THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113615. January 25, 1996]

BIENVENIDO VELARMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFINA PANSACOLA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Will the lot owners agreement to sell the property to the government as evidenced by the minutes of a
meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan, absent a formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground to defeat a forcible
entry suit? This was the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside
the Decision dated January 26, 1994 of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33332. By a Resolution
dated October 25, 1995, this case, along with several others, was transferred from the First Division to the
Third. After due deliberation on the submissions of the parties, it was assigned to undersigned ponente for
the writing of the Courts Resolution.

This case arose from an ejectment suit2 filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 64, Mauban, Quezon. Private respondent alleged: (1) that sometime in May 1981, petitioner
surreptitiously built his dwelling on a portion of her land at Barangay Lual (Poblacion), Mauban, Quezon,
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-91037 in the name of private respondents husband Publio
(deceased); (2) that the matter was reported to the Barangay Captain who conducted several conferences
during which petitioner promised to vacate the land and remove his house therefrom, notwithstanding which he
still failed or refused to do so; (3) that she instituted Criminal Case No. 1068 against petitioner in 1986 for
violation of P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the trial court convicted petitioner of the offense
and imposed a fine of P 1,500.00 on him; (5) that, despite such judgment, and notwithstanding repeated
demands to vacate, petitioner continued occupying the property, compelling her to bring the suit.

The trial court in its nine-page judgment rendered on April 2, 1991 found that private respondent had
satisfactorily established her ownership over the parcel of land in question. It also found that petitioner
entered and occupied private respondents land without authority of law and against the will of the owner x x x
through strategy and stealth.3 Furthermore, it declared that the claim of petitioner that by virtue of an
agreement between the former owner (Publio Pansacola) and the Municipality of Mauban x x x the lot [being
occupied by petitioner] became the property of the government, and therefore, [respondent] has no cause of
action against [petitioner] was baseless and unwarranted,4 since no deed had ever been executed to perfect
the deal between the municipality and Publio for the exchange of a portion of the abandoned provincial road
with a portion of the lot owned by Publio (on which was built petitioners dwelling), such that the Pansacola
spouses later demanded that petitioner vacate the land and sought the help of the barangay council. They
eventually instituted the criminal case against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.

The trial court ordered petitioner to vacate the subject land, remove his house therefrom and pay private
respondent exemplary damages and attorneys fees in the amounts of P2,000.00 and P3,000.00, respectively.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner insists that private respondent has no cause of action against him because the land on which his
house stands belongs to the government. Petitioners dwelling is situated on the shoulder of the new provincial
highway, part of which was constructed on a portion of the land belonging to and titled in the name of private
respondents husband. According to petitioner, while it is conceded that the premises [occupied by him] is still
within the area covered by [private respondents] title, nonetheless, x x x [the subject premises] x x x already
belong to the government by virtue of its exchange of the abandoned road and bridge.5

Petitioners claim is anchored on a document entitled Minutes of the Meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mauban, Quezon dated November 5, 1974. Therein, Publio Pansacola signified before the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mauban his agreement to the transfer of that portion of his land traversed by the new provincial highway and
its shoulder in exchange for a corresponding portion of the old abandoned provincial road.

As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan do not mention the
execution of any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the old abandoned road,
but this act does not in any manner convey title over the abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor
extinguish their ownership over the land traversed by the new provincial highway. No evidence was introduced
by petitioner to show that the survey was actually undertaken and a specific portion of the abandoned road
partitioned and conveyed to the Pansacolas. It must be stressed that the agreement to transfer the property
was made in 1974. More than twenty years later, no actual transfer had yet been made. Unless and until the
transfer is consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted by the government, private respondent
continues to retain ownership of the land subject of this case.

We note that the ejectment suit should have been filed before the Municipal Trial Court, and not the Regional
Trial Court. The issue of ownership, however, had been specifically raised before the Regional Trial Court by
petitioner himself, who at the same time did not move to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Instead, he filed his answer and went to trial. Estoppel by laches has already set in at this point in time.6

Petitioner also challenges the findings of the respondent Court that prior referral to the Lupong Barangay had
been made before the ejectment case was filed in the lower court, and that therefore, the trial court properly
acquired jurisdiction over the case. We agree, however, with the trial courts finding that

The compliance (with) the provision of P.D. No. 1508, Katarungang Pambarangay Law, can no longer be assailed
by the defendant [herein petitioner], its reference having been admitted (in) his affirmative allegations and
affirmative defenses in the Answer (page 3, par. 3.3 of defendants answer).7 (italics supplied)

Other issues raised had already been adequately traversed and disposed of by the appellate Court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco,. JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 101328. April 7, 1993.

EMILIANA CANDIDO AND FRANCISCA CANDIDO, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE DEMETRIO MACAPAGAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 18, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BULACAN AND MILA CONTRERAS, respondents.

Alberto M. Diaz for petitioners.

Luis S. Cuvin for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY (P.D. NO. 1508); SCOPE OF POWER; RULE. From the
provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear that the barangay court or Lupon has jurisdiction over disputes between
parties who are actual residents of barangays located in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays of
different cities or municipalities. The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all
types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same municipality, city or province. Where the
complaint does not state that it is one of the excepted cases, or it does not allege prior availment of said
conciliation process, or it does not have a certification that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by
the parties, the case could be dismissed on motion. In the instant case, the fact that petitioners and private
respondent, reside in the same municipality of Obando, Bulacan does not justify compulsory conciliation under
P.D. No. 1508 where the other co-defendants reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities and
provinces.

DECISION

NOCON, J p:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Orders 1 dated July 10, 1991 and August 9, 1991 of
the trial court dismissing the complaint of petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido against private
respondent Mila Contreras on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for petitioners' failure to comply with the
mandatory barangay conciliation process required by Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

It appears on record that petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido are the only legitimate children of
spouses Agapito Candido and Florencia Santos as shown by the certificates 2 of the latter's Record of
Marriage and the petitioners' Record of Birth.

However, petitioners' father eventually left his legitimate family and lived with Sagraria Lozada until his death
on May 6, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, Sagraria Lozada, Jorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina Candido and Eduardo Candido who
represented themselves to be the sole heirs of the late Agapito Candido executed a Deed of Extra-judicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale 3 covering parcels of land owned by the latter and sold to private respondent
Mila Contreras in whose name said properties are now registered under TCT No. T-120656-M.

On November 6, 1990, petitioners instituted an action with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 18 in
Civil Case No. 697-M-90 against Sagraria Lozada, Gorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina Candido, Eduardo
Candido, Register of Deeds of Bulacan and private respondent Mila Contreras to annul the Deed of Extra-
judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, to cancel TCT No. 120656-M issued in the name of private respondent
and to reinstate TCT No. 223602 in the name of Agapito Candido married to Sagraria Lozada.

On December 5, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 on the ground that petitioners failed to
comply with the mandatory conciliation process required under P.D. No. 1508 as she resides in the same
municipality with the petitioners.

On July 10, 1991, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, as prayed for, let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED in so far as defendant Mila
Contreras is concerned for lack of prior referral of the dispute before the Katarungang Pambarangay, without
prejudice." 5

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 6 which was denied in an Order 7 dated August 9,
1991.

Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge dismissing private
respondent in the complaint instituted by the petitioners notwithstanding the fact that the other defendants
in Civil Case No. 697-M-90 reside in different municipalities and cities.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 2 of P.D. No. 1508 provides:

"SEC. 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
except:

"(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof:

"(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;

"(3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;

"(4) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

"(5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government."

Further, section 3 of the same law provides:

"SEC. 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought
for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different
barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of
the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve real
property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof
is situated.

"The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:

(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such
barangays adjoin each other; . . ."

From the foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear that the barangay court or Lupon has jurisdiction
over disputes between parties who are actual residents of barangays located in the same city or municipality or
adjoining barangays of different cities or municipalities.

In the instant case, petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are residents of Barrio Paliwas,
Municipality of Obando, Bulacan while defendants' residences are as follows: Sagraria Lozada and Jorge
Candido at Javier Compound, Bo. Sto. Nio, Taytay, Rizal; Virginia and Maximina Candido at Road 2, Doa
Faustina Village, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City; Eduardo Candido at 388 Barrio Paliwas, Municipality
of Obando, Bulacan; Mila Contreras at San Pascual, Municipality of Obando, Bulacan; and the Registrar of
Deeds of Bulacan at his official address in Bulacan.

The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties
who actually reside in the same municipality, city or province. Where the complaint does not state that it is one
of the excepted cases, or it does not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or it does not have a
certification that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case could be dismissed
on motion. 8 In the instant case, the fact that petitioners and private respondent, reside in the same
municipality of Obando, Bulacan does not justify compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the other
co-defendants reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities and provinces.

Petitioners can immediately file the case in court. It would not serve the purpose of the law in discouraging
litigation among members of the same barangay through conciliation where the other parties reside in
barangays other than the one where the Lupon is located and where the dispute arose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of the trial court dated July 10, 1991 and
August 9, 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 697-M-90 in so far as defendant Mila Contreras is concerned are
hereby annulled and set aside. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for further
proceedings and to REINSTATE private respondent Mila Contreras as defendant in Civil Case No. 697-M-90.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115213 December 19, 1995

WILSON DIU and DORCITA DIU, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PETER LYNDON BUSHNELL and PATRICIA PAGBA, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Before us is an appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals 1 setting aside the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, 2 without prejudice to the refiling of the case by
petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the
"Katarungang Pambarangay Law."

Prefatorily, the Court desires to digress and call attention to the lamentable saga of delay in the dispensation
of justice and the regrettable abuse of judicial processes exemplified by this case. For, if just to collect an
indebtedness of P7,862.55 incurred way back in 1988, the proceedings had to go through all the rungs of the
judicial ladder and still present the prospect of hereafter infringing again upon the time of this Court and
three other courts, such protraction being manipulated by trifling with the very law which ironically was
intended to prevent such delay, then the bench and the bar should soberly reflect thereon and now take stock
of themselves. Indeed, it is not improbable that there are other cases agonizing under the same ennui created
by our courts.

Coming now to the case at hand, it appears that on several occasions from January 8, 1988 up to and until April
18, 1989, private respondent Patricia Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from
petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran, all valued at P7,862.55, as evidenced by receipts of goods marked as
Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioner's Manifestation filed in the trial court, dated August 9, 1991. Private
respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands.

Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman of Naval and the latter set the case for
hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the case was again set for hearing, the parties
appeared but they failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, the barangay chairman issued a
Certification to File Action. 3Petitioners then filed their complaint for a sum of money before the Municipal
Trial Court of Naval.

Private respondents, in their Answer, 4 while admitting the indebtedness to petitioner, interposed two
counterclaims, namely, (1) one for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat
belonging to petitioners, and (b) another for P12,000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which
petitioners allegedly misappropriated. Private respondents likewise alleged that despite the confrontations
before the barangay chairman, petitioners refused to pay their just and valid obligations to private respondent
and her husband.

Aside from petitioners claim and private respondents' counterclaims, the Municipal Trial Court of Naval also
resolved the issue on whether or not there was compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508
on conciliation. In resolving the said issue, the trial court relied on the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy 5 which
held that:

While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably
taking exemption thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking
affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining the
respondent. Upon this premise, petitioner cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by
attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. 6

However, said lower court dismissed the complaint by ruling against the admissibility of Exhibits "E-1" to "E-
15", which are the receipts of good marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioners' manifestation therein, for
not having been properly identified in court. 7

On private respondents' counterclaims, said trial court also ruled that the same had been settled when the
contending parties entered into a compromise agreement which was approved on January 9, 1989 by the
Regional Trial Court of Naval, Branch 16, in another action between them, that is, Civil Case No. B-0719. 8

Due to the dismissal of the complaint, petitioners appealed to the aforementioned Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Said appellate court, however, did not find it necessary to
pass upon the issue of the alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 but, instead, decided the
appeal on the merits. Modifying the decision of the lower court, the Regional Trial Court held that:

The case should have proceeded to its conclusion under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and the
regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court applies to the special cases only in a suppletory capacity
insofar as they are not inconsistent. . . .

The claim of the plaintiff is less than P10,000.00. It properly falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The
only pleadings allowed are complaints, compulsory counterclaims and cross claims pleaded in the answer, and the
answers thereto. The case could have been decided based on affidavits of the witnesses and other evidence on
the factual issues defined in the order of the Court, after the preliminary conference, together with the
position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by the parties.

The need for a formal offer, identification and cross-examination on Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15" was not
necessary. The said exhibits were inadmissible (sic). The receipts constituted evidence of indebtedness and
their possession by the plaintiff at the commencement of the suit gives rise to the legal presumption that the
debts in the total amount of P7,862.66 have not been paid.

Where, under the contract of sale, the ownership of the goods has passed to the buyer and he wrongfully
neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the contract of sale, the seller may
maintain an action against him for the price of the goods. 9
Accordingly, it rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners and ordered private respondent Patricia Pagba
to pay the former the amount of P7,862.55 plus legal interest from July, 1991, P1,000.00 as attorney fees, and
the costs of suit.

Private respondents then went to the Court of Appeals, raising just two issues, viz.: (1) whether or not the
Regional Trial Court erred in not making a factual finding that herein petitioners did not comply with
Presidential Decree No. 1508; and (2) whether or not said Regional Trial Court erred in not dismissing the
appeal or case for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508. 10

Respondent Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, on the ground that there had
been no compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508, with this ratiocination:

It is, therefore, clear that if efforts of the barangay captain to settle the dispute fails, the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted with the end in view of exploring all possibilities of amicable settlement.
If no conciliation or settlement has been reached pursuant to the aforesaid rules, the matter may then be
brought to the regular courts.

In the case at bar, it has been established that there was no valid conciliation proceeding between the parties.
The efforts of the barangay captain of Catmon, Naval, Biliran to mediate the dispute between the parties
having failed, the Pangkat ng Tagapamayapa should have been constituted for purposes of settling the matter.
However, the Pangkat was not constituted, instead, a Certification to File Action was issued by the barangay
captain in favor of respondent spouses Diu. In the same case of Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 690,
the Supreme Court ruled that the "Punong Barangay has no right to say that referral to the Pangkat was no
longer necessary merely because he himself has failed to work out an agreement between the petitioner and
private respondent. Dispute should not end with the mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay because
of his failure to effect a settlement . . . . In Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 566, it was held that
"failure to avail of conciliation process under P.D. 1508, . . . renders the complaint vulnerable to a timely motion
to dismiss." Inasmuch as petitioner has pleaded in his answer the lack of cause of action of respondent,
objection to the complaint has been timely made. 11

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant petition is whether or not the confrontations before
the BarangayChairman of Naval satisfied the requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No. 1508. This Court
finds for petitioners.

It must be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the Local Government
Code of 1991 12 which took effect on January 1, 1992. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the
trial court on July 10, 1991 before the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Nevertheless, Sections 4 and
6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in Sections 410 (b) and 412, respectively, of the latter
law. The pertinent provisions read as follows:

Sec. 410. PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. (b) . . . . If he (lupon chairman) fails in his mediation
effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date
for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

Sec. 412. CONCILIATION. (a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint . . . shall be filed
or instituted in court . . . unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the lupon chairman or
the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or
pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman . . . .

In the case at bar, it is admitted that the parties did have confrontations before the Barangay Chairman of
Naval although they were not sent to the pangkat as the same was not constituted. Their meetings with
said barangaychairman were not fruitful as no amicable settlement was reached. This prompted the issuance of
the following Certification to File Action. 13

This is to certify that:

Respondent, Patricia Pagba admitted her indebtedness with complainant but she refused to pay because
according to her, complainant has also an unsettled accounts (sic) with her husband. Hence no
settlement/conciliation was reached and therefore the corresponding complaint for the dispute may now be
filed in court.

Date(d) this 10th day of July 1991.

(Sgd.) JHONY C. JEREZ

Lupon Pangkat Chairman

Attested:

(Sgd.) IRENEO DOCALLOS

Lupon/Pangkat Secretary

According to private respondent, however, the above certification is "falsified" since no pangkat was
constituted. She, therefore, insists that petitioners have not complied with the mandatory provision of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 on compulsory arbitration. We disagree.

While no pangkat was constituted, it is not denied that the parties met at the office of the barangay chairman
for possible settlement. 14 The efforts of the barangay chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was
reached. Although no pangkat was formed, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the law. It is
noteworthy that under Section 412 of the Local Government Code aforequoted, the confrontation before
the lupon chairman OR the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the pre-condition for filing the case in court.

This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410 (b) of the same law that the barangay chairman shall
constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410 (b) should be construed together with
Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant
that the barangay chairman or punong barangay is himself the chairman of the lupon under the Local
Government Code. 15

From the foregoing facts, it is undeniable that there was substantial compliance with Presidential Decree No.
1508 which does not require strict technical compliance with its procedural requirements. Under the factual
antecedents, it cannot be said that the failure of the parties to appear before the pangkat caused any
prejudice to the case for private respondents considering that they already refused conciliation before
the barangay chairman and, as will hereafter be discussed, their sham insistence for a meeting before
the pangkat is merely a ploy for further delay. We are thus forced to remind them that technicalities should
not be made to desert their true role in our justice system, and should not be used as obstructions therein.

The court a quo was likewise correct in invoking the doctrine in Tijam and, as indicated by the factual scenario
in this case, private respondents are clearly in estoppel to assail the jurisdiction of the two lower courts. It is
also worth stressing that while the case was filed when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was still in force, the
procedural provisions of the Local Government Code, which we have earlier noted as being supportive of the
validity of the conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to this case. Statutes regulating procedure in
courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense. 16

To indulge private respondents in their stratagem will not only result in a circuitous procedure but will
necessarily entail undue and further delay and injustice. This is inevitable if this Court should dismiss the
complaint and require the parties to meet before the pangkat, only to bring the case all over again through the
hierarchy of courts and ultimately back to us for decision on the merits. Obviously, this is the game plan of
private respondents. For, when private respondents appealed to respondent court, they did not at all assail the
propriety or correctness of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court holding them liable to petitioners for the
sum of money involved. Such primary substantive issue, therefore, has been laid to rest, but private
respondents would wish to keep the case alive merely on a conjured procedural issue invoking their supposed
right to confrontation before the pangkat.

However, from the very start of this action, private respondents failed to show or evince any honest indication
that they were willing to settle their obligations with petitioners, notwithstanding the efforts of the latter to
submit the matter to conciliation. It is, therefore, quite obvious that their insistence on technical compliance
with the requirements of the barangay conciliation process is a dilatory maneuver. This is an evident and
inevitable conclusion since the main argument of respondents in this petition is only the supposed failure of
petitioners to comply with the barangay conciliatory procedure and not the denial or repudiation of their
indebtedness.

We do not agree with the findings of respondent appellate court that inasmuch as private respondents pleaded
in their answer the alleged lack of cause of action of petitioners, an objection to the complaint had been timely
made. It will be readily observed that said defense was only one of the six affirmative defenses cryptically
alleged in single short sentences in private respondents' Answer in the court a quo, running the implausible
gamut from supposed defects in parties to res judicata and up to capacity to sue, without any statement of the
facts on which they would rely to support such drivel. This calculated travesty of the rules on pleadings
betrays the ulterior motives of private respondents and cannot be countenanced.

The failure of private respondents to specifically allege that there was no compliance with
the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. All that they alleged in their Answer
in the trial court was that "the complaint states no cause of action" without giving even the semblance of any
reason to support or explain that allegation. On the other hand, they admitted the confrontations before
the barangay chairman in paragraph 13 of their Answer. 17

Since private respondents failed to duly raise that issue, their defense founded thereon is deemed waived,
especially since they actually did not pursue the issue before the case was set for hearing. Also, the
conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-
compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over the
subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein. 18

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. The judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 30962 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16,
in Civil Case No. B-0842 is hereby REINSTATED, with costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 96914 July 23, 1992

CECILIA U. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and JOSE T. DIZON, respondents.

NOCON, J.:

Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma prays before this Court for the reversal of the Decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals of August 30, 1990 1 ordering the dismissal of her ejectment complaint before the Manila
Metropolitan Trial Court for lack of cause of action due to non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508
(Katarungang Pambarangay Law) as well as the Resolution of January 7, 1991 2 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of said Decision.

The facts of this case as summarized by the petitioner in her Memorandum are as follows:

Petitioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment building located at 800-802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila.
Two (2) units of said apartment building were leased (now being unlawfully occupied) to private respondent at
monthly rates of P3,450.00 for the unit/apartment located at 800 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila and
P2,300.00 for the unit/apartment located at 802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila, respectively. . . .

Said lease was originally covered by written contracts of lease both dated December 10, 1984 and except for
the rates and duration, the terms and conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a "month-to-
month" basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code.

One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of Lease, that of monthly rental payments, was violated
by private respondent and that as of October 31, 1988, said private respondent has incurred arrears for both
units in the total sum of P14,039.00 for which letters of demand were sent to, and received by, private
respondent.

Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the
Barangay for conciliation which eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her
son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay proceeding as she was suffering from
recurring psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipts and prescriptions issued by her
psychiatrist, copies of which are attached as Annexes "E-E10" of the said Petition.

Due to the stubborn refusal of the private respondent to vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to
retain the services of counsel to initiate this ejectment proceeding. 3

The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila, rendered a decision on June 21, 1989 ordering private
respondent to vacate the premises, to pay rentals falling due after May 1989 and to pay attorney's fees in the
amount of P2,500.00. 4 The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, on appeal, affirmed the MTC ruling
except for the award of attorney's fees which it reduced to P1,000.00. 5

Private respondent, however, found favor with the respondent Court of Appeals when he elevated the case in a
Petition for Review, when it ruled, thus:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated October 13, 1989 of the RTC of Manila, Br. IX in Civil Case No. 89-
49672 is reversed and set aside and the Complaint for Ejectment against petitioner is dismissed for lack of
cause of action. No costs. 6

Thus, this appeal, raising several assignments of error, namely, that the Court of Appeals erred

1. In holding that private respondent raised the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 in
the lower court when in fact and in truth his answer and position paper failed to do so, contrary to evidence on
record;

2. In failing to consider that private respondent had waived his right to question the lack of cause of action of
the complaint, if there is any, contrary to law, established jurisprudence, and evidence on record;

3. In giving undue weight and credence to the self-serving allegations of the private respondent that summons
was not served him, contrary to law, established jurisprudence and evidence on record.

4. In disregarding the well-known principle of law that barangay authorities are presumed to have performed
their official duties and to have acted regularly in issuing the certificate to file action and grossly and
manifestly erred in making an opposite conclusion to this effect, contrary to law, established jurisprudence
and evidence on record.

5. In not holding that the settlement was repudiated, contrary to law and evidence on record.

6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court below.

Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508
only in his petition for review with the appellate court and which mislead the court to erroneously dismiss her
complaint for ejectment.
Section 6 of P.D. 1508 states:

Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving
any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the
settlement has been repudiated. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

while Section 9 states that:

Sec. 9. Appearance of parties in person. In all proceedings provided for herein, the parties must appear in
person without the assistance of counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and incompetents who
may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by private respondent in the court below, cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal, specially in the Court of Appeals, citing Saludes vs. Pajarillo. 7 Private
respondent had waived said objection, following the line of reasoning in Royales vs. Intermediate Appelate
Court. 8

Private respondent denies having waived the defenses of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508.
His Answer before the Metropolitan Trial Court, specifically paragraphs 4, 7, & 8, substantially raised the fact
of non-compliance by petitioner with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 and consequently, subjected petitioner's
complaint to dismissal for lack of cause of action, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Answering defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 8, the truth of the matter being that he was not
duly summoned nor subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, who issued the alluded certification, to appear for
hearing. 9

xxx xxx xxx

7. Plaintiff has no cause of action against answering defendant.

8. The certification to file action (annex D of the complaint) was improperly or irregularly issued as the
defendant was never summoned nor subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman to appear for hearing in connection
with the alleged complaint of the plaintiff. In effect the mandatory provision of P.D. 1508 was not complied
with warranting the dismissal of the instant complaint.

xxx xxx xxx 10

We do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was
raised only for the first time in the Court of Appeals. When private respondent stated that he was never
summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that since he was never
summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory personal confrontation, no
complaint could be filed with the MTC. Private respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer that he
was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that plaintiff has no cause of action against him
as alleged in paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification to file action was improperly issued in view
of the foregoing allegations thereby resulting in non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No.
1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are in substantial compliance with the raising of said issues
and/or objections in the court below.

Petitioner would like to make it appear to this Court that she appeared before the Lupon Chairman to confront
private respondent. She stated in her Petition 11 and her Memorandum 12 that:

Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the
barangay for conciliation which eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her
son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay proceeding as she was suffering from
recurring psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipt and prescriptions issued by her
psychiatrist copies of which are attached herewith as Annexes
"E-E10."

However, as found out by the respondent court:

We agree with the petitioner that private respondent Cecile Ledesma failed to comply with section 6 of P.D.
1508. The record of the case is barren showing compliance by the private respondent. Indeed, the
documentary evidence of the private respondent herself attached to the complaint buttresses this conclusion.
They show that it is not the private respondent but her son. Raymund U. Ledesma, and her lawyer, Atty.
Epifania Navarro who dealt with the petitioner regarding their dispute. Thus, the demand letter dated
October 18, 1988 sent to the petitioner for payment of rentals in the sum of P14,039.00 was signed by
Raymund Ledesma. On the other hand, the demand letter dated November 14, 1988 was signed by Atty.
Epifania Navarro. More telling is the Certification to File Action signed by Barangay Chairman, Alberto A. Solis
where it appears that the complainant is Raymund U. Ledesma and not the private respondent. 13

As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal confrontation of the parties because:

. . . a personal confrontation between the parties without the intervention of a counsel or representative would
generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants. In
other words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to the successful resolution of the dispute at the
barangay level. 14

Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before the barangay Chairman was because of
her recurring psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 1988 15 specifically September to
December 6 there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist for consultation. The
only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner. There was, therefore, no excuse then for her
non-appearance at the Lupon Chairman's office.

Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be represented by counsel or even by attorney-in-
fact who is next of kin. 16

As explained by the Minister of Justice with whom We agree:

To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the
effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute resolution, the above-quoted
provision is couched in mandatory language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory construction
dictating that "expressio unius est exclusio alterius", the express exceptions made regarding minors and
incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned. 17

Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred her from pursuing the ejectment
case in the MTC of Manila. 18 Having arrived at this conclusion, there is no need for Us to discuss the other
issues involved.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the respondent Court are affirmed in toto with treble
costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117005. June 19, 1997]

CARLITO D. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTEENTH DIVISION) and
JUANITO ALVARADO, respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner Carlito Corpuz questions the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 10, dismissing the petition for review in Civil Case No. 92-62869.

Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private respondent Juanito Alvarado with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, docketed as Civil Case No. 138532, for recovery of possession of the room
being occupied by the latter, which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for their own use.

Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo Barredo who, in May 1988, decided to sell
his property to the tenants. Due to economic difficulties, however, Alvarado and the other lessees executed an
"Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any person who can afford to purchase
the same. Consequently, Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy
relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado.

In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that he vacate the room which he was
occupying because the children of Corpuz needed it for their own use.Alvarado refused to vacate the room as
demanded, prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment.

In his answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1) the alleged "Affidavit of Waiver" executed
between him and Barredo was a forgery; and (2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa.
Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit, the MTC of Manila handed down on August 11, 1992 a
decision ordering Alvarado to vacate the room.[2]

Feeling aggrieved, Alvarado appealed to the RTC. On March 11, 1993, said court rendered its decision[3] which,
in effect, reversed the MTC's decision on the ground that the purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was
the subject of a controversy pending before the National Housing Authority (NHA) which must be resolved
first by said agency. It also concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado and Barredo was a
forgery. Consequently, it ordered the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, and ruled that Alvarado
cannot be legally expelled from the subject premises.

His motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied for lack of merit by the RTC[4] on July 16,
1993, Corpuz elevated his case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, found no reversible
error in the assailed judgment and affirmed the same in its entirety in its assailed decision dated July 14,
1994.[5] A subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
dated September 1, 1994.[6] Hence, this petition.

The main issues presented in this petition is whether Corpuz' unlawful detainer suit filed before the MTC
against Alvarado should be suspended until the resolution of the case lodged in the NHA impugning the sale of
said property, and whether the "Affidavit of Waiver" between Corpuz and Barredo was authentic. Corpuz
maintains that the mere assertion challenging his ownership over the said property is not a sufficient ground
to divest the MTC of its exclusive jurisdiction.[7]

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases.[8] As the law now stands, the
only issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possession
over the real property, that is, possession de facto.[9]

In the recent case of Refugia v. Court of Appeals,[10] however, we ruled that:

"In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court, in making a distinction between the
reception of evidence and the resolution of the issue of ownership, held that the inferior court may look into
the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine
the nature of possession. It cannot, however, resolve the issue of ownership, that is, by declaring who among
the parties is the true and lawful owner of the subject property, because the resolution of said issue would
effect an adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer. With
this as a premise and taking into consideration the amendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, it may
be suggested that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title
or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit."

Consequently, since the present petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with the issue of
ownership (i.e., the controversy pending in the NHA), the doctrinal pronouncement in Refugia is applicable.

Parenthetically speaking, the issue raised in this petition is far from novel. The prevailing doctrine is that suits
or actions for the annulment of sale, title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same
property.[11]
In Wilmor Auto Supply Construction Company Corporations, et al. v. Court of Appeals,[12] Justice (now Chief
Justice) Andres Narvasa outlined the following cases involving the annulment of the title or document over the
property which should not be considered in the abatement of an ejectment suit, to wit:

"Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment
actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment
of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v. CA [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v.
Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. [annulment of
document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]."

Clearly, the underlying reason for the above rulings is for the defendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit,
which is summary in nature, by the simple expedient of asserting ownership thereon. Thus, the controversy
pending before the NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the authenticity of the
"Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot deter the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for
the purpose of determining who has a better possessory right among the parties.

It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. We have ruled that a judgment rendered in an
ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor
shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause
of action involving possession.[13]

Furthermore, Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the ejectment suit was not referred to the
Lupon Tagapayapa as required by Presidential Decree No. 1508.

We are not persuaded. This defense was only stated in a single general short sentence in Alvarado's
answer. We have held in Dui v. Court of Appeals[14] that failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that
there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. A
perusal of Alvarado's answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation, which is
deemed a mere general averment.

In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance
therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter
and the parties therein.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated July 14, 1994, of respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 138532-CV dated August 11, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000]

FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN and FIDEL
BESARINO, petitioners, vs. ELIZABETH BALISING, ROGER ALGER, MERLINDA CAPARIC, EUSTAQUIO R.
TEJONES, ANDREA SAYAM, JENNY ISLA, WILMA ROGATERO, PABLITO ALEGRIA, ROLANDO CANON,
EDITHA ESTORES, EDMUNDO DOROYA, TERESITA GUION, DANNY ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY,
ROGELIO MANO, EVANGELINE CABILTES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, Antipolo,
Rizal, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 71 dated August 26, 1997.[1]

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were
the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa[2] filed by the private respondents. The cases were assigned
to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II. Ncm

After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty,[3] they filed a Motion to Dismiss
the aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of
the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo,
Rizal.[4] Petitioners averred that since they lived in the same barangay as private respondents, and the amount
involved in each of the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), the said cases were required under
Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code of 1991[5] and Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[6] to be referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned for conciliation proceedings before being filed in court.[7]

The municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17, 1995[8] denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to
the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for dismissing the
cases.[9]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in the
Revised Rules of Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss.[10]

On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against
petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
[11] Scncm

More than two months later, on February 26, 1996, private respondents through counsel, filed a Motion to
Revive the abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to
the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with.[12] Attached to the motion was a Certification
dated February 13, 1996 from the Lupong Tagapamayapaof Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal[13] stating that the
parties appeared before said body regarding the charges of estafa filed by private respondents against
petitioners but they failed to reach an amicable settlement with respect thereto. Petitioners filed a Comment
and Opposition to Motion to Revive claiming that the Order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13,
1995 dismissing the cases had long become final and executory; hence, private respondents should have re-
filed the cases instead of filing a motion to revive.[14]

On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial court issued an Order[15] granting private respondents Motion to
Revive. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] of the aforementioned Order which was denied by
the municipal trial court.[17]

Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, a petition for certiorari, injunction
and prohibition assailing the Order dated March 18, 1996 of the municipal trial court. They claimed that the
said Order dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the criminal cases against them had long become final and
executory considering that the prosecution did not file any motion for reconsideration of said Order.[18] In
response thereto, private respondents filed their Comment,[19] arguing that the motion to revive the said
cases was in accordance with law, particularly Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[20]

After the parties submitted additional pleadings to support their respective contentions,[21] the Regional
Trial Court rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition,
stating as follows:

Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and respondents comment thereto, the Court regrets that
it cannot agree with the petitioner(sic). As shown by the records the 16 criminal cases were dismissed without
prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for failure of the private respondent to comply with the
mandatory requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases was without prejudice, the Court
honestly believes that the questioned order has not attained finality at all.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Sdaamiso

SO ORDERED.[22]

The Regional Trial Court, likewise, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the aforementioned
Decision for lack of merit.[24]

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners raise the following questions of law:

1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed
within the reglementary period, as in the present case;

2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by motion
after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and

3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed without
prejudice still has jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the order of dismissal has become final and
executory.[25]

Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not
appealed within the reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to revive the case is filed within the
reglementary fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration of the courts
order, the order of dismissal becomes final and the case may only be revived by the filing of a new complaint
or information.[26] Petitioners further argue that after the order of dismissal of a case attains finality, the
court which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and, thus, does not have the authority to act on any
motion of the parties with respect to said case.[27]

On the other hand, private respondents submit that cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure such as the criminal cases against petitioners are not covered by the rule regarding finality of
decisions and orders under the Revised Rules of Court. They insist that cases dismissed without prejudice for
non-compliance with the requirement of conciliation before the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned may be revived summarily by the filing of a motion to revive
regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the case.[28]

Petitioners contentions are meritorious. Sdaad

A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution
what has been determined by the court.[29] As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which
does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.[30]

This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order[31] if no
motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.

In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals,[32] we stated thus:

The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any less
final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally
disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.

The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the courts decision or
order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.[33]

After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke.[34] A final judgment or order cannot
be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous
conclusion by the court which rendered the same.[35]

After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the
courts power to amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new
complaint.

This was explained in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,[36] where we ruled thus: Scsdaad

The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set aside the dismissal,
effectively operated to remove the case from the Courts docket. Even assuming the dismissal to be without
prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action,
but only by the filing of another complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding filing
fees prescribed by law.
xxx

[S]ince theoretically every final disposition of an action does not attain finality until after fifteen (15) days
therefrom, and consequently within that time the action still remains within the control of the Court, the
plaintiff may move and set aside his notice of dismissal and revive his action before that period lapses.
But after dismissal has become final after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period, the only way by
which the action may be resuscitated or "revived" is by the institution of a subsequent action through the
filing of another complaint and the payment of fees prescribed by law. This is so because upon attainment of
finality of the dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period, the Court loses jurisdiction and control
over it and can no longer make a disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with such dismissal.[37] (Emphasis
supplied.)

Contrary to private respondents claim, the foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but to criminal cases as
well. In Jaca vs. Blanco,[38] the Court defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without
prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent
filing of a new information for the offense."[39]Supremax

Thus, the Regional Trial Court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition and
ruled that the order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without prejudice the
criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of
a motion to revive.

Equally erroneous is private respondents contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments under the
Revised Rules of Court[40] do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the revival of
cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the same to conciliation at the barangay level, as required
under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code. The said provision states:

Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1508[41] where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed
without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This
provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.[42]

There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents view. Section 18 merely states
that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for
non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the
dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no
declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period
within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.

Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court applies
suppletorily to cases covered by the former:

Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply
to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith.
[43]
A careful examination of Section 18 in relation to Section 22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary Procedure
and Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10,[44] and Rule 36, Section 2[45] of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, leads to no other conclusion than that the rules regarding finality of
judgments also apply to cases covered by the rules on summary procedure. Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a judgment or order which is not
appealed or made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains
finality.[46] Hence, the principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi, or that every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence [47] applies in interpreting both sets of Rules.

The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that
said doctrine applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:

The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite
date set by law.[48] Misjuris

It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases subject to summary procedure
especially since the objective of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously.
[49] To construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the revival of dismissed cases by mere motion even after the
lapse of the period for appealing the same would prevent the courts from settling justiciable controversies
with finality,[50] thereby undermining the stability of our judicial system.

The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the municipal trial
court that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code
of 1991[51] may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the accused has been arraigned.

It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the
law[52] is not jurisdictional in nature[53] and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a
motion to dismiss.[54] The Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity
of the causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the
cases as soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said ground only after their
arraignment.

However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners on the
ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although said ground
was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be revoked at present considering that the same
had long become final and executory, and as earlier stated, may no longer be annulled[55] by the Municipal
Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court.[56] Scjuris

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch II dated August 26, 1997 and its Order dated January 29, 1998 in SCA Case No. 96-4092 are hereby
SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 94-0829, 94-0830, 94-0831, 94-0832, 94-0833, 94-0836, 94-0838, 94-
0839, 94-0841, 94-0843, 94-0847, 94-0848, 94-0850, 94-0854 and 94-0058 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Antipolo are ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice, pursuant to Sec. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
SO ORDERED. KAPUNAN

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111915 September 30, 1999

HEIRS OF FERNANDO VINZONS, represented by LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MENA EDORIA, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the January 27, 1993 1 Decision and
September 10, 1993 2 Resolution of the Court of appeals 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23948. The Court of Appeals
(CA) set aside the Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte in Civil Case No.
5832, affirming that of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Civil Case No. 2137 5, which ordered the ejectment
of herein private respondent.

The factual antecedents of this case are:

Petitioners Heirs of Vinzons are co-owners of a parcel of land in Barangay 5, Daet, of which a portion
measuring 148.5 square meters is being occupied by respondent Mena Edoria as lessee since 1951. Respondent
built thereon a residential house worth P40,000.00. He started paying a monthly rent of P4.00 which by 1986
had reached P13.00.

Sometime in 1986, an ejectment suit was filed by petitioners several others also occupying the same lot owned
by them, docketed as Civil Case No. 1923, on the ground, among others, of non-payment of rentals. After trial,
however, the case was dismissed on the finding that respondent was not in arrears but was even advance in his
rental payments. Both petitioner and respondent appealed from said decision to the Regional Trial Court.

Sometime in 1988, while the aforesaid Case No. 1923 was pending appeal before the RTC, petitioner filed
another ejectment suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 2061, against respondent and thirty-nine (39) others
alleging that said defendants refused to enter into an agreement with them as tenants-lessees and refused to
pay the increased rent of P1.00 per square meter per month. Respondent resisted the claim alleging, among
others, lack of cause of action and pendency of the earlier ejectment case. The trial court rendered its
decision dismissing the case against respondent in view of the pendency of Civil Case No. 1923 on appeal. This
decision was again elevated to the RTC.

While Civil Case No. 2061 was pending appeal in the RTC, petitioners again filed the instant suit for ejectment
docketed as Civil Case No. 2137 on the following grounds: (a) expiration of lease contract as of 1984; (b)
refusal to sign written renewal of contract of lease; and (c) non-payment of rent for one (1) year and ten (10)
months. In his answer, respondent sought dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds; (a) it did not
pass through barangay conciliation; (b) no prior demand was made or if there was such a demand, it was made
more than one year prior to the filing of the case; (c) there was no cause of action as it was in violation of PD
20 and BP Blg. 25; (d) the case is barred by prior judgment; and (e) there is still pending appeal a similar case
between the parties, Civil Case No. 2061.

After trial, the MTC of Daet rendered its decision ordering respondent to vacate the premises and pay the
accrued rentals. On appeal to the RTC, the said decision was affirmed in toto. The CA, however, reversed the
two (2) earlier decisions by dismissing the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia, failure to comply with the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law (PD 1508); and lack of evidence of prior demand to vacate before instituting the
complaint.

Hence, this petition on the following grounds:

THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF CAMARINES NORTE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UPON THE
GROUND THAT THE GROUNDS THEREIN AVERRED HAD ALREADY BEEN PASSED UPON IN ITS
DECISION. 6

Petitioners argue that the CA was duty-bound, under the rules and jurisprudence, to give weight to the
findings of fact of the MTC since the same had already been affirmed in toto by the RTC. Further, it is argued
that the action is not barred by prior judgment and the principle of litis pendentia does not apply; that the
petitioners complied with the requirements of PD 1508; and that demand to vacate is not necessary for judicial
action in case of expiration of the lease contract.

The petition is devoid of merit, we find that the MTC had improperly assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment
suit.

First, this case being one of unlawful detainer, it must have been filed within one year from the date of last
demand with the Municipal Trial Court, otherwise it is an accion publiciana cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court. 7 The rule is that the one-year period provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court 8 within
which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the last letter of demand to
vacate. 9 Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession when dispossession has
lasted for more than one year. 10

There is no question that the petitioners' dispossession has lasted for more than one year. In their Complaint
and Position paper, petitioners alleged that the lease contract expired in 1984 11; that thereafter, private
respondent became a lessee on a month-to-month basis 12; and that before the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 1908,
1923 and 2061, demand to vacate had already been made to defendant. 13 Since Civil Case No. 1908 was
instituted in 1986; Civil Case No. 1923 in 1986; and Civil Case No. 2061 in April 1988, the alleged demands to
vacate to abort an implied renewal of the lease on a month-to-month basis were made between 1986 and 1988,
the last one, before April 1988. Verily, the instant Complaint for ejectment filed by petitioner in October
1989, was filed more than one year from the termination of the month-to-month lease some time before April
1988. It is well-established that what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which
has jurisdiction over it is the allegation made by the plaintiff in his complaint. 14

Second, the challenged decision correctly dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs, the petitioners
herein, to avail of the barangay conciliation process under PD 1508, preliminary to judicial recourse. The Court
of Appeals had found that "there is no clear showing that it was brought before the Barangay Lupon or Pangkat
of Barangay 5, Daet, Camarines Norte, where the parties reside and the property subject of the case is
situated, as there is no barangay certification to file action attached to the complaint. 15

Paraphrasing Peaflor vs. Panis 16, "the Lupong Barangay is with jurisdiction under PD 1508 to pass upon an
ejectment controversy where the parties are residents in the same barangay or in barangays within the same
city or in barangays adjoining each other." It is clearly averred in the Complaint that herein petitioners, then
represented by the widow of the late Fernando Vinzons, resided in the same barangay, hence, covered by the
said law. In Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 17, this Court ruled that "non-compliance with the
condition precedent prescribed by PD 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and
make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity."
Defendants, private respondents herein, objected to the failure of the parties to undergo a confrontation at
the barangay level in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo to no avail as the trial courts
merely brushed aside this issue. Hence, the Court of Appeals had to rectify this error by the trial courts.

In refutation of the said findings of the Court of Appeals, petitioners submit that "it is clear in the findings
of fact of the MTC of Daet, as affirmed by the RTC of Daet that before the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 1908,
1923 and 2061, demand to vacate had already been made to the defendant after efforts to settle the
controversy at the barangay level had failed." 18 This is not a factual finding of the MTC, but an allegation in
petitioners' Complaint. As mentioned earlier, the MTC merely brushed aside the issue of non-recourse to
barangay conciliation. This allegation in petitioners' Complaint that efforts to settle the controversy at the
barangay level had failed in Civil Cases Nos. 1908, 1923 and 2061, does not constitute compliance with the
requirements of PD 1508 for purposes of filing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 2137. Section 6 of PD 1508
insofar as pertinent provides:

Sec. 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving
any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon chairman or the Pangkat . . . .

Referral to the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat should be made prior to the filing of the ejectment case under
PD 1508. Legal action for ejectment is barred when there is non-recourse to barangay court. 19 The Complaint
for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 2137, should have been coursed first to the barangay court.
Petitioners cannot rely on the barangay conciliation proceedings held in the other cases and consider the same
as compliance with the law.
Third, petitioners rely heavily on the general rule that findings of trial courts deserve to be respected and
affirmed by appellate courts. Almost as well-recognized as the general rule is the exception that the factual
findings of the trial court may nonetheless be reversed by the Court of Appeals if by the evidence on record
or the lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred. 20 Considering that the trial courts and the Court of
Appeals arrived at different factual findings, we have reviewed the evidence on record and have found as
aforesaid, the improper assumption by the MTC of the case due to non-recourse to barangay conciliation and
the lapse of the one-year period for bringing the case for unlawful detainer.

Having arrived at the above conclusion, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issues, specifically, those
bearing on the application of the principles of litis pendentia and/or res judicata. Moreover, the records of
Civil Cases Nos. 1923 and 2061 are not before us to enable us to determine the presence of the elements
thereof in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-687 February 9, 1994

ENGINEER EDGARDO C. GARCIA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MELJOHN DE LA PEA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte [Acting Judge, Municipal
Trial Court, Naval, Leyte], respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn-letter complaint 1 dated June 18, 1992, Engineer Edgardo C. Garcia charged Judge Meljohn de la
Pea in his capacity as acting judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte with partiality, abuse of authority
and grave abuse of discretion in connection with Crimimal Case No. 2577 for grave oral defamation which was
filed against his wife, Ignacia G. Garcia, a supervising nurse of Naval District Hospital, by respondent judge's
brother, Dr. Melencio de la Pea. Respondent judge, while acting as the presiding judge of the MTC of Naval,
Leyte, is the incumbent presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte.

Complainant Engr. Edgardo C. Garcia, husband of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2577, claimed that
respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case without the requisite certification from the Lupon
Tagapayapa; that he should have inhibited himself from acting on the case because private complainant Dr.
Melencio B. de la Pea is his brother; that he issued a warrant of arrest without the accompanying copy of the
complaint and affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses; that when complainant sought the approval of
the cash bail bond he posted for the provisional release of his wife at 2:40 P.M. of June 8, 1992, respondent
judge was not in his office, thus the Order of Release prepared by the Clerk of Court was brought to
respondent's house by Rey Morillo, a process server, for his signature at around 2:56 P.M., but they were
informed that he left for Ormoc City then by boat for Cebu; that at around 4:00 P.M. he hired a pump boat
and sent Basilio Borrinaga to Maripipi to have the bail bond approved and get the order of release from Judge
Dulcisimo Pitao of MTC of Maripipi but the latter explained in his letter that he cannot do so because he does
not know whether or not Judge de la Pea is on leave; that the following morning of June 9, 1992, they learned
that respondent judge left the Order of Release with his wife, Lolita de la Pea, instead of leaving it with the
Clerk of Court; that because of respondent judge's actuations, complainant's wife was detained at the
municipal jail for twenty (20) hours from 2:55 P.M. of June 8, 1992 to 10:10 A.M. of June 9, 1992; and that it
was only on June 15, 1992 that they received a copy of the criminal complaint, affidavit of the witnesses and
respondent judge's inhibition order dated June 15, 1992.

On November 19, 1992, this Court required respondent judge to file his comment and, upon receipt thereof,
the case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
On July 20, 1993, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez submitted a memorandum with the
corresponding evaluation and recommendation, duly approved by the Court Administrator.

Records show that Dr. Melencio B. de la Pea filed on June 8, 1992 a complaint for grave oral
defamation 2 against Ignacia G. Garcia with the Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2577. The complaint for oral defamation arose from an incident which occurred on April 19, 1992 in
Naval, Leyte. After the preliminary examination was conducted, respondent Judge Meljohn de la Pea issued on
the same date a warrant 3 for the arrest of the accused Ignacia G. Garcia. By virtue of said warrant, SPO3
Teofanes Pacioles of the Philippine National Police arrested the accused. 4

On the same day, June 8, 1992, Engr. Edgardo Garcia, husband of the accused, posted the cash bail bond in the
amount of P2,000.00 as fixed in the warrant of arrest for the provisional liberty of the accused. Thereafter,
herein complainant sought at around 2:40 P.M. the approval of the cash bail bond and the Order of Release of
the accused but respondent judge was not in the office at that time. Meantime, the accused remained under
detention in the municipal jail of Naval. It was only the following day, June 9, 1992 at around 10:10 A.M. after
complainant secured a copy of the Order of Release 5 dated June 8, 1992 duly signed by respondent judge
that the accused was released from detention. Complainant was informed that before respondent judge left
for Cebu City, he entrusted the Order of Release to his wife, Lolita de la Pea, whose whereabouts, however,
were unknown in the afternoon of June 8, 1992 despite efforts by the Clerk of Court to look for her. 6 The
delay in the release of his wife from detention by one day because the Order of Release could not be obtained
as respondent judge left for Cebu City despite proper posting of the cash bond of P2,000.00 for her
provisional liberty on the same day of her arrest on June 8, 1992, prompted complainant to file on July 22,
1992 this administrative case against respondent judge.
Earlier, or on July 16, 1992, a complaint containing the same charges was filed by complainant with the Office
of the Ombudsman (Visayas), docketed as OMB VIS-92-397. 7

In his comment, respondent judge stated that he is adopting his

counter-affidavit and memorandum filed with the Ombudsman as part of his comment, wherein he asserted
that the certification to file action from the Lupon Tagapayapa was not necessary for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2577 because the imposable penalty of the crime of grave oral defamation
(4 months and 1 day to 3 years and 4 months) is not within the coverage of the Lupon Tagapayapa; that even if
the private complainant is his brother, he need not inhibit himself to "mobilize the machinery of justice"
because the case has been deferred for quite a long time due to the absence of the incumbent judge and the
non-designation of a presiding judge from April to May 1992; that there is no room for bias or partiality in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest which is both a mandatory and ministerial duty provided the complaint and the
supporting affidavit engender a probable cause; that to show his neutrality, he issued an inhibition order dated
June 15, 1992; that the cash bond posted was defective for there was no written undertaking as required
under Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; that his Clerk of Court was informed in the morning of June
8, 1992 that he would be going to Cebu City that afternoon for his pre-scheduled medical check-up and that he
is preparing an order of release which could be obtained from his wife, Lolita de la Pea, in case the accused
actually files a bail bond, after determining that the same is in order.

It is at once clear that the administrative charges against respondent judge focused mainly on the fact of his
taking cognizance of the criminal case of grave oral defamation filed by his brother, Dr. Melencio de la Pea,
against complainant's wife, Ignacia Garcia, which, as a consequence, gave rise to the incidents narrated in the
letter-complaint descriptive of the perceived bias and partiality of respondent judge in the discharge of his
official functions in connection with Criminal Case No. 2577.

The Court agrees with respondent judge that the certification to file an action required under Presidential
Decree No. 1508 is not necessary in the prosecution for grave oral defamation 8 for the same is beyond the
coverage of said Katarungan Pambarangay Law. 9 But, the charge of partiality, abuse of authority and grave
abuse of discretion as regards respondent judge's taking cognizance of the criminal case despite the fact that
private complainant is his brother a relative within the second degree of consanguinity in violation of the
rule on compulsory disqualification of judges under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court is a different
matter.

The Court, in this regard, will not hesitate to exercise its full disciplinary powers in the instant case where the
violation is so patent and the same has caused grave injustice to a party in a criminal case. The facts
manifesting respondent's partiality are patent in the records.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides, thus:

Sec.1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he was presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied)

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent
judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary
principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. 10 A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. 11 The law conclusively presumes that
a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his
authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to
preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice. 12

The fact that respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he is
related within the second degree of consanguinity to private complainant is obviously a glaring violation of the
rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case. The proffered excuse that Criminal Case No.
2577 has been dragging on for some time due to the absence of the incumbent judge and the non-designation
of a presiding judge will not justify the violation of a well-settled rule on compulsory disqualification of judges
to hear a case. Respondent judge should have formally informed the Executive Judge of the RTC of Leyte if,
indeed, the case had been deferred, and thereafter sought the designation of another MTC judge to take
cognizance of the case. He should have foreseen the possibility that his actuation and motives would have been
suspect if he had ruled in favor of the prosecution as his blood relationship with the private complainant was
of general knowledge.

The violation was aggravated when respondent judge thereafter issued a warrant of arrest on June 8, 1992
but at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, left for an alleged pre-scheduled medical check-up in the
nearby province of Cebu, thus depriving the accused of the opportunity to secure an order for her provisional
liberty upon proper posting of a bail bond on the same day of her arrest. As a consequence, the accused spent
her night in the municipal jail of Naval until the following morning of June 9, 1992 after spending almost 20
hours in jail.

To make matters even worse, the excuse given by respondent judge that he left the duly signed order of
release with his wife instead of the Clerk of Court before he left for Cebu exposed his total disregard of, or
indifference to, or even ignorance of, the procedure prescribed by law. Respondent judge's actuation is
unquestionably not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is conduct prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
Realizing perhaps that he has violated Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 3.12 par. (d), Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 13respondent judge belatedly issued an order inhibiting himself from the case
on June 15, 1992, or seven (7) days after he caused the arrest and detention of the accused. Clearly, the
damage and intrusion on the liberty of the accused were alreadyfait accompli.

Respondent judge likewise violated Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides: "A judge
shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others
to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge."

Respondent judge in the instant case tainted the image of the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the
obligation to keep it at all times unsullied and worthy of the people's trust. As this Court has had occasion to
declare: "As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible representation of the
law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the
law." 14 If judges, who have sworn to obey and uphold the Constitution, shall conduct themselves as respondent
did, in wanton disregard and violation of the rights of the accused, then the people, especially those who have
had recourse to them shall lose all their respect and high regard for the members of the Bench and the
judiciary itself shall lose the high moral ground from which it draws its power and strength to compel
obedience to the laws.

Worthy of note is the fact that respondent judge had been previously charged in A.M. No. R-48-MTJ (Ragir v.
de la Pea) with ignorance of the law and incompetence, for having taking cognizance of, and having decided, a
case for frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 5926) over which his court has no jurisdiction. To rectify the
error, respondent judge, three days after the rendition of judgment, recalled his decision and remanded the
case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal at Naval, sub-province of Biliran, Leyte, now province of Biliran. In
the resolution of October 15, 1985, the Court, giving credence to respondent's allegation of good faith in the
rendition of the judgment and the fact that he took steps to rectify his mistake three days after the
rendition of the erroneous judgment, imposed on him a fine equivalent to a month's salary with the warning
that repetition of similar acts in the future shall be dealth with more severely.

From all indications, it is clear from the facts on record and, in the absence of evidence to negate the
perceived bias and partiality which resulted in undue prejudice to the accused, that respondent judge, through
his oppressive and vindictive actuations towards the accused arising from his relationship to the private
complainant in the Criminal Case No. 2577, committed a disservice to the cause of justice. He does not,
therefore, deserve to remain in the judiciary and should accordingly be removed from the service.

In a recent case, 15 a municipal trial court judge who presided over the trial of Criminal Case No. 89-3905 for
grave threats against the accused, Roberto Cruda, who later became her brother-in-law by virtue of a
marriage ceremony she herself solemnized, and who thereafter rendered judgment acquitting the said
accused, was dismissed from the service by the Court, after investigation for charges of grave misconduct,
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, among
others. The Court observed, thus:

. . . For one, she deliberately disregarded Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which pertinently
provides in part: . . . and Rule 3.12 (d), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which reads: . . . considering
that (a) Roberto Cruda, the accused in Criminal Case
No. 89-3905, is her brother-in-law, being the husband of her youngest sister and, therefore, her
(respondent's) relative by affinity within the second degree, and (b) she did not obtain the written consent of
all the parties in interest. That it was only on 9 August 1991 or long after the case had been submitted for
decision that she became Roberto's sister-in-law provides no reason for a departure from the enunciated
rule as the abovequoted provisions impose an absolute prohibition regardless of the stage in the resolution of
the case that the relationship is established. As a matter of fact, given her special bias for the accused whom
she even wanted to reform and rehabilitate a task which became an
obsession and in whose behalf she interceded to obtain settlement of the criminal cases against him,
thereby necessarily blinding her impartiality and irreparably affecting the cold neutrality she is supposed to
possess as a judge, the voluntary disqualification from a case provided under the second paragraph of Section
1, Rule 137 should have been availed of by the respondent. (Emphasis supplied)
The dismissal of the criminal aspect of the same complaint
(OMB-VIS-92-397) by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in its resolution 16 of March 23, 1993 will not
affect the resolution of this case which basically relates to the power of the Supreme Court under Article
VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution to exercise administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnel's
compliance with all laws and pertinent rules and take proper administrative action against them, in the event
that they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. 17

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Meljohn de la Pea (Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte)
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte is hereby DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 112050 June 15, 1994

QUINTIN F. FELIZARDO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS & NEMESIO B. JOSE, respondents.

Lorenzon O. Navario for petitioner.

Ernesto Gonzales, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Private respondent Nemesio B. Jose, as owner-lessor of a house and lot located at No. 63-20th St., East
Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, filed on February 24, 1992, an action for ejectment with an application for the
1
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner Quintin Felizardo. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3163 in the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City.
On February 27, 1992, summons was issued directing the petitioner to file an answer and informing him that
the Rule on Summary Procedure would be applied. 2

In his answer, the petitioner averred inter alia that the private respondent's allegations to support his prayer
3
for a preliminary injunction were utterly false and intended only to evade the requirements of P.D. 1508 for
4
prior barangay conciliation.

At the preliminary conference and in his position paper, the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the court
and the sufficiency of the private respondent's cause of action for non-compliance with the said decree.

5
On September 1, 1992, judgment was rendered against the petitioner. On September 17, 1992, upon motion
6
of the private respondent, the court issued an order for the execution of its decision.

On that same date, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition
for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
7
preliminary injunction.

On October 7, 1992, that court issued a temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the writ of
execution. 8
Later, however, on October 23, 1992, it dismissed the petition on the ground that certiorari with
9
injunction was not the proper remedy of the petitioner, appeal being then still available to him.

10
The dismissal was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals. His motion for a reconsideration having
been denied, 11
Felizardo is now before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The core issue is the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari instituted by the petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City to challenge the judgment rendered by the court a quo.

The petition has no merit.

It is settled that the writ of certiorari is available only where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there
12
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is also the rule that
this special civil action should not be allowed as a substitute for an ordinary appeal or where there are other
13
remedies available.

There is no doubt that the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the case lodged by the private respondent and over the person of the petitioner, who had filed his answer to
the complaint. The only question is whether that court, in continuing to act on the case despite the lack of
prior barangay conciliation as required by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, committed a mere error
or judgment that could be reversed in an ordinary appeal or an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.

Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides:

Sec. 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. No complaint,

petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be
 filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the
pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or the pangkat secretary, attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or
unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly to court in the
following instances:

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpusproceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent contained an application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, as allowed under Section 33 of BP 129. The suit
would, therefore, ostensibly fall under the exception mentioned in Section 412 (b) of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. A different conclusion must be reached, however, after a closer look at the attendant
circumstances in light of the following allegations made by the private respondent in his complaint:

xxx xxx xxx

9. Such act of subdividing and subleasing said property by the defendant to other persons has
resulted in great irreparable loss and great injustice to the plaintiff and as a result thereof
plaintiff incurred actual damages to be proven during the proceedings.

10. Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded which consists of immediately restraining the
further subdivision or alteration and subleasing of the property and enjoining the defendant
from proceeding with any alteration, subdivision or subleasing of the properties subject of
the controversy.

11. Defendant is doing, or about to do, is procuring or suffering to be done, the act herein
complained of, in violation of plaintiffs right and tending the judgment of the case
ineffectual.

As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, the issue of the subdividing and subleasing of the property may no
longer be raised again in this case because it had already been adjudicated in the antecedent case between the
petitioner and the private respondent. This was Civil Case No. 3031, where it was held:
 On the matter of subleasing the property, plaintiff underscored the contention of the
defendant that since part of the provisions in the contract between them is to the effect
that he may use the premises in question for business purposes, this is controverted by the
specific provision thereat that the same should not be subleased to other persons. While the
terms appear to be so broad as to be susceptible of different interpretations and while the
court likewise does not countenance that a specific provision controls a general provision in a
contract, however, it is to be noticed that the intent of the parties to a contract should also
be given credence. It likewise cannot be countenanced by this court that the plaintiff has no
knowledge about this alleged violation affecting the subleasing, in a way that when the rooms
were constructed, it was with the knowledge of the plaintiff as contained in the affidavits
submitted by the defendant forming part of his position paper to this effect. Therefore
there appears to be an implied consent upon the plaintiff as it is quite impossible that the
plaintiff would not notice that a construction was going on the leased premises. The plaintiff
therefore is estopped from claiming otherwise. (Cited in the CA decision, p. 7.)

The above finding is now final and conclusive in view of the private respondent's withdrawal of his appeal
therefrom. As the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City observed:

The court notes plaintiff had virtually withdrawn his own appeal concerning the finding of the
lower court that the construction of additional rooms and the consequent subleasing of the
properties to third persons were with the consent of the plaintiff and which therefore
cannot be treated as additional ground to eject the defendant. . . . (Cited in CA decision, p. 9.)

That withdrawal deprived the private respondent's prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction of all legal
basis and removed his complaint from the operation of Sec. 412 (b) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

It is also worth noting that during the preliminary conference and in his position paper, Jose had conveyed the
impression that he was no longer interested in pursuing his application for such provisional remedy and was
14
limiting his cause of action to the recovery of the unpaid rentals. This strengthens all the more the
petitioner's contention that the prayer was merely a pretense designed to avoid the requirements of the said
law.

Whether or not the court acted correctly in proceeding with the case even without the prior barangay
proceeding is a procedural question that could not be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari but only in
an ordinary appeal. A similar observation is made on its declaration that it was incumbent upon the petitioner
to prove that the private respondent's allegations in support of the prayer for preliminary injunction was false
and that compensation or set-off was not a proper defense. These conclusions would at most constitute errors
of judgment reviewable only on appeal and not errors of jurisdiction reviewable by certiorari.

An additional consideration against the petitioner is his contention that appeal, although available, was not a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. He errs again.

The judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, if in favor of the plaintiff, must be executed
immediately to prevent further damage to him arising from loss of possession. Nevertheless, the defendant is
not entirely without recourse. Under the Rules of Court, he may stay such immediate execution by a)
perfecting an appeal; b) filing a supersedeas bond; and
c) periodically depositing with the appellate court the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.

These remedies are expressly provided for in Rule 70, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, reading in part as
follows:

Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay

same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately,
unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient
bond, approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the
action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down
to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. . . .

Although an order for the execution of the judgment in favor of the private respondent had already been
issued and Felizardo's ejectment from the leased property was imminent, he could still prevent the
implementation of the said order by availing himself of the above remedies. But he did not.

His reason was that "there is no way that Mr. Jose can lose in Olongapo City and there is nothing to prevent
him from securing a writ of execution notwithstanding the filing of a supersedeas bond. This had happened
before in the very same MTCC and in the very same RTC in the first case between him and herein petitioner."

It appears, though, that the petitioner's apprehensions are unfounded. The record shows that in the earlier
case between him and the private respondent, he was in fact able to obtain the suspension of the adverse
judgment against him during the pendency of his appeal with the Regional Trial Court by filing a supersedeas
bond. 15

The petitioner invokes the ruling in the case of Echaus vs. Court of Appeals 16
which reaffirmed Valencia
vs. Court of Appeals, 17
thus:

. . ., that certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is
not founded upon good reasons. Also, the fact that the losing party had appealed from the
judgment does not bar the certiorari action filed in respondent court as the appeal could not
be an adequate remedy from such premature execution.

That petitioner could have resorted to a supersedeas bond to prevent execution pending
appeal, as suggested by the two lower courts, is not to be held against him. The filing of such
bond does not entitle him to the suspension of execution as a matter of right. It cannot,
therefore, be categorically considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, no rule
requires a losing party so circumstanced to adopt such remedy in lieu or before availment of
other remedial options at hand.

Furthermore, a rational interpretation of Section 3, Rule 39 should be that the requirement

for a supersedeas bond presupposed that the case presents presumptively valid occasion for
 discretionary execution. Otherwise, even if no good reason exists to warrant advance
execution, the prevailing party would unjustly compel the losing party to post a supersedeas
bond through the simple expedient of filing a motion for, and the trial court improvidently
granting, a writ of execution pending appeal although the situation is violative of Section 2,
Rule 39. . . .

The above observations are not squarely applicable to the case at bar because what were sought to be
reviewed in the certiorari proceedings instituted by the petitioner in those cases were the orders of execution
pending appeal, which were interlocutory and unappealable. Moreover, the orders of execution in those cases
were for the collection of damages and attorney's fees and were issued pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39, of the
Rules of Court. This section requires good reasons to support the issuance of the writ. Certiorari was available
to challenge the orders, which were annulled because there was no showing of such good reasons to sustain to
sustain the execution pending appeal.

By contrast, what was challenged in the special civil action for certiorari filed by the herein petitioner with
the Regional Trial Court was not merely the order of execution but the judgment of the court a quo on the
merits of the case. This was final and appealable. Besides, the writ in this case was issued under Section 8,
Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, under which it is not necessary to show good reasons for the immediate
execution of the judgment against the defendant. This is an ejectment case. As the Rules of Court require the
judgment in such cases to be executed immediately, the writ of execution can be stayed only upon compliance
with the requirements of the said action.

It is understood that the trial court retains its discretion to issue an order of execution pending appeal even
when the defendant posts a supersedeas bond. Of course, this discretion is not absolute. The court can still
disregard the supersedeas bond but only when there are special and compelling reasons justifying immediate
18
execution. If that discretion is exercised arbitrarily, the aggrieved party has the right to question such act
in a petition for certiorari.

To recapitulate, when the Municipal Trial Court ruled that it could act on the complaint for ejectment filed by
the private respondent even without prior barangay conciliation proceedings, it committed a mere error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. We have held in many cases that while the referral of a case to the Lupon
Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court, non-compliance therewith cannot
affect the jurisdiction which the court has already required over the subject matter and over the person of
the defendant. 19
Hence, the remedy available to the petitioner was to question the ruling of the court a quo in
an ordinary appeal and not, as he mistakenly did, in a special action for certiorari.

At any rate, even assuming that the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner was the proper remedy, the
same cannot be granted as it cannot be said that the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding the allegations for the issuance of preliminary injunction to be sufficient compliance with the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law. We agree with the Regional Trial Court that:

Thus, when the lower court allegedly disregarded the counterclaims of petitioner, when it
refused to rule on "compensation off-setting" and ruled that the application for a provisional
remedy in the complaint for ejectment was not sham or that it was not proved as such, and
also when said court failed to dismiss the case for lack of compliance with the requirement of
 PD 1508 there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court . . . It
cannot be said that respondent judge acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Besides, as already pointed out, the petitioner had other plain, speedy and adequate remedies available to him
under Rule 70, Section 8, of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.