SUBMITTED BY: ROSALIA DE LEON

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding

Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and RODERICK
ODIAMAR,
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131909. February 18, 1999]
ROMERO, J.:

FACTS: Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of
Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent
filed a motion praying that he be released on bail which petitioner opposed
by presenting real, documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court,
however, granted the motion for bail in an order.

WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this
court is constrained to grant bail for the provisional liberty of the accused
Roderick Odiamar in the amount of P30,000.00.

Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the

evidence against him was strong, the prosecution filed the two
abovementioned motions which the lower court disposed of, thus:
WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed by
Atty. Romulo Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are hereby denied, for lack of merit.

Petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals
denied the petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY
THE PROSECUTION THAT THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE PROVING
RESPONDENTS GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

HELD: There is a grave abuse of discretion. Based on the above-cited

procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.A
summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest
of a text or statement.

There are two corollary reasons for the summary. First, the summary of
the evidence in the order is an extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part
of procedural due process wherein the evidence presented during the prior
hearing is formally recognized as having been presented and most
importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of evidence in the
summary presented by the prosecution in their favor during the prior hearing
would be tantamount to not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said
hearing, for the inference would be that they were not considered at all in
weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due process, for
due process means not only giving every contending party the opportunity to
be heard but also for the Court to consider every piece of evidence
presented in their favor.Second, the summary of the evidence in the order is
the basis for the judges exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing
the pieces of evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate
his own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong based on his discretion.
SUBMITTED BY: ROSALIA DE LEON

Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a

complete compilation or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented
during the hearing proper. The lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion
as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. While
conceding that some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said
enumeration was incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective
inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be
considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of
any evidence presented by the prosecution. A summary that is incomplete is
not a summary at all. According to Borinaga v. Tamin, the absence of a
summary in the order would make said order defective in form and
substance. Corollarily, an order containing an incomplete summary would
likewise be defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained or be
given a semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang, said order was
considered defective and voidable. As such, the order granting or denying
the application for bail may be invalidated.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK),

vs. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES,[1] AND
SPOUSE.
SECOND DIVISION
SUBMITTED BY: ROSALIA DE LEON

[G.R. No. 143338, July 29, 2005]

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: On 13 June 1984, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a

complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondents, impleading the
spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales) in order to
bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner, a domestic banking and
trust corporation, alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in favor
of respondents a loan in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as
evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same date.
Under the promissory note, respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.
(respondent corporation) and Morales bound themselves jointly and severally
to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twenty-five monthly
installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged at 23% per annum.
The note was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents defaulted on
their monthly installments, the full amount of the loan became due and
demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note. Petitioner likewise
alleges that it made oral and written demands upon respondents to settle
their obligation but notwithstanding these demands, respondents still failed
to pay their indebtedness which, as of 09 March 1984, stood
at P1,332,474.55. Petitioner attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B, and
C, respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note supposedly executed by
respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20
January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to respondents loan.

On 31 October 1984, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the

Defendants in Default which was opposed by the defendants upon the
ground that they were never served with copies of the summons and of
petitioners complaint.

On 23 November 1984, respondent corporation filed before the trial court a

manifestation attaching thereto its answer to petitioners complaint.

On 06 December 1984, respondent Morales filed his manifestation together

with his answer wherein he likewise renounced any liability on the
promissory note.

On 26 December 1984, the trial court denied petitioners motion to declare

respondents in default and admitted their respective answers.

On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence.

However, as the original copy of Exhibit A could no longer be found,
petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the
promissory note which was identified and marked as Exhibit E.

On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation filed a manifestation and

motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order admitting into evidence
petitioners Exhibit E.

On 08 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion praying that the presiding judge,
Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the court a quo inhibit himself from this case
maintaining that the latter rushed into resolving its motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts order of 06 December 1985 thereby
depriving it the opportunity of presenting proof that the original of Exhibit A
was delivered to respondents as early as 02 April 1983. Such haste on the
part of the presiding judge, according to petitioner, cast doubt on his
SUBMITTED BY: ROSALIA DE LEON

objectivity and fairness. This motion to inhibit was denied by the trial court
on 06 August 1987.

The trial courts finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
decision now before us. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the

Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated December 28,
1987 dismissing plaintiff-appellant['s] complaint is
hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the plaintiff-appellant.

ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT

UPHELD THE EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT E, THE SECOND ORIGINAL OF THE
PROMISSORY NOTE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL OF EXHIBIT
A (XEROX COPY OF THE DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY
NOTE) WAS ACTUALLY IN THE POSSESSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS,
THUS WARRANTING THE ADMISSION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

HELD: The petition is meritorious. In resolving the case against petitioner,

the appellate court held that contrary to petitioners stance, respondents
were able to generally and specifically deny under oath the genuineness and
due execution of the promissory note.

In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that respondents were able to specifically deny the allegations in petitioners
complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules. In effect,
respondents had, to all intents and purposes, admitted the genuineness and
due execution of the subject promissory note and recognized their obligation
to petitioner.

The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the
best evidence rule or primary evidence must be applied as the purpose of
the proof is to establish the terms of the writing meaning the alleged
promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the money allegedly
loaned to the defendants (respondents herein).
SUBMITTED BY: ROSALIA DE LEON

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ LENDOY or

DODO,
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004]
PUNO, J.:

FACTS: Rolando Garcia was found guilty of rape. He was meted the penalty
of death. Amalia testified that on 24 March 1997, she left her two children
Remelyn (3 1/2 years old) and Kimberly (1 year old) at their house in Clib,
Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs food at Bulatukan. At the time, her
husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the
afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to
fetch water and proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of
Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any information. She found Remelyn
crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking with her legs spread apart) and with
fresh and dried blood on her body. Blood was oozing from her private
organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her.

The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house
of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack doctor, for treatment. Among the people
present in the premises were the relatives and parents of the appellant. The
quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in Remelyns
vagina, and told Amalia, Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being
(sic) raped. At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed
Amalia that he had seen the appellant pass by her house and take
Remelyn. At this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, Mal, let us talk
about this matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to pay the amount
of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed. Police officers came and
brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police
precinct of Hagonoy for investigation. Amalias statement was taken.

The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the
insertion of a foreign object, such as the penis of a man.

On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint. Amalia

stated therein that Remelyn had told her Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos.

The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi.

ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT,

ROLANDO (sic) GAUDIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

HELD: We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.Under
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based
on circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling case law is
that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with
SUBMITTED BY: ROSALIA DE LEON

the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.