SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

In re: The Controlled

Substances Act
No. 15-03

The Chief Justice delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Before us is a challenge to portions of the Controlled Substances Act,1

specifically the scheduling of marijuana as a schedule I narcotic. As a
threshold matter, the Government contends that the Petitioner lacks
standing to file this challange. For the reasons below, we find the Petitioner
has standing, but we deny the petition on the merits.

I
The U.S. Constitution gives this Court the authority to hear all
Cases . . . arising under this Constition, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made . . . under their Authority. U.S. Const., Art. III, 2. This
so-called Cases and Controversies provision has generally been held to
require actual injury to the person bringing suit. Indeed, this is a well-
established principle under the U.S. Constitution, and one that does not
allow a grievance alone to be sufficient to bring an action.

This requirement ensures the presence of the concrete

adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962). The presence of a disagreement, however
sharp and acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself
to meet Art. IIIs requirements. This Court consistently
has required, in addition, that the party seeking judicial
resolution of a dispute show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the other party. Gladstone,
Realtors v.Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).

1. 21 U.S.C. 801, et seq.

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Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1986). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 501 (1975). This would seem to put the matter to rest, and indeed,
for those courts it did. However, the Court at this time finds itself operating
under a slightly different framework and system. Rather than traditional
federalism, we are faced with a sort of metafederalism, where we have the
U.S. Constitution and a second, reddit-specific constitution. The question
then becomes which one prevails where they conflict, and logic dictates
only one answer. The reddit constitution must trump the other for our
purposes, or it would have been pointless to make. As far back as Marbury v.
Madison, this Court has presumed that the Legislature does not make empty
laws. 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) (It cannot be presumed that any clause in the
Constitution is intended to be without effect . . .).
With this in mind, we must look to see if there is an applicable
conflict. Article III of the reddit constitution contains the following
provision: Any member wishing to test the Constitutionality of a passed
bill is free to file a case with the Supreme Court, after obtaining a petition
with 10 signatories.
Once again, we must assume that this constitution was written
without extraneous language. Moreover, the plain reading of a provision
must control unless this would lead to absurdity; we must assume that
lawmakers use words in their natural and ordinary signification. Pensacola
Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1, 12 (1878). This
provision of the reddit constitution clearly indiactes that any member of
the Legislature who wishes to test the constitutionality of a law may do so
provided the other requirements are met. There is no indication that the
other requirements have not been met, and the Government has not alleged
this to be the case. This provision does not require any direct injury, and
one could have been added if that were the intent of its drafters.
In light of the above, the reddit constitution provides a way to
challenge a law absent direct injury, and this provision must trump the
conflicting one in the U.S. Constitution. We therefore find that Petitioner
has standing to challenge the constitutionality of this law, and we will decide
this case on the merits.

II
a
Petitioner challenges 21 U.S.C. 803(32)(A) as it applies to marijuana.
This is somewhat puzzling, as this provision does not address marijuana or
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indeed any well-known narcotic, but instead provides criminal penalties for
certain analogues of controlled substances:

The Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of

1986 (Analogue Act) identifies a category of substances
substantially similar to those listed on the federal controlled
substance schedules, 21 U. S. C. 802(32)(A), and then
instructs courts to treat those analogues, if intended for
human consumption, as controlled substances listed on
schedule I for purposes of federal law, 813.

McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, ___ (slip op. at 1) (2015). Thus this
provision is not applicable to marijuana itself, and so has not bearing on
Petitioners underlying claim.
However, Petitioner also attacks marijuanas inclusion as a Schedule
I narcotic, arguing that this violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. That provision provides, in relevant part, that: [No person
shall] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . .
Petitioner argues that this provision is violated by restrict[ing]
the individuals ability to consume marijuana without due process of law.
However, this represents a misreading of the Due Process Clause. Under
the Petitioners interpretation, any provision that banned the possession
of any object or, indeed, any criminal statute whatsoever, would be
unconstitutional. This is patently erroneous on its face, as will be explained
below. Petitioner subsequently argued:

The law was written and passed, but when the Executive
Branch applied it to Marijuana that is when the violation
of the 5th Amendment occurred, as there was no due
process involved with the instantaneous criminalization of
millions of American citizens, without any representation
of the oppositions interests.

This too is a misreading of what, exactly, the Due Process Clause guarantees.
It does not protect an individual from all government encroachment on
things he would otherwise like to do. Instead, it only means that if the
Government chooses to make something a crime, no one may be punished
for it without due process of law. It does not stand for the idea that the
Government may not change the legality of a certain action, including
possession of a certain substance. There is nothing in the history of the
Constitution or in the precedent of this or any other court within the United

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States to support petitioners interpretation of this particular protection.

Indeed, this reading is inconsistent with the very text of the Due
Process Clause. It states that no one may be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. In interpreting a statute, we must
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute. Montclair
v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). Petitioner has not pointed to any
particular deprivation that has taken place as a result of this law. True,
someone may face criminal prosecution for violation of the Controlled
Substances Act, just as is true with any other criminal statute. It is also true
that an individual could not be prosecuted for actions that took place prior
to marijuana being added to the list of prohibited substances. U.S. Const.,
Art. I, 9, cl. 3 (the so-called Ex Post Facto clause). That is, someone could
not be charged for possession of marijuana if that possession only took place
during a time when it was not illegal to do so. Petitioners argument seems
to amount to the idea that some due process is due before Congress may
pass a law. This is not consistent with the Constitution.
As stated above, the Due Process Clause prohibits a deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, but it does not prohibit
deprivation categorically, nor does it remove general rulemaking power
from Congress. The Controlled Substances Act creates the potential for
future deprivation, to be sure, but provided due process of law is given to
each person charged under this Act, the Clause is satisfied.
Congress has the power to criminalize certain conduct, provided
doing so does not conflict with any other right guaranteed by the
Constitution. Thus, for example, Congress may not criminalize service on
a jury. See U.S. Const., Amend.VI. And there are a host of laws, by either
the Government or the States, that have been ruled by this Court to be
unconstitutional because they infringe upon a constitutionally-guaranteed
right. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(state laws mandating school separation based on race), Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state laws banning interracial marriage), United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. ___ (2013) (federal law banning recognition of same-sex
marriages).
That being said, Petitioner has failed to establish any right in the
possession of marijuana. While the predecessor of the Controlled Substances
Act, known as the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, was ruled unconstitutional
by this Court in 1969, this was on self-incrimination clause grounds, and
did not challenge the underlying authority of Congress to impose these
restrictions. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Other challenges have
not been successful, and this Court has never held that a right to possess or
consume marijuana can be found anywhere in the Constitution. See, e.g.,

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Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (the Commerce Clause allows Congress
to criminalize home growing of marijuana), United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (common-law medical necessity
defense does not prevent conviction for possession of marijuana, even in a
State which allows medical use of marijuana). Petitioner gives us no reason
to do so, and we see none.
Because we find that Congress acted within its authority, we find
no issue with Congress delegating this authority to the Executive.

b
One final matter warrants discussion. Petitioner asserts that [i]t is the
Courts duty to stamp out factual incorrectness in laws, regardless of their
constitutionality. . . This is inconsistent with our constitutional structure.
As described in Part I, this Court has jurisdiciton over all Cases . . .
arising under this Constition, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made. . . It has long been established that the Courts role is to interpret
the laws, to say what the law is. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137. But from the
Founding,

Whoever attentively considers the different departments

of power must perceive, that, in a government in which
they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the
nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to
the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be
least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive
not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the
community. The legislature not only commands the purse,
but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights
of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the
contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the
purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth
of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever.
It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL,
but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon
the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.

The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton). Nothing in the Constitution gives this
Court the authority to substitute its judgment for that of Congress, absent

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Congress authorization to do so. The Constitution grants to Congress

[a]ll legislative Powers. Art. I, 1. Our task is to apply the text, not to
improve upon it. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of
Cadence Industries Corp., 493 U. S. 120, 126 (1989). We have no roving
license . . . to disregard clear language simply on the view that . . . Congress
must have intended something different. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Community, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (slip op. at 11) (2014).
The prohibition of marijuana has been frequently and persuasively
criticized, and organized efforts are ongoing to change these laws or defend
them. Some States have chosen to change their own codes to permit
both medical or recretaional use to varying degrees. See, e.g., Co. Const.
Art. XVIII, 16 (recreational use), R.I. Gen. Laws 21-28.6-1-13 (2010)
(medical use). The scientific community continues to study the issue from
a public health standpoint. But all this debate and scholarly work only
underscores the fact that this Court should leave such questions in the
hands of those more capable to make reasoned, appropriate judgments. The
People may, through ballot initiatives or their legislators, change the laws
should they conclude that to be best. But as long as the Legislature does not
infringe upon Constitutionally-guaranteed rights, such questions remain
entirely the will of the People. To hold otherwise would be to usurp the
Peoples command of their own affairs, and would be to change the form of
this Nation into one almost unrecognizable. This we decline to do.

***

Congress may pass any law that does not exceed its authority or conflict
with the guarantees of the Constitution. It has acted within its authority
here. The debate as to the wisdom of its actions in this case will doubtless
continue, as it should. But this Court may not insert itself into a debate on
policy. We have neither the expertise nor the authority to do so.
Because this Court finds that no Fifth Amendment violation exists
in this case, we need not address the issue raised by the Government of
whether Petitioners challege is an unjusticiable political question.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.

It is so ordered.