G.R. No.

L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and
Rene Saguisag for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-
Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known
as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication
and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the
seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the
Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns,
subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of
the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the
aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this
manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court
without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners,
before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in
the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of
the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence
of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the
revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court
[Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that
while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed
only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact
that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had
been raided.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring
their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the
past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public funds to
release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or
largesse

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like
Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the
return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through
Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command,
they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124,
Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or
chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently
negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby
refuting the charge of laches against them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some
of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the
search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as
evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this
petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is
interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search
warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the
articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
 Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued
because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for
respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the
places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who
headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the
opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he
issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity,
it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This
would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued,
and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in
the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed
against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J.
Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search
warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted
Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned
by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control
or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to
the articles and property seized under the warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under
Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by
the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a
tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries
were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla
Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M.
Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the
premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient
basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain
a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for
the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit
of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows
that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as
the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no
less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of
First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established
by this Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in
the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or
connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines,
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

 3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong
Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general.
In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute
dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the
search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era of
disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving
commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic
and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no
clear and imminent danger to state security.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and
the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and
sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed
under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been
sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of
the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly
constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary
of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President Marcos
himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December
7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE
FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and
took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.

Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of
the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then
Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall
addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11,
1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to close
the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on
December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of
mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are
hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985

JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII (Quezon
City), HON. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI
(Quezon City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN
MADELLA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause,
alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against
him. Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass,
oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.

The background of this case is a matter of public knowledge.

A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On
September 6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California,
almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his
room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several
pictures taken sometime in May, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's
residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses
appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely.

As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP
Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella,
under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA).
Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with subversion,
illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property.

On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of
an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a
number of persons.

On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger
brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he had
driven his elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August
20, 1980. Romeo stated that Victor did not bring any bag with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's
residence and did not carry a bag when he left. The second time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he
brought Victor only to the gate of the petitioner's house. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did
he return that day to pick up his brother.

The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had been linked
to the various bombings in Metro Manila.

Meanwhile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the
office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time.

On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in Metro Manila,
namely: Philippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula. The bombs injured nine people. A meeting
of the General Military Council was called for October 6, 1980.

On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International
Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small
bomb exploded. Within the next twenty-four hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against
persons who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them
was herein petitioner. Victor Lovely offered himself to be a "state witness" and in his letter to the President, he stated
that he will reveal everything he knows about the bombings.

On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila Medical
Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under
arrest. The arresting officer showed the petitioner the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or
charges against him. For some time, the petitioner's lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until
this Court in the case of Ordoez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., (G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980) issued an order
directing that the petitioner's right to be visited by counsel be respected.

On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation
room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner states that he was not
informed why he was transferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil
authority.

Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody
and placed "under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or
charges.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation"
in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12, 1980" and that petitioner
was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his
counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite
assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called
supporting evidence.

On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the
Ministry of Justice.
On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among others of having
violated Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of
the Revised Penal Code. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for March 17, 1981.

On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and
undergo comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal
of his left eye to save his right eye. Petitioner Salonga almost died as one of the principal victims of the dastardly
bombing of a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda on August 20, 1971. Since then, he has suffered serious
disabilities. The petitioner was riddled with shrapnel and pieces still remain in various parts of his body. He has an
AV fistula caused by a piece of shrapnel lodged one millimeter from his aorta. The petitioner has limited use of his
one remaining hand and arms, is completely blind and physical in the left eye, and has scar like formations in the
remaining right eye. He is totally deaf in the right ear and partially deaf in the left ear. The petitioner's physical
ailments led him to seek treatment abroad.

On or around March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by
Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated March 12, 1981, charging the petitioner, along with 39 other accused with the violation
of R.A. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 and P.D. 1736. Hearings for preliminary
investigation were conducted. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Ambassador Armando Fernandez, the
Consul General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California, Col. Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA Chief, Investigation and
Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command and Victor Lovely himself.

On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for failure of
the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him.

On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion. On January 4, 1982, he issued a resolution
ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40)
people, including herein petitioner.

The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4, 1982 are now the subject of the
petition. It is the contention of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to
justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of
evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution utterly insufficient
to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant the petition.

However, before going into the merits of the case, we shall pass upon a procedural issue raised by the respondents.

The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss, being
interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since the question of dismissal will again be
considered by the court when it decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law; and that public interest dictates that criminal prosecutions should not be enjoined.

The general rule is correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate or take into account certain
exceptions when a petition for certiorari is clearly warranted. The case at bar is one such exception.

In the case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) the same contentions were advanced by the respondents to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

 ... Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal case
shall be denied, the remedy of the accused-movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus
or prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the
grounds invoked in his motion to quash if an adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the
appeal that he may take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill v. People, et al., 101 Phil.
599; Echarol v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309.)

On this argument, we ruled:

There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is
also recognized that, under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper
in the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap v.
Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969."

Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the
citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around
forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-
Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested
at the Manila Medical Center while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the
nature of the charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the
issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him (Ordonez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., G.R. No.
55345, October 28, 1980). Only after four months of detention was the petitioner informed for the first time of the
nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary investigation, the petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint
but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an
information after finding that a prima facie case had been established against an of the forty persons accused.

In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime,
the initial disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together with the massive and damaging publicity made
against him, justifies the favorable consideration of this petition by this Court. With former Senator Benigno Aquino,
Jr. now deceased, there are at least 38 other co-accused to be tried with the petitioner. The prosecution must
present proof beyond reasonable doubt against each and every one of the 39 accused, most of whom have varying
participations in the charge for subversion. The prosecution's star witness Victor Lovely and the only source of
information with regard to the alleged link between the petitioner and the series of terrorist bombings is now in the
United States. There is reason to believe the petitioner's citation of international news dispatches * that the prosecution may
find it difficult if not infeasible to bring him back to the Philippines to testify against the petitioner. If Lovely refused to testify before an American federal grand jury
how could he possibly be made to testify when the charges against the respondent come up in the course of the trial against the 39 accused. Considering the
foregoing, we find it in the interest of justice to resolve at this stage the issue of whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the
questioned resolutions.

The respondents contend that the prosecution will introduce additional evidence during the trial and if the evidence,
by then, is not sufficient to prove the petitioner's guilt, he would anyway be acquitted. Yes, but under the
circumstances of this case, at what cost not only to the petitioner but to the basic fabric of our criminal justice
system?

The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain
the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a
conviction. The question raised before us now is: Were the evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if
they were unexplained or uncontradicted, would they, standing alone, sufficiently overcome the presumption of
innocence and warrant his conviction?

We do not think so.

The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the testimonies
of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on
subversive organizations in the United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an organizer, officer or member
of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any of the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on
the other hand, when asked what evidence he was able to gather against the petitioner depended only on the
statement of Lovely "that it was the residence of ex-Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Taada,
one of the brains of the bombing conspiracy ... and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting with several
subversive personnel based in the U.S.A. was also revealed to me by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and on the group
pictures taken at former Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In concluding that a conspiracy exists to
overthrow by violent means the government of the Philippines in the United States, his only bases were
"documentary as well as physical and sworn statements that were referred to me or taken by me personally," which
of course negate personal knowledge on his part. When asked by the court how he would categorize petitioner in
any of the subversive organizations, whether petitioner was an organizer, officer or a member, the witness replied:

A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he is an officer or he is a member,

your Honor, please, we have to consider the surrounding circumstances and on his involvement:
first, Senator Salonga wanted always to travel to the United States at least once a year or more
often under the pretext of to undergo some sort of operation and participate in some sort of seminar.
(t.s.n., April 21, 1981, pp- 14-15)

Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie
evidence of subversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, -has no probative value as the affiant could not have been cross-examined on the facts
stated therein. (See People v. Labinia, 115 SCRA 223; People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661). Moreover, as Victor Lovely,
himself, was personally examined by the court, there was no need for the testimony of Col. Diego. Thus, the inquest
judge should have confined his investigation to Victor Burns Lovely, the sole witness whose testimony had
apparently implicated petitioner in the bombings which eventually led to the filing of the information.

Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing mission is found in his sworn statement
made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella and taken on October 17, 1980 at the AFP Medical Center. Lovely was
not presented as a prosecution or state witness but only as a defense witness for his two younger brothers, Romeo
and Baltazar, who were both included in the complaint but who were later dropped from the information. Victor
Lovely was examined by his counsel and cross-examined by the fiscal. In the process, he Identified the statement
which he made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella. After Lovely's testimony, the prosecution made a
manifestation before the court that it was adopting Lovely as a prosecution witness.

According to Lovely's statement, the following events took place:

36. Q. Did Psinakis tell you where to stay?

A. Yes, at first he told me to check-in at Manila Hotel or the Plaza Hotel where
somebody would come to contact me and give the materials needed in the execution
of my mission. I thought this was not safe so I disagreed with him. Mr. Psinakis
changed the plan and instead told me to visit the residence of Ex-Sen. Jovito
Salonga as often as I can and someone will meet me there to give the materials I
needed to accomplish my mission

37. Q. Did you comply as instructed?

A. Yes, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980 and stayed at the residence of Mr.
Johnny Chua, husband of my business partner, then I went to the Hospital where I
visited my mother and checked-in at Room 303 of the YMCA at Concepcion Street,
Manila.

38. Q. Did you visit the residence of former Senator Jovito Salonga as directed by
Psinakis?

A. I visited Sen. Salonga's place three (3) times, the first visit was August 20 or 21,
and the last was 4:00 P.M. of August 31, 1980. In addition to these visits, I TALKED
to him on the phone about three or four times. On my first visit, I told him "I am
expecting an attache case from somebody which will be delivered to your house," for
which Sen. Salonga replied "Wala namang nagpunta dito at wala namang attache
case para sa iyo." However, if your attache case arrives, I'll just call you." I gave him
my number. On my second visit, Salonga said, "I'll be very busy so just come back
on the 31st of August at 4 P.M." On that date, I was with friends at Batulao Resort
and had to hurry back to be at Salonga's place for the appointment. I arrived at
Salonga's place at exactly 4 P.M.

39. Q. What happened then?

A. I was ushered to the sala by Mrs. Salonga and after five minutes, Sen. Salonga
joined me in the sala. Sen. Salonga informed me that somebody will be coming to
give me the attache case but did not tell me the name.

40. Q. Are there any subject matters you discuss while waiting for that somebody to
deliver your materials?

A. Yes, Salonga asked if Sen. Aquino and I have met, I explained to him the efforts of
Raul Daza in setting up that meeting but I have previous business commitments at
Norfolk, Virginia. I told him, however, that through the efforts of Raul Daza, I was able
to talk with Ninoy Aquino in the airport telephone booth in San Francisco. He also
asked about Raul Daza, Steve Psinakis and the latest opposition group activities but
it seems he is well informed.

41. Q. How long did you wait until that somebody arrived?

A. About thirty (30) minutes.

41. Q. What happened when the man arrived?

A. This man arrived and I was greatly surprised to see Atty. Renato Taada Jovy
Salonga was the one who met him and as I observed parang nasa sariling bahay si
Taada nung dumating. They talked for five (5) minutes in very low tones so I did not
hear what they talked about. After their whispering conversations, Sen. Salonga left
and at this time Atty. "Nits" Taada told me "Nasa akin ang kailangan mo, nasa
kotse."

43. Q. Were the materials given to you?

A. When Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave and I rode in
Atty. "Nits" Taadas old Pontiac car colored dirty brown and proceeded to Broadway
 Centrum where before I alighted, Atty. Taada handed me a "Puma" bag containing
all the materials I needed.

xxx xxx xxx

45. Q. What were the contents of the Puma bag?

A. Ten (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watch with screw and wirings, ten (10) pieces
electrical blasting caps 4" length, ten (10) pieces non-electrical blasting caps 1 "
length, nine (9) pieces volts dry cell battery, two (2) improvised electrical testers. ten
(10) plastic packs of high explosive about 1 pound weight each.

However, in his interview with Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz which was aired on Channel 4 on November 8, 1980 and
which was also offered as evidence by the accused, Lovely gave a different story which negates the above
testimony insofar as the petitioner's participation was concerned:

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Who were the people that you contacted in Manila and for what purpose?

A. Before I left for the Philippines, Mr. Psinakis told me to check in at the Manila
Hotel or the Plaza Hotel, and somebody would just deliver the materials I would
need. I disapproved of this, and I told him I would prefer a place that is familiar to me
or who is close to me. Mr. Psinakis suggested the residence of Sen. Salonga.

And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, 1 made a call to Sen. Salonga, but he
was out. The next day I made a call again. I was able to contact him. I made an
appointment t see him. I went to Sen. Salonga's house the following day. I asked
Sen. Salonga if someone had given him an attache case for me. He said nobody.
Afterwards, I made three calls to Sen. Salonga. Sen. Salonga told me "call me again
on the 31st of August. I did not call him, I just went to his house on the 31st of August
at 4 P.M. A few minutes after my arrival Atty. Renato Taada arrived. When he had a
chance to be near me, he (Atty. Tanada) whispered to me that he had the attache
case and the materials I needed in his car. These materials were given to me by Atty.
Tanada When I alighted at the Broadway Centrum. (Emphasis supplied)

During the cross-examination, counsel for petitioner asked Lovely about the so-called destabilization plan which the
latter mentioned in his sworn statement:

Q. You mentioned in your statement taken on October 17, 1980, marked Exhibit "G"
about the so-called destabilization plan of Aquino. When you attended the birthday
party of Raul Daza wherein Jovito Salonga was also present, was this destabilization
plan as alleged by you already formulated?

WITNESS:

A. Not to my knowledge.

COURT TO WITNESS:

Q. Mr. Witness, who invited you to the party?

 A. Raul Daza, your Honor.

Q. Were you told that Mr. Salonga would be present in the party.

A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor.

Q. Alright. You said initially it was social but then it became political. Was there any
political action taken as a result of the party?

A. Only political discussion, your Honor. (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69-84).

Counsel for petitioner also asked Lovely whether in view of the latter's awareness of the physical condition of
petitioner, he really implicated petitioner in any of the bombings that occurred in Metro Manila. The fiscal objected
without stating any ground. In sustaining the objection, the Court said:

Sustained . . . The use of the word 'implicate' might expand the role of Mr. Salonga. In other words,
you are widening the avenue of Mr. Salonga's role beyond the participation stated in the testimony of
this witness about Mr. Salonga, at least, as far as the evidence is concerned, I supposed, is only
being in the house of Mr. Salonga which was used as the contact point. He never mentions Mr.
Salonga about the bombings. Now these words had to be put in the mouth of this witness. That
would be unfair to Mr. Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, p. 67)

Respondent judge further said:

COURT:

As the Court said earlier, the parts or portions affecting Salonga only refers to the
witness coming to Manila already then the matter of . . . I have gone over the
statement and there is no mention of Salonga insofar as activities in the United
States is concerned. I don't know why it concerns this cross-examination.

ATTY. YAP:

Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he came to Manila.

COURT:

According to him it was Aquino, Daza, and Psinakis who asked him to come here,
but Salonga was introduced only when he (Lovely) came here. Now, the tendency of
the question is also to connect Salonga to the activities in the United States. It seems
to be the thrust of the questions.

COURT:

In other words, the point of the Court as of the time when you asked him question,
the focus on Salonga was only from the time when he met Salonga at Greenhills. It
was the first time that the name of Salonga came up. There was no mention of
Salonga in the formulation of the destabilization plan as affirmed by him. But you are
bringing this up although you are only cross-examining for Salonga as if his
(Lovely's) activities in the United States affected Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, pp. 73-
74).
Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by limiting the petitioner's alleged
"participation" in the bombing mission only to the fact that petitioner's house was used as a "contact point" between
Lovely and Taada, which was all that Lovely really stated in his testimony.

However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent judge suddenly included the
"activities" of petitioner in the United States as his basis for denying the motion to dismiss:

On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in one of his statements
declared: 'To the best of my recollection he mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the
Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately.

It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts and circumstances
sufficient for a finding that excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The Movement for
Free Philippines is undoubtedly a force born on foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of
foreign entities, and is being (sic) on gaining ascendancy in the Philippines with the use of force and
for that purpose it has linked itself with even communist organizations to achieve its end. It appears
to rely on aliens for its supporters and financiers.

The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in the United
States is not only inexplicable but without foundation.

The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts of violence
or terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a
leader of subversive organizations for two reasons-

(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and

(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not
instituted by President Marcos immediately."

The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory is too tenuous a
basis to conclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person
simply because some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his house or office would be to
establish a dangerous precedent. The right of citizens to be secure against abuse of governmental processes in
criminal prosecutions would be seriously undermined.

The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of inconsistencies. Senator Salonga and Atty.
Renato Taada could not have whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. Lovely could
not have met Senator Salonga at a Manglapus party in Washington, D.C. in 1977 because the petitioner left for the
United States only on November, 1978. Senator Salonga denies having known Mr. Lovely in the United States or in
the Philippines. He states that he has hundred of visitors from week to week in his residence but cannot recall any
Victor Lovely.

The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles where Senator
Salonga was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his many years in the turbulent world
of politics, he has posed with all kinds of people in various groups and various places and could not possibly vouch
for their conduct. Commenting on the matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to
pose with important visitors and the picture proves nothing.

It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's stature can expect guests and
visitors of all kinds to be visiting his home or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a
group picture at a birthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his home, the petitioner does not thereby
become a rebel or subversive, much less a leader of a subversive group. More credible and stronger evidence is
necessary for an indictment. Nonetheless, even if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss the
refutations and arguments of the petitioner, the prosecution evidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie
finding.

The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any
proscribed activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the
complaint. Lovely had already testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to
have been attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political action was taken but only political discussion.
Furthermore, the alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if
reforms are not instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of
thought and expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo meretur. And
as the late Justice Oliver W. Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, " ... if there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free
thought not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."

We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher
level than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a
fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As
explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history,
both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every
other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly
concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and
public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of
criminal indictments.

The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. United States (367 U.S. 290) distinguished between the abstract
teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence and speech which would
prepare a group for violent action and steel it to such action. In Watts v. United States (394 U.S. 705), the American
court distinguished between criminal threats and constitutionally protected speech.

It stated:

We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory
term. For we must interpret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254). The
language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputed is often vituperative abusive,
and inexact. We agree with petitioner that his only offense was a kind of very crude offensive method
of stating a political opposition to the President.

In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to violence, much less an advocacy of
force or a conspiracy to organize the use of force against the duly constituted authorities. The alleged remark about
the likelihood of violent struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat against the government. Nor is it even
the uninhibited, robust, caustic, or unpleasantly sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech.
Parenthetically, the American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action. The words which petitioner allegedly used according to the best recollections of Mr.
Lovely are light years away from such type of proscribed advocacy.

Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of
freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of
membership in a subversive organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885, Section 3, paragraph 6, political
discussion will only constitute, prima facie evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such discussion
amounts to:

(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of
any plan or enterprise thereof.

As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link between petitioner
and any subversive organization. Even if we lend credence to Lovely's testimony that a political discussion took
place at Daza's birthday party, no proof whatsoever was adduced that such discussion was in furtherance of any
plan to overthrow the government through illegal means. The alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless
reforms are instituted by no means shows either advocacy of or incitement to violence or furtherance of the
objectives of a subversive organization.

Lovely also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22, 1980, which was the only bombing
incident that occurred after his arrival in Manila on August 20, and before the YMCA explosion on September 6,
1980. (See TSN, pp. 63-63, July 8, 1981). He further testified that:

WITNESS:

Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing against the government.
My bombing mission was directed against the particular family (referring to the
Cabarrus family [TSN, p. 11, July 9, 1981] [Rollo, p. 10].

Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment which Lovely was supposed to
have been commissioned to perform upon the orders of his co- accused and which was the very reason why they
answer charged in the first place. The respondent judge also asked Lovely about the possible relation between
Cabarrus and petitioner:

COURT:

Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito Salonga, why did you
implicate Jovito Salonga?

A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.

It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to the court that it was adopting him as a
prosecution witness. Therefore, the prosecution became irreversively bound by Lovely's disclaimers on the witness
stand, that it was not his intention "to do some kind of bombing against the government" and that he "did not try to
implicate Salonga", especially since Lovely is the sole witness adopted by the prosecution who could supposedly
establish the link between the petitioner and the bombing incidents.

The respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case
exists against the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. (People v. Dayad, 56 SCRA 439). In the case at bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible
version of the petitioner's role in the bombings even if it ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and without
relying on mere affidavits including those made by Lovely during his detention.

The resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from the same defect. In this resolution, Lovely's previous declarations
about the bombings as part of the alleged destabilization plan and the people behind the same were accorded such
credibility by the respondent judge as if they had already been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety
of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241;
citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it
would be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to
satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making
sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of
the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live
in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused
from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie
case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no
general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of
the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion
of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run
counter to the clear dictates of reasons (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or
fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up
during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears
repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has
been before. It should continue to be so. Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93).

The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985,
respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion
case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence
and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under
the questioned resolution.

We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia
from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for
further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision
has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not precluded from filing new charges for
the same acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply. in that sense, the
case is not completely academic.

Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme Court's
functions.

The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of
Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may
not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees.

In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and,
therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became
moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and stated:

The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created
through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the
President's legislative powers under martial law. Stan, this Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the
preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the
Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners
were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of
murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not
prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions
ever printed in the Reports.

In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish
a prima facie case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the
government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the initiative of dropping the
charges against the petitioner. We reiterate the rule, however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an
information based on the kind of evidence against the petitioner found in the records.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and Cuevas, JJ.,
concur.

Aquino, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 258,
HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR.,
ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE
AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274,
respondents, LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor.

G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995

MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 258,
HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents.

G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995

ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 258,
HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR.,
ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE
AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
274, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of
Arrest issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No.
95-404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3)
dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. 1

From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with
the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J.
Lejano and six (6) other persons, 2 with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a
panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuo to conduct the preliminary
investigation 3of those charged with the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; 4 her mother Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde, 5 and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer 6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes,
Paraaque, Metro Manila.

During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of
their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime; 7 (2) the sworn
statements of two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila
S. Gaviola;8 (3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger of
United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-
passenger in the trip; (4) the sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the
manner of how Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar; 9 (5) the sworn statements of Belen
Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn statements of Normal White, a security guard
and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted and they showed that
Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen (19). 10 The genital examination of Carmela
confirmed the presence of spermatozoa. 11

Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for Production And
Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the following:
 (a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and stay of Hubert
Webb in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;

(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, M.D.;

(c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated October 7, 1991);

(d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during the investigation;

(e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;

(f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated September 2,
1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;

(g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro (other than the
May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other police agencies;

(h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by Superintendent
Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;

(i) The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their respective positions
and duties;

(j) Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.

The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. It alleged it lost
the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro. This compelled petitioner Webb to file Civil Case No.
951099 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Br. 63, for the purpose, among others, of obtaining the original
of said sworn statement. He succeeded, for in the course of its proceedings, Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., produced
a copy of said original in compliance with a subpoena duces tecum. The original was then submitted by petitioner
Webb to the DOJ Panel together with his other evidence. It appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to obtain
from the NBI the copy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request for its production.

Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar as he went to
the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992. 12 His alibi was corroborated
by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela
Francisco. 13 To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986
Toyota car while in the United States on said dates 14 and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License
No. A8818707 on June 14, 1991. 15 Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert
Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San
Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.

The other respondents Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Peter
Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss
denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. 16 Only the respondents Joey Filart and Artemio "Dong"
Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known address. 17 In his
sworn statement, petitioner Gatchalian alleged that from 11 o'clock in the evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 o'clock in the
morning of the following day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap, at New Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa watching video tapes. He claimed that his co-petitioner Lejano was with him.

On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents for
trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-
respondents, 18 On the same date, it filed the corresponding Information 19 against petitioners and their co-accused with
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258
presided by respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of
Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily
inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI
before his appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who
issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11, 1995, petitioner Webb
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and
Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before us.

In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them: (2)
the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the
crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge
Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.

We find the petitions bereft of merit.

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May 22, 1995 sworn
statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged material
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They assail her credibility
for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by
the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in
the sworn statements of the witnesses for the NBI.

We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule 112 provides that
a preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-
grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." Section 3 of the same Rule outlines the
procedure in conducting a preliminary investigation, thus:

Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be
sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or,
in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss
the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a subpoena to the respondent,
attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents. Within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents. He shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
 (c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall also be
sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies thereof shall be furnished by
him to the complainant.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits
within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence
presented by the complainant.

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties
so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the
parties or witnesses concerned.

(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve
the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer
shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent for trial,
he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall certify under oath that he, or as
shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses, that
there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof . . ."

The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature . . ." 20 An arrest without a
probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded
by the State. 21 Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of
case law reiterate that they are facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 22 Other jurisdictions utilize the term man
of reasonable caution 23 or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man. 24 The terms are legally synonymous and their reference is
not to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the street. 25 It ought to
be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of
common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.

Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel gravely abused its discretion
when it found probable cause against the petitioners. Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2)
grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she
committed material inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement, thus: 26

xxx xxx xxx

To illustrate, the following are some examples of inconsistencies in the two sworn statements of
Alfaro:

On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question

First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991.

Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."

 On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies

First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night. She just said "on
the following day I read in the newspaper that there were three persons who were
killed . . ."

Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw two bodies on top
of the bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert on top of Carmela."

On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde

First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.

Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top of Carmela and
pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning and I saw tears on her eyes."

On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house

First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little more than a meter
high."

Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."

On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house

First Affidavit: She never entered the house.

Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty kitchen."

In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies did not erode
the credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent ruling, viz.: 27

xxx xxx xxx

As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements, granting for purposes of argument merely that
she is a co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of a co-conspirator may be taken as
evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator's participation in the commission of the crime
(see People vs. Lumahang, 94 Phil. 1084).

Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence
of prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only rarely would such a prior agreement be
demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by
agreements in writing. Thus, conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, showing that the several accused had acted in concert
or in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of Appeals,
210 SCRA 402 [1992], citations omitted; People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 699).

Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of the inconsistencies in her two sworn statements.
In Angelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony of a witness accusing therein petitioner for the
slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even though said witness failed to name Angelo in his affidavit
which was executed five (5) months earlier. Granting, the Court continued, that a part of the witness'
 testimony is untrue, such circumstance is not sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the
witness.

On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent Webb submitted his memorandum suggesting
that the instant complaint "should not be decided within the month to give time to the NBI to
coordinate with the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the whereabouts of Hubert Webb . . . and to check
on our U.S.-based witnesses."

In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb calls for the application of the maxim falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of Alfaro's statements, among others. This is
untenable. As held in Angelo:

There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of the testimony of a
witness as worthy of belief and from simultaneously rejecting other parts which the
court may find incredible or dubious. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is
not a rule of law, let alone a general rule of law which is universally applicable. It is
not a legal presumption either. It is merely a latinism describing the conclusion
reached by a court in a particular case after ascribing to the evidence such weight or
lack of weight that the court deemed proper.

In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having reservations when she
first executed the first statement and held back vital information due to her natural reaction of
mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements
have been sufficiently explained especially specially so where there is no showing that the
inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of
Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit. As it has been often noted, ex parte statements are
generally incomplete because they are usually executed when the affiant's state of mind does not
give her sufficient and fair opportunity to comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in
full the incidents which transpired (People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been committed and what is
clear before us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by the complainant indicate a prima
facie case that respondents conspired in the perpetration of the imputed offense.

We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro was given with the assistance of counsel 28 and consists of
six (6) pages, in single space reciting in rich details how the crime was planned and then executed by the petitioners. In
addition, the DOJ Panel evaluated the supporting sworn statements of Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, former
housemaids of the Webbs, Carlos J. Cristobal, a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808 and Lolita Birrer, a paramour
of Gerardo Biong. The Panel assayed their statements as follows: 29

xxx xxx xxx

According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former housemaid of the Webb family, on June 29, 1991,
between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Hubert was at home inside his room with two
male visitors. She knew it because she and her co-housemaid, Loany, were instructed by Hubert to
bring them three glasses of juice. It was the last time she saw Hubert and was later told by then
Congressman Webb that Hubert was in the United States.

While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of the Webb family and who served as a laundry
woman, claims, aside from corroborating the statement of Nerissa Rosales, that on June 30, 1991,
she woke up at around 4:00 in the morning and as what she used to do, she entered the rooms of
the Webbs to get their clothes to be washed. As a matter of fact, in that early morning, she entered
Hubert's room and saw Hubert, who was only wearing his pants, already awake and smoking while
he was sitting on his bed. She picked up Hubert's scattered clothes and brought them together with
the clothes of the other members of the family to the laundry area. After taking her breakfast, she
began washing the clothes of the Webbs. As she was washing the clothes of Hubert Webb, she
noticed fresh bloodstains in his shirt. After she finished the laundry, she went to the servant's
quarters. But feeling uneasy, she decided to go up to the stockroom near Hubert's room to see what
he was doing. In the said stockroom, there is a small door going to Hubert's room and in that door
there is a small opening where she used to see Hubert and his friends sniffing on something. She
observed Hubert was quite irritated, uneasy, and walked to and from inside his room.

On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at around 1:00 in the afternoon and came back at
around 4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside his room using the secret door of the house. It
was the last time that she saw Hubert until she left the Webb family.

On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00 in the morning,
he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he was then scheduled to take the United Airlines
Flight No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New York. At the airport's lobby, he saw then
Congressman Freddie Webb with a male companion. He greeted him and Webb answered: "Mabuti
naman, at ito, ihahatid ko ang anak ko papuntang Florida." He knew Freddie Webb because he often
watched him then in a television show "Chicks to Chicks." He observed that the man whom Freddie
Webb referred to as his son, was of the same height as Freddie. The son referred to has fair
complexion with no distinguishing marks on his face. He (son of Webb) was then wearing a striped
white jacket. When he and his children were already inside the plane, he did not see Freddie
anymore, but he noticed his son was seated at the front portion of the economy class. He never
noticed Freddie Webb's son upon their arrival in San Francisco. He claims that, while watching the
television program "DONG PUNO LIVE" lately, he saw the wife of Freddie Webb with her lawyer
being interviewed, and when she described Hubert as "moreno" and small built, with a height of five
feet and seven inches tall, and who was the one who left for United States on March 9, 1991, he
nurtured doubts because such description does not fit the physical traits of the son of Freddie, who
left with him for United States on the same flight and date.

Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong because she had an affair with him for almost
three (3) years and in fact, she had a child with him who is now four (4) years old. Their relationship
started in February, 1991 until she broke up with him in September 1993. She recalls that on June
29, 1991, at around 6:00 p.m., Biong invited her to play mahjong at the canteen of a certain Aling
Glo located at the back of the Paraaque Municipal Hall.

At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30, 1991, the radio operator of the Paraaque police
told Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong went to the radio room, she was instructed to take
him over and after somebody won the game, she followed Biong at the radio room where she
overheard him uttering, "Ano?, Saan? Mahirap yan, Paano, o sige, aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na
taxi, o sige." When he put the phone down, Biong told her, "Mayroon lang akong rerespondehan,
ikaw muna ang maupo" and then, he went outside the canteen apparently waiting for somebody.
Twenty minutes later, a taxi, colored yellow, arrived with a male passenger sitting at the backseat
and parked near the canteen. After it made some signals by blinking its headlight, Biong rode thereat
at the front seat beside the driver and then, they left. She was not able to recognize the male
passenger because the window of the taxi was tinted. Biong came back at around 7:00 of the same
morning and when he arrived, he immediately washed his hands and face, and took his
handkerchief from his pocket which he threw at the trash can. She asked him why he threw his
handkerchief and he answered, "Hmp . . . amoy tae." She inquired what happened in BF Homes and
he replied, "Putang inang mga batang iyon, pinahirapan nila ako."
 Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first went to his office where she observed him doing
something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to be uneasy. Moments later, Galvan, another
policeman of Paraaque, arrived and said, "Oy Biong, may tatlong patay sa BF, imbestigahan mo" to
which Biong answered, "Oo susunod na ako." Biong went to the office of Capt. Don Bartolome who
offered to accompany him and with whom she asked permission to go with them. Before they
proceeded to the place where the killings happened, she asked Biong if he knew the exact address
and the latter immediately responded, "Alam ko na yon." She was surprised because Galvan never
told him the place of the incident.

As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence, Biong instructed the housemaids to contact the
victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched the barangay chairman and the president of the
Homeowners Association. When all these persons were already in the house, Biong started
recording the wounds of the victim. Inside the master's bedroom, she saw Biong took a watch from
the jewelry box. Because she could not tolerate the foul odor, she and Capt. Bartolome went out of
the room and proceeded to the dining area. On top of the dining table, she saw the scattered
contents of a shoulder bag. Moments later, Biong came out from the room and proceeded to the
front door to remove the chain lock; asked the keys from the housemaid and it was only then that the
main door was opened. Biong noticed a stone in front of the broken glass of the door and requested
Capt. Bartolome to go inside the servant's quarters as he doubted the housemaids' claim that they
heard nothing unusual. Using the handle of his gun, Biong broke the remaining glass of the door
panel. Bartolome then came out of the room and told Biong that he can hear the sound of the glass
being broken. At the garage, Biong also noticed same marks on the hood of the car.

On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong arrived in her house together with the Vizconde
housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a bath, she saw him remove from his pocket the
things she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit: calling cards, driver's license, ATM card, a
crossed check worth P80,000.00, earrings, a ring, bracelet, necklace, and the watch he took from
the jewelry box inside the room of the Vizcondes. These jewelry items were later pawned by Biong
for P20,000.00 at a pawnshop in front of Chow-Chow restaurant in Santos Avenue, Paraaque. The
next day, she saw Biong took from his locker at the Paraaque Police Station an imported brown
leather jacket, which the latter claimed to have been given to him by the person who called him up in
the early morning of June 30, 1991.

Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until they broke up sometime in 1993. She observed
that Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the investigation of the Vizconde case. In fact, when
Biong and this group picked up Mike Gatchalian and brought him to the Paraaque Police Station,
she was surprised that Biong halted the investigation when Gatchalian was profusely sweating while
being interrogated. After the father of Gatchalian talked to Colonel Pureza, the latter called up and
instructed Biong to bring Gatchalian to him (Colonel Pureza) and that was the last thing she
remembered regarding this case.

The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence against the exculpatory evidence of petitioners. It ruled: 30

xxx xxx xxx

The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his defense of denial
and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough evaluation of the records, believes
that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted by the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification made by a prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant consideration in the
face of positive identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and
 relatives (People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA 124 [1994]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 and a long
line of cases).

Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters (People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA
687 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and becomes even more weaker when arrayed against
the positive identification by the witness for the prosecution (People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62
[1994]).

Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano, whom he claimed was
with him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence. Other than claiming that he "was not and
could not have been at or near the area of the Vizconde residence at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime," respondent Lejano proffered no evidence to substantiate his claim of alibi.

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to enhance the acceptability of his alibi in the form of
documents tending to show that he was thousands of miles away when the incident occurred. We
have carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence submitted by respondent Webb in support of
his absence from the country since March 9, 1991 to October 26, 1992 and found the same wanting
to exonerate him of the offense charged. The material dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991.
While respondent Webb may have submitted proof tending to show that he was issued a California
driver's license on June 14, 1991, there is no showing that he could not have been in the country on
the dates above mentioned. Neither do we find merit in the allegation that respondent Webb
personally bought a bicycle on June 30, 1991 in California in view of his positive identification by
Alfaro and the two (2) househelps of the Webb family who testified that he was here in the country
on said dates. Additionally, the issuance of receipt evidencing the purchase of a bicycle in California
is no conclusive proof that the name appearing thereon was the actual buyer of the merchandise.

Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold that the DOJ Panel did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, 31 while probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding
of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, we
also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for
clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable
cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies
probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of
trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel
correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory
hearing was unnecessary.

II
We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary
examination. Petitioners support their stance by highlighting the following facts: (1) the issuance of warrants
of arrest in a matter of few hours; (2) the failure of said judges to issue orders of arrest; (3) the records
submitted to the trial court were incomplete and insufficient from which to base a finding of probable cause;
and (4) that even Gerardo Biong who was included in the Information as a mere accessory had a "NO BAIL"
recommendation by the DOJ Panel. Petitioners postulate that it was impossible to conduct a "searching
examination of witnesses and evaluation of the documents" on the part of said judges.

The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both with respect to issuance of
warrants of arrest or search warrants. The similarities and differences of their requirements ought to be
educational. Some of them are pointed out by Professors LaFave and Israel, thus: 32 "It is generally assumed
that the same quantum of evidence is required whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or
probable cause to search. But each requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and
circumstances, and thus one can exist without the other. In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by
substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity,
and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also necessary that a particular person be
implicated. By comparison, in arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the
crime will be found at premises under that person's control." Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do not provide for
a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants. With respect to
warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial
Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused." In contrast, the procedure to be followed in issuing
search warrants is more defined. Thus, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 126 provide:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the facts upon
which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must
issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and search warrants in Soliven
vs. Makasiar, 33 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.

Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law 34 repudiate the submission of petitioners
that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of
arrest against them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before
issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of
arrest.

In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2) sworn
statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer 35 as well as the counter-
affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the
DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against
petitioners. Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor
finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process
cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few
hours to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no
personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case. 36
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno 37 is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is predicated on the utter
failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Not even the corpus delicti of the crime was
established by the evidence of the prosecution in that case. Given the clear insufficiency of the evidence on
record, we stressed the necessity for the trial judge to make a further personal examination of the complainant
and his witnesses to reach a correct assessment of the existence or non-existence of probable cause before
issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. The case at bar, however, rests on a different factual setting. As
priorly discussed, the various types of evidence extant in the records of the case provide substantial basis for a
finding of probable cause against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the crime is a given fact. There is an
eyewitness account of the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The alibi defense of petitioner Webb is also disputed by
sworn statements of their former maids. It was therefore unnecessary for the respondent judges to take the further
step of examining ex parte the complainant and their witnesses with searching questions.

III

Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their
right to an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty and malicious prosecution by the NBI and
the DOJ Panel. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary
investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause
against them. The fairness of this opportunity is well stressed in the Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor
General, viz.:

Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities to be heard.
Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing in the initial
hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the second hearing on July 14, 1995; and by filing a "Motion
for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents" on June 27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a
"Reply to the compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and Examination
of Evidence" on July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a "Comment and Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6,
Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July 14, 1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to Resolve" on
August 1, 1995. Numerous letter-requests were also sent by the petitioner Webb's counsel to the
DOJ Panel requesting the latter to furnish him a copy of the reports prepared by the FBI concerning
the petitioner's whereabouts during the material period (Annexes "L", "L-1" and "L-2" of the
Supplemental Petition dated August 14, 1995). In fact, not satisfied with the decision of the DOJ
Panel not to issue subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a
"Petition for Injunction, Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
63 of Makati in order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr. to produce the first sworn statement of Alfaro
for submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The said court dismissed the petition after Mercader
produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first sworn statement of Alfaro, without ruling on the
admissibility and credence of the two (2) conflicting and inconsistent sworn statements of the
principal witness, Alfaro. (Attached hereto is a copy of the order of Judge Ruben A. Mendiola, RTC-
Makati, Branch 63 dated July 28, 1995) marked as Annex "F."

It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the preliminary
investigation was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the panel continued to
conduct further proceedings, e.g. comparison of the photo-copies of the submitted documents with
the originals on July 17, 1995. (p. 7, Petition) The panel even entertained the "Response" submitted
by accused Miguel Rodriguez on July 18, 1995. (p. 17 Resolution) In addition to these, the panel
even announced that any party may submit additional evidence before the resolution of the case. (p.
8, Petition) From the time the panel declared the termination of the preliminary investigation on July
14, 1995, twenty-seven (27) days elapsed before the resolution was promulgated, and the
information eventually filed in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque on August 10, 1995. This
 notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the
investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the termination of the preliminary
investigation. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf
and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This directly disputes the allegation of
the petitioners that the resolution was done with indecent haste in violation of the rights of the
petitioners. During the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and
present additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.

Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the conduct of the
preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and
filed the Information in court against them.

Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them for rape with
homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the
Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223,
series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993. We quote its pertinent sections, viz.:

Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the
Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable
cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the
showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the
appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the
appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.

An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not
hold the filing of the information in court.

Sec. 2. When to appeal. The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be interrupted only by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution and shall
continue to run from the time the resolution denying the motion shall have been received by the
movant or his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)

Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in court after the
consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still exercise the right to seek a
review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.

Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information considering her alleged
conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on
Republic Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program And For Other
Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10, which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and
desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the
Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:

(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the R.P.C. or its
equivalent under special laws;
 (b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and

(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may
be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may
upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused so that he can be used as a Witness
under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-inclusion in the
criminal Complaint or Information, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. The certification of admission
into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the provincial or city
prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE WITNESS IN THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION and if included therein, to petition the court for his discharge in order that he can be
utilized as a State Witness. The court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused
from the information.

Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution
for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and all the rights and benefits
provided under Section 8 hereof.

The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that they constitute ". . . an
intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the power under the Rules on Criminal
Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness." The argument is based on Section 9, Rule
119 38which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to be a state witness.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a
judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the
prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our
laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally
impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine
who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. 39 Section 9 of
Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent
judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it
has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the
exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have
never been interpreted to be beyond change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice
system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against
crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well put by
the Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear
and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal
complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective
administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them
certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative bodies/courts." 40 Petitioner Webb's
challenge to the validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.

Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings during their preliminary
investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI
Report. The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive reading of the rights of
persons under preliminary investigation it deserves serious consideration. To start with, our Rules on
Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation
stage of a criminal proceeding. 41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to move for a
bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution. 42 But
these provisions apply after the filing of the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are accorded to the
accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare for trial. 43

This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not, however, negate its
use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and
property. Preliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard against any significant erosion of the
constitutional right to due process of a potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary
investigation is to determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a
probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution. In
the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for they are charged with the crime
of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.

Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation.
Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high
duty is to be fair and impartial. 44 As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 45 "the right to have
a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally
at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right." A
preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a
potential accused can be protected from any material damage. We uphold the legal basis of the right of petitioners
to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the
FBI Report during their preliminary investigation considering their exculpatory character, and hence,
unquestionable materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional protection of
due process which we rule to be operational even during the preliminary investigation of a potential accused. It is
also implicit in section (3) (a) of Rule 112 which requires during the preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn
complaint, which shall ". . . state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents . . ."

In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from other jurisdictions. In the 1963
watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46 the United States Supreme Court held that "suppression of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
Its progeny is the 1935 case of Mooney v. Holohan 47 which laid down the proposition that a prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony to
procure conviction violates due process. Thus, evolved jurisprudence firming up the prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence in
The rationale is well put by Justice Brennan in Brady 49 "society wins not only when the guilty are
its possession. 48
convicted but when criminal trials are fair." Indeed, prosecutors should not treat litigation like a game of poker
where surprises can be sprung and where gain by guile is not punished.

But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory evidence in their favor, we are not
prepared to rule that the initial non-production of the original sworn statement of Alfaro dated April 28, 1995
could have resulted in the reasonable likelihood that the DOJ Panel would not have found probable cause.
To be sure, the NBI, on July 4, 1995, upon request of petitioners, submitted a photocopy of Alfaro's April 28,
1995 sworn statement. It explained it cannot produce the original as it had been lost. Fortunately, petitioners,
on July 28, 1995, were able to obtain a copy of the original from Atty. Arturo Mercader in the course of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 951099. 50 As petitioners admit, the DOJ Panel accepted the original of Alfaro's
April 28, 1995 sworn statement as a part of their evidence. 51 Petitioners thus had the fair chance to explain to the
DOJ Panel then still conducting their preliminary investigation the exculpatory aspects of this sworn statement.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the DOJ Panel still found probable cause to charge them despite the alleged material
discrepancies between the first and second sworn statements of Alfaro. For reasons we have expounded, this
finding of probable cause cannot be struck down as done with grave abuse of discretion. 52 On the other hand, the
FBI Report while corroborative of the alibi of petitioner Webb cannot by itself reverse the probable cause finding of
the DOJ Panel in light of the totality of evidence presented by the NBI.

Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to the prejudicial
publicity waged in the press and broadcast media by the NBI.

Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in constitutional law where the
conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the press, the public's right to information, and an
accused's right to a fair and impartial trial collide and compete for prioritization. The process of pinpointing
where the balance should be struck has divided men of learning as the balance keeps moving either on the
side of liberty or on the side of order as the tumult of the time and the welfare of the people dictate. The
dance of balance is a difficult act to follow.

In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its
excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure,
few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime.
Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a
fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and the public. In the
seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 53 it was wisely held:

xxx xxx xxx

(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials
both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of
participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community
therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice
serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and
emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of
justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided
by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported
by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v.
United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
 (b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment,
share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the
functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to
those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the
context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from
summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First
Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded
not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First
Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives
of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to
enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.

(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public
the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trials
is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could
be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., 54 we
held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in
the records that will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects
of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To
be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their
long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded
by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not
appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The
length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did
petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their
bombardment of prejudicial publicity.

It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as petitioners will now have to
undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable cause is not synonymous with guilt and while the light of
publicity may be a good disinfectant of unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an accused's right
to fair trial. Without imposing on the trial judge the difficult task of supervising every specie of speech relating
to the case at bar, it behooves her to be reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile criminal cases to
control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. 55 The Court reminds judges that our ability to
dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands
as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to
assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done and that is the only way for the judiciary
to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Regalado, J., concurs.

Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

[G.R. No. 139301. September 29, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HUANG ZHEN HUA and JOGY
LEE, appellants.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque
[1]

City, Metro Manila, Branch 259, convicting the appellants of violation of Section 16, Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

The Case for the Prosecution

Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) under
the Department of Interior and Local Government received word from their confidential
informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua
[2]

were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also learned that appellant Lee
was handling the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking
activities of Lao and Chan. PO3 Belliardo Anciro, Jr. and other police operatives
[3]

conducted surveillance operations and were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee
were living together as husband and wife. They once spotted Chan, Lao, the appellants
and two others, in a seafood restaurant in Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila, late in the
evening. On another occasion, the policemen saw Chan, Lao, and the appellants, at the
Celicious Restaurant along R. Sanchez Street, Ermita, Manila, at about 8:30 p.m. They
were spotted the third time at the Midtown Hotel at about 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. The [4]

police operatives also verified that Chan and Lao resided at Room Nos. 1245 and 1247,
Cityland Condominium, De la Rosa Street, Makati City, and in a two-storey condominium
unit at No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Nio, Paraaque, Metro Manila.
[5]

On October 25, 1996, SPO2 Cesar N. Teneros of the PARAC secured Search Warrant
No. 96-801 for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal possession of
firearms and explosives) and Search Warrant No. 96-802, for violation of Sections 12, 14
and 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, from Judge William M. Bayhon, Executive
Judge of the RTC of Manila. Senior Police Inspector Lucio Margallo supervised the
[6]
enforcement of Search Warrant No. 96-801 at the Cityland Condominium at about 11:00
p.m. on October 29, 1996. With him were PO3 Anciro, Jr., PO3 Wilhelm Castillo, SPO3
Roger Ferias and seven other policemen of the PARAC, who were all in uniform, as well
as a Cantonese interpreter by the name of Chuang. While no persons were found inside,
the policemen found two kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known
as shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and machines and tools apparently used for
the production of fake credit cards. [7]

Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan would be
delivering shabu at the Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant at the corner of Dasmarias and
Mancha Streets, Manila. The policemen rushed to the area on board their vehicles. It was
2:00 a.m. of October 26, 1996. The policemen saw Chan and Lao on board the latters
Honda Civic car. As the two men alighted, one of the men approached them and
introduced himself, but Chan and Lao fired shots. Thus, a shoot-out ensued between the
members of the raiding team and the two suspects. Chan and Lao were shot to death
during the encounter. The policemen found two plastic bags, each containing one kilo
of shabu, in Laos car.
The policemen then proceeded to No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, to enforce
Search Warrant No. 96-802. When the policemen arrived at the place, they coordinated
with Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of security in the building. The men found that
[8]

the Condominium Unit No. 19 was leased to Lao under the name Henry Kao Tsung. The
policemen, Pangan and two security guards of the Pacific Grand Villa proceeded to the
condominium unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front door, but no one responded.
Pangan, likewise, knocked on the door. Appellant Lee peeped through the window beside
[9]

the front door. The men introduced themselves as policemen, but the appellant could
[10] [11]

not understand them as she could not speak English. The policemen allowed Pangan to
[12]

communicate with appellant Lee by sign language and pointed their uniforms to her to
show that they were policemen. The appellant then opened the door and allowed the
policemen, Pangan and the security guards into the condominium unit. The policemen [13]

brought appellant Lee to the second floor where there were three bedrooms a masters
bedroom and two other rooms. When asked where she and Lao slept, appellant Lee
pointed to the masters bedroom. Anciro, Jr., Margallo and PO3 Wilhelm Castillo then
[14]

searched the masters bedroom, while Ferias and Pangan went to the other bedroom
where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping. Ferias awakened appellant Zhen Hua and
[15]

identified himself as a policeman. Appellant Zhen Hua was surprised. [16]

Anciro, Jr. saw a small cabinet inside the masters bedroom about six feet high. He
stood on a chair, opened the cabinet and found two transparent plastic bags each
containing one kilo of shabu, a feeding bottle, a plastic canister and assorted
[17] [18]

paraphernalia. Inside the drawer of the beds headboard, Anciro, Jr. also found assorted
[19]

documents, pictures, bank passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation, credit
cards, passports and identification cards of Lao and Lee. Anciro, Jr. asked appellant Lee
[20]

who was the owner of the crystalline substance, but the latter did not respond because
she did not know English. Anciro, Jr. asked Margallo for instructions on what to do with
[21]

the things he had found, and the latter told him to keep the same for future reference,
 and as evidence against any other suspect for illegal drug transactions. Anciro, Jr.,
[22] [23]

Pangan and Margallo later showed the seized articles to the other members of the team. [24]

Anciro, Jr. told appellant Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were bringing
her to the PARAC headquarters. Appellant Lee did as she was told and took some clothes
from the cabinet in the masters bedroom where Anciro, Jr. had earlier found the shabu. [25]

The policemen brought the appellants to the PARAC headquarters. The following
articles were found and confiscated by the policemen in the condominium unit:

a.TWO(2)BigTransparentPlasticBagscontainingaboutone(1)Kiloeachofwhitecrystalline
granuleslatertestedtobeMethamphetamineHydrochlorideorShabu,aregulateddrug;

b.ONE(1)TransparentPlasticBabyFeedingBottlecontaininganundeterminedquantityof
suspectedShabu;

c.ONE(1)SmallPlasticCannisteralsocontainingundeterminedamountofsuspectedShabu.

d.AssortedPiecesofShabuParaphernaliaconsistingofImprovisedTootersusedfor
sniffingshabu,ImprovisedBurnersusedforburningShabu,aluminumfoils,etc.; [26]

Anciro, Jr. placed the articles he found in the cabinet inside a box. The appellants
[27]

were then brought to the PARAC headquarters where they were detained. Pangan signed
a Certification that the search conducted by the policemen had been orderly and
[28]

peaceful. Anciro, Jr. affixed his initials on the transparent plastic bags and their contents,
the transparent baby feeding bottle and the plastic cannister and their contents. On
October 26, 1996, he and Ferias brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory
[29]

for laboratory examination along with the letter-request thereon.

[30] [31]

On the same day, Forensic Chemist Officer Isidro L. Cario signed Chemistry Report
No. D-1243-96 which contained his findings on the laboratory examination of the items
which were marked as Exhibits A to A-4, viz:

SPECIMENSUBMITTED:

Exh.AOne(1)mustdeCartierPariscartoncontainingthefollowing:

Exh.A1One(1)heatsealedtransparentplasticbagcontaining1,000.40gramsofwhitecrystalline
substance.

Exh.A2One(1)heatsealedtransparentplasticbagcontaining998.10gramsofwhitecrystalline
substance.

Exh.A3One(1)transparentplasticBabyfloNurserfeedingbottlewithpinkcovercontaining
18.52gramsofwhitecrystallinesubstance.

Exh.A4One(1)transparentplasticcontainerwithwhitecovercontaining3.28gramsofwhite
crystallinesubstance.
NOTE:Theabovestatedspecimenwereallegedlytakenfromtheresidenceoftheabovenamed
subjects.xxx

PURPOSEOFLABORATORYEXAMINATION:

Todeterminethepresenceofprohibitedand/orregulateddrug.

FINDINGS:

Qualitativeexaminationconductedontheabovestatedspecimens,Exhs.A1throughA4gave
POSITIVEresulttothetestforMethamphetaminehydrochloride,aregulateddrug.xxx [32]

The police officers executed an affidavit of arrest. Pangan and the two security
[33]

guards signed a certification stating that nothing was destroyed in the condominium unit
and that the search was orderly and peaceful. The policemen also accomplished an
[34]

inventory of the articles seized during the search. [35]

The appellants were charged of violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended, in an Information filed in the RTC of Paraaque, Metro Manila, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

Thatonoraboutthe26thdayofOctober1996,intheMunicipalityofParaaque,MetroManila,
Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,
conspiringandconfederatingtogetherandbothofthemmutuallyhelpingandaidingoneanother,
notbeinglawfullyauthorizedtopossessorotherwiseuseanyregulateddrugandwithoutthe
correspondinglicenseorprescription,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyhave,
intheirpossessionandundertheircontrolandcustody,thefollowingtowit:

A.One(1)heatsealedtransparentplasticbagcontaining1,000.40gramsofwhitecrystalline
substance;

B.One(1)heatsealedtransparentplasticbagcontaining998.1gramsofwhitecrystalline
substance;

C.One(1)transparentplasticBabyfloNurserfeedingbottlewithpinkcovercontaining18.52
gramsofwhitecrystallinesubstance;

D.One(1)transparentplasticcontainerwithwhitecovercontaining3.28gramsofwhitecrystalline
substance

whichwhenexaminedwerefoundtobepositiveforMethamphetamineHydrochloride(Shabu),a
regulateddrug.

CONTRARYTOLAW. [36]
 Both appellants, assisted by counsel, were duly arraigned on November 29, 1992, and
pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The Case for the Appellants

Appellant Jogy Lee denied the charge. She testified that she was a resident of
Kwantong, China, a college graduate who could not speak nor understand English. She
was once employed in a real estate firm. One of her co-employees was Huang Zhen Hua.
She met Henry Lao in China sometime in 1995, and he brought her to Belgium that
[37] [38]

same year. Lao also helped her procure a Belguim passport, for he explained that if she
only had a Chinese passport, it would be difficult to secure visas from countries she
wanted to go to and visit; whereas many countries did not require a Belgian passport
holder to secure visas before allowing entry therein. In the process, he and Lao fell in love
and became lovers.
Upon Laos invitation, appellant Lee visited the Philippines as a tourist for the first time
in April 1996. Lao met her at the airport, and she was, thereafter, brought to a hotel in
Manila where she stayed for less than a month. She returned to the Philippines a second
[39]

time and was again billeted in a hotel in Manila. All her expenses were shouldered by Lao,
who was engaged in the garlic business. As far as she knew, Lao was not engaged in
[40]

any other business. In June 1996, she invited her friend, appellant Huang Zhen Hua to
[41]

visit the Philippines to enjoy the tourist spots. They were then in China.
[42]

In the evening of October 1, 1996, appellant Lee returned to the Philippines on a

tourist visa. She was fetched by Lao, and she was brought to his condominium unit at No.
19, Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Nio, Paraaque. She had been residing there
since then. She and Lao used to go to the shopping malls and she even saw Chan once
[43]

when he cleaned his Nissan car in Laos garage.

On October 22, 1996, appellant Zhen Hua arrived from China at the NAIA and was
met by Lao at the airport. He tried to check in at the Diamond Hotel but Lee told him that
he could stay in the condominium unit. Zhen Hua was brought to the Villa where he had
been staying since then. The appellants had made plans to visit Cebu.
At about 6:00 a.m. on October 26, 1996, appellant Lee was sleeping in the masters
bedroom at the condominium unit. She had closed all the windows because she had
turned the air conditioning unit on. Zhen Hua was sleeping in the other bedroom in the
second floor beside the masters bedroom. Laos Honda Civic car and Chans Nissan car
were in the garage beside the condominium unit. Momentarily, Lee heard someone
knocking on the bedroom door. When she opened it, three (3) policemen barged into the
bedroom and at the room where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping. Anciro, Jr. was not
among the men. Lee did not hear the policemen knock at the main door before they
entered. The policemen were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who
[44]

told her that the policemen were going to search the house. Appellant Lee saw a[45]

policeman holding two papers, but no search warrant was shown to her. She was so [46]

frightened.
 The policemen placed two plastic bags on the bed before they searched the masters
bedroom. Appellant Lee went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua and when she returned
to the masters bedroom, she saw shabu on the bed. The policemen took her ring, watch
[47]

and the P600,000 owned by Lao which had earlier been placed in the cabinet, her papers
and documents, and those of Laos as well. She had never seen any shabu in the room
before the incident. Thereafter, she and appellant Zhen Hua were brought to the PARAC
headquarters where they were detained. Chuang, the cantonese interpreter, informed her
that shabu had been found in the condominium unit and that the policemen were
demanding P5,000,000 for her release. She was also told that if she did not pay the
amount, she would be charged with drug trafficking, and that the leader of the group who
arrested her would be promoted. However, she told Chuang that she had no money. Since
she could not pay the amount, she was boarded on a PARAC owner-type jeep and
returned to the condominium unit where the policemen took all the household appliances,
such as the television, compact discs, washing machine, including laundry detergent. Only
the sofa and the bed were not taken. About ten (10) days later, the appellants secured the
services of counsel.
Antonio Pangan testified that he and the policemen knocked on the door to the
condominium unit but that no one responded. He shouted, Sir Henry, referring to Lao, but
there was no response from inside the condominium. After about three (3) to five (5)
minutes, a policeman kicked the door open and they entered the house. They went to the
second floor and saw the appellants sleeping.
Pangan testified that he did not see any shabu that was seized by the policemen. He
learned that shabu had been found and taken from the condominium unit only when he
saw someone holding up the substance on television during the daily news program TV
Patrol.[48]

Appellant Zhen Hua also denied the charge. He corroborated the testimony of
appellant Lee that upon her invitation, he arrived in the Philippines on a tourist visa on
October 22, 1996. He claimed that he did not see Anciro, Jr. in the condominium unit when
policemen arrived and searched the house. He testified that aside from the PARAC
policemen, he was also investigated by policemen from Taiwan.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on January 10, 1999, convicting both
appellants of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE,PREMISESCONSIDERED,findingaccusedJogyLeeandHuangZhenHua
GUILTYbeyondreasonabledoubtforviolationofSec.16,Art.III,RA6425,asamendedbyRA
7659,andconsideringtheabsenceofanyaggravatingcircumstances,thisCourtherebysentences
bothaccusedtosufferthepenaltyofReclusionPerpetuaandtopayafineofP500,000.00each.
Thepropertiesseizedinaccordancewiththesearchwarrantsissuedrelativetothiscasearehereby
orderedconfiscatedinfavorofthegovernmentandtheClerkofCourtofthisCourtisdirectedto
turnovertotheDangerousDrugsBoard,thedrugsandparaphernaliasubjecthereofforproper
disposition.
TheClerkofCourtisalsodirectedtopreparetheMittimusfortheimmediatetransferofboth
accusedJogyLeeandHuangZhenHuafromtheParaaqueCityJailtotheBureauofCorreccions
(sic)inMuntinlupaCity.

SOORDERED. [49]

The Present Appeal

On appeal to this Court, appellant Zhen Hua, asserts that:

First.Theevidencefortheprosecution,asawhole,issofarasselfcontradictory,inherently
improbableandpalpablyfalsetobeacceptedasafaithfulreflectionofthetruefactsofthecase;

Second.AppellantHuangZhenHuasconvictionwasbasedmerelyonthetrialcourtsconclusion
thatheisnotanepitomeoffirstclasstouristandthatheappearednonchalantthroughoutthe
proceedings;

Third.Inconvictingsaidappellant,thecourtbelowcompletelydisregardedtheglaringfactsand
admissionsoftheprosecutionsprincipalwitnessesthatnoregulateddrugwaseverfoundinhis
possession;

Fourth.Thetrialcourt,likewise,ignoredthefactthattheappellantsarrestwasillegalandin
violationofhisconstitutionalandbasicrightsagainstarrestwithoutprobablecauseasdetermined
byaJudgeandthathisarraignmentdidnotconstituteawaiverofsuchright;

Fifth.Thetrialcourtfailedtoconsiderthefactthatthepresumptionofregularityofperformanceof
thepoliceofficerswhotookpartinthesearchhadbeenovercomebyprosecution'sownevidence,
therebywronglygivingsuchpresumptionsubstanceoverandabovetheconstitutionalpresumption
ofinnocenceoftheappellant.[50]

For her part, appellant Lee contends that:

1.01 THE ALLEGED TWO KILOS OF SHABU FOUND INSIDE ONE OF THE ROOMS IN THE
TOWNHOUSE RENTED BY HENRY LAU WERE MERELY PLANTED BY PARAC
OPERATIVES;
1.02 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS HIGHLY IRREGULAR, DUBIOUS
AND UNREASONABLE AS THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY PARTICULAR
DESCRIPTION OF THE ROOM TO BE SEARCHED, NOR WAS THERE ANY INTERPRETER
TO ASSIST AND GUIDE JOGY LEE, WHO NEITHER KNEW NOR UNDERSTAND THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, DURING THE SEARCH AND EVEN DURING THE TRIAL;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED JOGY LEE UPON THE GROUND
THAT HER GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[51]

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that appellant Zhen Hua
should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, but that the conviction of appellant
Lee should be affirmed.
 The Courts Ruling

We shall delve into and resolve the assigned errors of the appellants Huang Zhen Hua
and Jogy Lee sequentially.
On Appellant Zhen Hua
The OSG contends that the prosecution failed to muster the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove appellant Zhen Huas guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged, thus:

HuangZhenHuadenieshavinganythingtodowiththebagsofshabufoundinthetownhouseunit
ofHenryLau.HeclaimsthathearrivedinthePhilippinesasatouristonOctober22,1996,upon
theinvitationofJogyLee.Allegedly,atthetimeofhisarrest,hehadbeeninthePhilippinesfor
barelyfourdays.Heclaimsthathewasjusttemporarilybilletedasaguestatthetownhousewhere
JogyLeewasstaying.Andthathehadnocontrolwhatsoeveroversaidtownhouse.Heputs
emphasisonthefactthatthesearchofhisroomturnedouttobenegativeandthattheraidingteam
failedtoseizeorconfiscateanyprohibitedorregulateddruginhispersonorpossession.He,
therefore,praysforhisacquittal.

ThePeoplesubmitsthatHuangZhenHuaisentitledtoacquittal.Theprosecutionsevidencefailsto
meetthequantumofevidencerequiredtoovercometheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocence;
thus,regardlessofthesupposedweaknessofhisdefense,andhisinnocencemaybedoubted,heis
nonethelessentitledtoanacquittal(Natividadv.CourtofAppeals,98SCRA335(1980),cited
inPeoplev.Fronda,G.R.No.130602,March15,2000).Theconstitutionalpresumptionof
innocenceguaranteedtoeveryindividualisofprimaryimportance,andtheconvictionofthe
accusedmustrestnotontheweaknessofthedefensebutonthestrengthoftheevidenceforthe
prosecution.

Intheinstantcase,aspointedoutbyappellantHuangZhenHua,thetrialcourterredwhenitdid
notgivemuchweighttotheadmissionmadebytheprosecutionwitnessesthatnoregulateddrug
wasfoundinhisperson.Noregulateddrugwasalsofoundinsidehisroomorinhisother
belongingssuchassuitcases,etc.Thus,hehadnoactualorconstructivepossessionofthe
confiscatedshabu.

Moreover,itisnotdisputedthatHuangZhenHuahadonlybeeninthecountryforbarelyfour(4)
daysatthetimewhenhewasarrested.Theprosecutionwasunabletoshowthatinthesefour(4)
daysHuangZhenHuacommittedactswhichshowedthathewasincahootswiththedrugsyndicate
HenryLauandPeterChan.ItwasnotevenshownthathewastogetherwithHenryLauandPeter
Chanonanyoccasion.AsforHuangZhenHua,therefore,thereisnodirectevidenceofany
culpability.Noristhereanycircumstantialevidencefromwhichanyculpabilitymaybeinferred. [52]

We agree with the OSG. In a case of recent vintage, this Court, in People vs. Tira,
ruminated and expostulated on the juridical concept of possession under Section 16,
[53]

Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and the evidence necessary to prove the
said crime, thus:
Theessentialelementsofthecrimeofpossessionofregulateddrugsarethefollowing:(a)the
accusedisfoundinpossessionofaregulateddrug;(b)thepersonisnotauthorizedbylaworby
dulyconstitutedauthorities;and,(c)theaccusedhasknowledgethatthesaiddrugisaregulated
drug.Thiscrimeismalaprohibita,and,assuch,criminalintentisnotanessentialelement.
However,theprosecutionmustprovethattheaccusedhadtheintenttopossess(animusposidende)
thedrugs.Possession,underthelaw,includesnotonlyactualpossession,butalsoconstructive
possession.Actualpossessionexistswhenthedrugisintheimmediatephysicalpossessionor
controloftheaccused.Ontheotherhand,constructivepossessionexitswhenthedrugisunderthe
dominionandcontroloftheaccusedorwhenhehastherighttoexercisedominionandcontrolover
theplacewhereitisfound.Exclusivepossessionorcontrolisnotnecessary.Theaccusedcannot
avoidconvictionifhisrighttoexercisecontrolanddominionovertheplacewherethecontraband
islocated,issharedwithanother.

Thus,convictionneednotbepredicateduponexclusivepossession,andashowingofnon
exclusivepossessionwouldnotexoneratetheaccused.Suchfactofpossessionmaybeprovedby
directorcircumstantialevidenceandanyreasonableinferencedrawntherefrom.However,the
prosecutionmustprovethattheaccusedhadknowledgeoftheexistenceandpresenceofthedrugin
theplaceunderhiscontrolanddominionandthecharacterofthedrug.Sinceknowledgebythe
accusedoftheexistenceandcharacterofthedrugsintheplacewhereheexercisesdominionand
controlisaninternalact,thesamemaybepresumedfromthefactthatthedangerousdrugisinthe
houseorplaceoverwhichtheaccusedhascontrolordominion,orwithinsuchpremisesinthe
absenceofanysatisfactoryexplanation.[54]

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant, at any time, had actual
or constructive possession of the regulated drug found in the masters bedroom where
appellant Lee was sleeping; or that the appellant had accessed the said room at any given
time; or that he had knowledge of the existence of shabu in appellant Lees bedroom.
Appellant Zhen Hua had arrived in the Philippines upon the invitation of appellant Lee only
on October 22, 1996 or barely four (4) days before the arrival of the policemen and the
search conducted in the condominium unit leased by Henry Lao. He was a mere visitor of
appellant Lee. There is no evidence that appellant Zhen Hua was aware of the alleged
illegal drug activities and/or transactions of Henry Lao, Peter Chan and appellant Lee. The
policemen did not find any regulated drug in the room where appellant Zhen Hua was
sleeping when they made their search.
The evidence of the prosecution against appellant Zhen Hua falls short of the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove conspiracy between him, appellant Lee and Chan or Lao.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy cannot be presumed. Conspiracy must be proved beyond
[55] [56]

reasonable doubt like the crime subject of the conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proved by
[57]

direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design. [58]

The bare fact that on two or three occasions after the arrival of appellant Zhen Hua
from China, and before the search conducted in Laos condominium unit, appellant Zhen
Hua had been seen with Lao, Chan and appellant Lee. Having dinner or lunch at a
restaurant does not constitute sufficient proof that he had conspired with them or with any
of them to possess the subject-regulated drug. Mere association with the principals by
direct participation or mere knowledge of conspiracy, without more, does not suffice.
Anciro, Jr. even admitted that during his surveillance, he could have mistaken appellant
[59]

Zhen Hua for another group of Chinese persons who were also being watched. Appellant
[60]

Zhen Hua should, thus, be acquitted.

On Appellant Lee
Appellant Lee avers that certain irregularities were attendant in the issuance and
implementation of Search Warrant No. 96-802, as follows: (a) the policemen who
implemented the search warrant failed in their duty to show to her the said warrant, inform
her of their authority and explain their presence in the condominium unit; (b) the
policemen gained entry into the condominium unit by force while she was sleeping; and
(c) articles and personal effects owned by her and Lao were taken and confiscated by the
policemen, although not specified in the search warrant.
The appellant concludes that the articles procured by the policemen on the occasion of
the search of the condominium unit are inadmissible in evidence.
Appellant Lee, likewise, contends that she was a victim of a frame-up because the
policemen planted the regulated drug on her bed even before they searched the bedroom.
She went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua to find out if he was already awake, and
when she returned to the bedroom, she noticed shabu on her bed. She avers that the sole
testimony of Anciro, Jr., that he found the regulated drug in the masters bedroom, is
incredible because he was not with the policemen who barged into the bedroom. She
notes that even Pangan, the caretaker of the Villa, testified that he did not see any illegal
drug confiscated by the policemen.
According to appellant Lee, the trial court erred in convicting her of the crime charged,
considering that Lao and Chan were the suspects identified in the search warrants, not
her. She avers that she had no knowledge of the alleged illegal drug transactions of her
lover Lao. She contends that there was no probable cause for her arrest as her mere
presence in the condominium unit does not render her liable for the shabu found in the
masters bedroom of the condominium unit leased by Lao. She further avers that the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are inconsistent; hence, barren of
probative weight. The appellant also asserts that she was deprived of her right to due
process when the trial court conducted a trial without a Chinese interpreter to assist her.
The OSG, for its part, avers that the police officers are presumed to have performed
their duties. Based on the testimony of Anciro, Jr., appellant Lee was shown the search
warrant, through the window, and the policemen identified themselves through their
uniforms. The security guards of the condominium also explained the search warrant to
the appellant. Although she was, at first, reluctant to open the door, appellant Lee later
voluntarily opened the door and allowed them entry into the unit. There was no evidence
of forcible entry into the unit and no breakage of any door. The OSG further avers that the
appellant had been in the country for quite sometime already and could not have gotten
around without understanding English. In fact, the OSG argues that when Anciro, Jr. told
the appellant to get some of her clothes since she would be brought to the police
headquarters in Quezon City, she did as she was told and took her clothes from the
cabinet where the shabu were found by the policemen.
The OSG further points out that Pangan, the chief of security of the subdivision who
was a witness for appellant Lee, even testified that the search was orderly. The OSG
contends that there was probable cause for the appellants arrest because an informant
had tipped off the arresting officers that the appellant was a member of a syndicate
dealing with illegal drugs, and that she handled the accounts of Lao and Chan. The
appellant was not a victim of frame-up because she was present when the policemen
searched the masters bedroom where she was sleeping and where she kept her clothes,
and witnessed the discovery of the regulated drugs and paraphernalia.
We agree with the contention of the appellant that the constitutional proscription
against unreasonable search and seizure applies to Filipino citizens, as well as to aliens
temporarily residing in the country. The rule against unreasonable search and seizure
forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects all those suspected or known to be
offenders, as well as the innocent. The guarantee is as important and imperative as the
guarantee of the other fundamental rights of the citizens. All owes the duty for its
[61]

effective enforcement lest there shall be an impairment of the right for the purpose for
which it was adopted. [62]

Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC.7.Righttobreakdoororwindowtoeffectsearch.Theofficer,ifrefusedadmittancetothe
placeofdirectedsearchaftergivingnoticeofhispurposeandauthority,maybreakopenanyouter
orinnerdoororwindowofahouseoranypartofahouseoranythingthereintoexecutethe
warrantorliberatehimselforanypersonlawfullyaidinghimwhenunlawfullydetainedtherein.

The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their
authority, and demand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice and
demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. This is known as
the knock and announce principle which is embodied in Anglo-American Law. The method
of entry of an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as
important considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is
constitutionally reasonable. In Gouled v. The United States, it was held that a lawful
[63] [64]

entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would violate the
Constitution if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by force, by illegal threat or
mere show of force.
The principle may be traced to a statute in England way back in 1275 providing that if
a person takes the beasts of another and causes them to be driven into a castle or
fortress, if the sheriff makes a solemn demand for the deliverance of the beasts, and if the
person did not cause the beasts to be delivered incontinent, the king shall cause the said
castle or fortress to be beaten down without recovery. Common law courts appended an
important qualification:
Butbeforehebreaksit,heoughttosignifythecauseofhiscoming,andtomakerequesttoopen
doors,forthelawwithoutadefaultintheownerabhorsthedestructionorbreakingofanyhouse
(whichisforthehabitationandsafetyofman)bywhichgreatdamageandinconveniencemight
ensuetotheparty,whennodefaultisinhim;forperhapshedidnotknowoftheprocess,ofwhich,
ifhehadnoticed,itistobepresumedthathewouldobeyit [65]

Blackstone simply stated the principle that the sheriff may justify breaking open doors
if the possession be not quietly delivered. The principle was woven quickly into the fabric
[66]

of early American law and in the Fourth Amendment in the United States Federal
Constitution. It is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment
as held in Wilson v. Arkansas. [67]

Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence,

identify themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of
the premises to be searched, and show to them the search warrant to be implemented by
them and explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and understood
by them. The requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of the essence of the
substantial provision which safeguards individual liberty. No precise form of words is
[68]

required. It is sufficient that the accused has notice of the officers, their authority and the
purpose of the search and the object to be seized. It must be emphasized that the notice
requirement is designed not only for the protection of the liberty of the person to be
searched or of his property but also the safety and well-being of the officers serving and
implementing the search warrant. Unless the person to whom the warrant is addressed
and whose property is to be searched is notified of the search warrant and apprised of the
authority of the person serving the warrant, he may consider the unannounced intrusion
into the premises as an unlawful aggression on his property which he will be justified in
resisting, and in the process, may cause injury even to the life of the officer implementing
the warrant for which he would not be criminally liable. Also, there is a very real possibility
that the police serving and implementing the search warrant may be misinformed as to the
name or address of the suspect, or to other material affirmations. Innocent citizens should
not suffer the shock, fright, shame or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced
intrusion. Indeed, a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A
[69]

search would violate the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by force, or by threat or show of
force or obtained by stealth, or coercion. [70]

Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose
premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b)
when such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their
authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is
an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of the
presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door),
are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the
destruction of evidence is being attempted. Suspects have no constitutional right to
destroy evidence or dispose of evidence. However, the exceptions above are not
[71]

exclusive or conclusive. At times, without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur
of the moment, the officer must decide whether or not to make an unannounced intrusion
into the premises. Although a search and seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally
defective, if the police officers entry was without prior announcement, law enforcement
interest may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry. Indeed, there [72]

is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its

own facts and circumstances. In determining the lawfulness of an unallowed entry and
[73]

the existence of probable cause, the courts are concerned only with what the officers had
reason to believe and the time of the entry. In Richards v. Wisconsin, it was held that:
[74] [75]

[1]Inordertojustifyanoknockentry,thepolicemusthaveareasonablesuspicionthatknocking
andannouncingtheirpresence,undertheparticularcircumstances,wouldbedangerousorfutile,or
thatitwouldinhibittheeffectiveinvestigationofthecrimeby,forexample,allowingthe
destructionofevidence.Thisstandardasopposedtoaprobablecauserequirementstrikesthe
appropriatebalancebetweenthelegitimatelawenforcementconcernsatissueintheexecutionof
searchwarrantsandtheindividualprivacyinterestaffectedbynoknockentries. [76]

As articulated in Benefield v. State of Florida, what constitutes breaking includes the

[77]

lifting of a latch, turning a door knob, unlocking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to or
pushing open a closed door of entrance to the house, even a closed screen door.
However, entry obtained through the use of deception, accomplished without force is not
[78]

a breaking requiring officers to first announce their authority and purpose because the
reasons behind the rule are satisfied there was no real likelihood of violence, no
unwarranted intrusion or privacy and no damage to the residence of the accused. [79]

As to how long an officer implementing a search warrant must wait before breaking
open any door cannot be distilled into a constitutional stopwatch. Each case has to be
decided on a case-to-case basis requiring an examination of all the circumstances. The [80]

proper trigger point in determining, under the knock and announce rule, whether the police
waited long enough before entering the residence to execute a warrant, is when those
inside should have been alerted that the police wanted entry to execute a warrant. [81]

In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure before entering the condominium unit. Appellant Lee
admitted, when she testified, that the police officers were accompanied by Chuang, a
Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his companions were police officers and had
a search warrant for the premises, and also explained to her that the officers were going
to search the condominium unit. The appellant was sufficiently aware of the authority of
[82]

the policemen, who wore PARAC uniforms, to conduct the search and their purpose.
Moreover, Anciro, Jr. told the appellant, in English, to bring some clothes with her as she
was to be brought to the police headquarters. Without such request being interpreted to
the appellant, the latter did as she was directed and took some clothes from the cabinet
atop the headboard. [83]

The evidence on record shows that the police officers knocked on the outer door
before entering the condominium unit, and after a while, the appellant opened the door
and allowed the policemen and Pangan to enter. Anciro, Jr. testified, thus:
Q Do you still recall Mr. Witness the identities of the security guards who helped you or assisted you
in implementing said search warrants at Grand Villa Subdivision?
 A The OIC of the Home Owners Association, Antonio Pangan, and the OIC of the Security Agency
and two (2) other security guards.
Q Do you recall the names of those persons you mentioned Mr. Witness?
A I can hardly recall their names.
Q After having been assisted or coordinated with said security officers and the OIC of the Home
Owners Association, what did you do next?
A We told them that if we could ask them if they have a duplicate key and also knock and introduce
ourselves, knock on the said condominium.
Q Did they do that, the request?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning to say, you arrived at #19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa?
A Yes, Sir.
Q While you were already at the door of that targeted house to implement said search warrants, what
happened next, if any? What did you do after that?
A We knocked on the door and tried to find out if there was somebody there because the Home
Owners Association doesnt have any key for the door. We asked them to knock also because
they are the ones who have access with the tenants.
Q And after knocking, what happened next?
A There were around 5 minutes, no one was trying to open the door. By that time, we thought they
were still asleep.
Q And then after that what did you do, if any?
A We asked Mr. Pangan to knock and introduce himself and another security guard to try to knock on
the kitchen which is on the back door.
Q And then after that?
A And then after that, it was a female person who showed up to (sic) the window of the kitchen and
asked who we are in a sign language.
Q And this female person who showed up to (sic) the window I withdraw. Were you able to have a
good look on that female person who showed herself thru the window?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And who is this person Mr. Witness?
A She was identified as Jogy Lee, Sir.[84]

The appellant failed to prove that the policemen broke open the door to gain entry into
the condominium unit. She could have asked the court for an ocular inspection to show
the door which was allegedly broken into by the policemen, or at least adduce in evidence
pictures showing the said breakage. The appellant failed to do so. The testimony of the
appellant is even belied by Pangan, who was a witness for the appellant, who certified,
along with three other security guards, that nothing was destroyed and that the search
was conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner. [85]

We are not impervious of the testimony of Pangan that the policemen kicked the outer
door to gain entry into the condominium unit, which testimony is seemingly in derogation
of his certification. However, Pangan admitted that the policemen did so only after
knocking on the door for three (3) to five (5) minutes and after he had called Lao in a loud
voice and received no response from the appellants:
Q Did you come to know the persons wherein your presence was being required according to your
security guards?
A According to my security guards, they introduced themselves as police operatives.
Q Did you comply with the invitation of these police authorities?
A Yes, they called me and according to them, they will search Unit 19, that is what they told me.
Q Can you please tell us what time did the police operatives conduct the search?
A I cannot recall anymore because the incident happened in 1996. I dont know what time was that.
Q When they conducted the search, were you there?
A I was there because that unit cannot be opened if the caretaker is not present.
Q Are you trying to say that you were the one who opened the door of that unit occupied by Henry
Kau Chung?
A They kicked the door and when nobody opened the door, they pushed the door and the door was
opened.
Q They forcibly opened the door when nobody opened it?
A Kaya naman po ginawa yon dahil nandoon naman po ang caretaker, wala naman pong masamang
mangyayari dahil nandoon naman po ang namamahala.
Q From the time you knocked at the door of this unit up to the time that the police operatives forcibly
break open the door, how many minutes had elapsed?
A Matagal din po silang kumakatok sa pintuan. I said, Mr. Henry, pakibuksan nyo ang pinto, would you
mind to open the door, kasi merong mga police officers na gustong ma-search itong unit mo.
Then, when nobody was answering, they forcibly opened the door.
Q Was there any other occupant other than Henry Kau Chung in that unit at that time?
A At the second floor, they saw this Jogy Lee and her male companion whom I do not know.
Q But during the time that you were trying to seek entry to the door, there was no one who responded,
is that correct?
A Pardon, Sir?
Q At the time that you were trying to knock at the door, there was no one who responded to your
knocking at the door?
A Nobody was answering, Sir.
Q And that compelled the police operatives to open the door forcibly?
A Yes, Sir.[86]
COURT:
From the first time you knocked at the door, how long a time lapsed before the police officer broke
open the door?
A Matagal din po.
Q For how long?
A Maybe for about three to five minutes.
Q When nobody was answering, they forced open the door?
 A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Continue.[87]

The appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, her contention that
Anciro, Jr. placed the shabu on her bed before he continued his search in the bedroom,
and that she was a victim of frame-up by the policemen. She relied on her testimony and
those of Pangan and Ferias that they did not see Anciro, Jr. discover and take custody of
the shabu in the cabinet.
The appellants defense of frame-up is nothing new. It is a common and standard line
of defense in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. While such
defense cannot and should not always be considered as contrived, nonetheless, it is
generally rejected for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. Police officers are,
after all, presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions, in
the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, or that they are motivated by ill-
will.
[88]

It is true, as testified by Pangan and Ferias that, they did not see Anciro, Jr. discover
and take custody of the shabu subject of this case. However, as explained by Pangan, he
remained in the ground floor of the condominium unit while Anciro, Jr., Castillo and
Margallo searched the bedroom of appellant Lee and her lover Lao, and Ferias proceeded
to the room occupied by appellant Zhen Hua where he conducted his search. Thus,
Pangan testified:
Q When the masters bedroom was searched where Jogy Lee was then, according to you, sleeping,
did you accompany the PARAC members?
A No, Sir, because I was talking to a member of the PARAC downstairs.
Q What about the members of the security force?
A They were outside, Sir.
Q During the search made on the masters bedroom?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How about when the search was made in the room occupied by Huang Zhen Hua, were you
present then?
A No, Sir, I was still downstairs.
Q How about the other guards?
A They were also outside.[89]

For his part, Ferias declared:

Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?
A No, Sir.
Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then sleeping?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police officers.
 Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhenhua?
A He was surprised.[90]
Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?
A No, Sir.
Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then sleeping?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhen Hua?
A He was surprised.[91]

Pangan testified that before the police officers conducted their search in the second
floor of the condominium unit, he did not see them bring in anything:
Q But you are very sure that before the police officers searched the unit, you did not see them
bringing anything with them, they were all empty-handed?
A I did not see, Sir.[92]

No less than Pangan himself, a witness for the appellants, and three of the security
guards of the subdivision, who accompanied the policemen in implementing the search
warrants, certified that, what was found inside the condominium unit and confiscated by
the policemen were two plastic bags which contained white crystalline powder substances
suspected to be shabu. [93]

The appellant admitted that she saw shabu in her bedroom while the policemen were
there. She claimed that the policemen placed the plastic bag on the bed before they
started the search and that she noticed the shabu only after he returned from the room of
appellant Zhen Hua to see if he was already awake is hard to believe.
First. We find it incredible that the policemen placed the shabu on the appellants bed,
in her full view, for which the latter could be prosecuted for planting evidence and, if
convicted, sentenced to death under Section 19 of Rep. Act 7659:

SECTION19.Section24ofRepublicActNo.6425,asamended,knownastheDangerousActof
1972,isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:

Sec.24.PenaltiesforGovernmentOfficialsandEmployeesandOfficersandMembersofPolice
AgenciesandtheArmedForces,PlantingofEvidence.Themaximumpenaltiesprovidedfor[in]
Section3,4(1),5(1),6,7,8,9,11,12and13ofArticleIIandSections14,14A,15(1),16and19
ofArticleIIIshallbeimposed,ifthosefoundguiltyofanyofthesaidoffensesaregovernment
officials,employeesorofficers,includingmembersofpoliceagenciesandthearmedforces.

Anysuchabovegovernmentofficial,employeeorofficerwhoisfoundguiltyofplantingany
dangerousdrugspunishedinSections3,4,7,8,9and13ofArticleIIandSections14,14A,15
and16ofArticleIIIofthisActinthepersonorintheimmediatevicinityofanotherasevidenceto
implicatethelatter,shallsufferthesamepenaltyasthereinprovided.
 Second. The appellant failed to inform her counsel of the alleged planting of evidence
by the policemen; if she had done so, for sure, the said counsel would have prepared her
affidavit and filed the appropriate motion in court for the suppression of the things/articles
seized by the policemen.
Third. The appellant failed to charge the policemen with planting of evidence before or
after she was charged of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
Fourth. The appellant cannot even identify and describe the policeman or policemen
who allegedly planted the evidence.
The fact is that, as gleaned from the affidavit of arrest signed by Anciro, Jr. and Ferias,
the articles and substances found and confiscated from the condominium unit of Lao and
appellant Lee at Atlantic Drive and at the Cityland condominium unit of Lao and Chan
were itemized as follows:

a.TWO(2)BigTransparentPlasticBagscontainingaboutone(1)kiloeachofwhitecrystalline
granuleslatertestedtobeMethamphetamineHydrochlorideorShabu,aregulateddrug;

b.ONE(1)TransparentPlasticBabyFeedingBottlecontainingundeterminedquantityof
suspectedShabu;

c.ONE(1)SmallPlasticCanisteralsocontainingundeterminedamountofsuspectedShabu

d.AssortedPiecesofShabuParaphernaliaconsistingofImprovisedTootersusedfor
sniffingshabu,ImprovisedBurnersusedforburningShabu,aluminumfoils,etc.;

a.TWO(2)Kettles/Potscontainingmoreorless1kilosofRawShabuorMethamphetamine
Hydrochloride;

b.Two(2)BigTransparentPlasticBagscontainingmoreorlessTwo(2)KilosofShabu;

c.Three(3)PlasticBasins,small,medium,large,usedforcontainersoffinished/cookedShabu;

c.SeveralpiecesofPlasticStrainersusedfordrainingoutliquidsfromfinishedShabu;

e.One(1)PlasticContainerwithliquidchemicalofundeterminedelement;

f.SeveralpiecesofSpoonsandladleswithtracesofrawShabuusedinstirringmixtures

g.One(1)ElectricCookingStovew/onecoilburner;

h.One(1)UnitCardMakingMachine;

i.One(1)UnitCardStampingMachine;

j.SeveralpiecesofCreditCardsandTelephoneCards; [94]
 Anciro, Jr. placed his initials on the plastic bags containing white crystalline powder
which were found and confiscated at Atlantic Drive and, in the company of Ferias,
delivered the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, per the request of
Police Superintendent Janice P. de Guzman, the chief of the PARAC.
We agree with the appellant that she was not one of the accused named in the search
warrants. However, such fact did not proscribe the policemen from arresting her and
charging her of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. There was, in fine, probable
cause for her warrantless arrest independent of that found by Judge William Bayhon when
he issued the search warrants against Lao and Chan for search of the condominium units
at Atlantic Drive and Cityland.
Probable cause exists for the warrantless detention and arrest of one at the premises
being searched when the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which
they had reliable and trustworthy information are sufficient to themselves warrant a
reasonable belief of a cautious person that an offense has been or is being committed. It [95]

has been held that:

ProbablecauseforthearrestofpetitionerDianeKer,whilenotpresentatthetimetheofficers
enteredtheapartmenttoarrestherhusband,wasneverthelesspresentatthetimeofherarrest.Upon
theirentryandannouncementoftheiridentity,theofficersweremetnotonlybyGeorgeKerbut
alsobyDianeKer,whowasemergingfromthekitchen.OfficerBermanimmediatelywalkedtothe
doorwayfromwhichsheemergedand,withoutentering,observedthebrickshapedpackageof
marijuanainplainview.Evenassumingthatherpresenceinasmallroomwiththecontrabandina
prominentpositiononthekitchensinkwouldnotaloneestablishareasonablegroundforthe
officersbeliefthatshewasinjointpossessionwithherhusband,thatfactwasaccompaniedbythe
officersinformationthatKerhadbeenusinghisapartmentasabaseofoperationsforhisnarcotics
activities.Therefore,wecannotsaythatatthetimeofherarresttherewerenosufficientgrounds
forareasonablebeliefthatDianeKer,aswellasherhusband,werecommittingtheoffenseof
possessionofmarijuanainthepresenceoftheofficers.
[96]

In Draper v. United States, it was held that informations from a reliable informant,
[97]

corroborated by the police officers observations as to the accuracy of the description of

the accused, and of his presence at a particular place, is sufficient to establish probable
cause. In this case, the police officers received reliable information and verified, after
surveillance, that appellant Lee and Lao were living together as husband and wife in the
condominium unit and that appellant Lee handled the accounting of the payments and
proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao. Indeed, the policemen found that
the appellant occupied the bedroom and slept in the same bed used by Lao. The appellant
took her clothes from the same cabinet where the subject shabu and paraphernalia were
found by Anciro, Jr. The appellant had been living in the same condominium unit with Lao
since October 1, 1996 until her arrest on October 25, 1996. Along with Lao, the appellant
thus had joint control and possession of the bedroom, as well as of the articles,
paraphernalia, and the shabu found therein. Such facts and circumstances are sufficient
on which to base a reasonable belief that the appellant had joint possession of the
regulated drugs found in the bedroom along with Lao, her live-in partner, in line with our
ruling in People v. Tira. For the purpose of prosecution for violation of the Dangerous
[98]

Drugs Law, possession can be constructive and need not be exclusive, but may be joint. [99]

Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to the
appellant and Lao which were not described in the search warrants. However, the seizure
of articles not listed in a search warrant does not render the seizure of the articles
described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render inadmissible in evidence such
articles which were described in the warrant and seized pursuant thereto. Moreover, it
bears stressing that Anciro, Jr. saw the unlisted articles when he and the other policemen
implemented the search warrants. Such articles were in plain view of Anciro, Jr. as he
implemented the search warrants and was authorized to seize the said articles because of
their close connection to the crime charged. As held in Coolidge, Jr. v. New Hampshire: [100]

Anexampleoftheapplicabilityoftheplainviewdoctrineisthesituationinwhichthepolicehavea
warranttosearchagivenareaforspecifiedobjects,andinthecourseofthesearchcomeacross
someotherarticleofincriminatingcharacter.

Wheretheinitialintrusionthatbringsthepolicewithinplainviewofsuchanarticleissupported,
notbyawarrant,butbyoneoftherecognizedexceptionstothewarrantrequirement,theseizureis
alsolegitimate.Thus,thepolicemayinadvertentlycomeacrossevidencewhileinhotpursuitofa
fleeingsuspect.Andanobjectthatcomesintoviewduringasearchincidenttoarrestthatis
appropriatelylimitedinscopeunderexistinglawmaybeseizedwithoutawarrant.Finally,the
plainviewdoctrinehasbeenappliedwhereapoliceofficerisnotsearchingforevidenceagainstthe
accused,butnonethelessinadvertentlycomesacrossanincriminatingobject. [101]

It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents and
papers seen by the policemen have an intimate nexus with the crime charged or, at the
very least, incriminating. The passport of the appellant would show when and how often
she had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and bank book would indicate
how much money she had amassed while in the country and how she acquired or earned
the same. The pictures and those of the other persons shown therein are relevant to show
her relationship to Lao and Chan. [102]

Contrary to the claim of the appellant, it is not true that the trial court failed to provide
an interpreter when she testified. The records show that a Cantonese interpreter attended
the trial and interpreted her testimony. The Rules of Court does not require the trial court
to provide the appellant with an interpreter throughout the trial. An interpreter is required
only if the witness on the stand testifies in a language other than in English or is a deaf-
mute. The appellant may procure the services of an interpreter at her own expense.
Contrary to the claim of appellant Lee, the prosecution adduced proof beyond
reasonable doubt of her guilt of the crime charged. She and Lao, her lover, had joint
possession of the shabu which the policemen found and confiscated from her bedroom.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal of appellant Huang Zhen Hua is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, convicting him of
the crime charged, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The said appellant is ACQUITTED of
said charge. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to release the
said appellant from detention unless he is detained for another cause or charge, and to
submit to the Court, within five (5) days from notice hereof, a report of his compliance with
the directive of the Court.
The appeal of appellant Jogy Lee is DENIED. The Decision dated January 10, 1999, of
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, convicting her of violation of Section 16, Rep.
Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.

[G.R. No. 144037. September 26, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA

and DINDO BOLONG y NARET, accused-appellants.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

.Itisdesirablethatcriminalsshouldbedetected,andtothatendthatallavailableevidenceshould
beused.Italsoisdesirablethatthegovernmentshouldnotitselffosterandpayforothercrimes,
whentheyarethemeansbywhichtheevidenceistobeobtained.Ifitpaysitsofficersforhaving
gotevidencebycrime,Idonotseewhyitmaynotaswellpaythemforgettingitinthesameway,
andIcanattachnoimportancetoprotestationsofdisapprovalifitknowinglyacceptsandpaysand
announcesthatitwillpayforthefruits.Wehavetochoose,andformypartIthinkitalessevilthat
somecriminalsshouldescapethanthatthegovernmentshouldplayanignoblepart.

So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. U.S. On this occasion, this
[1]

Court is made to choose between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the
government play an ignoble part.
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao
City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel
Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was
[2]

allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. [3]

Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior,
SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station,
[4]

conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For five days,
[5]

they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According [6]

to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. [7]

On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and
would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as
[8]
big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same
[9]

day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted
themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All [10]

wore civilian clothes. [11]

About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other
carry a carton marked King Flakes. Standing some five feet away from the men, PO1
[12] [13]

Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description. The [14]

same man also toted a plastic bag. [15]

PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified
themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received
[16]

information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who [17]

resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto [18]

asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright.
[19]

Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on.

[20] [21]

The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in
a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap
[22] [23]

the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves.
[24] [25]

The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and
brought them to the police station. The two did not resist.
[26] [27]

The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief Inspector Noemi
[28]

Austero, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region XI, on specimens taken
from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag
contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890
grams. Police Chief Inspector Austero reduced her findings in her report, Physical
[29]

Sciences Report No. D-220-99 dated 2 August 1999. [30]

Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before [31]

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved
[32] [33]

their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against
them. [34]

Trial ensued thereafter.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1 Desierto and
PO1 Floreta, their civilian informant Bobong Solier, forensic chemist Police Chief Inspector
Noemi Austero, and SPO3 Nicolas Algabre, exhibit custodian of the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Said witnesses testified to the foregoing narration of facts.
The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.
Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan, North Cotabato
to sell pairs of Levis pants, which was his sideline. At about 5:00 in the afternoon, he[35]

returned to Davao City by bus. Upon reaching Toril, Tudtud, along with less than ten
[36]

passengers, got down the bus. [37]

 Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him, pointing a .
38 caliber revolver. The man told him not to run. Tudtud raised his arms and asked, Sir,
[38] [39]

what is this about? The man answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag
[40]

Tudtud was carrying, and instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs
of Levis pants. [41]

The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away.
According to Tudtud, the box was already there when he disembarked the bus. Tudtud
[42] [43]

told the man the box was not his, but proceeded to open it out of fear after the man again
pointed his revolver at him. Tudtud discovered pieces of dried fish, underneath which
[44]

was something wrapped in cellophane. [45]

What is that? the man asked. Tudtud replied that he did not know. Without even
[46] [47]

unwrapping the cellophane, the man said it was marijuana and abruptly handcuffed
Tudtud. [48]

Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the other side
of the street, some eight meters from Tudtud. [49]

Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after attending a
cousins wedding in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur when he was accosted. After alighting the [50]

bus, Bolong crossed the street. Someone then approached him and pointed a gun at
[51]

him. The man ordered him not to move and handcuffed him. Bolong asked why he was
[52] [53]

being arrested but the man just told him to go with them. [54]

The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later claim, they
met each other for the first time. [55]

Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered the testimonies
of Felicia Julaton, Branch 3 Clerk of Court, Claudio Bohevia, Branch 7 Clerk of Court,
[56] [57]

and Mercedita Abunda, Branch 9 Utility Clerk, all of the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit
[58]

Court. They testified and presented court documents showing that one Bobo or Bobong
Ramirez was charged in their respective branches with various crimes, specifically, light
threats, less serious physical injuries and robbery. The defense asserted that the Bobo or
Bobong Ramirez accused in these cases is the same person as the informant Bobong
Solier. [59]

Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered
judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. [60]

On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission
in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution, which states:

SEC.2.Therightofthepeopletobesecuredintheirpersons,houses,papers,andeffectsagainst
unreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureandforanypurposeshallbeinviolable,and
nosearchwarrantorwarrantofarrestshallissueexceptuponprobablecausetobedetermined
personallybythejudgeafterexaminationunderoathoraffirmationofthecomplainantandthe
witnesseshemayproduce,andparticularlydescribingtheplacestobesearchedandthepersonsor
thingstobeseized.

The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of
the above-quoted constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Section 3 (2), Article III of
[61]

the Constitution explicitly provides:

(2)Anyevidenceobtainedinviolationoftheprecedingsectionshallbeinadmissibleforany
purposeinanyproceeding.

The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only unreasonable searches
and seizures. The following instances are not deemed unreasonable even in the absence
of a warrant:

1.Warrantlesssearchincidentaltoalawfularrest.(Sec.12,Rule126oftheRulesofCourtand
prevailingjurisprudence);

2.Searchofevidenceinplainview.Theelementsare:(a)apriorvalidintrusionbasedonthevalid
warrantlessarrestinwhichthepolicearelegallypresentinthepursuitoftheirofficialduties;(b)
theevidencewasinadvertentlydiscoveredbythepolicewhohavetherighttobewheretheyare;
(c)theevidencemustbeimmediatelyapparent;(d)plainviewjustifiedmereseizureofevidence
withoutfurthersearch;

3.Searchofamovingvehicle.Highlyregulatedbythegovernment,thevehiclesinherentmobility
reducesexpectationofprivacyespeciallywhenitstransitinpublicthoroughfaresfurnishesahighly
reasonablesuspicionamountingtoprobablecausethattheoccupantcommittedacriminalactivity;

4.Consentedwarrantlesssearch;

5.Customssearch;

6.StopandFrisk;and

7.Exigentandemergencycircumstances. [62]

The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first
exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. It cited as authorities this Courts rulings
in People v. Claudio, People v. Tangliben, People v. Montilla, and People v. Valdez.
[63] [64] [65]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in arguing for the affirmance of the appealed
[66]

decision, invokes the cases of People v. Maspil, Jr., People v. Malmstedt, and People v.
[67] [68]

Bagista. [69]
 A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Prior to its
revision in 2000, Section 12, Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows:
[70]

SEC.12.Searchincidenttolawfularrest.Apersonlawfullyarrestedmaybesearchedfor
dangerousweaponsoranythingwhichmaybeusedasproofofthecommissionofanoffense,
withoutasearchwarrant.

Section5(a),Rule113oftheRules,inturn,allowswarrantlessarrests:

SEC.5.Arrestwithoutwarrant;whenlawful.Apeaceofficeroraprivatepersonmay,withouta
warrant,arrestaperson:

(a)When,inhispresence,thepersontobearrestedhascommitted,isactuallycommitting,oris
attemptingtocommitanoffense;

It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
[71]

precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search. The question, therefore, is whether the police in this case had probable cause to
[72]

arrest appellants. Probable cause has been defined as:

anactualbelieforreasonablegroundsofsuspicion.Thegroundsofsuspicionarereasonablewhen,
intheabsenceofactualbeliefofthearrestingofficers,thesuspicionthatthepersontobearrestedis
probablyguiltyofcommittingtheoffense,isbasedonactualfacts,i.e.,supportedbycircumstances
sufficientlystronginthemselvestocreatetheprobablecauseofguiltofthepersontobearrested.A
reasonablesuspicionthereforemustbefoundedonprobablecause,coupledwithgoodfaithofthe
peaceofficersmakingthearrest. [73]

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is
that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section
5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
In the leading case of People v. Burgos, this Court held that the officer arresting a
[74]

person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view. In Burgos, the authorities obtained information that the accused
[75]

had forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok as member of the New Peoples Army, threatening
the latter with a firearm. Upon finding the accused, the arresting team searched his house and
discovered a gun as well as purportedly subversive documents. This Court, in declaring then
Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court inapplicable, ruled that:
Thereisnosuchpersonalknowledgeinthiscase.Whateverknowledgewaspossessedbythe
arrestingofficers,itcameinitsentiretyfromtheinformationfurnishedbyCesarMasamlok.The
locationofthefirearmwasgivenbytheappellantswife.

Atthetimeoftheappellantsarrest,hewasnotinactualpossessionofanyfirearmorsubversive
document.Neitherwashecommittinganyactwhichcouldbedescribedassubversive.Hewas,in
fact,plowinghisfieldatthetimeofthearrest.

Therightofapersontobesecureagainstanyunreasonableseizureofhisbodyandanydeprivation
ofhislibertyisamostbasicandfundamentalone.Thestatuteorrulewhichallowsexceptionsto
therequirementofwarrantsofarrestisstrictlyconstrued.Anyexceptionmustclearlyfallwithin
thesituationswhensecuringawarrantwouldbeabsurdorismanifestlyunnecessaryasprovidedby
theRule.Wecannotliberallyconstruetheruleonarrestswithoutwarrantorextenditsapplication
beyondthecasesspecificallyprovidedbylaw.Todosowouldinfringeuponpersonallibertyand
setbackabasicrightsooftenviolatedandsodeservingoffullprotection.
[76]

Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation
of the accuseds constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In People v. Aminnudin, this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and
[77]

subsequent search of appellant therein illegal, given the following circumstances:

theaccusedappellantwasnot,atthemomentofhisarrest,committingacrimenorwasitshown
thathewasabouttodosoorthathehadjustdoneso.Whathewasdoingwasdescendingthe
gangplankoftheM/VWilcon9andtherewasnooutwardindicationthathecalledforhis
arrest.Toallappearances,hewaslikeanyoftheotherpassengersinnocentlydisembarkingfrom
thevessel.Itwasonlywhentheinformerpointedtohimasthecarrierofthemarijuanathathe
suddenlybecamesuspectandsosubjecttoapprehension.Itwasthefurtivefingerthattriggeredhis
arrest.Theidentificationbytheinformerwastheprobablecauseasdeterminedbytheofficers(and
notajudge)thatauthorizedthemtopounceuponAminnudinandimmediatelyarresthim. [78]

Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that
the search yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side while holding
ones abdomen, or of standing on a corner with ones eyes moving very fast, looking at
[79]

every person who came near, does not justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5
[80]

(a). Neither does putting something in ones pocket, handing over ones baggage, riding
[81] [82]

a motorcycle, nor does holding a bag on board a trisikad sanction State intrusion. The
[83] [84]

same rule applies to crossing the street per se. [85]

Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria. Recently, [86]

in People v. Binad Sy Chua, this Court declared invalid the arrest of the accused, who
[87]

was walking towards a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. For the exception in
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is
insufficient.
In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because
of suspicious circumstances: People v. Tangliben (accused [88]
was acting
suspiciously), People v. Malmstedt (a bulge on the accuseds waist), and People v. de
[89]

Guzman (likewise a bulge on the waist of the accused, who was wearing tight-fitting
[90]

clothes).
There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information
sufficient to justify a search incident to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113,
thus deviating from Burgos. To this class of cases belong People v. Maspil, Jr., People v. [91]

Bagista, People v. Balingan, People v. Lising, People v. Montilla, People v. Valdez,

[92] [93] [94] [95]

and People v. Gonzales. In these cases, the arresting authorities were acting on
[96] [97]

information regarding an offense but there were no overt acts or suspicious circumstances
that would indicate that the accused has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last two, come
under some other exception to the rule against warrantless searches. Thus, Maspil,
Jr. involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a search of a moving vehicle, Bagistawas
both, and Lising and Montilla were consented searches.
Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos, which, in
turn, more faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule 113. Note the phrase in his
presence therein, connoting personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The
right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of
his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one,
the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly
construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by
law. [98]

The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely
misplaced. In Claudio, the accused, who was seated aboard a bus in front of the
[99]

arresting officer, put her bag behind the latter, thus arousing the latters
suspicion. In Tangliben and Malmstedt, the accused had also acted suspiciously.
As noted earlier, Maspil, Jr., Bagista and Montilla were justified by other exceptions to
the rule against warrantless searches. Montilla, moreover, was not without its
critics.There, majority of the Court held:

Appellantinsiststhatthemerefactofseeingapersoncarryingatravelingbagandacartonbox
shouldnotelicittheslightestsuspicionofthecommissionofanycrimesincethatisnormal.But
precisely,itisintheordinarynatureofthingsthatdrugsbeingillegallytransportedarenecessarily
hiddenincontainersandconcealedfromview.Thus,theofficerscouldreasonablyassume,andnot
merelyonahollowsuspicionsincetheinformantwasbytheirsideandhadsoinformedthem,that
thedrugswereinappellantsluggage.Itwouldobviouslyhavebeenirresponsible,ifnowdownright
absurdunderthecircumstances,torequiretheconstabletoadoptawaitandseeattitudeattherisk
ofeventuallylosingthequarry.
Here,thereweresufficientfactsantecedenttothesearchandseizurethat,atthepointpriortothe
searchwerealreadyconstitutiveofprobablecause,andwhichbythemselvescouldproperlycreate
inthemindsoftheofficersawellgroundedandreasonablebeliefthatappellantwasintheactof
violatingthelaw.Thesearchyieldedaffirmancebothofthatprobablecauseandtheactualitythat
appellantwasthenactuallycommittingacrimebyillegallytransportingprohibiteddrugs.With
theseattendantfacts,itisineluctablethatappellantwascaughtinflagrantedelicto,hencehisarrest
andthesearchofhisbelongingswithouttherequisitewarrantwerebothjustified. [100]

While concurring with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on the
discussion on the warrantless search being incidental to a lawful arrest. Mr. Justice
Panganiban, joined by Messrs. Justices Melo and Puno, filed a Separate Opinion.
Although likewise concurring in the majoritys ruling that appellant consented to the
inspection of his baggage, Justice Panganiban disagreed with the conclusion that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. He argued that jurisprudence required
personal knowledge on the part of the officers making the in flagrante
delicto arrest.In Montilla, the appellant did not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that
would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he was embarking on some
felonious enterprise.

Lawandjurisprudenceinfactrequirestrictergroundsforvalidarrestsandsearcheswithoutwarrant
thanfortheissuanceofwarrantstherefore.Intheformer,thearrestingpersonmusthaveactually
witnessedthecrimebeingcommittedorattemptedbythepersonsoughttobearrested;orhemust
havepersonalknowledgeoffactsindicatingthatthepersontobearrestedperpetratedthecrimethat
hadjustoccurred.Inthelattercase,thejudgesimplydeterminespersonallyfromtestimoniesof
witnessesthatthereexistsreasonablegroundstobelievethatacrimewascommittedbythe
accused.

Tosaythatreliabletipsconstituteprobablecauseforawarrantlessarrestorsearchisinmy
opinion,adangerousprecedentandplacesingreatjeopardythedoctrineslaiddowninmany
decisionsmadebythisCourt,initsefforttozealouslyguardandprotectthesacredconstitutional
rightagainstunreasonablearrests,searchesandseizures.Everyonewouldbepracticallyatthe
mercyofsocalledinformants,reminiscentofthemakapilisduringtheJapaneseoccupation.Any
onewhomtheypointouttoapoliceofficerasapossibleviolatorofthelawcouldthenbesubjectto
searchandpossiblearrest.Thisisplacinglimitlesspoweruponinformantswhowillnolongerbe
requiredtoaffirmunderoaththeiraccusations,fortheycanalwaysdelaytheirgivingoftipsin
ordertojustifywarrantlessarrestsandsearches.Evenlawenforcerscanusethisasanoppressive
tooltoconductsearcheswithoutwarrants,fortheycanalwaysclaimthattheyreceivedraw
intelligenceinformationonlyonthedayorafternoonbefore.Thiswouldclearlybeacircumvention
ofthelegalrequisitesforvalidlyeffectinganarrestorconductingasearchandseizure.Indeedthe
majoritysrulingwouldopenloopholesthatwouldallowunreasonablearrests,searchesand
seizures.[101]
 Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganibans concurring opinion
in People v. Doria, supra, where this Court ruled:

AccusedAppellantGaddaowasarrestedsolelyonthebasisoftheallegedidentificationmadeby
hercoaccused.PO3Manlangit,however,declaredinhisdirectexaminationthatappellantDoria
namedhiscoaccusedinresponsetohis(PO3Manlangits)queryastowherethe
markedmoneywas.AppellantDoriadidnotpointtoappellantGaddaoashisassociateinthedrug
business,butasthepersonwithwhomheleftthemarkedbills.Thisidentificationdoesnot
necessarilyleadtotheconclusionthatappellantGaddaoconspiredwithhercoaccusedinpushing
drugs.AppellantDoriamayhaveleftthemoneyinherhouse,withorwithoutanyconspiracy.Save
foraccusedappellantDoriasword,theNarcomagentshadnoshowingthatthepersonwhoaffected
thewarantlessarresthad,inhisownright,knowledgeoffactsimplicatingthepersonarrestedtothe
perpetrationofacriminaloffense,thearrestislegallyobjectionable. [Italicsintheoriginal.]
[102]

Expressing his accord with Mr. Justice Punos ponencia, Justice Panganiban said
that Doria rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests
and searches, which have seemingly been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben
Montilla. [103]

Montilla, therefore, has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions searches

incidental to lawful arrest under similar circumstances. At any rate, Montilla was a
consented search. As will be demonstrated later, the same could not be said of this case.
That leaves the prosecution with People v. Valdez, which, however, involved an on-
the-spot information. The urgency of the circumstances, an element not present in this
case, prevented the arresting officer therein from obtaining a warrant.
Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious
manner that would hint that a crime has been, was being, or was about to be,
committed. If the arresting officers testimonies are to be believed, appellants were merely
helping each other carry a carton box. Although appellant Tudtud did appear afraid and
perspiring, pale and trembling, this was only after, not before, he was asked to open
[104] [105] [106]

the said box.

In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant Tudtud
was in possession of marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only
from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information
only from his neighbors and the friends of appellant Tudtud:
Q What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to Cotabato and get stocks of
marijuana?
A Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be the person whou [sic] would
point to him because he had been giving trouble to the neighborhood because according to them
there are [sic] proliferation of marijuana in our place. That was the complained [sic] of our
neighbors.
Q Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in reporting him particularly?
A His friends were the once who told me about it.
Q For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud in proliferation of marijuana?
 A About a month.
.
Q Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of marijuana which led to his
apprehension sometime in the evening of August 1 and according to the report [which] is based
on your report my question is, how did you know that Tudtud will be bringing along with him
marijuana stocks on August 1, 1999?
.
A Because of the information of his neighbor.[107]

In other words, Soliers information itself is hearsay. He did not even elaborate on how
his neighbors or Tudtuds friends acquired their information that Tudtud was responsible for
the proliferation of drugs in their neighborhood.
Indeed, it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliablility of their
informant. He testified on cross-examination:
Q You mean to say that Bobot Solier, is not reliable?
A He is trustworthy.
Q Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable?
A (witness did not answer).
ATTY. CAETE:
Never mind, do not answer anymore. Thats all.[108]

The prosecution, on re-direct examination, did not attempt to extract any explanation from
PO1 Floreta for his telling silence.
Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to
conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of
staking out appellant Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere
gather[ing] of information from the assets there. The police officers who conducted such
[109]

surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters
information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge.
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to
do away with the requisite warrant, PO1 Desiertos assertions of lack of
time notwithstanding. Records show that the police had ample opportunity to apply for a
[110]

warrant, having received Soliers information at around 9:00 in the morning; Tudtud,
however, was expected to arrive at around 6:00 in the evening of the same day.
In People v. Encinada, supra, the Court ruled that there was sufficient time to procure a
[111]

warrant where the police officers received at 4:00 in the afternoon an intelligence report
that the accused, who was supposedly carrying marijuana, would arrive the next morning
at 7:00 a.m.:

EveniftheinformationwasreceivedbyBoloniaabout4:00p.m.ofMay20,1992athishouse,
therewassufficienttimetosecureawarrantofarrest,astheM/VSweetPearlwasnotexpectedto
dockuntil7:00a.m.thefollowingday.AdministrativeCircularNo.13allowsapplicationfor
searchwarrantsevenafterofficehours:
3.Rafflingshallbestrictlyenforced,exceptonlyincasewhereanapplicationforsearchwarrant
maybefileddirectlywithanyjudgewhosejurisdictiontheplacetobesearchedislocated,after
officehours,orduringSaturdays,Sundays,andlegalholidays,inwhichcasetheapplicantis
requiredtocertifyunderoaththeurgencyoftheissuancethereofafterofficehours,orduring
Saturdays,Sundaysandlegalholidays;....

ThesameproceduraldispatchfindsvalidationandreiterationinCircularNo.19,seriesof1987,
entitledAmendedGuidelinesandProceduresonApplicationforsearchwarrantsforIllegal
PossessionofFirearmsandOtherSeriousCrimesFiledinMetroManilaCourtsandOtherCourts
withMultipleSalas:

ThisCourthasreceivedreportsofdelaywhileawaitingraffle,inactingonapplicationsforsearch
warrantsinthecampaignagainstloosefirearmsandotherseriouscrimesaffectingpeaceand
order.Thereisaneedforpromptactiononsuchapplicationsforsearchwarrant.Accordingly,these
amendedguidelinesintheissuanceofasearchwarrantareissued:

1.AllapplicationsforsearchwarrantsrelatingtoviolationoftheAntisubversionAct,crimes
againstpublicorderasdefinedintheRevisedPenalCode,asamended,illegalpossessionof
firearmsand/orammunitionandviolationsoftheDangerousDrugsActof1972,asamended,shall
nolongerberaffledandshallimmediatelybetakencognizanceofandacteduponbytheExecutive
JudgeoftheRegionalTrialCourt,MetropolitanTrialCourt,andMunicipalTrialCourtunder
whosejurisdictiontheplacetobesearchedislocated.

2.IntheabsenceoftheExecutiveJudge,theViceExecutiveJudgeshalltakecognizanceof
andpersonallyactonthesame.IntheabsenceoftheExecutiveJudgeorViceExecutiveJudge,the
applicationmaybetakencognizanceofandacteduponbyanyjudgeoftheCourtwhere
applicationisfiled.

3.Applicationsfiledafterofficehours,duringSaturdays,Sundaysandholidays,shalllikewisebe
takencognizanceofandacteduponbyanyjudgeoftheCourthavingjurisdictionoftheplacetobe
searched,butinsuchcasestheapplicantshallcertifyandstatethefactsunderoath,tothe
satisfactionofthejudge,thatitsissuanceisurgent.

4.Anyjudgeactingonsuchapplicationshallimmediatelyandwithoutdelaypersonallyconduct
theexaminationoftheapplicantandhiswitnessestopreventthepossibleleakageof
information.Heshallobservetheprocedures,safeguards,andguidelinesfortheissuanceofsearch
warrantsprovidedforinthisCourtsAdministrativeCircularNo.13,datedOctober1,1985.
[Italicsintheoriginal.]
[112]

Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1 Floretas testimony
that the real reason for their omission was their belief that they lacked sufficient basis to
obtain the same assumes greater significance. This was PO1 Floretas familiar refrain:
Q When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from Cotabato to get that (sic)
stocks, you did not go to court to get a search warrant on the basis of the report of Bobot Solier?
A No.
 Q Why?
A Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.
Q When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have also no real basis to search
Tudtud and Bulong at that time?
A Yes, sir.
.
Q And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this was 9:00 a.m.?
A Yes, sir.
Q The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for the search warrant or the
prosecutor do [sic] not assist?
A They help.
Q But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search warrant?
A As I said, we do not have sufficient basis.[113]

It may be conceded that the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer concerning
the existence of probable cause is not binding on [the courts] which must independently
scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause and that a court
may also find probable cause in spite of an officers judgment that none exists. However, [114]

the fact that the arresting officers felt that they did not have sufficient basis to obtain a
warrant, despite their own information-gathering efforts, raises serious questions whether
such surveillance actually yielded any pertinent information and even whether they
actually conducted any information-gathering at all, thereby eroding any claim to personal
knowledge.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures if the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [115]
 Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records
disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested
appellant that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the
marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box
himself.
The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these
circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to
be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to
[116]

permission thereto.

.Astheconstitutionalguarantyisnotdependentuponanyaffirmativeactofthecitizen,thecourts
donotplacethecitizeninthepositionofeithercontestinganofficersauthoritybyforce,orwaiving
hisconstitutionalrights;butinsteadtheyholdthatapeacefulsubmissiontoasearchorseizureis
notaconsentoraninvitationthereto,butismerelyademonstrationofregardforthesupremacyof
thelaw. [Underscoringsupplied.]
[117]

Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag or the [118]

chairs containing marijuana to the arresting officer, this Court held there was no valid
[119]

consent to the search.

On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional
right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official
functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented.
[120]

In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by

the allegation of appellants in this case that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them
before asking them to open the subject box. Appellant Tudtud testified as follows:
Q This person who approached you according to you pointed something at you[.] [What] was that
something?
A A 38 cal. Revolver.
Q How did he point it at you?
A Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms holding something towards
somebody).
Q This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you?
A He said do not run.
Q What did you do?
A I raised my hands and said Sir, what is this about?
Q Why did you call him Sir?
A I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.
Q Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?
A Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is carrying a gun is a policeman.
 Q When you asked him what is this? What did he say?
A He said I would like to inspect what you are carrying.[]
Q What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?
A I told him that is not mine.
Q What did this man say?
A He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.
Q What did you do?
A So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot.[121]

Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus,
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount
[122]

to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search

and seizure. [123]

As the search of appellants box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a
valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in
evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting
officers and their informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped
naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government
becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III
of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the
articles on governmental power. [124]

The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy
of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property,
[125]

which is protected by the due process clause. This is as it should be for, as stressed by
[126]

a couple of noted freedom advocates, the right to personal security which, along with the
[127]

right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure
includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing. Emphasizing
such right, this Court declared in People v. Aruta:

Unreasonablesearchesandseizuresarethemenaceagainstwhichtheconstitutionalguarantees
affordfullprotection.Whilethepowertosearchandseizemayattimesbenecessarytothepublic
welfare,stillitmaybeexercisedandthelawenforcedwithouttransgressingtheconstitutional
rightsofthecitizens,fortheenforcementofnostatuteisofsufficientimportancetojustify
indifferencetothebasicprinciplesofgovernment.

Thosewhoaresupposedtoenforcethelawarenotjustifiedindisregardingtherightsofthe
individualinthenameoforder.Orderistoohighapricetopayforthelossofliberty.AsJustice
Holmesdeclared:Ithinkitislessevilthatsomecriminalsescapethanthatthegovernmentshould
playanignoblepart.Itissimplynotallowedinfreesocietytoviolatealawtoenforceanother,
especiallyifthelawviolatedistheConstitutionitself. [128]
 Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the
government play an ignoble part, the answer, to this Court, is clear and ineluctable.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is
REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are hereby
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is
ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they are
being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court compliance herewith
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., please see dissenting opinion.

G.R. No. 76005. April 23, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODELIO C. EXALA, RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN and JAIME P. FERNANDEZ, accused, RESTITUTO B.
BOCALAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Amador E. Mostajo and Presbiterio Velasco, Jr. for accused -appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; "STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT A MILITARY OR POLICE CHECKPOINT,

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WHICH HAS BEEN UPHELD, IS ONE OF THE INSTANCES WHERE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE CAN BE EFFECTED WITHOUT PRIOR ARREST OR WARRANT. There are indeed instances
where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be
the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already
been upheld by this Court. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is because of some
probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-
offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an offense. However, lest
it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with the general rule that no person shall be subjected
to search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on
the occasion of a lawful arrest. The case before Us is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a
military or police checkpoint.

2. ID.; ID.; THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE MAY BE WAIVED, AS IN THIS
CASE. Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest
on their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubt on their professed innocence but also confirms their
acquiescence to the search. Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. In
one case We held ". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 361).
The right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly."

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST MADE UPON DISCOVERY OF ACT OF DISPATCHING IN
TRANSIT OR TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED, IS
LAWFUL AND REQUIRES NO WARRANT; AN INSTANCE OF WARRANTLESS ARREST UNDER SEC. 5, PAR.
(A), RULE 113, 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED. The arrest of the three (3) accused
was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in their possession. There was no need
for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was committed. This is one of the situations envisioned by Sec. 5,
par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when a warrantless arrest may be
made. The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or transporting marijuana, in violation of Sec. 4,
Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.

4. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT OF FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS BY TRIAL COURT RELATIVE TO CREDIBILITY OF

WITNESSES; CASE AT BAR. Factual conclusions by the trial court relative to the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect and are generally sustained by the appellate court unless some material facts have been
overlooked or misconstrued as to affect the result. There is none in this case on appeal.

5. ID.; EVIDENCE; OBJECTION ON THE LEGALITY OF SEARCH AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

OBTAINED IN THE COURSE OF SEARCH IS WAIVED WHEN NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, AND
THE COURT IS BOUND TO ADMIT THE EVIDENCE. We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the
marijuana as evidence in the light of Bocalan's contention that it was seized without a valid search warrant. Since
the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This issue
was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the
ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his
objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of
such waiver, the court is bound to admit evidence.

6. CRIMINAL LAW; MATERIALITY OF OWNERSHIP OF PROHIBITED DRUG IN A PROSECUTION FOR

VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED. Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused
is charged with the unlawful transportation of marijuana. Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not
require that one be the owner of the prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted for dispatching in transit or
transporting a prohibited drug.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT AN ORDINARY CHECKPOINT IS

ILLEGAL FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS ENVISIONED IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS. I do not agree that in
the interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and searched
without warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is not the probable cause
envisioned in the Bill of Rights. In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the
search. The search is made as a matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing that a
crime is about to be committed, is actually being committed, or has just been committed and the searching officer
has personal knowledge that the person being searched or arrested is the culprit . . . I realize that this view would
result in the inadmissibility of the seized marijuana as evidence against the petitioner and in his inevitable acquittal.
But as I have always maintained, we cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification that, after all,
the articles seized are illegal.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

The admissibility of the evidence seized from the accused at a checkpoint after being stopped for routine inspection
is put to test in this appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City finding inter alia accused-
appellant Restituto B. Bocalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."

On 2 November 1982, at about 8:15 in the evening, a private jeep driven by accused-appellant Restituto B. Bocalan
was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection regarding unlicensed firearms and other
prohibited items. With Bocalan were his co-accused Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala. Pfc. Ricardo
Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms inside.
They answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside.
He noticed a black leather bag measuring about one (1) foot wide and two (2) feet long with its sides bulging. He
asked what it contained. There was deadening silence. Nobody answered. Instead, the three (3) accused, Restituto
B. Bocalan, Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala, suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered
the bag opened. He found what he excitedly described as "marijuana, marijuana, napakaraming marijuana!" At this
juncture, the three (3) remained motionless in their seats and appeared petrified with fear. They were brought to the
police station that same night for further investigation. 2

After laboratory examination, the bag was verified to contain more than two (2) kilos of Indian hemp otherwise
known as marijuana. 3

Thereafter, Rodelio C. Exala, Restituto B. Bocalan and Jaime P. Fernandez were accordingly charged for violation of
Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.

After trial, Bocalan was held guilty as principal and sentenced to life imprisonment. A fine of P25,000.00 was also
imposed. 4 The other two (2) were convicted as accomplices and received lighter penalties. Fernandez appealed to
the Court of Appeals. Exala did not.

Bocalan, whose punishment is reviewable only by this Court, is now before Us assailing his conviction; hence, We
deal only with him in this appeal.

Appellant Bocalan seeks exculpation by imputing ownership of the bag to Exala alone. 5 Bocalan claims that while
on the way to Cavite City, he and Fernandez offered Exala a ride. Exala accepted the offer and requested Bocalan
to make a detour to Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite, where he was to pick up some clothes. They agreed and Exala
got the bag which he kept beside him all the time until their apprehension at the checkpoint. 6

Bocalan further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against him since it was obtained
through a warrantless search. 7

The protestations of Bocalan are devoid of merit. We agree with the trial court that the conduct of Bocalan was not
only unusual but also contrary to normal human experience. 8 He alleged that he knew Exala only by face and had
no personal association with him; 9 yet, on that eventful day of 2 November 1982, he agreed to detour to Salitran
which was some fifteen (15) to twenty (20) kilometers out of his way. Thus, his contention that it was Exala who
owned the bag containing the marijuana is hardly credible.

On the other hand, Exala declared that it was he who did not know the contents of the bag as it was already in the
jeep when he boarded it. Exala asserted that it was either Bocalan or Fernandez who owned the bag. Exala swore
that Bocalan and Fernandez offered him P5,000.00, later raised to P10,000.00, to take the blame alone, but he
refused. 10

Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful transportation of marijuana. 11
Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not require that one be the owner of the prohibited drug before he
can be prosecuted for dispatching in transit or transporting a prohibited drug. The law simply provides thus

"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of
the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."

Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence to prove that Bocalan was directly involved in the unlawful dispatch in
transit or transport of marijuana. The evidence of the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of Pfc. Ricardo Galang
and Pat. Rosauro de Guzman, belies the defense of Bocalan and establishes beyond cavil that he was caught in
flagrante delicto of transporting the prohibited drug; that he was the driver of the jeep owned by his father that
carried the stuff; and, that he was in fact the owner of the bag. The trial court noted that Bocalan picked up
Fernandez and Exala one after the other to accompany him to the place where the bag of marijuana was taken and
to help him bring the marijuana to Cavite City. 12 Regardless of the degree of participation of Fernandez and Exala,
Bocalan is correctly punished for his direct involvement in the crime.
Such factual conclusions by the trial court relative to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and are
generally sustained by the appellate court unless some material facts have been overlooked or misconstrued as to
affect the result. 13 There is none in this case on appeal.

We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the marijuana as evidence in the light of Bocalan's contention
that it was seized without a valid search warrant. Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan
argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest.

This issue was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence
on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his
objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. 14 In
view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the evidence. 15 But even assuming arguendo that there was no
waiver, still appellant's contention deserves scant consideration.

There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest. 16 An illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court. 17 Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through
these checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints
that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the
commission of an offense. 18 However, lest it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with the
general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his
residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 19 The case before Us is an
incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.

The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with "Operational Bakal" the main object of which was to
search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized persons passing
through it. 20 When the jeep carrying the contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the
occupants were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the sides of
which were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that moment,
the demeanor of the accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were concealing
something from Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar
apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the probable
cause justifying a more extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff.
Significantly, there was no sign of any protest or objection to the search. The accused remained silent even after
their arrest.

Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their
part when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their professed innocence 21 but also confirms their
acquiescence to the search. 22 Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
23 In one case 24 We held

". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 361). The right to be
secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either
expressly or impliedly" (emphasis supplied).

The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in
their possession. There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was committed. This is one of
the situations envisioned by Sec. 5, par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
when a warrantless arrest may be made. 25 The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or
transporting marijuana, in violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.

The alleged contradiction between the sworn statements of Pfc. Galang and Pat. de Guzman was explained in their
separate testimonies and, in any event, has been resolved by the trial court as a factual issue. We find no reason to
reverse its findings.
Anent the argument that the three (3) accused should not have been assigned different levels of liability, suffice it to
say that whether a principal, co-principal or conspirator, accused-appellant would have been meted out the same
penalty imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision appealed from finding accused-appellant RESTITUTO
B. BOCALAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the same is AFFIRMED, with costs against him.

SO ORDERED.

Grio-Aquino and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent, for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinions in Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665/178 SCRA
211, and People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, and the following additional observations.

I am opposed to checkpoints as regular police measures aimed at reducing criminality in general. I do not agree that
in the interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and searched
without warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is not the probable cause
envisioned in the Bill of Rights.

In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the search. The search is made as a
matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing that a crime is about to be committed, is
actually being committed, or has just been committed and the searching officer has personal knowledge that the
person being searched or arrested is the culprit.

I will concede that checkpoints may be established at borders of states or at "constructive borders" near the
boundary for the purpose of preventing violations of immigration and customs laws. But in the interior of the territory,
the requirements of a valid search and seizure must be strictly observed. The only permissible exemption is where a
crime like a bank robbery has just been committed or a jailbreak has just occurred, and the authorities have to seal
off all possible avenues of escape in the area. In all other cases, I submit that the checkpoint should not be allowed.

I realize that this view would result in the inadmissibility of the of the seized marijuana as evidence against the
petitioner and in his inevitable acquittal. But as I have always maintained, we cannot retroactively validate an illegal
search on the justification that, after all, the articles seized are illegal. That is putting the cart before the horse. I
would rather see some criminals go unpunished now and then than agree to the Bill of Rights being systematically
ignored in the oppressive checkpoint. Respect for the Constitution is more important than securing a conviction
based on a violation of the rights of the accused.

[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of
the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a
sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that
"individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably
acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is
justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

Thesoleendforwhichmankindiswarranted,individuallyorcollectively,ininterferingwiththe
libertyofactionofanyoftheirnumber,isselfprotection.Theonlypurposeforwhichpowercan
berightfullyexercisedoveranymemberofacivilizedcommunity,againsthiswill,istoprevent
harmtoothers.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the
end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a
system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-
observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social
order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of
contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled
and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism,
often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by
its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are
pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the
crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element
of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional
boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section1.xxxx(d)"Illgottenwealth"meansanyasset,property,business,enterpriseormaterial
possessionofanypersonwithinthepurviewofSectionTwo(2)hereof,acquiredbyhimdirectlyor
indirectlythroughdummies,nominees,agents,subordinatesand/orbusinessassociatesbyany
combinationorseriesofthefollowingmeansorsimilarschemes:

(1)Throughmisappropriation,conversion,misuse,ormalversationofpublicfundsorraidsonthe
publictreasury;

(2)Byreceiving,directlyorindirectly,anycommission,gift,share,percentage,kickbacksorany
otherformofpecuniarybenefitfromanypersonand/orentityinconnectionwithanygovernment
contractorprojectorbyreasonoftheofficeorpositionofthepublicofficeconcerned;
(3)BytheillegalorfraudulentconveyanceordispositionofassetsbelongingtotheNational
Governmentoranyofitssubdivisions,agenciesorinstrumentalities,orgovernmentownedor
controlledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries;

(4)Byobtaining,receivingoracceptingdirectlyorindirectlyanysharesofstock,equityorany
otherformofinterestorparticipationincludingthepromiseoffutureemploymentinanybusiness
enterpriseorundertaking;

(5)Byestablishingagricultural,industrialorcommercialmonopoliesorothercombinations
and/orimplementationofdecreesandordersintendedtobenefitparticularpersonsorspecial
interests;or

(6)Bytakingadvantageofofficialposition,authority,relationship,connectionorinfluenceto
unjustlyenrichhimselforthemselvesattheexpenseandtothedamageandprejudiceofthe
FilipinopeopleandtheRepublicofthePhilippines.

Section2.DefinitionoftheCrimeofPlunder,Penalties.Anypublicofficerwho,byhimselforin
connivancewithmembersofhisfamily,relativesbyaffinityorconsanguinity,businessassociates,
subordinatesorotherpersons,amasses,accumulatesoracquiresillgottenwealththrough
acombinationorseriesofovertorcriminalactsasdescribedinSection1(d)hereof,inthe
aggregateamountortotalvalueofatleastfiftymillionpesos(P50,000,000.00)shallbeguiltyof
thecrimeofplunderandshallbepunishedbyreclusionperpetuatodeath.Anypersonwho
participatedwiththesaidpublicofficerinthecommissionofanoffensecontributingtothecrime
ofplundershalllikewisebepunishedforsuchoffense.Intheimpositionofpenalties,thedegreeof
participationandtheattendanceofmitigatingandextenuatingcircumstancesasprovidedby
theRevisedPenalCodeshallbeconsideredbythecourt.Thecourtshalldeclareanyandallill
gottenwealthandtheirinterestsandotherincomesandassetsincludingthepropertiesandshares
ofstocksderivedfromthedepositorinvestmentthereofforfeitedinfavoroftheState
(underscoringsupplied).

Section4.RuleofEvidence.Forpurposesofestablishingthecrimeofplunder,itshallnotbe
necessarytoproveeachandeverycriminalactdonebytheaccusedinfurtheranceofthescheme
orconspiracytoamass,accumulateoracquireillgottenwealth,itbeingsufficienttoestablish
beyondreasonabledoubtapatternofovertorcriminalactsindicativeoftheoverallunlawful
schemeorconspiracy(underscoringsupplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par.
(e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of
Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees);
(d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565,
for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No.
26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the
accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable
cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported
ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in
that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding
that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that
the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1)
offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or
on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for
resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b)
The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the
rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum,
and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the
basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. [3] Courts
invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack,
for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its
bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and
powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch
accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts
should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must
be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing
therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to
sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be
touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not
sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where
the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on
sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of
the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-
founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has
miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of
the Plunder Law.
 As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would
enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes
the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1.Thattheoffenderisapublicofficerwhoactsbyhimselforinconnivancewithmembersofhis
family,relativesbyaffinityorconsanguinity,businessassociates,subordinatesorotherpersons;

2.Thatheamassed,accumulatedoracquiredillgottenwealththroughacombinationorseriesof
thefollowingovertorcriminalacts:(a)throughmisappropriation,
conversion,misuse,ormalversationofpublicfundsorraidsonthepublictreasury;(b)by
receiving,directlyorindirectly,anycommission,gift,share,percentage,kickbackoranyother
formofpecuniarybenefitsfromanypersonand/orentityinconnectionwithanygovernment
contractorprojectorbyreasonoftheofficeorpositionofthepublicofficer;(c)bytheillegalor
fraudulentconveyanceordispositionofassetsbelongingtotheNationalGovernmentoranyofits
subdivisions,agenciesorinstrumentalitiesofGovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsor
theirsubsidiaries;(d)byobtaining,receivingoracceptingdirectlyorindirectlyanysharesof
stock,equityoranyotherformofinterestorparticipationincludingthepromiseoffuture
employmentinanybusinessenterpriseorundertaking;(e)byestablishingagricultural,industrial
orcommercialmonopoliesorothercombinationsand/orimplementationofdecreesandorders
intendedtobenefitparticularpersonsorspecialinterests;or(f)bytakingadvantageofofficial
position,authority,relationship,connectionorinfluencetounjustlyenrichhimselforthemselvesat
theexpenseandtothedamageandprejudiceoftheFilipinopeopleandtheRepublicofthe
Philippines;and,

3.Thattheaggregateamountortotalvalueoftheillgottenwealthamassed,accumulatedor
acquiredisatleastP50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide
the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the
accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty
that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth
of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder
Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable
certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:

"TheundersignedOmbudsman,ProsecutorandOICDirector,EPIB,OfficeoftheOmbudsman,
herebyaccusesformerPRESIDENTOFTHEREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES,Joseph
EjercitoEstrada,a.k.a.'ASIONGSALONGA'
anda.k.a.'JOSEVELARDE,'togetherwithJose
'Jinggoy'Estrada,Charlie'Atong'Ang,EdwardSerapio,YolandaT.Ricaforte,AlmaAlfaro,JOHN
DOEa.k.a.EleuterioTanOREleuterioRamosTanorMr.Uy,JaneDoea.k.a.DeliaRajas,and
JohnDOES&JaneDoes,ofthecrimeofPlunder,definedandpenalizedunderR.A.No.7080,as
amendedbySec.12ofR.A.No.7659,committedasfollows:
ThatduringtheperiodfromJune,1998toJanuary2001,inthePhilippines,andwithinthe
jurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,accusedJosephEjercitoEstrada,THENAPRESIDENTOF
THEREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES,by

himselfAND/ORinCONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY withhiscoaccused,WHOARE
MEMBERSOFHISFAMILY,RELATIVESBYAFFINITYORCONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESSASSOCIATES,SUBORDINATESAND/OROTHERPERSONS,BYTAKING
UNDUEADVANTAGEOFHISOFFICIALPOSITION,AUTHORITY,RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION,ORINFLUENCE,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandcriminally

amass,accumulateandacquireBYHIMSELF,DIRECTLY ORINDIRECTLY,illgotten
wealthintheaggregateamountorTOTALVALUEofFOURBILLIONNINETYSEVEN
MILLIONEIGHTHUNDREDFOURTHOUSANDONEHUNDREDSEVENTYTHREE
PESOSANDSEVENTEENCENTAVOS(P4,097,804,173.17),moreorless,THEREBY
UNJUSTLYENRICHINGHIMSELFORTHEMSELVESATTHEEXPENSEANDTO
THEDAMAGEOFTHEFILIPINOPEOPLEANDTHEREPUBLICOFTHE
PHILIPPINES,throughANYORAcombinationOR AseriesofovertORcriminalacts,OR
SIMILARSCHEMESORMEANS,describedasfollows:

(a)byreceivingORcollecting,directlyorindirectly,onSEVERALINSTANCES,MONEYIN
THEAGGREGATEAMOUNTOFFIVEHUNDREDFORTYFIVEMILLIONPESOS
(P545,000,000.00),MOREORLESS,FROMILLEGALGAMBLINGINTHEFORMOF
GIFT,SHARE,PERCENTAGE,KICKBACKORANYFORMOFPECUNIARY
BENEFIT,BYHIMSELFAND/ORinconnectionwithcoaccusedCHARLIE'ATONG'
ANG,Jose'Jinggoy'Estrada,YolandaT.Ricaforte,EdwardSerapio,ANDJOHNDOESAND
JANEDOES,inconsiderationOFTOLERATIONORPROTECTIONOFILLEGAL
GAMBLING;

(b)byDIVERTING,RECEIVING,misappropriating,convertingORmisusingDIRECTLYOR
INDIRECTLY,forHISORTHEIRPERSONALgainandbenefit,publicfundsintheamountof
ONEHUNDREDTHIRTYMILLIONPESOS(P130,000,000.00),moreorless,representinga

portionoftheTWOHUNDREDMILLIONPESOS( P
200,000,000.00)tobaccoexcisetaxshare

allocatedfortheprovinceofIlocosSurunderR.A.No.7171,byhimselfand/or inconnivance
withcoaccusedCharlie'Atong'Ang,AlmaAlfaro,JOHNDOEa.k.a.EleuterioRamosTanor
Mr.Uy,JaneDoea.k.a.DeliaRajas,ANDOTHERJOHNDOES&JANEDOES;(italic
supplied).

(c)bydirecting,orderingandcompelling,FORHISPERSONALGAINANDBENEFIT,the
GovernmentServiceInsuranceSystem(GSIS)TOPURCHASE351,878,000SHARESOF
STOCKS,MOREORLESS,andtheSocialSecuritySystem(SSS),329,855,000SHARESOF
STOCK,MOREORLESS,OFTHEBELLECORPORATIONINTHEAMOUNTOF
MOREORLESSONEBILLIONONEHUNDREDTWOMILLIONNINEHUNDRED
SIXTYFIVETHOUSANDSIXHUNDREDSEVENPESOSANDFIFTYCENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50)ANDMOREORLESSSEVENHUNDREDFORTYFOURMILLION
SIXHUNDREDTWELVETHOUSANDANDFOURHUNDREDFIFTYPESOS
(P744,612,450.00),RESPECTIVELY,ORATOTALOFMOREORLESSONEBILLION
EIGHTHUNDREDFORTYSEVENMILLIONFIVEHUNDREDSEVENTYEIGHT
THOUSANDFIFTYSEVENPESOSANDFIFTYCENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50);
ANDBYCOLLECTINGORRECEIVING,DIRECTLYOR
INDIRECTLY,BYHIMSELFAND/ORINCONNIVANCEWITHJOHNDOESAND
JANEDOES,COMMISSIONSORPERCENTAGESBYREASONOFSAIDPURCHASES
OFSHARESOFSTOCKINTHEAMOUNTOFONEHUNDREDEIGHTYNINE
MILLIONSEVENHUNDREDTHOUSANDPESOS(P 189,700,000.00)MOREORLESS,
FROMTHEBELLECORPORATIONWHICHBECAMEPARTOFTHEDEPOSITIN
THEEQUITABLEPCIBANKUNDERTHEACCOUNTNAME'JOSEVELARDE;'

(d)byunjustlyenrichinghimselfFROMCOMMISSIONS,GIFTS,SHARES,
PERCENTAGES,KICKBACKS,ORANYFORMOFPECUNIARYBENEFITS,IN
CONNIVANCEWITHJOHNDOESANDJANEDOES,intheamountofMOREOR
LESSTHREEBILLIONTWOHUNDREDTHIRTYTHREEMILLIONONEHUNDRED
FOURTHOUSANDONEHUNDREDSEVENTYTHREEPESOSANDSEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS(P3,233,104,173.17)ANDDEPOSITINGTHESAMEUNDERHISACCOUNT
NAME'JOSEVELARDE'ATTHEEQUITABLEPCIBANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the
elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against
him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in
Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the
Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due
process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; [6] much
less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of
expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in
the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words. [8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to usestatutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of
the words "combination" and"series:"
Combinationtheresultorproductofcombining;theactorprocessofcombining.Tocombineis
tobringintosuchcloserelationshipastoobscureindividualcharacters.

Seriesanumberofthingsoreventsofthesameclasscomingoneafteranotherinspatialand
temporalsuccession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is
pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder
Law:

DELIBERATIONSOFTHEBICAMERALCOMMITTEEONJUSTICE,7May1991

REP.ISIDRO:Iamjustintriguedagainbyourdefinitionofplunder.WesayTHROUGHA
COMBINATIONORSERIESOFOVERTORCRIMINALACTSASMENTIONEDINSECTION
ONEHEREOF.Nowwhenwesaycombination,weactuallymeantosay,iftherearetwoormore
means,wemeantosaythatnumberoneandtwoornumberoneandsomethingelseareincluded,
howaboutaseriesofthesameact?Forexample,throughmisappropriation,conversion,misuse,
willthesebeincludedalso?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a
repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that
two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion
because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
 REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result in
such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of overt or, to read,
therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series.
Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say acts
of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation
and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature
intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan [9] that this term is sufficiently
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

xxxxunderSec.1(d)ofthelaw,a'pattern'consistsofatleastacombinationorseriesofovertor
criminalactsenumeratedinsubsections(1)to(6)ofSec.1(d).Secondly,pursuanttoSec.2ofthe
law,thepatternofovertorcriminalactsisdirectedtowardsacommonpurposeorgoalwhichisto
enablethepublicofficertoamass,accumulateoracquireillgottenwealth.Andthirdly,theremust
eitherbean'overallunlawfulscheme'or'conspiracy'toachievesaidcommongoal.Ascommonly
understood,theterm'overallunlawfulscheme'indicatesa'generalplanofactionormethod'which
theprincipalaccusedandpublicofficerandothersconnivingwithhimfollowtoachievethe
aforesaidcommongoal.Inthealternative,ifthereisnosuchoverallschemeorwheretheschemes
ormethodsusedbymultipleaccusedvary,theovertorcriminalactsmustformpartofa
conspiracytoattainacommongoal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of
what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is
manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the
effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked
against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In suchinstance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. [10] But the
doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge
may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. [11] With more reason, the
doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in
its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be
impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the
deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial
review of its validity -

Thevoidforvaguenessdoctrinestatesthat"astatutewhicheitherforbidsorrequiresthedoingof
anactintermssovaguethatmenofcommonintelligencemustnecessarilyguessatitsmeaning
anddifferastoitsapplication,violatesthefirstessentialofdueprocessoflaw." [13]Theoverbreadth
doctrine,ontheotherhand,decreesthat"agovernmentalpurposemaynotbeachievedbymeanswhichsweep
unnecessarilybroadlyandtherebyinvadetheareaofprotectedfreedoms."[14]

Afacialchallengeisallowedtobemadetoavaguestatuteandtoonewhichisoverbroadbecause
ofpossible"chillingeffect"uponprotectedspeech.Thetheoryisthat"[w]henstatutesregulateor
proscribespeechandnoreadilyapparentconstructionsuggestsitselfasavehicleforrehabilitating
thestatutesinasingleprosecution,thetranscendentvaluetoallsocietyofconstitutionally
protectedexpressionisdeemedtojustifyallowingattacksonoverlybroadstatuteswithno
requirementthatthepersonmakingtheattackdemonstratethathisownconductcouldnotbe
regulatedbyastatutedrawnwithnarrowspecificity." [15]Thepossibleharmtosocietyinpermitting
someunprotectedspeechtogounpunishedisoutweighedbythepossibilitythattheprotected
speechofothersmaybedeterredandperceivedgrievanceslefttofesterbecauseofpossible
inhibitoryeffectsofoverlybroadstatutes.

Thisrationaledoesnotapplytopenalstatutes.Criminalstatuteshavegeneralinterroremeffect
resultingfromtheirveryexistence,and,iffacialchallengeisallowedforthisreasonalone,the
Statemaywellbepreventedfromenactinglawsagainstsociallyharmfulconduct.Intheareaof
criminallaw,thelawcannottakechancesasintheareaoffreespeech.

Theoverbreadthandvaguenessdoctrinesthenhavespecialapplicationonlytofreespeech
cases.Theyareinaptfortestingthevalidityofpenalstatutes.AstheU.S.SupremeCourtputit,in
anopinionbyChiefJusticeRehnquist,"wehavenotrecognizedan'overbreadth'doctrineoutside
thelimitedcontextoftheFirstAmendment."[16]InBroadrickv.Oklahoma,[17]theCourtruledthat
"claimsoffacialoverbreadthhavebeenentertainedincasesinvolvingstatuteswhich,bytheir
terms,seektoregulateonlyspokenwords"and,again,that"overbreadthclaims,ifentertainedat
all,havebeencurtailedwheninvokedagainstordinarycriminallawsthataresoughttobeapplied
toprotectedconduct."Forthisreason,ithasbeenheldthat"afacialchallengetoalegislativeactis
themostdifficultchallengetomountsuccessfully,sincethechallengermustestablishthatnosetof
circumstancesexistsunderwhichtheActwouldbevalid."[18]Asforthevaguenessdoctrine,itis
saidthatalitigantmaychallengeastatuteonitsfaceonlyifitisvagueinallitspossible
applications."Aplaintiffwhoengagesinsomeconductthatisclearlyproscribedcannotcomplain
ofthevaguenessofthelawasappliedtotheconductofothers." [19]

Insum,thedoctrinesofstrictscrutiny,overbreadth,andvaguenessareanalyticaltoolsdeveloped
fortesting"ontheirfaces"statutesinfreespeechcasesor,astheyarecalledinAmericanlaw,First
Amendmentcases.Theycannotbemadetodoservicewhenwhatisinvolvedisacriminal
statute.Withrespecttosuchstatute,theestablishedruleisthat"onetowhomapplicationofa
statuteisconstitutionalwillnotbeheardtoattackthestatuteonthegroundthatimpliedlyitmight
alsobetakenasapplyingtootherpersonsorothersituationsinwhichitsapplicationmightbe
unconstitutional."[20]Ashasbeenpointedout,"vaguenesschallengesintheFirstAmendment
context,likeoverbreadthchallengestypicallyproducefacialinvalidation,whilestatutesfound
vagueasamatterofdueprocesstypicallyareinvalidated[only]'asapplied'toaparticular
defendant."[21]Consequently,thereisnobasisforpetitioner'sclaimthatthisCourtreviewtheAnti
PlunderLawonitsfaceandinitsentirety.

Indeed,"onitsface"invalidationofstatutesresultsinstrikingthemdownentirelyontheground
thattheymightbeappliedtopartiesnotbeforetheCourtwhoseactivitiesareconstitutionally
protected.[22]Itconstitutesadeparturefromthecaseandcontroversyrequirementofthe
Constitutionandpermitsdecisionstobemadewithoutconcretefactualsettingsandinsterile
abstractcontexts.[23]But,astheU.S.SupremeCourtpointedoutinYoungerv.Harris[24]

[T]hetaskofanalyzingaproposedstatute,pinpointingitsdeficiencies,andrequiringcorrectionof
thesedeficienciesbeforethestatuteisputintoeffect,israrelyifeveranappropriatetaskforthe
judiciary.Thecombinationoftherelativeremotenessofthecontroversy,theimpactonthe
legislativeprocessofthereliefsought,andaboveallthespeculativeandamorphousnatureofthe
requiredlinebylineanalysisofdetailedstatutes,...ordinarilyresultsinakindofcasethatis
whollyunsatisfactoryfordecidingconstitutionalquestions,whicheverwaytheymightbedecided.

Forthesereasons,"onitsface"invalidationofstatuteshasbeendescribedas"manifestlystrong
medicine,"tobeemployed"sparinglyandonlyasalastresort,"[25]andisgenerallydisfavored.[26]In
determiningtheconstitutionalityofastatute,therefore,itsprovisionswhichareallegedtohave
beenviolatedinacasemustbeexaminedinthelightoftheconductwithwhichthedefendantis
charged.[27]

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real.Ambiguity, where none
exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the
want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with
reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of
what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be
aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of
which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound
constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the
point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and
deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In
that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is
highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give
fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information
charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest
partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function
and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because
they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad
faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense
penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same
Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

Theword'unwarranted'isnotuncertain.Itseemslackingadequateorofficialsupport;unjustified;
unauthorized(Webster,ThirdInternationalDictionary,p.2514);orwithoutjustificationor
adequatereason(PhiladelphiaNewspapers,Inc.v.USDept.ofJustice,C.D.Pa.,405F.Supp.8,
12,citedinWordsandPhrases,PermanentEdition,Vol.43A1978,CumulativeAnnualPocket
Part,p.19).

TheassailedprovisionsoftheAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesActconsideracorruptpracticeand
makeunlawfultheactofthepublicofficerin:
xxxorgivinganyprivatepartyanyunwarrantedbenefits,advantageorpreferenceinthedischarge
ofhisofficial,administrativeorjudicialfunctionsthroughmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithor
grossinexcusablenegligence,xxx(Section3[e],Rep.Act3019,asamended).

Itisnotatalldifficulttocomprehendthatwhattheaforequotedpenalprovisionspenalizeistheact
ofapublicofficer,inthedischargeofhisofficial,administrativeorjudicialfunctions,ingivingany
privatepartybenefits,advantageorpreferencewhichisunjustified,unauthorizedorwithout
justificationoradequatereason,throughmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithorgrossinexcusable
negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the
term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its
primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate
to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts
constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing
unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC.4.RuleofEvidence.Forpurposesofestablishingthecrimeofplunder,itshallnotbe
necessarytoproveeachandeverycriminalactdonebytheaccusedinfurtheranceofthescheme
orconspiracytoamass,accumulateoracquireillgottenwealth,itbeingsufficienttoestablish
beyondreasonabledoubtapatternofovertorcriminalactsindicativeoftheoverallunlawful
schemeorconspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. [29] The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is
indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is
critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going
about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has
acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. [30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and
Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are
elucidating -

DELIBERATIONSOFTHEHOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVESONRA7080,9October1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated
in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say,
by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is
malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For
 example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of
pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the
conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the
prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the
offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount
is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of
bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1
million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on
the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need
to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the
amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration
the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will
sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these
transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring
supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum
of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of
doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a
dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable
doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in
the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is
charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need notprove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least
two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating,
acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of
the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no
other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to
prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a
very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of
plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying
Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts
complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not
plunder.
 JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without
applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for
violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are
concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder
and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of
them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC.4.RuleofEvidence
.Forpurposesofestablishingthecrimeofplunderxxxx
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of
the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive
law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4
is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the
provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can
supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -

Sec.7.SeparabilityofProvisions.IfanyprovisionsofthisActortheapplicationthereoftoany
personorcircumstanceisheldinvalid,theremainingprovisionsofthisActandtheapplicationof
suchprovisionstootherpersonsorcircumstancesshallnotbeaffectedthereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the
nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions
thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of
the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which
requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

xxxPreciselybecausetheconstitutivecrimesaremalainsetheelementofmensreamustbe
proveninaprosecutionforplunder.Itisnoteworthythattheamendedinformationallegesthatthe
crimeofplunderwascommitted"willfully,unlawfullyandcriminally."Itthusallegesguilty
knowledgeonthepartofpetitioner.
Insupportofhiscontentionthatthestatuteeliminatestherequirementofmensreaandthatisthe
reasonheclaimsthestatuteisvoid,petitionercitesthefollowingremarksofSenatorTaadamade
duringthedeliberationonS.B.No.733:

SENATORTAADA...Andtheevidencethatwillberequiredtoconvicthimwouldnotbe
evidenceforeachandeveryindividualcriminalactbutonlyevidencesufficienttoestablishthe
conspiracyorschemetocommitthiscrimeofplunder. [33]

However,SenatorTaadawasdiscussing4asshownbythesucceedingportionofthetranscript
quotedbypetitioner:

SENATORROMULO:And,Mr.President,theGentlemanfeelsthatitiscontainedinSection4,
RuleofEvidence,which,intheGentleman'sview,wouldprovideforaspeedierandfasterprocess
ofattendingtothiskindofcases?

SENATORTAADA:Yes,Mr.President...[34]

SenatorTaadawasonlysayingthatwherethechargeisconspiracytocommitplunder,the
prosecutionneednotproveeachandeverycriminalactdonetofurthertheschemeorconspiracy,it
beingenoughifitprovesbeyondreasonabledoubtapatternofovertorciminalactsindicativeof
theoverallunlawfulschemeorconspiracy.Asfarastheactsconstitutingthepatternareconcerned,
however,theelementsofthecrimemustbeprovedandtherequisitemensreamustbeshown.

Indeed,2providesthat

Anypersonwhoparticipatedwiththesaidpublicofficerinthecommissionofanoffense
contributingtothecrimeofplundershalllikewisebepunishedforsuchoffense.Intheimposition
ofpenalties,thedegreeofparticipationandtheattendanceofmitigatingandextenuating
circumstances,asprovidedbytheRevisedPenalCode,shallbeconsideredbythecourt.

TheapplicationofmitigatingandextenuatingcircumstancesintheRevisedPenalCodeto
prosecutionsundertheAntiPlunderLawindicatesquiteclearlythatmensreaisanelementof
plundersincethedegreeofresponsibilityoftheoffenderisdeterminedbyhiscriminalintent.Itis
truethat2refersto"anypersonwhoparticipateswiththesaidpublicofficerinthecommissionof
anoffensecontributingtothecrimeofplunder."Thereisnoreasontobelieve,however,thatitdoes
notapplyaswelltothepublicofficerasprincipalinthecrime.AsJusticeHolmessaid:"Weagree
toallthegeneralitiesaboutnotsupplyingcriminallawswithwhattheyomit,butthereisnocanon
againstusingcommonsenseinconstruinglawsassayingwhattheyobviouslymean." [35]

Finally,anydoubtastowhetherthecrimeofplunderisamaluminsemustbedeemedtohave
beenresolvedintheaffirmativebythedecisionofCongressin1993toincludeitamongthe
heinouscrimespunishablebyreclusionperpetuatodeath.Otherheinouscrimesarepunishedwith
deathasastraightpenaltyinR.A.No.7659.Referringtothesegroupsofheinouscrimes,thisCourt
heldinPeoplev.Echegaray:[36]
Theevilofacrimemaytakevariousforms.Therearecrimesthatare,bytheirverynature,
despicable,eitherbecauselifewascallouslytakenorthevictimistreatedlikeananimalandutterly
dehumanizedastocompletelydisruptthenormalcourseofhisorhergrowthasahuman
being....Seeninthislight,thecapitalcrimesofkidnappingandseriousillegaldetentionfor
ransomresultinginthedeathofthevictimorthevictimisraped,tortured,orsubjectedto
dehumanizingacts;destructivearsonresultingindeath;anddrugoffensesinvolvingminorsor
resultinginthedeathofthevictiminthecaseofothercrimes;aswellasmurder,rape,
parricide,infanticide,kidnappingandseriousillegaldetention,wherethevictimisdetainedfor
morethanthreedaysorseriousphysicalinjurieswereinflictedonthevictimorthreatstokillhim
weremadeorthevictimisaminor,robberywithhomicide,rapeorintentionalmutilation,
destructivearson,andcarnappingwheretheowner,driveroroccupantofthecarnappedvehicleis
killedorraped,whicharepenalizedbyreclusionperpetuatodeath,areclearlyheinousbytheir
verynature.

Therearecrimes,however,inwhichtheabominationliesinthesignificanceandimplicationsof
thesubjectcriminalactsintheschemeofthelargersociopoliticalandeconomiccontextinwhich
thestatefindsitselftobestrugglingtodevelopandprovideforitspoorandunderprivileged
masses.Reelingfromdecadesofcorrupttyrannicalrulethatbankruptedthegovernmentand
impoverishedthepopulation,thePhilippineGovernmentmustmusterthepoliticalwilltodismantle
thecultureofcorruption,dishonesty,greedandsyndicatedcriminalitythatsodeeplyentrenched
itselfinthestructuresofsocietyandthepsycheofthepopulace.[Withthegovernment]terribly
lackingthemoneytoprovideeventhemostbasicservicestoitspeople,anyformof
misappropriationormisapplicationofgovernmentfundstranslatestoanactualthreattothevery
existenceofgovernment,andinturn,theverysurvivalofthepeopleitgovernsover.Viewedinthis
context,nolessheinousaretheeffectsandrepercussionsofcrimeslikequalifiedbribery,
destructivearsonresultingindeath,anddrugoffensesinvolvinggovernmentofficials,employees
orofficers,thattheirperpetratorsmustnotbeallowedtocausefurtherdestructionanddamageto
society.

ThelegislativedeclarationinR.A.No.7659thatplunderisaheinousoffenseimpliesthatitis
amaluminse.Forwhentheactspunishedareinherentlyimmoralorinherentlywrong,they
aremalainse[37]anditdoesnotmatterthatsuchactsarepunishedinaspeciallaw,especiallysince
inthecaseofplunderthepredicatecrimesaremainlymalainse.Indeed,itwouldbeabsurdtotreat
prosecutionsforplunderasthoughtheyaremereprosecutionsforviolationsoftheBouncingCheck
Law(B.P.Blg.22)orofanordinanceagainstjaywalking,withoutregardtotheinherentwrongness
oftheacts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the
archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid
stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an
integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places
which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in
the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the
coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated,
extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder
Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked,
will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The
Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and
thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national
importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the
highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing
saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to
the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the
midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Rudy G. Agravate for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The validity of a warrantless search on the person of petitioner is put into issue in this case.

On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of
the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but
his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver
with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade, 3 and two
(2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the
course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the
prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty
and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged as
follows:
 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court , finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged.

It appearing that the accuse d was below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the commission of
the offense (Art. 68, par. 2), he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN
(10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5) months and Eleven
(11) days of Reclusion Temporal, and to pay the costs.

The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in favor of the government and the
Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn over said items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom,
Davao City. 5

Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision
was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner. 6

Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or search and
seizure, the items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against
him.

The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that
under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that
the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)

From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or
private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.

The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or
had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police
officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance
with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree.

At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to
flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know
what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.

However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as
follows:

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without
a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his light against unlawful search and seizure, is
not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right
against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings
in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions
which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community. (Emphasis supplied).

Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search
thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in
the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after
they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
much too late.

In People vs. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court held as follows:

. . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not
argue that there are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.

The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor General:

The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose
object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the case
of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men repeatedly walked past a store window
and returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the suspicion
of a police officer. To the experienced officer, the behaviour of the men indicated that they were
sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When the police officer approached the men and asked
them for their names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him
around and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to the other two and
found another weapon. In the prosecution for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the
defense of illegal search and seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held that "a
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for
the purpose of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to
make an arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his
shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more information. . . .

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986

JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL
COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE, respondents.
CRUZ, J:

Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution. As we can do no
less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do annul.

One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own
house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their
fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This
was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.

That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues
to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right
after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal
son returning.

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence shag be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require otherwise.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the
military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently
enjoined.

The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The petitioner's house was searched
two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum
4
revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.

To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some other
authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No less important, there
must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and
indiscriminate use of the warrant. 5

Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific offense. 7

The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional
Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federa Constitution of the United States
which served as our model it was then already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless,
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal
and it was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the Convention. 8

Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:

SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him.

The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with the above rule, but
this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of the complainant's two witnesses in addition to
the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.

Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:

The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search
warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their respective affidavits taken
by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col.
Maximo Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine
Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the
same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before me. 10

By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because "the application was not yet subscribed and
swom to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been
completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited
himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the
record, together with the affidavit presented to him.

As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he niay produce and attach
them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it wifl be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering
that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses
whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and
not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is
to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify
the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the apphcant's
claims. 14

Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant
himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit
but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 15

A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be
"intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits,
except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge.
Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a
follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own
suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.

The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw eight men deliver
arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open
18
window of the house while he was near the gate. He could even positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber
revolvers. 19

One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even
as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second
floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the
witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they
were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant
sought was issued forthwith.

The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues
that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested
his conformity in writing. 20

We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the
petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search
they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial
writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case, 21 the manifestation merely of our
traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that
the petitioner could not resist.

The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized from the petitioner
were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military authorities even without a warrant.
Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the
Wegal articles could be taken even without a warrant.

Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there
was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner.
In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to be there and therefore had no
right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per
se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized
simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military
authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without
bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves
recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of
possessing.

It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and articles may be
taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful
arrest,22 as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected
23 24
at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally
25
removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to
26
be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and
hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. 27

Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot
even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought
and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are
protected by the exclusionary principle.

Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While
conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go free because "the constable has
blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand's
justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by
their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "

The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action against
him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the said articles must remain
in custodia legis.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the
search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos,
"this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of
the constitutional issues raised. 28

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby declared null
and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr and Paras, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal
Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates, 3 a
total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed
to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules
of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered
to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and
prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be
rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of
the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and
things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate
to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by
one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional
rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if
any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows,
therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was
taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned
resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid
or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and
things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein. 1wph1.t

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged
in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this
Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded
by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as
well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches
and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the
opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American
common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to
an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times
the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no
longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by
their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches
and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only
 courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that
all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion
as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the
assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and
underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard
as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the
amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we
have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of
the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to
when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of
the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd,
Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily
that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of
the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy
embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer
permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at
the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to
find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction,
is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners
allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in
said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the
corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts
of federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in
their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of
June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit
the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits
or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain
either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and
the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of
the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our
opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962,
are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents,
papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion
for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and
the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the
deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants
and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were
consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared,
abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and void
the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal
standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than
 the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other places and
as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph
(numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants
served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under
the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down
the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without
exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and
indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or
otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures
made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void,
and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of
the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the
petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and
effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional
provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and
effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of
documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or
constructive of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search
warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against
the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three
corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also
the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all
the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be
made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the
petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives
them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of
seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the
defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of
corporation of which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in
an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books
seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683
(10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the
constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth
Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when
he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he
puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be
secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment
could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have
come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the
protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring
countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the
Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S.
vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have
standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for
reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or
indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club;
Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices
(IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the
papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned
the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the
premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the
books, papers and affects seized therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the
searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly
technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that
it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in
evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped
by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration
has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability
Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions
such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman
vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized
in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a
Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved
for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the
corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate
documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
 The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation's was
entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar,
the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the
suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles seize had the
necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S.
461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may
expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of
the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in
1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere
guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected
him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone
legitimately on premise where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution
against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650,
652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First
he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the premises
searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had
seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal
Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not
show ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade
premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police
officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim
ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that
the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving
defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his
files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically
in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court
rejected the contention, holding that

Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and
papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere
procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs.
United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C.
S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn,
was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at
his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and
management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books
and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type
records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held
that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the
return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra,
pointed out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively
against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first
search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant
was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was
the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters
not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl.
D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal from this
decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many
personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the
searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of
documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection
with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were
directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the
petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their
personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their
residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners
in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the
corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful
searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were
they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or
possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in
securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things
are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued
the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to
move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions,
the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of
their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.

Claro M. Recto for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma. Veloso,
guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252 of the Penal Code, and
sentencing him to four months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties, to pay a fine
of P200, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The errors
assigned by counsel for the accused as appellant, go to the proposition that the resistance of the police was
justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant.

In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as
the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the
Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.

The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a
gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club
and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of
Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the
police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned.
They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman
Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by
Townsend, broke in the outer door.

Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the
defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso
read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to
search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging,
as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five
minutes was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on
searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.

At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his
resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured
the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down
on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his
pockets.

All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to obey
and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the policemen to conduct him
downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol
wagon. 1awph!l.net

In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling. All of them
were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole exception of Veloso, who was
found guilty of maintaining a gambling house. This case reached the appellate court where the accused was finally
sentenced to pay a fine of P500. (No. 22163. 1 )

The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge, the Honorable Vicente
Nepomuceno. Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to impugn these findings, except that he stresses certain
points as more favorable to the case of his client. The defense, as previously indicated, is planted squarely on the
contention that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John
Doe was used, Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force. The nature of this defense makes it advisable to
set forth further facts, relating particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.

There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for search warrant, and the search
warrant. The application reads:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant.

APPLICATION FOR (G)

SEARCH WARRANT

Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduo, Judge, Municipal Court, Manila.

Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:

Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? A. Andres Geronimo, No. 47 Revellin,
detective.

Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of W. C., City of Manila?
A. Yes. sir.

Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? A. I do not know. According to the best of my
information the house is occupied by John Doe.

Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? A. It has been reported to me by a
person whom I consider to be reliable that in said premises there are instruments and devices used
in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in
prohibited games kept. It has been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that
there are or there will be gambling conducted in said premises. The aforesaid premises are known
as gambling house. I have watched the foregoing premises and believed it to be a gambling house
and a place where instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips,
lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games are kept.

I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing questions and
answers and that I find the same to correct and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO

 Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUO Judge, Municipal Court

The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the search warrant alone. This
document reads:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,

vs.

JOHN DOE, Defendant.

SEARCH WARRANT (G)

The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the

Police Force of the City of Manila.

GREETING:

Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he has good reason to
believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him and
which is under his control, namely in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines
Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards,
chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with the game commonly
known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects with the illegal
and criminal intention of using them in violation of the Gambling Law.

Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within ten (10) days on or
after this date to make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the house situated at No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and if you
find the same or any part thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law.

Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUO
Judge, Municipal Court

Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the Philippine Bill of Rights, as found
in the present Organic Act, the security of the dwelling and the person is guaranteed. The organic act provides "that
the right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." It further provides "that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import although naturally entering
more into detail. It is therein provided, among other things, that "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable
cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person of
thing to be seized." (Section 97.) After the judge or justice shall have examined on oath the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce, and shall have taken their depositions in writing (section 98), and after the judge or
justice is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to
believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant which must be substantially in the following form:

. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of ............................, or in
the house situated ...................................... (describing it or any other place to be searched with reasonable
particularity, as the case may be) for the following property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a
person charged with a crime may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the crime. (Section 105).

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which
it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a description of process
known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such
intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed strictly
without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be
invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24 R. C. L., pp. 711, et seq.; Reed vs.
Rice [1829], 2 J. J. Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith vs. McDuffee [1914], 72 Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D,
947.)

The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that there are material
differences between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to John Doe search warrants we propose
to take into consideration the authorities relied upon by the appellant, thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs.
Villareal ([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where the regularity of the issuance of the search warrant was also questioned.

In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted from Wharton's Criminal Procedure.
In that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth Edition, is found the following:

Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is
unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him
when found.

xxx xxx xxx

Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party to be apprehended is
void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify
the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the essential
requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about blank warrants, that a warrant
for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard
Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to
 be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in
addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be
apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon
whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his
occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.

Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the other hand, the
apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such circumstances it is not necessary
that a warrant should have been issued.

The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the United States Supreme Court, is
the case of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). It there appeared that one Peaslee had made
a complaint to the police court Lee, charging that "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your
complainant unknown," had committed an assault and battery upon him; upon which complaint a warrant was
issued against "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown, named in the
foregoing complaint." Neither the complaint nor the warrant contained any further description or means of
identification of the person to be arrested. Crotty resisted the arrest upon the ground that the warrant was invalid.
Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow, as the organ of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, said:

We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest one of the defendant at
the time of the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. It did not contain the name of the defendant, nor
any description or designation by which he could be known and identified as the person against whom it was
issued. It was in effect a general warrant, upon which any other individual might as well have been arrested,
as being included in the description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary to elementary
principles, and in direct violation of the constitutional right of the citizen, as set forth in the Declaration of
Rights, article 14, which declares that every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches
and seizures of his person, and that all warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the order in the
warrant to a civil officer to arrest one or more suspected persons or to seize their property be not
accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest or seizure. This is in fact
only a declaration of an ancient common law right. It was always necessary to express the name or give
some description of a party to be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank, and
without other designation of the person to be arrested, it was void. (1 Hale P. C. 577. 2 Ib. 119. Foster, 312.
7 Dane Ab. 248. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow., 332, and cases cited.)

This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose name is
unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be arrested is to be given in the
warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation, his
personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other circumstances by which he can
be identified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40.)

The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the person on whom he
attempted to serve it. He acted without warrant and was a trespasser. The defendant whom he sought to
arrest had a right to resist by force, using no more than was necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the
officer . . .

The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrant in question, if they
were guilty of no improper or excessive force or violence, did not do an unlawful act by lawful means, or a
lawful act by unlawful means, and so could not be convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which they
are charged in the indictment.
Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law, constitutional and statutory,
requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the application "particularly" describe the person to be
seized. A failure thus to name the person is fatal to the validity of the search warrant. To justify search and arrest,
the process must be legal. Illegal official action may be forcibly resisted.

For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney-General, and as the law was
summarized by the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logical reflection brings forth certain points of
paramount force and exercising a decisive influence. We will now make mention of them by correlating the facts and
the law.

In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be
searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a
sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended. (Steele vs. U. S. [1925], U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed., 757). The police
officers were accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied by the
so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a
prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has been held that an officer
making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person, which was used
in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the
means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not
otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.)

Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search warrant, the
affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be seized. But the affidavit and
the search warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him, and
which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten
that the Organic Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus, and, in
addition, contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by the appellant, it is
invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases
where it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The description
must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the search
warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124
Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police
could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.

Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club purposes. It was not
the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the law carefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a
club partially public in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged club with a high sounding name calculated to
mislead the police, but intended for nefarious practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the home, there
would commonly be varying occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose names would be
unknown to the police.

It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his family or his dwelling, a man has
a right to employ all necessary violence. But even in the home, and much less so in a club or public place, the
person sought to be arrested or to be searched should use no more force than is necessary to repel the unlawful act
of the officers. To authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly
manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. There was no case for excessive violence to enforce
the defendant's idea of a debatable legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra; People vs. Chan Fook [1921],
42 Phil., 230; 3 Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)

The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently identified therein.
Mention was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or information, permitting a fictitious
name to be inserted in the complaint or information, in lieu of the true name. The Attorney-General adds to this the
argument that the police were authorized to arrest without a warrant since a crime was being committed. We find it
unnecessary to comment on this contention.

John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. The police should
not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of
conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference.

We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that the search warrant
was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of
the agents of the authority.

The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was a member of the House of
Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this allegation in relation with the facts as an aggravating
circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly. We doubt, however, that advantage was taken by the
offender of his public position when he resisted the officers of the law. The offender did not necessarily make use of
the prestige of his office as a means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would
have resisted the police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty, accordingly, falls within
the medium of that provided by the Penal Code.

Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as made by the trial judge, and
concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, it results that the judgment appealed from
must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole modification that the defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to
two months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the costs of this instance against him. Let the
corresponding order to carry this judgment into effect issue.

Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Villa-Real, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F.
APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS
ALTUNA, respondents.

Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated. The
three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.

1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused
of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison,
et al." She was then still at large.

2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group
(CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of
petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen
issued against NOLASCO.

3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The
stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however,
respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6th.

4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from
respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No.
239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA."
AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.

In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:

(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque,
Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was
Branch 88.

(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno
to Judge Pao.

(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by
Judge Pao but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal
knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA
and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for
rebellion. 1

5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:

(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party presumably
without a warrant of arrest.

(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2
wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3

(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was made in
the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was made
that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by the two
Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before
the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."

(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal
Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.

(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE
and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.

7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying, inter
alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases that are
presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5

(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return, which
AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to
the Search Warrant.

(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall
be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."

8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying
that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the
Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity
of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware of the
Order of Judge Pao of December 13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued
by respondent RTC Judge Pao; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain
Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress.

This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or their duly
authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.

The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does
not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has
not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness. The
respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be
entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant
with the issuing Judge.

We find merit in the Petition.

Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things
to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:

Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army
and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups,
Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise
available to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding
the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive
or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as
to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they
should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a
general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be
seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
being too general. Thus:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives
and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement. 6

The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were described as
'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other subversive
materials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to the search team as to what articles
might be lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than, the
description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of Staff"which this Court
declared null and void for being too general. 7

In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the seizure of printed
copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies
subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing
and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all
conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The
search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally
objectionable. 8

The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for Search
Warrant.

Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col.
Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your
answer in this deposition?

(The deposition instead)

A Yes, sir,

Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?

A Almost a month, sir.

 Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?

A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.

Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for search
warrant?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?

A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many
suspicious persons with documents.

Q What kind of documents do you refer to?

A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's Army.

Q What else?

A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front,
Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines ...

Q And may include what else?

A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these
groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public and support money from foreign and
local sources. 9

The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant
thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching
questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in the
Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and
merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. 11

Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant is with the
Court that issued it instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records show, however, that petitioners
did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact, they
already questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even during the inquest
investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress
on December 12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially,
therefore, while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search
Warrant.

Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be
advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is
initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more
substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right
to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.

Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an
invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE.
Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:

Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.

The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who
had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest
was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the
search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of
general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises
which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's
interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13

Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the
warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the
general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are
of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search
warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order.

Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the
Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission
No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.

WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani
Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from
introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case hereby made
permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction
as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to
petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all
irrelevant documents and articles.

SO ORDERED.

Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo concur.

Makasiar, C.J., concurs in the result.

Aquino, J.; took no part.

Concepcion Jr., J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT.
CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA:
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,

vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT.
JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO
AROJADO, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p

Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the
petitions, with the following dispositive part:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs.
Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00. No costs.

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule as
many misunderstood it to do that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is
a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual
situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in
this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected
representative of the people not the Court that should repeal, change or modify them.

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without
warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113
(Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons
arrested;

2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of
the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the
time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility
of extrajudicial admissions;

4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners
under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore,
the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be
ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering
decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance
with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such
arrests also in accordance with law.

There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo
without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which
read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified
it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when
arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization,
where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,
and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of
organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST,
simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of
several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2)
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his
mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot
or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense
that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and
rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in
the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of
Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a
valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the
arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is
the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based
on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest. 11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital,
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the
information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who
murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before
a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the
wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of
Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna. 12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit")
was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was
based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly
in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31 January 1988,
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including
Dural; second a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie
Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality
Rolando Dural.

In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action
and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential
information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and
hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who
make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the
same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The
records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear
that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information
charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as
distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.

As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R.
Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were
searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives
and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that
a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby
placing them within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas
corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in
the custody of the authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the
operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato
Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila
was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house was placed under
military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a
search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could
not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications
equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16

2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he
was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra
who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the
military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said
house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were
found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one
Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the
court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive
documents in the car of Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which
compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military
authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were
being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato
Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was
true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant
was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person
named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession
were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were
unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as
their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former
comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural,
the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque
house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons
(Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better for
the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of
official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and
judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and
to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest
without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace
and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section
5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for
which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of
their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be
innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting
officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of
certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay
Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he
said, among other things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on
22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November
1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the
perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech
guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the
merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was
uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were
uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes
difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the
arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For Espiritu had
before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this
development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case
against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was
killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28
December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December
1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made
only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28
December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the
killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and
despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted
several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging
Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No.
731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the
trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-
accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso
Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear
the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that
the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed
against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of
said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably
because of the strength of the evidence against him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against
them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by
factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or
whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is
pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an
extrajudicial admission.

In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia
Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA,
as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again,
these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which
the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons
arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already
guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or
innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of
the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court
finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where
national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What
is important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court.
will promptly look into and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same the legality of the arrest
without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution,
are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee
shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted
or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a
subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity
of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on
compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for
stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records
show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to
some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is
FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188611

Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.

BELEN MARIACOS, Promulgated:

Appellant.
June 16, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos
guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7,

2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed
as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of

San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3,
(sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit
or authority from the proper government agency or office.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During
the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:

1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information
as Belen Mariacos;

2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;

3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted
from a passenger jeepney;

4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused
contained in two (2) bags were submitted for examination to the
Crime Lab;
 5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug
submitted for examination gave positive result for the presence of
marijuana;

6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and
submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;

7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by

the accused; and

8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the

accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena
Carino.

During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel,
La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept
a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La
Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc (PO2
Pallayoc), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not
yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed
to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).

At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a
secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage
of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for
the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic
bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc
then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle
was in motion, he found the black backpack with an O.K. marking and peeked inside
its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then
asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no
one knew.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the
other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from
atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3)
other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2)
women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told
them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.

PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-
appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the
investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags.
When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and
 three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of
marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper,
were recovered.

Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated

marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination
showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.

When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that:

On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with
Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the
jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang (Lao-
ang), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of
the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded later when she
was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion,
Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and
then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them,
arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station. When
they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police
station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the bags which she was
asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that she did
not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a
Counter-Affidavit.[3]

On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged
and sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00.

The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court
personnel and media.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering
the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.[5] She claimed that her right against
an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter
searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from
her. She averred that PO2 Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she
was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended
that there was no probable cause for her arrest.[6]

Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.
[7]
She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes
the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses,
and articles. The said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the
same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her
representative, who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with
this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items allegedly
confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items
allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over
the same.

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that
the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal,
[8]
justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground
to believe that appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on
reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and
smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.[9] The OSG also argued that appellant was now
estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of not
guilty upon arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence. [10] The OSG
brushed aside appellants argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and
inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that
physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending team, whichever was practicable.[11]

In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision in toto.[12] It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried
away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the police, contained
dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and
conveying the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants warrantless
arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:

It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags
when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper.
That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified
destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to
 whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying the bags,
PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-
appellant.

xxxx

Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of
the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop
the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation
of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.

Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has
been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no
avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly
as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search
of a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be
expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which
were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have
been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.[13]

Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.

Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States agents to conduct
searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on searches and
seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining which are proper and which
are not.

Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence
used against her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was
flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.

Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been
probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

 Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid.
These are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now

Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14]

Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search
was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
 Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.[15]

In People v. Bagista,[16] the Court said:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits

of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in
plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to

conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the

requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure
must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable
cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
[17]
Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person
arrested.[18]

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.[19]

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officers making the arrest.[20]

Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders
on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity.[21]

This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the
search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to
obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor
vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant
must be sought.[22]

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The
vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to
make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant
before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the
vehicle before the same left for its destination.

It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants arrest, the
police received information that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang,
and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27,
2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who
informed him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for
the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the packages allegedly
containing illegal drugs.

This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense without a search warrant. [23]
 For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although,
generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions
therefor, to wit:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. [24]

Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest
can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.[25]

Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also valid.

Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:

SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
 The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor
and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to
a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no
consequence.

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs,

the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated
marijuana is not necessary.[26]

Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of
criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged
is malum prohibitum, as in this case.[27] Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug,
without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.[28]

Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their
violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn
behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public order.[29]

Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to another.[30] There
is no definitive moment when an accused transports a prohibited drug. When the circumstances
establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should
be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. [31] The fact that there is actual
conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is
immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.[32]

Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the
disputable presumption[33] that she is the owner of the packages and their contents. [34] Appellant
failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had
prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.

Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely
asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the
packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang
ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have
ran after him to give him the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey
without knowing where they were taking the bags.

Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In
particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the
custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of
all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus
delicti of that crime.[35]
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition
of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and

control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
 physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.

PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the
police station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags
seized from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the
other police officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper,
while the plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting
tops.[36] PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same.
Then the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not
accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present.
However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not
fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.[37]

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was immediately
brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor
who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to
the police crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to appellants claim, the
prosecutions evidence establishes the chain of custody from the time of

appellants arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for
non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellants arrest was
illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown
because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her
during the trial.[38] Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21,
appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the
quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have
waived any objection on the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain
of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.
Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are
presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.[39]

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her conviction must be
affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.
SECOND DIVISION

ELENITA C. FAJARDO, G.R. No. 190889

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. January 10, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
 At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the February 10, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed with modification the August 29, 2006 decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner guilty of violating Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1866, as amended.

The facts:

Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D.
No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as follows:

That on or about the 28 th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority
of law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control two (2) receivers
of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and
Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short
magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16
ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45
ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from their
possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial
Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office, Kalibo,
Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive
Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan. [3]

When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. [4] During
pre-trial, they agreed to the following stipulation of facts:

1. The search warrant subject of this case exists;

2. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search warrant in this
case who is a resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo,
Aklan;

3. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the evening of
August 27, 2002 but does not live therein;

4. Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;

 5. The search warrant was served in the house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the
morning of August 28, 2002; and

6. The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested immediately upon
the arrival of the military personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw
them in possession of a firearm in the evening of August 27, 2002.[5]

As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the CA, [6] these are the chain
of events that led to the filing of the information:

In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special
Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent
Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens
residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay
Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were
indiscriminately firing guns.

Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the
PISOG proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered
and ran in different directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols.
He fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of petitioner.

Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of
her shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioners house but,
in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the house
as they waited for further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner
went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the police troops. No agreement
materialized.

At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio
Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice
on top of the house and throw something. The discarded objects landed near the wall of
petitioners house and inside the compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together
with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter of RMN
DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2) receivers
of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN) 763025, and model no.
M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items were then surrendered to
SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and
obtaining a search warrant.
 The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with
a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, the police
team proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found and was able to confiscate the
following:

1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;

2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.

Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to
possess the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for
violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against
them.

For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search
warrant was defective because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by
SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal knowledge. They quoted this pertinent portion of the
application:

That this application was founded on confidential information received by the

Provincial Director, Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza. [7]

They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since petitioner,
who was inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to accompany the policemen
as they explored the place, but was instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala).

Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt
prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito
Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the
raiding team arrived. She averred that such situation was implausible because she was wearing
garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse.[8]

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same were already
denied in the Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying
the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders were not
appealed and have thus attained finality. The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio were
estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest since they participated in the trial by
presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they have effectively
waived such irregularities and defects.

In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC explained:

Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having

served with the Philippine Army prior to his separation from his service for going on
absence without leave (AWOL). With his military background, it is safe to conclude
that Zaldy Valerio is familiar with and knowledgeable about different types of
firearms and ammunitions. As a former soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and
disassemble firearms.
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of Elenita Fajardo is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for firearms,
explosives and ammunition. Granting arguendo that those firearms and ammunition
were left behind by Benito Fajardo, a member of the Philippine army, the fact remains
that it is a government property. If it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the
proper place to store those items. The logical explanation is that those items are stolen
property.

xxxx

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of

firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes
not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection
of the thing to ones control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which
the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its
owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law[,] the proprietary concept of
the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.

xxxx

x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is
sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and
without criminal intent.

xxxx

To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under

P.D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably
established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm ammunition or explosive
which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the
 testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the
negative fact that the accused has no license or permit to own or possess the firearm,
ammunition or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or
certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the
accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive (Exhibit
G).

The judicial admission of the accused that they do not have permit or license on
the two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and
model M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition,
5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and
recovered from their possession during the search conducted by members of the
PISOG, Aklan Police Provincial Office by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall
under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. [9]

Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No.
8294, which provides:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high
powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber
and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but
considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other
firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three:
Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied in an Order dated October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with the
CA.

Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its
conclusions of law, and held that the search warrant was void based on the following
observations:

[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have
personal knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as
required by law. For one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that point
during the application. Also, he failed to attach to the application a certification to that
 effect from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x
x, this certification is the best evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed has
no license or permit to possess a firearm. There was also no explanation given why
said certification was not presented, or even deemed no longer necessary, during the
application for the warrant. Such vital evidence was simply ignored. [10]

Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioners residence were declared
inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the
house of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the
plain view doctrine.

Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a

firearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They were
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21)
days to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, and
ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11] but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution
dated December 3, 2009.[12] Hence, the present recourse.

At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against petitioner and
Valerio charged duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, viz.:

Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses.

A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated articles
confiscated from Valerio and petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of Section 1,
P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. [13] Illegal possession of two (2) pieces of short
magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber,
and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45 ammunition is punishable under paragraph 2 of the
said section, viz.:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high
powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38
caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered
firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire
magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of
 two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.[14]

On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol,
model no. M1911A1 US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial
number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which states:

Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of

firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of firearms or ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of
similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.[15]

This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which
categorized the kinds of firearms proscribed from being possessed without a license, according
to their firing power and caliber. R.A. No. 8294 likewise mandated different penalties for illegal
possession of firearm according to the above classification, unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866
which set a standard penalty for the illegal possession of any kind of firearm. Section 1 of the
old law reads:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession

of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis ours.)

By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of firearm should now
particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is classified, and
should there be numerous guns confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped according to
the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer
suffice to lump all of the seized firearms in one information, and state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866
as the violated provision, as in the instant case,[16] because different penalties are imposed by the
law, depending on the caliber of the weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous charges.

Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a quashal, but petitioner
and Valerio failed to raise this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a waiver, and
they could be convicted of as many offenses as there were charged in the information. [17] This
accords propriety to the diverse convictions handed down by the courts a quo.
Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2, Section
1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the search warrant
that led to their confiscation, is now beyond the province of our review since, by virtue of the
CAs Decision, petitioner and Valerio have been effectively acquitted from the said charges. The
present review is consequently only with regard to the conviction for illegal possession of a part
of a firearm.

The Issues

Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers does
not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion was
attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw
the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers recovered by
the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her
shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that petitioner had
knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers.

Our Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were seized in
plain view, hence, admissible.

No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is
encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
 Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the
same article

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence
obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any of the following
circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[18]
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a
right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.[19] It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c)
it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.[20]

Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber
pistol outside petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers
around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen
respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought refuge.
The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law
enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for the policemen to cordon off the house
as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search warrant.

Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances,
Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering
the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe
that the things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of the offense they were then
suspected of committing. Indeed, when subsequently recovered, they turned out to be two (2)
receivers of .45 caliber pistol.
 The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are elucidating:

Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?

A Yes, sir.

Q What were they doing?

A They were cordoning the house.

Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that incident. What did he
tell you?
A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun.

Q And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned is the police officers
were surrounding?
A Yes, sir.

Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to 12:00 oclock the following day.

Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you recall where were
you?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police.

Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?
A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something.

Q And did you see the person who threw something out of this house?
A Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw that something outside
the house?
A It was Zaldy Valerio.

COURT: (to witness)

Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

xxxx

PROS. PERALTA:
Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you do something if any?
A I shouted to seek cover.

xxxx

Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, take cover?
A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of the flashlight on the
place where something was thrown.

Q What did you see if any?

A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.

xxxx

Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of August 28, 2002, do you recall
another unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.

Q And can you tell us what was that incident?

A I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was thrown fell on top of the
roof of another house.

Q And you saw that person who again threw something from the rooftop of the house?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who was that person?

A Zaldy Valerio again.

xxxx

Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something out of the house?
A I was on the road in front of the house.

Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out of the house?
A He was on top of the house.

xxxx

Q Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out?
A Yes, sir.

Q What was that?

A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.

xxxx
Q And what did he tell you?
A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.

xxxx

Q What did you do if any?

A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.

xxxx

Q Who opened the fence for you?

A It was a lady who is the owner of the house.

Q When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you find?
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic) [21]

The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial
discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized
contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer
observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure.

Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. The
liability for their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.

The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal
possession of part of a firearm.
In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches, the
following disquisitions in People v. De Gracia[22] are instructive:

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only
 actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the
thing to one's control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the
law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law
penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a
borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a
person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to
constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of
illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in
which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the
crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the
act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate
the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit
a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of
things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal
intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is
done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a
person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus
possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is,
however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused
may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the
intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is
sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and
without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or
control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the
possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus,
although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus
possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.[23]

Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when
the holder thereof:

(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof

 (2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.[24]

We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject
receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the
house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the
receivers, before or during their disposal.

At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio,
the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners house. Absent any
evidence pointing to petitioners participation, knowledge or consent in Valerios actions, she
cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers.

Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from
the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of
her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption
into concrete evidence.

Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses are
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum
prohibitum by virtue of special law.[25] The quantum of proof required by law was not
adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.

The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband was not identified with sufficient
particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the same with any of the seized
receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio holding two guns when
he and the rest of the PISOG arrived in petitioners house. It is not unlikely then that the
receivers later on discarded were components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.

These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner conspired
with Valerio in committing illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence
indubitably proving that petitioner participated in the decision to commit the criminal act
committed by Valerio.

Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The constitutional presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately overcome by the
evidence adduced by the prosecution.

The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.

 In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not have the
corresponding license for it.[26]

By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must
yield these requisites:

(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and

(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm to
which the seized part/component corresponds.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings United States Property and
the other bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as Exhibits E and E-1,
respectively. They were also identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm parts he retrieved af ter
Valerio discarded them.[27] His testimony was corroborated by DYKR radio announcer Vega,
who witnessed the recovery of the receivers.[28]

Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it was ascertained
that Valerio is not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber of
firearms.[29] To substantiate his statement, he submitted a certification [30] to that effect and
identified the same in court.[31] The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would suffice to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.[32]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo yCastro, who is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013

GEORGE ANTIQUERA Y CODES, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the police officers chance sighting
through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.

The Facts and the Case

On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused George Codes Antiquera * and
Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City in Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM.2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail, the court tried her in absentia.3

The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence
Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were
conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house
number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.

Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men came and
peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter
and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner.
They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves,
and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4

While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an
improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised
scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to
the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing. 5

A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them positive for traces of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.6

Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question, he and Cruz were asleep in their
house when he was roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it, three armed police officers forced themselves
into the house. One of them shoved him and said, Dyan ka lang, pusher ka. He was handcuffed and someone instructed
two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought accused Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and there
informed them of the charges against them. They were shown a box that the police said had been recovered from his house. 7

On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced them to a prison term ranging from six months and one day to two years and four months, and to pay a fine of
P10,000.00 each and the costs of the suit.

The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught accused Antiquera and Cruz in the
act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession. Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio
and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and rejected the self-serving claim of
Antiquera.

The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiqueras claim of illegal arrest, given PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihans credible
testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and Cruz in a pot session at their living room and in possession of
drug paraphernalia. The police officers were thus justified in arresting the two without a warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.9

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision 10 on September 21, 2007 affirming in full the decision of the trial
court. The accused moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it. 11 The accused is now before this Court seeking acquittal.

The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of
possessing drug paraphernalia.

Ruling of the Court

The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid warrantless arrest in that the
police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid
warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize
the paraphernalia they found there.

The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were no doubt used for
smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section
12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime
charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added
that even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question
the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the courts jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.12

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act constituting the crime is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.14
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.

1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David
Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase
to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the
fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for
help from it.

2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood.
Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus,
PO1 Cabutihan testified:
THE COURT:

Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open
door, how was the door open? Was it totally open, or was it partially open?
A It was partially open Your Honor.

Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.

Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door
was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?
A We pushed the door, Your Honor.

xxx

Q Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and
peeped inside it, as a police officer?
A Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may

Q Are you not allowed to Are you not required to get a search warrant before you
can search the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching
the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to
investigate the house, considering your admission that you suspected that there
was something wrong inside the house?
A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.

Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep
through its opening because you did not know what was happening inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera
without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the
house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. 17

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his
conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.18
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21, 2007 and Resolution dated
November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937 and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of
the crime of which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court
further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail bond he posted for his provisional liberty.
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from the January 1 7, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069,
1

affirming in toto the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 127, finding
2

accused-appellant Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta (Calantiao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 in an Information, the pertinent portion of which reads: That on or about the 11th day of November, 2003
3

in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the
same to be a dangerous drug.

The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION

On November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 x x x in the afternoon, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3
EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for police assistance
regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck and traversing
along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to
follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the
passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera
could not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the
incident.

The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano
testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan
City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their
guns towards them (police officers) and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were
subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting
tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiaos companion
[a] .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police investigator at
Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a
black bag with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the
same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.

The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that he personally
saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. He confirmed that he was with PO1 Mariano when they
apprehended said accused and his companion and testified that while PO1 Mariano recovered from the accused a
black bag containing marijuana, on his part, he confiscated from accuseds companion a .38 revolver.

MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects boarded was also presented in open court
and testified as to what he knows about the incident. He confirmed that on that date, two (2) persons boarded on his
taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and ran away.

Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution also offered the following documentary evidence to
boost their charge against the accused:

Exh. "A" Request for Laboratory Examination dated November 12, 2003

Exh. "B" Physical Sciences Report No. D-1423-03 dated November 12, 2003

Exh. "C-1" Picture of First brick of marijuana fruiting tops

Exh. "C-2" Picture of Second brick of marijuana fruiting tops

Exh. "D" Referral Slip dated November 12, 2003

Exh. "E" Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 12, 2003 of PO3 Eduardo Ramirez and
PO1 Nelson Mariano

Exh. "E-1" Their respective signatures

Exh. "F" Sinumpaang Salaysay of Crisendo Amansec (Erroneously marked as Exh. "E")

EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE

The accused offered a different version of the story. According to his testimony, this instant case originated from a
traffic mishap where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost collided with another car.
Reyes then opened the window and made a "fuck you" sign against the persons on board of that car. That prompted
the latter to chase them and when they were caught in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons on
board of that other car alighted and kicked their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the
latter and uttered, "Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba ako kilala?" Said police officer poked his gun
again[st] Reyes and when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes were then handcuffed and
were brought to the police station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and their wallets and money were
taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed them that they will be charged for drugs. A
newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them and said police officer told them that it would be sufficient
evidence against them. They were detained and subjected to medical examination before they were submitted for
inquest at the prosecutors office.
4

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecutions case. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused MEDARIO CALANTIAO y
DIMALANTA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A.
9165, for illegally possessing997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting tops. Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00). 5

In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it was discovered
during a body search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police
officers. Moreover, the RTC found all the elements of the offense to have been duly established by the prosecution. 6

Aggrieved, Calantiao appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, assigning the following errors:
7

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ITEMS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE

ARRESTING OFFICERS PATENT NON-COMPLIANCE WITHTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER
CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.

III

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE

PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THE PROPER CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS. 8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiaos conviction. It found that there was sufficient reason to
justify a warrantless arrest, as the police officers were acting on a legitimate complaint and had a reasonable
suspicion that the persons identified at the scene were the perpetrators of the offense. Likewise, the Court of
Appeals held that the search and subsequent seizure of the marijuana in question was lawful and valid, being
incidental to a lawful arrest. Finding that all the elements of the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to
9

be present and duly proven, the Court of Appeals, on January 17, 2012, promulgated its Decision, affirming in toto
10

the RTCs ruling.

Undaunted, Calantiao is now before this Court praying for an acquittal, adding the following arguments in support of
his position:

First, the plain view doctrine is not an exception to a search incident to a valid warrantless arrest.

xxxx

Second, Calantiao did not waive the inadmissibility of the seized items.
 xxxx

Finally, the seized items custodial chain is broken. 11

In essence, Calantiao is questioning the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession, as evidence against
him on the grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or because its custodial chain was broken.

Ruling of this Court

This Court finds no merit in Calantiaos arguments.

Search and Seizure of

Marijuana valid

This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiaos contention that the marijuana in his possession cannot be admitted as
evidence against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been within the apprehending
officers "plain view."
12

Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting
officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the States police power to
13

protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and
(2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the
integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

In People v. Valeroso, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach of a valid warrantless search
14

and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officers safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer
to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.

Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters reach.
Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the
one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control"
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table
or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested. (Citations omitted.)

In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from him could not be used against him
because they were discovered in a room, different from where he was being detained, and was in a locked cabinet.
Thus, the area searched could not be considered as one within his immediate control that he could take any
weapon or destroy any evidence against him. 15
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiaos possession and within his immediate
control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the
black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiaos possession, it was within the permissible area that the
apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.

Calantiaos argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its discovery was in
violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his immediate control. This is so
because "[o]bjects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as evidence." "The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
16

searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x
x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure." 17

The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation because the police officers purposely
searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in
Calantiaos possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiaos lawful arrest.

Inventory and Chain of

Custody of Evidence

Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the marijuana is still inadmissible as
evidence against him for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the rules on chain of custody, as the
item was marked at the police station. 18

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources
of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources
of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
 (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as
immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 19

Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical inventory, and (2) taking
of photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia : 20

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of
the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same
evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather
than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized
items to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.

The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the police officers
confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which
21

both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized
from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.

Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption
that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome
the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged
their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden. 22

It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his appeal. He himself admits this. His 23

theory, from the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was being framed for having offended the
police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up. However, those defenses have
always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be
concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In
order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the
cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving
assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations. 24

Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers were stirred by
illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,

vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is
essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The
alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the compromise is
there because law enforcers neglect to perform what could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they
pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.

Squarely raised in this appeal is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless arrest. The
1

police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The
information as to the accuseds whereabouts was sent through a text message. The accusedwho never acted
suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was required to be opened
under intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a
reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a
legitimate "stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly,
and without improper pressure or coercion.

The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.

According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan
(PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an
unidentified civilian informer" that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting
2

marijuana" from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
3 4

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr.
5

(SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers
from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1
6

Taracatacs checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
7

passengers who were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later
8
identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while
9

Dayao was holding a yellow bag. 10

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 11

Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed
Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
12

marijuana. Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates
13

to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag." "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and
14

brought them to the police station." Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags" inside the
15 16

station. 17

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested
Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. Inside Cogaeds sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana
18

fruiting tops," and inside Dayaos yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.
19 20

PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. PSI Bayan personally delivered the
21

suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem
22

Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana. The marijuana collected 23

from Cogaeds blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams. The marijuana from Cogaeds sack weighed 4,246.1
24

grams. The marijuana collected from Dayaos bag weighed 5,092 grams. A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected
25 26

from Cogaeds and Dayaos bags. 27

According to Cogaeds testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney to take him" to 28

the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide. He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger
29

brothers friend. Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the
30

jeepney. Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaeds] help in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a
31

sack." Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market. This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached
32 33

them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not
know. SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation. Thereafter,
34 35

SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station. These facts were 36

corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was
apprehended. 37

At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head." The bags were also opened, but
38

Cogaed never knew what was inside. 39

It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. The information against them states:
40

That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and
SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by law,
have in their control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen
thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.

CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"). 41

The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union. Cogaed and Dayao 42

pleaded not guilty. The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was
43
exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344. Trial
44

against Cogaed ensued. In a decision dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The
45

dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00). 46

The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaeds arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just done so. He just
alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest." Since the
47

arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be considered illegal. However, the trial court stated that
48

notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to such irregularity" when "he did not
49

protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag." 50

Cogaed appealed the trial courts decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and affirmed the trial
51

courts decision. The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches when
52

"[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag." Hence, this appeal was filed.
53

The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellants brief:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF
SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE
SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS. 54

For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as
against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether
there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.

In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements on the chain of
custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary. 55

We find for the accused.

II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One
of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and seizures are
"reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision
are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge. The 56

existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after asking searching questions and
answers. Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the
57

warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the
things to be searched. 58

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of Court,
59

searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. This court has taken into account
60

the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence
of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured." The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and
61

seizures are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consentedwarrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. (Citations omitted)

62

III

One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches are often
confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest
63

require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and withinreach
by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. 64

On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the
search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals was similar "to a stop and frisk situation whose object is either to determine
65

the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to
obtain more information." This court stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a
66

rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . .
a search warrant." 67

The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the requirements
of reasonability required by the Constitution.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches ) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law
68

enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced police officers have
personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern
based on facts that they themselves observe whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a
basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to
the suspicion of an illicit act.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented by people
69

abusing drugs. When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking
70

in a swaying manner." The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police officers. These observations led
71 72

the police officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs. These were sufficient facts observed by the police
73

officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate."

74

In People v. Solayao, police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. This man was also "wearing a
75 76

camouflage uniform or a jungle suit." Upon seeing the police, the man fled. His flight added to the suspicion. After
77 78 79

stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade firearm" in his possession. This court ruled that
80 81

"[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first." This 82

was also a valid search.

In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with
reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses
dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.

The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There
was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion
was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that
Cogaed was "suspicious."

This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:

COURT:

Q So you dont know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the passenger jeep?

WITNESS:

A Not yet, Your Honor. 83

SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:

COURT:

Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to believe that the accused were
carrying marijuana?

WITNESS:

A No, Your Honor. 84

The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers otherwise.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The
police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringementupon ones basic
85

right to security of ones person and effects.

IV

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine
probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in
86

Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious circumstances as probable cause:

The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same. (Emphasis supplied)
87

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicionsupported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged."
88

Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause,but it cannot be
89

mere suspicion. It has to be a "genuine reason" to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:
90 91 92

Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
93

In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single
94

suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken
95

together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches
96

and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
97

search.98

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the probable
cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person mentioned by the
informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it
was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only
as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a
valid search warrant.
 V

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with
the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in
Malacat:

[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer. (Emphasis supplied)99

The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous
weapons. As in Manalili, jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
100 101

The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the police that a
102

certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus terminal, the police officers
103

prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified her as "Aling
104 105

Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The
106 107

bag contained marijuana leaves. 108

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. There were no suspicious 109

circumstances that preceded Arutas arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. It was only the informant that 110

prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal
111

search. Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.

112 113

Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the polices informant, who informed
the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. Here, the National Bureau ofInvestigation
114

(NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive
115

and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected
116

Aminnudins bag and found bundles of what turnedout to be marijuana leaves. The court declared that the 117

searchand seizure was illegal. Aminnudin was acquitted.

118 119

People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving
120

information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City." One night, the police 121

received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a
stakeout. A car "arrived and parked" at the hotel. The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel
122 123 124

was dealing drugs. The man alighted from his car. He was carrying a juice box. The police immediately
125 126 127

apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding. 128

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chuas situation when the police
apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no validstop-and-frisk." 129

VI

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be admissible.The facts of this
case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful
arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5
of the Rules of Court:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, withouta warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension,
Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a
warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested
must execute anovert act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting officer." Both elements were
130

missing when Cogaed was arrested. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
131

suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable
warrantless arrest.

VII

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the
police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:

Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if
there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. (Citations
132

omitted) Cogaeds silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought
about by the police officers excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the
burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any
coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again from the testimony of
SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:

ATTY. BINWAG:

Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their bags, is it not?

WITNESS:
A Yes, maam.

Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?

A Yes, maam.

Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?

A None, maam.

Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents ofthe bag, you have not
seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?

A It seems they were frightened, maam.

Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it not?

A Yes, maam but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised. (Emphasis supplied)
133

The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatacs responses to Judge Florendos questions:

COURT:

....

Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?

A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was somewhat frightened. He was a1wphi1

little apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him, "whats that," and
he answered, "I dont know because Marvin only asked me to carry." 134

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police officerintroduce
himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The police officer must also inform the person to be searched
1wphi1

that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do
not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to
the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given to the police
officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a persons constitutional right
to privacy requires no less.

VIII
The Constitution provides:

Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. 135

Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision
originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law
136

enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as
evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures." It ensures that the fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not
137

lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a
pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.

Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be
equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise
our societys fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the
very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice