You are on page 1of 5

G.R. No.

L-48585 March 3, 1980 December 23, 1977 - respondent judge issued an order denying the
motion for appointment of a special administrator.
FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs. (The appointment of a special administrator is predicated on the necessity
THE HONORABLE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., Judge of the Court of First of enabling somebody to take care of the properties where there is a
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, and JULIAN VILLEGAS, considerable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator. In the
NATIVIDAD VILLEGAS, GEMINIANO VILLEGAS, CESAR VILLEGAS, present case, since the properties covered by the will are undoubtedly in
MAXIMO MATIAS, ROSARIO VILLEGAS MATIAS, ANA MARIE V. the possession of the oppositors who claim to be the owners thereof, the
MATIAS, and LOURDES V. MATIAS, respondents. Court sees no necessity of appointing a special administrator.

FERNANDEZ, J.: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby denies the motion
for the appointment of a special administrator filed by the petitioner)
FACTS:
June 5, 1978 - petitioner filed an MR
February 3, 1977 - Catalina Bajacan died.
June 9, 1978 MR was denied
That the decedent's estate consists of eighty (80) hectares of first class
agricultural rice land, more or less, yielding fifty thousand pesos Hence the current petition
(P50,000.00) worth of rice harvested twice a year; that somebody
representing the estate should collect and receive the palay harvests Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion of the
pending the probate of the will. private respondents, postponed the hearing of the probate of the will
which was then scheduled on August 23, 1978 to September 20, 1978.
March 16, 1977 petitioner filed a petition with the CFI of Nueva Ecija a Again, in view of the motion for reconsideration of the private respondents
Special Proceeding for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed dated September 4, 1978, the respondent judge issued an order dated
by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and September 12, 1978, which in part reads: ... the hearing of this case
universal heir and naming him as executor. scheduled on September 20, 1978 is hereby cancelled pending the
outcome of the case before the Supreme Court. 21
May 10, 1977 - private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or
opposition contending, among others, that all the real properties of ISSUE: whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order
Inter vivos executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a special administrator
Bajacan in their favor. denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

September 23, 1977 - that a motion for the appointment of a special HELD:
administrator was filed by the petitioner alleging that the unresolved
motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the will and the Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
appointment of an executor
Section 1 Appointment of Special Administrator When there is delay
September 30, 1977 - respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause
the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall have presented their including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court
evidence may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided
and executors or administrators appointed.
Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer
administrator 15 should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary it for benefit of creditors and heirs. 23
or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the It appears that the estate the properties registered under the Torrens
appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. system in the name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty
16 This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or (80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It is claimed that these 80
Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year.
Obviously there is an immediate need for a special administrator to protect
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad the interests of the estate as regards the products.
enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in
carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or in the case at bar.
administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among
themselves. 18 Likewise, when from any cause general administration The respondent judge has failed to distinguish between the partisan
cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed possession of litigants from that of the neutral possession of the special
to collect and preserve the property of the deceased. administrator under the Rules of Court. When appointed, a special
administrator is regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the
It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of
transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. 24 The accountability
probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will which the court. which attaches to the office of a special administrator to
consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a be appointed by the court is absent from the personal possession of
special administrator. private respondents.

The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are: The only way to test the validity of the alleged donation in favor of the
private respondents is to appoint a special adiu administrator who will
(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win. have the personality to file the corresponding action. In view of all the
foregoing, respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of denying the petitioner's motion for appointment of a special administrator.
Catalina Bajacan and opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of
donation dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by the deceased Catalina WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby granted and the
Bajacan and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor. Order of the respondent judge dated December 23, 1977, denying
petitioner's motion for appointment of a special administrator and the
The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in order dated June 9, ,978 denying the petitioner's motion for
the fact that estates of decedents frequently become involved in reconsideration are set aside. The respondent judge is ordered forthwith to
protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and losses if appointment a special administrator pending the probate of the last will of
there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in Catalina Bajacan in Special Proceeding No. 865, without pronouncement as
the interim. The occasion for such an appointment usually arises where, to costs.
for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the
will, regular administration is delayed. No temporary administration can be SO ORDERED
granted where there is an executor in being capable of acting, however. 22
Hence the current petition upon the theory that, pursuant to Section 2,
G.R. No. L-20735 August 14, 1965 Rule 81 of the (old) Rules of Court, "a special administrator shall not be
liable to pay any debts of the deceased," and that, accordingly, Agregado
GLICERIA C. LIWANAG, Special Administratrix of the Estate of PIO has no cause of action against her as a special administratrix.
D. LIWANAG, petitioner,
vs. ISSUE: WON Mortgagee may bring action for foreclosure against
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS DE VEYRA, as Judge of the special administrator
Court of First Instance of Manila, and MANUEL AGREGADO,
respondents.
HELD:
Absence of a cause of action does not affect respondent's jurisdiction to
C. M. Baltazar and A. P. Narvasa for petitioner.
hear Case No. 50897, it follows that the denial of petitioner's motion to the
Manuel P. Calanog for respondents.
same, even if it were erroneous, is reviewable, not by writ of certiorari, but
by appeal, after the rendition of judgment on the merits. Moreover, the
CONCEPCION, J.: theory that a mortgagee cannot bring an action for foreclosure against the
special administrator of the estate of a deceased person.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor
Pio D. Liwanag, the settlement of which is the subject of Special holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other
Proceeding No. 46599 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his
security and prosecute his claim and share in the general distribution of
January 9, 1962 - respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his
such special administratrix for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage security by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a
constituted in his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag during his lifetime. party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the
mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate
July 18, 1962 - petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado's complaint, upon proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it
the ground that as special administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor any time within the ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies
of the deceased. exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of
the assets.
August 1, 1962 - respondent, Hon. Jesus de Veyra, as Judge of said court,
denied the motion, whereupon petitioner filed case CA-G.R. No. 31168-R Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having
of the Court of Appeals against respondent Judge and Agregado, to annul filed his action for foreclosure against the administratrix of the property.
said order by writ of certiorari and enjoin said Judge from entertaining said
Case. Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as
special administratrix. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making
Upon petitioner's motion, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate.
injunction directing respondent Judge to refrain from proceeding with the Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of
trial of that case, until further orders. limitations running against them in cases where the appointment of a
regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are not to deny the present
December 3, 1962 CA rendered a decision denying the writ prayed for action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular
and dissolving said writ of preliminary injunction, with costs against the administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage
petitioner. was constituted will be defeated.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs October 21, 1958 compliance therewith, special administrator submitted
against the petitioner. It is so ordered. to the court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the
personal properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be
G.R. No. L-15388 January 31, 1961 sold marked with a check in red pencil, with the statement that said items
were too voluminous to enumerate.
DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee, vs.
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant. July 9, 1956 - Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed
sale. Reasons, for the opposition were that (1) most of the properties
FACTS: sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased
husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture
April 28, 1956 - Eugene Arthur Perkins died in Manila leaving personal and belonging to the estate had been made.
real properties with a probable value of P5,000,000.
December 2, 1958 - the lower court approved the proposed sale,
May 10, 1956 - Dora Perkin Anderson filed a petition for the probate of the authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same.
supposed last will and testament of the deceased.
February 23, 1959 MR was denied
May 10, 1956 - petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent
petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special Hence the current petition.
administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court issued an
order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon ISSUE: WON POWER TO SELL NOT LIMITED TO PERISHABLE PROPERTY
his posting of a bond in the amount of P50,000.
HELD:
July 9, 1956 - Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not
entered an opposition to the probate of the will presented by petitioner being perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell
Dora Perkins Anderson. them. This argument is untenable, because section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules
of Court, specifically provides that the special administrator "may sell such
September 28, 1956 - the special administrator submitted an inventory of perishable and other property as the court orders sold", which shows that
all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the the special administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable"
deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death. property only.

September 4, 1958 - special administrator submitted to the court a It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and
petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is
educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the appointed. But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to
deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., be preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the
which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to sale by a special administrator of perishable property. It is in line with this
avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value might be general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the
obtained in their disposition. property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also
empowers such administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered
September 25, 1958 - court required the administrator to submit a sold;" .
specification of the properties sought to be sold
Records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and
judicially approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started,
to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from
the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious
conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased claim. But it does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable
opportunity to point out which items in the inventory she did not want
Therefore the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion for
heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an reconsideration to the order approving the same were overruled by the
agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her
conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an
the proposed sale is clearly premature. inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.

Most of the items sought to be sold pieces of furniture, kitchen and WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the
dinner ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and books can easily special administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set
be protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures in aside, with costs against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
either or both of two residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City left petition-appellee Dora Perkins Anderson.
by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the
proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition and objection of
oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial
portion of the personal estate in question.

The special administrator claims in his brief that the oppositor-appellant


should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want

You might also like