THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING

CORPORATION ,petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.

Facts:
Respondent, Mariano Cu Unjieng, was convicted with the crime of fraud in
forging warehouse receipts and certificate of stock in a criminal proceeding (People
v. Mariano Cu Unjieng G.R. No. L-41200) initiated by a complaint filed by Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation. The petitioners, People and complainant HSBC
filed a motion for execution of judgment and simultaneously, Mariano Cu Unjieng
applied for probation under Act No. 4221 (Probation Act). Judge Jose Vera of Branch
7 of CFI Manila suspended the hearing for execution of judgment to pave way for
the hearing for probation.
The complainant bank questioned the authority of the judge to hold probation
hearings and assailed the constitutionality of the Probation Act because it violates
the equal protection laws and it gives unlawful and improper delegation of
legislative power to provincial board. The assailed law, by virtue of Section 11,
allows the existence of a probationary officer if the provincial board grants it a
salary as high as a city fiscal. The City Fiscal of Manila filed a supplementary
petition, affirming the issues raised by the complainant bank, further arguing that
probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the
exclusive power of the Chief Executive. Both petitioners filed this original action in
the Supreme Court to deal with the issues.
Issue:
Whether or not the Act 4221 Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill
of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection.
Ruling:
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all
the three grand departments of our government and on the subordinate
instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like
the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws,
sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws." Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will
cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating against some
and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor
made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. (YOU MAY
NOT COPY THIS PART)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not
necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the
counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may
appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while
another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would
be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person
otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits
of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the
necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective
provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that
probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative
action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every
person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of
the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province,
through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the
probation officer which is the situation now and, also, if we accept the
contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be
considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any
appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations
suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the
law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all
cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section
11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are
permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual
denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of
setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances
considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the
denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no
difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair
on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions