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3rd International ASRANet Colloquium

10 12th July 2006, Glasgow, UK.

RISK-BASED SHIP DESIGN: CONCEPT, METHDOLOGY AND


FRAMEWORK
D. Vassalos, Universities of Glasgow and Strathclyde, UK
L. Guarin, Safety at Sea Ltd., UK
D. Konovessis, Universities of Glasgow and Strathclyde, UK

ABSTRACT
This contribution aims to elucidate Risk-Based Design (RBD), a design methodology that incorporates
explicitly safety objectives in the design process. Drawing from over ten years of effort with many
organisations undertaking a large number of research and development projects, the contribution
introduces the subject, explains the motivation for RBD, details the underlying principles and constituent
pasts of the methodology and outlines the development of a framework to facilitate implementation.
Emphasis is placed on demonstrating the considerable potential offered to the maritime industry by
embracing innovation through the adoption of risk-based methodologies and through the routine
utilisation of all forms of scientific and technological breakthroughs in dealing with ship safety as a life-
cycle ship design issue.

1. INTRODUCTION stronger resurgence of safety as a key issue that


cannot be considered in isolation any longer nor
Traditionally ship safety has been dealt with by fixed by add-ons is prevailing, bringing home the
adherence to rules and regulations, thus treated as long overdue realisation that lack of safety or
a constraint in the design process. With ineffective approaches to dealing with it can drive
technology and users requirements developing shippers out of business. This progressively
faster than knowledge can be assimilated and best acquired appreciation that the marine industry is a
practice produced, this approach to safety risk industry is catching up with the maritime
assurance is expected to be largely ineffective. profession, necessitating changes in peoples
More specifically, the lack of a systematic and all- attitude and the adoption of holistic risk-based
embracing approach to ship safety, offering a approaches to maritime safety, approaches capable
framework that allows for a strategic overview of of striking a balance between all the many facets
safety and the derivation of effective solutions, affecting safety cost-effectively and throughout
means that the wealth of information amassed over the life cycle of the vessel. Added to the above,
many years of research and development on stand- recent civil catastrophes of cosmic proportion (the
alone safety-critical areas remains under utilised, September 11 2001 events in the USA) have
whilst ship safety continues to be unnecessarily brought all safety-driving forces (socio-political,
undermined. techno-economic and ethical) in alignment,
pushing safety issues to the fore-front of societal
However, recent well publicised marine disasters problems. As a result, a clear tendency to move
(Herald of Free Enterprise 1987, Exxon Valdez from prescriptive to performance-based
1989, Scandinavian Star 1990, Estonia 1994, approaches to safety is emerging internationally
Erika 1999, Express Samina 2000, Prestige 2002), and this, in turn, is paving the way to drastic
linked to intolerable consequences with respect to evolutionary changes in design, where safety is
human life, property and the environment, dealt with as a central issue with serious economic
triggered a chain of events that raised safety implications rather than a simplistic compliance.
awareness among the whole maritime community
and the wider public. Concerted efforts Concerted efforts to respond to these
internationally forced the subject of safety to the developments in the marine industry led to the
forefront of developments, overcoming the inertia establishment of the first significant EU Thematic
of the marine industry and giving way to scientific Network (TN) SAFER EURORO (SAFER
approaches to assessing safety at the expense of EURORO 1997 and 2001, Vassalos et al. 2005)
the traditionally governing empiricism. A new aimed to promote a new design philosophy under
the theme Design for Safety - an initial methodology for designing safe ships must be
partnership of 33 that grew to more than 90 adopted aiming to promote safety to the heart of the
organisations from across the whole spectrum of design process rather than being seen to be in
the marine industry in Europe. The strategic conflict with ship production and operation and be
objective of SAFER EURORO was to integrate treated in isolation from other ship design factors.
safety cost-effectively within the design process in
a way that safety drives ship design and A historical exploration into the development of
operation. This in turn entailed the development of Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and an examination
a formal state-of-the-art design methodology to of the safety-related drivers reveals trends which
support and nurture a safety culture paradigm in ought to be considered with care in facing a future
the ship design process by treating safety as a full of new challenges. These include:
design objective rather than a constraint. The
internationalisation of the TN output through Enhancement of safety is sought through
contribution to IMO activities and through other legislation.
dissemination activities, the significant Regulations address mainly the ship itself,
contribution to the regulatory process (for example, more specifically areas perceived to be safety
HARDER and SAFETY FIRST were instrumental critical (e.g., subdivision).
to the development of the probabilistic damage Clear goals and objectives are missing
stability and fire safety regulations, respectively) (prescriptive regulations).
and the increasing realisation by all concerned that Safety rules and regulations have been driven
scientific approaches to dealing with ship safety by disaster and public outrage (reactive
offer unique opportunities to the maritime industry approach).
to strengthen competitiveness, have helped create Raising of safety standards has always been
a momentum that is now providing the fuel, the preceded by casualties including considerable
inspiration and the foundation for SAFEDOR loss of life or property or environmental
(SAFEDOR 2005, Christensen et al. 2005). This damage.
is a newly-funded EU FP6 Integrated Project The pace of rule development until recently
aimed at integrating safety research in Europe and has been slow.
beyond and to drive risk-based design to full
Safety has been treated as a separate,
implementation ranging from concept
conflicting engineering discipline without any
development to approval.
consideration of cost-effectiveness analyses or
attempt in understanding how it interacts with
2. MOTIVATION FOR RISK-BASED other design factors.
SHIP DESIGN
Vested interests always delayed and often
defeated the imposition of new regulations or
It is interesting to note that the first principle in
forced a compromise that was unwise or
Design for Production as recommended by
unworkable. As a result, maritime law has
Storch (Storch et al. 1995) is to use common
constantly shown a large time interval between
sense and by analogy nothing stirringly new is
accidents and prevention of their repetition.
presently advocated in suggesting Design for
There are underlying trends of decreasing loss
Safety as the way forward to improving ship
in ships and fatalities but those have to be
safety. However, even though good designs should
always take into account safety matters, this has considered in conjunction with the decreasing
invariably been governed by minimum compliance human tolerance to risk which becomes
with the rules and hence not addressed optimally. unacceptable, however remote the possibility
Many may argue that competent designers have of a tragedy involving large loss of life.
always strived to produce safe designs, but history Today, human life is much more precious than
demonstrably shows that intention is not a ever before. An emerging trend concerns also
substitute for methodological treatment when it the importance attached by humans to the
concerns a complex and multi-disciplinary subject protection of the marine environment, which
such as ship safety. To this end, a formalised must not be taken lightly.
Developments in shipping happen faster than The notion of Risk is usually associated with
experience is gained, thus the traditional events, the outcome of which we dont like.
reliance on experience and codes of best Hazards in ship operations have led in the past
practice is running thin. to well-publicised collisions, groundings,
Over-capacity of transportation, over-supply of sinkings, founderings, etc., in many cases
services and painfully low margins, drive some resulting in significant loss of life, and damage
of the best companies and the core of the to the environment. There is no doubt that
seagoing skill-base out of shipping. The shipping operations are risky and ships should
resulting combination of an ageing fleet, sub- be also designed with this in mind.
standard ships and multi-national crews
presents safety problems. In order to address safety explicitly, we need
Global media coverage brings the accident at to measure it (what gets measured gets
the door of the public and is capable of stirring done): in this respect, risk is considered the
strong emotions. currency of safety. Hence explicit
Shift of safety focus from hardware to software consideration of safety is equivalent to
follows wide awareness and growing evaluating risk during the design (risk-based
appreciation of the role of human factors on design).
safety matters.
Phenomenal progress in science and From a practical viewpoint, the application of
technology over the recent past presents the risk-based design will be biased towards
shipping industry with opportunities to meet design concepts with high levels of innovation.
emerging challenges cost-effectively and In risk-based design, the target is to increase
safely. the influence of good practice, engineering
judgment, state-of-the-art tools and knowledge,
Considering the above, adopting a risk-based all of which are part of Quantitative Risk
design approach that embraces innovation and Analysis (QRA).
promotes routine utilisation of first-principles
tools will lead to cost-effective ways of dealing Within the context above, and taking into account
with safety and to building and sustaining the notions presented in the previous section, it
competitive advantage. This is particularly so for can be stated that the essential advance that risk-
knowledge-intensive and safety-critical ships; based design represents in relation to ship design
knowledge intensive as such ship concepts are as is practiced today, is the explicit, rational and
fuelled by innovation and safety critical as with cost-effective treatment of safety. To achieve this,
such ship design safety is indeed a design driver. the following have to be considered:
This paper specifically targets these issues, by
detailing current advances on the establishment of a) A consistent measure of safety must be
a risk-based design framework with the view to employed and a formalised procedure for its
maximizing safety through treating safety as a quantification adopted (risk analysis). For this
design objective. This must be achieved with the to be workable, considering the complexity of
support of advanced safety performance prediction what constitutes safety, a clear focus on key
tools, in a systematic and all-embracing approach safety drivers is necessary (major accident
to ship safety integrating all factors concerning categories). Numerous formal procedures for
safety at sea for the entire vessel life-cycle. risk quantification, risk assessment and risk
management exist in various contexts (for
3. RISK-BASED SHIP DESIGN instance FSA for making rules, safety case for
specific design/operational solutions, among
In addressing risk-based ship design, it is others). The right-hand-side of Figure 6
important to first make the following illustrates the elements of a typical safety
considerations: assessment process.
b) Such procedure must be integrated into the objective, multi-criteria optimisation problem.
design process to allow for trade-offs between A common ship design model managed within
safety and other design factors by utilising an integrated design environment (software)
overlaps between performance, life-cycle cost will also be required for that process to be
considerations, functionality and safety at the conducted efficiently.
parameter level. The interfaces between the
ship design process and the safety assessment With the above in mind, risk-based design can be
procedure are illustrated in Figure 6. defined as follows:
Consequently, additional information on safety
performance and risk will be available for Risk-based design is a formalised methodology
design decision making and design that integrates systematically risk assessment in
optimisation, which in principle, should not the design process with prevention/reduction of
change. risk (to life, property and the environment)
embedded as a design objective, alongside
c) Considering the level of computations that conventional design objectives (such as speed,
might be necessary to address all pertinent capacity, etc).
safety concerns and the effect of safety-related
design changes on functionality and other It is noted that Figure 1 depicts a possible high-
performance, a different handling is required; level framework of risk-based design. The
namely, the use of parametric models to allow elements of such a framework and its implications
for trade-offs through overlaps at the for ship design are described next.
parameter level and access to fast and accurate
first-principles tools. The design optimisation
process becomes thus a typical case of a multi-

SHIP DESIGN SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

(i)
Performance Design safety goals
Expectations Functional requirements / preferences

(ii)
Identification of hazards
Requirements and
Constraints Identification of possible design solutions
(focus on preventing accidents)
(iii)
Ship functions and Identification of critical functions, systems
and relevant key safety parameters
performances safety
performance Identification of critical/design scenarios
(iv) (flooding, fire, system failure, etc)
Systems, fitness for purpose
Risk Analysis
components, feasibility
How probable? How serious?
risk
hardware (Level of detail depends on design stage)
Design
(design solution)
aesthetics
Decision- Risk Assessment
costs making Implementation of risk control measures
(v) (focus on mitigating consequences of
Evaluation of ship technical company/society accidents)
performances performance values, preferences

Integrated Design Environment


[Software Platform]

Figure 1: A High-Level Framework for Risk-Based Design Implementation


3.1 SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE minimal impact to the environment in case of a
ship accident.
In principle, the safety assessment procedure
referred to above is a systematic and formalised Specific Technical Goals
risk assessment process, which can be carried out vessel to remain upright and afloat in all
in a variety of ways. The selection of the right feasible operational loading and environmental
approach has to be viewed in the context of the conditions,
following drivers (HSE 2001): vessel to remain upright and afloat in case of
water ingress and flooding,
Design stage: will determine the level of ship structure to withstand all foreseeable
flexibility to possible design changes as well loads during its lifetime (e.g., no extreme load
as the level of design knowledge. At concept structural failure or fatigue failure of key
design stages (pre-contract) there is flexibility structural members),
for major design trade-offs; on the other hand, sufficient residual structural strength in
there is lesser knowledge about the ship, hence damage conditions,
the risk assessment approach must be limited high passenger comfort (low incidence of sea
to coarser methods. The risk assessment can - sickness, low vibrations levels, low noise
of course - be refined during advanced design levels), and
stages (as more design details are available) etc.
and up to construction and commissioning
process. Similar safety goals may be implicit in statutory or
Major hazard potential: the greater the class requirements for risk acceptability if such
potential exposure to total loss or multiple are available for approval purposes. Other design
fatality, the less desirable it is to use only goals can be summarised in the expression,
conventional rules-based approaches for
decision making. Hence the focus on major fit for purpose (turnaround time, service speed,
ship accident categories. capacity, services, etc.)!
Risk decision context: with higher elements of
novelty, uncertainty or stakeholder concern 3.3 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
will also push towards more thorough risk
assessment, hence the bias of risk-based design In order to achieve generic safety goals such as
towards high innovation, high-value vessels. those stated above, more specific functional
requirements must be defined so that compliance
3.2 DEFINITION OF SAFETY GOALS with such requirements would ensure achievement
of the safety goals. In line with risk-based
Safety goals as other design goals, are related to approaches, the identification of such
the ships mission and ships purpose. Explicit requirements must be based on a systematic and
safety goals are already part and parcel of the rational assessment of what can impede the
design input. Examples of design goals driven by achievement of the safety goals; thus the what-
safety considerations (mainly associated with can-go-wrong question must be explored
company values and policies) can be listed as systematically. This can be accomplished using
follows: hazard identification techniques. Hazard
identification is usually a qualitative exercise
Top-Level Goals based primarily on expert judgment. Various
no accidents leading to total ship loss techniques and formats for reporting are available
(collisions, groundings, stranding, fires, etc), depending on the case, the purpose and the level
no loss of human life due to ship related of the design knowledge available (Hazard
accidents, Identification, HAZID; Failure Modes Effects and
low impact to the environment (low air Criticality Analysis, FMECA; Structured Whats
emissions, low noise, low wash), and If Technique, SWIFT; Hazard Operability Studies,
HAZOP; etc.
fact that ship safety, as a top-down process, is
To this end, it is always useful to have a clear governed only by a handful of factors which, when
definition of the ships mission and its operational considered individually or in combination, define
profile, the latter may include (but not be limited a limited set of design scenarios with calculable
to) the following: probabilities of occurrence and consequences that
could collectively quantify the life-cycle risk of a
departure: bunkering, loading/unloading, ship at sea. These relate to accident categories
manoeuvring out of port, etc.; with major hazard potential, thus can be derived
passage: services on board, other functions, from hazard identification. Typical linkages
navigation in restricted waters, navigation in among these hazard scenarios are illustrated in
open waters, etc.; Figure 2. When generic design scenarios are
arrival: manoeuvring into port, berthing, available, these must be adapted and customised to
unloading/loading, etc.; and the specific design features and expected
others: dry-docking, maintenance and repairs, performance of the vessel in question.
etc.
3.5 DEFINITION OF FUNCTIONAL
Within the above operational profile, significant REQUIREMENTS
hazards that could lead to catastrophic loss of the
vessel, significant loss of human life/injuries, Once a list of prioritised hazards is available
and/or significant damage to the environment must (based on qualitative ranking of risk) along with
be identified and their design implications relevant design scenarios, specific functional
understood so that appropriate design measures requirements and evaluation parameters need to be
can be taken to prevent the ensuing accidents and formulated. These can be seen as an additional set
to mitigate the severity of their consequences. In (in relation to the normal set of performances) of
principle and depending on the ship type, hazards safety performance requirements, an example of
that may lead to all or some of the accident which is shown in Table 2. These, of necessity,
categories need to be included in the subsequent must be based on engineering judgment and
steps of the safety assessment procedure. The available safety knowledge. With a consolidated
outcome of such exercise at initial design stages list of safety-related functional requirements, the
may be illustrated as indicated in Table 1. design process can proceed as normally. Such
requirements will, alongside other conventional
3.4 CRITICAL DESIGN SCENARIOS design requirements, be used by a designer to put
together the first base line design and to identify
What makes risk-based design feasible and design disciplines for evaluation.
manageable, hence practicable, derives from the
Table 1: Example of Results from Hazard Identification

Ship type: RoPax; Capacity: 1000 pax, 200 cars, 20 lorries, 50 trailers, etc.
Operational mode Hazard Accident category
Loading of vehicles Vehicles carrying dangerous goods, (1) Fire / explosions on car deck,
Electrical faults within vehicles, contact damage to car deck structural
Drivers (human) errors members

Embarkation of passengers Relative motion between span-link and ship (2) Span-link failure when pax
embarkation/disembarkation

Transit and navigation in coastal Proximity to grounding hazards, wind, (3) Collision
areas currents, loss of power, loss of steering, other
vessels activity (4) drifting grounding,

(5) power grounding



Figure 2: Typical Structural Links of Design Scenarios

Table 1: Example of Possible Ship Functions, Performances


and Performance Evaluation Parameters

Required safety Ship safety performance Safety performance evaluation parameters / functional requirements (to be
Function identified following risk analysis)
Collision and Vessel to remain upright and Prevention:
Grounding afloat in all feasible water Effectiveness of navigational equipment; bridge layout design (alarms,
Safety ingress scenarios visibility, controls, etc)

Mitigation:
Loss of structural integrity of the hull, damage extend, time to flood,
flooding extent, instantaneous heeling, time to capsize, damage control
arrangements, etc. Power, propulsion and steering redundancy after damage.
Fire safety Safety objectives implicit in Prevention:
SOLAS II-2 Limit the amount of ignition sources and combustible materials on the car
decks, etc

Mitigation:
Alarm and detection effectiveness, fire protection, time to reach untenable
conditions, effectiveness of fire fighting arrangements, etc.

Others Prevention:
Car deck layout designed for easy of loading/unloading (visibility, space,
ramp arrangements, ventilation, lighting, crew communication
arrangements, etc.)

4. DESIGN DECISION-MAKING running costs, earning potential, etc.) then if


would be possible to make major design decisions
Use of risk analysis or alternatively of risk- and trade-offs optimally and cost-effectively in a
knowledge models in ship design would provide practical time-scale.
additional information on safety performance and
risk levels to the design decision making process. In relation to design decision making, in the same
The use of risk-knowledge models would allow way as there are explicit ship performance
such information to be easily re-calculated if evaluation criteria (design criteria), and economic
design changes are made. If similar parametric targets (within owners requirements) there is a
models existed for other elements of ship need to define safety performance evaluation
performance (weight, efficiency, capacity, etc.) criteria and risk acceptance criteria. The latter
and economic implications (relative initial and could be related to safety performance criteria, so
that safety performance could be used in the would provide the designer with means to rapidly
design iterations, alongside or even instead of and reasonably accurately obtain quantitative
explicit risk acceptance criteria. As a result, key information for rational and transparent design
design aspects of the initial baseline designs decision making (see Figure 3). It is obvious that
(watertight subdivision, structural design, internal not all necessary Performance- and Risk-
layout, main vertical zones, bridge layout, Knowledge models would be available in all
materials, major ship systems, etc.) can be cases; however, the implied availability of a
optimised from the point of view of ship global parametric description of the baseline
performance, cost implications, potential earnings design solution would facilitate the use of explicit
while also ensuring that the safety performance performance and safety-performance (first-
level (as quantified) is appropriate and principles) evaluation tools and would allow
commensurate with acceptable and quantified risk formal (numerical) optimisation techniques in ship
levels (provided that such do exist). design to be used effectively. Indeed, the
possibility of optimising ship performance without
regulatory constrains is what would make a
It is obvious that some design decisions determine
significant difference in ship design decision
the construction costs, other determine the
making as the best design solution (from all
operating cost and potential earnings. While ship
relevant perspectives) may lie outside the
designers are, to a large extent, able to manage the
regulatory envelope. Established optimisation
construction costs, it is also unlikely that they
tools and techniques can help the designer to
would be able to do the same with the operational
explore a much wider design solution envelope
economic profile of the vessel. For the former,
within the time scale available during early design
shipyards possess detailed knowledge and
concept development and beyond.
empirical models (indeed such relationships do
exist within shipyards) to estimate construction
costs. For the latter, it is the shipyards clients 5. CONCLUSIONS
(the shipowners) who possess the detailed
Responding to well-publicised marine disasters,
knowledge and working models of their
the marine industry strives to shape safety through
operational costs and earnings profile.
concerted efforts on an international scale. The
progress is slow amidst burdens of inertia,
Notwithstanding the above, the ultimate decision
tradition, conventions, interventions, old rules,
about the design parameters and variables lies of
new rules, biased attitudes, fierce competition and
course with the designers themselves and other
painfully low margins. But it points in the right
involved stakeholders (shipowner, shipyard, etc.).
direction! Maintaining or improving ship safety at
The quantified ship performance measures
the rightful level, however, requires more than
(technical performance, safety performance, costs,
disaster-triggered reactions. It requires the
earning potential, and risk) would be weighted
systematic use of the scientific method in all its
alongside other factors that are outside the design
forms together with a change in peoples attitude
studies themselves (preferences, company policies,
toward safety as well as willingness from the
etc). The key aspect of the proposed approach is
establishment to sustain both. In the past, the
that any ship design decision will be well-informed
ability and understanding to respond to these
and will lead to design concepts that are
needs were lacking. Today, scientific and
technically sound (at least to a level commensurate
technological breakthroughs offer unique
with the current available state-of-the-art), fit for
opportunities to make a difference in improving
purpose, and last but not least, with a known level
ship safety.
of safety that is more likely (than by following
rules) to meet modern safety expectations.
The main conclusions that can be drawn from the
work presented in this paper are the following:
At early design stages, Performance-, Earnings-,
Costs-, and Risk-knowledge models (PERC)
Key Design Variables
and Parameters

Set I Set II
Global parametric model Baseline Concept
of the baseline design
(Set I Set II) Set III Set III
{common model}

Performance Cost/Earning Risk-


models models Knowledge
models

Technical Costs & Earnings Safety Risk


performance potential performance

aesthetics etc
Design
Decision-
making preferences
feasibility

company/society fitness for purpose


values, preferences

Figure 3: Decision-Making in Risk-Based Design


Sets I, II and III Performance, Cost/Earnings and Risk Parameter Models

A consistent measure of safety must be will be available for design decision making
employed and a formalised procedure for its and design optimisation.
quantification adopted (risk analysis). For this
to be workable, considering the complexity of Considering the level of computations that
what constitutes safety, a clear focus on key might be necessary to address all pertinent
safety drivers is necessary (major accident safety concerns and the effect of safety-related
categories). A number of formalised design changes on functionality and other
procedures for risk quantification, risk performance factors, a different handling is
assessment and risk management exist in required; namely, the use of parametric
various contexts, for instance Formal Safety models to facilitate trade-offs and access to
Assessment (FSA) for rule-making, Safety fast and accurate first-principles tools. The
Case addressing for specific design optimisation process becomes thus a
design/operational concepts, among others. typical case of multi-objective, multi-criteria
Adding to these, a risk assessment framework optimisation problem. A common ship design
for use in ship design has also been described model managed within an integrated design
in this paper. environment (software platform) will also be
required for this process to be conducted
Such procedure must be integrated into the efficiently.
design process to allow trade-offs between
safety and other design factors by utilising The concepts presented in this paper reflect the
overlaps between performance, life-cycle cost current level of understanding and experience with
considerations, functionality and safety at the risk-based ship design. It is anticipated that during
parameter level. Consequently, additional the developments to be undertaken as part of
information on safety performance and risk SAFEDOR activities (SAFEDOR 2005) in the
near future, the ideas presented here will be further
elucidated, nurtured, refined and evolved.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The work reported in this paper has been carried


out under the SAFEDOR project, IP-516278, with
partial funding from the European Commission.
The opinions expressed are those of the authors
and should not be construed to represent the views
of the SAFEDOR partnership.

REFERENCES

CHRISTENSEN, H., HENSEL, W., DE LUCAS,


A. P., SAMES, P. C., SKJONG, R.,
STRANG, T. and VASSALOS, D. (2005)
SAFEDOR- Risk-Based Ship Design,
Operation and Regulation, Proceedings of
the International Maritime Association of
the Mediterranean (IMAM) 2005 Congress,
26 30 September, Lisbon, Portugal.

HSE (2001) Marine Risk Assessment, Offshore


Technology Report No. 2001/063,
prepared by Det Norske Veritas for the
Health and Safety Executive, UK.

SAFEDOR (2005) Risk-Based Design, Operation


and Regulation for Ships, EC FP6 IP
516278, www.safedor.org.

SAFER EURORO (1997, 2001) Design for


Safety An Integrated Approach to Safe
European Ro-Ro Ferry Design, ERB-
BRRT-CT97-5015 and G3RT-CT-2001-
05050, www.safereuroro.org.

STORCH, R. L., MOORE, R. C., HAMMON, C.


P. and BUNCH, H. M. Ship Production,
Second Edition, Cornell Maritime Press,
1995.

VASSALOS, D., KONOVESSIS, D. and GUARIN,


L. (2005) Fundamental Concepts of Risk-
Based Ship Design, Proceedings of the
International Maritime Association of the
Mediterranean (IMAM) 2005 Congress, 26
30 September, Lisbon, Portugal.

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