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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.133917February19,2001

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
NASARIOMOLINAyMANAMA@"BOBONG"andGREGORIOMULAyMALAGURA@"BOBOY",accused
appellants.

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:

TosanctiondisrespectanddisregardfortheConstitutioninthenameofprotectingthesocietyfromlawbreakersis
tomakethegovernmentitselflawlessandtosubvertthosevaluesuponwhichourultimatefreedomandliberty
depend.1

ForautomaticreviewistheDecision2oftheRegionalTrialCourtofDavaoCity,Branch17,inCriminalCaseNo.
37,26496,findingaccusedappellantsNasarioMolinayManamatalias"Bobong"andGregorioMulayMalagura
alias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,4 and sentencing them to suffer the supreme
penaltyofdeath.

Theinformationagainstaccusedappellantsreads:

That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana which are
prohibited.

CONTRARYTOLAW.5

UponarraignmentonSeptember4,1996,accusedappellantspleadednotguiltytotheaccusationagainstthem.6
Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y.
Pamplona,Jr.,andSPO1MarinoS.Paguidopon,Jr.aswitnesses.

Theantecedentfactsareasfollows:

SometimeinJune1996,SPO1MarinoPaguidopon,thenamemberofthePhilippineNationalPolicedetailedat
Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana
pusher in Davao City.7 The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first
week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer
pointedtothemotorcycledriver,accusedappellantMula,asthepusher.AstoaccusedappellantMolina,SPO1
Paguidoponhadnooccasiontoseehimbeforethearrest.Moreover,thenamesandaddressesoftheaccused
appellantscametotheknowledgeofSPO1Paguidopononlyaftertheywerearrested.8

At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged
pusherwillbepassingatNHA,Maa,DavaoCityanytimethatmorning.9Consequently,ataround8:00A.M.of
the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately
dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon),andSPO1Pamplona,toproceedtothehouseofSPO1MarinoPaguidoponwheretheywouldwait
fortheallegedpushertopassby.10

At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1
Paguidopon,a"trisikad"carryingtheaccusedappellantspassedby.Atthatinstance,SPO1Paguidoponpointed
to the accusedappellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle and overtook the
"trisikad."11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accusedappellants were
accosted.12

The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accusedappellant Mula who was holding a
blackbaghandedthesametoaccusedappellantMolina.Subsequently,SPO1Pamplonaintroducedhimselfasa
police officer and asked accusedappellant Molina to open the bag.13 Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will
settle this."14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside.
ThereafteraccusedappellantsMulaandMolinawerehandcuffedbythepoliceofficers.15

OnDecember6,1996,accusedappellants,throughcounsel,jointlyfiledaDemurrertoEvidence,contendingthat
themarijuanaallegedlyseizedfromthemisinadmissibleasevidenceforhavingbeenobtainedinviolationoftheir
constitutionalrightagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.16Thedemurrerwasdeniedbythetrialcourt.17
A motion for reconsideration was filed by accusedappellants, but this was likewise denied. Accusedappellants
waivedpresentationofevidenceandoptedtofileajointmemorandum.

OnApril25,1997,thetrialcourtrenderedtheassaileddecision,18thedecretalportionofwhichreads:

WHEREFORE,findingtheevidenceoftheprosecutionalonewithoutanyevidencefrombothaccusedwho
waivedpresentationoftheirownevidencethroughtheircounsels,morethansufficienttoprovetheguiltof
bothaccusedoftheoffensechargedbeyondreasonabledoubt,pursuanttoSec.20,sub.par.5ofRepublic
Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME
PENALTYOFDEATHthroughlethalinjectionunderRepublicAct8176,tobeeffectedandimplementedas
thereinprovidedforbylaw,inrelationtoSec.24ofRep.Act7659.

The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the entire records of this case
withtheClerkofCourtoftheSupremeCourt,Manila,fortheautomaticreviewoftheircasebytheSupreme
Courtanditsappropriateactionasthecasemaybe.

SOORDERED.19

PursuanttoArticle47oftheRevisedpenalCodeandRule122,Section10oftheRulesofCourt,thecasewas
elevatedtothisCourtonautomaticreview.Accusedappellantscontend:

I.

THATTHEMARIJUANAISINADMISSIBLEINEVIDENCEFORHAVINGBEENSEIZEDINVIOLATIONOF
APPELLANTS'CONSTITUTIONALRIGHTSAGAINSTUNREASONABLE,SEARCHESANDSEIZURES

II.

THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE

PROVEDTHEIRGUILTBEYONDREASONABLEDOUBTAND

III.

THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE
IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
AGGRAVATINGCIRCUMSTANCE,ISLIFEIMPRISONMENT,NOTDEATH.20

TheSolicitorGeneralfiledaManifestationandMO1ion(InLieuofBrief),whereinheprayedfortheacquittalof
bothaccusedappellants.

The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion,
thatis,byvirtueoronthestrengthofasearchwarrantpredicatedupontheexistenceofaprobablecause.The
pertinentprovisionoftheConstitutionprovides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
searchwarrantorwarrantofarrestshallissueexceptuponprobablecausetobedeterminedpersonallyby
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce,andparticularlydescribingtheplacetobesearchedandthepersonsorthingstobeseized.21

Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph2,whichbolstersandsolidifiestheprotectionagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.22Thus:
 Anyevidenceobtainedinviolationofthisortheprecedingsectionshallbeinadmissibleforanypurposein
anyproceeding.

Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties so too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of
privacywouldbesoephemeralandsoneatlyseveredfromitsconceptualnexuswiththefreedomfromallbrutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of
orderedliberty.23

The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
withoutawarrantandtheevidenceobtainedtherefrommaybeadmissibleinthefollowinginstances:(1)search
incident to a lawful arrest (2) search of a moving motor vehicle (3) search in violation of customs laws (4)
seizureofevidenceinplainview(5)whentheaccusedhimselfwaiveshisrightagainstunreasonablesearches
andseizures24and(6)stopandfrisksituations(Terrysearch).25

Thefirstexception(searchincidentaltoalawfularrest)includesavalidwarrantlesssearchandseizurepursuant
toanequallyvalidwarrantlessarrestwhichmustprecedethesearch.Inthisinstance,thelawrequiresthatthere
befirstalawfularrestbeforeasearchcanbemadetheprocesscannotbereversed.26Asarule,anarrestis
considered legitimate if effected with .a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes
permissiblewarrantlessarrests.Thus,apeaceofficeroraprivatepersonmay,withoutwarrant,arrestaperson:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commitanoffense(arrestinflagrantedelicto)(b)whenanoffensehasjustbeencommittedandhehasprobable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit) and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escapedfromapenalestablishmentoraplacewhereheisservingfinaljudgmentoristemporarilyconfinedwhile
hiscaseispending,orhasescapedwhilebeingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother(arrestofescaped
prisoners).27

Inthecaseatbar,thecourtaquoanchoreditsjudgmentofconvictiononafindingthatthewarrantlessarrestof
accusedappellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accused
appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.28 This brings us to the issue of
whetherornotthewarrantlessarrest,searchandseizureinthepresentcasefallwithintherecognizedexceptions
tothewarrantrequirement.

In People v. Chua Ho San,29 the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must
have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria,30
probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,supported by circumstances
sufficientlystronginthemselvestocreatetheprobablecauseofguiltofthepersontobearrested.Areasonable
suspicionthereforemustbefoundedonprobablecause,coupledwithgoodfaithonthepartofthepeaceofficers
makingthearrest.

As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act
indicativeofafeloniousenterpriseinthepresenceandwithintheviewofthearrestingofficers,arenotsufficient
toconstituteprobablecausethatwouldjustifyaninflagrantedelictoarrest.Thus,inPeoplev.Aminnudin,31itwas
heldthat"theaccusedappellantwasnot,atthemomentofhisarrest,committingacrimenorwasitshownthat
hewasabouttodosoorthathehadjustdoneso.WhathewasdoingwasdescendingthegangplankoftheMN
Wilcon9andtherewasnooutwardindicationthatcalledforhisarrest.Toallappearances,hewaslikeanyofthe
otherpassengersinnocentlydisembarkingfromthevessel.Itwasonlywhentheinformerpointedtohimasthe
carrierofthemarijuanathathesuddenlybecamesuspectandsosubjecttoapprehension."

Likewise,inPeoplev.Mengote,32theCourtdidnotconsider"eyes...dartingfromsidetoside:..[while]holding...
[one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to
arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination
could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being
committedorwasatleastbeingattemptedin[thearrestingofficers']presence."Soalso,inPeoplev.Encinada,33
the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorelawhile holding two plastic
babychairs. 1 w p h i1 .n t

Then,too,inMalacatv.CourtofAppeals,34thetrialcourtconcludedthatpetitionerwasattemptingtocommita
crimeashewas"`standingatthecomerofPlazaMirandaandQuezonBoulevard'withhiseyes'movingveryfast'
and'lookingateverypersonthatcome(sic)nearer(sic)tothem.'"35 In declaring the warrantless arrest therein
illegal,theCourtsaid:

Here,therecouldhavebeennovalidinflagrantedelicto...arrestprecedingthesearchinlightofthelackof
personal knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.36

Itwentontostatethat

Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even
mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us
increduloussinceYuandhisteammateswerenowherenearpetitioneranditwasalready6:30p.m.,thus
presumablydusk.Petitionerandhiscompanionsweremerelystandingatthecomerandwerenotcreating
anycommotionortrouble...

Third,therewasatallnoground,probableorotherwise,tobelievethatpetitionerwasarmedwithadeadly
weapon.NonewasvisibletoYu,forasheadmitted,theallegedgrenadewas"discovered""insidethefront
waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale
bulge,assumingthatpetitionerwasindeedhidingagrenade,couldnothavebeenvisibletoYu.37

Clearly,toconstituteavalidinflagrantedelictoarrest,tworequisitesmustconcur:(1)thepersontobearrested
mustexecuteanovertactindicatingthathehasjustcommitted,isactuallycommitting,orisattemptingtocommit
acrimeand(2)suchovertactisdoneinthepresenceorwithintheviewofthearrestingofficer.38

Inthecaseatbar,accusedappellantsmanifestednooutwardindicationthatwouldjustifytheirarrest.Inholdinga
bag on board a trisikad,accusedappellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have
committedacrime.ItmattersnotthataccusedappellantMolinaresponded"Boss,ifpossiblewewillsettlethis"to
therequestofSPO1Pamplonatoopenthebag.Suchresponsewhichallegedlyreinforcedthe"suspicion"ofthe
arresting officers that accusedappellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing
alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1
MarinoPaguidopon(whodidnotparticipateinthearrestbutmerelypointedaccusedappellantstothearresting
officers),accusedappellantscouldnotbethesubjectofanysuspicion,reasonableorotherwise.

While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accusedappellant Mula,
SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after the arrest. What is
more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accusedappellant Mula. It is worthy to note that,
beforethearrest,hewasabletoseeMulainpersononlyonce,pinpointedtohimbyhisinformerwhiletheywere
on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at
accusedappellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon
caughtaglimpseofhim.WithrespecttoaccusedappellantMolina,SPO1Paguidoponadmittedthathehadnever
seenhimbeforethearrest.

ThisbeliestheclaimofSPO1Pamplonathatheknewthenameofaccusedappellantsevenbeforethearrest,to
wit

"QWhenyousaidthatcertainMulahandedablackbagtoanotherpersonandhowdidyouknowthat
itwasMulawhohandedtheblackbagtoanotherperson?

ABecauseIhavealreadyinformationfromPaguidopon,regardingMulaandMolina,whentheypass
by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one who is big one that is
GregorioMulaandthethinoneisNazarioMolina"39

The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless SPO1 Pamplona could not have
learned the name of accusedappellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly
conductedthesurveillance,wasnotevenawareofaccusedappellants'nameandaddresspriortothearrest.

Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers
themselves, could not have been certain of accusedappellants' identity, and were, from all indications, merely
fishingforevidenceatthetimeofthearrest.

ComparedtoPeoplev.Encinada,thearrestingofficerinthesaidcaseknewappellantEncinadaevenbeforethe
arrestbecauseofthelatter'sillegalgamblingactivities,thus,lendingatleastasemblanceofvalidityonthearrest
effectedbythepeaceofficers.Nevertheless,theCourtdeclaredinsaidcasethatthewarrantlessarrestandthe
consequentsearchwereillegal,holdingthat"[t]heprosecution'sevidencedidnotshowanysuspiciousbehavior
when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a
feloniousenterprisecouldbeascribedtoappellantundersuchbarecircumstances."40

Moreover, it could not be said that accusedappellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and
seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformitygivenunderintimidatingorcoercivecircumstancesandisthusconsiderednoconsentatallwithinthe
purviewoftheconstitutionalguarantee.41

Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accusedappellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the
rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by
thepeaceofficerscouldnotbeadmittedasevidenceagainstaccusedappellants,andtheCourtisthus,leftwith
nochoicebuttofindinfavorofaccusedappellants.

While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our lawenforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drugfree society
mustnotencroachonthefundamentalrightsandlibertiesofindividualsasguaranteedintheBillofRights,which
protectionextendseventothebasestofcriminals.

WHEREFORE,theDecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofDavaoCity,Branch17,inCriminalCaseNo.37,264
96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accusedappellantsNasarioMolinayManamatalias"Bobong"andGregorioMulayMalaguraalias"Boboy",are
ACQUITTEDandorderedRELEASEDfrom confinement unless they are validly detained for other offenses. No
costs.

SOORDERED.

Davide,Jr.,Bellosillo,Melo,Puno,Vitug,Kapunan,Mendoza,Panganiban,Quisumbing,Pardo,Buena,Gonzaga
Reyes,YnaresSantiago,DeLeon,Jr.,andSandovalGutierrez,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes:

1DissentingopinionofJusticeBrennaninStonev.Powell,428U.S.465,96S.Ct.3037,49L.Ed.2d1067,
1105[1976].

2DatedApril25,1997,Rollo,pp.1124.

3Sec.8.PossessionorUseofProhibitedDrugs.Thepenaltyofreclusionperpetuatodeathandafine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unlessauthorizedbylaw,shallpossessoruseanyprohibiteddrugsubjecttotheprovisionsofSection20
hereof.

Sec.20.ApplicationofPenalties,ConfiscationandForfeitureoftheProceedsorInstrumentsofthe
Crime.ThepenaltiesforoffensesunderSections3,4,7,8and9ofArticleIIandSections14,14A,
15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the
followingquantities:

5)750gramsormoreofindianhempormarijuana

xxxxxxxxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the forgoing quantities the penalty shall range from
prisioncorreccionaltoreclusionperpetuadependinguponthequantity.

4AnActImposingtheDeathPenaltyonCertainHeinousCrimes.

5FiledonAugust10,1996Rollo,p.7.

6Records,p.14.

7TSN,November14,1996,pp.24.

8TSN,November14,1996,pp.79.

9Id.,pp.10and18.

10TSN,November26,1996,pp.45(Directexaminationofspa1Pamplona).
11TSN,November26,1996,pp.56.

12TSN,November14,1996,pp.1415.

13TSN,November26,1996,pp.68.

14Id.,p.14.

15Id.,p.9.

16Records,pp.3237.

17Records,pp.3943.

19Decision,Rollo,p.24.

20Rollo,p.40.

21Constitution,ArticleIII,Section2.

22Peoplev.ChuaHoSan,308SCRA432,443[1999].

23Mappv.Ohio,367U.S.643,81S.Ct.1684,6L.ed.2d1081,1090[1961].

24 People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 705 [1999] citing Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517, 527
[1996] People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174, 182183 [1994] Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697
[1986]Bernas,TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,p.169[1996]Cruz,ConstitutionalLaw,
pp.147153[1986]RevisedRulesonCriminalProcedure,Rule126,Section12,andRule113,Section5
Peoplev.Bagista,214SCRA63,69[1992]Peoplev.LoHoWing,193SCRA122,126128[1991]Roldan,
Jr.v.Arca,65SCRA336,348[1975]Papav.Mago,22SCRA857,871874[1968]Peoplev.Tabar,222
SCRA144,153[1993]Alvarezv.CFI,64Phil.33,48[1937]andPeoplev.KaguiMalasugui,63Phil.221,
226[1936].

25 People v. Chua Ho San, supra. citing Terry v. Ohio, 20 L Ed 2d, 896 adopted in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals,188SCRA288[1990]andPeoplev.Ramos,222SCRA557[1993].

26Id.,at449citingMalacatv.CourtofAppeals,283SCRA159,175[1997].

27Id.,at444andtheRevisedRulesonCriminalProcedure(asamended),Rule113,Section5.

28Decision,Rollo,p.22.

29Peoplev.ChuaHoSan.supra.citingPeoplev.Burgos,144SCRA1[1986]Peoplev.Encinada,280
SCRA 72 [1997] People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 [1998] People v. Claudio. 160 SCRA 646 [1988]
People v. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 751 [1988] People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991] People v.
Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990] Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990] People v.
Malmstedt,198SCRA401[1991].

30Peoplev.Doria,supra.citing Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251, 263 [1991] United States v. Santos, 36
Phil.851[1917]Peoplev.Bati,189SCRA97[1990]Peoplev.Sucro,195SCRA388[1990]andPeoplev.
Ramos,186SCRA184[1990].

31163SCRA402,409410[1988].

32210SCRA174,179180[1992].

33280SCRA72,8687[1997].

34283SCRA159[1997].

35Id.,at169.

36Id.,at175.

37Id.,at178.

38ConcurringOpinionofJusticeArtemioV.PanganibaninPeoplev,Doria,301SCRA668,720[1999].

39TSN,November26,1996,p.7.
 40Peoplev.Encinada,supra.

41Id.,at91citingAniagv.CommissiononElections.237SCRA424,436437[1994].

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