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A modelfor understanding& quantifying a difficult concept


By Domink Cooper

'IDUSTRIES WORLDWIDE ARE SHOWING beliefs, attitudes and behaviors is disputed by many
increased interest in the concept of "safety culture" as
(Wlliams, et al). They argue that not all corporate
a-means of reducing the potential for large-scale dis- -members respond in the same way in any given situ-
asters, as well as the inherent risks associated with ation, although they may adopt similar styles of
routine tasks. The extent of this interest was illustrat-
dress, modes.of conduct and perceptions of how the
ed by the "Corporate Culture and Transportation corporate body does (or should) function. As such, a
Safety" symposium sponsored by the National cultural theme may be dominant (e.g., quality, safety),
Transportation Safety Board in 1997; it drew 550 but the way in which this theme manifests itself or is
attendees from associated industries. Publicized expressed will vary; in turn, these may either be
efforts to achieve homogeneous worldwide safety aligned or in conflict with the dominating theme. In-
cultures in the offshore (May 127+) nuclear (Rosen other words, corporate culture is heterogeneous, not
287+) and shipping (Payer 12+) industries also testify homogeneous. Beliefs, attitudes and values abouf the
to its growing importance. Although well-inten- corporate body, its function or purpose can vary from
tioned, such aims also illustrate the confusion that division to division, department to department,
surrounds the concept within the safety profession workgroup to workgroup, individual to individual.
and academia. In both areas, this confusion centers on Therefore, different subcultures will emerge from or
what a safety culture is-and how it can be achieved. form: around functional groups, hierarchical levels
and corporate roles, with few values, beliefs, attitudes
The Concept of Corporate Culture or behaviors being commonly shared by the whole of
Since recognizing that its structure has limitations the corporate membership. On the basis of such evi-
in providing the "glue" that holds organizations dence, an industry-wide homogeneous safety cul-
together, -much management thinking over the last ture-let alone a global one-will likely never arise.
two decades has focused on the concept of corporate
culture. Usually based on a blend of visionary ideas, The Concept of Safety Culture
the dominating culture within any organization is The term "safety culture" first appeared in the
supported by ongoing analyses of organizational 1987 OECD Nuclear Agency report on the 1986
systems, goal-directed behavior, attitudes and per- Chemobyl disaster (INSAG). Gaining international
formance outcomes (Fry and Killing 64+). Although currency over the last decade, it is loosely used to
no universal definition of corporate culture exists, it describe the corporate atmosphere or culture in
appears to reflect shared behaviors, beliefs, attitudes which safety is understood to be, and is accepted as,
and values regarding organizational goals, functions the top priority (Cullen). Unless safety is the domi-
and procedures (Furnham and Gunter). The main nant characteristic of corporate culture-which
Dominic Cooper, Ph.D., CPsychol, FROSH, difference among available arguably it should be in high-risk industries-safety
FRSH, is a professor of safety education at definitions involves their culture is a subcomponent of corporate culture,
Indiana University. Bloomington. A focus on the way people which alludes to individual, job and organizational
professional member of ASSE's U.K. Section, think or on the way people features that affect and influence safety and health.
he has published extensively on safety in behave (Williams, et al), As such, the dominant corporate culture and the
professional and scientificjoumals and is a although some focus on both prevailing context-such as downsizing and organi-
well-known conference speaker in Europe. aspects (Uttal). zational restructuring (Pierce 36+)-will influence
Cooper is also president of B-Safe Ltd., a U.K. The idea that corporate cul- its development and vice-versa, as both interrelate
consulting firm based in Hull, East Yorkshire. tures reflect shared values, and reinforce each other (Williams). That is, safety
30 PROFESSIONAL .SAFETY JUNE 2002 www.asse.org
culture does not operate in a vacuum; it affects and, ture is viewed as an emergent property (set of values,
in turn, is affected by other operational processes or beliefs and attitudes) of social groupings, reflecting an
organizational systems. "interpretative view" favored by academics and social
These other influences become more apparent scientists. The latter reflects the functionalist view that
when theoretical models of accident causation are culture has a predetermined function (implementing
examined. (See Cooper(f) for a detailed overview.) The controls and policies to improve safety) favored by
most influential of these is Heinrich's domino model, managers and practitioners. HSC's definition com- Safety
originally conceived in 1931 (Heinrich, et al), and sub- bines both views. The "product of values, attitudes,
sequently adapted by Weaver, Adams and Reason. competencies patterns of behavior" element of the culture is a
While Heinrich conduded that the key domino was definition reflects an interpretative view, while the
unsafe acts, Weaver (22+) focused on symptoms of functionalist view is reflected by its stated putpose- subcomponent
operational error (management omissions) that inter- it deternines people's commnitment to safety, and the
act with unsafe acts and/or conditions. Adams (27+) style and proficiency of safety programs. of corporate
emphasized that operational errors were caused by The lack of clarity about the "product" has caused
the management structure and its objectives; the syn- much of the confusion that currently surrounds culture, which
chronization of the workflow system; and how opera- safety culture. What exactly is the product? One con-
tions were planned and executed. In turn, these ceptualization consistent with 1)the assessment char- alludes to
operational errors caused "tactical errors" (unsafe acts acteristics (direction and intensity) of culture (Schein
or conditions). Reason aligned the domino model to a 109+); 2) culture belonging to a group of people individual,
parallel five-element production model and identified (Rousseau); 3) culture as "the way we do things
how and where safety-related pathogens (e.g., latent around here" (Deal and Kennedy); and 4)goal-setting job and
and active failures) might be introduced into organi- theory (Locke and Latham) is "that observable degree
zational systems (Figure 1). It is suggested that latent of effort by which all organizational members direct organizational
failures are caused by organizational or managerial their attention and actions toward improving safety
factors (e.g., top-level decision making), while active on a daily basis" (Cooper(e)). features that
failures are triggered by individuals (e.g., psychologi- This definition for the safety culture "product"
cal or behavioral precursors). Like Adams, Reason provides an outcome measure (consequence) that affect and
shifts the main focus of accident prevention away has been severely lacking. Although one could argue
from unsafe acts and onto the organization's manage- that accident rates provide a better outcome meas- influence
ment systems. ure, these can be inaccurate for various reasons (e.g.,
Definitions of Safety Culture underreporting). Even if genuine zero accident rates safety.
The literature contains many definitions of safety were achieved, this outcome measure would suffer
culture. For example, Turner, et al defined it as "the set from a lack of ongoing evaluative data, making it
of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and tech- difficult to determine the quality of an ongoing
nicalpractices that are concerned with minimizing the "safety culture." Thus, reductions in accident and
exposure of employees, managers, customers and injury rates, although important, are not sufficient in
members of the public to conditions considered dan- themselves to indicate the presence or quality of a
gerous or injurious." The International Atomic Energy safety culture, whereas "that observable degree of
Authority (IAEA) calls it "that assembly of character- effort" is something that can be continuously meas-
istics and attitudes in organizations and individuals ured, monitored and assessed.
which establishes that, as an overriding priority, Operationalizing Safety Culture
nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention war- In practice, developing a safety culture is depend-
ranted by their significance." The Confederation of ent on the deliberate manipulation of various orga-
British Industry defined it as "the ideas and beliefs nizational characteristics thought to affect safety
that all members of the organization share about risk, (e.g., conducting risk assessments). The very act of
accidents and ill health" (CBI). The Advisory Commit- doing so means that such manipulations must be
tee for Safety in Nuclear Installations (subsequently goal-directed. Examining the specific purposes of
adopted by the U.K Health and Safety Commission- safety culture reinforces this view. These purposes
HSC-in 1993) defined it as "the product of individual include 1) reductions in accidents and injuries
and group values, attitudes, competencies and pat- (Turner, et al); 2) ensuring that safety issues receive
terns of behavior that determine the commitment to appropriate attention (LAEA); 3) ensuring that orga-
and the style and proficiency of an organization's safe- nizational members share the same ideas and beliefs
ty and health programs. Organizations with a positive about risks, accidents and ill health (CBI); 4) increas-
safety culture are characterized by communications ing people's commitment to safety; and 5) determin-
founded on mutual trust, shared perceptions of the ing the style and proficiency of a safety program
importance of safety and confidence in the efficacy of (HSC). Each purpose can be viewed both as a sub-
preventive measures." goal (antecedent) that helps an organization attain
Similar in concept to corporate culture, each defini- its superordinate goal (creating a safety culture) and
tion speaks to the way people think and/or behave in goal achievement (consequence) that arises from the
relation to safety. With the exception of the HSC, they creation of safety culture. Developing a safety cul-
suggest that safety culture "is," rather than something ture, therefore, simply becomes a superordinate
that the organization "has." In the former, safety cul- goal-one achieved by dividing the task into a series
www.asse.org JUNE 2002 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 31
XAdaptationm of Reasonm Pathogen: Model
Production Systemic Accident
Factors Pathogens Factors

High-levdl Latent Failures b S


decision makers Strategic kved decisions
Types
Line Latent Failures Line

Setting management Tactical level management


FuncUon

-- ---- Preconditions: Latent Failures Preconditions:


the difficult People, Technology Operationallevel for unsafe acts Conditiont

goal of & FqIuilpment I


Synchrmnized Active Failures Unsafe acts Human
Tokens

developing poduXctive Behavioral level Error

a safety
culture will
challenge
of subgoals (e.g., conducting risk assessments, audit- ed evidence. To greater or lesser degrees, this body of
the entire ing safety management systems, providing safety evidence reveals the presence of a dynamic reciprocal
training) that direct people's attention and actions relationship between psychological, behavioral and
organization. toward the management of safety. situational factors. For example, it is recognized in
In goal-theoretic terms, performance is a positive 1) safety culture definitions; 2) accident causation
function of goal difficulty. The greater the challenge, theories (such as Adams); 3) work conducted to iden-
the better people's performance tends tobe (assum- tify the organizational characteristics of high- vs.
ing the challenge is accepted). Setting the difficult low-accident plants, which emphasized the interac-
superordinate goal of developing a safety culture tion between organizational systems, modes of orga-
will challenge individuals, workgroups, depart- nizational behavior and people's psychological
ments and an organization as a whole. Dividing the attributes (Cohen 168+); and 4) research examining
task into more manageable subgoals that are, in why cultural change initiatives such as total quality
themselves, challenging and difficult should lead to management have failed (Cooper and Phillips(b)).
much greater overall attainment of the superordi- Consequently, rather than being solely concerned
nate goal (Cooper(b); Locke and Latham). with shared perceptions, meanings, values and
Goal attainment is affected by several mediators beliefs (as many propose), it can be cogently argued
and moderators, each of which readily translates that corporate (safety) culture is "the product of mul-
into safety characteristics. For example, goal-related tiple goal-directed interactions between people (psy-
mediators include the direction of attention, effort chological), jobs (behavioral) and the organization
and persistence (e.g., people's actual safety-related (situational)" (Cooper and Phillips(a)). Viewed from
behaviors at the strategic, tactical and operational this perspective, the prevailing corporate culture is
levels); task-specific strategies (i.e., the processes of reflected in the dynamic reciprocal relationships
goal achievement); and self-efficacy (people's confi- between members' perceptions about, and attitudes
dence in pursuing particular courses of action). toward, the operationalization of organizational
Goal-related moderators include ability (safety- and goals; members' day-to-day goal-directed behavior;
job-related competencies); goal commitment (com- and the presence and quality of systems and subsys-
mitment to safety at various hierarchical levels); tems to support goal-directed behavior.
goal-conflict (e.g., safety vs. productivity); feedback In essence, this definition reflects Bandura's
(e.g., safety communications); task complexity (e.g., model of reciprocal determinism derived from
managerial vs. operative role functions); and situa- Social Cognitive Theory (SCT). SCT focuses on cog-
tional constraints (such as lack of resources). These nitively based antecedents (such as goals), behaviors
moderators and mediators should be examined indi- and consequences (such as self-evaluative rewards),
vidually and in various combinations to assess their while also stressing the use of observable variables
effect on both the achievement of subgoals and the for assessment purposes. These same principles are
superordinate goal of creating a safety culture. highly valid for safety (Cameron 26+), particularly
in the domain of managerial decision making, one of
Quantifying Safety Culture the key routes by which "pathogens" or "latent fail-
No universally accepted model has yet been ures" are introduced into organizations (Reason).
established to enable the profession to quantify and This vast body of evidence also suggests that change
analyze safety culture. What is required is a concep- initiatives which do not consider the reciprocal rela-
tual model that facilitates the development of neces- tionship between psychological, behavioral and sit-
sary measurement tools. Here, a psychological model uational factors when developing a safety culture
is available that reflects a wide range of safety-relat- are doomed to failure.
32 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY JUNE 2002 wwwasse.org
- -- [-7r-1-r,Figure-2
E -WF- _'
-

Bandura's Model of
Rediprocal Determinism
Internal
tf |Person Psychological
Fatr
Factors

External
Observable
Factors
CONTEXT

I Environment I
EIior
1 ~iXF lF @-h -F _ :__ __ _ _ _ _ _ - _

Re@c'mpcal Safety Culture [Wodzel Intemal


Psychological
PERSON Factors
Safety Climate:
Perceptual Audit

Extemal
Observable
ORGANIZATION CONTEXT Factors
Safety System:
Objective Audit . r

JOB
Safety Behavior:
Behavioral Safety

Analyzing Safety Culture instruments that do not depend solely on incident or


Bandura's model has been adapted to reflect the accident indices; and 3) a dynamnic framework that
concept of safety culture (Figure 3). In this new provides the means with which to conduct multilevel
model, each element is measured via commonly analyses of the safety culture construct in order to
used methods. For example, internal psychological identify where cause-effect relationships exist.
factors (attitudes and perceptions) are assessed via Empirical efforts to examine these reciprocal rela-
safety climate surveys; ongoing safety-related be- tionships clearly support the model. For example, a
havior is assessed via behavioral safety initiatives; study conducted in a U.K. packaging manufacturer
situational features are assessed via safety manage- (Cooper, et al 219+) showed the impact of situational
ment system audits. features (both societal and organizational) on employ-
Each element in the model can also be broken ees' ongoing safety behavior, while a change initiative
down into exactly the same reciprocal relationships improved not only such behaviors, but also employ-
(Figure 4); this allows the multifaceted nature of the ees' perceptions of the safety climate. Duff, et al (67+)
safety culture construct tobe systematically examined, showed the effect of different approaches to goal set-
both within and between the three measurement ting (situational) on safety behavior in the U.K. con-
methods. It is recognized that the content of each ele- struction industry; they reported that participative
ment as presented may/may not be fully inclusive in rather than assigned goal setting produced better
relation to safety culture. However, the characteristics results. Similarly, Hurst, et al (161+) audited the safety
labeled were derived from diverse sources such as climate of six hazard sites in four European countries
human factors in industrial safety (HISE); successful and their process safety management systems. Results
health and safety management (HSE); goal-setting indicated that the two measures correlated with each
theory; behavioral safety research; safety climate other, but differentially with accident and loss-control
research; accident causation models; and studies of rates, demonstrating the practical utility of using a
organizational characteristics at high- and low-acci- combination of measurement methods.
dent plants. Thus, the model provides 1) an integra- Although these studies used a between-methods
tive way of thinking about the many processes that approach, examinations conducted from a within-
impact on safety culture; 2) a set of measurement method approach also offer support. A multiple
wwwasse.org JUNE 2002 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 33
n ! F_igurle!-74
T. FTh-rr (7

Rei'proca Modell of Safey Culture |X


Applieslto Each Element XVf X:
'PERSON
Personal Commitment
Perceived Rlsk
Job4nduced Siress
RoloAmbiguity
Compelencies
Social Status
Safety Knowledge
Attributions of Slamo
Commiltment to Organlalo
C satttactlont tb

:6 0i/'Safety Climate
ORGANIZATION Dimenslons JOB
Management Commitment Required Workpace
Management Actions Standard Operating Procedures
Communications > InvolvementinDcisionMaking
Ailocatlon of Resources Man-Machino Interfacing
Emergency Preparedness Working Environment
Status of Safety Personnel Working Patterns
I Housekeeping

Person
PERSON
Personnel ScIecton
Person-Job Fit PERSON
Task Training Goal Commitment
Saftty Training Organizational Posillon
Competencies Situation Elehavior
E<i+> Social Status
Safety Knowledgo
Hatlth Asscsaments
Job Satisfaction Dispoantion/Personallty
Organizational Commitment f Jab SaUtsfacton

Safety Management System


ODimnsions Dimensions
ORGANIZATION JOB
ORGAN17ATION JOB Management Commitment Teamwork
Management Commitment Rlsk Asses sments Management AcUons Task Complexity
ManagementActions RequiredW orkpace Communicatlons < Task Strategies
Communlcations . > Standard OperatlrigProcedures Performanco Indicators Goal Conflict
Allocation of Resources Teamwark Recruiting Observers Involvement In Decision Making
Emergency Preparedness Involvement In Decislon Making Monitoring Working Environment
Status of Safety Personnel MannMachine Intertfacing GoalSetting Working Patterns
PollcytStrstegy Development Working Environment Feedback
Planning Working Piattorns Safety Champion
Standards Houseke, iping
Monitoring
Controls
Cooperaton

regression analysis of 10 separate distributions of a of "matched" factors within each element of the
safety climate questionnaire to U.K chemicals, man- model. This is best illustrated by using the measure-
ufachting and food industries revealed considerable ment of management's commitment as an example.
differences between process workers' and managers' Questions would be asked about it via a safety climate
perceptions of risk (Cooper(d)). These findings indi- survey (e.g., are managers perceived by the workforce
cate the extent of each group's frame of reference as committed?) and also via a safety management sys-
when assessing risk, while also suggesting that risk tem audit (e.g., what is the safety budget relative to the
perception appears to be culturally determined. As total budget?). The degree to which managers visibly
such, it provides strong evidence to support the demonstrate their commitment would also be moni-
notion that all.levels of personnel must be involved tored during a behavioral safety initiative (e.g., the fre-
in conducting risk assessments. Similarly, utilizing quency with which management "walked the talk").
applied behavioral analyses (within a behavioral The second is to use a common metric across each
safety initiative to examine an organization's acci- of the three elements. Percentages are perhaps the
dent records) reveals employees' internal motivators easiest to use as they are commonly found in safety
(psychological) and the associated pathogens or management system audits and behavioral safety
latent safety management system failures (situation- initiatives. Safety climate surveys scores can easily
al) that affect ongoing safety behavior (Cooper(c)). be converted to percentages as well. Percentage
scores also facilitate the use of a five-point banding
Quantification Strategy scale that ranges from alarrning (0 to 20 percent) to
Since each safety culture component can be direct- excellent (80 to 100 percent). In principle, the per-
ly measured, or in combination, one can quantify safe- centage score for each element is calculated and con-
ty culture in a meaningful way at many different verted into the five-point scale. Scores are then
organizational levels, which has historically been a placed on their appropriate axis (Figure 5). Scores
challenge. Quantification may also provide a common relative to each other indicate which of the three
frame of reference for the development of safety safety culture elements is weaker; this area then
benchmarking partnerships with other business units becomes the focus of attention and corrective action.
or organizations-something of particular importance
to industries that use specialized subcontractors. Illustration
To quantify safety culture, two relatively simple A safety director for a large multinational compa-
things must occur. The first requires the measurement ny worked with a safety psychologist to develop a
34 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY JUNE 2002 wwwasse.org
safety climate survey
and safety manage- -_ _ _ __u__e_ _ _ _
ment audit that pos-
sessed 100 percent Safety Culture Prof 'lie
point-to-point corre- I
spondence between NE
ifety Values Score = 3.10 (62%)
safety system items to
be audited and survey
questions. Both instru-
ments reflected activi- A
ties gleaned from Scale %Score
a behavioral analysis 0 to 1=Alarmung 0 to 20% Overall Safety Culture Score = 3.05
that had been con- 1to 2-Poor 21 to 40% 1 (61%) l
ducted two years 2 to 3=Average 41 to 60%
prior, when the firm's 3 to4=Good 61 to 80%
locations implement- 4 to S=Excellent 81 to 100%
ed a behavioral safety
system; this system
involved the measure-
ment of various safe-
ty-related behaviors of
all personnel.
Both instruments /
were used at the same
time. Once complete, 4
the safety director and
5
his team calculated
the global safety cli- Safety System Score 3.04 (60.8%) Behavioral Safety Score = 3.01 (60.2%)
mate survey score for
the whole company = _
via statistical analysis of all responses. The team then References
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elies
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:F-gure-6 0
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(542%)
___-- -- --
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I-IMSO, 1993.
___....

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-_ ---
_ ------- _ --
_ ---
_ -_ -___ --. ------------- _ __
--- ----------- ---- __ -___._. INSAG. Safety Culture Safety Series No. 75-
_----------------

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of safety culture may help overcome much of the of Operational Error."
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