Romans.
However, Gnaeus Scipio
Historical Background
At the onset of the Second Punic War in
218 BC, Rome dispatched one of its
consular armies, under Publius Cornelius
Scipio, to invade northern Spain. Arriv-
ing at Massilia (modern Marseille), the
Romans were stunned to discover that
Hannibal was already on the east bank of
the Rhone, headed for Italy. In what was
possibly the key strategic decision of the
war, Publius opted to continue with the
invasion of Spain. He sent his army on
under the command of his older brother
Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, while Publius
himself returned to Italy to face
Hannibal. This move resulted in a 13-
year duel for supremacy between Rome
and Carthage for control of the Iberian
Peninsula.
Following the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, and
Corsica to Rome during the First Punic
War (264-241 BC) and its aftermath,
Hamilcar Barca ((Hannibal's father)
carved out an extensive Spanish province
for Carthage between 238 and 229 BC.
As the Second Punic War opened,
Carthage held all of southern and
eastern Spain, up to the Ebro River.
When Hannibal departed for Italy, he
left his brother, Hasdrubal Barca, with
12,650 infantry, 2,550 cavalry, 21
elephants, and a small fleet to hold the
province. After a swift conquest of
northeastern Spain, Hannibal left Hanno
with another 11,000 troops to control the
newly-won territory. Hannibal took
with him all the veteran troops and
experienced officers of Carthage's
Iberian army. He had also bypassed the
coastal Greek cities of northern Spain,
allies of Rome.
Gnaeus Scipio had 22,000 infantry, 2,200
cavalry and a small fleet with which to
undertake the invasion of Spain. With
these troops, and friendly bases at
Emporiae and Tarraco, Gnaeus easily
crushed Hanno's army and took control
of northern Spain in the fall of 218 BC.
The following spring, Hasdrubal, his
forces augmented by Iberian levies,
advanced north to challenge the
reinforced his fleet with picked legion-
naires, caught the Carthaginian fleet by
surprise, and crushed it at the Battle of
the Ebro. In the fall of 217 BC, Publius
Cornelius Scipio, now a pro-consul,
finally arrived in his allotted province
with 8,000 reinforcements.
Meanwhile, in Italy, Hannibal won three
spectacular victories over the Romans at
Trebbia, Trasimene, and Cannae by the
summer of 216 BC. The Carthaginian
government resolved that the time had
come to reinforce Hannibal in Italy with
an army from Spain and bring the war
to a conclusion. Carthage sent
Hasdrubal 4,000 foot and 500 horse as
reinforcements, along with orders to
march for Italy. A rebellion among the
Tartesii tribe in southern Spain, how-
ever, delayed his invasion until the
following year. In the meantime, the
Scipio brothers consolidated their
control north of the Ebro and prepared
to meet Hasbrubal's onslaught.
The Battle of Dertosa
In the spring of 215 BC, Hasdrubal
moved north with some 25,000 foot,
4,000 horse and 21 elephants. The
Scipio brothers masses 30,000 infantry
and 3,000 cavalry to bar his path at the
Ebro River. Hasdrubal's objective was
to defeat the main Roman field army so
that he could cross into Italy while still
maintaining Carthaginian control of
Spain. The Scipio brothers likewise
aimed to defeat Hasdrubal in open
battle to prevent his crossing into Italy
and to break his grip on the Iberian
Peninsula.
Hasdrubal's army was comprised
mainly of African and mercenary
regulars augmented by Iberian levies.
His infantry consisted of around 15,000
Libyan spearmen, 1,000 mercenaries
(Ligurians and other unspeci-
fied soldiers of fortune), 8,000
Iberians, and 1,000 Balearic
slingers. His mounted force
included 2,300 Numidian light
cavalry, 450 Liby-Phoenician
heavy cavalry, 1,200 Spanish
horse, and 21 elephants.
Reportedly, his Spanish levies
were none too anxious to
make the trek to Italy that
would follow a victory.

The Scipio brothers' forces

included two reinforced
Roman legions, consisting of
10,000 foot and 600 horse, and
allied Italian troops number-
ing nearly 18,000 infantry and
1,800 cavalry. Their auxiliary
Iberian forces probably
included about 2,000 foot and
400 horse.

The Roman command was

exercised jointly by the Scipio
brothers. Although Publius
had initially been the supreme
commander, with Gnaeus as
his deputy, the command by this
point
was largely shared. Gnaeus was the
elder brother, and he had served a
consulship with distinction against the
Insubrian Gauls in 222 BC. Gnaeus has
also served as the sole commander in
Spain for over a year before Publius
arrived. The Senate appears to have
vested both brothers with pro-consular
authority. Hasdrubal, on the other
hand, was the unquestioned sole
Carthaginian commander. This was
mainly because he had no subordinate
commanders of note. Himilco, his
deputy, remained behind in southern
Spain to maintain control of the vast
Carthaginian province.
Since both sides sought to fight a
decisive battle, the maneuvering was
limited and straightforward. In the
early spring of 215 BC, the Romans
crossed the Ebro and laid siege to the
Carthaginian allied city of Ibera (the
Battle of Dertosa is also known as the
Battle of Ibera). Hasdrubal in turn laid
siege to a small Roman allied city, also
on the south bank of the Ebro, across
from the city of Dertosa (modern
Tortosa). The Romans then moved
against Hasdrubal and he obliged by
coming down onto a nearby plain to
face them. The two camps were about
five miles apart, and the two armies felt
each other out during five days of
skirmishing. The stage was set for the
climactic showdown.
The Scipio brothers deployed their army
in standard fashion, with the two
legions in the center and the allied
infantry divided evenly between the
wings. The Roman cavalry, reinforced
with the Spanish horse, formed on the
extreme right. On the far left were
posted all the Italian cavalry. About
2,000 roman and Italian infantry and the
Spanish auxiliary foot remained behind
as a camp guard.
Hasdrubal, who by now had received a
full account of the action at Cannae,
posted his sturdy African phalanxes on
the wings of his infantry line. The right
wing was purely African, while the left
wing was reinforced by his mercenaries.
The center was composed entirely of
Iberian tribal levies. He stationed his
Liby-Phoenician heavy cavalry and
Iberian horsemen on his far left,
opposite the Roman cavalry. Against
the Italian horse he posted his superb
Numidian light cavalry. Each cavalry
wing was also reinforced with about ten
African war elephants (the same
disposition Hannibal had employed at
the Battle of Trebbia). The Balearic
slingers formed an extended skirmish
line. The remaining infantry, 2,000 to
3,000 in number, guarded his camp.
The Roman battle plan appears to have
been typically straightforwarda
frontal assault, weighted in the center.
The Scipio brothers, like Hasdrubal,
were well aware of what had occurred
at Cannae. They apparently believed
the appropriate counter to envelopment
was to rupture the enemy center. For
his part, Hasdrubal knew that the
circumstances he faced were signifi-
cantly different from those at Cannae.
His infantry was much closer in
numbers to his Roman opponent's than
Hannibal's had been, but he lacked the
decisive cavalry superiority his brother
had exploited to such good effect.
Hasdrubal could only hope that his
elephant corps would provide the
quick victory he needed from his
cavalry on the flanks, and that his
unenthusiastic Iberian infantry could
hold in the center long enough for the
envelopment to unfold.
The action began in the center with the
charge of the two Roman legions into
Hasdrubal's Iberian infantry; the
Spanish troops immediately gave
ground. The African phalanxes and
mercenaries on the wings now came
into play and forced the allied Italian
foot back. Meanwhile, on the extreme
flanks, the elephant charges proved
ineffectual, and neither side's mounted
troops gained a quick advantage. At
this critical juncture, the Carthaginian
center broke in the face of the aggressive
Roman assault. Although Hasdrubal
had thus lost his chance for scoring a
"Cannae," he could still win a "Trebbia"
at this point. For just as in that earlier
battle, the Carthaginian infantry wings
were victorious even as their center
faltered. In fact, the Italian infantry was
hard pressed and effectively outflanked
by the African phalanxes.
But at the Trebbia, the Carthaginian
cavalry had won a decisive victoryat
Dertosa, they skirmished indecisively,
then lost their nerve when they ob-
served the rout of the center. The Punic
cavalry joined in the flight, thereby
dooming the heretofore victorious
African and mercenary infantry on the
wings. After putting up a stubborn
fight and both inflicting and suffering
heavy losses, Hasdrubal's wings joined
in the rout. Cannae had been avenged.
The Aftermath
The immediate result of this battle was
to prevent Hasdrubal from crossing into
Italy with a second Carthaginian army.
He would not accomplish this for
another eight years (208-207 BC).
Although the failed invasion attempt of
215 BC has been historically eclipsed by
the Metaurus campaign of 207 BC,
Hasdrubal's earlier effort actually posed
a far greater threat to Rome's survival.
In 215 BC, Rome, still reeling from
Cannae, would most likely have been
overwhelmed by the combined forces of
the two eldest sons of Hamilcar Barca.
By 207 BC, Rome was far better pre-
pared to handle a second invasion, as
the resulting Battle of Metaurus demon-
strated.
The Roman victory at Dertosa also
brought the Scipio brothers new Iberian
allies and the opportunity to carry the
war into Punic Spain. In fact, the Scipio
brothers carried on the war in Spain
with great success for the next four
years. However, in 211 BC, Hasdrubal
Barca, along with his brother Mago and
Hasdrubal Gisgo, defeated and slew
them both in the twin Battles of Castulo
and Ilorca. Of course, Hasdrubal was
also destined to die in a losing battle, at
the Metaurus. It was left to Publius
Scipio's son, the great Africanus, to
avenge the deaths of his father and his
uncle by decisively crushing the
Carthaginian Spanish armies at Ilipa in
206 BC. This battle would spell the end
of Carthaginian domination and the
beginning of Roman control of the
Iberian Peninsula.
The Final Analysis
Why did Hasdrubal fail at Dertosa
while his brother Hannibal had suc-
ceeded at Cannae against a far larger
Roman army? Many have assumed
that Hasdrubal was simply inferior to
his older brother in command ability.
While this charge may have some merit,
Hasdrubal undeniably suffered from a
number of serious disadvantages.
First of all, he lacked the cavalry
superiority (10,000 to 6,000) that
proved decisive at Cannae. He lacked
the disciplined troops that Hannibal
commanded, veterans of 20 years of
continuous warfare in Spain. Even
more important, he lacked the cadre of
highly trained, professional staff officers
that accompanied Hannibal into Italy.
This was particularly evident in the
failure of the Carthaginian cavalry to
press home its attacks on the extreme
flanks. In addition, Hasdrubal faced
two very competent Roman command-
ers in the Scipio brothers, whereas
Hannibal had been matched against the
inept Gaius Terentius Varro. But most
important, a double envelopment is
probably the riskiest of battle plans,
promising total, annihilating victory or
overwhelming defeat. Chance, or fate,
had its role as well. Hasdrubal tossed
the dice, and lost.
Hasdrubal is killed, there is no substi-
tute OC. Tychaeus may only command
Numidian cavalry.
Roman Leadership
Publius and Gnaeus Scipio are both
Roman OCs, but only over the following
units:
Gnaeus Scipio is OC for the III Double
Legion, VII Ala Sociorum Legion, and
all AS Cavalry.
Publius Scipio is OC for the V Double
Legion, XIV Ala Sociorum Legion, and
the Roman and Iberian cavalry.
Both Scipio brothers can command
any Roman unit which is outside its
normal command chain by using
individual orders. If either brother is
killed, the other becomes OC for the
entire Roman army.
Retreat Edges
The Carthaginians use the Southwest
edge as their Retreat Edge.
The Romans use the Northeast edge as
their Retreat Edge.
Optional Rules
The following rules from Consul for
Rome are recommended, if you have
the module:
Triarii Tactical Doctrine
Roman Line Replacement
From SPQR's Zama scenario, you may
use the Special Rule: "Blow, Scipio,
Blow." Either Africanus' father or uncle
may issue the command for the sonic
anti-elephant blast in this scenario.
(Surus is not affected.)
Victory
The army which routs loses the
scenarios. If both armies rout
simultaneously, the Carthaginians win.
Army Rout
Rome: Army routs when units with TQ
totaling 188 have been eliminated.
Carthage: Army routs when units with
TQ totaling 110 have been eliminated.
Sources
The sources for Dertosa are generally
the same as those listed for SPQR.
However, the primary source is Livy,
rather than Polybius, as the latter's
account of this battle has not survived.
Additional sources:
Head, Duncan,
Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars,
Wargamers Research Group,
Sussex, 1982
Lazenby, J. F.,
Hannibal's War,
Warminster, 1978