File: Page | of I Page 1 of 19 4 i @ . . . i 9 | ‘ | The Balance of . Nuclear Forces in : ‘Central Europe | pe | “nts nc, GA sowed. : i : SELES ISSO SANIZED * ! ‘ . i | ; | \ Do sob. _ )Beeret—~ : : i ; yo) eta tts : | : : or NB http://www. foia.ucia.gow/seripts/cgiserviets/NavigatorServlet.pl?method=sendImageBackéedocN 9/7/01File: Page 1 of 1 Page 2 of 19 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Uncuthoreed Blchaors Sub set 9 Celina} Sections : ei | DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS: i i | NorORNA! | Hot Reece fo Faron icots ! NOCONTRAGT: Not Retort fo Comectert or] 1 Contreeter/ Contents pROPIN- ||. cetn—Propietary flormaton nv NEIBONWY= "—NFIB Deportments OH 0}! Diuemnoten and Extraction of nfermatien Contraited by Originetor REL ‘This Infaemtfon har been Aishortred for 2 Rekeate tO ‘ http://wonw.foia.ucia.gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServlet.p!?method=sendlmageBack&doeN 9/7/01File: Page 3 of 19 Page | of I os The Balance of Nuclear Forces + in Contral Europe ; bo. ental tic Amey ; . , National Porcign Aunessment Center : fanwary 1008 [a Key Judgments ¥ tmprovements that have been made in Sovict tactical nuiclear forces In Central Europo over the past several years have eroded rouch of NATO's long- standing nuclear advantage there, Asa result, Pact planners probably consider that the credibility and, therafore, the utility of NATO's nuclear forces os a ‘counter to the Pact’s preponderance in conventional forces have been reduced. If 'presont trends continue and Soviet forces over the next few years attain a general nublear parity in Centeal Burope, the basis of deterrence there will shift more to the conventional forces of both sides, NATO sitll tetains an ovarall aevantege in force rondiness and In the numbers and quality of lts tactical nuclear systems, most notably in nuclear ar lillery. NATO's nuclear weapons are generally suparior in their varicty, tech- inital sophistication, and flexibility, and a number of programs are under way tolinorense thelr capabilities | 7! 5 fore Dad i, | Mocent Sovet force tmprovemént prograins have been ele at redress tng.the nuclear Imbalance in Central Europe, The intost significant of these have been the increasés in the number and quality of Soviet tectical nuclear delivery alroraft in Central Europe and in the number of nuclear weapons al- + located to Soviet foreés thers, Of potential liriportance Is the development of nuicleat rounds For heavy artillery units In'the USSR If such weapons are de~ ployed with Soviet forces in Contral Europe, as seoms Itkely soon, they will ‘break NATO's monopoly on nuclear artillery'there and ence reduce the de~ terrent value of these weapons, Foroo Improvements carried out to date hava increased tho flexibility with which the Sovlets can employ their tactical nuclear forces and provided! them with a capability for conducting theater nuclear war at higher levels of ‘ i http://www foia.ucia.gov/scripts/egiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pl?method=sendlmageBacké&docN 9/7/01File: Page | of | Page 4 of 19 i secret tinea before having to resort to the peripheral strike forces baved on soviet territory. ‘ rr | ‘The evidence indicates -that the Soviet’ are Becoming more comfortable with the theater ouclear balance and ace exploring alternatives to thelr Tong: hold strategy of massive responsa to any NATO first uso of nuclear weapons Although the Soviets still see little chance for limiting escalation once the nuclear threshold has been crossed, there Is a growing Sovlet tendency to plan to use nuclear weapons in Europe with greater flexibility and restraint, at least Initially, than was seen during the sixties. ‘Whatever increased confidence Saviet plinners may havo gained Is likely to be tempored by an/awareness of NATO!s projected force Improvements and Its ability, to quickly open; new.aread of competition, Crutse mulsilles, for «example, ropresent a devélopmons, that from!the Sovict perspectivg has the potenttal for profoundly.-affectieg the nuclear balance in Europe, ‘These NATO Improvements probably wauld,also eerve as an Impettts to efforts by the Soviets to further Iinprova thelr éwn theater nuclear forces. 4 i : i http://www. foia.ucia.gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServiet.pl?method=send|mayeBack&docN 9/7/01File: Page I of 1 NATO's Forces wuuslanuinan Employinent Polley mw | Force Trends wainmunnnves Tmplications for Deterrence TOUITOOK senneinnninininnnan ' : Page 5 of 19 teen | CONTENTS i Key Judgments i {Pref smn i { [A Currant Astossmont .. t 3 |} Taotloal Missiles i |) ‘Taetieal Aviation | | warsas} Pact Forces-—Growth and Modernization =. | | [> volving Perooptions seyue 7] ck | || Fores Tretds wine 7 : ' [ Soviet Changes, yuenmnmimnn | http://www foia.ucia gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pl?method=sendlmageBack&docN 9/7/01File: Page 6 of 19 Both NATO and Weriaw Pact foreed in Central Europe have long maln- tained @ variety of miclear weapon systems, wvhich they have occastonally up- raded. Over the paitisoveral’ ‘years, howaver, improvements in Pact forces rave beon madd at duch apace and magnitude as.lo cquse concern that the ‘West will loso Its longstanding aulvantage i ‘in tactical rricoar capubliity, “This paper tools at this [proseitt arniy of nuclear systems within Central Europe and discusses some indexes of the exisiting numerical and qualitative balance, It then evaluates trends In the balance as a result of the deployment of riow systema and relates those trends to the nucloar doctrines and employ ment pollctes of the two alliances. Filly it astessos the effect af these trends fon the overall balatice of ground and taotleal afr forces in Central Europe particularly as this balance contributes to deterrence there, Page 1 of 1 http://www foia.ucia.gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pI?method=sendlmageBack&dooN 9/7/01File: Page fof | Page 7 of 19 cos cee este saealeliahalis te 1 Central, : yoru : my ; POLAND: i http://www. foia.ucia.gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pl?method=sendImageBacké&docN 9/7/01File: http://www. foia.ucia.gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pl?method=sendImageBack&docN 9/7/01 Page | of | Page 8 of 19 The Balance of Nuclear Forces: in Central Europe * ‘ A Current Assessment ‘A comparison of forces and trends Indicates that the Warsaw Pret Is closing the gap between the capabitities of {t8 nuclear forces in Central Europe and those of NATO. Although NATO curently has quantitative and qualitative advan tages, these have been declining over tho past several years as Vha Sovicts have both rioderalaed ‘and expanded thete nuclear forces there. Tho tramediate- result of these efforts has been to ‘enhance the Pact's capabilities to wage nuclear war in Central Europe at whatever level NATO. chooses, using ‘only locally based ‘systems, ‘The military |dootzine of both sides generally holds that a conflict in Europe would escalate to nuclear warfare, but the Pact, probably because ‘of its longstanding Infertority in battlefield nicleae capabilities, has placed greater emphasis. than NATO on! developing passive defense and decontamination lites. Because of the uncertainties dstociated with widespread use of aticlear weapous, It Is problematical how effec tive these‘ preparations; would be. : As shown by table 1, NATO stil enjoys an overall advantage in numbers of tactical nuclear delivery systems based in Europe. This advantage is vested primarily in NATO's large force of nuclear artillery. In the past fow years the Pact hhas overtaken NATO in the number of tactical surface-to-surface mistles in Central Europe and tactical alroraft Intended for, nuglear delivery ralssions there.! ot ‘Nuclear artillery! also provides NATO: with a qualitative advantage in. Pattlefteld support capa ‘bilities that Is presently acking in, Warsaw Pact forces. With low-yleld nuclear rounds and the accuracy inherent in tube artillery, NATO ctl Tory carr provide responalva, close-in support for fob, fe il t Tobie + Teeticol Nucisar Oatvery Systemt In Central Ewope ATO Wana Poet : ise tory been Areal 60 100400 Burfacotointace ale sad cockela sg" 00 ssi ‘Nuclearantlery WA for ‘ Freach tated nuceer tite are eacladed, "NATO date for £608 ate incepta Egures shoul be cote atdeed woghetizutea The figure or the NATO side represents those steaft that would bo enigned « primey estoy of nuclear delivry under [NATO planing. Wa de oot koaw how tiny Pact ical are Tanyas bt some 40 pt abot one gard neach cele ret equipped with nocoarsapuble avers) tran Ccqraly relerdolvry techs and ae beloved to have a pricy o> specblty, or mule delivery sndet Pact platen. th ages ioe oral at hat tcl egal of orig tele wre pond bt herein pace delivery teckalais ines ‘Gully Tata and wo done elev hal they afd ngs to Uh nace detivery capabilites of ele kde { * Asanes, fa than oneforcaa replacement by Lance, "Tha Soviets appen to have added st lah tot lat end of ‘Bet Sco beads in ast Germany. fh jrogram were extended {oullthe Soviet Sod beguder fa Cartel Earopn 4 euocers ould ‘bo added 1 ts ical, "Muelousertiied NATO un crema No campeable gue for 1908 arte, engaged ground forces units Thus, Pact forces massing Immediately in front of NATO lines ‘would still be subject to nuclear strikes, With thelr larger yleld warheads and less aceurate rocket nnd aircralt delivery systems, Pact nuclear” forces. would be less capable of striking targets Xo thole oven troops, ‘The tallitéry utility of NATO's nuclear antl ery, howaver, {s diminished by Its maldeploy- ‘ment within: the European theater, Historically, the main avonue,of attack into Central EuropeFile: httpu/www-foia.ucia gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pl?method=sendlmageBack&docN 9/7/01 Page I of I Page 9 of 19 stent jus been via the North German Plain. In the area defended by. the. Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), the terrain most favors: the at tacker, the distance to the Benelux, parts is the * shortest, and. Warsaw Pact strength ts tho greatest. ‘We estimate that the main thrust of a Warsaw Pact attack in. Central Eutope would fall In precboly this ateabetween Hannover and Mannhelin (see map). Thus, tho heavlost aseaults » most likely would stelke tho German E Corps atid ‘the British £. Corps. Yet most of NATO's nuclear © aritllory. is deployed with US forces’ in areas whore the terrain -ls more, Favorable to -the defender and the’ ehenty threat is less eritieal, ‘The remainder of NATO's present array of tactical nuclear weapons ato is generally superior 4 technteal sophistication and flexibility. Here again, however, the technological gap is narrow Ing, particularly In the case of tactical aviation. ‘Tactical Missltes NATO's tactical futssile forces have two advan- tages over the Pact’s. First, the Pact’s logistics requirements aré, greater. ‘This burdens Soviot missile unlts with a: more cumbersome support structure that could alow their movement and, if ‘it were successfully attacked, sharply, cut their opotational effectiveness. Furthermore, older So viet missiles audjwarheads must move through a complex logisticg network before they reach user units. The Seud missle uses lquld propellants thus requiring extensive. preparation:—and. the | sensitivity of witheads to temperate : tates environmental controls On if the missile, systems. now in-use" by: NATO. (Pershing, Honest John,| Lance) use primarily" solid | and US warheads'do nat need ; rigid environme al controls. pou 1 “Tho other majpt advantage of NATO ts that Its missile forces gro capable of reacting moro quickly, Some ‘of NATO's missile force Is maintained’ on flert, with warkeeds mated to missiles that ard capable of launch within 20 minutes, No Sovlet missiles ero so maimained. Because of ; the ‘Preparations required, a Soviet } 2 yf Scud brigude takes at least four hours to deploy and to reach its W'ghett readiness. condition, Fecause of the loglstte and technical problems with their older systems, the Sovicts probably view an indefinite conventional phose preceding, nuclear operations as a complicating factor in achieving, and malnteining peak readiness: to launch o respond to aucl : attacks, ‘Teeteol Aviation NATO's tactical alt forces are still gonorally auportor to those of the Patt in pilot training and particularly avionles. NATO alrcraft have Incetial guldance or terrain-following havigation systerns ‘whieh give them a greater eapabllity to pencteate at low altitudes and locate thelr targets. Newer, improved Soviet alreraft, however, have largely eroded NATO's advantage in overall range capability. The primary NATO nuclear dalivory aircraft of tho early seventles—the F-4C and the 104G-—hiid nearly twice the range of the Pact’s SU-7 Fitter. This enabled them to strike targets deep In Pact territory from bases that ‘were beyond the range of most Pact tactical alreraft, This range gap has been closed by now Soviet fighters such as the SU-17 Fitter and the MIG-23 Plogger. Thelt range characteristics for nuclear attack wilssions compare favorably to most NATO attack aircraft now deployed in Europe, As with the tactical missile forces, NATO's. ete ale fore to maotelned a a igher readiness; for muslear opéyations than are thelr Pact counterparts, In peacetime, some NATO tcraft: are ‘on alert with nuclear weapons aboard, No Pact alrcraft ‘aro koown to be in'a * alralla state of readiness, woods joa : i Warsaw Pact Forces—-Grawth and | Modernization 1 ! Since the Inte sities the Soviet approach to nuclear war In Europe has undergone major changes. Tho Soviets have experimented with varlous strategies for nuclear eoniltet. The strate~ gies, in turn, have been made possible by the Browth and modernization of tho USSR's for- ward-based nuclear forces, : i aFile: Page I of I Page 10 of 19 Misstles and Rockets of Warsaw Pact and NATO. http://www. foia.ucia.gov/scripts/egiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pl?method=sendimageBackéedocN 9/7/01File: Page | of 1 Page 11 of 19 NATO and Warsaw Pact Tactical Aviation spam ch sree nmin eaten ee at http://www foia.ucia gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pl?method=sendlmageBack&dooN 9/7/01File: http://www. foia.ucia.gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServlct.pl?method=sendImageBack&docN 9/7/01 Page I of 1 Page 12 of 19 Evolving Perceptions Savtet doctrine, during the curly shales postu: hated that any war Involving the Saviet Union and the West would be a decisive global conflict. The Soviets considstedl that the outcome would be determined largely by massive nuclear exchanges during the first felv hours. Because of the decisive advantage they ‘es would accrue to the side that struck first on beemiury on the Kernnertilty es mediatesrange ballistle missile sp Sued in the USSR and the'relative dearth of. Saviet nu © elear systems tn Conteal Europe, oy V Accordling to the: Sovet doctrine of that pertod, © the first Soviot nuclear strike in a European ' conflict would he one of maximum: strength delivered throughout the cate depth of the * theater of war, Because of the range Hmitations of Soviet tactical trucloar: Speer th atl tke ‘wantlet depand heavily on Soviet systems based In the USSR. The sequence of tht ‘tke ‘would be Renernlly as follows: * The Strategic Rocket Torces (SRF) would launch on signal by the Supreme Higi Command, © Simultaneously with the SRF strikes, or as . soon as possible thereafter, the mille sub> | marines and ground forces rocket would seks and the long-range alert would take 6 a oat shave been thelr percépt fon raay have eee a ee ileny Merature fhe a 2 mide, that NATO's tactile Lon: stltuted thermajority of the Alll ol | nuclear delivery! eal avalon ane were concentrated at a smiall number'of available t ftelds and would have been Highly vulnerable t ton! massive preemptive strike In the context of a theuter nuclear threat Sorslsting ng lapel ‘of alr: craft ‘operating. from a few kne preemption! could’ rightly have en ‘considered * the most effective strategy, : SECRET tn the mid-sisties the perceptions of Sovict tniltary planners changed. They cere to blleve hat the bulk af NATO's ouclear delivery vapar bility was vested not in tactical aviation but in the: missiles, rockets, and nuclear artillery deployed with army corps and divisions This roughly coincided with the initial deployments of the US M-109 self-propelled 155+mm howltzer into West Germany: ‘These deployments appreciably ex- * panded NATO's nuclear actillery force und the © Anrget base facing, Warsaw Pact planners. ‘The Saviets further t ized that, because of is expanding huclear artillery force, NATO had nificant advantage In in baitleleld nuclear copa tlittes and that thelr Sopabltes for close-in + support to tongs were mic! NATO. Becauée of this, Fact planners estimated that even after the Pact had delivered a massive nuclear strike, NATO would retain strong de- one forces opposite the Pact’s main axes of advances Soviet changes : Recognition’ of these defictencles hos lod the Soviets to experiment with alternative nuclear strategtes and has affected the nuclear forces thoy have in Central Europe. Doctrinal changes ust ally take several years to implement, however, as new equipment is fielded and tactics are devel oped to meet the new requirements Aterative Stotegies | During the mids to late, sixtles Soviat miliary theorist advanced nuclear tuetles designed § offset the USSR’s pronounced inferiority in ‘all seal nuclear systems, These included: * «Moving from = ‘massive, preemptive, “ont © ' istrike to a still massive system of ‘ grouped and Stale ilee see delivered ls Aemportant targets emerge »Givtig more emphasis in nuclear targeth fo ey king large ground force-units ij the of det actoal nuclear eps deployed with th elciving ‘Frontal {Aviation « greater role alt those smi! and mobile nucle sys t i 5 tess than those ofFile: Page 1 of 1 Page 13 of 19 ssecrer toms that missiles would have difftzulty ante, tnvestigatig the extent to whlch nuclear oer toweyletd Finest tal eo tribute to oribat Hert During this pétied the i apparently ‘ex+ amine the pony fates sein ates ‘Lut the pr ‘Soviet response.to NATO" Aa a! cong Yo be stare ike vel ie mle . Slice 1970, planning moved aay from exclusive cleat retaliation. and ‘probably now mee other options for for conducting m ear ‘wat, Plan: ning variants have . Delaying alresponse {2 NATO's first use of fear weapons. This suggests that Sivlet planners ay ve degun to regard the Fitted selective use of nuclear weapons by NATO as @ distinctive, If transitional, phose of conflict “at would not necessarily require an Immedia. > nuclear response. Responding at the lower end of the nuclear spectrum ah Umited strikes be forward- based jaystems rather than with massive atrtkes ti USsA-based systems, This variation would call for the Soviets Initial ‘ase of nticlear weapons to be more limited in. *# Preempting masstoely when intelligence in- dteates that NATO fs preparing to deliver _ massior, widespread nuclear strikes. This ~ provmption vuriation differs fram the doo- tring of the alatiss, which specltied that a + massive Initial strike:be delivered upon dee tection of enemy preparations to employ ‘nuclear weapons on boy scale whatever. ‘These planning vaclatlons suggést that the So- ‘viets are basorntng tnore comfortable with the theater nueldar balance and are exploring alter- natlves to thelr strategy of massive response. The extent to which such alternatives have become pait of jofficlal Soviet doctrine is unclear, At resent there seems to ‘bo tendency to we ‘nuclear woapons, af Teast initially, with greater Coxibility ad restraint, but the evidence, indl- cates thet Soviet planners still see little prospect for limiting escalation once the nuclear threshold 1s crowed, With thelr own improved In-theater quclear capabilities. mitigating tho requirement to re- spond masively to any NATO nuclear Inte, Soviets may now believe it Is In their Interest would afford them greater opportunlty to sane ‘out and destroy NATO's nuclear delivery sys- tems, thus reducing the ligt of any eventual Intensity, matching more closely NATO's aaterkie pe attack by the West. Such a ty ueand pete cheney oc ie riot ret only] when ig, 0 ‘ deliver is bya masive, theatdrwie sree _by the widespread we ™ suite i Beclating the intensity of nile eed Soviets apparently ‘are at, Teast coma riage ol esealation of a cone! fitct, either at thelr own volition or, {i sponse to NATO exealation. jj Initiating limited nuclear strikes with tact cal systems in support of. specifte mallitary. goals, The Sovlets might consldo* using. nue elear’ weapons: first if they were on the Aefensive or possibly to break ti NATO defenses, but we do not believe that these options enjoy any teal prominance in Soviet planning. . ‘The Sovlets are carrying out a broad variety or force improvements in an effort to reduce the “alee alc et aye pet “in the improved range and * pay! oad capab ities, and more effective tac~ teat mises wll be deployed soon, The 120- km $S-21 will offer significant improve- SECRET. http://www foia.ucia. gov/scripts/egiservlets/NavigatorServlet.p!?method=sendlmageBack&docN 9/7/01File: Page I of L Page 14 of 19 -SEERER——— ments Inrange and accuracy over the Toble 2 FROG, which it is replacing. The SS-X-22 appears tobe ayprosching inkl operational Soviet Tactical Nextar Detvery System, apabiity and could by deployed) at any ‘Weapon Alocations, end Weopom Vivid in time. It Is similar to the Sealeboard system ‘Cental Excope and apparently Is Intended to replace it. The ~ Soviets may sn jin flight ering ether Daiwiey ena new short-range. balllstia: milssile, which Speen brcbably will eplae the oping Seid i at seaynta ssfaco . Stefan inereating the inventory of ngage eta ‘oS nuciear delioery systems in Europe, 1100 oss foray sed ed hw et Mi eeu . 7 incresse in tho number of tactical missle: * [ENO | tea open launchers ae ing of ucetncaable| jt: 8, delivery aircraft: in Central Ewrope:since | 2 1970. Another round of Trees in Soviet" ‘Te oldie ah rspcantsrcercapabeacnts Five tactlenl nuclear forces In Central Eutope ° VY il tures windy dalrideates mmberal warheads may be undor way. One Seud brigade hes. yay saaateeneanned sy apparently been Increased ‘rom 12 ta 18 ‘rom dt saman, Pigs sepastd by wk tunchers ¥ all Soviet Scud brigades, there ee Etnjiely augmented as will probably The ‘evidence mow indicates that the nuclear be the case—the force will have an addi- attack cole of Frontal Aviation has expanded, tn tional 54 ‘eoneher fact; aircraft may now be allocated as much as Iworthieds of a front’s nuclear weapons. This shift * Increasing the numbers of nuclear weapons probably reflects a Soviet view that aircraft are they plan tq use in Central Europe, Better sutted than miss for delivering sttkes in tho immediate battlefield area and for attacking Increasing the warhead yields for their mobile targets throughout the theater, tactical missiles, The motivations for the larger yields are uncles, but the Soviets nay Colneting wit this expansion of Frontal Avi perceive a requirement for greater areas of _ otion’s battletlold role has been ¢ renewed inter~ destruction to compensate for the.rolatively . ust in nuclear artillery. In the early seventies the ‘accuraby of their missle systems sind , Soviets formed heavy artillery units equipped ly, accurate reconnalssance |; with ohiolescent 200mm howllzers and 240-mm ta on eral, moe targets! PS | iontars The ‘rine. such units identified in the 1 : USSR thus far} are colocated with Sealeboard oF The evidence fal sugeeste that Frontal. Avi- Soud brigades, suggesting that they have a nur ation Is replacing missiles as the USSE's predoml- , clear. tre New: 20m sel-propeled ie : nant means for delivoring tactical nuclear weap- rons and .240-mm self-propelled mortars prol ons | Baginting | about 1050 “and | continulng ; sheen ene troughout thst ot the sites, about 70 percent tt . o any given fr . t iiles, F aera Kent bing being al pany for providing air defense to Pact ground units and advantage spears sea ure. Kiven ifthe Soviets _ Frstallation, Soviets In ihe late filles ao deployed tuclear arllery to Central Europe In developed hope ely led mortars to deliver the near future—as scoms fikely—ihey would nuclear roun =p z too were discarded In requlre deveral years: to develop the doctrine, ee dt heat term, ower, NATO’ sudear- favor of tactical storage, ends procedures, traiulng, and stock 7 SECRET http://www. foia.ucia.gow/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pl?method=sendImageBack&docN 9/7/01File: http://www. foia.ucia.gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServiet.pl?method=sendImageBack&docN 9/7/01 Page | of I Page 15 of 19 of nuctoar founds noeded to match NATO's war fighting capabilites, The Immediate military efe {ret of such deployment would be to expand the clear target ba Tang NATO, Boose ol Sovtet and East European artillery pleces.of the type assoclated with nuclear rounds would have to be considered nuclear capable. The Soviets’ renewed Interest tn nuclear art. ery suggests that they view tho expanded use of Frontal Aviation 63 only a partial solution to the problems of praviding cluse-in nuckear support to ground forces add destroying NATO's many nu- ‘clear systems In the tactical depth of the theater. ‘The Soviets apparently consider that, because NATO's ysl cna artillecy would be de- played close to the battloline, Pact artillery fire would be the |most effective and - responsive means for destroying {t, . Theoter Strike ovens os “the Sovtets are’also undertaking improvements. In perlphoral stektogle forces that will affect tholr war-fighting doctrine and capabilities in Central Europe. Potentially the greatest improvement will result from deployment of.the mobile SS-X- 20 IRBM to replice the old, fixed $54 and $8.5 launchers. In addition to its multiple watheads and increased accuracy, the $$-X-20 apparently willhave a teflre capabllity, Jt will provide the Soviets with a theater strike weapon that, de- pending on the manner of its deployment, oan ba signiflonntly less vulnerable to preemptive attack than thetr present missile force, ‘The reduced vulnerability of these misiles could lessen the Soviet Incentive to launch them preemptively to prevent their destruction by NATO first strike. ‘This "shoot it or lose it” hilosaphy has been one of the driving factors Eohind the preemptive nature of Soviet theater nitclear doctrine, Widespread deployment of the S3-X-20 will provide Sovlet planners with theater strike force meré compatible with shat appears to be a more fexl sonfldent theater nuclear doctrine. NATO's Forces. fF a ‘Two factors Kave combined over the past few years to | pressures for-rcevaluating US. a i taetleal nuclear doctrine for Europe and for reducing. and modernizing US qucléar forces there. }, Congress in 4974 called for a reas. sessment of the rationale .of maintaining US theater nuclear forces in Europe and fox removat ‘of those nuclear warheads that, in number or type, were nat exential for Europe's defense, Secondly, at the MBF? telks the West has pro- posed In its Option III package to withdraw from Europe 1,000 nuclenr warheads, 20 nuclear deliv- ery systems—54 Feds and 36 Pershing missles— and 29,000 US ground troops in exchange for the withdrawal of a Soviet lank army. : Employment Policy In response te the Congressional mandate, the Secretary of Defense tn April 1875 submitted a report that made the following judgments con- cerning the pu and capabilities of US nu- clear forces deployed in Europe: ‘Although tactical nuclear forces eannot sub- stitute for adequate conventional forces, they vould temporarily affect the tactical situation and create a stalemate or NATO advantage that could be tsed to induce nogotlations. +. A nuclear strike by NATO to blunt a Ware “saw Pact conventional attack that threatened to overwhelm NATO's dofenses should clearly be limited and defensive in nature, so as to reduce the risks of escalation, © On the other band,'the attack should be. dolivered with sufficient shock and intensity to foretbly change tho Warsaw Pact leaders’ perceptions of the risks Involved and to create a situation conductive to negotiations. Overall, US doctrine holds that deliberate esca- {ation of a conflict in Europe could involve the imtted use of nuclear weapons in any or all of the following ways: ‘* Use ina clearly defensive role, as in.employ+ -Ing nvcléar-armed Nike Hercules missiles ‘for alr defense or atomlo demolition munl- Mans for aren denial. : ‘*{Demonstrative use, ot launching a strike [designed to convey resolve but to minimize ‘the tisk of provoking an escalntory response. f | pod : seenFile: Page 1 Page 16 of 19 @ Selective nuclear strikes on interdiction targets. . * Selective muclear iteikes agalnst other sult able military targets, “ ta general, planning guidelines emphasize tht NATO mus retain the freedom to eschow early tise: of nuclear weapons If elrcuinstances.clo nat derpand, thelr use, that only conventional forces should be employed inftlally to meet a conven: Tioilal attack, but that nuclear weapons should not te held back. until conventional forces are ahd NATO's goal In using nuclear weapons would shift from a chiefly political to a chiefly military * $ ee conflict toeréased. one aé the intensity of mu ‘The purpose In low-key Inltlation of nuclear war would be primarily palitical—that 1s, to restore detorrence by inducing a change of mind In Soviet political leaders through a demonstration of NATO's resolve and determination and, by implication, {ts willingness to escalate the con- fllct. Indeed, NATO would consider the primary purpose even In early follow-on use to be politi- cal, as it would see live military advantage to such escalation against an enemy that also has ‘substantial Lactigal nuclear eapabilittes, This early stage of escalation would be intended not to deteat the eneniy but to show NATO's—and the enemy’s=wlllingness to ralse the stakes. With escalation to higher levels of muck conflict, NATO's use of ruclear weapons would test be driven more by military requirewients. That ts; by military a with more’ widespread: usage, stetkes wor Intended to destroy attacking forces and to Freeze the battlefield for n period sufficient for political negotiations to restore prewar borders, i vee Farce Trends : Plans for the modernization of NATO's tactical uclear farces have focused upon the develop ment of more efficient nuclear warheuds and a changing mix in US tactlcal alr forces based in Europe. Congresstonal teview and the MBFR. nnegatiations have probably had an fpact on this modlernization. Questions about the appropriate -SeeRET , Europe are still under review. ~SEERET size and composition of US nuclear forces in the Stockpile . ‘The US nuclear stockplle began to grow ia the qold-fifttes, when NATO's nuclear strategy was one of ntastive retaliation; The grawt in number and varlety of watheads continues during the early to maid-1960s. with the new doctrine of flexible response, which required the US to be prepated for nuclear combat with wide variations fn tactles:and levels.of intensity. Growth in the stockpile was stopped between 1967 and 1968 whan clings weyo established. Misiles ond Artilery ‘The’ trond: in US. warhead design has been toward lowor ytelds, in keeping with NATO's desire for a capobillty to minimize collateral damage from strikes against Pact forces on NATO territory.-Lower yields have been made possible by advances in warhead design, while effectiveness has enhanced by Improve- ments In missile accuracy, Probably the most notable of the ylold watheads are the enhanced radi fron) weapons, These provide initial levels of lethal fadiation equal to that normally obtained from a standard fission weapon whose yteld Is some 10 times greater. There fs presently no pric. 4, lower tion (net ‘emitted by neutron weay y Neution warheads for the Lance missile ant the 155-mm_ and 8-Inch howitzers are.in various sages of development, The decision to add these ‘weapons to the operational inventory and deploy them in Europe is still under executive review. Toeticl Asfotlon || m The employment anceps for the US tactical air forces in Europe are changing in response to the Pact’s Inereased conventional, rather than nu clear, capabilities, US nuclear doctrine for tacti- cal aviation, which until recently emphasized widespread, preplanned attacks against {ixed tare gels as part of @ massive thenterwide nuclear 9 of 1 Heal defense against the high levels of radiation. ao http://www foia.ucia.gov/scripts/cgiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pI?method=sendlmageBack&docN 9/7/01File: Page tof 1 - Page 17 of 19 ‘seen 7 : strike plan, is ;jnow placing more emphasis on limited and selective strikes, The new emphasis is more In tune with NATO's doctrine of flexible response, which calls for a carefully modulated tiposte to.a Pact conventional attao ‘The new plarining calls for more flexible use of tactical alt forces against mobile battlefield tar- gets, The current trend toward increased com- titment of missile warheads--particularly SLUM watheads—for fixed targets would perralt allo. eating! a greater proportion of tactical aircraft sorties to nuclede strikes.” fet ‘With the US Alr Force's emphasts on upgrad~ Ing. Its conventional rather than its nuclear strength, there probably vill be a decline In tho number of nuclear-capable aircraft as new mod ‘els enter the inventory. Many of the new US alrcraft to be deployed in Europe in'tho naxt fow Weigel specter i sperintyo ground leat for air superiority oF grow attack missions and will not be nuclear capable. ‘The aircraft they are intended to replace are all technically capable of delivering nuclear bombs, and thelr pilots recelve some nuclear-delivery training, Nevertheless, no significant degradation In NATO's overall tactical nuclear capebllity ts likely, This ls because one of the aireraft to be In- twoduced is the nuclear-capable F-16, whtch Is far superior to the alreratt it will replace; the number. of US F-111s in the UK l being doubled and the, number of Poseidon. warheads allocated to Cen’ tral Europe hasjbeen increased, t tqnplications for! Deterrence | : ee ce Judgment as to whether the growth and mod. ernization of the Warsaw Pacts tucear: forces have lessened detertencs if: Europe can:be no more than’ speculative, use deterrence fs based on the Hons of both sides. Tho deter- sent effet Nato theater nucle forces is lent on the Soviet lea 's perception of NATO's force capabilities, the credibility of NATO's thieat to us these Fores If necessary to halt aggression, and the losses the Pact would In~ cur If NATO's threat were ignored. 10 xheonventional misions and selective During the slaties NATO's clear superiority in nuclear forces constituted a deterrent against bboth conventional and nuclear attack by the War- saw Pact. The large number of NATO battlefield and theater nuclear weapons gave the Alliance a range of employment capabilites that the Pact could Hot offset with in-theater systems. To match NATO's capability to fight « theater nu- clear war, Soviet leaders would have’ been forced to escalate the conflict by. using systems based in the USSR, thus inviting rotallatory strikes agalnst’ Sovlet territory. : . Given NATO's lange advantage in the number, sophistleatlon, and readiness of nuclear systems during the sixties, Soviet planners probably be- fieved that the Alliance viauld be strongly matt- vated to use nuclear weapons at the beginning or early stages of a war In Europe, Soviet planners belleved that, after nuclear altaeks by both sides, ‘NATO's milltary position would be better than the. Paet’s. : ‘With the Improvements in their own tactical nuclear forces over the past several yeats, how- ever, Soviet leaders probably now consider that the milltary advantages to NATO of using nu- clear weapons have decreased and that the Alli- ance would be more reluctant to use them in re- sponse ta a conventional atk To tho extent (this is the ease, the growth of the Pact's tactl- cal nuclear forces has reduced the credibility— and therefore the utillty—~of NATO's theater nu- clear weapons as a counter to the Puct's conven- Honal atrength, If present trends continued and ‘Warsaiy Pec nuclear fortes approached a gen- eral patity wlth those of NATO, the basis of de- ‘terrence tn Europe would shift furthor to the con- ventional forces of both sides Outlook =| : © Whatever inoreased coifldence the Soviets may havo gated from thele force improvements 1s likely to be tempered by thels awareness of the US ability to quickly open new areas of competi- Yon, Cruise misiles represent just such an area that from the Soviet perspective has the potential for profoundly affecting the nuclear balance. ‘The deployment of such mistiles to, Europe could confront the Soviets with great number of SECRET http/Avww foia.ucia.gov/scripts/ogiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pl2method=sendImageBacké&docN 9/7/01Page 1 of 1 Page 18 of 19 nuclear weapons that would be diffleult to detect, A further complleating factor ts that, because of the high European interest fn cruise misiles, the US might transfer them or thelr assuclated tech nology to its NATO ales, “Thus, althoiigh the Sovets may fee} mare com- fortable with | present nuclear balance in i | | |. I | | secret rope, thelr public commentery and thetr positions in the SALT I negotiations reflect a deep con- cern about the potential of cruise missiles for in- creasing both the tactical and the theater nuclear threat. Such concern may be reflected in the near term by a continued effort to expand and im- - prove thelr own theater nuclear forces, The author of this paper ts. . «, Office of Strategic Research. Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to http://www.foia.ucia.gow/scripts/ogiservlets/NavigatorServlet.pl?method=sendImageBackécdocN 9/7/01