WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition

THIRD DIVISION for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION G.R. No. 154598 jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the
petition is not sufficient in substance.
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS Present:

RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman, Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on
and in behalf of the minor SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United
child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER CORONA and
DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON CARPIO MORALES, JJ. Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby
Petitioner,
girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.

However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a

- versus -
plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a guest

ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, relations officer in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her
Respondent. Promulgated:
friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country,
August 16, 2004
respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
in the care of the househelp.

DECISION
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she

CORONA, J.: continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left

This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
July 5, 2002 resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division,
in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The
dispositive portion[2] read:
the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her
husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to
Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family
Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of
the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to
Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their
daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay
office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification [3] that
respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular
phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva
Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another
petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that
since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it
impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-
stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the
jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural
expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was
enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The
Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship,
custody of children, habeas
corpus in relation to the
latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129
and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue
writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is
concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there
is no other meaning of the word exclusive than to constitute
the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said
writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses
the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is
not exclusive but concurrent and such an interpretation is
contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction
over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of
minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ
of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the
region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ
has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then
jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law
conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it
even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the
authority of this Court or any court for that matter to
determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within
the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a
perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought
form the courts but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be

helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of
Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which
the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation
seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will
to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003)
be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have
has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a
been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family
petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court, [4] Court
Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.[5] the State is to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children. The creation of the Family Court is geared towards
addressing three major issues regarding childrens welfare
The petition is granted. cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such
cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets,
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the
nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. that the privacy of the children party to the case remains
protected.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA

7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests
over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole
of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court
court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the
of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
word exclusive apparently cannot be construed any other way.
corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the

We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an Solicitor General:

iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the
petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one
 of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the
welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte
nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in
disruption of the childs privacy and emotional well-being;
whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will
result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the
childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word exclusive
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by
the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,[6] the
heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file
suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmens Compensation
Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive
jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the
case at bar. it supports petitioners submission that the word
exclusive in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote
automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over
habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner
that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the
case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs
of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial
jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be
determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the
same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as
provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court,
thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted
by the Supreme Court, or any member
thereof, on any day and at any time, or
by the Court of Appeals or any member
thereof in the instances authorized by law,
and if so granted it shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines, and may be
made returnable before the court or any
member thereof, or before a Court of First
Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing
and decision on the merits. It may also be
granted by a Court of First Instance, or a
judge thereof, on any day and at any time,
and returnable before himself, enforceable
only within his judicial district. (Emphasis
supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioners exclusive jurisdiction did
not foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in
the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving
effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also
applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit
and intent, not the letter, of the law:
Idolatrous reverence for the law sacrifices the
human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and
ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, the letter of the
law killeth; its spirit giveth life.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social
justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by
the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of
the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the
mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing
legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of
being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature
actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a
statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead
to absurdity, injustice or contradiction.[7] In the case at bar, a literal
interpretation of the word exclusive will result in grave injustice and
negate the policy to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children[8] under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal
technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the
provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that
implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a
clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of
implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the
maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and
brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the
legislature should be presumed to have known the existing
laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting
statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. [9]
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue
writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA
7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing
writs of habeas corpus in cases
involvingthe custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA
8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that
family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with
the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section
20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A
verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody
of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall
be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if
so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family
Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for
hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
of

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family
courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
That the serving officer will have to search for the
child all over the country does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task
is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the
peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter
is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.

involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all
for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals,
the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As
Sixteenth Division.
[10]
explained by the Solicitor General:

SO ORDERED.