Florida vs Jardines 11-564

Facts of the case

On November 3, 2006, the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified "cr

ime stoppers" tip that the home of Joelis Jardines was being used to grow mariju
ana. On December 6, 2006, two detectives, along with a trained drug detection do
g, approached the residence. The dog handler accompanied the dog to the front do
or of the home. The dog signaled that it detected the scent of narcotics. The de
tective also personally smelled marijuana.
The detective prepared an affidavit and applied for a search warrant, which was
issued. A search confirmed that marijuana was being grown inside the home. Jardi
nes was arrested and charged with trafficking cannabis. Jardines moved to suppre
ss the evidence seized at his home on the theory that the drug dog's sniff was a
n impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment and that all subsequent eviden
ce was fruit of the poisonous tree.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently ruled to suppr
ess the evidence. The state appealed the suppression ruling and the state appell
ate court reversed, concluding that no illegal search had occurred since the off
icer had the right to go up to the defendant's front door and that a warrant was
not necessary for the drug dog's sniff. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court's decision and concluded that the dog's sniff was a substantial
government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constituted a search with
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The state of Florida appealed the Florid
a Supreme Court's decision.

Question

Is a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotic
s detection dog a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause?
Conclusion
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered a 5-4 opinion affirming the Florida Suprem
e Court's decision. The Court held that the front porch of a home is part of the
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Typically, ordinary citizens are inv
ited to enter onto the porch, either explicitly or implicitly, to communicate wi
th the house's occupants. Police officers, however, cannot go beyond the scope o
f that invitation. Entering a person's porch for the purposes of conducting a se
arch requires a broader license than the one commonly given to the general publi
c. Without such a license, the police officers were conducting an unlawful searc
h in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Elena Kagan wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that the case
dealt with privacy issues as well as the property issues the majority opinion a
ddressed. People have a heightened expectation of privacy in their homes and the
areas immediately surrounding their homes, and in this case, the police violate
d that expectation. Because the police officers used a device (a drug-sniffing d
og) not in public use to learn details about the home, Justice Kagan argued that
an illegal search had been conducted. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice S
onia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.
Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented, arguing that the majority's interpretation of
the public license to approach a person's front door is too narrow and should e
xtend even to police officers collecting evidence against an occupant. The disse
nt argued that the common law of trespass does not limit the public license to a
particular category of visitors approaching the door for a specific purpose. Ch
ief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Stephen G.
Breyer joined in the dissent.