Jr. before Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as the
Investigating Justice. Also testifying thereat were the complainants' witnesses,
namely: Allan Rafols, Daisy Rafols and Larry Sevilla.
A. Evidence for the Complainants
The complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6209 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in General Santos City, wherein they sought the
cancellation of a deed of sale. Civil Case No. 6209 was assigned to Branch 37
of the RTC, presided by Judge Dizon, Jr. The complainants were represented
by the respondent, paying to him P15,000.00 as acceptance fee. ADCIca

On December 22, 1997, at 9:30 a.m., the respondent visited the

complainants at their residence and informed complainant Manuel that the
judge handling their case wanted to talk to him. The respondent and Manuel
thus went to the East Royal Hotel's coffee shop where Judge Dizon, Jr. was
already waiting. The respondent introduced Manuel to the judge, who
informed Manuel that their case was pending in his sala. The judge likewise
said that he would resolve the case in their favor, assuring their success up to
the Court of Appeals, if they could deliver P150,000.00 to him. As he
had no money at that time, Manuel told the judge that he would try to produce
the amount. The judge then stated that he would wait for the money until noon
of that day. Thus, Manuel left the coffee shop together with the respondent,
who instructed Manuel to come up with the money before noon because the
judge badly needed it. The two of them went to a lending institution,
accompanied by Allan Rafols, but Manuel was told there that only P50,000.00
could be released the next day. From the lending institution, they went to the
complainants' shop to look for Ditas Rafols, Allan's wife, who offered to
withdraw P20,000.00 from her savings account.
 On their way to the bank, Manuel, Allan and Ditas dropped off the
respondent at the hotel for the latter to assure Judge Dizon, Jr. that the money
was forthcoming. Afterwards, Ditas and Manuel withdrew P20,000.00 and
P30,000.00 from their respective bank accounts, and went back to the hotel
with the cash. There, they saw the judge and his driver, who beckoned to them
to go towards the judge's Nissan pick-up then parked along the highway in
front of the hotel. Manuel alighted from his car and approached the judge.
Manuel personally handed the money to the judge, who told Manuel after
asking about the amount that it was not enough. Thereafter, Manuel entered
the hotel's coffee shop and informed the respondent that he had already
handed the money to the judge.
On December 24, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m., the respondent again
visited the complainants. He was on board the judge's Nissan pick-up driven
by the judge's driver. The respondent relayed to the complainants the
message that the judge needed the balance of P100,000.00 in order to
complete the construction of his new house in time for the reception of his
daughter's wedding. However, the complainants managed to raise only
P80,000.00, which they delivered to the respondent on that same day.
On January 20, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called up the complainants'
residence and instructed their son to request his parents to return his call,
leaving his cell phone number. When Manuel returned the call the next day,
the judge instructed Manuel to see him in his office. During their meeting in his
chambers, the judge demanded the balance of P30,000.00. Manuel clarified
to the judge that his balance was only P20,000.00 due to the previous amount
given being already P80,000.00. The judge informed him that the amount that
the respondent handed was short. Saying that he badly needed the money,
the judge insisted on P30,000.00, and even suggested that the complainants
should borrow in order to raise that amount.
On January 22, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called the complainants to
inquire whether the P30,000.00 was ready for pick up. After Manuel replied
that he was ready with the amount, the judge asked him to wait for 20
minutes. The judge and his driver later arrived on board his Nissan pick-up.
Upon instructions of the judge's driver, the complainants followed the Nissan
pick-up until somewhere inside the Doa Soledad Estate, Espina, General
Santos City. There, the judge alighted and approached the complainants and
shook their hands. At that point, Manuel handed P30,000.00 to the judge. The
judge then told Manuel that the RTC judge in Iloilo City before whom the
perpetuation of the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido was made
should still testify as a witness during the trial in his sala in order for the
complainants to win. The judge persuaded the complainants to give money
also to that judge; otherwise, they should not blame him for the outcome of
the case. ETCcSa

The complainants were forced to give money to the judge, because they
feared that the judge would be biased against them unless they gave in to his
demands. But when they ultimately sensed that they were being fooled about
their case, they consulted Larry Sevilla, their mediamen friend, and narrated to
Sevilla all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. They agreed that
the details should be released to the media. The expose was published in
the Newsmaker, a local newspaper.
Thereafter, the respondent and Judge Dizon, Jr. made several attempts
to appease the complainants by sending gifts and offering to return a portion
of the money, but the complainants declined the offers.
According to the complainants, the respondent demanded P25,000.00
as his expenses in securing the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido
in Iloilo City to be used as evidence in their civil case. In addition, the
respondent requested the complainants to borrow P60,000.00 from the bank
because he wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he
needed to give P11,000.00 to his nephew who was due to leave for work
abroad.
B. Evidence for the Respondent
In his verified comment dated March 22, 2006, 10 the respondent
confirmed that the complainants engaged him as their counsel in Civil
Case No. 6209. His version follows.
On December 22, 1997, the respondent introduced Manuel to Judge
Dizon, Jr. inside the East Royal Hotel's coffee shop. The respondent stayed at
a distance, because he did not want to hear their conversation. Later, Manuel
approached the respondent and gave him P2,000.00. When the respondent
asked what the money was for, Manuel replied that it was in appreciation of
the former's introducing the latter to the judge. The respondent stated that
Manuel did not mention what transpired between the latter and the judge; and
that the judge did not tell him (respondent) what transpired in that
conversation.
Two days later, the respondent again visited the complainants at their
house in General Santos City on board the judge's Nissan pick-up driven by
the judge's driver, in order to receive the P80,000.00 from the complainants.
The amount was being borrowed by the judge for his swimming pool. Later on,
the judge told the respondent to keep P30,000.00 as a token of their
friendship. After Manuel handed the P80,000.00, the respondent and the
judge's driver headed towards Davao City, where, according to the judge's
instruction, they redeemed the judge's wristwatch for P15,000.00 from a
pawnshop. The driver brought the remaining amount of P35,000.00 to the
judge in his home.
On January 27, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. visited the respondent at the
latter's house to ask him to execute an affidavit. Declining the request at first,
the respondent relented only because the judge became physically weak in
his presence and was on the verge of collapsing. Nonetheless, the respondent
refused to notarize the document. IDcHCS

In that affidavit dated January 27, 1998, 11 the respondent denied that
Judge Dizon, Jr. asked money from the complainants; and stated that he did
not see the complainants handing the money to the judge. He admitted that he
was the one who had requested the judge to personally collect his unpaid
attorney's fees from the complainants with respect to their previous and
terminated case; and that the judge did not ask money from the complainants
in exchange for a favorable decision in their case.
On January 28, 1998, the respondent returned to the complainants'
residence, but was surprised to find complainant Lolita crying aloud. She
informed him that the judge was again asking an additional P30,000.00
although they had given him P30,000.00 only the week before. She divulged
that the judge had told her that their case would surely lose because: (a) they
had engaged a counsel who was mahinang klase; (b) the judge hearing Civil
Case No. 5645 in Iloilo and the woman who had testified in Civil Case No.
6029 had not been presented; and (c) they would have to spend at least
P10,000.00 for said judge's accommodations in General Santos City. 12
On January 31, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. went to the house of the
respondent, but the latter was not home. The judge left a note addressed to
the complainants, and instructed the respondent's secretary to deliver the note
to the complainants along with a gift (imported table clock). 13 According to the
respondent, the complainants consistently refused to accept the gift several
times; it was later stolen from his house in Cebu City.
On February 1, 1998, the respondent delivered the note and gift to the
complainants, but the latter refused to receive it, telling him that they
were nolonger interested to continue with the case. At the same time, the
complainants assured him that they bore no personal grudge against him,
because they had a problem only with Judge Dizon, Jr.
On February 24, 1998, the respondent went to the National Bureau of
Investigation Regional Office, Region XI, and the Philippine National Police
Regional Office, Region XI, both in Davao City, to request the investigation of
the matter. 14
On March 2, 1998, the respondent paid Judge Dizon, Jr. a visit upon the
latter's request. In that meeting, the respondent told the judge about the
refusal of the complainants to accept the judge's gift and about their decision
not to continue with the case. 15
On the next day, Judge Dizon, Jr. sent a note to the respondent to
inform him that the judge had raised the amount that he had borrowed from
the complainants. 16 The judge requested the respondent to tell the
complainants that he (Judge Dizon, Jr.) was going to return whatever he had
borrowed from them. However, the complainants informed the respondent that
he should tell the judge that they were no longer interested in getting back the
money.
 The respondent made a follow-up at the NBI and PNP Regional Offices
in Davao City of his request for assistance after Manuel mentioned to him that
he (Manuel) knew of many armed men ready at any time to help him in his
problem with the judge. ECAaTS

Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated May 15, 2008, 17 the OBC
opined that the administrative case against the respondent could not be
dismissed on the ground of failure to prosecute due to the complainants'
failure to appear in the scheduled hearing despite due notice.
Based on the facts already established and identified, as rendered in
the decision dated January 21, 2006 in Manuel Rafols and Lolita B. Rafols v.
Judge Teodoro A. Dizon, 18 the OBC rejected the respondent's denial of any
knowledge of the transaction between his clients and the judge.
The OBC recommended:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS, Jr. be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years with a stern
warning that a repetition of similar act in the future will be dealt more
severely."

Ruling of the Court

We approve and adopt the report and recommendations of the OBC,
which we find to be fully and competently supported by the evidence adduced
by the complainants and their witnesses, but we impose the supreme penalty
of disbarment, which we believe is the proper penalty.
I
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which governs the disbarment and
suspension of attorneys, provides:
Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by the Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction for a crime involving
 moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers constitute malpractice.

The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always

rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary
power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly
preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. 19 As
a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further
presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath. 20 cDHAES

Here, the complainants successfully overcame the respondent's

presumed innocence and the presumed regularity in the performance of his
duties as an attorney of the complainants. The evidence against him was
substantial, and was not contradicted.
To begin with, the respondent's denial of knowledge of the transaction
between the complainants and Judge Dizon, Jr. was not only implausible, but
also unsubstantiated. It was the respondent himself who had introduced the
complainants to the judge. His act of introducing the complainants to the judge
strongly implied that the respondent was aware of the illegal purpose of the
judge in wanting to talk with the respondent's clients. Thus, we unqualifiedly
accept the aptness of the following evaluation made in the OBC's Report and
Recommendation, viz.:
. . . Being the Officer of the Court, he must have known that meeting
litigants outside the court is something beyond the bounds of the rule
and that it can never be justified by any reason. He must have known the
purpose of Judge Dizon in requesting him to meet the complainants-
litigants outside the chamber of Judge Dizon. By his overt act in
arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon and complainants-litigants
in the Coffee Shop of the East Royal Hotel, it is crystal clear that he must
have allowed himself and consented to Judge Dizon's desire to ask
 money from the complainants-litigants for a favorable decision of their
case which was pending before the sala of Judge Dizon. 21

Secondly, the respondent's insistence that he did not see the

complainants' act of handing the money to the judge is unbelievable. In his
comment, the respondent even admitted having himself received the
P80,000.00 from the complainants, and having kept P30,000.00 of that
amount pursuant to the instruction of the judge as a token of the friendship
between him and the judge. 22The admission proved that the respondent had
known all along of the illegal transaction between the judge and the
complainants, and belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the
money to the judge.
Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the complainants had given the
money to the judge as a loan, far from softening our strong impression of the
respondent's liability, confirmed his awareness of the gross impropriety of the
transaction. Being the complainants' attorney in the civil case being heard
before the judge, the respondent could not but know that for the judge to
borrow money from his clients was highly irregular and outrightly unethical. If
he was innocent of wrongdoing, as he claimed, he should have desisted from
having any part in the transaction. Yet, he did not, which rendered his
explanation unbelievable. Compounding the unworthiness of his explanation
was his admission of having retained P30,000.00 of the "borrowed" money
upon the judge's instruction.
And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that the respondent's act of
requesting the NBI Regional Office in Davao City to investigate was an
afterthought on his part. We agree with the OBC, for the respondent obviously
acted in order to anticipate the complainants' moves against him and the
judge. To be sure, the respondent sensed that the complainants would not
simply forgive and forget the mulcting they had suffered at the hands of the
judge and their own attorney from the time that the complainants assured him
that they were no longer interested to get back their money despite their being
very angry at the judge's greed. HScCEa

Overall, the respondent' denials were worthless and unavailing in the

face of the uncontradicted evidence showing that he had not only personally
arranged the meeting between Manuel and Judge Dizon, Jr., but had also
communicated to the complainants the judge's illegal reason for the meeting.
It is axiomatic that any denial, to be accepted as a viable defense in any
proceeding, must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. This
need derives from the nature of a denial as evidence of a negative and self-
serving character, weightless in law and insufficient to overcome the testimony
of credible witnesses on affirmative matters. 23
II
The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with
conditions. 24 The attorney is a vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people's faith and
confidence in the legal system are ensured. 25 Thus, he must conduct himself,
whether in dealing with his clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond
reproach at all times. 26Any violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition on the attorney of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment. 27
Specifically, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an attorney
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful conduct. 28 Corollary to this
injunction is the rule that an attorney shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the Legal Profession and support the activities of the Integrated
Bar. 29
The respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards of the
Law Profession, which demanded of him as an attorney the absolute
abdication of any personal advantage that conflicted in any way, directly or
indirectly, with the interest of his clients. For monetary gain, he disregarded
the vow to "delay no man for money or malice" and to "conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients" that he made when he took the
Lawyer's Oath. 30 He also disobeyed the explicit command to him as an
attorney "to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval." 31He conveniently
 ignored that the relation between him and his clients was highly fiduciary in
nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character. 32
Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, which is
"improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,
and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment." 33 Any gross
misconduct of an attorney in his professional or private capacity shows him
unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the
penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an
essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance
of such privilege. 34
The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr.
wereconspirators against the former's own clients, whom he was sworn to
protect and to serve with utmost fidelity and morality, is inevitable for the Court
to make in this administrative case. And, being conspirators, they both
deserve the highest penalty. The disbarment of the respondent is in order,
because such sanction is on par with the dismissal of Judge Dizon, Jr. DISEaC

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is disbarred.

This decision shall be entered in the records of Atty. Barrios, Jr. as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
Copies of the decision shall be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for record purposes; and to the Court
Administrator, for circulation to all courts nationwide.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Rafols v. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 4973, [March 15, 2010], 629 PHIL 213-
229)
G.R. Nos. 151809-12 (April 12, 2005)
A.C. No. 4018 (March 8, 2005)

OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A.

BUBONG, respondent.
 DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

This is a verified petition for disbarment 1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for
having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of
Register of Deeds of Marawi City.

It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative

case earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was
initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant
charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona
Abdullah, 2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli
Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of
respondent. 3

The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The
investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges
brought against him, thus: HaEcAC

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to
prove his case but that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib
Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for
lack of merit and evidence. 4

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a
report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon
exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the
custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct
for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu
and the latter's co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon
recommended respondent's dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative
OrderNo. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and
ordering respondent's dismissal from government service. Respondent
subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court through a
petition forcertiorari, mandamus, and prohibition 5 claiming that the Office of the
President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He
also insisted that respondents 6 in that petition violated the laws on security of
tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA
committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to
resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).

In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure

on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order." 7 Respondent
thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our
Resolution of 15 November 1994. AcCTaD

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now

before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has
become obvious that respondent had "proven himself unfit to be further entrusted
with the duties of an attorney" 8 and that he poses a "serious threat to the
integrity of the legal profession." 9

In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his
issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him,
both law 10 and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty,
as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land
registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In
the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his
office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in
their favor.

Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal
complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji
Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants. Respondent explains that his
participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued
by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land
titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal
case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by
the parties. Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of
the case is totally unjustified.

Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995, 11 this Court referred this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation
of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The
pertinent portion of this order provides: HScAEC

ORDER

When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent
appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have

the reception of evidence vis--vis this case be done in Marawi City,
Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties
agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for
Bar Discipline for appropriate action. 12

On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving

Commissioner Fernandez's recommendation for the transfer of venue of this
administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to
designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report,
and recommendation. 13 The IBP Resolution states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018

Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor

C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and
direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to
designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation,
report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar
Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George
C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the
evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as
directed by the IBP Board of Governors. 14

In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato

Chapter 15 informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the
investigating panel 16 had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a
series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP
Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for five years. DTSIEc

On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the
transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter
of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner
Fernandez's Order dated 23 February 1996.

Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP

Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondent's motion. 17 Complying with this
directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondent's motion for the
transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City. 18 On 25 September
1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi
City for the reception of respondent's evidence. 19 This order of referral, however,
was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268
issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
for the transmittal of the case records of the above-entitled case to
Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation
submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of
Governors. 20

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08

October 1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato
Chapter be stricken from the records. 21 Respondent insists that the investigating
panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the
investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner
Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the
power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of
any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving
him of his right to due process.

Complainant opposed 22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches.

According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP
Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the
hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did
nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother to
submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent
is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the
presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends
that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the
process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter. iatdcjur

In an Order dated 15 October 1999, 23 Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP

Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the
investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly
received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP
Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a
copy of the panel's order dated 4 August 1997. 24 Attached to said order was
Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of
the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib A.
Bubong." SHIcDT

On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo,

Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the
report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive
had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-
2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C.
Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and
direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation,
 report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
notice. 25

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father,
Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away
on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was
requesting the withdrawal of this case. 26

Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to
direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to
designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct
an investigation of this case. 27 This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro
S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002. 28 According to Atty. Castillo
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special
attention made on the report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the
Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned
sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-
evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of
Cotabato City.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chapter of Marawi City,

Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his
Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within
ten (10) days from date hereof.

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and
conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the
Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26,
1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct
in:

a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the

anti-squatting law. EaHIDC

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of

Marawi City. In the Comment filed by respondent in the instant
 Administrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of
T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal
complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way, was
filed against respondent's relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office
of the President in Administrative CaseNo. 41, the undersigned finds
substantial evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before
the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave
Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was
fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in
considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present
case.

In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for

amending or disturbing the Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Chapter of South Cotabato. 29

In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted

and approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation
of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension
from the practice of law which should be imposed on respondent whereas Atty.
Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a
five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension
to be proper.

On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP
which the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to
this Court.30

The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be
disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer

simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express
provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall
apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks."
Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may
be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. 31 Although the general
rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may,
however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his
oath as a member of the legal profession. 32

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, 33 we ordered the

disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government
service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, we declared
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is
designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes
an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility
of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid
discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be
that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law
profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to
paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of
truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty,
and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which,
throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral
character. 34

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, 35 this Court found
sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated
while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on
Higher Education. As we had explained in that case
. . . [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act
or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said,a lawyer in government service is a keeper of
the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. 36 (Emphasis
supplied) DAHCaI
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of
the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification
as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi
City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the
benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not
only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership
in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this
matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter
to interfere with his public duties.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the

public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal
profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law
calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter,
requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the
same as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by
reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." 37 As we have
previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A.
Rayos: 38
. . . A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether,
on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress
for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts
of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer
 of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administrative of justice. 39

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and

his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and
notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. TcSAaH

||| (Ali v. Bubong, A.C. No. 4018, [March 8, 2005], 493 PHIL 172-185)

A.C. No. 7332

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, complainant, vs. RICARDO G.

BARRIOS, JR.,respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by

Eduardo A. Abella (complainant) against Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. (respondent)
based on the latter's violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02,
Canon 6 of theCode of Professional Responsibility (Code).
The Facts
On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT&T) before the Cebu City
Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), docketed as RAB-VII-01-0128-99. Finding merit in the complaint, Labor
Arbiter (LA) Ernesto F. Carreon, through a Decision dated May 13,
1999, 2 ordered PT&T to pay complainant P113,100.00 as separation pay and
P73,608.00 as backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LA's Decision to the
NLRC.

In a Decision dated September 12, 2001, 3 the NLRC set aside LA Carreon's
ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate complainant to his former position
and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay, including moral damages and attorney's fees. On reconsideration, it modified
the amounts of the aforesaid monetary awards but still maintained that
complainant was illegally dismissed. 4 Consequently, PT&T filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).

In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision), 5 the CA affirmed the
NLRC's ruling with modification, ordering PT&T to pay complainant separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial reconsideration,
claiming that all his years of service were not taken into account in the
computation of his separation pay and backwages. The CA granted the motion
and thus, remanded the case to the LA for the same purpose. 6 On July 19, 2004,
the CA Decision became final and executory. 7

Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution

before the Cebu City RAB on October 25, 2004. At this point, the case had
already been assigned to the new LA, herein respondent. After the lapse of five
(5) months, complainant's motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a
Second Motion for Execution on March 3, 2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still,
there was no action on complainant's motion. Thus, on November 4, 2005,
complainant proceeded to respondent's office to personally follow-up the matter.
In the process, complainant and respondent exchanged notes on how much the
former's monetary awards should be; however, their computations differed. To
complainant's surprise, respondent told him that the matter could be "easily fixed"
and thereafter, asked"how much is mine?" Despite his shock, complainant
offered the amount of P20,000.00, but respondent replied: "make it P30,000.00."
By force of circumstance, complainant acceded on the condition that respondent
would have to wait until he had already collected from PT&T. Before complainant
could leave, respondent asked him for some cash, compelling him to give the
latter P1,500.00. 8
On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a writ of execution, 9 directing the
sheriff to proceed to the premises of PT&T and collect the amount of
P1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. PT&T moved to
quash 10 the said writ which was, however, denied through an Order dated
November 22, 2005. 11 Unfazed, PT&T filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash
dated December 2, 2005, 12 the contents of which were virtually identical to the
one respondent earlier denied. During the hearing of the said supplemental
motion on December 9, 2005, respondent rendered an Order 13 in open court,
recalling the first writ of execution he issued on November 7, 2005. He confirmed
the December 9, 2005 Order through a Certification dated December 14,
2005 14 and eventually, issued a new writ of execution 15 wherein complainant's
monetary awards were reduced from P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of
execution and deposit fees.

Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction

before the NLRC. In a Resolution dated March 14, 2006, 16 the NLRC annulled
respondent's December 9, 2005 Order, stating that respondent had no authority
to modify the CA Decision which was already final and executory. 17

Aside from instituting a criminal case before the Office of the

Ombudsman, 18complainant filed the instant disbarment complaint 19 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant
in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give
benefit and advantage to PT&T.

In his Comment, 20 respondent denied the abovementioned accusations,

maintaining that he merely implemented the CA Decision which did not provide
for the payment of backwages. He also claimed that he never demanded a single
centavo from complainant as it was in fact the latter who offered him the amount
of P50,000.00.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 2008, 21 IBP Investigating
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco) found that
respondent tried to twist the meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical,
reasonable and grammatical context in order to favor PT&T. 22 He further
observed that the confluence of events in this case shows that respondent
deliberately left complainant's efforts to execute the CA Decision unacted upon
until the latter agreed to give him a portion of the monetary award thereof.
Notwithstanding their agreement, immoral and illegal as it was, respondent later
went as far as turning the proceedings into some bidding war which eventually
resulted into a resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was found
to be guilty of gross immorality and therefore, Commissioner Limpingco
recommended that he be disbarred. 23

On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-345 (IBP Resolution), 24 adopting and approving Commissioner Limpingco's
recommendation, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and for Respondent's violation of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED. 25

Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for
his violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner
Limpingco as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

The pertinent provisions of the Code provide:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
 Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.

CANON 6 THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN

GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL
TASKS.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code,
delineate the lawyer's responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding
prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or
proceeding or delaying any man's cause for any corrupt motive or interest;
meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government service,
enjoining them from using one's public position to: (1) promote private interests;
(2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public
duties. 26 It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government office may be
disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer. 27

In this light, a lawyer's compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned

rules should be taken into consideration in determining his moral fitness to
continue in the practice of law.

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent

and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession." 28 This proceeds from the lawyer's duty to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's
integrity. 29 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the
lawyer's public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension
or disbarment. 30

In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to re-compute the
monetary awards due to the complainant who sought to execute the CA Decision
which had already been final and executory. When complainant moved for
execution twice at that respondent slept on the same for more than a year.
It was only when complainant paid respondent a personal visit on November 4,
2005 that the latter speedily issued a writ of execution three (3) days after, or on
November 7, 2005. Based on these incidents, the Court observes that the
sudden dispatch in respondent's action soon after the aforesaid visit casts
serious doubt on the legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that he did not extort money
from the complainant.

The incredulity of respondent's claims is further bolstered by his complete

turnaround on the quashal of the November 7, 2005 writ of execution.

To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&T's initial motion to

quash through an Order dated November 22, 2005 but later reversed such order
in open court on the basis of PT&T's supplemental motion to quash which was a
mere rehash of the first motion that was earlier denied. As a result, respondent
recalled his earlier orders and issued a new writ of execution, reducing
complainant's monetary awards from P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of
execution and deposit fees.

To justify the same, respondent contends that he was merely implementing the
CA Decision which did not provide for the payment of backwages. A plain and
cursory reading, however, of the said decision belies the truthfulness of the
foregoing assertion. On point, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION, ordering petitioner PT&T to pay private respondent
Eduardo A. Abella separation pay (as computed by the Labor Arbiter) in
lieu of reinstatement. 31
Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC's rulings dated
September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 which both explicitly awarded
backwages and other unpaid monetary benefits to complainant. 32 The only
modification was with respect to the order of reinstatement as pronounced in both
NLRC's rulings which was changed by the CA to separation pay in view of the
strained relations between the parties as well as the supervening removal of
complainant's previous position. 33 In other words, the portion of the NLRC's
rulings which awarded backwages and other monetary benefits subsisted and the
modification pertained only to the CA's award of separation pay in lieu of the
NLRC's previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion, palpable as it is, can be
easily deduced from the records.

Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions

of its decision, propounding that the CA's award of separation pay denied
complainant's entitlement to any backwages and other consequential benefits
altogether. In his Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP
Resolution, 34 respondent stated:
From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is very clear and
categorical in directing PT&T to pay complainant his separation pay
ONLY in lieu of reinstatement. Clearly, the Court did not direct the PT&T
to pay him his backwages, and other consequential benefits that were
directed by the NLRC because he could no longer be reinstated to his
previous position on the ground of strained relationship and his previous
position had already gone, and no equivalent position that the PT&T
could offer. . . . .

Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate
and distinct from separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded
conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally dismissed. 35 There is
nothing in the records that could confound the finding that complainant was
illegally dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC, and the CA were all unanimous in
decreeing the same. Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly believable that respondent
could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to backwages in view of the
standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal. In this regard, respondent's defense
deserves scant consideration.
Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise, the Court gives credence
and upholds Commissioner Limpingco's and the IBP Board of Governor's
pronouncement of respondent's gross immorality. Likewise, the Court observes
that his infractions constitute gross misconduct.

Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community. 36 It treads the line of
grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of
decency. 37 On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment." 38

In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a
lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be
suspended or disbarred:
SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willfull disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as respondent's violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and

gross misconduct, his disbarment should come as a matter of course. However,
the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a
previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios,
Jr., 39 which therefore precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same.
In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in
the amount of P40,000.00 40 in order to penalize respondent's transgressions as
discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar acts
in the future.

As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of
law is a privilege 41 accorded only to those who continue to meet its exacting
qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which the profession
brings lies the greater responsibility to uphold its integrity and honor. Towards this
purpose, it is quintessential that its members continuously and unwaveringly
exhibit, preserve and protect moral uprightness in their activities, both in their
legal practice as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the Bar
holds no place for the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of

gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct in violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03,
Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P40,000.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Abella v. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 7332, [June 18, 2013])
A.C. No. 6622

MANUEL G. VILLATUYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BEDE S.

TABALINGCOS, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office of the
Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bede
S. Tabalingcos (respondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and
gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondent's first marriage
was subsisting. 1

In a Resolution 2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court

required respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005. 3 The
Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
the record. 4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission)

issued a Notice 5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on
05 July 2005. During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his
counsel and respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be
resolved by the Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant,

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful

solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for

having married thrice. 6 IcaEDC

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position
Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position Paper, 7 on 15 July 2005 while
complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005. 8
Complainant's Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as
a financial consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the
latter's numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts.
Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be
entitled to P50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they
would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He
alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in
millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on
together. Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of
P900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with
respondent, and a total of P4,539,000 from the fees paid by their
clients. 9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in

violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly
respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his
legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by
attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and
Jane, 10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates 11 and
proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients. 12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of

committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his
first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office
(NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted
marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in
Dasmarias, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena
Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary
Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. 13cHDEaC

Respondent's Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that
complainant was not an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates
Law Office 14 but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a
major stockholder. 15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional
and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the
latter's dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases. 16Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between
them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by
his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had
been paid. 17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He

contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate
rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the
case' such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court.
To support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint
Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and
Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.; 18 and an Affidavit
executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said
company. 19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by

William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as
havingno probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant
himself. 20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his
alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage

Contracts. 21 To the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the
Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO. 22 The
appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the
contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the
three marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted
was a marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in
Dasmarias, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The second marriage contract was
between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place at the
Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987. 24 The third
Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E.
Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second
and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the
entry for civil status.
TcHEaI
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit
filed by complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the
mandatory conference or submitted during the hearing of the case. 25 Thus,
respondent was supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those
documents. 26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him
by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to
Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-
3270. 27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. B-3271. 28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered
that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name
and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different
occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null
and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled

a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. 29 While complainant manifested to
the Commission that he would not attend the hearing, 30 respondent manifested
his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the
administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed
with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he
discovered to be bearing his name. 31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate

original copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against
respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos." 32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-
257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma.
Rowena Garcia Pion while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid. 33 The
other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with
having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin
Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting. 34 Each of the
Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional
liberty as accused in the criminal cases. 35cCaEDA

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the

same proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the
proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with
the RTC-Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the administrative case
against him be submitted for resolution. 36
IBP's Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. 37 The
first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was
dismissed for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have
been filed with the proper courts since it was only empowered to determine
respondent's administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to prove
dishonesty on the part of respondent. 38 On the second charge, the Commission
found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having
advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that
he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly the
specific provision he violated. 39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross
immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that
complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence that respondent
committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latter's first
marriage was subsisting. 40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken
off the roll of attorneys. 41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. 42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature.
He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the
annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into
those contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence
proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was not
substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for
the reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive
the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he
separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage
Contracts. 43SEAHcT

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for
Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008
recommending respondent's disbarment. 44
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP's dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do
not concur with the rationale behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the
former's share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is
violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients
that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to
proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David 46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a
layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null
and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct.
Considering that complainant's allegations in this case had not been proven, the
IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
 Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising
legal services through various business entities. Complainant submitted
documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by respondent to
advertise the latter's legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated
the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision
that was breached. aADSIc

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities
mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services,
purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts
of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from
soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.

Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted
in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's duties as a member of
the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend
itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can
be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer's behalf; or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law. 48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi &
Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant,
was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional
employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" 49 of the
Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which proposed an
agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that,
should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would
render legal services related to the former's loan obligation with a bank. This
circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the
letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and
not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.08 50 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the
client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is
a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that
certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be
operative in one and not in the other. 51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if
it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence
of this practice by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the
latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious
accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified
copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3)
different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these documents,
claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been
submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them. 52 We
are not persuaded by his argument. TEcCHD

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on
the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and
not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido
v. Garrido: 53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the
complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in
the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice
law.Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
 practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the
State may inquire into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For
the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent
must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. 54 In this case,
complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent
entered into two marriages while the latter's first marriage was still subsisting.
While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he
resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not
dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted
those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed
separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other in Calamba
to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void. 55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not

disputed the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified
copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the former's
marriages to two other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this
disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed
bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The
documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil
registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person. Having
been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case,
respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those
documents. cTCaEA

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third
marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the
attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated
the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than
as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on
marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondent's regard for
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard
of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of
action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into
marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-
Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom
we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good
moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for
their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership
therein. Nodistinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life. This
is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be
competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply
and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do
so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional
honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of
dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice,
in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court,
demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part
so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him

as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. 57 His acts of committing bigamy twice
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order
that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos as follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement
and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in

bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. aHTEIA

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from
the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

||| (Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, [July 10, 2012], 690 PHIL 381-399)

A.C. No. 9226

MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C.

ADVINCULA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONARDO C.
ADVINCULA, respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

This administrative case stemmed from the complaint for disbarment

dated June 16, 2006 brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula (Atty. Advincula) by no less than his wife,
Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula (Dr. Advincula).
In her complaint, 1 Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula
committed unlawful and immoral acts; 2 that while Atty. Advincula was still
married to her, he had extra-marital sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz
Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga); 3that the extra-marital relations bore a child in the
name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula (Alexandria); n 4 that Atty.
Advincula failed to give financial support to their own children, namely: Ma.
Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his having
sufficient financial resources; 5 that he admitted in the affidavit of late
registration of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted another marriage with
Ms. Gonzaga; 6 that even should Atty. Advincula prove that his declaration in
the affidavit of late registration of birth was motivated by some reason other
than the fact that he truly entered into a subsequent marriage with Ms.
Gonzaga, then making such a declaration was in itself still unlawful; 7 that
siring a child with a woman other than his lawful wife was conduct way below
the standards of morality required of every lawyer; 8 that contracting a
subsequent marriage while the first marriage had not been dissolved was also
an unlawful conduct; 9 that making a false declaration before a notary public
was an unlawful conduct punishable under the Revised Penal Code; 10 and
that the failure of Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to his children
showed his moral character to be below the standards set by law for every
lawyer. 11 Dr. Advincula prayed that Atty. Advincula be disbarred. 12
In his answer, 13 Atty. Advincula denied the accusations. He asserted
that during the subsistence of his marriage with Dr. Advincula but prior to the
birth of their youngest Jose Leandro, their marital relationship had
deteriorated; that they could not agree on various matters concerning their
family, religion, friends, and respective careers; that Dr. Advincula abandoned
the rented family home with the two children to live with her parents; that
despite their separation, he regularly gave financial support to Dr. Advincula
and their children; that during their separation, he got into a brief relationship
with Ms. Gonzaga; and that he did not contract a second marriage with Ms.
Gonzaga. 14
Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that as a result of the relationship
with Ms. Gonzaga, a child was born and named Alexandra; 15 that in
consideration of his moral obligation as a father, he gave support to
Alexandra; 16 that he only learned that the birth of Alexandra had been
subsequently registered after the child was already enrolled in school; 17 that it
was Ms. Gonzaga who informed him that she had the birth certificate of
Alexandria altered by a fixer in order to enroll the child; 18 that he strived to
reunite his legitimate family, resulting in a reconciliation that begot their third
child, Jose Leandro; that Dr. Advincula once again decided to live with her
parents, bringing all of their children along; that nevertheless, he continued to
provide financial support to his family and visited the children regularly; that
Dr. Advincula intimated to him that she had planned to take up nursing in
order to work as a nurse abroad because her medical practice here was not
lucrative; that he supported his wife's nursing school expenses; 19 that Dr.
Advincula left for the United States of America (USA) to work as a
nurse; 20 that the custody of their children was not entrusted to him but he
agreed to such arrangement to avoid further division of the family; 21 that
during the same period he was also busy with his law studies; 22 that Dr.
Advincula proposed that he and their children migrate to the USA but he
opposed the proposal because he would not be able to practice his profession
there; 23 that Dr. Advincula stated that if he did not want to join her, then she
would just get the children to live with her; 24that when Dr. Advincula came
home for a vacation he was not able to accompany her due to his extremely
busy schedule as Chief Legal Staff of the General Prosecution Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation; 25 and that when they finally met arguments
flared out, during which she threatened to file a disbarment suit against him in
order to force him to allow her to bring their children to the USA. 26 Atty.
Advincula prayed that the disbarment case be dismissed for utter lack of
merit. 27
CAIHTE

Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD

After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) rendered the following findings and
observations, and recommended the following sanctions, to wit:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers comes this provisions (sic): "A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
This means that members of the bar ought to possess good
moral character. Remember we must (sic) that the practice of law is a
mere privilege. The moment that a lawyer no longer has the required
qualifications foremost of which is the presence of that character earlier
mentioned, the Honorable Supreme Court may revoke the said
practice.
No doubt, Respondent Leanardo (sic) C. Advincula, probably
due to the weakness of the flesh, had a romance outside of
marriage (sic) with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga. This he admitted.
From such affair came a child named Ma. Alexandria. He
supported her as a moral obligation.
How, then, must we categorize his acts? It cannot be denied
that he had committed an adulterous and immoral act.
Was his conduct grossly immoral?
Before answering that, let us recall what the highest Court of the
Land defined as immoral conduct: "that conduct which is willful, flagrant
or shameless and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community." 28
xxx xxx xxx
It is the Commissioner's view that what he did pales when
compared to Respondent Leo Palma's case earlier cited.
In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court stressed that Atty.
Palma had made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.
The highest Court of the Land intoned in the same case: "But
what respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As a
husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity; and render help and support."
Deemed favorable to Respondent's cause were the various
exhibits he presented evidencing the fact that he supported their
children financially. Such conduct could not illustrate him as having
championed a grossly immoral conduct.
Another factor to consider is this: Complainant should share part
of the blame why their marriage soured. Their constant quarrels while
together would indicate that harmony between them was out of the
question.
 The possibility appears great that she might have displayed a
temper that ignited the flame of discord between them.
Just the same, however, while this Commissioner would not
recommend the supreme penalty of disbarment for to deprive him of
such honored station in life would result in irreparable injury and must
require proof of the highest degree pursuant to the Honorable Supreme
Court's ruling in Angeles vs. Figueroa, 470 SCRA 186 (2005), he must
be sanctioned.
And the proof adduced is not of the highest degree.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, having, in effect,
Respondent's own admission of having committed an extra-marital
affair and fathering a child, it is respectfully recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for at least one month with the
additional admonition that should he repeat the same, a more severe
penalty would be imposed.
It would be unjust to impose upon him the extreme penalty of
disbarment. What he did was not grossly immoral. 29

The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted the findings and

recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner with slight modification of
the penalty, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's
admission of engaging in a simple immorality and also taking into
account the condonation of his extra-marital affair by his wife, Atty.
Leonardo C. Advincula is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) months.30

Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

as final and executory, and manifested in his compliance dated February 26,
2013, as follows: DETACa
 1. That on 28 November 2011 this Honorable Court issued a resolution
suspending the undersigned Attorney from the practice of law for
two (2) months under "A.C. No. 9226 (formerly CBD Case No. 06-
1749) (Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo C.
Advincula) . . .
2. That on 30 October 2012 in faithful compliance with the above order,
the undersigned attorney applied for Leave for two (2) months
starting November up to December thereby refraining himself
from the practice of law as Legal Officer on the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) . . .
3. That the undersigned Attorney would like to notify this Honorable
Court of his compliance with the above resolution/order so that he
may be able to practice his law profession again. 31

Ruling of the Court

The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at
the time of their application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained
until retirement from the practice of law. In this regard, the Code of
Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the

Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen
to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and
officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships
or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the
practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals,
whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles
but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. 32
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action,
such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must
be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 33
On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for
immorality based on the surrounding circumstances of each case.
In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 34 the extreme penalty of disbarment
was imposed on the respondent who had abandoned his wife and maintained
an illicit affair with another woman. Likewise, disbarment was the penalty for a
lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a married woman prior to the
judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void, while he himself was
also married. 35 In another case we have suspended for two years, a married
attorney who had sired a child with a former client. 36 In Samaniego v.
Ferrer, 37 suspension of six months from the practice of law was meted on the
philandering lawyer.
Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although
his siring the child with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted
immorality, he committed the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer.
The degree of his immoral conduct was not as grave than if he had committed
the immorality when already a member of the Philippine Bar. Even so, he
cannot escape administrative liability. Taking all the circumstances of this case
into proper context, the Court considers suspension from the practice of law
for three months to be condign and appropriate.
 As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated
February 26, 2013 that he had immediately accepted the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for two months
as final and executory; that he had then gone on leave from work in the NBI
for two months starting in November and lasting until the end of December,
2012; and that such leave from work involved refraining from performing his
duties as a Legal Officer of the NBI.
The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him
ought to know that it is only the Court that wields the power to discipline
lawyers. The IBP Board of Governors did not possess such power, rendering
its recommendation against him incapable of finality. It is the Court's final
determination of his liability as a lawyer that is the reckoning point for the
service of sanctions and penalties. As such, his supposed compliance with
the recommended two-month suspension could not be satisfied by his going
on leave from his work at the NBI. Moreover, his being a government
employee necessitates that his suspension from the practice of law should
include his suspension from office. A leave of absence will not suffice. This is
so considering that his position mandated him to be a member of the
Philippine Bar in good standing. The suspension from the practice of law will
not be a penalty if it does not negate his continuance in office for the period of
the suspension. If the rule is different, this exercise of reprobation of an erring
lawyer by the Court is rendered inutile and becomes a mockery because he
can continue to receive his salaries and other benefits by simply going on
leave for the duration of his suspension from the practice of law. aDSIHc

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO

C. ADVINCULA GUILTY of immorality; and SUSPENDS him from the practice
of law for a period of THREE MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE
HEREOF, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be
imposed should he commit the same offense or a similar offense; DIRECTS
ATTY. ADVINCULA to report the date of his receipt of the Decision to this
Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the Personnel Division of the National
Bureau of Investigation to implement the suspension from office of ATTY.
 ADVINCULA and to report on his compliance in order to determine the date of
commencement of his suspension from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of the
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant; and furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Service Commission for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Advincula v. Advincula, A.C. No. 9226, [June 14, 2016])