Ontology and Utterance

Author(s): Keiji Nishitani

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1981), pp. 29-43
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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Keiji Nishitani Ontologyand utterance

I would like to beginwitha shortdiscussionof "utterance"seen particularly

as a modeofman's being.Buta discussion,howevershort,ofspeech"speaking"
as a particularmode ofman's beingwillnecessarilyinvolvethequestionofthat
which transcendseverykind of speaking-that which is in its verynature
unspeakable.In thehistoryof Westernphilosophicaland theologicalthought,
it is not uncommonto findan emphasison such an "unspeakableness"of the
absolute being or the ultimatetruth,for example,the Platonic Idea of the
Good, or the Christianconceptof God as ens realissimum, whichare said to
be inexpressible in theviapositiva,exceptas expressedallegorically,
metaphor-
or
ically,symbolically, by analogy. The unspeakableness of theabsolutebeing
or ultimatetruthis said to requirean immediateexperiencein deep silenceas
the transcendenceof speaking,a mysticalunion in the so-called ecstasyas
transcendence of thehumanmode of being.The onlyway open to man is the
via negativa,thatis to talkabout whatis not.Now, are thewordsof Heidegger
to be understoodas pointingin the directionof such a mysticalway? I think
we can in one sense say, yes,but at the same time,in anothersense,no: for
whenwe look at Heidegger'swords carefully,it is the "Sage" (utterance)of
Denken(thinking)that is to be broughtto restin its essence.This means,in
turn,that these words of Heideggerhave an intrinsicinvolvementwith the
domain of thetraditionof philosophy,especiallythe "first"philosophycalled
metaphysics, whichdeals withontologicalproblems.The earliercited theme
fromHeideggeris an utteranceoriginating"fromtheexperienceof thinking"
(aus der Erfahrungdes Denkens). AlthoughI need not enterhere into the
extremelycomplicatedyet,at the same time essentiallysimple,implications
hiddenin Heidegger'swords,let me briefly remarkabout two things.
First,it has oftenbeen the case thatphilosophyand its thinkinghas only
foundits own restor repose in a returnto the mystical.To cite the greatest
instances,Augustine'srestlesssoul, as he describesit in his Confessions,after
its long philosophicalwanderingfromManicheismto Neo-Platonism,finally
attainedto theawarenessthatsinceit is createdby God towardGod, it could
findreposeonlybycomingto restin God. It is also said thatThomasAquinas,
whilewritinghis greatwork,the SummaTheologica,stoppedwritingwhenhe
became conscious of his incompetenceto talk even theologicallyabout that
whichof its verynatureshould remainunspoken,and thereuponsteppedinto
the silenceof the mystical.Contraryto thatmysticalway,philosophyand its
thinkinghave neverceased frombeing restless;rather,man has devotedall
his abilitiesand facultiesto satisfyhis propensity
to thinking.Here I need only
mentionthenames of Descartes,Bacon, Kepler,Galileo, or Marx and Freud.
Man's thinkingseemsmeanwhileto have even forgotten theway back to the

Keiji Nishitaniis Professorof Philosophyat Otani University,

Japan.
NOTE: This article was firstpresentedas a paper at the FourthInternational
Consultationon
Hermeneutics heldat SyracuseUniversity, October1970.
PhilosophyEast and West31, no. 1 (January,1981). C by The University
Pressof Hawaii. All rightsreserved.

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30 Nishitani

mystical,and to have become optimisticenough to finda positivemeaning

in itsown restlessness-whichis now called progress-by expellingeverykind
ofmetaphysics, ithas enhancedthephysicalto thepointthatevenman's being
comes to be located therein.Thus, finally,metaphysicsitselfhas begun to
debatewithGod about how and whata God oughtto be, or to protestagainst
God's existenceitself-as, forexample,in Nietzsche'sactive nihilism,or to
findin process itselfthe ultimatemeaningas reality.These radical attitudes
look verymuchlike thoseof Job and the Preacherin the Old Testament,yet
are whollydifferent fromthe latterin theirloss of orientationtowardGod.
At anyrate,it goes withoutsayingthattheentirehistoryof theWesternphilo-
sophical quest and its turmoilformsthe backgroundof the previouslycited
wordsofHeidegger.
Second, regardingWesternreligiosity,there has been in Christianitya
traditionof thinkingabout man's mode of being in referenceto that which
of itsverynatureis unspeakable.This is seenmostexemplarily in theApostles
-especially Paul-as theyproclaimedthegospeland workedto make known
the revelationof God. In thecontentsof theirutterancesthereare contained
many thingswhich permitour thinkingto attemptan ontologicalreinter-
pretation.For instance,it is said thatChristis the Word who was in the be-
ginningwithGod and bywhomall thingsweremade; or thewordsoftheChrist
incarnate,"He who seethme seethHim who sentme"; or theutteranceofPaul,
"It is no longerI thatlive,butChristwho livesin me." Here ontologicalfactors
remainimplicitin themystical,submergedin theonticexistence,so to speak,
ofthepersonswho are speaking.Theirutterancesserveto bearwitnessto their
ownpersonalexistence.Butinspiteoftheirreposeinthedomainofthemystical,
theydid not remainin themysticalsilence,butcame out to expressthemselves
in "bodily" utterance.I thinkthatthisprocedureof theirsis the origin-and
the creativepower-of the whole traditionof Christianreligiosity, as I will
discusslater.Here I onlywant to pointout the factthatas soon as thinking
triesto make explicitthe latentontologicalfactors,ontologybecomes theo-
logicalinsteadof philosophical,and theologyitselftendsto becomea dogma-
ticsthatwantsto excludephilosophyaltogether.In fact,philosophyhad to be
confinedfora long timeto therole of handmaidento theology;and evenafter
the emancipationof philosophicalthinking,the assumptionhas continued
that the circumstanceof the aforesaidrelationoriginatesnecessarilyand in-
evitablyfromtheveryessenceof Christianfaith.
Thus farI have been talkingabout both Westernphilosophyand Western
religion(Christianity). I have spokenofthetendencyof philosophicalthinking
to go radicallyin its own way of ontology,sacrificing the directiontoward
the mysticaland takingeithera radicallyphysicalor positivistic-or at any
rateantimetaphysical-wayofthinking, ora radicallynihilistic
wayofthinking
thatis a destructiveself-negation of ontologyand its time-honored tradition.
I have also spoken of certainradical utterancesof religiousfaiththatare in

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31

theirverynaturenonontological,beingrootedin the profoundsilenceof the

mystical,but whichdare to stepout intothefieldof actual,practicallife.And
I have mentionedthe bias inherentin such utterancesto become dogmatic.
Viewed in a comprehensive perspectiveinclusiveof both philosophyand reli-
gion,therehas been,especiallyin themodernworld,no truecontactbetween
them; even the tensionof polaritybetweenthemhas been lost, and each is
goingitsown separateway.The situationas a wholeindicatesa decisivechasm
thathas opened up in the innermostdepthsof the human mind-that is, at
the verybasis of man's beingitself.
I mustnow turnto theEasternway of thinkingabout theprimaryquestion
of utteranceas thedistinctive mode of man's being.As is well known,a sensi-
bility about thinking similar to thatwhichis explicitlyexpressedin theearlier
mentionedwords of Heideggeras the insightof thinkinginto its own nature
as wellas an admonitionto itself,has alwaysbeenfamiliarto thelongtradition
of Easternthought.The emphasison themystical,thatis an awarenessof the
incompetenceof utteranceas themode of man's beingin regardto thatwhich
should remainunspoken,and the insightthatutteranceand humanthinking
can returnto and restin its own natureonlywhenthatawarenessof incom-
petenceis trulygained,have been,I think,commontenetsthroughoutIndian
Brahmanism,ChineseTaoism, and JapaneseShinto.In Mahayana Buddhism,
especially,it has been regardedas theway to one of thetwo pillarsof theMa-
hayana,namely,to theso-calledGreatWisdom,prajhaparamiti.For example,
Nagarjuna,who lived in the second centuryA.D. and is called the founderof
Mahayana Buddhism,criticizedeveryvarietyof intellectualistic theoryand
discussioncurrentinhisday,callingthemso manyjokes becausetheycontained
nothingof the true,enlightenedawareness,and because theybetrayeda lack
of unityon the part of theirexponents.ParticularlyZen, in the traditionof
whichNagarjuna himselfis regardedas the fourteenth patriarch,and which
is oftenassumedto be a radical formof Easternmysticism (an interpretation
thatis as such questionable),containswithinitselfthe most radical negation
bothofintellectualactivitiesand theirmeans-such as letters, words,concepts,
and so forth.If silenceis golden,thenZen maybe called an alchemythattrans-
formsall thingsinto gold by purifying themin the fireof the negationof all
lettersand words,namesand concepts,logicalmethodsand theoreticalsystems.
Zen is, so to speak, an antiontologicalalchemy.But, on the otherhand, it is
also an obvious factthat the historyof Zen is repletewithpracticallyevery
kindofliterary production,moreso indeedthanthetraditionsof otherschools
of Buddhismthat are mainlytheoretical.These literaryworks are as fullof
positiveZen utterancesin the formof monologicalsayingsand of dialog as
of its admonitionsto cut away all intellectualactivities.For instance,a monk
asks his teacher: "How can one pass throughsafely,withoutcommitting the
errorof fallinginto the pitfalleitherof silenceor of utterance?"Or a Zen
masterdemandsthathis disciple"make an utterancefrombeyondspeaking

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32 Nishitani

and silence." Or more simply,demandsof the questioningdisciple,"Who is

it thatspeaks?"
Let us take this last questionas the topic of our followingquest, since it
would seemto bringintofocusall possibleproblemsconcerningontologyand
utterance.The questionis a Zen question,similarto such questionsas "Who
is it thathears,or thatsees" and so forth.Such questions,althoughput on the
fieldof our daily life,are not questionsoriginatingfromour daily lifeat all.
"Who are you? I am (say) David Smith."That answeris no answerto theques-
tionput.It is thesameas "Whatare you?" . .. "I am an engineer."The question
asks just who and what you, an engineernamed David Smith,are. Or you
question yourself,"Who and what am I?" Suppose that you go to a Zen
teacherand,beingasked,"Who areyou?" answer:"My nameis David Smith."
He may perhapsask you somethingmore of yourself,sayingwitha gesture
of invitation,"Fine! Please show me, David, yourkinglypower as Smithby
forgingyourwhole kingdominto an iron ball!" or "Change yourrealminto
a realmfullofgold," or somethinglikethat.If a cleverpresidentcould succeed
in makinghis countryfullof gold, or a Hitlersucceededin forgingan iron
ball out of his Reich,thatwould be no answer.The questionis an existential
(at once 'existenziell'and 'existential'in Heideggerianterms)and an ontic-
ontologicalquestion.It presupposes,in thebackgroundoftheman in question
-or in thegroundbeneathhis feet,thedomain of fundamental ontologyand
the various ontologicalregionsgroundedin it, and, moreover,a complexof
existentialproblems-a domain lying beyond the differentiation between
"who" and "what," betweenpersonal and impersonal.An answermust be
givenin accordancewithsuch a question.
The precedingquestionconcerning"who" and "what" the I is thatspeaks,
is a questionabout man's beingin theformwhichis expressedbytheterm"I."
I thinkthatthecomplexof problemsinvolvedin thatquestioncan be reduced
to the followingtwo questions: one is about the "I-being" as a factorin the
ontologicaldomain; the otherconcernsthe "I-being" as a factorin the ontic
domain. The distinctionbetweenthesetwo modes of I-beingcan be seen,for
example,in the German languagewhichdistinguishesdas Ich, "the I," and
ich as thepersonal"I." The one is the ontologicalI, the otheris thepersonal
"I." The problemincludedin this distinctionmay be said to have virtually
appeared alreadyin the earlystage of Westernphilosophy.It lies hiddenin
Plato's distinctionbetweenthedomainofIdeas and thatofsensiblephenomena.
As is well known,Plato endeavoredto solve the problemof the relation
betweenthesetwo realmsby the conceptof participation(methexis)without
whollysucceedings.What gave this concept of participationits ground or
foundationwas theconceptof soul (psyche).The soul was made to carrythe
main responsibility for the entireproblem.The soul is an animatingentity
dwellingin thebody,and the self-identical subjectnot onlyin animal lifebut
of theactivitiesof thefivesenses.The soul was thoughtto be able to enterinto

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33

the supra-sensibleontologicaldomain whilemaintainingits own self-identity,

and thusto combinein itselfboththerealmoftheIdeas and thatofthesensible.
The soul signifiesthe self-identity of man priorto the developmentof his ex-
plicitself-consciousness. This was thereasonthatitcould becometheprinciple
of affiliationmediatingthetwo realms.The soul is related,on theone hand,to
the body and its life-power,sense-faculties, and movements-and thus is a
part of the sentient world,while, on the other hand, it belongsas pure soul to
thesupra-sensible worldand is partofit.Whilethusbeingan objectquestioned
alongwithotherobjects,sensibleand supra-sensible, itis in itsown self-identity
as soul the subject that questions.Thereforeits self-identity consists,in its
concreteform,in theidentity ofthequestioningand thequestioned,an identity
thatgroundstherelationbetweensubjectand object.
It was throughits own naturethat the soul could be giventhe mediating
centralposition and could be made the principleof affiliationbetweenthe
sensibleand supra-sensible.But at the same timethe same fact became the
reasonforits incapacitytrulyto solve theproblemjust mentioned.In a word,
its self-identity did not have the power to bringits own contents,whichare
extremely heterogeneous, to a trueunityand to maketheirrelationstransparent.
Its self-identity remainsonly formaland has no power to reflectitselfin its
contentsand to make theirunitytransparent and trulyidentical.It could not
establisha trueself-identity in concreteformwherethereis neitherthequestion-
ing nor the questioned, which meanswheretheansweris given.Thereforethere
mustremainan essentialambiguityin theconceptofsoul-an ambiguity which
is expressed in the of
concept participation.At any rate,by the soul having
been made thekeypointof theproblem,theplace wherethequestionlies was
opened up forthe firsttime,but at the same timewas also concealed by the
soul itself.
For thatplace to be disclosedso thata new attemptto resolvetheproblem
could be made, it was necessarythatthebasic mode of man's beingshiftfrom
thesoul to theego-that is, to theself-conscious subject,or the"I" in thetrue
sense. For example,Descartes in his Discourseon Methoddeveloped his so-
called methodicdoubt.This developmenthas thecharacterof an epistemologi-
cal and ontologicaldiscussion,but at the same timeis writtenas a description
of his personalquest foran indubitablecertaintyregardinghis own thinking
and being.It is a recordor reportof his own "investigation of himself,"to use
his own phrase. Accordingly,when he finallyattainedhis purpose in his "I
think,therefore I am," it was a solutionof his own personalquest as well as
the keywithwhichto solve the ontologicaland epistemologicalproblemsof
thisday. In thislatterrespect."I thinktherefore I am" is an ontologicalprinci-
ple. The "I" of the cogito is "the I" thatis and that thinks.
Descartes drew into his methodicdoubt the existenceof all thingsin the
world-the world itself,the mathematicalscienceswhich have indubitable
logical certainty, and even God. He made out of thewhole,understoodas an

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34 Nishitani

ontologicalsystem,a large ball of doubt, so to speak, regardingthe certainty

of theirreal existence.There remainednothingmorethanhis act of doubting
whichgrew secretlyas that ball of doubt became more and more complete.
Consequently,througha suddenturnabouthe could returnto theact ofdoubt-
ingitselfand findthereinhis "I thinktherefore I am," bothas hisown personal
certaintyand, at the same time,as thekeypointof ontologicaland epistemo-
logicalcertainty. The certaintyof the"I" and of his personal"I" could at once
be attained.Here theontological"I" and thepersonalI, in spiteofthedifferent
domains to whichtheybelong,are the one and same "I." In thisself-identity
of "I" thereemergesa transparency throughthewhole of the sensibleand the
supra-sensible which could not appear in the Platonic soul as a mediating
center.Here thereappears the fundamentaldifference betweenparticipation
and self-identity. Betweenthe transcendental I and the personal I therecan
be no participationas betweentwo different beings; thereis onlyself-identity
whichis conscious of itself."I-am-thinking"could forthe firsttimedisclose
the place in whichthe intrinsicconnectionbetweenthe ontologicaland ontic
planes obtains. Or, rather,it becomes thatveryplace itself.This means,that
signifiesat thesame time,thata new answerwas proposed.
But we cannot say that Descartes was able to bringhis own new proposal
to fulfillment.When he took his pointof departurefromhis cogitoto establish
the certaintyof God's existenceand of the materialworld,he seemsto have
departedfromthe axis of "I am thinking"and to have returnedto the tradi-
tionalway of ontology.That partin his thoughtis dominatedby speculatively
syllogisticontology.It seemssymptomatic, in thisrespect,that,in his attempt
to prove the existenceof God, Descartes bringsforthagain the concept of
soul as theplace in whichtheidea oftheinfinite is foundto be innate.He could
not pursue his cogito"I think"to its ultimateconsequence.There ultimately
remainssome lack of transparency in Descartes' thought.
In Kant, thislack of transparency is removed.In his philosophytheconcept
ofthesoul is notemployedas a philosophicalterm.The "I" occupiesa sovereign
place in Kant's systemas the transcendental I, thatis, the so-calledtranscen-
dentalapperceptionof self-consciousness, and as the"I think"(das ichdenke).
The new lightof the transcendentalI could penetratethe whole domain of
traditionalontologyin his Critiqueof Pure Reason, althoughit was undera
of thinking,givingup cognitionof theentireintelligible
self-restriction world,
on theone hand,and recognitionof things-in-themselves in thesensibleworld,
on theother.At anyrate,in Kant thetranscendental I and theactual,personal
I was one and the same I. In his analysisof thedomain comprehendedby the
transcendentalI, he sometimesuses the termich,forinstance,when he says
"whenI draw a lineon thepaper," and so on, to givesome concreteexamples.
In suchcases hisdiscussioneasilywandersbetweenthetwodomains.He freely
usesbothterms,das Ich and ich.Makingtheself-identity ofthe"I" theprinciple
Kant could constitutetheinnerconnectionof thetwo fields.
of affiliation,

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35

But this standpointof the I still contains a problem. Althoughit could

become,in Descartesor Kant, a principlecomprisingthetwo fieldsof thesen-
sible and the supersensible,overcomingthe ambiguityof the Platonic soul,
it is stillnotclear about whatthegroundis of thepossibilityof theself-identity
of thetranscendental I and thepersonalI. The place of thatI is opened,forit
is theplace of its own being; but thatplace is stillnot theplace as theground
on whichthat self-identity of the two modes of I-beingbecomes possible. So
faras thatgroundis not clarified,it is also unclearabout whatkindof I is the
self-identical. Viewed fromthe transcendental I, the self-identical
I is open to
the question,"What is thatI?"
I take up thisutteranceof Paul in reference to the precedingZen question,
"Who and what is it thatspeaks?" The question,therefore, is about whom it
is thatspeaks.Is itPaul? ButthisutterancesaysthatPaul does notliveanymore,
it is Christwho is livingin him. Is it thenChrist?But whenit is said that"it
is no longerI who live" this"I," theutterer,is not Christ,but Paul. However,
Paul says that he lives no more,that he is dead. Who is it then,that speaks
here? This questioningis not to indicatethe logical paradox includedin this
utterance,which is too clear to be especiallyindicated.Logicians mightsay
thatsuch an utteranceis nonsense,ifnot a joke, and it is indeed nonsensical
to deal with such an utteranceseriously.If this utterancewere an ordinary
utterance,logicianswould be right.But it is not an utteranceoriginating from
the plane whence ordinaryutterancesarise. The plane fromwhich it comes
lies far beyondlogic. And viewedfromthat plane, logical criticismbecomes
a "joke" in Nagarjuna's sense and logiciansthemselvesappear to be lacking
seriousness.In the aforementionedquestion, "Who is it that speaks?" the
questiontakes seriouslythe utteranceof Paul-for it is doubtlesslyhis-and
seekstheplace whenceit originates,thatis, theplace wherePaul is. But before
thatwe mustfurther clarifywhatthisutteranceis not.
It is hardlyan utteranceofa generalcharactersuchas thoserecitedbypeople
in churches.Its latterpart,seen alone, may appear to be that.Paul says else-
where,"whilewe live we are alwaysgivenup to death forJesus'sake, so that
the lifeof Jesusmay be manifestedin our mortalflesh."Such a saying,too,
withitsplural"we," maygivea similarimpression.It wouldthenbe an utterance
by anychurchgoerwhomsoever,and thustrulyby none. It mightserveforde-
voted believersto keep faithfully to the teachingsof thechurchregardingthe
dogmas of Christianfaith,and mighthave, at most,a value forsocial ethics.
But, in fact,the singular"I" in the firstutterancehas too much of a serious
personaltone to be treatedin such a way. The "we" in the second quote of
Paul also mustbe understoodwiththat"I."
Or is thatutteranceonlyan exaggeratedexpressionof a fanaticismtoo eager
in its exhortationsto the waveringGalatians? Or an expressionof ecstasyof
an enthusiasticmystique?Although the practical activityof the apostolic
missionand themysticalquietudeof the"alone" belovedone can be somehow

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36 Nishitani

essentiallyrelatedto the case in question,all such views mentionedearlier

surelycannot do justice to this utterance,the main concernof whichlies in
Paul's and Christ's"life" and "death." It is clear fromthefirstthattheplace
fromwhichit originatesmustbe a plane whereinlifeand death interfuse. The
question is, where can such a plane be found? Or, as the "death" Paul speaks
of was no real death,thenis it said onlyas a metaphor?If by the"real" death
a physicaldeath were meant,the answeris yes. But Paul here indicatesby
"death" thathis "I"-being has been totallyannihilated.Also it does not refer
to a metaphysicalview. He is speakingof the lifeand death of his personal
I whichhas nothingto do withthe transcendental or ontologicalI (das Ich
Kantian).However,althoughit is not an utterancethatis metaphysical,it is
always possible formetaphysicsto interpret it metaphysically in the domain
of theologyin termsof beingand nonbeing.And if our questionconcerning
"Who and whatI am" includestheproblemofthetranscendental I in addition
to theproblemof thepersonalI, thenmetaphysicalinterpretations will some-
how become relevantto our question.Similarly,the physicaldeath as such,
havingnothingto do withPaul's case, can becomerelevantwhenwe seek,for
example,the meaningof the term"flesh" or "mortal flesh" found in that
utterance.But eventhen,in orderthatthemetaphysicalas wellas thephysical
can manifestthemselveseach in theirtruernaturethan throughmetaphysics
and the physicalsciences,some transmetaphysical domain will be required
forthemto appear in a new light.
Now letus returnto Paul himself.Afterthewordsjust cited,Paul continues:
"And thelifeI now live in theflesh,I live by thefaithin theSon of God who
loved me and gave himselfforme." What is thelifewhichhe now livesin the
flesh?Is it the lifeof Christlivingin him?It should be, because Paul himself
saysthatit is no longerhe who lives.But his lifein theflesh-is it possibleto
thinkit otherthan his own? Are there,therefore, two lives,the lifeof Paul
and thelifeof Christin them?Or, is thereafterall onlyone life?Bothmustbe
true.Otherwiseboth would become false.Because if onlyone of thesetheses
were true,and the otherfalse,the entireutterancewould collapse, including
the one assumedto be true.Ordinarily,of two contradictory thesesonlyone
is true,and if one is true,the othermustbe false.But here,both of the two
contradictory thesesmustbe true; if not, both must be false. This logically
absurbsituation,however,onlyservesto showhow farbeyondlogicthematter
lies.
How, then,is thisparadoxicalmatterable to obtain? Christlives in Paul,
and in Paul thereis death. His self-beingor "I"-being has been broughtto
death.Buthe stilllivesin theflesh,and thislifein thefleshis nowa lifeanimated
by Christwho livesin him.There,thelifePaul livesin thefleshis none other
than the lifeChristlives in Paul. There is one and the same life,an identity
in and of life,a livingidentity.At thesame time,thelifePaul livesin theflesh
is preciselyPaul's own lifethat he lives withhis own body and mind in the

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37

sinfulfleshand in his practicalactivitiesas an apostle of Christ.Paul's lifeis

Paul's and not Christ's,as thelifewhichChristlivedin thefleshwas different
fromthat of Paul. These two sides, that of identityand that of difference,
thoughcontradictory at firstsightas well as logically,are reallynot contra-
dictoryat all; rather,theyare made possible by one another.Paul's own
apostoliclifewas made possibleonlythroughbeinganimatedby Christliving
in him,onlyin a livingmysticalunionwithChrist,Christ"gave himself"for
Paul in his crucifixion;he gave his lifeforPaul and livesin Paul, givinghima
new lifeand rebirth.That is the work of Christas the savior,the expression
of Christ'sown lifeas Christ.And it was possiblein thelivingmysticalunion
with Paul, in a livingidentity.Here identityis trulyidentityas that which
makesPaul's lifePaul's and Christ'slifeChrist's.
True identityconsistsin difference, as truedifference consistsin identity.
In otherwords,trueidentityis no otherthan duality,as truerealityis none
other than identity.In Paul's precedingutterance,he is simultaneouslyin
trueoneness,onenessin lifewithChrist,and is trulyhimself, thatis theapostle
Paul. They are in "no-other-ness."This no-other-ness is Love, Life,Reality,
and Faith,of whichPaul saysthat"the lifeI now livein thefleshI live by the
faithin the Son of God who loved me and gave himselfforme."
The otherside of lifeis death. Christgave himselfforPaul. He gave up his
lifein orderto give it over to Paul as a gift.Paul, receivingthe lifeof Christ,
gave his own lifeto death. Now it is Christwho livesin him; Paul's death in
himselfand Christ'slifein himtook place simultaneously, at thesame instant.
As a historicalevent,thisoccurrenceand thisinstant,thissuddenconversion,
was a unique eventin Paul's life,an eventthathappenedat a particulartime
and place. But thatdoes not mean thatitdid not come back. On thecontrary,
it occurredcontinuouslyat everyinstant,as Paul himselfsays,"Whilewe live
we are alwaysgivenup to deathforJesus'sake, so thatthelifeofJesusmaybe
manifested in ourmortalflesh."The samedeath-life occurrencewas repeatedin
Kierkegaard'ssenseof repetition. It is not an emptyrepetition;on thecontrary
it arisesat everyinstantas a whollynew event.Whyand how is thatpossible?
Paul's death and Christ'slifein him was one eventat one instant.What
caused thateventwas thatChristgave Himselfforhim,Christ'sdeathwas in
the crucifixion. Throughthis death, Christgave Paul His verybeing,which
contains the source of eternallife,and Paul, broughtto awarenessof this
gift,utteredthat "it is Christwho lives in me." As said earlier,Christ'slife
became withinPaul an animatingpower in the mysticalunion withhis new
lifeand senthim to his apostolic mission.Thus Christ'slifeis transferred to
Paul and is repeatedin Paul's own activelife.The lifeof the apostle Paul is
a repetitionof the lifeof Christthe savior.Or, in otherwords,Christ'sbeing
itself,givento Paul, reflectsitselfin Paul, whose beingis at the same instant
givenup to death and turns,so to speak, into a mirrorreceivingthe image.
Here, however,the image of Christis not a mere "image" but life,because

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38 Nishitani

it is an utteranceof self-giving love thatsilentlyand genuinelyexhalesrealness

of thelove realizedin it,in thesame way as a trueword reallytransmits, from
the silenceaccompanyingit, the man who speaks. And when Paul, in self-
awarenessof thematter,uttershis confessionabout Christlivingin him,it is
a re-collection (anamnesis)intotheoriginof his life,a concentration (samddhi)
of himselftowardthe giver.This being of Paul, in its awarenessof its own
origin,is just like the beingof a son who re-collectshimselfin his filialpiety
and love, of his sonship.Thus we will be able to say thatin Paul, withhis re-
collectionand self-awareness in relationto Christ,occurreda repetitionof the
being of Christas the Son of God.
In reference to what has just been said, however,the mostimportantthing
is thatthroughoutthisreligiousdomain,lifeis always interfused withdeath,
or rather,deathis thespring-or at least thespringboard-oflife.In thecase
of Christ,the springboardwas his death on thecross forPaul alone; and this
"for Paul alone" essentiallyimplies"for all mankind"as well as "for each
personalone."
Now, the death of the Christcrucified,of Christwho gave himself-his
whole beingas man-for Paul alone, foreach personof mankindalone, and
forthewhole mankind,was the fullrealizationof his beingas Christ,thatis,
was thefulfillment of his telosas Christ.For his birthitself,his appearancein
the world,takingthe mode man's being,the so-called incarnationof God's
Word,meantthathe emptiedhimselfintoa servantof mankindto save man-
kind. Christis therefore Christ,the Savior. In the groundof Christ'sbeing
Christis contained,fromthe first,this emptiness.His being-His being as
Christ-is essentiallybeing-in-emptiness. His being-in-the-world-his lifein
the world is as such the utteranceof God's Word in the world. And this
utterancecomes fromemptiness,fromabsolute silence. This is all because
Christis Christ.His death in the crucifixion in whichhe gave up himselfis
none otherthan the consummationof his lifeas Christthat originatesfromr
emptyinghimself.It is, as was just said, the fullrealizationof his being,the
fulfillment of his telos. He gave up himself,emptiedhimselfof himself,and
deliveredhimselfto Paul. And Christ'sdeathis thefullrealizationof his life:
thecompletionof his utterance.This realizationof his lifewas transferred to
Paul, was translatedintohis lifein Paul; and thiscompletionof his utterance
was translatedinto that utteranceof Paul's, "Christ lives in me." And this
utterance,as indicatedearlier,is a recollectionand reflection into the origin
of his lifeand being.In thisutteranceis containedthewhole reciprocaltrans-
ference,or transition, or translationof life-deathof Christand Paul.
ThereforePaul beginsthatutterancewiththewords,"I have been crucified
withChrist."This expressesthe mysticalunion in lifeand in death of Christ
and Paul, whichin factis there.And in thatmysticalunion,Paul is alwaysin
Christ,alwayscontemporary withhim; and converselyChristalwaysis in and
withhim.And thismysticalcontemporaneity denoteswhyand how therepeti-

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39

tionis possible.But is whathas been said earlierthewhole implicationof the

utteranceofPaul? If so, thenitmustbe said thatafterall Paul remainsbasically
on the levelof mysticism, althoughall dependson thedefinition of mysticism
one gives. Nobody will deny,however,that thereis found in Paul another
aspectwhollydifferent fromtheecstasyof mysticalunion(whichis ordinarily
assumedto be thecharacteristic of mysticism)namely,his practicalactivities.
This aspect indicatesthathe did not stop at the level of mysticism. Here the
difference betweencontemplativequietude and practicalactivitiesdoes not
signify a difference merelyon theniveauof man's innatedispositionor charac-
ter.It is, rather,essentiallyconnectedwithPaul's religiosityor his faith,with
his lifeand death as hithertodealt with.
We have dealtwithPaul's deathmainlyin itsrelationto Christ.This relation
consists,so we have said, of a mutualgivingover,a reciprocalreflection of
lifeand death,or, more concretely, of life-deathand death-life.This relation
betweenPaul and Christis repeatedalways as one occurrencein whichtwo
movementsto and froare intertwined. The mysticalunion is the place where
thisrelationis developed,thegroundon whichit can develop itselfas well as
the centerof its development.Because the mysticalunion is at the same time
the pointfromwhichthatrelationstartsand into whichit returns,it always
bringsforthan opennessthatgivesthe relationits place. Now the place that
is opened by the mysticalunion-or, rather,that is that unityitself-is the
openness in which all returnsto its origin.Paul's life originatingfromthe
life-giving death of Christreturns,throughthe onenesswithChristwho lives
in him,to theChrist'sdeath.This is a re-collection
and has thesimilarcharacter
of Plato's anamnesis. In the repetitionfromthe origintherealways arises
somethingnew,as fromthedeath-lifeof Christarisesa new life-death of Paul.
But thisnew lifeis always broughtback and re-collectsitselfinto the origin.
Here the instantof the repetitiontendsto lose its newnessthroughreturning
to itsorigin.It is thusrobbedof itsdecisivesignificance
as theinstant,itssigni-
ficanceof havingbroughtsomethingdecisivelynew-from "eternity,"if you
like. (I would rathersay only "somethingdecisivelynew," because what is
"decisivelynew," thatis, radicallytemporal,wears (just throughthatradical
"only-once"-ness)a kindof color-tarte(or color-sound,sound-colorof "eter-
nity.") In theplace opened by therepetitionobtainstheinternalization. Here
theplace is likea whirlpoolin whichall, once havingburstout fromtheinner
center,is broughtback again and again towardthe same center,whichis in
thecase now in questionthemysticalunion.Ontologicallytranslated, themys-
ticalunion has itscounterpartin Plotinus'"The One" (to hen).The transcen-
dence,theso-calledecstasy,of themystical(union) is similarto thePlotinean
ekstasisinto the One ultimatelytranscendingbeing as well as thinking.The
One is the ultimateend of an all-comprehensive hierarchicinternalization.
This transcendence,however,is the absolute identitywhere all difference
disappears.It is not yetthetrueidentitywhichis, as I said before,none other

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40 Nishitani

than difference. It is not the trueunitythatis none otherthan duality.True

unity demands the breaking-through of the vast Circle centeredaround the
One. The One withoutdifference, abstractedas the One, althoughthought
beyondthinking, is already re-presented objectivelyas Being; and although
beyondbeing,as something beyondbeing.Ontologyas well as epistemology
in generalmustbe cut down. Logic in generalmustbe cut down. Metaphysics
in generalmust be cut down. The true One is transmetaphysical; and here
thereis no hierarchyof value and being.The trueOne, the negationof "the
One," is whereeverydifferent thingis as suchtransmetaphysical.
To go beyond"the One" re-presented (thatis, thought)as beyondthinking,
is to erase fromrealityeven the last trace of subjectivity cast upon it. Put
differently, this is to stand out to the unsubjectiveworld of the diverseand
manifoldrealityof things,such as thesun,thewind,thestars,themountains,
therivers,theplants,and so on. For man,it is to go out intotheworldof the
physicalbody, senses,and passions. This is to rob the re-presentation of its
functionof re-presenting. When this occurs,thingscease to be objects. To
breakthrough"theOne" re-presented to be beyondall beingnessis to wipeout
the
completely objective contents ofknowledge.Thisis to robtherepresentation
of itscontents.The re-presentation (thatis, man's cognition)therebybecomes
an emptyre-presentation. This is preciselywhen representation ceases to be
representation.
Thus opens up the "emptiness"transcending even "the One." That which
refusesall objectification couldnot even be named "the One." For to name is
to objectify;it is thus to make into "something."Thereforeone mustcall it
"emptiness" or "nothingness."This "nothingness"is no objective being;
neitheris it subjectivenothingness.If it were subjective"nothingness"there
would have to be objective"being" in relationto it. Therefore,that which
is beyondthe representation of both "being" and "nothingness"is the true
nothingness. That which can in no way be objectifiedis this "nothingness."
In this place of nothingness,as mentionedearlier,various thingspresent
themselves, buttheyareno longerre-presented. The unobjectifiable nothingness
and the phenomenaof variousthingsare trans-metaphysically one. Nothing-
ness is identicalwiththeworldof difference wherea mountainis a mountain
and a riveris a river.Emptinesssignifiesan openness opened in breaking
through"the One"; it signifies the hiddencenterof thewhirlpool.Emptiness
is the whollyexposed place that appears when the most deeplyinternalized
circleis brokenout-and-out.
In Paul's relationwiththeChrist,it was onlyin thisplace of emptinessthat
hislife-gained-through-death did notremainin sheermysticalsilenceand quie-
tude, but was actualized as practicalworks.It was a sortof radicalizationof
theBeing-in-emptiness of Christwho emptiedhimself.Paul's apostolicactivity
is the breakthrough action of the mysticalunion of the ontologicalOne. It
is "the action that breaks the circle" (Bergson). It is the union, in the true

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41

sense of the word,withChrist'sBeing-in-emptiness. It is the union withthe

practical lifeof Christthe Savior who emptied himself.
Paul writes,"For we whichlive are always deliveredunto death forJesus'
sake, that the lifealso of Jesusmightbe made manifestin our mortalflesh.
So thendeathworkethin us, but lifein you" (II Cor. 4: 11, 12). These words
well describetheexistenceof Paul, who toiledhardin thisworld.That his life
is alwaysdeliveredunto death means,first,thathis apostolicworkcomes out
of his death,that is, the emptiness,as he says, "So death is at work in us";
and second,the same apostolicwork,motivatedby thedeathworkingin him,
that is, emergingfromhis emptiness,makes Christ'seternallifemanifestin
his mortalflesh.
But what did all thismean? It meantthatPaul workedto bringmankind,
forexample,theGalatians,to faith;thathe workedto letthemgaintheeternal
lifethroughdying-in-Christ. Thus he says, "So death is at workin us but life
in you." Death is at work,so thathis apostolicworkarisesfromhis emptiness,
means that he had radicallyand exhaustivelygiven himselfover to death;
thisdeath of his, however,was forthe sake of the new lifeof his disciples.It
was a repetitionof the work of Christwho gave himselfto Paul. He entered
into the union with Christwho was the originof this repetition.However,
thisis not a mysticalunion in so-calledmysticism. It is the mysticalunion in
a newand deepersenseof theword,makingtheformerunionthespringboard
forthisleap. In otherwords,thisis themysticalunionin workattainedthrough
emptinessas theradicaldeath-life and at thesame timethroughmortalflesh.
That he is givingoverhis lifeforthesake of thedisciplesis preciselyforthe
sake of Christ.The deathis, therefore, at workin him; thelifeof Christis thus
made manifestin him.This is his existence.Therethetwo deaths,thatis, the
deathforthe sake of thenew lifeof thedisciplesand thedeathforthesake of
Christ,constituteone singleact. The death-lifetransference fromChristto
thedisciples,and the life-deathtransference fromthedisciplesto Christcross
each otherin thisact. The opennessthatgivestheplace to thesetransferences,
whilebeingopened bythem,is not onlythedrawingback of thepresentto the
originas it is in therelationonlybetweenPaul and Christ.It includesalso, as
thenecessarydevelopmentof thatrelationfromthepresentto thefuture,that
is, the relationbetweenPaul and his disciples.In thatopennesstakes place a
reciprocalgiving-receiving of lifeand death along two directions,one from
origin to the futureand the other conversely, Paul's workat thepresentalways
makingthe centerof theircrossing.This reciprocalgiving-receiving is spoken
of as the givingup in death and givingover (paradidomai,trado)of oneself,
ofone's beingand living,to another.Fromthistraditioof life-death and death-
lifeoriginatesthetraditionof Christian"life" and "faith."Here lies thefoun-
tainheadof Christianity.
Traditionis not a mereemptyrepetition. The traditionof lifein Zen is com-
pared to the pouringof waterfroma brimmingbowl into anotherwithout

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42 Nishitani

spillinga singledrop. This is made possible only by the radical transference

of life-deathand death-lifetakingplace betweenman and man. The sheer
difficulty of this task bringsabout formalization.Treacherycreeps into the
relationwhich ought to be the giving/receiving of the eternallife between
man and man. The traditioof lifecan, at anytime,turnintoa falseness.But a
truetraditionis alwayscreative.Jesussaid, "Verily,verily,I say untoyou, he
thatbelievethon me, theworksthatI do shall he do also; and greaterworks
thantheseshall he do; because I go unto myFather" (John14:12). It is not
at all strangethatJesusexpectedgreaterworksthanthisfromthe faithful of
thelatterdays. But at thebottomof thetransference ofhis life,thatis, "faith,"
existssomethinguntransferable, which is the mysticalunion originatingin
Christ.
Paul's utterancebringsout boththisuntransferable mysticalunion and the
truetransference of life,whenhe writes:"... open untous a door of utterance,
to speak themystery of Christ,forwhichI am also in bonds: That I maymake
it manifest, as I oughtto speak" (1 Thess. 4:3, 4).
Now let us returnto theZen questionthatwas posed earlier,"Who is the
uttererof thisutteranceof Paul?" Is the Zen questionnonsensicalafterall,
since it asks about the uttererwhenit is obvious thatit is Paul? But in Paul
thereis a death withtwo faces,one towardChristand the othertowardhis
disciplesand it is at workin himat everyinstant.His worksderivefromthat
death, fromhis emptyinghimselfradicallyto both. But again in thisdeath,
workingas emptiness,livesthelifeof Christ,as wellas thelivesofthedisciples
who are committedto him.This is all because of theemptiness.
In such an existenceof Paul's, then,whatwould be his self?Paul evidently
existsthere,utteringout of death,out of nothingness. Then, who or what is
his self?His self,existingas no otherthan Paul himself,at the same timeis
nowhere.His self-beingis nowhereas a self-centered ego. Thereforeit is the
nonself.Then who or whatis thisnonself?If thisquestionwereto be asked of
Paul, he would be clearin regardto theanswer.The questionforhimis a vain
one, forhe does not need to questionhimself.Or mighthe simplysay,"I don't
know."
The anecdoteis wellknownoftheencounterof Bodhidharma,thefirstpatri-
archofZen in China,witha certainemperorwhowas a devoutBuddhist.When
he was askedwhattheessenceofHoly Truthis,he is reportedto haveanswered,
"Infinitely vast Unholiness."This, too, maybe called a directutteranceof the
trans-metaphysical, or a sword of deontologydirectedagainst the other's
ontological stance. When the emperorfurtherasked Boddhidharmaabout
theWhat,or Who, of thisInfinitevastnesssittingin frontof him,he answered
"I don't know."
This is not,of course,an acknowledgment of his ignorancein the ordinary
sense,also it is not onlyan announcementof his unknowingknowing.This is
an act ofutterance.It is a realizationoftheInfinite vastness.It can be a spewing

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43

out of thewholecosmos. Or, we may say thatBodhidharma'sunknowingwas

the swordto cut down the emperor'sknowing.There is anotherZen saying:
"One does not knowevenifone had one's head cut off."We can say also it is
an equivalentof Rinzai's katz. One of Rinzai's fourkatz is called the"treasure
sword as hard as a diamond" which cuts down everything, even Buddha,
insofaras Buddha is ontologicallyobjectified,or insofaras Buddha is objec-
tivelyrepresentedin Buddhology.This cuts down as well the objectifying
subject (ego), and the epistemologicalEgo, that is, das Ich. This utterance
indeedis thepresentationof unknowing!

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