1. Baranda vs.

Gustilo

Facts:

A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo involving a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by OCT No. 6406 in the name
of Romana Hitalia.
The OCT was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the names of petitioners Baranda
and Hitalia.
The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao
refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517.
The Court found out that TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently acquired by Perez, Gotera and
Susana.
Thereafter, the court issued a writ of demolition which was questioned by Perez and others so a
motion for reconsideration was filed.
Another case was filed by Baranda and Hitalia (GR. NO. 62042) for the execution of judgement in
the resolutions issued by the courts.
In the meantime, the CA dismissed a civil case (GR. NO. 00827) involving the same properties.
Three cases are involved excluding the case at bar. The petitioners prayed that an order be
released to cancel No.T-25772.
Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia To cancel No.T-25772.
Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia.
In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated
the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of
titles in the name of petitioners.
However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens
was annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates.
Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of
PD 1529.

Issue: What is the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in
a torrens certificate of title.

Held:
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration. ... If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith
deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons
therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree." Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step
to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented
to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register
of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of
Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."

The function of ROD is ministerial in nature: The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent
Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument
presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the
Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section
117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

No room for construction for the laws on functions of ROD: The elementary rule in statutory construction
is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The
statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of
title is clear and leaves no room for construction.

2. Cheng vs. Genato & Sps. Da Jose (G.R. NO. 129760 December 29, 1998)

Facts:

Genato is the owner of two parcels of land. He entered into an agreement with the Da Jose
Spouses over said land. The agreement culminated in the execution of a contract to sell in a
public instrument and contained the stipulation that. after 30 days, after having satisfactorily
verified and confirmed the truth and authenticity of documents vendee shall pay the vendor the
full payment of the purchase price. The Da Jose Spouses asked for an extension of 30 days.
Pending effectivity of said extension period, and without due notice to Spouses Da Jose, Genato
executed an affidavit to annul the contract to sell. This was not annotated at the back of his titles.

Cheng expressed interest in buying the properties. Genato showed Cheng the copies of his titles
and the annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell with the Da Jose Spouses, and the
affidavit to annul contract to sell. Cheng issued a check for 50,000php upon the assurance that
the previous contract will be annulled.

Genato later continued with the contract for Da Jose spouses, and informed Cheng of his
decision and returned to the latter, the down payment paid. Cheng however contended that their
contract to sell said property had already been perfected.

The lower court held that here was a sale between Cheng and Genato, and there was a valid
rescission of the contract to sell (between Genato and Spouses Da Jose)

CA reversed the lower court declaring that the contract to sell in favor of Spouses Da Jose was
not validly rescinded.

Issue: Who has the better right to the land?

Held:

The Spouses Da Jose. The contention of the Da Jose Spouses that no further condition was agreed when
they were granted the 30-day extension period from October 7, 1989 in connection with clause 3 of their
contract to sell should be upheld. Also, Genato could have sent at least a notice of such fact, and there
being no stipulation authorizing him for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the encumbrance on his
titles and make it available to other would be buyers, it bolstered that there was no default on the part of
the Da Jose Spouses. Genato is not relieved from the giving of a notice, verbal or written, to the Da Jose
spouses for his decision to rescind their contract.

The Court ruled that if it was assumed that the receipt is to be treated as a conditional contract of sale, it
did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to suspensive condition that the earlier contract to
sell between Genato and the Da Jose Spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded - a condition never
met.
Note: "Registration", as defined by Soler and Castillo, means any entry made in the books of the registry,
including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even marginal
notes. In its strict acceptation, it is the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently
the right of ownership and other real rights.

Spouses Da Jose made annotation on the title of Genato. Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have
been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the contract to sell duly
annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, Cheng was in bad faith when he registered his
claim.

3. CAMPILLO v CA G.R. No. L-56483 May 29, 1984

FACTS:

Tomas de Vera was the owner of two parcels of land in Tondo, Manila. In 1961, de Vera sold the
lands to Simplicio Santos. Santos however did not register the sale in the Registry of Deeds,
which means that the land was still under de Veras name.

On the other hand, de Vera was indebted to Sostenes Campillo. Campillo obtained a favorable
judgment for sum of money against de Vera. De Veras 3 parcels of land, including those sold to
Santos, were levied in 1962 in favor of Campillo. Campillo acquired the land, and he was able to
have the lands registered under his name.

ISSUE: Who has better right over the property: Santos who first bought it without registering it? or
Campillo, who subsequently purchased it at a public auction and had it registered under his name?

HELD:

Campillo has the right over the said properties. It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate,
whether made as a result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally
effective against third persons only from the date of its registration. Santos purchase of the two parcels of
land may be valid but it is not enforceable against third persons, because he failed to have it registered.

Campillo is a purchaser in good faith as he was not aware of any previous sale, since Santos never
caused the annotation of the sale.

Section 51, PD No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides as follows:

Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He
may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law.
But no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument except a will purporting to convey or affect
registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register
of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.

The purchaser in the execution sale of the registered land in suit, acquires such right and interest as
appears in the certificate of title, unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein. This must be
so in order to preserve the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under
our Torrens system of land registration.
4. ENCARNACION GATIOAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIXTO GAFFUD ET AL., defendants,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-21953 March 28, 1969]

Facts:

The land in question was originally registered in the name of Rufina Permison on the basis of a
free patent. In the year 1948, Permison sold it to Sibreno Novesteras, who in turn, conveyed it to
appellee Encarnacion Gatioan on 1949.

From 1950 to 1957, Gationan obtained four loans from the Philippine National Bank, and as
security therefor, mortgaged the land in question. Said mortgage was duly inscribed at the back of
the title. On 1960, appellee paid P2,800.00, plus interest, in full payment of the last loan secured
by mortgage on the land. Despite these payments, appellant executed no instrument releasing or
discharging the incumbrance.

In the meantime, on 1956, the defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan procured a
free patent covering the identical parcel of land of Gationan. They also obtained two loans from
PNB and mortgaged the said land.

Subsequently, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources compared the technical
descriptions, areas, lot numbers and cadastral numbers of the land of Gationan and Gaffud and
was convinced that both titles covered the same identical land. He recommended the cancellation
of the latter title, Gaffuds.

On 1962, Gationan filed a complaint for quieting of title. The court decided in her favor.

PNB now insists that the lower court should have declared it an innocent mortgagee in good faith
and for value as regards the mortgages executed in its favor by Gaffud and duly annotated on
their title and that consequently, the said mortgage annotations should be carried over to and
considered as incumbrances on Gationans land which, as already stated, is the identical land of
the Gaffuds.

Issue: WON the banks contention has merit.

Held: The Court finds no merit in this contention.

It is a matter of judicial notice that before a bank grants a loan on the security of land, it first undertakes a
careful examination of the title of the applicant as well as a physical and on-the-spot investigation of the
land itself offered as security. Undoubtedly, had the Bank taken such a step, it would have easily
discovered the flaw in the title of Gaffuds; and if it did not conduct such examination and investigation, it
must be held to be guilty of gross negligence in granting them the loans in question. In either case,
appellant Bank cannot be considered as a mortgagee in good faith.

From the stipulated facts, it can be seen that prior to the execution of the mortgage between appellant
and the Gaffuds, Gationan had been mortgaging the land to it. The appellant Bank had possession of, or
at least, must have examined appellee's title including the technical description, exact area, lot number
and cadastral number of the land covered by said title. By the time Gaffud offered the land in their names,
the bank was in a position to know that they referred to one and the same lot. Under the circumstances,
appellant had absolutely no excuse for approving the application of the defendant spouses and giving the
loans in question.

In Legarda v. Saleeby, the Court held:

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed.
This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose
and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by
proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that
he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which
the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute.

5. SULPICIO CARVAJAL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and

EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO and LIBERATA CACABELOS, respondents. G.R. No. L-44426 February
25, 1982

FACTS:

Private respondents, who are husband and wife, had instituted a complaint before the Court of
First Instance for ejectment and recovery of possession against herein petitioner alleging that
they are the owners in fee simple of a parcel of commercial land, pro-indiviso, consisting of 150.8
sq. meters, more or less, situated in Poblacion, Tayug, Pangasinan, having bought the same from
Evaristo G. Espique by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on April 15, 1964. They also
demand that petitioner pay a monthly rental for the use of the property all P40.00 until the
property is surrendered to them.

The property in question is a 1/5 portion of a 754 sq. meter land originally owned by Hermogenes
Espique and his wife, both dead. After their death their five children, namely: Maria, Evaristo,
Faustina, Estefanio and Tropinia succeeded them in the ownership of the whole lot.

Petitioner presently occupies two-fifths of the whole lot inherited pro-indiviso by the Espique
children. Petitioner alleges that he purchased the northern one-half portion of the lot he is
occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio Espique and that the southern
one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio
Espique and that the southern one-half portion is leased to him by Tropinia Espique. The land
subject of the controversy is the most southern portion of the whole lot inherited by the Espique
children which petitioner claims he had bought from Estefanio on April 26, 1967 and which
respondents claim they had bough from Evaristo on April 15, 1964.

Both sales were made while the petition for partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending
before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can properly be ejected and pay the monthly rentals for the use of
such.

RULING:

No. The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by herein respondents in the lower
court is premature, for what must be settled first is the action for partition. Unless a project of partition is
effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition,
either by agreement between the parties of by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific
portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate is owned by such heirs.
Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with
respect to the part of portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus
formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.

While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete,
specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his
right over the thing is represented by an abstract or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. An
individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing
owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the
co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by
all the co-owners. What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be
limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his
successional rights.

In the case at bar, the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. Espique in favor of respondents and the
sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made before the partition of the property
among the co-heirs does not annul or invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. However, the
interests thereby acquired by petitioner and respondents are limited only to the parts that may be
ultimately assigned to Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the estate subject to
provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-purchaser provided in Article
1088 of the Civil Code. Respondent court's ruling that the sale by Estefanio in favor of petitioner is not
valid because of lack of notice to his co-heirs is erroneous. Such notice in writing is not a requisite for the
validity of the sale. Its purpose is merely to apprise the co-heirs of the sale of a portion of the estate, for
them to exercise their preferential right of subrogation under Article 1088 of the New Civil Code, that is,
the right to redeem the property sold within one month from the time they were notified in writing of the
sale by a co-heir. (There is nothing in the record to indicate that such right of subrogation was in effect
sought to be exercised upon the co-heirs' having learned of the sale, which is not in issue here.)

Thus, respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand payment of rentals for the use of the
property in dispute. Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
in the pending partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds,
neither petitioner nor respondents can rightfully claim that what they bought is the part in dispute.

6. HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SR., represented by their Administrator ELPIDIO VENCILAO,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES SABAS and RUPERTA GEPALAGO, and
DOMICIANO GEPALAGO, respondents.

FACTS:

Between two (2) sets of claimants of real property - those claiming ownership by acquisitive
prescription, and those asserting ownership on the basis of a deed of sale recorded in the
certificate of title of the vendor as mortgagee and highest bidder in a foreclosure sale - who has a
better right?

On 12 February 1990 the heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., represented by their Administrator
Elpidio Vencilao, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol a complaint for quieting of title,
recovery of possession and/or ownership, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance
of writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction against the spouses Sabas and
Ruperta Gepalago

The heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr. alleged that they were the absolute owners of a parcel of land
situated in Cambansag, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of 3,625 square meters having inherited
the same from their father, Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., declared the property for taxation purposes and
religiously paid the real estate taxes. He likewise had the property consistently declared as his
own in other documents, e.g., those relevant to the 1987 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). After his death, his heirs continued to possess and enjoy the property.

The Gepalago spouses, on the other hand, denied all the material allegations in the complaint
and claimed that they were the registered owners of a 5,970-square meter property located in
Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol, and covered by TCT No. 16042, previously a portion of a
 1,401,570 square-meter land originally owned by a certain Pedro Luspo. The entire parcel of land
was mortgaged by Pedro Luspo to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for a loan.
Since Luspo failed to pay the obligation upon maturity the mortgage was foreclosed. Thereafter
PNB, the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale, conveyed the whole property to fifty-six (56)
vendees among whom were the spouses Sabas and Ruperta Gepalago who acquired the 5,970
square-meter portion thereof. Since then, they had been the owner and possessor of the land
until they donated the same in 1988 to their son Domiciano Gepalago.

The trial court appointed a commissioner to survey the litigated property and determine the areas
claimed by both parties. The commissioner reported that the area claimed by the Vencilaos was
included in the titled property of the Gepalagos. On the basis of the commissioners report and the
other pieces of evidence presented by the parties, the trial court found the following: (a) The
property claimed by the Gepalagos consisted of 5,970 square meters, while that of the Vencilaos
covered an area of 22,401.58 square meters as indicated in the survey plan submitted by Engr.
Jesus H. Sarmiento, the court appointed commissioner; (b) Insofar as the survey plan and report
submitted by Engr. Sarmiento were concerned, these indubitably established the fact that the
Vencilaos owned the excess area of 16,431.58 square meters which was clearly outside the area
claimed by the Gepalagos; (c) The lot in question had been titled to defendant Sabas Gepalago
and subsequently titled to his son, defendant Domiciano Gepalago, under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 18621 by virtue of a deed of donation executed on 25 October 1988 by Sabas Gepalago
in favor of Domiciano Gepalago; and, (d) As stated in the commissioners report, "If the titled lot of
Domiciano Gepalago is plotted in accordance with the technical description appearing in the title,
it will be relocated to more than 219 kilometers eastward away from its supposed actual
location. This amounts to its non-existence.

The trial court then ruled in favor of the Vencilaos holding that they had been in possession,
cultivation and enjoyment of the litigated property for more than thirty (30) years and that the
improvements therein were introduced by them long before any title was ever issued to the
Gepalagos The Gepalagos appealed the decision of the trial court. After due consideration, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared the Gepalagos owners of the disputed
property. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE: Between two (2) sets of claimants of real property - those claiming ownership by acquisitive
prescription, and those asserting ownership on the basis of a deed of sale recorded in the certificate of
title of the vendor as mortgagee and highest bidder in a foreclosure sale - who has a better right?

RULING: The petition is denied.

In awarding the disputed land to petitioners, the trial court erroneously found that petitioners had been in
possession and enjoyment of the property for more than thirty (30) years. It should be noted that the land
in dispute is a registered land placed under the operation of the Torrens system way back in 1959, or
more than thirty (30) years before petitioners instituted the present action in the court a quo, and for which
Original Certificate of Title No. 400 was issued. The rule is well-settled that prescription does not run
against registered land. Thus, under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, it is specifically provided that "no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." A title, once registered, cannot be
defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. The certificate of title issued is an absolute
and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.All persons must take notice and no one can
plead ignorance of the registration
7. ARCADIO, MELQUIADES, ABDULA, EUGENIO, APOLONIO, all surnamed YBAEZ, petitioners,
vs.THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VALENTIN O. OUANO,
respondents G.R. No. L-68291 March 6, 1991

Facts:

Records show that private respondent Valentin Ouano, filed on February 27, 1959, a homestead
application with the Bureau of Lands. The said application, recorded as Homestead Application
No. 20-107001, was approved in an order dated March 3, 1959 issued by the District Land
Officer, Land District No. 20, for and by authority of the Director of Lands.

Three (3) years thereafter, a "Notice of Intention to Make Final Proof was made by Valentin
Ouano to establish his claim to the lot applied for and to prove his residence and cultivation
before Land Inspector Lorenzo Sazon at the Bureau of Lands, Davao City at 10:00 o'clock A.M.
appending thereto an affidavit attesting that a copy of his intention to make final proof relative to
his Homestead Application No. 20-10701 was posted at the Municipal building of the Municipality
of Gov. Generoso (now San Isidro), Davao, on the bulletin board of the barrio where the land
applied for is located, and in a conspicuous place on the land itself on the 5th day of August, 1962
and remained so posted for a period of thirty days, until September 5, 1962.

On the said date, or on September 5, 1962, Valentin Ouano made his "Final Proof" before Land
Inspector Lorenzo Sazon pursuant to Section 14, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The
following year, or on March 4, 1963, an order for the issuance of patent was issued by the Bureau
of Lands.

On April 15, 1963, an "Original Certificate of Title No. P-15353" was issued to private respondent
Valentin Ouano over Homestead Patent No. 181261 which was transcribed in the "Registration
Book" for the province of Davao on October 28, 1963.

On January 4, 1975, after 19 years of possession, cultivation and income derived from coconuts
planted on Lot No. 986, private respondent Valentin Ouano was interrupted in his peaceful
occupation thereof when a certain Arcadio Ybanez and his sons, Melquiades, Abdula, Eugenia
Numeriano, Apolonio and Victoriano, forcibly and unlawfully entered the land armed with spears,
canes and bolos.

Because of the unwarranted refusal of Arcadio Ybanez, et al. to vacate the premises since the
time he was dispossessed in 1975, private respondent Valentin Ouano filed on September 24,
1978 a complaint for recovery of possession, damages and attorney's fees before the then Court
of First Instance (now RTC) of Davao Oriental .

In his complaint, Valentin Ouano, then plaintiff therein, alleged that he has been in lawful and
peaceful possession since 1956 of a parcel of land situated in Bagsac, Manikling, Governor
Generoso (now San Isidro), Davao Oriental, to which an Original Certificate of Title was issued in
his name; that petitioners, then defendants therein, unlawfully entered his land on January 4,
1975 and started cultivating and gathering the coconuts, bananas and other fruits therein, thereby
illegally depriving him of the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the premises.

Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that plaintiff Valentin Ouano, now private respondent, has
never been in possession of any portion of Lot No. 986 as the same has been continously
occupied and possessed by petitioners since 1930 in the concept of owner and have introduced
valuable improvements thereon such as coconuts and houses; that Lot No. 986 was the subject
matter of administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Lands in Mati, Davao Oriental which
was consequently decided in their favor by the Director of Lands on the finding that Valentin
 Ouano has never resided in the land; that it was declared by the Director of Lands that the
homestead patent issued to private respondent Valentin Ouano was improperly and erroneously
issued, since on the basis of their investigation and relocation survey, the actual occupation and
cultivation was made by petitioner Arcadio Ybaez and his children, consisting of 9.6 hectares
which cover the whole of Lot No. 986 and portions of Lot Nos. 987, 988 and 989; that based on
the ocular inspection conducted, it was established that Valentin Ouano did not have a house on
the land and cannot locate the boundaries of his titled land for he never resided therein.

The trial court, after hearing, rendered on June 8, 1991 its decision in favor of private respondent.
Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. On June 29, 1984, the Intermediate
Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division promulgated a decision, 8 affirming the decision of the
trial court. Hence the instant recourse by petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not a collateral attack on the ownership of the land is valid.

RULING: No.

It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to private
respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession filed
by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in their answer the Order of the
Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the investigatory power of the Director of Lands
under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a defense partakes of the nature of a
collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under the operation of the Torrens system of
registration pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D. 1259. The case
law on the matter does not allow a collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of
actual fraud.

The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one (1) year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible. The settled rule is that a decree
of registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of actual
fraud within one (1) year from the date of its entry and such an attack must be direct and not by a
collateral proceeding. The validity of the certificate of title in this regard can be threshed out only in an
action expressly filed for the purpose.

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a
homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial
registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the
contemplation of the Public Land Law.

In the instant case, the public land certificate of title issued to private respondent attained the status of
indefeasibility one (1) year after the issuance of patent on April 15, 1963, hence, it is no longer open to
review on the ground of actual fraud. Consequently, the filing of the protest before the Bureau of Lands
against the Homestead Application of private respondent on January 3, 1975, or 12 years after, can no
longer re-open or revise the public land certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. No reasonable
and plausible excuse has been shown for such an unusual delay. The law serves those who are vigilant
and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.

In rendering judgment restoring possession of Lot No. 986 to private respondent Ouano, the duly
registered owner thereof, the trial court merely applied the rule and jurisprudence that a person whose
property has been wrongly or erroneously registered in another's name is not to set aside the decree, but,
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages.
Although petitioners may still have the remedy of reconveyance, assuming that they are the "owners" and
actual occupants of Lot No. 986, as claimed by them before the trial court, this remedy, however, can no
longer be availed of by petitioners due to prescription. The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title.

8. Legarda vs. Saleeby. G.R. No. 8936. October 2, 1915

FACTS:
The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the
city of Manila. There exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906, presented a petition in
the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot, which decreed that the title of the
plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the
Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.

Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On March 25, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system.
The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the
certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant
.They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and
correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said
parties.

The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory
that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendants land, they failed to
make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

HELD:

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the
defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did
not appear and oppose it

Granting that theory to be correct one , then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself.
Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs
to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he
be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration?

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) provides for the registration of titles under
the Torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under
conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land
which has been registered in the name of two different persons.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners
of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers
his original certificate to an innocent purchaser. The general rule is that the vendee of land has no
greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under
that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the
later certificate.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law
should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore
exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may
correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of
the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.

9. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS (Banilad Friar Lands Estate) v GAN TAN

Facts:

Petitioner is a Chinese citizen. He bought the lots from the Cebu Heights Company, and obtained
from the office of the register of deeds the corresponding certificate of title. Transfer took place on
March 14, 1940. The title issued to the petitioner was lost during the last war. And so he filed this
petition for reconstitution. The lower court denied the petition.

On Appeal, a petition was filed by the petitioner under Republic Act No. 26, which authorizes the
reconstitution of transfer certificates of title (section 3a). This Act provides that the petition may be
filed either with the register of deeds (section 5), or with the court of first instance (section 10),
and that it shall be accompanied with an affidavit of the registered owner stating, among other
things, that no deed or other instrument affecting the property had been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the nature thereof, the date of its presentation, and the names of
the parties, and whether the registration of such deed or instrument is still pending
accomplishment (section 5). In the instant case, petitioner complied with all these requirements,
and the petition was published in accordance with law.

Issues:

1. WON there is a title to be reconstituted?

2. WON an alien is not entitled to have his title reconstituted for the reasons there, being an alien, he is
not qualified to acquire the land covered by the said title under our Constitution.

Ruling:

1. Yes. The court, after hearing, finds that the evidence presented is sufficient and proper to warrant the
reconstitution of the lost certificate of title and that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property,
and said certificate was in force at the time it was lost, the duty of the court is to issue the order or
reconstitution. This duty is mandatory. The laws does not give the court basic requirements have been
complied with.

2. No. A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The rule on this matter is that this issue can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Moreover, it is well known doctrine that a Torrens
title, as a rule, is irrevocable and indefeasible, and the duty of the court is to see to it that this title is
maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding. Whether the petitioner has the right
to acquire the land or not, is beyond the province of the proceeding. That should be threshed out in a
proper action. The two proceedings are distinct.

10. Viacrusis, et al. v. CA, et al. G.R. No. L-29831. March 29, 1972
Facts:
Private respondents Orais brought the action to establish their title to a land in Leyte. They
alleged that the land is a part of the land sold to them by the registered owner, Pedro Sanchez,
and they demanded the recovery from the petitioners the possession of said land damages.

Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of the land, that the deed of sale in favour of the
private respondents attests merely to a simulated transaction, and that the action of recovery is
barred by the statute of limitations. Alleging that the rights of petitioners had been assigned to
them, spouses Marquez interve
It was found that the subject property was owned by Sanchez who executed the deed of sale in
favour of the private respondents and that such deed was filed with the office of the register of
deeds.

Sanchez subsequently executed another deed, conveying the disputed portion to Ruizo, who, in
turn, sold to herein petitioners.

The trial court ruled in favour of private respondents. Petitioners appeal was likewise denied.

Petitioners now argue that private respondents had never been in possession of the land and that
it had remained in the name of Pedro Sanchez.

Issue: Was the sale of land to petitioners valid?

Held: No.

Since the deed of sale executed in favour of the respondents had been filed with the office of the register
of deeds and recorded therein, petitioners are deemed to have constructive notice of the sale in favour of
the respondents.

Where, aware of the status of the land in question, petitioners had advisedly chosen to treat the same as
an unregistered land, none of them claims to have relied upon the original certificate of title in the name of
Sanchez, they cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser for value in good faith under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act.

As between Sanchez, private respondents and petitioners, the title of the land if treated as unregistered
one was passed to private respondents and recorded in the office of the register of deeds. Thus,
Sanchez was no longer its owner when he sold it to Ruizo, who as a consequence acquired no title to
said land and conveyed none to petitioners, who, in turn, could not have transmitted any to spouses
Marquez.

Thus, petitioners could not possibly have acquired title to said land, as one registered under Act No. 496,
inasmuch as the deeds of conveyance in their favour and in that of their predecessors-in-interest have not
been registered. Neither could the petitioners acquire title by prescription for no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owners shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

11. ROXAS V. DINGLASAN G.R. No.L-27234 May 30, 1969

Facts:

Felisa Kalaw was the registered owner of a certain parcel of land with an area of 26,530 square
meters at Lipa City. She sold the land to Francisca Mojica by means of a public instrument an
undivided portion of 11,530 square meters of the lot. In the same month and year, she sold to
Victoria Dinglasan by means of private instrument the remaining 15,000 square meters. The
 vendors Certificate of Title No.9125 was not delivered to the buyers because it was previously
mortgaged by Kalaw.

Pedro Dinglasan, by falsifying a public document of conveyance, succeeded in having Certificate

of Title No.9125 in the name of Felisa Kalaw and a new Transfer Certificate of Title No.T-10392
issued in his name. He mortgaged the lot to Leonora Roxas, who caused the instrument to be
registered on the back of the said transfer certificate of title since it was delivered to her. Later,
Roxas foreclosed the mortgage. Pedro was declared in default. Francisca Mojica and Victoria
Dinglasan intervened. Their intervention alleged that they were the owners of the lot having
purchased the same from Felisa Kalaw, that the title of said land was fraudulently transferred by
Pedro Dinglasan, that Pedro Dinglasan mortgaged the land in favor of Roxas, that said mortgagor
has been convicted of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual, and that the
document used by him in transferring title in his name was the subject of the said felony.
Intervenors prayed to be declared as the true and absolute owners of the parcel of land covered
by TCT No.T-10392.

The lower court ruled against the intervenors saying that this is not the time and place for them
(intervenors) to raise their claim of ownership over the property," and that the intervenors were
not entitled to any relief. Judgment was rendered ordering foreclosure of the mortgage.

Issues:

1. WON the intervenors could vindicate ownership of the land in question

2. WON the mortgage of the lot to Roxas was valid

Ruling:

1. No. The intervenors could not vindicate ownership of the land in question.

It is well settled that in case of sale of a piece of land titled under the Torrens System, it is the act of
registration, and not tradition, that transfers the ownership of the land sold.

In this case, the complaint in intervention was to vindicate ownership of the land in the intervenors.
However, the deeds of sale involving the parcel of land covered by Certificate of Title No.9125 in the
name of Felisa Kalaw was not registered. Hence, the intervenors did not acquire ownership over the lot.
The vendees-intervenors not having acquired the ownership of the land, their action to vindicate
ownership must fail because such action can prosper only upon proof by plaintiff that he is the owner. As
pointed out, the intervenors did not acquire ownership of the land because their deeds of sale were not
registered. Hence, the intervenors could not vindicate ownership of the land in question.

2. Yes. The mortgage of the lot to Roxas was valid.

Article 2085 of the New Civil Code requires that the mortgagor be the owner of the property mortgaged. In
the case of De Lara, et al. vs. Ayrosa, G.R. No.L-16122, May 31, 1954, the Court held that where the
certificate of title was already in the name of the forger when the land was sold to an innocent purchaser,
the vendee had the right to rely on what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to
excite suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.

In this case, although Pedro Dinglasan was not the owner of the property mortgaged because he had
secured title thereto thru fraud or falsification of a public document, the mortgage was valid because
Roxas was an innocent mortgagee for value, having relied upon the mortgagor's TCT which according to
the Register of Deeds was genuine and free from any objection. Thus, the mortgage is valid.
12. SAJONAS vs CA G. R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996

FACTS:

The case before us is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a
certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made by
the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde and Lucita Jarin, and was later
carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry,
issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas, who purchased the
parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case.
On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel
of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R.
Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The
property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the
annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject
property, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the
Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas
couple on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or
on August 28, 1985. However, it turned out that in the title of the same property was an
annotation of notice of levy on execution for Uychocdes failure to pay and to comply with his
undertaking in the compromise agreement with Domingo Pilares whom he owed P27, 800
payable in two years from June 25, 1980. When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4
1984 was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
TCT No. N-109417 was ssued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution
annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title.On October 21, 1985, the
Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the auction sale of
the subject property did not push through as scheduled. the Sajonas spouses demanded the
cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon defendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter
to their lawyer, Atty. Melchor Flores. Despite said demand, defendant-appellant Pilares refused to
cause the cancellation of said annotation. Thus the spouses filed a complaint.
The Trial Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Pilares, as
follows:
1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy on Execution annotated on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000 as attorneys fees.
3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by said defendant.
Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs and after going over the evidence presented
by the parties, the court finds that although the title of the subject matter of the Notice of Levy on
Execution was still in the name of the Spouses Uychocde when the same was annotated on the
said title, an earlier Affidavit of Adverse Claim was annotated on the same title by the plaintiffs
who earlier bought said property from the Uychocdes.

Defendant Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning errors on the part of the lower
court. The appellate court reversed the lower courts decision.
 The Sajonas couple filed a Petition for Review on Certiori, praying inter alia to set aside the Court
of Appeals decision, and to reinstate that of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE/S: Who has a better right over the property the buyer in good faith or the creditor? Was the sale
made in fraud of creditors?
HELD:
The court ruled in favor of Sajonas spouses and reversed the CA decision; reinstated the trial courts
decision and ordered that the inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 to be
cancelled.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the
time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the
property.Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage
of another.Thus, the claim of the private respondent that the sale executed by the spouses was made in
fraud of creditors has no basis in fact, there being no evidence that the petitioners had any knowledge or
notice of the debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondents, nor of any claim by the latter over
the Uychocdes properties or that the same was involved in any litigation between said spouses and the
private respondent. While it may be stated that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be
established by competent proof by the party alleging the same. Sans such proof, the petitioners are
deemed to be purchasers in good faith, and their interest in the subject property must not be disturbed.
At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of
registered land in good faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and all prior claims, liens
and encumbrances except those set forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly mentioned in the
ACT as having been preserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiveness of the Certificate
of Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would be futile and nugatory.

13. AZNAR realty v. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Co. (AZNAR) acquired a lot located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu-Lapu
City, from the heirs of a certain Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. Said deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-
Lapu City. On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the successors and
descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta Maloloy-on, whose names appeared as the
registered owners in the Original Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. They also alleged that they had
been residing and occupying the subject portion of the land in the concept of owner since the time
of their parents and grandparents. Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed by AZNAR
to occupy portions of the subject lot by mere tolerance provided that they leave the land in the
event that the company would use the property for its purposes.

Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the
development of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing subdivision and beach resort.

When its demands for the private respondents to vacate the land failed, AZNAR filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case for unlawful detainer and damages.

The respondent argues that there was no evidence that petitioner was ever in possession of the
property. Its claim of ownership was based only on an Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of
Absolute Sale, which private respondents, however, claimed to be null and void for being
simulated and fraudulently obtained and the failure to annotate of the extra-judicial partition in
 Deed of Absolute Sale in the reconstituted Original Certificate of Title makes the deed legally
defective.

Issue: WON the failure to annotate the extra judicial partition in the DOA in reconstituted OCT makes the
deed defective

Held:

No, the failure of such did not make the deed legally defective.

It must be borne in mind that the act of registering a document is never necessary to give the conveyance
legal effect as between the parties and the vendor's heirs. As between the parties to a sale, registration is
not indispensable to make it valid and effective. The peculiar force of a title is exhibited only when the
purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the land described in the conveyance. The purpose of
registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be
ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the
parties thereto of their obligations thereunder.

Here, no right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the subject lot is involved; thus, the
conveyance executed in favor of AZNAR by private respondents and their predecessors is valid and
binding upon them, and is equally binding and effective against their heirs. The principle that registration
is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land "refers to cases
involving conflicting rights over registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on the
clean title of the properties." This principle has no bearing on the present case, as no subsequent transfer
of the subject lot to other persons has been made either by private respondents or their predecessors-in-
interest.

14. Heirs of Severa Gregorio v. CA (G.R. No. 117609, December 29, 1998)

Facts:

Severa Gregorio (Severa) previously owns the disputed land. In 1976, Severa died intestate
leaving behind three legitimate children - Buenconsejo Vivar (Buenconsejo), Jesusa Galang
(Jesusa) and Cecilio Pineda who died in 1982.

On October 1986, Buenconsejo tried to sell the lot, but records show that Severa sold to Ricardo
Santos 2/3 portion of the lot. Santos, in turn, sold the same 2/3 portion to spouses Tan. With
respect to the remaining 1/3 portion, it appears that in 1978, spouses Palomo filed with the then
CFI of Caloocan City an action for a sum of money against Jesusa and her husband. The court
decided the case in favor of the Palomos and the 1/3 undivided share of Jesusa in the lot was
sold on execution to the Palomos, being the highest bidders. The Galangs failed to redeem the
property within one year. Hence, a final deed of sale in favor of the Palomos was confirmed by
the court and recorded in the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. On September 1986, the Palomos
assigned to spouses Wilson and Benita Tan that 1/3 portion of the lot. On the same day, at the
instance of spouses Tan, (1) the deed of sale between Severa Gregorio and Ricardo Santos, (2)
the subsequent deed of sale between Ricardo Santos and spouses Tan and (3) the deed of
assignment between spouses Palomo and spouses Tan were registered in the Registry of Deeds.

Consequently, TCT No. in the name of Severa Gregorio was cancelled and a new TCT No. was
issued in the name of spouses Tan covering the entire lot.

On October 30, 1986, the heirs of Severa Gregorio filed with the trial court the instant complaint
against spouses Tan for cancellation of title and/or reconveyance with damages alleging that the
deeds of conveyance were forged and are therefore void.
 Thereafter, on 1988, a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall Building. The entire records of this case
were destroyed. The key documents, such as the original copy of the deeds in connection with
the disputed land were all burned.

The petitioners filed an amended and/or supplemental complaint which matters revolved around
the signature of Severa affixed to the deed of sale between her and Ricardo Santos; where,
spouses Tan filed an answer alleging that the deed of sale was genuine and that they purchased
the property in good faith.

The Trial Court rendered the two (2) Deeds of Absolute sale of Severa to Ricardo, and Ricardo to
Spouses Tan, null and void ab initio, because of the forged signature of Severa. But maintained
the validity of the Deed of Assignment executed by Spouses Palomo to spouses Tan.

Both the plaintiffs and defendant spouses Tan appealed to the CA. The Court of Appeals reversed
the findings of the trial court, and declared valid the ownership and title of spouses Tan over the
entire disputed lot, as innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.

Issue: Whether or not respondent CA erred in holding that defendant spouses Tan are innocent
purchasers for value and in good faith with respect to the 2/3 portion of the subject lot conveyed to them
by Santos.

Ruling:

No. The CA found that the petitioners were not able to overcome the presumption of good faith which
benefits defendant spouses Tan.

It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed unless convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced.
It is incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation. Absent enough proof
thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails. The petitioners failed to present evidence of any dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity on the part of the spouses Tan. In fact, no bad judgment or negligence can be
attributed to the latter because they took the necessary steps to protect their investment.

In view of the indefeasibility of a Torrens title, every person dealing on registered lands may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the
certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendors acquisition of the property. The
rights of innocent third persons who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title and acquired rights
over the property covered thereby cannot be disregarded and the courts cannot order the cancellation of
such certificate for that would impair or erode public confidence in the Torrens system of land registration.

When a portion of registered property was sold and the sale was duly registered (and annotated in the
certificate of title of the vendor), the vendee technically becomes the owner of the sold portion as of the
registration of the sale although the title to said property is still in the name of the vendor.

It bears stressing, however, that the indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to
perpetuate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Mere registration of sale is not good enough.
Good faith must concur with registration because otherwise registration becomes an exercise in futility.

In this case, when the spouses Tan purchased the subject property from defendant Santos, they satisfied
themselves that subject certificate of title was clean, and of the genuineness and authenticity of the deed
of sale of Santos, by personally verifying the same with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Such
verification, in fact, disclosed that subject certificate of title was free from any adverse claim except that of
the Palomos.

Respondent spouses Tan even consulted a lawyer before proceeding with the sale. Verily, the latter were
not amiss in their duty to ascertain their vendors capacity to sell the property.
15. ELISA D. GABRIEL vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, respondent, JUANITA R. DOMINGO,
oppositor-appellant G.R. No. L-17956 September 30, 1963

FACTS:

On January 4, 1960, petitioner Elisa D. Gabriel, filed Adverse Claims with the Register of Deeds
of Manila and in Register of Deeds of Rizal, against the properties located in these places that
were registered in the name of oppositor Juanita R. Domingo, her sister. Petitioner alleged that
the properties included in the amended inventory of Juanita Domingo were actually acquired by
their late mother Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo. The adverse claims also alleged that Juanita's
registration of the properties were made fraudulently.

The Register of Deeds of Manila, elevated the matter to the Land Registration Commission en
Consulta saying it was in doubt as to whether the registration of the claim is proper determination
by this Commission.
Juanita Domingo contended that the adverse claim was made to embarass and harass her and
that said properties were acquired by her pursuant to an extrajudicial partition in which the
petitioner Gabriel and their mother (Antonia), were signatories.

On January 13, 1960, the Register of Deeds of Rizal denied registration of the Notice of Adverse
Claim. Elisa Gabriel elevated the case to the Land Registration Commission (LRC), which
resolved the question on whether the adverse claims were valid. The LRC believed that the
notices of adverse claim filed both registries substantially comply with the legal requirements and
are hence, valid.

Issue: Whether or not the adverse claims were registrable

Ruling:

Yes, the adverse claims were registrable.

The legal provision applicable to the case, Section 110 of Act No. 496 is divided into two parts: the first
refers to the duty of the party who claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, subsequent to the date of the original registration; and the requirements to be complied with in
order that such statement shall been titled to registration as an adverse claim, thus showing the
ministerial function of the Register of Deeds, when no defect is found on the face of such instrument; and
the second applies only when, after registration of the adverse claim, a party files an appropriate petition
with a competent court which shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such
adverse claim, and to enter a decree, as justice and equity require; and in this hearing, the competent
court shall resolve whether the adverse claim is frivolous or vexatious, which shall serve as the basis in
taxing the costs.

The first part was already acted upon by the L.P.C. which resolved in favor of the registrability of the two
adverse claims and this part should have been considered as closed. What is left, is the determination of
the validity of the adverse claims by competent court, after the filing of the corresponding petition for
hearing, which the appellant had not done.

The Land Registration Commission did not state that it was mandatory for a Register of Deeds to register
invalid or frivolous documents, or those intended to harass; it merely said that whether the document is
invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of
competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the documents sought to be registered
conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.

16. BAYOCA vs. NOGALES G.R. No. 138201 (340 SCRA 154) September 12, 2000

Facts:
 Gaudioso Nogales acquired ownership over the subject property on the basis of the Compromise
Agreement and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Julia Deocareza who had acquired of said
property from the Canino brothers and sisters. However, Preciosa Canino subsequently sold at
different times portions of the subject property to herein petiitoners, Francisco Bayoca, Nonito
Dichoso, Erwin Bayoca, and spouses Pio and Dolores Dichoso.

The Appellee, filed complaint against the Appellants for Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages.
He alleged in his complaint, that he purchased the said property from Julia Decareza and thus
acquired ownership thereof and that the Appellants respectively purchased portions of said
property in bad faith and through fraud. The Appellants, in their Answer to the complaint, alleged
that Preciosa Canino and her siblings acquired just title over the property when they executed
their Deed of Partition of Real Property and conveyed titles to the vendees, the Appellants in the
present recourse, as buyers in goof faith.

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Nogales and declared that the sales of portions of said
property by Preciosa Canino were null and void. The trial court further declared further that
petitioners were purchasers in bad faith.
On appeal, the court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence this petition.

Issue: Who has the superior right to the parcel of land sold to different buyers at different times by its
former owners?

Held:
Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

There is no question from the records that respondent Nogales was the first to buy the subject property
from Julia, who in turn bought the same from the Canino brothers and sisters. Petitioners, however, rely
on the fact that they were the first to register the sales of the different portions of the property resulting in
the issuance of new titles in their names.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, as
follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in possession; and in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith.

Based on the foregoing, to merit the protection under Article 1544, second paragraph, the second buyer
must act in good faith in registering the deed. Thus, It has been held that in cases of double sale of
immovables, what finds relevance and material is not whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in
good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without
knowledge of any defect in the title of the property.

On account of the undisputed fact of registration by respondent Nogales as the first buyer, necessarily,
there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the petitioners Erwin Bayoca and the spouses
Pio and Lourdes Dichoso for which they had been issued certificates of title in their names. As for the
petitioners Francisco Bayoca and Nonito Dichoso, they failed to register the portions of the property sold
to them, and merely rely on the fact that they declared the same in their name for taxation purposes.
Suffice it to state, that such fact, does not, by itself, constitute evidence of ownership and cannot likewise
prevail over the title of respondent Nogales.
17. SALAO v SALAO

FACTS:

The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal begot four children
named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son,
Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao. His widow died on May 28, 1914.

After her death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia. It was partitioned extrajudicially
in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May 22, 1919. The deed was signed by her four
legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao,
in representation of his deceased father, Patricio.

The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two
children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao,
Pampanga. It is also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later
became a part of Bataan.

Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business. Valentin Salao and
Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the
properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition
of the Calunuran fishpond.

On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands purchased by
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908 After Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they exercised dominical rights
over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.

The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of Lands reveals that the Calunuran
fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia
Salao, while the Pinanganacan fishpond (subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of
975,952 square meters.

On May 27, 1911 Ambrosia Salao bought for four thousand pesos from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a
parcel of swampland planted to bacawan and nipa with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and 73 centares
located at Sitio Lewa, Barrio Pinanganacan, Lubao, Pampanga. The record of Civil Case No. 136,
General Land Registration Office Record No. 12144, Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that
Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao filed an application for the registration of that land in their names on
January 15, 1916. Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land. The decree was issued
on February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao. That Pinanganacan or Lewa
fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre. It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond

Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years. His nephew, Valentin Salao,
died on February 9, 1933 at the age of sixty years according to the death certificate. The intestate estate
of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on December 28, 1934 between his two daughters, Benita
Salao-Marcelo and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza. His estate consisted of the two fishponds which he had
inherited in 1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio. If it were true, he had a one-third interest in the
Calunuran and Lewa fishponds with a total area of 145 hectares registered in 1911 and 1917 in the
names of his aunt and uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan Y. Salao, Sr., respectively.

Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao, three lots located at Barrio Dampalit
with a total area of 5,832 square meters. As donee Benita Salao signed the deed of donation. On that
occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the children of her sister,
Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of
Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.

It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death that she thought of filing an action for the reconveyance of the
Calunuran fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan
Salao y Santiago (Juani).

On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's
death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she
donated her one-half proindiviso share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr.
(Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family, he was already the owner of the the other half of the
said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed of donation included
other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the said
properties during her lifetime. The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950.

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January 26, 1951
informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani
took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share of
the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the
two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the
Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's one-half share.

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on
January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan. They amended their complaint on January 28,
1955. They asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to
them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of
fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao.

Whether or not the issue is tied up with the question of whether plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had
already prescribed.

HELD:

Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there was an
express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence
cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust.

A Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496).
A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to
maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and
convincing

The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. "Once a title is registered, the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa,
to avoid the possibility of losing his land
There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan Y.
Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no constructive trust
because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by
fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the
Calunuran fishpond " being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.

And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly barred by prescription or
laches Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this
case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year.

The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance
was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty
years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on
their rights if they had any rights at all.

18. Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippines Islands (plaintiff-appellant) vs. Pastor
Conegero VDA. De Lizarraga, et al., (defendant-appellees)

Facts:

Prior to June 26, 1913, Conegero was the holder of Torrens CT, No. 147, covering a parcel of
land in the city of Iloilo. Subsequently, in the course of the cadastral proceedings the court found
it convenient or desirable to order that the certificate of title No. 147 be cancelled and that a new
certificate of title should be issued to Conegero in its stead.

Before the cancellation Conegero, she mortgaged the land covered by it to El Hogar Filipino to
secure a debt, and the encumbrance thereby created was noted on her duplicate certificate of
title. On March 30, 1916, she entered into an agreement with one Samuel Thomas whereby she
bargained and sold to the said property described in title No. 147. At the time of such sale, no
Torrens certificate was produced or delivered and certificate No. 147 was non-existent as having
been cancelled.

As evidenced by deed of sale, Thomas attorney sent the document to Francisco Enage, register
of deeds in Iloilo, in order that the transfer might be registered and that a new certificate might in
due course be issued to Samuel Thomas. However, Mr. Enage, replied by returning the document
and informing the writer that the registration thereof could not be effected for the reason that
certificate No 147 had been cancelled.

Conegero mortaged again the said property to Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine
Island to secure a credit of P2,000 guaranteed by the surety company. This mortgage was
registered and noted on the original certificate of title, No. 194, by the register of deeds at Iloilo.

Thus, Thomas commenced an action in the CFI of Iloilo to compel Conegero to produce
certificate No. 194 for cancellation, and to secure the issuance of a new title in his name. On the
other hand, Conegero executed a third mortgage, to Southworth and Goyena, to secure a note
for P500.

On March 22, 1918, the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands brought an action
to foreclose its mortgage, naming Thomas, and Southworth and Goyena as codefendants with
Conegero.

The trial court held that the property belonged to Samuel Thomas and plaintiffs remedy was only
limited to a judgment in personam against Conegero for the amount of P1,982.50. Hence, the
plaintiff appealed.
Issue: WON the deed of March 30, 1916 (sale) to Samuel Thomas is superior to the mortgage of October
18, 1916, executed in favor of the Fidelity and Surety Company.

Held:

No. The deed of March 30, 1916 to Samuel Thomas is not superior to the mortgage of October 18, 1916
executed in favor of the Fidelity and Surety Company.

Section 56 of Act No. 496 provides in part as follows:

Each register of deeds shall keep an entry book in which he shall enter in the order of their
reception all deeds and other voluntary instruments, and all copies of writs or other process filed
with him relating to registered land. He shall note in such book the year, month, day, hour, and
minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they are received. They shall be
regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument when
made on the certificate of title to which it refers shall bear the same date.

This statute says that an instrument shall be regarded as registered from the time the annotation is made
in the entry book, these word must be understood to apply to such instruments as are competent to
transfer, or effect, the Torrens title and upon which a new certificate is in fact issued in due course. This
means that wherever registration is actually effected, and a new certificate issued, the registration is
retroactive and takes effect by relation as of the date when the annotation in the entry book was made. In
the light of this interpretation it is quite evident that the mere annotation of a contract relating to land
covered by a Torrens title, which is not followed by registration and the emission of a new certificate, is
without significance as regards its effect upon such title. In this case at bar, the absolute deed of sale in
favor of Thomas was presented to the register of deeds but the Torrens title upon which that deed was
supposed to operate was non-existent, having been judicially canceled with the consent of the owner.
There can be con constructive registration in a situation of this kind.

The steps by which registration is accomplished are fully set out in section 57 of Act No. 496. Registration
of the transfer of registered land depends upon several vital conditions, among which is the requirement
that the grantor's duplicate certificate, upon which the title is founded, shall be produced before the
register of deeds for cancellation; and that he shall also have before him the original certificate, likewise to
be cancelled. This prerequisite condition was not complied with when the deed to Thomas was presented
for registration. On the other hand, the conveyance of the land covered by certificate No. 194, by way of
mortgage to the Fidelity and Surety Company, was effected in compliance with all legal requirements. As
a consequence it must be held that the title acquired by the Fidelity and Surety Company is superior to
that acquired by Samuel Thomas.

The judgment appealed from was reversed and the cause was remanded to the court of origin with
direction to proceed to the foreclosure of the plaintiffs mortgage in the manner prescribe by law.

19. TENIO-OBSEQUIO vs. CA G.R. No. 107967 March 1, 1994

Facts:

Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for recovery of possession and
ownership of a parcel of land in Agusan del Sur. They alleged that they mortgaged the land to
Eduardo Deguro for P10,000 and to guaranty the loan they delivered the OCT of the land; the
latter, without consent and knowledge of the private respondents, prepared a document of sale
made it appear that the private respondents sold the land to him.

The deed of sale was annotated at the back of the certificate of title. By virtue thereof, the Original
Certificate of Title in the name of Eufronio Alimpoos (private respondent) was cancelled and a
Transfer Certificate of Title was correspondingly issued in favor of Eduardo Deguro. After the
death of the latter, his heirs sold the land to Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio.
 Respondent Alimpoos, as the original owner of the said land, assailed the title of petitioner on the
ground that their original certificate of title over the said land was cancelled by virtue of a forged
deed of absolute sale.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio as the true
and absolute owner being a purchaser in good faith. However CA reversed the decision.
Petitioners went to SC.

Issue: WoN petitioners may validly claim ownership of the land as purchaser in good faith.

Held: Yes

Under Section 55 the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
an original owner, of registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer thereof on the ground of fraud.
However, such a remedy is without prejudice to the rights of any innocent holder for value with a
certificate of title. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for
the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property.

The petitioners had relied on the TCT obtained by Deguro. The main purpose of the Torrens system is to
avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the
public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will
in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of property.

Moreover, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the deed of sale which constituted the basis for
the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Eduardo Deguro, considering that not only
was the contract notarized but that it was also approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in compliance with Section 118 of the Public Land Act.

It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent
purchaser for value intervenes. Where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the
true owner to the forger and, while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of
anything to excite suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the
title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.

20. Del Mundo v CA

FACTS:

The spouses Carlos and Alejandra Nava owned a house and lot located in Project 6, Quezon City
which was mortgaged to the Philippine Veterans Bank. In 1981, before the spouses Nava
migrated to the United States, this residential property was leased by Gerardo A. Del Mundo. In a
lease contract denominated as Agreement of Lease with Option to Purchase, spouses agreed to
lease the property to petitioner for one year, with a monthly rental of P2,500.00. Gerardo A. Del
Mundo was given until October 16, 1982 to exercise his option to buy the property.

After a year, Gerardo A. Del Mundo failed to exercise his option, while spouses were in the United
States, Gerardo A. Del Mundo sent them a Deed of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage asking
spouses Nava to sign the said Deed ostensibly to enable him to borrow part of the purchase price
in the sum of P470,000.00 from the bank, sending also an Addendum to the Deed of Sale which
states that he will also assume her obligations to Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales and to Pablo Nava.
 Alejandra Nava lost faith after several letters, Gerardo A. Del Mundo failed to comply of his
promise to pay the P174,000.00 obligation to the Philippine Veterans Bank, the P166,000.00
indebtedness to Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales and her P40,000.00 obligation to Pablo Nava.

March 16, 1983: spouses Nava executed a Revocation of Deed of Sale with Assignment of
Mortgage in favor of petitioner and his wife was revoked and canceled by private respondent
spouses because the former had not yet paid the private respondent spouses and Mrs. Ligaya
Gonzales.

August 11, 1983: The spouses through attorney-in-fact Bayani Sy, filed a complaint for Unlawful
Detainer against Gerardo A. Del Mundo and was order to vacate the premises, pay rent and
attorneys fees in a decision dated March 26, 1992.

January 14, 1993: Upon motion by spouses, Judge Teodoro P. Regino ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution pending appeal. In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner assails the
issuance of the writ on the ground that the Metropolitan Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over
the ejectment case.

June 30, 1993: the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision on the ejectment case on appeal.
The judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court was merely modified by increasing the attorneys
fees and costs to be paid by petitioner.

November 5, 1985; a Petition for Declaratory Relief to Quiet Title was filed by herein petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79 The trial court rendered a decision on
May 31, 1991 in favor of private respondents.

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER:
The notarized Deed of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage signed by the spouses Nava
conclusively shows that there was consideration for the contract of sale. More particularly,
petitioner contends that respondent court erred in not upholding the validity of the Deed of Sale
with Assignment of Mortgage; in giving credence to parol evidence over the written instrument; in
holding that the documentary evidence of private respondents have been formally offered and in
giving full weight to private respondents evidence which is based on deposition upon written
interrogatories. In addition, petitioner maintains that the respondent RTC judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of the writ of execution in the unlawful detainer case.

Petitioner in the main contends that the Deed of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage executed by
the parties is valid, thus making him the owner of the property.

RULINGS OF LOWER COURT

RTC: the deed of sale with mortgage assignment is merely a sale of property and is only
realizable when a promise to pay is compiled by the petitioner and the lease of contract only
states a lease of a year and has given to exercise his option to buy the property after a year and
failed to do so.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC

Issues:

1. Won the Deed of Sale with attachment of Mortgage is valid.

2. Won the writ of execution in the ejectment case is valid.

Rulings:

1. The errors raised by petitioner are clearly factual in nature. There is no justification to depart from the
well-settled principle laid down in a long line of cases that the findings of fact of the lower courts, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, are, as a general rule, binding and conclusive upon this Court.[23] There
is likewise no basis to review the factual conclusions of the Regional Trial Court, particularly since
respondent Court of Appeals adopted them as its own and found them to be in order.

Moreover, we agree with respondent appellate court in sustaining the trial courts findings:

a) Appellants allegation that he paid the amount of P476,000.00 to Mrs. Nava in his law office was not
corroborated by any of the office personnel allegedly present at that time;

b) There was no receipt of payment signed by the Navas presented in evidence;

c) Appellants allegation that he paid the consideration in his office is in conflict with his statement in his
affidavit-complaint (Exh. 32-a-1) that he paid the said amount at the City Hall of Manila.

d) His payment of the rentals on the premises in question for the months of December 1981 and January
1982; and his failure to declare the property in question in his name and his non-payment of the realty
taxes due thereon, are clear indications that at the time of the alleged sale, he still recognized the Navas
as the owners of the premises in question.

e) The series of letters he sent to the Navas who were in the United States (Exhs. 16 to 24) from March to
June 1982 would show that he has not paid the consideration as he was then requesting the Navas to
sign the prepared documents and return them to him, so that he may use them in applying for a bank loan
the proceeds of which will be used in paying the loans of the Navas and the consideration for the sale of
the property.

2. Petitioner fails to make his case. He contends that the Metropolitan Trial Court which ruled against his
favor was bereft of jurisdiction because the issue of possession cannot be decided without deciding the
issue of ownership and because respondent judge deprived him of his right to be heard. The records
elevated to the Court are those of the declaratory relief suit (Special Civil Action No. Q-46386 and CA-
G.R. CV No. 33251).

First, petitioner submitted only copies of the Order and writ of execution issued by the respondent Judge
Teodoro P. Regino. He did not attach a copy of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court against him.
Petitioner offers nothing substantial to justify his allegations.

Second, the issue of possession can be resolved in an ejectment proceeding without deciding the issue of
ownership. A judgment rendered in the summary action of forcible entry or unlawful detainer is conclusive
only on the question of possession and not of ownership. When the issue of ownership is indispensable to
the resolution of the issue of possession, the Metropolitan Trial Court is empowered to decide it as well.
[27] In any case, its decision does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.[28]

Lastly, his allegations are now moot and academic. The writ of execution issued by Judge Regino was
served and effected on March 1, 1993. A decision in favor of private respondents was rendered by
respondent RTC Judge on June 30, 1993, in effect confirming the propriety of the writ.