Professional Documents
Culture Documents
American Political
Realism, Clausewitz and Raymond Aron on
the Problem of Means and Ends in
International Politics
MURIELLE COZETTE
This article focuses on the relationship between means and ends in international
politics, which is one of the core issues that has been reected upon in international
relations. Political realism, usually regarded as the dominant paradigm in international
relations, provides a very specic understanding of this relationship: power and
survival are considered as the unique, given and xed ends of political action on the
international scene. Consequently, a theory of international relations only concentrates
on how states can make the most efcient use of the varied means the states dispose of
in order to achieve these ends. However, this article argues that this dominant
conception of international politics is surprisingly narrow. By focusing on other
prominent thinkers traditionally labelled as realists, like Clausewitz and Aron, the
article stresses the complexity of the relationship of means and ends and the place of
power within a realist theory of international relations.
The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.27, No.3, September 2004, pp.428 453
ISSN 0140-2390 print/1743-937X online
DOI: 10.1080/1362369042000282976 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
AMERICAN POLITICAL REALISM 429
distinction between the domestic and the international spheres that lies in the
structures of the two realms: anarchy becomes the central, dening feature of
the international structure. It is noticeable that this very much resembles
Morgenthaus phrasing when he mentions different conditions of actions at
the domestic and international levels. In sum, Waltz simply turned this rather
vague and scientically unsatisfactory expression into a highly scientic
concept, that of structure.14
In the international system, states are regarded as units, and as such, they
are inuenced by the very nature of the system they live in hierarchy or
anarchy. In Waltzs terms: Agents and agencies act, systems as a whole do
not. But the actions of agents and agencies are affected by the system
structure. In itself a structure does not directly lead to one outcome rather
than another. Structures affect behaviour within the system but do so
indirectly.15 States, as they are units acting within a system, are inuenced
by the structure of the system, but it cannot be said that this very structure
obliges states to act in a certain way. Waltz put it this way: Structures shape
and shove. They do not determine behaviors and outcomes, not only because
unit-level and structural causes interact, but also because the shaping and
shoving of structures may be successfully resisted.16
Having distinguished between the different structures of the two realms,
the exact role and place of power and survival remains problematic. The
fuzziness realists display when it comes to this issue is all the more puzzling
because power and survival have a central place in their theory. It would have
seemed logical that they devote a great deal of attention to their status within
their theory. Both Morgenthau and Waltz regard power and survival as the
essence of international politics, the elements for which states permanently
strive. For Morgenthau, power is the primary goal of politics. Not only is it a
primary goal, it is also often presented as the unique one. Herein lies one of
the most strikingly unrealistic aspect of realism.
Morgenthau was aware of the problems raised by this indeterminacy of the
place power has in international politics, especially as he readily admits that
human beings, even though they are driven by the lust for power, are also
keen to pursue other types of goals: Man is a political animal by nature, he is
a scientist by chance or choice, he is a moralist because he is a man.17
Having stated this specicity, Morgenthau then becomes less clear about its
implications.
On the one hand, he recalls his denition of international politics as being
necessarily and uniquely preoccupied by power, by stating, rather sweep-
ingly, that politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its
ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal.18 By doing so, he saved
the rationality of his account of international politics, as he retained the idea
of a given, rational end for political action. However, the weakness of the
AMERICAN POLITICAL REALISM 433
Being realistic then, Morgenthau not only accepts the instrumental use of
morality, he also clearly advocates it, as moral claims are just a translation of
the real struggle that actually takes place, which is about power: The true
nature of the policy is concealed by ideological justications and
rationalizations.25 These claims perform the same role for a country as for
an individual: they rationalise the pretence to power by making it seemingly
moral, hence justifying it. This parallel between the individual and the state is
explicitly made by Morgenthau when he restates the domestic analogy to
explain further the nature of ideologies: it is a characteristic aspect of all
politics, domestic as well as international, that frequently, its basic
manifestations do not appear as what they actually are manifestation of a
struggle for power.26 In this sense, then, power remains the unique end of
international politics, and ideologies are truly power politics by other means.
What Morgenthau forcefully opposes is the false belief that ideologies do
have a force of their own, that is, distinct from the struggle for power. Indeed,
his chief concern was that these moral claims seemed to be taken at face
value by US politicians during the Cold War, while in his view, they should
be wise enough to recognise their true nature and purpose: rationalisation and
instruments of the struggle for power:
The difference between liberal and non liberal aims in the international
eld does not lie in the fact that the former are ideological whereas the
latter are not. The ideological character is common to both, since men
will support only political aims which they are persuaded are justied
before reason and morality.34
relativism, and would not permit certain policies to be considered at all from
the point of view of expediency.46 What Morgenthau had in mind is the
Holocaust. However, this idea goes against his assertion that the national
interest is always rationally dened in terms of power. States decide what
their national interest consists of, and they also decide what they think to be
appropriate actions to protect it and to increase their power. Then it might be
the case that some states may regard genocide as an option, if the national
interest is dened in racial terms. This is precisely what happened in Nazi
Germany.47 Realism, clinging to the concept of rationality at the core of its
account of international relations, is unable to explain these situations, which
exemplify the basic fact that politics can often be an exercise in human
irrationality.48
The lack of concern displayed by realists for ideologies and regimes fosters
criticisms about the immoral character of realism, which in turn could not
be regarded as a proper guide for action in politics because of the neglect of
these features. The narrow denition they adopt of international politics gives
power and survival a central place, that of the given end of states actions.
International politics is therefore about using means in order to achieve this
end. It is noticeable that despite historical facts that would tend to contradict
realist tenets, neither Morgenthau nor Waltz put their assumptions into
question.
Political realism therefore ends up in a strangely apolitical account of
international relations, in the sense that it cannot account for some crucial
elements of these relations, most notably values and ideologies. However,
these elements are political ones par excellence. The narrow denition of
international politics as being uniquely about a struggle for power can
ultimately be labelled unrealistic.49
This weakness of realism has been repeatedly pointed out by scholars, and
in most cases, alternative approaches to realism are proposed. It is the
contention of this article that the best criticism of political realism can be
found within the school of thought itself, broadly understood in historical
terms as including Clausewitz, and also Aron.
rational insofar as it decides to use a means war to achieve its ends. What
is rational is this choice, not the goal pursued.
What is possible then, according to Clausewitz, is an analytical
investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to
experience [. . .] it leads to thorough familiarity with it.58 It is in this sense
that Clausewitz argues that theory must not accompany the military chief on
the battleeld.59 Its only purpose is to educate his judgement, which by
denition remains particular, specic to his own genius. Morgenthau and
Waltz did exactly the contrary: they refused to deal with immaterial features,
like ideologies or political regimes. As a result, their theories are contradicted
by their very object of study, as it is inherently composed of these irrational
elements they explicitly leave aside in their analysis.
Asserting that war is the continuation of politics by other means says
nothing about what the political ends are. It certainly does not presuppose that
power is the ultimate political objective pursued by states in history. On the
contrary, Clausewitz stresses that political ends vary over time. This diversity
is precisely what explains the different characters war may take, even though
its instrumental nature remains constant. The more grandiose the political
ends, the closer war gets to its absolute nature.60 Clausewitz therefore does
not assert that politics has only one, primary, goal, that is, survival or the
acquisition of power. Furthermore, for Clausewitz, war is an instrument
among others that politics decides or decides not to use, and politics is at the
same time the force that will prevent the escalation of the war, and keep it
within certain bounds. That means that international politics is not equated
with war alone, or violence. As Aron remarks, the fact that Clausewitz retains
violence as the essence of war implies he could not argue that war was a
permanent feature of international politics: politics may aim at the same ends
in peace as in war; it cannot be the continuation of war by other means, as
war is only characterised by the specicity of its means, violence.61
Peace, understood as the absence of violence, is by denition a different
stage in international relations. In other words, conict does not continue
after war. As Aron noted, it is not true that inter state relations as such or that
the essential inter state relation implies a struggle to death. War does not
continue when war falls silent.62 This goes against a realist assumption that
states are in a permanent conict or competition for power and survival, even
in times of peace peace being dened as war by other means.
Furthermore, once war is over, politics returns to the other means it has at
its disposal to deal with other states. That is to say that the primary goal of
politics can be said to be peace, not power or survival. In his commentaries of
Clausewitz, Aron emphasises that political ends are diverse, but cannot be
reduced to the will for power. On the contrary, politics determines the end,
that is not reduced to power and which would consist much more of a
AMERICAN POLITICAL REALISM 441
the essence of the phenomenon he deals with. His answer is that inter states
relations present an original feature, which distinguishes them from all social
relations: they take place under the shadow of war, they imply by essence the
alternative between peace and war.69 The shadow of war stems from the fact
that the use of force by states is recognised as both legal and legitimate. This
is what constitutes the very specicity of international relations compared to
other social relations: force is an acceptable, and sometimes necessary means
states can use. It leads Aron to recall the Hobbesian state of nature to describe
the international realm: states have not left, in their mutual relations, the
state of nature. There would be no theory of International Relations if they
had left it.70
However, Arons understanding of this expression differs from that of
Morgenthau or Waltz that is, a state of war of all against all. Indeed, he
stresses that throughout history, states, despite engaging regularly in war,
nevertheless acknowledge the existence of rules, explicit or implicit, that
restrain their conduct. These rules may have changed over time, but the fact
that they have always been an integral part of international relations cannot
be disregarded: realism omits the basic fact that even in relations among
states, the respect of ideas, the aspiration to values, the concern for
obligations have been manifested. Rarely have the communities behaved as if
they were not obliged to anything towards one another.71
On this, Aron is close to the proponents of the English school and their
notion of international society. However, Aron does not regard these
common rules to be binding for states, especially in the case of a major threat
to their own security: Never [. . .] did values or common interests command
the conduct of actors in great circumstances.72 This is a reminder of the
essence of international relations that always implies the risk of war. The key
point is that if states do live in a state of nature, it does not follow that war is
the permanent feature of their relations. Only the risk of war is.
Stating that international relations take place in the shadow of war says
nothing about the ends politics may have. It simply posits the necessity of
calculations for statesmen stemming from the risk of war.73 It certainly does
not imply that power is always the ultimate or even immediate aim states
strive for. It does not assume that there is one driving force explaining the
conduct of states, what Clausewitz would call a positive doctrine. What it
does assert is the necessity, for the decision-makers, to be constantly aware of
the risk of war. This falls far from afrming that international politics is of
necessity power politics. Most importantly, it does not even assume that
survival is the permanent or supreme concern for states.
As Aron remarks, at the individual level, security understood as mere
survival is not regarded as the highest of all ends: men are willing to die in
specic circumstances, they do not attach a supreme value to survival:
AMERICAN POLITICAL REALISM 443
The focus on ideas, values and passions prevents the scholar from relying on
an idealistic rationality in order to explain states behaviour, and in turn
AMERICAN POLITICAL REALISM 445
By being aware of the diversity of political ends that can be pursued, the
statesman will aim at understanding each of them in relation to the military
capabilities of states. This in turn would allow him to make a truly political
judgement on the specic situation he faces. This is where Aron distinguishes
between a false realism uniquely concerned with balance of power and
military capabilities, and what he calls the true realism, that is, a much
broader understanding of the nature of relations among states, including a
knowledge of the competing ideologies.91 This true realism is also concerned
with people and morality, and not only with the struggle for power.92
Against Morgenthau, who states that right and wrong are not discernible on
the international scene, Aron argues that a moral judgement is required in
order to truly understand it.93 Unlike Weber, then, he argues for the necessity
to judge the ideologies of states.94 This does not mean, however, that it must
lead to military action in order to enforce ones idea of the just or the good.
Like Morgenthau, Aron stresses the danger of moral crusades, which he
regards as the most murderous conicts.95 However, following Reinhold-
Niebhur, Aron is concerned to prevent realism from being too prudent, that
is, to end up not so much in amorality, but in immorality.96
Trying to overcome the Weberian opposition between ethics of conviction
and ethics of responsibility, Aron advocates what he calls the morality of
wisdom, which he denes as an attitude that:
analysis. It includes classical realist concerns about power and conict, but it
also considers the ideological side of relations among states within a
particular system. In other words, it recognises the power and inuence of
ideas in international politics, and as such can provide a more realistic
account of international relations.
Aron proposes six questions that should preside over the analysis of any
particular diplomatic constellation. The rst three are classical, realist ones:
What is the diplomatic eld? What is the conguration of relations of power
within this eld? What is the technique of war to which governments refer
more or less explicitly in order to estimate the signicance of positions of
relations?.103 These echo the realist preoccupations with the balance of
power as well as the stress on security. They recall Arons assertion about the
essence of international relations, the risk of war. Aron then adds three other
questions he dened as ideological political: To what extent do the states
involved mutually recognise each other so that frontiers only, and not the
very existence of these states, constitute the stake of conict? What is the
relation between the game of internal politics and the statesmens decisions?
What meaning do they give to peace, war, to relations among states?.104
Here, the emphasis is on the importance of ideologies and perceptions of
decision-makers: Aron focuses on the understanding they have of their
relations with other states, as well as on the interaction between domestic and
international politics. What matters is the meaning given by the actors to their
relations or, in Arons words, their specic historical perception, as well as
the particular idea they want to promote. This ideological prism inuences
their decisions at the international level. In order to understand it, a study of
ideologies is necessarily required, as it indicates the use that is likely to be
made by each state of its power. This does not provides statesmen with
eternal rules of states conduct, but with a sound general understanding of
international relations as a specic realm of action with its own
characteristics (permanent risk of war and legitimacy of the use of force),
as well as an awareness of the particularities of the historical international
system in which they act (knowledge of ideologies of other states, hence
better understanding of their perception of international relations).
In conclusion, it has been argued that political realism is too often
conceived as a uniquely Anglo-American school of thought. Morgenthau and
Waltz provide similar accounts of the relation between means and ends in
international relations. Rationality being the key notion, they retain the idea of
a univocal goal for action in international politics, survival often equated with
power. This simplistic denition of international politics is, however,
contradicted by the facts themselves: politics is, more often than not,
characterised by irrationality, and the univocal relation posited between means
and ends singularly impoverishes the understanding of international relations.
AMERICAN POLITICAL REALISM 449
NOTES
1. Stanley Hoffmann, An American Social Science: International Relations, Daedalus, CVI
(Summer 1977); See also Alfred Grosser, Letude des relations internationales: specialite
americaine?, Revue Francaise de Science Politique III (1956); Knud Erik Jorgensen,
Continental International Relations Theory: The Best Kept Secret, European Journal of
International Relations 6/1 (March 2000); Ekkehart Krippendorf, The Dominance of
American Approaches in International Relations, Millenium 16 /(2) (Summer 1987).
2. This is not to argue that Arons ideas in international relations are never investigated at all
of course. See notably Brian Anderson, Raymond Aron, the Recovery of the Political (NY,
Oxford: Rowman and Littleeld 1997); Robert Colquhoun, Raymond Aron, volume I: The
Philosopher in History (London: Sage 1986), Raymond Aron, volume II: The Sociologist in
Society 19551983 (London: Sage 1986); Brian Paul Frost, Resurrecting a Neglected
Theorist: Philosophical Foundations of Raymond Arons Theory of International
Relations, Review of International Studies 23/2 (April 1997); Stanley Hoffmann,
Raymond Aron et la theorie des relations internationales, Politique Etrange`re 4 (Winter
1983); Daniel Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: a Critical
Introduction (Lanham: Rowman and Littleeld 1992); David Thompson, The Three
Worlds of Raymond Aron, International Affairs 38/1 (1963); Oran R. Young, Aron and
the Whale A Jonah in Theory in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds), Contending
Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1969).
3. Frost (note 2).
4. Hans Morgenthau, Scientic Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago, IL: Chicago University
Press 1946) p.192.
5. Ibid. p.155.
6. Ibid. p.155.
7. Ibid. p.14: The desire for power [. . .] concerns itself not with the individuals survival but
with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secure. Consequently, the
selshness of man has limits; his will to power has none.
450 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
8. John Coffey, Political Realism in American Thought (London: Associated Press University
1977) p.135.
9. It must be stressed, however, that while Morgenthau denes politics as being necessarily
evil, he is also acutely sensitive to the tension between political actions and moral demands,
which can never be resolved. This is precisely because Morgenthau was very aware of the
importance of moral demands for man, alongside the animus dominandi that is the driving
force for action in the political sphere. This awareness in turn explains Morgenthaus
denition of international politics as the realm of tragedy, where competing demands can
never be accommodated, and where requirements of the national interest always take
precedence over moral demands. See Robert M.A.Crawford, Idealism and Realism in
International Relations (NY: Routledge, 2000), pp. 4041. Peter Gellman also emphasises
the contradictions to be found in Morgenthaus theory, and stresses that Morgenthau
regarded the relationship between power and purpose as symbiotic. There is power in the
professional attachment to higher principles and there needs to be a governing purpose to
power, Hans J Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism, Review of International
Studies 14 (1988), p.256.
10. Morgenthau, quoted in Coffey (note 8) p.131: A universal force inherent in human nature
and necessarily seeking power over other men ; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations
The Struggle for Power and Peace (NY: Alfred A. Knopf 1985) p.32: Mans control over
the minds and actions other men [. . .] the mutual relations of control among the holders of
public authority and between the latter and the people at large; Hans Morgenthau, The
Restoration of American Politics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1962) p.11: A
psychological relationship in which one man controls certain actions of another man
through the inuence he exerts over the latters will. That inuence derives from three
sources: the expectations of benets, the fear of disadvantages, the respect or love for men
and institutions.
11. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (note 10) p.39.
12. Raymond Aron, Etudes Politiques (Paris: Gallimard 1972) p.184.
13. Ibid. p.183.
14. For a survey of the similarities to be found between Morgenthau and Waltz, see Crawford,
Idealism and Realism in International Relations (note 9) pp.11415.
15. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (NY: McGraw-Hill 1979) p.74.
16. Quoted in Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy:
Neorealism to Structural Realism (NY: Columbia University Press 1993) p.23.
17. Morgenthau, Scientic Man Versus Power Politics (note 4) p.168.
18. Ibid. p.195. See also Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (note 10) p. 31: International
Politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international
politics, power is always the immediate aim.
19. See, for example, Crawford, Idealism and Realism in International Relations (note 9) p.60:
Morgenthaus oft-quoted and sometimes blunt assertions that international politics is a
continual struggle for power presupposes that the goal of each state is to maximise its
power, either as an end in itself or as a means to an end. This ambiguity is also pointed out
by Stanley Hoffmann, see Notes on the Limits of Realism, Social Research (Winter 1981)
p.655; see also Peter Gellman, Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism,
Review of International Studies 14 (1988) p.252.
20. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (note 15) p.92.
21. Ibid. p.92.
22. Morgenthau, The Restoration of American Politics (note 10) p.15.
23. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (note 10) p.13: Political realism refuses to identify
the moral inspiration of a particular nation with the moral law that governs the universe
24. Ibid. p.358.
25. Ibid. p.101.
26. Ibid. p.101.
27. Ibid p.358.
28. Morgenthau, quoted in Greg Russel, Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American
Statescraft (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisianna University Press 1990) p.226.
AMERICAN POLITICAL REALISM 451
29. Hans Morgenthau, Postcript Interview, in K. Thompson and R. Myers (eds), Truth and
Tragedy A Tribute to Hans Morgenthau (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books
1984) p.379: I was taken aback at the time by the emotional approach to the Soviet Union
on the part of all groups. I tried to warn against this kind of uncritical approach to the Soviet
Union on ideological grounds. However, as many noted, Morgenthau was ambiguous at
time in his presentation of the Cold War, sometimes dening it as an ideological struggle.
On Morgenthaus inconsistencies on this point, see Michael Joseph Smith, Hans
Morgenthau and the American National Interest in the Early Cold War, Social Research
(Winter 1981) pp.7745. See also Robert Tucker, Professor Morgenthaus Theory of
Political Realism, The American Political Science Review XLVI/1 (March 1952) p.217.
30. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (note 10) p.578.
31. Ibid. p.586.
32. Ibid.
33. Morgenthau therefore urges students and practitioners not to be blinded by words See
Crawford, Idealism and Realism in International Relations (note 9) pp.489
34. Morgenthau, Scientic Man Versus Power Politics (note 4) p.72.
35. Morgenthau, quoted in Russel, Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft (note 28)
p.105.
36. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (note 10) p.5.
37. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (note 15) p.79.
38. Andrew Linklater, Neo Realism in Theory and Practice, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith
(eds), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press 1995) p.252. See also
Buzan et al., The Logic of Anarchy (note 16) p.24: [. . .] as Waltzs primary purpose in
establishing the unit-system boundary was to elaborate theory at the system level, he
naturally paid little attention to unit factors once he had banished them beyond the realm of
his structural denition. See also John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations
(Cambridge: CUP 2000) p.23.
39. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (note 15) p.96.
40. Ibid. p.99. See also p.98, where Waltz states why he dismisses ideologies and regimes as
irrelevant for a theory of international politics: One may wonder why only capability is
included in the third part of the denition, and not such characteristics as ideology, form of
government, peacefulness, bellicosity or whatever. The answer is: Power is estimated by
comparing the capabilities of a number of units.
41. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations
(London: Clarendon Press 1991) p.97.
42. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (note 15) p.118: Theory, as a general explanatory
system, cannot account for particularities.
43. Jack Donelly, Realism in International Relations (Cambridge: CUP 2000) p.52.
44. Ibid. p.65.
45. Crawford points out the limits of empirical theory as dened by Waltz: as a neutral and
scientic enterprise, empirical theory is not concerned with the morality of foreign policy,
and thus the theorist cannot, qua theorist, comment on the morality of the policies and
outcomes which he is trying to explain, Idealism and Realism in International Relations
(note 9) p.99.
46. Morgenthau, quoted in Russel, Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statescraft (note
28) p.230. See also p.209, where Russel explains that Morgenthau believed in a moral
order which God directs, the content of which we can guess, and afrmed his faith in a
higher power.
47. Jan Willem Honig, in his article Totalitarianism and Realism: Hans Morgenthaus German
Years in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Roots of Realism (London: Frank Cass 1996), stresses
another problem with Morgenthaus realism in relation with Nazi Germany: while
advocating the preservation of the national interest dened in terms of power, Morgenthau
did not investigate the consequences of this claim upon domestic politics. As Honig pointed
out, while other realist thinkers draw the conclusion that the inevitability of total war
necessitated the construction of a total state (p.306), Morgenthau did not really address the
issue. Even more strikingly, Honig shows that when it comes to assess the reason why the
452 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
Nazis were eventually defeated, Morgenthau expressed the belief that in the end, the power
of morality overcomes all (p.307), that is, he did not explain the defeat in classical realist
terms. In other words, Morgenthau still relied on his pre-war, idealist ideas in some ways.
48. Michael Nicholson, Realism and Utopianism Revisited in Timothy Dunne, Robert Cox
and Ken Booth (eds), The Eighty Years Crisis (Cambridge: CUP 1998) p.81. A realist reply
to this argument could be that political leaders can occasionally be blinded by passions, and
therefore lose sight of the national interest.
49. Crawford stresses the unrealistic side of Morgenthaus assumptions and their shortcomings
which stem from his narrow denition of ideologies as merely a disguise of the struggle for
power. He focuses on the example of the Soviet Union and argues that Morgenthau offers
no criteria as to how one can evaluate Soviet goals, and therefore deal with Moscow in a
realistic manner, Idealism and Realism in International Relations (note 9) pp.623.
Crawfords concludes that Realism, as expressed by Morgenthau, is idealistic in the sense
that it assumes that political man can be abstracted from real man to provide a realistic
view of international politics which reies one part of human nature (p.66). Similarly,
Hoffmann argues that Politics, divorced from economics, law or ethics becomes a kind of
pure game that is played by nobody, for the simple reason that it would be a game without
either cards or stakes, Notes on the Limits of Realism (note 19) p.656.
50. Carl Van Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1976) p.87.
51. Raymond Aron, Sur Clausewitz (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1987) p.54.
52. Clausewitz, On War (note 50) p.92.
53. Aron, Sur Clausewitz (note 51) p.157.
54. Clausewitz, On War (note 50) p.141.
55. Ibid. p.140.
56. Ibid. pp.1378.
57. Aron, Sur Clausewitz (note 51) p.36.
58. Clausewitz, On War (note 50) p.141.
59. Ibid. p.141.
60. Clausewitz, On War (note 50) pp.878.
61. Aron, Sur Clausewitz (note 51) p.119.
62. Rayond Aron, Penser la guerre, Clausewitz, Tome 2 Lage planetaire (Paris: Gallimard
1976) p.258.
63. Aron, Sur Clausewitz (note 51) p.68.
64. Ibid. p.101.
65. Ibid. p.143.
66. Ibid. p.67.
67. Aron, Sur Clausewitz (note 51) p.67.
68. Aron, Etudes Politiques (note 12) p.362.
69. Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris: Calmann-Levy 1962) p.17.
70. Ibid. p.19.
71. Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (note 69) p.596.
72. Ibid. p.719.
73. Ibid. p.28.
74. Ibid. p.585.
75. Aron, Lecons sur lhistoire (Paris: Editions de Fallois 1989) p.400.
76. Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (note 69) p.99.
77. Ibid. p.83. See also Robert Gilpin, No One Loves a Political Realist, in Benjamin Frankel
(ed), Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass 1996) p.6, where Gilpin
argues along the same lines: Morgenthau for example believed that human beings were
driven by a lust of power; other realists including myself, while acknowledging that power
can become the primary goal of a Hitler or Stalin, regard power as essentially instrumental
to and necessary for the achievements of other goals such as security and even liberal
ideals.
78. Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (note 69) p.100.
79. Raymond Aron, Lopium des intellectuels (Paris: Calmann-Levy 1955) p.197.
AMERICAN POLITICAL REALISM 453
80. Aron, Etudes Politiques (note 12) p.477.
81. Ibid. p.474.
82. Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (note 69) p.587.
83. Raymond Aron, Les desillusions du progres Essai sur la dialectique de la modernite,
(Paris: Calmann-Levy 1969) p.309. See also Memoires 50 ans de reexion politiaue
(Paris: Julliard 1993) p.411: A global representation of society and its past, a representation
proclaiming salvation and prescribing freeing actions
84. Aron, Etudes Politiques (note 12) p.389.
85. Aron, Memoires (note 83) p.79.
86. Aron, Lopium des intellectuels (note 79) p.149.
87. Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (note 69) p.84.
88. Ibid. p.92.
89. Ibid. p.287. See also Aron, Etudes Politiques (note 12) p.422 It took us a long time to grasp
the decisive fact and some pseudo realists still refuse to see it that the Soviet leaders
perceive the world, think about their action and history in conceptual frameworks that stem
from a certain philosophy, and p.423: The interest of the USSR is confounded with the
interest of the worldwide revolution.
90. Aron, Etudes Politiques (note 12) p.424.
91. Ibid. p.471. Aron criticises Morgenthau, and classical, Anglo-American realism in general,
for turning into an ideology because of the tendency to rely on a mono-causal type of
explanation, and because of the desire of the main proponents to argue against idealism.
Hence Arons description of Morgenthau as a crusader.
92. Ibid. p.461.
93. Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (note 69) p.592: Ethical judgement is not separable
from historical judgement upon the goals of the actors and the consequences of their
successes or failures.
94. Ibid. p.589.
95. Ibid. p.82.
96. Ibid. p.582.
97. Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (note 69) p.596.
98. See Aron, Memoires (note 83) p.604, on the inescapable dilemma of political actions: a
democracy cannot and must not ignore the internal regime of states with whom it deals ; but
it cannot and must not either lead a crusade to spread its own institutions.
99. Raymond Aron, Democratie et totalitarisme (Paris: Gallimard 1965) p.53.
100. Aron, Lopium des intellectuels (note 79) p.197.
101. Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (note 69) p.102.
102. Aron, Lecons sur lhistoire (note 75) p.547.
103. Aron, Memoires (note 83) p.300.
104. Ibid. p.301.