ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR
T. ANDANAR, Respondents.
We grant Rosalinda A. Peneras (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Courts
Decision of 11 September 2009 (Decision).
The assailed Decision dismissed Peneras petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30
July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the
COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office
of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should
succeed Penera.
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of
RA 8436 as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial
evidence against Penera for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and
has consistently disputed the charge of premature campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as
admitting she engaged in premature election campaigning.
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person
aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x
x x." The second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by
Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy
within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The immediately
succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period." These two provisions determine the resolution of this case.
The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his
certificate of candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into
actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to
the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence,
constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified."1
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after
the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period.
From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign
period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate
of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person
can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the
campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of
candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. lawphil
The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.
The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC, 2 which held that a person who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
In Lanot, this Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act
is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3)
the act is done outside the campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a
candidate is one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office.
Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third
element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign
or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the
last day, which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the
start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80
for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate
or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of
filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers
only acts done "outside" the campaign period.
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Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may
only apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period
and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the
reason why those running for elective public office usually file their certificates of
candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election campaigning or partisan political
activities were committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether
Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate"
when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March
2004.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of
certificates of candidacy to 120 days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was
moved from 23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial question
is: did this change in the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy make one who
filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 immediately liable for violation of
Section 80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan political activities prior to the
start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?
Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:
SECTION 11. Official Ballot. The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the
official ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the
propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each
position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and
uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the
Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot
shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/ manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one
hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is
holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-president, shall be
deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the
position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline
for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President,
Senators and candidates under the party-list system as well as petitions for registration
and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be on February 9, 1998
while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on
March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper
security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the
services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political
parties and deputized citizens arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure
that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be
easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a
photocopying machine, and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and
other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of
one (1) ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per
precinct.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of
candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the
following deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee:
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the
same[,] uniform for local and national officials?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the
present periods.
SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, hes already
a candidate, and there are many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .
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SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began
(sic).
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we dont provide that the filing of the certificate
will not bring about ones being a candidate.
SENATOR GONZALES. If thats a fact, the law cannot change a fact.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the
certificate of candidacy will not result in that official vacating his position, we can also
provide that insofar he is concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet
commence. Because here, the reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford
enough time to prepare this machine readable ballots.
So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House
Panel will withdraw its proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the
Senate version.
THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
xxxx
SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan
acts which apply immediately upon being a candidate?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is just
to afford the Comelec enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to
change the campaign periods as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed
by existing law.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other
prohibition.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Thats right.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no
conflict anymore because we are talking about the 120-day period before election as the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
last day of filing a certificate of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So that is
election period already. But he will still not be considered as a candidate.
Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official
ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress,
however, never intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to
make the person filing to become immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the
printing of ballots. This legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. The clear
intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law"
prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be
considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the
deliberations of the legislators who explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436,
which laid the legal framework for an automated election system. There was no express
provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a certificate of candidacy is
not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the
Lanot doctrine into law, realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of
Congress in holding that
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by
existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still
not be considered as a candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early
deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized
for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in
enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the second
sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:
xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
3

candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing
and underlining supplied)
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the
second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which
cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The
Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second sentence, because to
reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence.
The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second
sentence or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is
unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the
Decision is self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of
the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is
irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third
paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. The original provision in RA 8436 states
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.
In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that
election offenses can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign
period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election
offenses cannot be so committed.
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together,
these provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for
any other interpretation.
We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:
x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code
should be read together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "candidate refers to
any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of
candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of
parties." However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of candidacy for a
person to be considered a candidate because "any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus file
a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of
candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining
ones possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there
is no "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to promote the election
or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is
no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the campaign period. Therefore, despite
the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider Penera a candidate at
the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the start of the
campaign period. x x x
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May
2007. Penera filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a
candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007,
the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of
ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a
"candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are
not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the
realm of a citizens protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within
the campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts
outside the campaign period.5
The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the
third paragraph, the amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to
candidates take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The Decision states
that:
4

x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that
"any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the campaign period," does not mean that the acts constituting premature
campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during
the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in said
proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful,
such that the offender may freely carry out the same with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming
a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or
partisan political activity, However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate,
at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature
campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person
officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her
disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is
only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate,
that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature
campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are
only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in
premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her
candidacy.6 (Emphasis supplied)
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by
law. This is specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except
on very narrow grounds involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The
mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is
lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the campaign
period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."
The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of
the campaign period, are lawful.
In laymans language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only
for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight any
election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be
committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for
premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the
assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be
disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the
law says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate
shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The plain meaning of this
provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period,
the same partisan political acts are lawful.
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done
by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only
upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political
acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but
becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language
of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal
act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon
the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and
express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within
[the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to
the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not
this Court but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as
clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding
proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for Reconsideration.
We SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11
September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of
the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No.
07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.
5
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3

G.R. No. L-52365 January 22, 1980
AMADO F. GADOR, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AS REPRESENTED
BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HON. LEONARDO PEREZ, respondent.
This petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed on
January 21, 1980 at 4:47 o'clock in the afternoon seeking the following relief:
In as much as the election is only eight (8) days away, it is to the interest of all
concerned, specially the petitioner himself, that this matter be resolved immediately.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectably prayed that the respondent be

immediately ordered to include the name of the herein petitioner in the list
of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz which shall be printed and
distributed soon to all voting centers in the City of Ozamis.

The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of
Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election; that he filed his
certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980;
that the petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor on January 7, 1980 on the
basis of a news item in the Bulletin Today, January 6, issue; that on January 8, 1980, the
petitioner wired the Chairman of the Commission on Elections informing him of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and at the time requesting him to release the approval of
the said certificate; that on January 11, 1980, the petitioner caused the Election Registrar
of Ozamiz City to wire the Chairman, Commission on Elections, reiterating the
information that the petitioner had filed a certificate of candidacy on January 7; that he
was already in the thick of campaigns and was asking about the status of his candidacy;
that in view of the President's announcement that the resolution of the respondent,
Commission on Elections, for the extension of time for filing certificates of candidacy
from January 4 to January 10 had been denied, there is a strong probability that the
petitioner's name as candidate for Mayor may not be included in the list of candidates to
be voted which is to be printed soon and distributed in Ozamiz City; and that on grounds
of fairness, principles of equity and for the best interest of the people of Ozamiz City,
judgment should be rendered commanding the respondent, Commission on Elections, to
immediately include the petitioner in the list of candidates for Mayor.

The only issue is whether or not the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was
filed on January 7, 1980 is valid. Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that
"The sworn certificate of candidacy shag be filed in triplicate not later than January 4,
1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the
period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.

This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed
beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

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G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999
JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction questioning the resolution of the Comelec En
Banc dated December 8, 1998 in SPA Case No. 98-288 which disposed:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered to:
1. AMEND and RECTIFY the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the
Commission (First Division) in SPA No. 98-019 promulgated on May 5, 1998, to
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (First Division)
GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE "PEMPE" MIRANDA's
certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor of Santiago City in the
May 11, 1998 national and local elections is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE AND/OR CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
2. ANNUL the election and proclamation of respondent JOEL G. MIRANDA as
mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election and CANCEL the Certificate
of Canvass and Proclamation (C.E. form 25) issued therefor;
3. DIRECT THE City board of Canvassers of Santiago City to RECONVENE,
PREPARE a new certificate of canvass & proclamation and PROCLAIM the
winning candidate among those voted upon as the duly elected mayor of
Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election; and
4. DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this
Decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines; the Department of
Interior and Local Government; the Department of Finance, and the Secretary of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Santiago City.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 90-91, Rollo.)
The aforementioned resolution dated December 8, 1998 reversed and set aside the
earlier resolution of the First Division of the Comelec dated May 16, 1998, dismissing
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
private respondent's petition to declare the substitution of Jose "Pempe" Miranda by
petitioner as candidate for the City of Santiago's mayoralty post void.
Briefly, the pertinent factual backdrop is summarized as follows:
On March 24, 1998, Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the
synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed
as SPA No. 98-019. The petition was GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution dated
May 5, 1998 (pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose
"Pempe" Miranda.
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner
Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a
substitute for his father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
During the May 11, 1998 elections; petitioner and private respondent vied for the
mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private
respondent who got only 20,336 votes.
On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void
Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the
nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the
certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to
substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.
On May 16, 1998, Comelec's First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio (pp.
57-61, Rollo). Private respondent moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo). On
December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered the assailed decision aforequoted,
resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the substitution by
petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago
City.
On December 9, 1998, petitioner sought this Court's intercession via a petition
for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On December 11, 1998, the Court resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order and to require respondents to comment on the petition. On December
7

14, 1998, private respondent filed his Comment (pp. 140-187 and 188-234, Rollo) and on
February 16, 1999, the Comelec, through its counsel, the Solicitor General, filed its
Comment (pp. 254-265, Rollo). The Court required petitioner to file a consolidated reply
within 10 days from notice, but petitioner twice asked for an extension of the period.
Without granting the motions for extension of time to file consolidated reply, the Court
decided to resolve the controversy in favor of petitioner.
Tersely, the issues in the present case may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation was
issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private
respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the
annulment of the substitution and proclamation of petitioner.
On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the case at hand is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Comelec. As early as in Herrera vs. Barretto (25 Phil,
245 [1913]), this Court had occasion to apply the following principles:
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a
case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon
the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the
decision made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise
of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision
rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over
the subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other questions
arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. (p. 251)
On the issue of soundness of the disposition in SPA No. 98-288, the Court finds that the
Comelec's action nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the
mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound.
Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may
file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election
and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the Comelec ruled to disqualify Jose "Pempe"
Miranda in the May 5, 1998 resolution and he heavily relies upon the above-quoted
provision allowing substitution of a candidate who has been disqualified for any cause.
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited
political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified
for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the
person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of
the Code.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a
candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate
is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for
the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of
candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of
the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included
those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or
cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any
person, but only "an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be
substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court
explicitly ruled that "a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy" (p.13).
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in
much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all
can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
The law clearly provides:
8

Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein.
By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but
logical to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a
certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult him
into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court held that a certificate
of candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is
not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner as a person who filed no certificate of
candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of
candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no candidate at all. No amount of votes
should entitle him to the elective office aspired for.
The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in
fixing the time limit therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days
before the regular election, the candidates among whom they are to make the choice,
and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. For if
the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered
candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes
might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in
favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. (Monsale vs. Nice, 83 Phil.
758 [1949]).
It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the
very core of the electoral process. It cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and
chaos. Verily, this explains why the law provides for grounds for the cancellation and
denial of due course to certificates of candidacy.
After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily
understood why in Bautista we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no
candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that Section 77
of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible
substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied
due course.
Also, under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as
"disqualification for any cause" in this case) follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class (such as the words "dies" and "withdraws" in the instant
case) or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed
to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned (see: Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
[1979]). A deceased candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of
candidacy, otherwise his political party would not be allowed to field a substitute
candidate in his stead under Section 77 of the Code. In the case of withdrawal of
candidacy, the withdrawing candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of
candidacy in order to allow his political party to field a substitute candidate in his stead.
Most reasonable it is then, under the foregoing rule, to hold that a valid certificate of
candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of a
disqualified candidate under the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in the
two previous instances.
Furthermore, interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut euiatur inconveniens et
absurdum, meaning, where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity shall in all cases be adopted. To include those disqualified
candidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and/or
cancelled among those who may be substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code, leads to the absurdity where a substitute is allowed to take the place of
somebody who had not been a candidate in the first place a person who did not have
a valid certificate of candidacy prior to substitution. Nemo dat quod non habet. What right
can a non-candidate pass on to his substitute? Clearly, there is none because no one
can give what he does not have.
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the
concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for
how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The
Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably
filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of
candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person
was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if
we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of
candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of
unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the controversy at hand is not a simple
case of hair-splitting. A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have
filed a valid certificate of candidacy. Another candidate may likewise be not qualified and
at the same time not have a valid certificate of candidacy, for which reason, said
certificate of candidacy is also cancelled and/or denied due course. Or, a third candidate
may be qualified but, his certificate of candidacy may be denied due course and/or
cancelled. This is possible because the grounds for disqualification (see: Omnibus
9

Election Code, Section 68 Disqualifications) are totally separate and distinct from the
grounds for cancellation and/or denying due course to a certificate of candidacy (Ibid.,
Section 69 nuisance candidates; and Section 78 material misrepresentation). Only
the candidate who had a valid certificate of candidacy may be substituted.
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being
disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had
likewise been denied due course and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
Private respondent's petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due
course and/or cancelled.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for. (Rollo, p.
31; Emphasis ours.)
In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the
Comelec ruled favorably in the following manner:
SO ORDERED. (p,43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998
in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly
sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter
whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the
specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. It
may be stressed at this instance that the legal consequences of this May 5, 1998
resolution are independent of the issue of whether or not the Comelec was correct in
reviving SPA No. 98-019 by consolidating it with SPA No. 98-288 in its December 8, 1998
resolution.
As regards the procedural matter in the present petition for certiorari, the following
considerations are also in point:
It may be relevantly stressed that the review powers of the Supreme Court over
decisions of the Constitutional Commissions, in general, and the Commission on
Elections, in particular, were rather particularly defined and "limited" by the 1987
Constitution, as they were also circumscribed in the 1973 Constitution, to a petition for
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
review on certiorari under Rule 65. In Dario vs. Mison (176 SCRA 84 [1989]), the Court
held:
. . . We affirm the teaching of Aratuc vs. Commission of Elections, 88 SCRA 251
[1979]) as regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil
Service Commission which is that judgments of the Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
In Aratuc, we declared:
It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications
that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the
Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional body charged
with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers
of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of
what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court." And since instead
of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's
actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We
cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy,
considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is
well known in remedial law.
. . . It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973
Charter, "any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari," which, as Aratuc tells us, "technically connotes
something less than saying that the same "shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court," which in turn suggests an appeal by review by petition for
review under Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from the
Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65. (pp. 111-112)
To emphasize this procedural point, then Commissioner, later to become a distinguished
Member of this Court, Mr. Justice Florenz Regalado responded to Commissioner Bernas'
query during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution thusly:
FR. BERNAS. So, for purposes of the record, now, what is the intention of the
Committee? What are the grounds for certiorari?
10

MR. REGALADO. The Committee refers specifically to a technical term of review
by certiorari would be relying on the provision of Rule XLV [Should be LXV] of the
Rules of Court that laid down the three grounds.
(I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 539, as cited
in Bernas, S.J, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 Edition, p. 903.)
Thus, we have to be guided by jurisprudence relating to review by certiorari under Rule
65. Generally, certiorari lies where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. "Without jurisdiction" refers to an absolute want of
jurisdiction; "excess of jurisdiction" refers to the case where the court has jurisdiction, but
it transcended the same or acted without any statutory authority; "grave abuse of
discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Comelec committed an error in the
exercise of its jurisdiction in the present case, such is not within the province of certiorari,
as a remedial measure, to correct. The only issue that may be taken cognizance of in the
present case is whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed decision.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been
done in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility (Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 170 SCRA 246 [1989]; Litton Mills vs. Galleon Traders, 163 SCRA 489 [1988];
Butuan Bay Export Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 297 [1980]). An error of judgment
committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of
discretion". An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically (Soriano vs. Atienza, 171 SCRA 284
[1989]).
Petitioner posits that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled
the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner, who under Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code, was allowed to substitute for disqualified the candidate Jose "Pempe"
Miranda. Petitioner also contends that it was an act of grave abuse of discretion for the
Comelec to direct the proclamation of private respondent as the winning candidate in the
May 11, 1998 election.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Petitioner further faults the Comelec for amending the dispositive portion of its resolution
in SPA No. 98-019, which was not elevated to it on review, the same having already
attained finality by then.
While it may be conceded that the Comelec stepped overboard and acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it motu proprio took cognizance of SPA No. 98-019, the decision in
which was by then already final, it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec also
committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving to grant private respondent's motion for
reconsideration by nullifying the substitution of petitioner Joel G. Miranda. Evidently, what
is under review before us in this certiorari proceedings is SPA No. 98-288, and not SPA
No. 98-019.
The question to answer is: will the Comelec's act which may constitute an excess of
jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-019 be tantamount to an act of grave abuse of discretion in its
judgment in the separate and distinct case of SPA No. 98-288 as well? Clearly, non
sequitur. SPA No. 98-288 should be judged on its own accord, and not under the shadow
of SPA No. 98-019.
Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion, in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of
private respondent. As earlier pointed out, the result in the dispositive portion of the
December 8, 1998 resolution pertaining to the issues involved in SPA No. 98-288 is
correct insofar as it annulled the election and proclamation of Joel G. Miranda. But even
assuming for the sake of argument that it is not, still, this supposed error does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion which may be annulled and reversed in the present
petition for certiorari.
As earlier elucidated too, the crux of the Comelec's disposition in SPA No. 98-288 is the
fact that former candidate Jose "Pempe" Miranda's certificate of candidacy was denied
due course and cancelled. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by
private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no
question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is
rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA
No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was
granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due
course and cancelled. In fact, it was not even necessary for the Comelec to reiterate this
in its December 8, 1998 resolution. At best, the Comelec's motu proprio act of
resurrecting SPA No. 98-019 should be treated as a mere surplusage. The fact that the
certificate of candidacy of Joel "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled
did not depend on the en banc resolution dated December 8, 1998 of the Comelec. It
stems from the fact that the May 5, 1998 resolution GRANTED private respondent's
Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.
11

Verily, there is clear basis to find that there indeed was a blatant misrepresentation in the
instant case and that it was a valid ground for the granting of the petition in SPA No. 98-
019. Also, there appears to be sound basis to rule that a certificate of candidacy which
has been denied due course on account of misrepresentation is, in every legal
contemplation, no certificate at all. Ergo, there is nothing to substitute. If this judgment,
rendered in the Comelec's rightful exercise of its jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-288 may, at
all, be considered flawed, this blemish would only constitute an error of judgment and
definitely not grave abuse of discretion. And, of course, errors of judgment may not be
corrected by certiorari.
It may be noted that Commissioner Flores raised this supposed error in her dissenting
opinion (pp. 93-99, Rollo). However, her legal opinion failed to convince the majority of
the collegiate body and was not adopted by the Commission en banc. This Court in the
present certiorari proceedings cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Comelec
without violating the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the matter. The Comelec's
decision is not subject to appeal to this Court. We may only strike out a Comelec
decision if it was rendered without jurisdiction, in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The Court cannot accede to the reasoning that this Court should now acquiesce and
submit to the sovereign will of the electorate, as expressed by their votes. We should
always be reminded that ours is a government of laws not of men. If this Court should
fold its arms and refuse to apply the law at every "clamor" of the majority of the supposed
constituency, where shall order and justice lie? Without the least intention to degrade,
where shall "people power" end, and where shall "law and justice" begin? Would the
apparent results of the canvassing of votes justify this Court in refusing to apply the law
instead? The answers to the foregoing are obvious. The Court cannot choose otherwise
but to exercise its sacred duty to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the Republic for
and under which it exists. Besides, only history will discern whether Jose "Pempe"
Miranda's filing of a certificate of candidacy for a 4th term and the intended substitution
by his son was a ploy to perpetrate the Mirandas in power by way of a political dynasty
disdained and abhorred by our Constitution which declared:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Article II, 1987
Constitution)
The invalidation of petitioner's supposed substitution of Jose "Pempe" Miranda brings
about the disqualification of petitioner in the mayoralty race. In this regard, what was said
in Nolasco vs. Commission on Elections (275 SCRA 763 [1997]) may be recalled:
Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. Thus, we
reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes v. Comelec (254 SCRA 514
[1996]), viz.:
We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in
denying petitioner Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of
the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.
That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled.
The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings has since been removed.
In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second
placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by
either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate,
the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances.
Garcia's plea that the votes case for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The
votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes
was qualified and for that reason can be treated as stray, void and meaningless.
The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the
elections as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
Consequently, respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar
as it failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo
v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1[1989]).(pp. 782-783)
Thus, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the
above-cited settled ruling consistently applied by this Court since the case of Labo
vs. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Aquino vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 [1995], Reyes
vs. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]); and Nolasco vs. Comelec (275 SCRA 763 [1997]).
Even as the Court cannot accede to the contention that, in view of the election results
pointing to petitioner as the electors' choice for the mayoralty post, we should now close
our eyes to the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the matter,
nevertheless, the Court duly notes that the said election results point to the fact that
private respondent was not then the choice of the people of Santiago City, Isabela. This
Court has no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people of Santiago
12
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
City to accept private respondent as their mayor. The law on succession under section
44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, would then
apply. Said provision relevantly states:

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor,

Mayor, and Vice Mayor, (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor,
vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member, or,
in case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian
member, shall become governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case
may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by
the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

xxx xxx xxx

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the

sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained
by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district
in the immediately preceding local election.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partly DENIED, insofar as the Comelec ruling to
ANNUL the election and proclamation of petitioner is being AFFIRMED. The petition is,
however, hereby GRANTED so as to MODIFY the resolution of the Comelec in SPA No.
98-288 by DELETING the portion directing the city board of canvassers to reconvene
and proclaim the winning candidate from among those voted upon during the May 11,
1998 elections. The law on succession should be enforced. Accordingly, the restraining
order issued in this case is forthwith LIFTED. SO ORDERED.

13

G.R. No. 147741 May 10, 2001
REP. MA. CATALINA L. GO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FELIPE V.
MONTEJO and ARVIN V. ANTONI, respondents.
The Case
In her petition for certiorari, 1 petitioner seeks to nullify the resolution of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) en banc declaring her disqualified to run for the office of
governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because she filed certificates of
candidacy for both positions and the withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor
was filed late by twenty eight minutes from the deadline.
Forthwith, we issued an order2 to maintain the status quo ante, in effect allowing
petitioner's certificate of candidacy for governor in the meantime.
In its Comment, the COMELEC justified its resolution on the ground that petitioner's
3
affidavit of withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was
ineffectual because it was submitted twenty eight (28) minutes late at the office of the
municipal election officer at Baybay. The facsimile copy thereof was filed with said office
at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001, and the original copy thereof was actually received by the
office of the municipal election officer of Baybay at 1:15 p.m., the same day. The
provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, to whom petitioner
filed her certificate of candidacy for governor at 11:47 p.m., 28 February 2001, refused to
accept the affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously therewith because, as he
claimed, the affidavit must be filed with the office of the municipal election officer of
Baybay, Leyte where petitioner filed certificate of candidacy for mayor. 1wphi1.nt
The Facts
Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose
term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001.
On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the
municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for
governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with
the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of
the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. Hiowever, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte
refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay,
Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.
At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to
Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax 4 to
her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the election
officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001. 5 On the same day, at 1:15 p.m.,
the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal. 6
On 05 March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of
candidacy of petitioner.7 Respondent Antoni filed a similar petitions, namely, that for
mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for
both.1wphi1.nt
On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L. Villegas, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte,
by 1st indorsement, referred the cases to the Commission on Election, Manila, Law
Department, on the ground that he was inhibiting himself due to his prior action of
refusing to receive the petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously with
the filing of the certificate of candidacy for governor on 28 February 2001. 9
In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena,
made a study of the cases without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to
submit responsive pleadings. On 05 April 2001, they submitted a report and
recommendation to the COMELEC en banc10
The report and recommendation reads:
"Submitted for due consideration is the petition filed by Atty. Felipe V. Montejo
and Atty. Arvin V. Antoni on March 5, 2001, before the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Leyte, seeking to deny due course and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Catalina L. Go for Governor of Leyte.
"Both petitions which are exactly worded in the same language allege, as follows:
"This petition is heretofore filed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of
the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE and Section 15, as well, of
RESOLUTION NO. 3253-A of the COMELEC EN BANC promulgated on
November 20, 2000. Ditto, this petition is filed within the reglementary
14

period following the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy on
February 28, 2001.
'Petitioner Atty. Felipe V. Montejo is of voting age, Filipino, lawyer by
profession, married, and a resident of #50 Juan Luna Street, Tacloban
City, of which locality he is a registered voter.
'Respondent re. Catalina L. Go, on the other hand, is likewise of legal
age, married, resident of Baybay, Leyte, of which locality she is a
registered voter, and the incumbent Member of the House of
Representatives representing the 5th Congressional District of Leyte.
'Respondent CATALINA L. GO filed a certificate of candidacy for the
office of Mayor of the Municipality of Baybay, Leyte on February 27,
2001. Without canceling or withdrawing the said certificate of candidacy
this time for the office of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 28,
2001. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, respondent indubitably failed to declare under
oath the office for which she desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office.
'Verily, at the time respondent filed her certificate of candidacy for
Provincial Governor, she knew fully well that she was ineligible for the
said office, having filed, a day earlier, a certificate of candidacy for Mayor
of Baybay, Leyte. Hence, respondent falsely represented in her certificate
of candidacy for provincial Governor, and under oath, that she is
ELIGIBLE for the said office; a material fact required by law to be sworn
to and contained in certificates of candidacy. In fine, respondent likewise
falsely represented in her certificates of candidacy, under oath, the she
will OBEY THE LAWS, ORDERS, DECRESS, RESOLUTIONS AND
REGULATIONS PROMULGATED AND ISSUED BY THE DULY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES; a material fact required by law to be
sworn to and contained in certificates of candidacy.'
"Petitioners' ground to deny due course and/or to cancel the said certificate of
candidacy is anchored on Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted
hereunder.
'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filed in the
same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the
same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than
one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the
expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the
person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare
under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.'
"In relation to Section (1) (b) of the Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A, to wit:
'SECTION 1. Certificate of Candidacy. xxxxxx (b) No person shall be eligible for
more than one office to be filed in the same election. If he files a certificate of
candidacy for more than one office he shall not be eligible for either. However,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, he may
declare under oath the office for which he desire to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the office or offices.'
"Moreover, petitioners contended that CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-Go is
ineligible to run either Mayor of Baybay, Leyte or Governor of Leyte Province.
"Based on the certified list of candidate for the provincial candidates of Leyte on
March 7, 2001, the certificate of candidacy of Catalina Lopez Loreto-Go for the
position of Governor of Leyte was filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor on February 28, 2001 at 11:47 p.m., the last day for filing certificates
of candidacy.
"In support of the petitions of Atty. Montejo and Atty. Antoni, is a certified machine
copy of the affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina L. Loreto-Go, which was filed on
march 01, 2001 at the Office of the Election Officer of Baybay, Leyte, which she
filed on February 28, 2001.
"The affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina Loreto-Go, a portion of which reads:
"1. That last February 27, 2001 I filed my certificate of candidacy for mayor for
the MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, LEYTE;
"2. That due to political exigency and influence form my political leaders urging
me to run for mayor of the Municipality of baybay, leyte, I have no other recourse
but to follow desire of my political constituents;
15

"3. That therefore, I am formally withdrawing my certificate of candidacy for
Mayor of the Municipality of Baybay, leyte and in it stead I am formally filing my
certificate for Governor of Leyte.
"A careful scrutiny and examination of Catalina Loreto-Go certificate of candidacy
for Governor of Leyte Province although filed on the last day of February 28,
2001, her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte, was filed only on
March 1, 2001 or one (1) day after the February 28, 2001 deadline. In other
word, there are two (2) certificates of candidacy filed by Catalina Loreto-Go, one
for governor of Leyte and the other for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
"Clearly, on March 1, 2001 when she filed her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of
baybay, Leyte, both her certificates of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, leyte and
Governor of Leyte were still subsisting and effective making her liable for filing
two certificates of candidacy on different elective positions, thus, rendering her
ineligible for both positions, in accordance with Section (1) (b) of Comelec
Resolution No. 3253-A.
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department RECOMMENDS as follows:
"1.) To give due course to the petition of Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and Atty. Arvin V.
Antonio against the certificates of candidacy of Catalina Loreto-Go for Governor
of Leyte; and
"2.) To direct the Provincial Election Suprevisor of Leyte and the Election Officer
to delete/cancel the name of CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-GO from the certified
list of candidates for Governor of Leyte and Mayoralty candidates of Baybay,
Leyte, and to accordingly notify the parties and the above-named Comelec
Officials."11
On 23 April 2001, the COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of the Director,
Law Department and adopted the resolution in question as set out in the opening
paragraph of this decision.12
Hence, this petition.13
The Issues
At the oral argument on 07 May 2001, at 3:00 p.m., we defined the following issues to be
addressed by the parties:
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay,
Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions?
II. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Baybay, Leyte?
(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place
where the certificate of candidacy was filed?
(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax?
III. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law?
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner
disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of
Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay,
Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of
the law.14 We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of
candidacy for governor.15
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
provides that:
"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein.
"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election,
withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration
under oath.
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he
shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one
certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to
be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."
16
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be Section 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates
filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. of candidacy explicitly provides:
Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the
regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the "Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election
officer of the said municipality. "xxxx

While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 "Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily after due
November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the notice. (emphasis supplied)
place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, 16 such requirement is merely directory,
and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative
Obviously, the COMELEC en banc in approving the report and recommendation of the
resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in
Law Department, deprived the petitioner of procedural due process of law. 22 The
the law.17 Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of
COMELEC, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of
Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw
procedural due process in resolving cases before it. 23
such candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declare
petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court ANNULS COMELEC
Resolution No. 3982, adopted on 23 April 2001, and DECLARES valid petitioner's
There is another important moiety that affects the validity of the COMELEC resolution
certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte. The Chairman, Commission on Elections,
canceling petitioner's certificates of candidacy. It is that petitioner was deprived of
Manila, and the provincial election supervisor of Leyte shall immediately order the
procedural due process of law.18 The petition to cancel her certificate of candidacy or to
inclusion of petitioner's name in the certified list of candidates for Governor, province of
deny due course to both were filed before the provincial election supervisor of Leyte who
Leyte, to be posted in each polling place,/voting booth in every precinct throughout the
inhibited himself and referred the cases to the Law Department, COMELEC, Manila. On
province of Leyte, in the voters information sheet to be given to each registered voter
11 April 2001, the COMELEC, First Division, acting on the first indorsement of Atty.
therein, in the election returns, statement of votes by percents, and certificate of
Villegas approved his inhibition and required the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to
canvass, and all other election papers.
immediately forward his copy of the records of these cases to the Regional Election
Director, Region 08, at Tacloban, Leyte, for hearing. 19 On 18 April 2001, Regional
Election Director, Region 08, Atty. Adolfo A. Ibaez issued summons/subpoena to The status quo ante order heretofore issued is made permanent.
petitioner Go to submit her consolidated answer to the petitions and counter-affidavits
including position paper within three (3) days form notice. 20 On 23 April 2001, petitioner This decision is immediately executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be
submitted her consolidated position paper.21 On 25 April 2001, at 9:00 a.m., Director entertained.
Ibaez set the cases for hearing for reception of evidence of the parties.
No costs.
In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELCE conducted an ex-parte study
of the cases. It did not give petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not
required to submit a comment or opposition to the petitions for cancellation of her
certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not set the cases for hearing. It
was not even aware of the proceedings before Director Ibaez in Tacloban. After an ex-
parte study of the cases, on 05 April 2001, the Law Department submitted its report and
recommendation, approved by Director Balbuena, to the COMELEC en banc.

During the oral argument on 07 May 2001, Director Balbuena candidly admitted that the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires that notice be given to the respondent . Indeed,

17

G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006
URBANO M. MORENO, Petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NORMA L.
MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO, Respondents.
In this Petition 1 dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the
Resolution 2 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1, 2005,
affirming the Resolution 3 of the Comelec First Division dated November 15, 2002 which,
in turn, disqualified him from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and
One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he
was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, 4 the
imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was
thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of
1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him
all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000
allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a
result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002
elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for
preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that
Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration
filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed.
According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides
that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. 5 Since
Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall
commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno
merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification
from running for an elective local office.
Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code
take precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation
Law because it is a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government
Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers
because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should
allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special
law which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his
subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his
previous misconduct.
In its Comment 6 dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the
Solicitor General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec 7 definitively settled a
similar controversy by ruling that conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude
stands even if the candidate was granted probation. The disqualification under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment 8 dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and
pointing out material differences between his case and Dela Torre v. Comelec which
allegedly warrant a conclusion favorable to him. According to Moreno, Dela Torre v.
Comelec involves a conviction for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving
moral turpitude covered by the first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
Dela Torre, the petitioner in that case, applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his
conviction and only after appealing his conviction, such that he could not have been
eligible for probation under the law.
In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the
period specified therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to him.
18

The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase
"within two (2) years after serving sentence" found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code, which reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
....
We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary
Detention, the crime of which Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves moral
turpitude falling under the first part of the above-quoted provision. The question of
whether Arbitrary Detention is a crime involving moral turpitude was never raised in the
petition for disqualification because the ground relied upon by Mejes, and which the
Comelec used in its assailed resolutions, is his alleged disqualification from running for a
local elective office within two (2) years from his discharge from probation after having
been convicted by final judgment for an offense punishable by Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides, a determination that the crime of
Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude is not decisive of this case, the crucial issue
being whether Morenos sentence was in fact served.
In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our pronouncement
therein that the grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of
the Local Government Code was based primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing
of which petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude, a circumstance which does
not obtain in this case. At any rate, the phrase "within two (2) years after serving
sentence" should have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those
who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that the
phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
The Courts declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code, we should add, ought to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre
was not even entitled to probation because he appealed his conviction to the Regional
Trial Court which, however, affirmed his conviction. It has been held that the perfection of
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law,
the purpose of which is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused
who, although already eligible, did not at once apply for probation, but did so only after
failing in his appeal. 9
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The
phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the
confinement of a convicted
person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. 10 This seemingly clear and
unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Courts
attention because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened
the coverage of the law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence
because they were granted probation.
Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified because he
did not serve the adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally
discharged by the trial court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is
not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We
held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal
penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting
probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period 11 imposed upon Moreno
were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with
service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that
19

the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of
probation, 12 the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court
but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation
order. 13
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in
this case. They focused on the fact that Morenos judgment of conviction attained finality
upon his application for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had
been served.
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the
letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those
who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment
of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence by
reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service
of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office
because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code does not even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his
position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of
his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for
which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the
courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was
deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were
restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
which gives room for judicial interpretation, 14 our conclusion will remain the same.
It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue
as to the intended meaning of the phrase "service of sentence," i.e., whether the
legislature also meant to disqualify those who have been granted probation. The Courts
function, in the face of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the
Probation Law and the Local Government Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus
est optimus interpretandi.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency
or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who
thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of
which he was convicted. 15 Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards
regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of
probation shall not be extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of
the State; those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine
of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on probation; and those who are
already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law
became applicable. 16
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty
which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not
specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission
is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as
a distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted in
1991, some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature
approved the enumerated disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of
probation on the disqualification from holding public office. That it chose not to include
probationers within the purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will
not to disqualify probationers.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later
law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the
Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of
statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing
a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier
statute. 17
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the
scope of the disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious
error which we here correct. We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong
20
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his
conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh
mandate from the people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
elections. This situation calls to mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec 18 where he said that "it would be far better to
err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood
legalisms."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on

Elections en banc dated June 1, 2005 and the Resolution of its First Division dated
November 15, 2002, as well as all other actions and orders issued pursuant thereto, are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to proceed in
accordance with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

21

G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND
YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15,
1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the
petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she
left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate
Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and
was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil
Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground
therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that
respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en
banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows
that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her
late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the
Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary
notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other
evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that
respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship
as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and
deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequence. The evidence
adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent
contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship". 1
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for
disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division,
contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the
COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran
for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her
candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing
the petition, and disposing as follows:
"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant
case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner
herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in
SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents
already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the
Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter
substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel
reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of
course.
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues
tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse
the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This
Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED."2
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no
avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15,
1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the
citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
22

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a
Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father,
Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she
was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a
Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on
January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian
Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC
No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run
for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian
citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration
as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No.
404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private
respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application
for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private
respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia;
and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to
run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11,
1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the
said acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino
citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine
citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under
Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office did not mean
the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private
respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run
for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the
principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim
Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,3 that:
"xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has
to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. xxx"
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her
birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and
native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this
was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as
the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine
islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
23

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of
the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein. (underscoring
ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the
Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo
Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were
the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle
of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 4 and 19875 Constitutions. Thus,
the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of
dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a
Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress
this contention, petitioner cited private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19,
1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign
country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine
armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws
in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express.
Petitioners contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in
24

the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano
6
and COMELEC.7
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a
holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a
Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount
to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent
Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before
he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his
American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must
be express.8 As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an
alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation
of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case
of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before
she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual
citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born
in another country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine
citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not
hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had
dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing
Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which states:
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx xxx xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as
used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.9Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court
explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
"xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for
candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon
the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship.10 The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. 11 This is so
because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and
that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her
Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department
of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on
February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as
certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila.
As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the
issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation
25
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
was effective, petitioners claim that private respondent must go through the whole
process of repatriation holds no water.

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or

administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not
considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the
case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.12 He insists that the same
issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res
judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However,
in the case of Burca vs. Republic,13 an exception to this general rule was recognized. The
Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in
cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where

said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not
foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may
somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to
make the effort easier or simpler.14 Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the
prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which
resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence
adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior
cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a
reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding,
considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions,

dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for
governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

26

G.R. No. 182701 July 23, 2008
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship
at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution 1 and (2) Omnibus Order2 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as
Barangay Chairman.
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition 3 before the
Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of
petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for
any public office. In his Answer,4 petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and
at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise
known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. 5 He returned to the
Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the
winner.6
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is
GRANTED and respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from running
as Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.
SO ORDERED.7
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his
Filipino citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able
to qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner failed to do.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present
petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying
him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
We dismiss the petition.
Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections, 8 petitioner argues that his filing of a
certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling in Valles are
substantially different from the present case. In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, was a dual citizen by accident of birth on foreign soil. 9 Lopez was born of Filipino
parents in Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus soli. As a result, she
lauuphi1
acquired Australian citizenship by operation of Australian law, but she was also
considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law. She did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines.
In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship
and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring
Filipino citizenship.
1awphi1
More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 922510 in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the
conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in
the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and
the following conditions:
xxxx
27
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
oath. (Emphasis added)
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly
provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath."

Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC
observation on this point:

While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual
Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough
to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a
candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is
no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A.
No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman
of Barangay Bagacay.

For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before
an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear
and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In
the instant case, respondent Lopezs failure to renounce his American citizenship as
proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission
to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of
respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this
Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the
Philippines.11 (Emphasis added)

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the
functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy.
Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified
candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.12

28

G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting claims of
the parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice as that phrase is so used
under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No.
7160). That law states:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective
position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition
for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning
candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive
from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a
criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial
District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court
for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his
alleged "flight" from that country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of
respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification
under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the
COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th May
1992 resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in
due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.
The Court, in its resolution of 02 June 1992, held:
Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy.
Since the private respondent had already been proclaimed as the duly elected
Governor of the Province of Quezon, the petition below for disqualification has
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 84462-63 and Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
Nos. 84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March 1989, 171 SCRA 468, this court held
that a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and
should be dismissed. The proper remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the
disqualification suit in a separate proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice
to the filing of the appropriate proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired,
within ten (10) days from notice. 1
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.
Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private
respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December
1993, denied a reconsideration of the resolution.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to be expected,
focuses on whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and
evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice"
contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore,
disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an
elective local office.
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no
further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather
clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who
flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee
to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine
Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz,
138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it
may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of
the Oversight Committee which, conformably with Section 533 2 of R.A. 7160, was
convened by the President to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of the Code
to ensure compliance with the principles of Local Autonomy.
Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:
29

CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.
So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next, Page 39.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.
REP. CUENCO: What does he want?
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung
kuwestiyunin ang constitutionality nito before the Supreme Court later on.
REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.
Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or
abroad.
Mabigat yung abroad. One who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of
arrest pending, unserved. . .
HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, ano what is a
fugitive? It is not defined. We have loose understanding. . .
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong fugitive.
Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.
THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She is not a
fugitive from justice. Mrs. Marcos can run at this point and I have held that for a
long time ago. So can. . .
MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording, this is very
important. Manny, can you come up?
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.
THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment.
Okay,. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment. Insert that
on Line 43 after the semi-colon. Is that approved? No objection, approved (TSN,
Oversight Committee, 07 May 1991).
xxx xxx xxx
THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page 2? Sino ba
ang gumawa nito? Okay, on page 2, lines 43 and 44, "fugitive from justice". What
"fugitive"? Sino ba ang gumawa nito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to clarify the
word "fugitive".
THE CHAIRMAN. "Fugitive from justice means a person" ba ito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person...
THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?
HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.
THE CHAIRMAN; Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall mean
or means one who has been convicted by final judgment. It means one who has
been convicted by final judgment.
HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.
THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.
HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?
THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been convicted
by final judgment, meaning that if he is simply in jail and because he put up, post
bail, but the case is still being reviewed, that is not yet conviction by final
judgment. 3
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible
constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification
30
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal which is DIRECTED to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conformably with the
charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the foregoing opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.
bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made
this reservation: SO ORDERED.

. . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo
bothered ako doon, a. 4

The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:

Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from

running for any elective local position:

(a) . . .

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or

abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final
judgment. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in
charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees;
however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must
merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can
neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes
and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during
the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term
"fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by
final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact,
private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and
applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the
COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule
73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court
itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC
for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission

31

G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., respondents.
Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr.
(Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of
Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-
elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for quo warranto before the
COMELEC (EPC No. 92-28). Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States
where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter before the Los
Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted
grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a
ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government
Code (R.A. 7160), so argued Marquez.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez' quo warranto petition (EPC No. 92-28) in a
resolution of February 2, 1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof.
Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPC No. 92-28 before this Court via
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 112889. The crux of said petition is whether
Rodriguez, is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40 (e) of the Local
Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him (as
previously mentioned).
In resolving that Marquez petition (112889), the Court in "Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC"'
promulgated on April 18, 1995, now appearing in Volume 243, page 538 of the SCRA
and hereinafter referred to as the MARQUEZ Decision, declared that:
. . . , "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it
may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the
term. 1
Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus given was
not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand
of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with
the MARQUEZ Decision. Rodriguez sought a reconsideration thereof. He also filed an
"Urgent Motion to Admit Additional Argument in Support of the Motion for
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Reconsideration" to which was attached a certification from the Commission on
Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985 roughly five (5)
months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los
Angeles court. The Court however denied a reconsideration of the MARQUEZ Decision.
In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same
position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that
Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice." This petition for disqualification (SPA No. 95-089)
was filed by Marquez on April 11, 1995 when Rodriguez' petition for certiorari (112889)
from where the April 18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung was still then pending
before the Court.
On May 7, 1995 and after the promulgation of the MARQUEZ Decision, the COMELEC
promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo warranto case) and SPA
NO. 95-089 (disqualification case). In justifying a joint resolution of these two (2) cases,
the COMELEC explained that:
1. EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 are inherently related cases
2. the parties, facts and issue involved are identical in both cases
3. the same evidence is to be utilized in both cases in determining the common issue of
whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice"
4. on consultation with the Commission En Banc, the Commissioners unanimously
agreed that a consolidated resolution of the two (2) cases is not procedurally flawed.
Going now into the meat of that Consolidated Resolution, the COMELEC, allegedly
having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice", found
Rodriguez to be one. Such finding was essentially based on Marquez' documentary
evidence consisting of
1. an authenticated copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the Los
Angeles municipal court against Rodriguez, and
2. an authenticated copy of the felony complaint
which the COMELEC allowed to be presented ex-parte after Rodriguez walked-out of the
hearing of the case on April 26, 1995 following the COMELEC's denial of Rodriguez'
motion for postponement. With the walk-out, the COMELEC considered Rodriguez as
32

having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of Marquez' aforementioned
documentary evidence. The COMELEC thus made the following analysis:
The authenticated documents submitted by petitioner (Marquez) to show the
pendency of a criminal complaint against the respondent (Rodriguez) in the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and the fact that there is an
outstanding warrant against him amply proves petitioner's contention that the
respondent is a fugitive from justice. The Commission cannot look with favor on
respondent's defense that long before the felony complaint was allegedly filed,
respondent was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the
same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded against criminally. In a
sense, thru this defense, respondent implicitly contends that he cannot be
deemed a fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of the filing
of the criminal complaint, and his disappearance in the place where the long arm
of the law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a clear
desire to avoid and evade the warrant. This allegation in the Answer, however,
was not even fortified with any attached document to show when he left the
United States and when he returned to this country, facts upon which the
conclusion of absence of knowledge about the criminal complaint may be
derived. On the contrary, the fact of arrest of respondent's wife on November 6,
1985 in the United States by the Fraud Bureau investigators in an apartment paid
for respondent in that country can hardly rebut whatever presumption of
knowledge there is against the respondent. 2
And proceeding therefrom, the COMELEC, in the dispositive portion, declared:
WHEREFORE, considering that respondent has been proven to be fugitive from
justice, he is hereby ordered disqualified or ineligible from assuming and
performing the functions of Governor of Quezon Province. Respondent is
ordered to immediately vacate said office. Further, he is hereby disqualified from
running for Governor for Quezon Province in the May 8, 1995 elections. Lastly,
his certificate of candidacy for the May 8, 1995 elections is hereby set aside.
At any rate, Rodriguez again emerge as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995
election for the position of governor.
On May 10 and 11, 1995, Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez'
proclamation which the COMELEC granted on May 11, 1995. The Provincial Board of
Canvassers nonetheless proclaimed Rodriguez on May 12, 1995.
The COMELEC Consolidated Resolution in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 and the
May 11, 1995 Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation thus gave rise to the filing
of the instant petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 120099) on May 16, 1995.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
On May 22, 1995, Marquez filed an "Omnibus Motion To Annul The Proclamation of
Rodriguez, To Proclaim Marquez And To Cite The Provincial Board of Canvassers in
Contempt" before the COMELEC (in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089).
Acting on Marquez' omnibus motion, the COMELEC, in its Resolution of June 23, 1995,
nullified Rodriguez' proclamation and ordered certain members of the Quezon Province
Provincial Board of Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for
disobeying the poll body's May 11, 1995 Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation.
But with respect to Marquez' motion for his proclamation, the COMELEC deferred action
until after this Court has resolved the instant petition (G.R. No. 120099).
Rodriguez filed a motion to admit supplemental petition to include the aforesaid
COMELEC June 23, 1995 Resolution, apart from the May 7 and May 11, 1995
Resolutions (Consolidated Resolution and Order to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation,
respectively).
As directed by the Court, oral arguments were had in relation to the instant petition (G.R.
No. 120099) on July 13, 1995.
Marquez, on August 3, 1995, filed an "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Or
Preliminary Injunction" which sought to retain and enjoin Rodriguez "from exercising the
powers, functions and prerogatives of Governor of Quezon . . . ." Acting favorably
thereon, the Court in a Resolution dated August 8, 1995 issued a temporary restraining
order. Rodriguez' "Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order And/Or For
Reconsideration" was denied by the Court in an August 15, 1995 Resolution. Another
similar urgent motion was later on filed by Rodriguez which the Court also denied.
In a Resolution dated October 24, 1995, the Court
. . . RESOLVED to DIRECT the Chairman of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to designate a Commissioner or a ranking official of the
COMELEC to RECEIVE AND EVALUATE such legally admissible evidence as
herein petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez may be minded to present by way of
refuting the evidence heretofore submitted by private respondent Bienvenido
Marquez, Sr., or that which can tend to establish petitioner's contention that he
does not fall within the legal concept of a "fugitive from justice." Private
respondent Marquez may likewise, if he so desires, introduce additional and
admissible evidence in support of his own position. The provisions of Sections 3
to 10, Rule 33, of the Rules of Court may be applied in the reception of the
evidence. The Chairman of the COMELEC shall have the proceedings
completed and the corresponding report submitted to this Court within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof.
33

The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court, on December 26, 1995, a
report entitled "'EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION"
wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is
NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision,
thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In
arriving at this new conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material
element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in
Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the
Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los
Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).
But the COMELEC report did not end there. The poll body expressed what it describes
as its "persistent discomfort" on whether it read and applied correctly the MARQUEZ
Decision definition of "fugitive from justice". So as not to miss anything, we quote the
COMELEC's observations in full:
. . . The main opinion's definition of a "fugitive from justice" "include not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also those who, after
being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." It proceeded to state that:
This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine
Law Dictionary Third Edition, p. 399 by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law
Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King v. Noe, 244 SC 344; 137
SE 2d 102, 103; Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980;
Tobin v. Casaus 275 Pacific Reporter 2d p. 792), and it may be so
conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of
the term.
But in the majority of the cases cited, the definition of the term "fugitive from
justice" contemplates other instances not explicitly mentioned in the main
opinion. Black's Law Dictionary begins the definition of the term by referring to a
"fugitive from justice" as:
(A) person, who, having committed a crime, flees from jurisdiction
of the court where crime was committed or departs from his usual
place of abode and conceals himself within the district. . . .
Then, citing King v. Noe, the definition continues and conceptualizes a "fugitive
from justice" as:
. . . a person who, having committed or been charged with a
crime in one state, has left its jurisdiction and is found within the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
territory of another when it is sought to subject him to the criminal
process of the former state. (our emphasis)
In Hughes v. Pflanz, the term was defined as:
a person who, having committed within a state a crime, when
sought for, to be subjected to criminal process, is found within the
territory of another state.
Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. considers the term as an:
expression which refers to one having committed, or being
accused, of a crime in one jurisdiction and is absent for any
reason from that jurisdiction.
Specifically, one who flees to avoid punishment . . . (emphasis
ours)
From the above rulings, it can be gleaned that the objective facts sufficient to
constitute flight from justice are: (a) a person committed a "crime" or has been
charged for the commission thereof; and (b) thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of
the court where said crime was committed or his usual place of abode.
Filing of charges prior to flight is not always an antecedent requirement to label
one a "fugitive from justice". Mere commission of a "crime" without charges
having been filed for the same and flight subsequent thereto sufficiently meet the
definition. Attention is directed at the use of the word "crime" which is not
employed to connote guilt or conviction for the commission thereof. Justice
Davide's separate opinion in G.R. No. 112889 elucidates that the disqualification
for being a fugitive does not involve the issue of the presumption of innocence,
the reason for disqualification being that a person "was not brought within the
jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was
brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has
successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or
escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice."
Other rulings of the United States Supreme Court further amplify the view that
intent and purpose for departure is inconsequential to the inquiry. The texts,
which are persuasive in our jurisdiction, are more unequivocal in their
pronouncements. In King v. US (144 F. 2nd 729), citing Roberts v. Reilly (116 US
80) the United States Supreme Court held:
34

. . . it is not necessary that the party should have left the state or
the judicial district where the crime is alleged to have been
committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of
avoiding an anticipated prosecution, but that, having committed a
crime within a state or district, he has left and is found in another
jurisdiction (emphasis supplied)
Citing State v. Richter (37 Minn. 436), the Court further ruled in unmistakeable
language:
The simple fact that they (person who have committed crime within a state) are
not within the state to answer its criminal process when required renders them, in
legal intendment, fugitives from justice.
THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THAT GIVEN THE AUTHORITIES CITED IN G.R.
NO. 112889, THE MERE FACT THAT THERE ARE PENDING CHARGES IN
THE UNITED STATES AND THAT PETITIONER RODRIGUEZ IS IN THE
PHILIPPINES MAKE PETITIONER A "FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE".
From the foregoing discussions, the determination of whether or not Rodriguez is
a fugitive from justice hinges on whether or not Rodriguez' evidence shall be
measured against the two instances mentioned in the main opinion, or is to be
expanded as to include other situations alluded to by the foreign jurisprudence
cited by the Court. In fact, the spirited legal fray between the parties in this case
focused on each camp's attempt to construe the Court's definition so as to fit or
to exclude petitioner within the definition of a "fugitive from justice". Considering,
therefore, the equally valid yet different interpretations resulting from the
Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 112889, the Commission deems it most
conformable to said decision to evaluate the evidence in light of the varied
constructions open to it and to respectfully submit the final determination of the
case to the Honorable Supreme Court as the final interpreter of the law.
The instant petition dwells on that nagging issue of whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from
justice", the determination of which, as we have directed the COMELEC on two (2)
occasions (in the MARQUEZ Decision and in the Court's October 24, 1995 Resolution),
must conform to how such term has been defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ
Decision. To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice":
. . . includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be
an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing
subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the
Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of
Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995, 4 preceded the filing of the felony
complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date
of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly
impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at
the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less
conviction to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was
Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence
of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to
be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez.
With that, the Court gives due credit to the COMELEC in having made the same analysis
in its ". . . COMMISSION'S EVALUATION". There are, in fact, other observations
consistent with such analysis made by the poll body that are equally formidable so as to
merit their adoption as part of this decision, to wit:
It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by private respondent to show
Rodriguez' intent to evade the law. This was done by offering for admission a
voluminous copy of an investigation report (Exhibits I to I-17 and J to J-87
inclusive) on the alleged crimes committed which led to the filing of the charges
against petitioner. It was offered for the sole purpose of establishing the fact that
it was impossible for petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to its
magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusion misleads because investigations of
this nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with utmost
secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of
those who would be charged. Otherwise, the indiscreet conduct of the
investigation would be nothing short of a well-publicized announcement to the
perpetrators of the imminent filing of charges against them. And having been
forewarned, every effort to sabotage the investigation may be resorted to by its
intended objects. But if private respondent's attempt to show Rodriguez' intent to
evade the law at the time he left the United States has any legal consequence at
all, it will be nothing more than proof that even private respondent accepts that
intent to evade the law is a material element in the definition of a fugitive.
The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez' departure
that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith
in his favor. The same suggests nothing more than the sequence of events which
35

transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's purpose cannot be inferred
from the objective data at hand in the absence of further proof to substantiate
such claim. In fact, the evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that
his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and
participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. For indeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in the country,
the upheaval wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events which
occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in the Philippine history. The
EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of former Pres. Marcos and precipitated
changes in the political climate. And being a figure in these developments,
petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. Then, he was elected
Governor in 1988 and continues to be involved in politics in the same capacity as
re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in 1995. Altogether,
these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a period of relentless, intensive and
extensive activity of varied political campaigns first against the Marcos
government, then for the governorship. And serving the people of Quezon
province as such, the position entails absolute dedication of one's time to the
demands of the office.
Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed
against him at the time he left the United States, it becomes immaterial under
such construction to determine the exact time when he was made aware thereof.
While the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not countenance flight
from justice in the instance that a person flees the jurisdiction of another state
after charges against him or a warrant for his arrest was issued or even in view of
the imminent filing and issuance of the same, petitioner's plight is altogether a
different situation. When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not
his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him
while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does
not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him
outright as a fugitive from justice.
The severity of the law construed in the manner as to require of a person that he
subject himself to the jurisdiction of another state while already in his country or
else be disqualified from office, is more apparent when applied in petitioner's
case. The criminal process of the United States extends only within its territorial
jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left said country when the latter sought to
subject him to its criminal process is hardly petitioner's fault. In the absence of an
intent to evade the laws of the United States, petitioner had every right to depart
therefrom at the precise time that he did and to return to the Philippines. Not
justifiable reason existed to curtail or fetter petitioner's exercise of his right to
leave the United State and return home. Hence, sustaining the contrary
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
proposition would be to unduly burden and punish petitioner for exercising a right
as he cannot be faulted for the circumstances that brought him within Philippine
territory at the time he was sought to be placed under arrest and to answer for
charges filed against him.
Granting, as the evidence warrants, that petitioner Rodriguez came to know of
the charges only later, and under his circumstances, is there a law that requires
petitioner to travel to the United States and subject himself to the monetary
burden and tedious process of defending himself before the country's courts?
It must be noted that moral uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching as to
demand of political candidate the performance of duties and obligations that are
supererogatory in nature. We do not dispute that an alleged "fugitive from justice"
must perform acts in order not to be so categorized. Clearly, a person who is
aware of the imminent filing of charges against him or of the same already filed in
connection with acts he committed in the jurisdiction of a particular state, is under
an obligation not to flee said place of commission. However, as in petitioner's
case, his departure from the United States may not place him under a similar
obligation. His subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-
submission to the jurisdiction of the former country does not operate to label
petitioner automatically a fugitive from justice. As he was a public officer
appointed and elected immediately after his return to the country, petitioner
Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the service of his office.
He could not have gone back to the United States in the middle of his term nor
could he have traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of
the public he serves. The require that of petitioner would be to put him in a
paradoxical quandary where he is compelled to violate the very functions of his
office.
However, Marquez and the COMELEC (in its "COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" as earlier
quoted) seem to urge the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice". They espouse the
broader concept of the term and culled from foreign authorities (mainly of U.S. vintage)
cited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by
the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him,
regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight.
Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded
re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision)
and proceed therefrom in resolving the instant petition. The various definitions of that
doctrine have been laid down in People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992, 999, to wit:
"Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal.
More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
36

controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on a general principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court. (21 C.J.S. 330)
It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a
second or succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or
preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the
prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be
considered or readjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267)
In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite
determination, the court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will
refuse to examine question other than those arising subsequently to such
determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its
mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the
directions of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second
appeal.
As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be
the law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the
party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77).
Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be
regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions
are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all
the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due
consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S.
1286-87).
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Besides, to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our
jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or
ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of
the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in
the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:
A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. (Emphasis ours.)
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that
there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the
time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be
denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 7, 1995 (Consolidated Resolution),
May 11, 1995 (Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation) and June 23, 1995
(Resolution nullifying Rodriguez' proclamation and ordering the Quezon Province
Provincial Board and Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited in contempt)
are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not
Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the
instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 (the
Marquez' quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an
appeal from EPC No. 92-28 although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with SPA
No. 95-089 (Marquez' petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must
govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from
justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the
significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their
proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize.

37
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008 (f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents. one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as
it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities,
is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results.
x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for
dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution
No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national
and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x

xxxx
xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a
random drug testing x x x;
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be
subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public
rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace.
will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that
Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt
only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
efficiency would be elected x x x.
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions
of the Civil Service Law;
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it
under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA]
xxxx
9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby

38

promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory
drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and
local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall
undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug
testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective
offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law
Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of
those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second
list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of
the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of
candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who
failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test
certificate. - No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of
his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices
enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re -
election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they
impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided
for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of
the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of
age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate.
He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and
Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator
must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a
registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and
(g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For
another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be
used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165
be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination,
and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the
standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert,
39

SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the
constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with
a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. 3 But even with
the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial
review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the
requisite standing to challenge it. 4 To have standing, one must establish that he or she
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non
- traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. 6 There is no doubt
that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004
elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the
subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS
and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the
transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement
of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically,
do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of
legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out
that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs
only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these
stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.
The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards,
as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, 7 or alter
or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it
is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. 9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain
limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the
abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional
governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority,
the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the
four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only
exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The
Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of
legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap. 10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly
found in the Bill of Rights 12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly
40

impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen
in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions
of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to
the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine
qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The
COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the
drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the
provision does not expressly state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a
disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may
be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section
of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory,
necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals
with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence
adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of
public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no
longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004
synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless,
to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules,
on its validity as an implementing issuance.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the
qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and
tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random
and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard
in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful
effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of
the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting
campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies,
programs and projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as
those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not
necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should
the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are
clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment
and Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of
this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x
apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency.
Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which
shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the
examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug
dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission
Program. - A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is
finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability
under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
xxxx
41

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are
more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their
recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the
right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure 16 under Sec.
2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own,
this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state - decreed search or
intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and
employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to
random drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly
pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of
governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug
menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by
school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug
testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied
participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug
testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter
alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia,
considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school
children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less
privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non - athletes since the former
observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports
activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's
privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is
need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young.
The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the
Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy
constitutional.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma
required a drug test for high school students desiring to join extra - curricular activities.
Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined
to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug - testing policy made to apply to non -
athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who
routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms,
non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even
among non - athletes on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In
so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non - athlete and an athlete. It
ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest
and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could
implement its random drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of
search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this
jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to
their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are
subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of
their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants
for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that
the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country
that threatens the well - being of the people, 21 particularly the youth and school children
who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is
conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and
tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and
interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are
to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our
Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the
42

Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to act is
magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not just upon
the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to
incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random
drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and
private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this
regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug
testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the
individual right to privacy,"23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to
privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2
of the Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and
gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without
elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various
rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the
workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the
mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right
against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively
hereinbelow.25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. 26 In context, the right to privacy
means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from
intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's
ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general agreement as to the basic
function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines
for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v.
Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain
paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has
been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is
judged by the balancing of the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's
privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. 31 In the criminal
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students
for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what
was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable -
cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should
focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the
backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office
is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace.
Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a
degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the
challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion
clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a
search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically
directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or
place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is
to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested.
And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a
narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to
"random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to
protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of
the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the
screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that
43

the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering
and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH
provides that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know" basis; 34 that the
"drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted
practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results." 35 Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received
as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country
and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious
effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among
others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the
workplace via a mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to
at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts
across gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state
that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would
be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such
activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a
notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect
to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random
drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees
in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other
modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to
lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the
part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of
the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also
labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and
other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of
undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its
position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled
options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36
expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and
officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the
persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice
to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the
company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning
that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the
confidentiality of the test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with
the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education,
and Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to
enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug
testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to
say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often,
under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional
landscape.39 In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and
the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative
agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
44
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness"
and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and
are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being
haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug
testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos.
157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but
declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly,
permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

45

G.R. No. 133495 September 3, 1998
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE
T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.
This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring
elective local officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than
three consecutive terms. In particular, the question is whether a vice-mayor who
succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term
is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18,
1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran
and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May
8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. 1
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor
of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr., who
was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the theory that the
latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998
and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of
petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection
as mayor of Pateros. 2 However, on motion of private respondent the COMELEC en
banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in
the May 11, 1998 elections. 3 The majority stated in its decision:
In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term
limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It
made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. In the
case before the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the position
of Mayor in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by
operation of law and served for the unexpired term of his predecessor.
Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one (1) term for
purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution
and the Local Government Code.
Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes
against petitioner's 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated My 7, 1998, of
the COMELEC and to seek a declaration that private respondent is disqualified to serve
another term as mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from September 2,
1989 to June 30, 1992 should be considered as service for one full term, and since he
thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered
to have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the
Constitution and 43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that,
upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent became
the mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is
irrelevant that private respondent became mayor by succession because the purpose of
the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may
serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.
This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):
Sec. 43. Term of Office. . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected. . . .
First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in
the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom
of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the
official concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by
operation of law would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional
provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Article X, 8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned
46

with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by
Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine
years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials
be simply barred from running for the same position in the of the succeeding election
following the expiration of the third consecutive term. 4 Monsod warned against
"prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose" as a result of the
proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained
provisions "recognizing people's power." 5
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:
The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a
temporary or a perpetual disqualification on those who have served their terms in
accordance with the limits on consecutive service as decided by the
Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about this Commission
exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will already
have served their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think the
Commission achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the
excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. We do put a
cap on consecutive service in the case of the President, six years, in the case
of the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection.
In the case of the Members of Congress, both from the legislative districts and
from the party list and sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and
later on the policy concerning local officials will be taken up by the Committee on
Local Governments. The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent
future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent
reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to
develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers
and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts
to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of
because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken service of all of these
officials. But where we now decide to put these prospective servants of the
people or politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual
disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the
people, whereas we should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms
of their own freedom of choice. . . . 6
Other commissioners went on record against "perpetually disqualifying" elective officials
who have served a certain number of terms as this would deny the right of the people to
choose. As Commissioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked, "why should we arrogate unto
ourselves the right to decide what the people want?" 7
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on her
colleagues to "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and [rely] on
their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself." 8
Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: "Why should we not leave [perpetual
disqualification after serving a number of terms] to the premise accepted by practically
everybody here that our people are politically mature? Should we use this assumption
only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice
for the people and for politicians who may aspire to serve them longer?" 9
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the
accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea
of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom
they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did
so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election.
This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning
term limits, now embodied in Art. VI, 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of
Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the
second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he
can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before if the Gentlemen
will remember was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election
which is three years or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed
the view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years,
whether such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this
particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of
hibernation for six years. That was the Committee's stand. 10
Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be
allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them. 11 To bar the election of a
local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of
47

succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this
principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of
the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three
consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of "the term of office
of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for more than three
consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official
may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The term served must
therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." The purpose of this
provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an
elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was
elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas' comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly
bars members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms.
Commissioner Bernas states that "if one is elected Representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered
one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed." 12
This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer to a
query of Commissioner Suarez: "For example, a special election is called for a Senator,
and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one
term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would
disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on
disqualification, Madam President?" Commissioner Davide said: "Yes, because we speak
of "term," and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of
that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the
Members of the Lower House." 13
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member
of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes
incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by
operation of law. 14 On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the
vacancy. 15 In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he
was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right to be
elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as
his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another
confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the
Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After stating that "The
President shall not be eligible for any reelection," this provision says that "No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time." Petitioner contends that, by analogy,
the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he
succeeds to the latter's office and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-
President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession, would be qualified to run
President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a
similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference
between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of
office to which one may have been elected for purposes of the three-term limit on local
elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and
serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The
Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latter's
death, permanent disability, removal, or resignation. While he may be appointed to the
cabinet, his becoming, so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In
running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their
part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill
the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the Presidency for
more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the Local Government Code, he is the
presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such
local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the
event of vacancy therein being only one of
them. 16 It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a
vacancy in the Presidency, that, in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship.
His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than
of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any
term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it
is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
48

times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by
considering the following cases or situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the
death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is
twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election?
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and
subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not
actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit.
Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one
"for which he was elected." Since A is only completing the service of the term for
which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to have
completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible
to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly
restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-
mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not
reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor,
there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he
is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose
of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the
Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a
monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of
choice is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice SO ORDERED.
suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that,
can he run for one more term in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for
the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the
local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to
have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first
term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the
local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three
consecutive terms.

Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by

succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the
purpose of applying Art. X, 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that
term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term
but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he
served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by
the death, of the deceased mayor.

49

G.R. No. 149736. December 17, 2002.
MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E. IBARRA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and LEONARDO B. ROMAN, Respondents.
For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario
E. Ibarra, seeking to set aside the resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated
August 15, 2001, in EPC No. 2001-5 and to declare respondent Leonardo B. Romans
election as governor of Bataan on May 14, 2001 as null and void for allegedly being
contrary to Art. X, 8 of the Constitution, which provides that:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition.
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition. He
contended that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional Commission, the
Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service for three full terms
before the proscription applies. Therefore, not being a full term, a recall term should not
be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification whether served prior (as in this
case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to the nine-year, full three-term limit.
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined, voted to dismiss the petition
on the ground that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA
157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v.
COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb.
4, 2002, a term during which succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall
election is held should not be counted in determining whether an elective local official
has served more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution does not
prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms
because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of
service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the
office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during
which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall
election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had
previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (19951998 and
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
19982001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same
position.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition. He argued that
a recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation
would in effect cut short the elected officials service to less than nine years and
shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should
be balanced against the need to uphold the voters obvious preference who, in the
present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast. He explained that, in
Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the electorate, because in a
democracy the people should, as much as legally possible, be governed by leaders
freely chosen by them in credible elections. He concluded that, in election cases, when
two conflicting legal positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be
tilted in favor of the peoples overwhelming choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that it is clear
from the constitutional provision that the disqualification applies only if the terms are
consecutive and the service is full and continuous. Hence, service for less than a term,
except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count to disqualify an elective
local official from running for the same position. This case is different from Socrates,
where the full three consecutive terms had been continuously served so that
disqualification had clearly attached.
On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J., and
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ., concurred, holds the view
that the recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising the period June 28, 1994
to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term. Since he thereafter served for two
consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, his election on May 14,
2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes Art. X, 8 of the Constitution. For this
reason, she voted to grant the petition and to declare respondents election on May 14,
2001 as null and void.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO-MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to grant the
petition. He held that a recall term constitutes one term and that to totally ignore a recall
term in determining the three-term limit would allow local officials to serve for more than
nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution.
50
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
He contended that respondent Romans election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the
three-term limit imposed by the Constitution.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS DISMISSED.

51
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3

G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009 The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its October
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. 7, 2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the following ISSUES:
TALABONG, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F.
ASILO, Respondents. 1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of
the three-term limit rule; and
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of
office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the 2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Government Code)?
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to
provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the
THE COURTS RULING
purpose of the three-term limit rule.
We find the petition meritorious.
The present petition1 seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
General Considerations
THE ANTECEDENTS
The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the
Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
elective officials term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term
consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In
of an elective public official, has been mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission
September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
on Elections.2 Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court,
preventive suspension, but with the application of the three-term rule on the term that an
however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed
elective official acquired by succession.
performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
a. The Three-term Limit Rule: The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on
the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its
for which he was elected.
Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not
apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any
suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.

52

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits
an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the
first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during
which an official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals, 3 a
Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a "term"
connotes, as follows:
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which
the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term
of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officers
term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a
public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural
frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the
terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied]. 1avvphi1
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, 4 reiterated that "[T]he term means the
time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another."
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative "no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." This formulation no
more than three consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of an
inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to "serve. . . three consecutive
terms" exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference is to the term, not to the
service that a public official may render. In other words, the limitation refers to the term.
1awphi1
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it
expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." This
declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of
service for a full term" for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory
statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the
phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without significance in determining
constitutional intent.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is
to give up, abandon, decline, or resign.5 It is an act that emanates from its author, as
contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a "term" in
mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional
provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of
title to office. The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with "renunciation" signifies
an act of surrender based on the surenderees own freely exercised will; in other words,
a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule,
such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely
sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the
term "voluntary renunciation" shed further light on the extent of the term "voluntary
renunciation":
MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? This
term "voluntary renunciation" does not appear in Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also appears
in Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could the
Committee please enlighten us exactly what "voluntary renunciation" mean? Is this akin
to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the
restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term "voluntary renunciation" is
more general than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.6
From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term
"voluntary renunciation," the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps that an
elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary
renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the three-term limit
rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision, we note further that
Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the negative formulation of the first
branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that it suggests.
53

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances
surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a
high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which
cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth.
We view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation with this firm mindset.
b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the Three-term Limit Rule
Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the
concepts within the provisions contemplation, particularly on the "interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term" that it speaks of.
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public
official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his
supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We
ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms) were not
present. In so ruling, we said:
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process
of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance
from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be
exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
Ong v. Alegre8 and Rivera v. COMELEC,9 like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of
whether there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term limit
disqualification. These cases, however, presented an interesting twist, as their final
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the contested office had expired
so that the elective officials in these cases were never effectively unseated.
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly
elected), the Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a
full term in contemplation of the three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the
final decision that the third-termer lost the election was without practical and legal use
and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office had expired;
and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of the office from
the start to the end of the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious
effect of a contrary view that the official (referring to the winner in the election protest)
would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have served a term by virtue of a
veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served the term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. This factual variation
led the Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost
the election contest was merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer."
The Court obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its
purpose defeated when an official fully served in the same position for three consecutive
terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercised the powers and enjoyed
the perquisites of the office that enabled him "to stay on indefinitely."
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of
what they directly imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the
Court still gave full effect to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent
to strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled
how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to
strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections10 dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term
limit disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the disqualification
applies if the official lost in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was
elected in a recall election covering that term. The Court upheld the COMELECs ruling
that the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out
that for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third term.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections 11 also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit
disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was
54

disqualified to run for a fourth term, he did not participate in the election that immediately
followed his third term. In this election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was
elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates assumed the functions of the
office, recall proceedings were initiated against him, leading to the call for a recall
election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but
Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served
three terms prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run because of
the three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection
for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a
recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption
in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials,
the question asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or
whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after three terms.
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after
the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the
third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the
third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to
run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the
Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. 12
Latasa v. Commission on Elections13 presented the novel question of whether a
municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run as city
mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality into a city. During the third
term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood charter provided that the
elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to exercise
their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. The Court
ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the
municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the
inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3
consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor
held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid
the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa
to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote
this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the
same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This
is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. 14
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that
no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or break in the service between terms
or tenure in a given elective post intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private
citizen with no title to any elective office for a few months before the next mayoral
elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as private
citizens for two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that
the law contemplates a complete break from office during which the local elective official
steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on
Elections,15 where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of
vice-mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he subsequently ran for
councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his term as
councilor that would place him outside the operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled
that an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result
seemingly deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective
official continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen during the
interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the
elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-
mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption
that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
c. Conclusion Based on Law and Jurisprudence
55

From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an elective
official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss
of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of
time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the
thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an
elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using
"voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other
hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post,
even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because
it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding
office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions
of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to
hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter
occurs during an office holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot
exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term "failure to
serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to
serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by
structure and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in
office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing
voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read
in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of
the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The "voluntary renunciation" it speaks
of refers only to the elective officials voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to
this office. It does not speak of the temporary "cessation of the exercise of power or
authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one
of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:16
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].
Preventive Suspension and the Three-Term Limit Rule
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
a. Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code, 17 the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act,18or the Ombudsman Act19 is an interim remedial measure to
address the situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally,
where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt
or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code "when the
evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that
the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat
to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence." Under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that requires a finding of
probable cause) has been filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed
when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the
charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but
does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only
results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled
conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the
interests of the individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as
far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the officials office; the
official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension
is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position
is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly
happened to Asilo.
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the
exercise of all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and the laws. The
imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not an unlimited power; there are
limitations built into the laws20 themselves that the courts can enforce when these
limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of discretion is present. In
light of this well-defined parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension, we
should not view preventive suspension from the extreme situation that it can totally
56

deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an effective
interruption of an election officials term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective
officials service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above,
preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people being served,
and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term
limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his three
terms in office without any break. Its companion concept interruption of a term on the
other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or
interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to the
discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run
parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a
temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term
limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-Term Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay
in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is
barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension
period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of
a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy
exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term
is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry
by equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the
interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many
reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them personal and some of them by
operation of law that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising
the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended
illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty,
to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the
functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is
no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term.
Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective
interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may
be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the
enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing
determination of what an effective interruption is.
c. Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a
voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he
may have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him.
From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness
that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation
or loss of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the
service that an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its
very nature the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and
temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. The
easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important
consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render
service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is
therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term
and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a
threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of
a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary
renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest
time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed
soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing
preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention
more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as
an interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-
imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an
57
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of
candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action
was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and
was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.21

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY

the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared
DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a
prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo. SO ORDERED.

58

G.R. No. 105436 June 2, 1994
EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO NAZAL, REY, MEDINA,
MELENCIO CASTELO and GODOFREDO LIBAN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ANTONIO V. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO NAZAL, REY MEDINA,
MELENCIO CASTELO, GODOFREDO LIBAN and ANTONIO V. HERNANDEZ were
among the candidates in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections for the six (6) positions
of councilor for the Second District of Quezon City.
On 23 March 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission on
Elections his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats. In Item No. 6 of his
certificate he gave as his address "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City."
However, he did not indicate on the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct
Number and the particular Barangay where he was a registered voter. 1 His biodata
submitted together with his certificate of candidacy gave his address as "Acacia Street,
Mariana, Quezon City," 2 which is part of the Fourth District of Quezon City. 3 In other words,
his certificate of candidacy and his biodata filed with COMELEC did not expressly state that
he was a registered voter of Quezon City or that he was a resident of the Second District
thereof within the purview of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides:
Sec. 39. Qualifications (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panglunsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
In view of the seeming deficiency in the certificate of candidacy of private respondent,
petitioners herein challenged his qualification before public respondent COMELEC
explaining however that since they became aware of the grounds for private
respondents qualification only after the elections, they chose to file their petition under
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizing the filing of such petition at
any day after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation. 4
On 2 June 1992, COMELEC promulgated its questioned resolution denying the petition
for disqualification for being filed outside the reglementary period under Sec. 5 of RA
6646, which pertains to nuisance candidates. 5Hence the instant petition
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of
COMELEC in issuing the assailed resolution of 2 June 1992.
It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code
of 1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically require that the candidate must
state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is
registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct
where he intends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for
office.
In the case at bench, his failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct
Number is satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was
not yet assigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon City. He
was formerly a registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the
elections he was already a resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates," admittedly within
the Second District of Quezon City.
In his Petition for Inclusion in the Registry of Registered Voters of Second District,
Quezon City, private respondent explained that
. . . since 1990, he is a resident of Block 26, Lot 1, New Capitol Estates (formerly
Capitol Bliss), Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City; that he failed to register as
a voter during the general registration held at Quezon City on March 14 and 15,
1992 because he was sick of Acute Gastroenteritis as evidenced by the Medical
Certificate duly issued by Dr. Angelito S. Regala, M.D., of the Family Clinic, Inc.;
that he was a previous registered voter of Manila . . . that he would like to
transfer and to register as voter in Quezon City, particularly at Precinct 233-B,
New Capitol Estates, Quezon City because he is now a resident of Quezon City. 6
Confirming the explanation of private respondent, Barangay Captain Manuel Laxina
testified that he was the Barangay Captain of New Capitol Estates (formerly Capitol
Bliss), Barangay Batasan, Quezon City, since 8 October 1986; that petitioner (private
respondent herein) was a resident of New Capitol Estates for two (2) years as of the time
he testified.
After due notice and hearing, and without any written opposition, the petition was granted
by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City the dispositive portion of the order stating
that
59

WHEREFORE . . . and it appearing that petitioner Antonio Viana Hernandez also
known as Anthony Alonzo possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of a voter plus the fact that there was no opposition at all, the
court resolves to grant his petition. Accordingly, the Chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates (formerly Capitol
Bliss), Quezon City, is hereby ordered to include in the official list of voters the
name of Antonio Viana Hernandez also known as Anthony Alonzo and to allow
him to cast his vote in the coming May 1992 election. Let copy of the Order be
furnished the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 233-B,
New Capitol Estates formerly Capitol Bliss, Quezon City, Election Registrar,
Commission on Elections, Quezon City, Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, Intramuros, Manila, for their information and guidance. 7
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
While COMELEC therefore proceeded on the erroneous premise that private respondent
Hernandez should be treated as a "nuisance candidate" as already shown, nevertheless
its conclusion to dismiss the petition and give due course to the candidacy of private
respondent he being a qualified voter of Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates,
Barangay Batasan Hills, must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
Commission on Elections in issuing its questioned resolution of 2 June 1992, the instant
petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

Consequently, as a registered voter of Precinct Number 233-B, New Capitol Estates,

Quezon City, as judicially confirmed, the COMELEC had no other recourse but to declare
that he was eligible, hence qualified, to run for the position in question.

COMELEC referred to the action taken by petitioners herein as one to declare private
respondent a "nuisance candidate" and intimating that they should have instead
petitioned COMELEC to refuse to give due course to or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent, citing Sec. 69 of BP Blg. 881, which provides:

Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters
by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

Certainly, the holding of COMELEC that private respondent Hernandez was a "nuisance
candidate" is erroneous because, tested against the provisions of Sec. 69, there is no
way by which we can categorize him as a "nuisance candidate," hence, the procedure
therein provided could not have been properly invoked by petitioners herein. Neither
could they apply Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which would require such
petition to be filed at any day after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation.

60

G.R. No. 191938 October 19, 2010
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ANTONIO V. GONZALES and ORLANDO R. BALBON, JR., Respondents.
We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Oral
Arguments2 filed by private respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr.
(private respondents), dated July 19, 2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, addressing
our Decision of July 2, 2010 3 (July 2, 2010 Decision or Decision). We annulled in this
Decision the February 10, 2010 and May 4, 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC, and
denied the private respondents petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (Mitra).
The Assailed Ruling
To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite our limited certiorari
jurisdiction in election cases, we are not only obliged but are constitutionally bound to
intervene when the COMELECs action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of its discretion in this case, a situation where resulting errors,
arising from the grave abuse committed by the COMELEC, mutated from being errors of
judgment to errors of jurisdiction. Based on our evaluation of the evidence presented by
both parties, we found that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material
misrepresentation in his COC. We noted, too, that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in its appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a
resident of Aborlan, Palawan. We also found that the COMELEC failed to critically
consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that
would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan.
On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented his Aborlan
residence to deceive and mislead the people of the Province of Palawan, we found that
Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced positive evidence of transfer of residence which the
private respondents evidence failed to sufficiently controvert. Specifically, the private
respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City
resident.
In this regard, we took note of the "incremental moves" Mitra undertook to establish his
new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following: (1) his expressed intent to
transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a
provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of
registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the
construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing
pending the completion of his house. Thus, we found that under the situation prevailing
when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that Mitra committed any
misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan.
We also emphasized that the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable
basis (as it used subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to conclude that Mitras
statement in his COC concerning his residence was indeed a misrepresentation. In sum,
we concluded that the evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed, showed that
Mitra indeed transfered his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the
period required by law.
The Motions for Reconsideration
In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010, the COMELEC, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, asks us to reconsider our July 2, 2010 Decision on the sole
ground that:
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVIEWED THE PROBATIVE VALUE
OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN FACTUAL FINDINGS
OVER THAT OF [THE] PUBLIC RESPONDENT.4
The COMELEC argues that we overstepped our review power over its factual findings;
as a specialized constitutional body, the findings and conclusions of the COMELEC are
generally respected and even given the status of finality. The COMELEC also contends
that the Court erred in taking cognizance of the present petition since the issues raised
therein are essentially factual in nature. It claims that it is elementary that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to correcting questions of law and that the
factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on
certiorari.
On the merits, the COMELEC submits that there is substantial, if not overwhelming,
evidence that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. It argues that it merely took
cognizance of Mitras purported dwellings "habitableness," or lack thereof, to determine
the fact of residency; while Mitra may have exhibited his intention to transfer his domicile,
the fact of actual residency was lacking.
For their part, the private respondents raise the following errors in support of their Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments dated July 20, 2010, viz:
61

I.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN EXERCISING THIS HONORABLE COURTS LIMITED
CERTIORARI JURISDICTION EVEN WHEN THE PETITION, ON ITS FACE, FAILED TO
SHOW HOW THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
II.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE COMELEC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY USING SUBJECTIVE AND NON-LEGAL
STANDARDS IN ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY MITRA.
III.
GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ONE ASPECT OF ITS RESOLUTION, THE SUPREME
COURT SHOULD NONETHELESS CONSIDER WHETHER THE OTHER EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED ARE ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN THE RULING OF THE COMELEC.
A.
THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO OVERTURN THE FINDINGS
OF FACTS OF THE COMELEC SHOULD BE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE. WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF [THE] PETITIONER ARE
UNSUBSTANTIATED AND CONTROVERTED, THE SAME FAILS TO REACH
THE QUANTUM OF PROOF NECESSARY TO SUBSTITUTE THE FINDINGS
OF THE COMELEC.
IV.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN FOCUSING ON THE COMELECS OPINION REGARDING
THE PHOTOGRAPHS SUBMITTED BY MITRA OF HIS SUPPOSED RESIDENCE,
WHILE TOTALLY DISREGARDING OTHER EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND CONSIDERED BY THE COMELEC.
A.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE
CONTRACT OF LEASE WHICH SHOWS THAT THE SAME IS ONLY UP TO 28
FEBRUARY 2010.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
B.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE WHICH SHOW THAT
MITRA FAILED TO ABANDON HIS DOMICILE OF ORIGIN.
V.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MITRA HAD TRANSFERRED HIS
RESIDENCE FROM HIS DOMICILE OF ORIGIN IN PUERTO PRINCESA CITY TO HIS
DOMICILE OF CHOICE IN ABORLAN, IN AN INCREMENTAL PROCESS.
VI.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MITRA DID NOT COMMIT ANY
DELIBERATE MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION IN HIS COC.
A.
THE MATERIAL STATEMENT IN PETITIONERS COC RESPECTING HIS
RESIDENCE HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE FALSE. BY MAKING SUCH FALSE
STATEMENT, PETITIONER DELIBERATELY TRIED TO MISLEAD AND TO
MISINFORM THE ELECTORATE AS TO HIS ACTUAL RESIDENCE. HENCE,
HIS COC WAS CORRECTLY DENIED DUE COURSE AND CANCELLED.
B.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN EXONERATING MITRA FROM THE VIOLATION OF
A MANDATORY PROVISION OF LAW WHICH ENTAILS BOTH
ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL LIABILITIES BY INVOKING THE PURPOSE
OF THE LAW WHERE SUCH RESORT IS NOT CALLED FOR IN VIEW OF THE
GIVEN FACTS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.
VII.
JURISPRUDENCE RELIED ON BY THE MAJORITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
PRESENT CASE.
A.
62

THE CASE OF TORAYNO V. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
PRESENT CASE.
B.
THE CASE OF ASISTIO V. TRINIDAD PE-AGUIRRE IS LIKEWISE NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE.
C.
THE CASE OF VELASCO SHOULD BE APPLIED STRICTLY TO THE
PRESENT CASE.5
Our Ruling
We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and for oral
arguments.
We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondents arguments are mere
rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the
issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision. Thus, both
the COMELEC and private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument
meriting reconsideration. The denial of the motion for oral arguments proceeds from this
same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties original submissions on issues our
Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and attention
that an oral argument shall require.
Having said these, we shall still proceed to discuss the aspects of the case the motions
touched upon, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of our July 2,
2010 Decision.
First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the Court improperly
exercised its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize that Mitras petition failed to
allege and show errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC. They also stress that the Court should respect and consider the
COMELECs findings of fact to be final and non-reviewable.
The COMELECs submission in this regard that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
is limited to corrections of questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the
present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari is wholly
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
erroneous. This submission appears to have confused the standards of the Courts
power of review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the COMELEC
to grossly misread the import of Mitras petition before the Court.
To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via a petition for certiorari, pursuant to Section
2, Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court. Thus, in our July 2, 2010
Decision, we emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of
discretion, and not under the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited
ground, i.e., on the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The basis for the Courts review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that
"[U]nless otherwise provided by [the] Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." For this reason, the Rules of Court
provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of
Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause "except
as hereinafter provided."6
In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections7 and Dario v. Mison,8 the Court construed the
above-cited constitutional provision as relating to the special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 (although with a different reglementary period for filing) and not to an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court now clearly specifies that the mode of review is the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, except as therein provided. In Ocate v. Commission on
Elections,9 we further held that:
The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the challenged tribunal
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari
1avvphi1
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the
resolution of jurisdictional issues.
The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, 10 in defining judicial
power, pointedly states that
63

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power and duty of this Court in
grave abuse of discretion situations, and differentiates this authority from the power of
review by appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines.
Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELECs position that patently
confuses the mode of review in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of
Court, with the appellate review that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides.
We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents proposition that the Court
erred in exercising its limited certiorari jurisdiction. Although the COMELEC is admittedly
the final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution 11 and the Rules of Court12 provide,
we stress that in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional duty is to
intervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because a specialized agency
has been given the authority to resolve the factual issues.
As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the past recognized exceptions to the
general rule that the Court ordinarily does not review in a certiorari case the COMELECs
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. One such exception is when the COMELECs
appreciation and evaluation of evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion to the point
of being grossly unreasonable. In this situation, we are duty bound under the Constitution
to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant grave abuse of
discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.
Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitras submissions and arguments on grave abuse of
discretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to appreciate that the case is a cancellation
of a COC proceeding and that the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false
material representation to deceive the electorate. In fact, Mitras petition plainly argued
that the COMELECs grave abuse of discretion was patent when it failed to consider that
the ground to deny a COC is deliberate false representation. We completely addressed
this issue and, in the process, analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC
decision. At every step, we found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of the evidence.
Second, the private respondents contend that the COMELEC did not use subjective non-
legal standards (i.e., interior decoration of the room) in arriving at its decision; it merely
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
stated how it perceived Mitras alleged residence. The private respondents additionally
claim that the quantum of evidence necessary to overturn the findings of the COMELEC
should be clear and convincing evidence, which level of evidence does not obtain in the
present case.
The assailed COMELEC ruling speaks for itself on the matter of the standards the
COMELEC used. We found that the COMELEC plainly used a subjective non-legal
standard in its analysis and thereby, the COMELEC used wrong considerations in
arriving at the conclusion that Mitras residence at the Maligaya Feedmill is not the
residence contemplated by law.
We reiterate that the COMELEC based its ruling that Mitra did not take up residence in
Aborlan largely on the photographs of Mitras Aborlan premises; it concluded that the
photographed premises could not have been a residence because of its assessment of
the interior design and furnishings of the room. Thus, the COMELEC Second Divisions
Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully supported) did not merely conclude that
Mitra does not live in the photographed premises; more than this, it ruled that these
premises cannot be considered a home or a residence, for lack of the qualities of a home
that the Second Division wanted to see. To quote:
The pictures presented by Mitra of his supposed "residence" are telling. The said
pictures show a small, sparsely furnished room which is evidently unlived in and which is
located on the second floor of a structure that appears like a factory or a warehouse.
These pictures likewise show that the "residence" appears hastily set-up, cold, and
utterly devoid of any [personality] which would have imprinted Mitras personality thereto
such as old family photographs and memorabilia collected through the years. In fact, an
appreciation of Mitras supposed "residence" raises doubts whether or not he indeed
lives there. Verily, what is lacking therein are the loving attention and details inherent in
every home to make it ones residence. Perhaps, at most, and to this Commissions
mind, this small room could have served as Mitras resting area whenever he visited the
said locality but nothing more.
This observation coupled with the numerous statements from former employees and
customers of Maligaya Feed Mill and Farm that Mitras residence is located in an
unsavory location, considering the noise and pollution of being in a factory area, and that
the same, in fact, had been Maligaya Feed Mills office just a few months back, militates
against Mitras claim that the same has been his residence since early 2008. These
information make it clear to this Commission that this room is not a home.13
64

Thus presented, the COMELECs requirement of what should be considered a
"residence" cannot but be a highly subjective one that finds no basis in law, in
jurisprudence, or even in fact.
Third, we cannot likewise agree with the private respondents theory that the quantum of
evidence necessary to overturn the factual findings of the COMELEC should be clear
and convincing evidence, as it misappreciates that we nullified the COMELECs findings
because it used the wrong considerations in arriving at its conclusions.
The private respondents fail to realize that the important considerations in the present
case relate to questions bearing on the cancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the
main critical points are the alleged deliberate misrepresentation by Mitra and the
underlying question of his residency in Aborlan, Palawan.
While it is undisputed that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra
adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to
Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009. As our Decision
discussed and as repeated elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed
to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer,
while the COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but even used the wrong
considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence.
To convince us of their point of view, the private respondents point out that we (1) totally
disregarded the other evidence they submitted, which the COMELEC, on the other hand,
properly considered; (2) disregarded the import of the effectivity of the lease contract,
which showed that it was only effective until February 28, 2010; and (3) disregarded the
evidence showing that Mitra failed to abandon his domicile of origin.
These issues are not new issues; we extensively and thoroughly considered and
resolved them in our July 2, 2010 Decision. At this point, we only need to address some
of the private respondents misleading points in order to clear the air.
1. The private respondents reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract,
to disprove Mitras claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence,
is misplaced. This argument is flimsy since the contract did not provide that it
was completely and fully time-barred and was only up to February 28, 2010; it
was renewable at the option of the parties. That a lease is fixed for a one-year
term is a common practice. What is important is that it is renewable at the option
of the parties. In the absence of any objection from the parties, the lease contract
simply continues and is deemed renewed.14
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
2. In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto
Princesa City, the private respondents submitted in their Motion for
Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of Mitras alleged Puerto Princesa
City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009 15 allegedly
showing Mitras signature. To recall, we found that based on the records before
us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra.
Although the private respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully
examined the recently submitted colored copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and
saw no reason to reverse our finding; the "alleged signature" appears to us to be
a mere hazy "superimposition" that does not bear any resemblance at all to
Mitras signature. We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3, 2009 CTC, if
at all, carries very little evidentiary value. It did it not at all carry Mitras signature;
his secretarys positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the
latters participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.
3. The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated
July 17, 2010,16 from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office
does not have any record of the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay
Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. This late submission was made to show that Mitra has
no established business interests in Aborlan. The Certification pertinently states:
This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration in our
office regarding the alleged pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan,
Palawan. However, the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of
gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value
Commercial Crops in Aborlan.
This certification is issued to MR. BENJAMIN KATON a resident in Penida
Subdivision, Puerto Princesa City for whatever legal purposes may serve him
best.
We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two reasons. First, it
was filed only on reconsideration stage and was not an evidence before us when
the case was submitted for resolution. Second, even if it had not been filed late,
the Certification does not prove anything; it is, on its face, contradictory. On the
one hand, it categorically states that there are no existing records of any
pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it
also expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is "on the
process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High
Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan." 17 Under what law or regulation the certifying
65

office has the obligation to prepare a list of agricultural business interests in
Aborlan has not even been alleged.
At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitras business interests in Aborlan
stand undisputed in the present case. Not only was Mitra able to present
photographs of his experimental pineapple plantation; his claim of ownership was
also corroborated by the statements of Dr. Carme Caspe, Ricardo Temple and
other witnesses.
4. The private respondents also claim that the Court erred in ruling that Mitra did
not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC. We likewise
see no merit in this claim. One important point in the present case is that the
private respondents failed to prove that there was deliberate material
misrepresentation in Mitras statement on his required residency prior to the May
10, 2010 elections. This, as we stressed in our Decision, is a glaring gap in the
private respondents case:
We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he
knew of his transfer, as shown by the moves he had made to carry it out. From the
evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence confirming residence in Aborlan
decidedly tilts in Mitras favor; even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his
favor cannot go below the level of an equipoise, i.e., when weighed, Mitras evidence of
transfer and residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents evidence that
he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident. Under the situation prevailing when Mitra
filed his COC, we cannot conclude that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, much
less a deliberate one, about his residence.
The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case
that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on the character of
Mitras feedmill residence. For this reason, the COMELEC was led into error one that
goes beyond an ordinary error of judgment. By failing to take into account whether there
had been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the COMELEC committed the
grave abuse of simply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate
falsity in a material representation. In this case, it doubly erred because there was no
falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his
residence within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach of
using subjective norms, as they now argue that given his stature as a member of the
prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a three term congressman, it is highly incredible
that a small room in a feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.
We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the
COMELECs use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitras feed mill dwelling cannot be
considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of
residence, specifically, his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto
Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory moves
starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot
for his permanent home; and the construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically,
is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the completion of his house. These
incremental moves do not offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELECs highly
subjective non-legal standards do.
Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding before us, that
the respondents have not presented a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras
evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his
representation on this point in his COC, while the COMELEC could not even present any
legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his
residence was a misrepresentation.18
5. The private respondents submit that the Court erred in relying on jurisprudence
(Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC 19and Asistio v. Hon. Trinidad Pe-Aguirre 20) not applicable to
the present case. They additionally argue that our ruling in Velasco v.
COMELEC21 should be applied strictly to the present case.
These submissions are wrong, as they do not consider the purposes and the specific
points of law for which we cited these cases. Torayno, Asistio and Velasco, read in their
proper perspective, fully support our findings and conclusions in this case.
While Torayno does not share the exact factual situation in the present case, we cited the
case to illustrate that it is not unknown in this jurisdiction to have a situation where a
candidate, due to legal developments (such as reclassification of a component city to a
highly urbanized city), is compelled to transfer residence to allow him to continue his or
her public service in another political unit that he or she cannot legally access as a
candidate, without a change of residence. In the present case, as in Torayno, Mitra would
not have had any legal obstacle to his gubernatorial bid were it not for the reclassification
of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city. The adjustment
66

he had to make was solely in his residence, as he already had, as a Puerto Princesa City
resident, knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs of the Palawan electorate.
The factual antecedents of Asistio are likewise not exactly the same as the facts of the
present case, but the Courts treatment of the COC inaccuracies in Asistio fully supports
our conclusion that Mitra has established his Aborlan domicile. In Asistio, we held that
Asistios mistake in his residency statement in his COC "is not sufficient proof that he has
abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of
Caloocan City."22 In the present case, Mitra did not commit any inaccuracies in his COC.
In fact, any inaccuracy there may have been was committed by third persons on
documents (such as the building permit, contract of sale of the Temple property, and his
CTC) that do not have any bearing on his candidacy. Under these circumstances, we
would apply a harsher rule to Mitra if we conclude that he has not established his Aborlan
domicile.
Our July 2, 2010 Decision finds commonality with our ruling in Velasco in the recognition,
in both cases, of the rule of law. But as we explained in our Decision, the similarity ends
there as the facts to which the law was applied differed. We thus ruled:
These cases are to be distinguished from the case of Velasco v. COMELEC where the
COMELEC cancelled the COC of Velasco, a mayoralty candidate, on the basis of his
undisputed knowledge, at the time he filed his COC, that his inclusion and registration as
a voter had been denied. His failure to register as a voter was a material fact that he had
clearly withheld from the COMELEC; he knew of the denial of his application to register
and yet concealed his non-voter status when he filed his COC. Thus, we affirmed the
COMELECs action in cancelling his COC.
If there is any similarity at all in Velasco and the present case, that similarity is in the
recognition in both cases of the rule of law. In Velasco, we recognized based on the
law that a basic defect existed prior to his candidacy, leading to his disqualification and
the vice-mayor-elects assumption to the office. In the present case, we recognize the
validity of Mitras COC, again on the basis of substantive and procedural law, and no
occasion arises for the vice-governor-elect to assume the gubernatorial post. 23
To summarize, both the COMELEC and private respondents have not shown, through
their respective motions, sufficient reasons to compel us to modify or reverse our July 2,
2010 Decision.
Other Developments,
Issues and Rulings
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
In the course of the Courts consideration of this case, a dissent was entered that
contained its own arguments on why our Decision of July 2, 2010 should be reversed.
For a complete treatment and presentation of the issues raised, the arguments in the
dissent and the refutation are discussed below, separately from the arguments the
COMELEC and private respondents themselves raised.
First, the dissent asserts that our conclusion that the private respondents
evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident is
"way off point" since the private respondents showed, as the COMELEC has
found, that Mitra could not have stayed and resided at the mezzanine portion of
the Maligaya Feedmill located at Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. 24 In
concluding that Mitra remained to be a Puerto Princesa City resident, the dissent
points to the certification of the Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica, Puerto
Princesa City attesting that Mitra continued to reside in that barangay. The
dissent also argues that the certification of the Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica,
supported by the sworn statement of Commodore Hernandez that Mitra resides
in that same barangay, deserves equal if not greater weight than the statement of
the Punong Barangay of Isaub, Aborlan; the latter supporting statement should
provide the "tilting element on the question of Mitras continued residency in his
domicile of origin."25
Second, the dissent faults us for not giving weight to the sworn statements of
Maligaya Feed Mills customers and former employees, who testified that Mitra
did not reside at the mezzanine portion of the Feed Mill. It emphasizes the
undisputed point that the room at the mezzanine neither has the usual comfort
room nor a kitchen area. Additionally, it argues that we conveniently failed to cite
any statutory standard with respect to the determination of whether Mitras
alleged residence constitutes a "residence" as defined by law.26
Third, the dissent submits that we gravely erred "in giving credence to Mitras
gratuitous claims of business interests in Aborlan Palawan" to justify our finding
that "Mitras transfer of residence was accomplished not in one single move but,
through an incremental process."27 It notes that Mitra failed to submit material
proofs to prove his substantial business interests in Aborlan, Palawan, such as
but not limited to - "government issued permits or licenses, tax declarations, or
real estate tax payments, property leases and proofs of commercial
transactions."28 The dissent concludes that the suppression of material evidence,
which, could directly prove the existence and ownership of the pineapple
plantation should be taken against Mitra who claims ownership and existence of
these businesses.29
67

Fourth, the dissent argues that we erred in unduly relying on the "dubious" lease
contract for being ante-dated. It stresses that the ponencia unreasonably gave
credence to the lease contract despite "indicators" of its invalidity, which should
have forewarned the Court that the same is not what it purports to be. 30 It also
adds that our justification that the lease contract by law may be impliedly
renewed from month to month lacks factual basis, since Mitra himself, in his
Motion for Reconsideration dated February 13, 2010 before the COMELEC en
banc, stated that "he had moved to his own new house physically residing in his
newly completed home in Aborlan."31
Fifth, the dissent implores the Court to apply to the present case our June 15,
2010 Decision in G.R. No. 192127, Mario Joel T. Reyes v. Commission on
Elections and Antonio V. Gonzales,32 where we resolved to dismiss Reyes
petition via a minute resolution for failure to sufficiently show that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in cancelling Reyes COC for his deliberate
misrepresentation on his transfer and establishment of a new residence in
Aborlan, Palawan.
Finally, the dissent submits that the mere fact that Mitra won in the May 10, 2010
gubernatorial elections cannot disregard the mandatory one-year residency
requirement to qualify as a gubernatorial candidate. It cites our ruling in Velasco
v. Commission on Elections,33 where we ruled that the provisions on material
qualifications of elected official should always prevail over the will of the
electorate in any given locality; to rule otherwise, would be "to slowly gnaw at the
rule of law."
These arguments are addressed in the same order they are posed under the topical
headings below.
The private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra
remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.
The evidence before us, properly considered and carefully reviewed, fully supports our
conclusion that the private respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a
Puerto Princesa City resident. As discussed now and in our Decision of July 2, 2010,
Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental
process to Aborlan beginning 2008, concluding his transfer in early 2009. Given this
proof, the burden of evidence lies with the private respondents to establish the contrary.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Proof to the contrary is sadly lacking, as the dissents reliance on the Certification of the
Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City is misplaced. The ponencia
cannot give full evidentiary weight to the aforementioned Certification which simply
stated -
This is to CERTIFY that ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, is a bonafide resident of
Purok El Rancho this (sic) Barangay.
CERTIFIES FURTHER, that on February 3, 2009, he secure (sic) community tax
certificate in this Barangay with CTC No. 16657723.34
To be sure, a bare certification in a disputed situation cannot suffice to conclusively
establish the existence of what the certification alleged. The purported CTC, on the other
hand, was neither signed nor thumb-marked by Mitra and, thus, bore no clear indication
that it had been adopted and used by Mitra as his own. In our evaluation, we in fact
pointedly emphasized that the Puerto Princesa City CTC dated February 3, 2009, if at all,
carries little evidentiary value in light of Lilia Camoras (Mitras secretary) positive
declaration that she was the one who procured it, while Mitras Aborlan CTC dated March
18, 2009 carried Mitras own signature. Camora fully explained the circumstances under
which she secured the CTC of February 3, 2009 and her statement was never disputed.
On the other hand, Commodore Hernandez declaration on its face did not controvert
Carme E. Caspes sworn statement which adequately proved that Mitras transfer to
Aborlan was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process
that started in early 2008 and concluded in March 2009. Thus, we emphasized in our
Decision:
A sworn statement that has no counterpart in the respondents evidence in so far as it
provides details (particularly when read with the statement of Ricardo Temple) is Carme
Caspes statement on how Mitras transfer of residence took place. Read together, these
statements attest that the transfer was accomplished, not in one single move but,
through an incremental process that started in early 2008 and was in place by March
2009, although the house Mitra intended to be his permanent home was not yet then
completed.35
The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence
and in using wrong considerations which lead it to incorrectly conclude that Mitra is not a
resident of Aborlan and that he committed a deliberate misrepresentation in his COC.
68

Contrary to the dissents view, the sworn statements of Maligaya Feedmills customers
and former employees that Mitra did not and could not have resided at the mezzanine
portion of the Feedmill cannot be given full evidentiary weight, since these statements
are in nature of negative testimonies that do not deserve weight and credence in the face
of contrary positive evidence, particularly, Carme E. Caspes testimony, cited above, that
Mitra did indeed transfer residence in a process that was accomplished, not in a single
move, but through an incremental process that started in early 2008. It is well-settled in
the rules of evidence that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.36
Additionally, we noted in our Decision that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion, as it failed to correctly appreciate that the evidence clearly pointed to fact that
Mitra effectively transferred his residence to Aborlan, viz:
Specifically, it was lost on the COMELEC majority (but not on the Dissent) that Mitra
made definite, although incremental transfer moves, as shown by the undisputed
business interests he has established in Aborlan in 2008; by lease of a dwelling he
established his base; by the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; by his transfer of
registration as a voter in March 2009; and by the construction of a house all viewed
against the backdrop of a bachelor Representative who spent most of his working hours
in Manila, who had a whole congressional district to take care of, and who was
establishing at the same time his significant presence in the whole Province of
Palawan.37
The dissents observation that the ponencia conveniently failed to cite any statutory
standard with respect to the determination of whether Mitras alleged residence
constitutes a "residence" as defined by law is simply not true. 38Our July 2, 2019 Decision
was particularly sensitive to the matter of standards, as we noted that the COMELEC
used personal and subjective standards in its assessment of Mitras dwelling when, in
fact, the law is replete with standards, i.e., the dwelling must be where a person
permanently intends to return and to remain. Thus, we held:
In considering the residency issue, the COMELEC practically focused solely on its
consideration of Mitras residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on the basis of mere
photographs of the premises. In the COMELECs view (expressly voiced out by the
Division and fully concurred in by the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could not
have been Mitras residence because it is cold and utterly devoid of any indication of
Mitras personality and that it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every home to
make it ones residence. This was the main reason that the COMELEC relied upon for its
conclusion.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a dwelling
as shown by and examined only through photographs, is far from reasonable; the
COMELEC thereby determined the fitness of a dwelling as a persons residence based
solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete
with standards that can be used. Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence i.e., the
dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and to remain his or her
capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial. 39
To buttress our finding that the COMELEC used personal and subjective assessment
standards instead of the standards prescribed by law, we cited Coquilla v.
COMELEC,40 which characterized the term residence as referring to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain (animus manendi).
Mitras business interests in Aborlan remain undisputed and are supported by the
evidence on record.
The dissents view that Mitras business interests are not supported by the evidence on
record is not accurate. As discussed above and in our July 2, 2010 Decision, Mitras
business interests in Aborlan stand undisputed in the present case. On the one hand, the
private respondents failed to present any iota of evidence to disprove Mitras claims that
he had significant investments in Aborlan, such as the expiremental pineapple plantation,
farm, farmhouse and cock farm.
On the other hand, Mitra submitted photographs 41 of his experimental pineapple
plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm to prove his business interests in Aborlan.
Carme E. Caspes and Ricardo Temples statements also corroborated Mitras claim that
he owns the pineapple plantation which is located in a property near the Maligaya
Feedmill. In this regard, Carme E. Caspes sworn statement pertinently declared:
3. Since 2001, Congressman Mitra has been frequently visiting my farm and we
often meet at the Maligaya Feedmill and Farm located along National Hi-way,
Sitio Maligaya, Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.
4. Sometime in January 2008, Congressman Mitra together with his brother
Ramon B. Mitra and his Chief of Staff, Atty. Winston T. Gonzales and some of
their friends started an experimental pineapple growing project in a rented
farmland located near the Maligaya Feedmill and Farm.
69

5. At about the time that they started the pineapple project, Congressman Mitra
and Ramon Mitra would from time to time stay overnight in the residential portion
of Maligaya Feedmill located along National Hi-way, Sitio Maligaya, Barangay
Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.
6. Sometime in February 2008, inasmuch as Congressman Abraham Kahlil B.
Mitra and Ramon B. Mitra would want to permanently stay in Aborlan, as
Congressman Mitra would want to be nearer and have easier access to the
entire 2st Congressional District and as they intend to invest in a chicken layer
venture in Aborlan in addition to their pineapple project, we ented onto a contract
of lease covering the residential portion of the Maligaya Feedmill as their
residence, a chicken layer house and a growing house for chickens. We also
agreed that Congressman Mitra has the option to purchase a portion of the
Feedmill where he can erect or contruct his own house if he so desires later.
7. Congressman Mitra, pursuant to our agreement, immediately renovated and
refurbished the residential part in a portion of the Feedmill and as of March 2008
he started to occupy and reside in the said premises bringing with him some of
his personal belongings, clothes and other personal effects.
10. That in January 2009, Congressman Mitra decided to purchase a nearby
farmland located behind the Deaf School where he intends to contruct his
residential house and farm. However, as he needed time to consummate the sale
of the property and to construct his house thereon, we agreed to renew the lease
for another year effective February 2, 2009 to February 28, 2010 consisting of,
among others, a residential portion of the Maligaya Feedmill.
11. Sometime in May 2009, Congressman Mitra caused the construction of a
house and established a game fowl/fighting cock farm in the lot that he
purchased but he continued to reside in the Maligaya Feedmill up to the
present.42
The photographs of the experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock
farm, coupled with the sworn statements of Carme E. Caspe and Ricardo Temple,
substantially prove the existence of Mitras business interests in Aborlan. Thus, Mitras
failure to submit permits or licenses, tax declarations, real estate tax payments and other
proofs of commercial transactions does not negate the fact that he has substantial
business interests in Aborlan as he claims.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Incidentally, the dissents invocation of the adverse presumption of suppression of
evidence43 is erroneous, since it does not arise when the evidence is at the disposal of
both parties. 44 In the present case, the required proofs of commercial transactions the
dissent cites are public documents which are at the disposal of both parties; they are not
solely under the custody of Mitra and can be easily obtained from the municipal offices of
Aborlan had the private respondents been minded to do so. The bottom line is that no
such evidence was ever presented in this case, and none can and should be considered
at this point.
The validity or invalidity
of the lease contract is not determinative of question of Mitras residence in Aborlan.
Beyond the arguments raised about the invalidity of the lease contract, what is significant
for purposes of this case is the immateriality of the issue to the present case. As we
emphasized in our Decision:
The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what concerns us
is the question of whether Mitra did indeed enter into an agreement for the lease, or
strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feedmill as his residence (while his house, on the lot
he bought, was under construction) and whether he indeed resided there. The notarys
compliance with the notarial law likewise assumes no materiality as it is a defect not
imputable to Mitra; what is important is the parties affirmation before a notary public of
the contracts genuineness and due execution.45
The dissents thesis that Mitras allegation in his Motion for Reconsideration (dated
February 13, 2010) before the COMELEC en banc that he had already transferred to the
newly constructed house in Aborlan negates the proposition that the lease agreement is
extendible from month to month - is misleading. The significance of Mitras statement in
his Motion for Reconsideration that he had already transferred to his newly constructed
house in Aborlan must not be read in isolation; it must be appreciated under the
backdrop of Mitras explicit intention to make Aborlan his permanent residence through
an incremental transfer of residence, as evidenced by the following:
(1) his initial transfer through the leased dwelling at the mezzanine portion of the
Maligaya Feedmill;
(2) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and
70

(3) the construction of a house on this lot which is adjacent to the premises he
was leasing pending the completion of his house.
All these should of course be read with the establishment of Mitras business interest in
Aborlan and his transfer of registration as a voter.
Reyes v. Commission on Elections is not applicable in the present case.
In invoking the applicability of our June 15, 2010 ruling in Reyes v. Commission on
Elections, the dissent cites the "explanatory note" penned by Justice Conchita Carpio-
Morales recommending the dismissal of Reyes petition. The explanatory note states:
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (1) actual removal or
change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and (3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that the petitioner
had not sufficiently established a change of his domicile from Coron, Palawan, his
domicile of origin, to Aborlan, Palawan, his supposed domicile of choice, for failure to
show, among others things, (1) actual presence at Aborlan, Palawan, and (2)
abandonment of his residence at Coron, Palawan. It thus correctly relied on the Courts
pronouncement in Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado that without clear and positive proof of the
concurrence of the requirements for a change of domicile, the domicile of origin
continues.
Reading Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code with the constitutional qualifications
for a Member of the House of Representatives, petitioners false representation in his
COC regarding his residence, which affects his qualifications, gave cause for the
COMELEC to cancel the same.46
On June 15, 2010, the Court issued a Minute Resolution dismissing Reyes petition,
which states:
The Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for failure thereof to sufficiently show that
any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Commission on Elections in
rendering the challenged resolutions which, on the contrary, appear to be in accord with
the facts and applicable law and jurisprudence. 47
This Resolution found no grave abuse of discretion and upheld the March 25, 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division 48 and May 7, 2010 Resolution of the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
COMELEC en banc. In this March 25, 2010 Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division
49
found:
An evaluation, however, of the evidence presented by the parties vis--vis the three
requirements for a successful change of domicile would show that the petitioner is
correct.
First, the alleged residence of respondent is a mere beach house or a lodging house with
a roof made of pawid as shown in the Declaration of Real Property of Clara Espiritu
Reyes, the wife of the respondent. This description of the property is confirmed by two
photographs attached to the Memorandum of the petitioner. By its very nature, a beach
house is a mere temporary abode, a lodging house where people stay merely as
transients. It is not meant to be a permanent place to live in. As the Supreme Court
declared in Dumpit Michelena v. Boado, a beach house is at most a place of temporary
relaxation and it can hardly be considered a place of residence. With this kind of
property, it can scarcely be said that respondent has the intention of remaining there
permanently or for an indefinite period of time.
Second, respondent has failed to show actual presence at his domicile of choice.
Respondent himself admitted that he goes only to Aborlan whenever he gets reprieves
from work as most of the time he stays at Puerto Princesa City, where he also resides
with his wife. His witnesses also confirm this saying that all Palaweos know that the
office of the governor is at the capitol of Puerto Princesa City, where respondent and his
wife stay if there is work at the office. However, considering that Aborlan is only about an
hours away from Puerto Princesa, it is odd that respondent and his wife never go home
to Aborlan after office hours if he intended to establish his domicile of choice in the said
municipality. It is also unusual that respondents wife still stays at Puerto Princesa City
while she works as manager of Palawan Agricultural and Animal Husbandy Corporation,
which is based in Aborlan. This conduct is not indicative of an intent to establish their
domicile at Aborlan.
Third, respondent failed to show that he already cut his ties with Coron, Palawan as his
domicle. Although respondent declared that as early as 2008, he has already transferred
his domicile at Aborlan, still he secured his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) for the year
2009 at Coron.
Respondent tried to wiggle out from this tight spot by explaining that it was secured by
his secretary, who through force of habit inadvertently got it for him. However, such
explanation proved futile when respondent was confronted with the fact that he still used
the said CTC in establishing his identity when he signed a Special Power of Attorney on
71

January 12, 2009 and when he signed a contract in behalf of the Palawan Provincial
Government on August 10, 2009 even when he has supposedly secured another CTC
from Aborlan on April 7, 2009.
Thus, even in August of 2009, less than a year prior to the May 10, 2010 election,
respondent still portrayed himself as a resident of Coron. The intention then to abandon
the said place as his domicile is wanting.
Based on the foregoing discussions alone, it is at once apparent the three-point
requirements for the abandonment of a domicile and the establishment of a new one do
not concur in the case of the respondent.50
Contrary to the dissents view, no parallelism can be drawn between this ruling and the
present case, so that this ruling cannot apply to the latter.
First, the dissents citation of Justice Carpio-Morales explanatory note recommending
the dismissal of Reyes petition cannot be considered a precedent that should be made
applicable to the present case. The explanatory note, while reflective of the Courts
thinking, is not a decision nor an opinion of the Court. It remains what its description
connotes an explanatory note provided by one Justice and approved by the Court
and nothing more; what binds the Court is its pronouncement that no grave abuse of
discretion transpired in the COMELECs consideration of the case. Under this legal
situation, what assumes significance are the COMELEC Resolutions that the Court
effectively upheld when it issued the June 15, 2010 Minute Resolution dismissing Reyes
petition.
Second, the factual circumstances in Reyes are entirely different from the present case;
no parallelism can be drawn so that the application of the ruling in Reyes cannot be
bodily lifted and applied to Mitra. In Reyes, the COMELEC ruled that Reyes committed a
material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that his residence is Tigman,
Aborlan, Palawan and that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to. The
COMELEC so concluded after it found that the evidence showed that Reyes failed to
prove that (1) he had the intention to remain permanently in Aborlan since his alleged
residence is a mere beach house which by its very nature is a temporary place of
residence as held by the Court in Dumpit Michelana v. Boado; 51 2) he had actual
presence at his domicile of choice; and (3) that he had already transferred from his
domicile (Coron, Palawan) to Tigman, Aborlan Palawan. The COMELEC even found, on
the matter of CTC, that Reyes consistently used his Coron CTC in his transactions, thus
negating his explanation that the CTC was procured without his knowledge and consent.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
In contrast, we found in the present case that Mitra did not deliberately misrepresent his
Aborlan residence to deceive or mislead the Palawan electorate since he in fact adduced
positive evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents failed to
sufficiently controvert. In this regard, we noted with emphasis that Mitra undertook
"incremental moves" to his new domicile in Aborlan as evidenced by the following: (1) his
expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him
eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the
transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased
dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6)
the construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was
leasing pending the completion of his house. 52 The issue regarding Mitras CTC, too, was
satisfactorily explained and is far different from the obtaining facts in the case of Reyes.
No occasion exists to apply the rule of the primacy of the will of people since Mitra did
not commit any deliberate misrepresentation; in fact, he proved that he transferred his
residence to Aborlan within the period required by law.
The dissent contends that Mitras election as Governor "did not render the present case
moot and academic or lift the statutory one-year residency requirement for him to qualify
for the gubernatorial post."53 The dissent apparently perceives Mitras electoral victory as
a major consideration in our Decision of July 2, 2010. Unfortunately, the dissent is
mistaken in its appreciation of the thrust of our Decision; we in fact ruled that no reason
exists to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will since Mitra did not commit any
material misrepresentation in his COC. We said:
We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest will of the people as
expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect; in case of doubt, political laws
must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate. Thus, we have held
that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions,
requiring certain steps before elections, will be construed as directory after the elections,
to give effect to the will of the people.
Quite recently, however, we warned against a blanket and unqualified reading and
application of this ruling, as it may carry dangerous significance to the rule of law and the
integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way
around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the
electorate with the basic information for an informed choice about a candidates eligibility
and fitness for office. Short of adopting a clear cut standard, we thus made the following
clarification:
72
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by the
clarification that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material
misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory
requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall
have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the
will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under
oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well
with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a
choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand,
and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold
that we cannot choose the electorate will.

Earlier, Frivaldo v. COMELEC provided the following test:

[T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will
in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of
a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve
the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely
sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of
the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner
must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. [Emphasis supplied.]

With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC,
we see no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will. We cannot
deny, however, that the people of Palawan have spoken in an election where residency
qualification had been squarely raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their
verdict on Mitras qualifications.54

Under these terms, we cannot be any clearer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to DENY with FINALITY, for lack of

merit, the motions for reconsideration and motion for oral arguments now before us. Let
entry of judgment be made in due course.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999
JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMELEC, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B.
JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM,
SR., respondent, LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor.
Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the
Resolution of 6 May 1998 1 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as
candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in
the 11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998 2 of the COMELEC en
banc denying DOMINO's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are not disputed. 1wphi1.nt
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in
item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to
be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election. 3
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P.
Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed
as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private
respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani
where he seeks election. To substantiate their allegations, private respondents presented
the following evidence:
1. Annex "A" the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of
Congressman of the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where in item 4 thereof
he wrote his date of birth as December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in
the constituency where he seeks election for one (1) year and two (2) months; and, in
item 10, that he is registered voter of Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel,
Sarangani;
2. Annex "B" Voter's Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997
indicating respondent's registration at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City;
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
3. Annex "C" Respondent's Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C dated January
15, 1997;
4. Annex "D" Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial
& Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, dated February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr.
Conrado G. Butil, which reads:
In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you herewith certified xerox
copy of the triplicate copy of COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the
name of Juan Domino.
Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same stub was issued to
Carlito Engcong on September 5, 1997, while Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued
to Mr. Juan Domino but was cancelled and serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name
of Marianita Letigio on September 8, 1997.
5. Annex "E" The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C in
the name of Juan Domino dated September 5, 1997;
6. Annex "F" Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P. Riego dated March
2, 1998 addressed to Mr. Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial Treasurer and
Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, which states:
For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping, the stub of
Community Tax Certificate containing Nos. 11132201C-11132250C issued to you on
June 13, 1997 and paid under Official Receipt No. 7854744.
Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.
7. Annex "G" Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman
in the 3rd District of Quezon City for the 1995 elections filed with the Office of the
Regional Election Director, National Capital Region, on March 17, 1995, where, in item 4
thereof, he wrote his birth date as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his "residence in
the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election" as 3
years and 5 months; and, in item 9, that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 182,
Barangay Balara, Quezon City;
8. Annex "H" a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION
RECORDS DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of respondent dated August 30, 1997
addressed to and received by Election Officer Mantil Alim, Alabel, Sarangani, on
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September 22, 1997, stating among others, that "[T]he undersigned's previous residence
is at 24 Bonifacio Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein
he is a registered voter" and "that for business and residence purposes, the undersigned
has transferred and conducts his business and reside at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel,
Province of Sarangani prior to this application;"
9. Annex "I" Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR OF CANCELLATION OF THE
VOTER'S [TRANSFER OF] PREVIOUS REGISTRATION of respondent subscribed and
sworn to on 22 October 1997 before Election Officer Mantil Allim at Alabel, Sarangani. 4
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In support
of the said contention, DOMINO presented before the COMELEC the following exhibits,
to wit:
1. Annex "1" Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and
Administrator of the properties of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal
and respondent as Lessee executed on January 15, 1997, subscribed and sworn to
before Notary Public Johnny P. Landero;
2. Annex "2" Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of
sale executed by and between the heirs of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios
Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and Beberlie and the respondent on
November 4, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A. Alegario;
3. Annex "3" True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in Election Case NO.
725 captioned as "In the Matter of the Petition for the Exclusion from the List of voters of
Precinct No. 4400-A Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino,
Petitioners, -versus- Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City, District III, and the
Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City,
Respondents." The dispositive portion of which reads:
1. Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-A,
Barangay Old Balara, in District III Quezon City as completely erroneous as
petitioners were no longer residents of Quezon City but of Alabel, Sarangani
where they have been residing since December 1996;
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
2. Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in Quezon City as done in
good faith due to an honest mistake caused by circumstances beyond their
control and without any fault of petitioners;
3. Approving the transfer of registration of voters of petitioners from Precint No.
4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to Precinct No. 14A1 of Barangay
Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and
4. Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and forward all the
election/voter's registration records of the petitioners in Quezon City to the
Election Officer, the Election Registration Board and other Comelec Offices of
Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are obviously qualified to excercise their
respective rights of suffrage.
4. Annex "4" Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to
Change of Residence addressed to Mantil Alim, COMELEC Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani,
dated August 30, 1997.
5. Annex "5" Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application, the roster of
applications for registration approved by the Election Registration Board on October 20,
1997, showing the spouses Juan and Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as numbers 111 and
112 both under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the slate indicated as
transferees without VRR numbers and their application dated August 30, 1997 and
September 30, 1997, respectively.
6. Annex "6" same as Annex "5"
7. Annex "6-a" Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous
Registration (Annex "I", Petition);
8. Annex "7" Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No.
31326504 dated October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay
Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
9. Annex "7-a" Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan,
Election Officer IV, District III, Quezon City, which reads:
This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer
registered voters of District III, Quezon City. Their registration records (VRR) were
transferred and are now in the possession of the Election Officer of Alabel, Sarangani.
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This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO.
10. Annex "8" Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the
circumstances and incidents detailing their alleged acquaintance with respondent.
11. Annexes "8-a", "8-b", "8-c" and "8-d" Copies of the uniform affidavits of witness
Myrna Dalaguit, Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos subscribed
and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying
their alleged personal knowledge of respondent's residency in Alabel, Sarangani;
12. Annex "8-e" A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Bonifacio, containing a listing of the names of fifty-five (55) residents of
Alabel, Sarangani, declaring and certifying under oath that they personally know the
respondent as a permanent resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January 1997 up to
present;
13. Annexes "9", "9-a" and "9-b" Copies of Individual Income Tax Return for the year
1997, BIR form 2316 and W-2, respectively, of respondent; and,
14. Annex "10" The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of events and
circumstances leading to his relocation to the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani,
appending Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", "D-1", "E", "F", "G" with sub-markings "G-1" and
"G-2" and "H" his CTC No. 111`32214C dated September 5, 1997, which are the same
as Annexes "1", "2", "4", "5", "6-a", "3", "7", "9" with sub-markings "9-a" and "9-b" except
Annex "H". 5
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring
DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of
Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on the basis of the following findings:
What militates against respondent's claim that he has met the residency
requirement for the position sought is his own Voter's Registration Record No.
31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex "B", Petition] and his address indicated
as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This evidence,
standing alone, negates all his protestations that he established residence at
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as January 1997. It is highly
improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who previously ran for the same
position in the 3rd Legislative District of Quezon City during the elections of 1995
to unwittingly forget the residency requirement for the office sought.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent
registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May
11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency requirement
provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
All told, petitioner's evidence conspire to attest to respondent's lack of residence
in the constituency where he seeks election and while it may be conceded that
he is a registered voter as contemplated under Section 12 of R.A. 8189, he lacks
the qualification to run for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of the
Province of Sarangani. 6
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to
suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as
candidate had not yet become final and executory. 7
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers,8 shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of
votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6
May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May
1998. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-
year residence requirement.
On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINO's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of
the filing of the instant petition. 9
On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the
candidate receiving the second highest number of votes, was allowed by the Court to
Intervene. 10 INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to Intervene and in her Comment in
Intervention 11 is asking the Court to uphold the disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and
to proclaim her as the duly elected representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.
Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:
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a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final,
conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on
Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional
district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998
elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition
a quo for the disqualification of petitioner. 12
The first issue.
The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani
and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election
Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the
exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to
determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of
candidacy that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters
in the precinct within its territorial jurisdicton, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the
determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of
compliance with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary
in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in
the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its
territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in
inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the
issue raised including the questions of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter,
the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily
caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of
said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being
excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and
unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata. 13 In this sense, it does not
operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed
upon in the proceeding.14 Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be
conclusive on the voter's political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be
registered as a voter in any other election. 15
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar 16 we ruled that:
. . . It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in
question has become final, the same does not constitute res adjudicata as to any
of the matters therein contained. It is ridiculous to suppose that such an
important and intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and determined
with finality in such a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion
and exclusion of persons in the registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had
granted appellant's petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters on the
allegation that she is a Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino
citizenship would still have been left open to question.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of
Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct No.
4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion,
Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion
proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The
jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right
of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not
qualified to vote in the precint in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the
voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of
registration from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the election
Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. 17 The only effect of
the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the
Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's
registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion
therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file. 18
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action are indispensable requirements for the application of said
doctrine. Neither herein Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is a party in the
exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed by DOMINDO himself and his
wife, praying that he and his wife be excluded from the Voter's List on the ground of
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erroneous registration while the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy was filed by private respondents against DOMINO for alleged false
representation in his certificate of candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the
dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first
and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes
of action. 19 In the present case, the aforesaid essential requisites are not present. In the case
of Nuval v. Guray, et al., 20 the Supreme Court in resolving a similar issue ruled that:
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not
the judgment rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto
Guray's name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the
institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3387, is of a summary character and the judgment rendered
therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the
peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the
judge of first instance, with whom said two lower judges have concurrent
jurisdiction.
The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity
as qualified voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate
for the office of president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a
registered voter in the election list of said municipality. The present proceeding
of quo warranto was interposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered
candidate voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto
Guray, as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity
of parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of
persons, but there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate.
(Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34
Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165)
In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the
litigious matter was the exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election
list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present que warranto proceeding, the
object of the litigation, or the litigious matter is his exclusion or expulsion from the
office to which he has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in
the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto
Guray had not the six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a
qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceeding of quo warranto, the
cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence
required for eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does
there exist therefore, identity of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of
parties; (b) identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino v. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case of the petition for excluision and in the
present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity of parties, or of things or
litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.
The Second Issue.
Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately
preceding the 11 May 1998 election as stated in his certificate of candidacy?
We hold in the negative.
It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the
qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile,"
which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. 21 "Domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return.22 "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In
the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. 23
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos
Sur 24 and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St.
Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City
and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed
lost until a new one is established. 25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
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correspond with the purpose. In
26
other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 27
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani
since December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot
located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath of the
residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their
locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said
date he had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of
choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that
intention. While "residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile"
requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable
intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. 28
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality
involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new
domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention
to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition
of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention. 29
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support
a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to
reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not
result in loss or change of domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and
lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the
absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City.
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of
residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay.
Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of
residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place
the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. 31 The fact that a party continously
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his
domicile. 32
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events
over which he had no control cannot be sustained. The general registration of voters for
purposes of the May 1998 elections was scheduled for two (2) consecutive
weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22. 33
While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the
fact that be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought
cancellation of his previous registration in Qezon City on 22 October 1997, 34 and that he
applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of
residence on 30 August 1997, 35 DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency
requirement under the Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence
in the district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. 36 Domino's failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office
null and void. 37
The Third Issue.
DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is
bereft of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election
Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final
judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing
disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes 38 and provided
further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office. 39
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section
17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives. 40
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The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically
vest the position in the winning candidate. 41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must
have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of the House of
Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental
Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the
suspension of DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes.
This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998
resolution disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the position.
Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of
the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal
which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate. 42
Issue raised by INTERVENOR.
After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative
of the province of Sarangani, may INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the
next highest number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning candidate?
It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of
votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. 43 In
every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will
must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a
candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can
be declared elected in his place. 44
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. 45 To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions
would have substantially changed. 46
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. 47
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the
election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred 48 from the
disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a
declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes 49 and does
not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In
such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. 50 To allow
the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection
by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials
of their choice. 51
INTERVENOR's plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes
cannot be sustained. INTERVENOR's reliance on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr.
case 52 to wit: if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification
so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nevertheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away
their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes
may be deemed elected, is misplaced.
Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the
public as an ineligible candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as
candidate was rendered before the election, however, the same is not yet final and
executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and ordered that the
votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet
attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the
sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply their
franchise. Thus, said votes can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. 53
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of
the COMELEC 2nd Division and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En
Banc, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
1wphi1.nt
80

G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs.HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO
P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.
In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the
people cannot represent the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections as
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated legal
alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue governing the people of
Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not subject
to the discretion of any official of the land.
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents
Speaker Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of
Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the Commission on
Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the duly-elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against
respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and
exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the
position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001
elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin
was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one
Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the
COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification 1 against the petitioner for indirectly
soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of
Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the
equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and
distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the
purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the
petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates,2 Danilo D. Maglasang,3 Cesar A.
Laurente;4 (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Salvera; 5 (c) Extract
Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police Superintendent Elson G. Pecho; 6 and
(d) Photographs showing government dump trucks, haulers and surfacers and portions
of public roads allegedly filled-in and surfaced through the intercession of the
respondent.7 The case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the
COMELEC's Second Division.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the
hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the
Regional Director of Region VIII.8 On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division sent
a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against him and
that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for investigation. 9
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet
to hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of
candidates for district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that
petitioner was the winning candidate.
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as
intervenor in SPA No. 128 and filed a "Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation
of Respondent [herein petitioner]" with the COMELEC Second Division. 10 Respondent
Locsin alleged that "the evidence on record against respondent is very strong and unless
rebutted remains." She urged the Commission to set the hearing of the disqualification
case and prayed for the suspension of the proclamation of the respondent "so as not to
render the present disqualification case moot and academic." A copy of the Motion was
allegedly served on petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt was
attached thereto.11
On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proclamation of Respondent" stating "there is clear and convincing evidence showing
that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the charges against him and this remains
unrebutted by the respondent." A copy of the Motion was sent to the petitioner and the
corresponding registry receipt was attached to the pleading. 12 The records, however, do
not show the date the petitioner received the motion.
On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte
Order13 directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by reason of
"the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for disqualification." 14 It also directed the
Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward
immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the Office of the
Clerk of the Commission.15 As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even
though the final election results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against
respondent Locsin's 53,447 votes.16
At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his
proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for
81

disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May 24,
2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his disqualification with
the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the summons
together with the copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by virtue of
the telegram sent by the COMELEC Second Division informing him that a petition was
filed against him and that the Regional Election Director was directed to investigate and
receive evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the
COMELEC Regional Office No. 8 at his own instance. 17 Petitioner further alleged that the
maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities of Matag-
ob and Kananga were undertaken without his authority, participation or directive as City
Mayor of Ormoc. He attached in his Answer the following: (a) Affidavit of Alex B.
Borinaga;18 (b) Copy of the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular Session of Barangay
Monterico;19 (c) Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel; 20 (d) Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A.
Fiel;21 and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y. Padayao.22
On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,23 alleging that
(a) he did not receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was
denied the right to rebut and refute the allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not
receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification and after personally
obtaining a copy of the petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c)
that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his
proclamation only on May 22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in support of his
Motion to Lift the Suspension of his proclamation, and requested the setting of a hearing
on his Motion.24
On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion and the
parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. 25 On June 4, 2001, petitioner
submitted his Memorandum26 in support of his Motion assailing the suspension of his
proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due process; (b) the order has
no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for the
purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his proclamation as winning
congressional candidate be expediently made, even while the disqualification case
against him continue upon due notice and hearing. He attached the following additional
evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification issued by PNP Senior Inspector
Benjamin T. Gorre;27 (b) Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer; 28 (c)
Copy of certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc; 29 (d) Joint
Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and Pepito Restituto; 30and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio
Brion,31 Igmedio Rita32 and Gerardo Monteza.33 Respondent Locsin's memorandum also
contained additional affidavits of his witnesses.34
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved.
Instead, on June 14, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its
Resolution35 in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of
votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed the "immediate proclamation of the
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes xxx." A copy of said
Resolution was sent by fax to the counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of
the following day.36
By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were
declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001,
respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Member
of the House of Representatives stating that "MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN
obtained a total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
(53,447) votes representing the highest number of votes legally cast in the legislative
district for said office."37 Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June 18, 2001
and assumed office on June 30, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion
for Reconsideration38from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division which ordered his disqualification, as well as an Addendum to the Motion for
Reconsideration.39 Petitioner alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration that the
COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of
the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the
allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the resolution
in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein the immediate
proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.' Respondent Locsin and her co-petitioner
in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. 40
On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation,41 docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the
validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only the second highest
number of votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission
lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the proclamation of Locsin and
that any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin can only be taken
cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case
should be filed and heard in the first instance by a Division of the Commission and not
directly by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of Locsin was valid
because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla being
stray.
82

On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation stating that he was
42
Accordingly:
deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification case because while the documentary
evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his Motion for the lifting
of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead
ruled on the main disqualification case. In consonance with his prayer that a full-dress
hearing be conducted on the disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional
witnesses43 which he claims would refute and substantially belie the allegations of
petitioner's/intervenor's witnesses. A Reply,44 Rejoinder45 and Sur-Rejoinder46were
respectively filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for reconsideration in SPA No.
01-208 and the petition for declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-324 were submitted for
resolution.
From the records, it appears that initially, a "Resolution" penned by Commissioner Rufino
S.B. Javier, dated July 24, 2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman, dismissing
the petition for declaration of nullity for lack of jurisdiction and denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Codilla. 47 Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and
Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting opinions 48 to the Javier
resolution. It bears emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered the disqualification of
petitioner but after considering the additional evidence presented by the latter, he
concluded that the totality of the evidence was clearly in petitioner's favor. Equally worth
mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who was the Presiding
Commissioner of the Second Division, also dissented and voted to grant Codilla's motion
for reconsideration on the ground that "[T]he people of Leyte have spoken and I respect
the electorate's will. x x x." 49
On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote and
Opinion and Summary of Votes" reversing the resolution of the Second Division and
declaring the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void. The dispositive
portion reads:
"JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner
Resurreccion Z. Borra, Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner Ralph
C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion for reconsideration and to
REVERSE the resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 1,
2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the petition
of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of losing
candidate Locsin.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against
Codilla, promulgated by the Commission (Second Division) on June 14, 2001
(SPA No. 01-208), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and to REVERSE the Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for
insufficiency of evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla,
issued by the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, having
been issued without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of
guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for "(t)he immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes,
to the exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent order for "the
Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene
and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes counting out the Respondent" the same being violative
of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the
Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated o June 14, 2001, that the votes of
respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling being
issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to
established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality
of this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the
winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of
Leyte to comply with its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for that position;
and
83

(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution,
to vacate the office of Representative of the House of Representatives
representing the Fourth legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose,
to inform the House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker
of this resolution for its attention and guidance; and
2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma. Victoria L.
Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and
void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin, the proclamation being violative
of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission
on Elections;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by
the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, having
been issued without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of guilt of
petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, for "(t)he immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the
exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent order for "the provincial Board of
Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim
forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes counting out
the Respondent" the same being violative of election laws, established
jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, that the votes of
respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on
the basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this
resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate
for Representative of the Fourth legislative district of Leyte he (sic) having
garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for the position; and
(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the
office of Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of
Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention
and guidance.
Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion Z.
Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for
Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the disqualification Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) in SPA No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14, 2001, and as an
inevitable consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of nullity of the
proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the verdict/opinion of the
Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners taken together now stands, as it is, the
MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases; and the "Resolution"
submitted by three (3) Commissioners, namely, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier,
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, is
considered, as it is, the MINORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both
cases.
The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who
joined the majority. The Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the
majority decided that no one will be assigned to write a Majority Decision. Instead, each
one will write his own separate opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and the
undersigned Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote an
explanation on his vote."50
The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a "Vote of Adoption" signed by
Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.51
Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation.
Instead, she filed a "Comment and Manifestation" 52 with the COMELEC en banc
questioning the procedure and the manner by which the decision was issued. In addition,
respondent Locsin requested and was issued an opinion by House of Representatives
Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she
had taken her oath and assumed office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of
election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. 53Relying on this opinion,
respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to the House during its regular
session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that she will not only disregard but
84

will openly defy and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate
her position.54
On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order 55 constituting the
members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid
decision. It likewise ordered the Board to reconvene and "proclaim the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes in the district, as the duly-elected Representative of
the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate of Canvass
and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member of the House of Representatives x x
x, based on the city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to the
previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte x x x."
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest number of votes
cast in the district.56 On the same day, petitioner took his oath of office before Executive
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City.57
On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent
Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc
resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the
duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. 58Petitioner also served
notice that "I am assuming the duties and responsibilities as Representative of the fourth
legislative district of Leyte to which position I have been lawfully elected and proclaimed.
On behalf of my constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and privileges intended for
the position of Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be accorded to me,
including all physical facilities and staff support." On the basis of this letter, a
Memorandum59 dated October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy Secretary-
General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating that "there is no
legal obstacle to complying with the duly promulgated and now final and executory
COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x x x."
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of
the COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001, 60 no action was taken by the
House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner sought the assistance of his
party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter 61 addressed to respondent Speaker De
Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party President Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio
Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the House of Representatives to act decisively on the
matter in order that petitioner "can avail of whatever remedy is available should their
action remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive."
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter62 dated October 30, 2001, stating that:
"We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it.
However, Rep. Locsin has officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted
in the HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall 'openly defy and disobey'
the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the decision would result
in the spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same congressional seat, a
legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSE's liberty to take
action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC
decision is a matter that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme
Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously." (emphases supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which has
become final and executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has
become the ministerial duty: (1) of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as its
Administrative Head and Presiding Officer, to implement the said resolution of the
COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official custodian of the
records of the House, to formally register his name in the Roll of Members of the House
and delete the name of respondent Locsin therefrom. Petitioner further contends that
respondent Locsin has been usurping and unlawfully holding the public office of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her premature
proclamation has been declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges that
the action or inaction of public respondents has deprived him of his lawful right to
assume the office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
85

In his Comment, public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus will not
63
lie to compel the implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely a
ministerial duty but one which requires the exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the
House considering that: (1) it affects the membership of the House; and (2) there is
nothing in the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty on the
House Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House
member.
In his Comment,64 public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in reading
the name of respondent Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take her oath
before the Speaker-elect and sit as Member of the House during the Joint Session of
Congress, he was merely performing official acts in compliance with the
opinions65 rendered by House of Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive Director
Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the
proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void since it is the HRET which is the sole
judge of all election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. He also
contends that the determination of who will sit as Member of the House of
Representatives is not a ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled by
mandamus.
Respondent Locsin, in her Comment, 66 alleged that the Supreme Court has no original
jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a member of the House of
Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution it is the HRET which
is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise asserts that this Court cannot
issue the writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative department without grossly
violating the principle of separation of powers. She contends that the act of recognizing
who should be seated as a bona fide member of the House of Representatives is not a
ministerial function but a legislative prerogative, the performance of which cannot be
compelled by mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot be
directed against the Speaker and Secretary-General because they do not have the
authority to enforce and implement the resolution of the COMELEC.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending
before it after her proclamation and after she had taken her oath of office. Jurisdiction
then was vested in the HRET to unseat and remove a Member of the House of
Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a pre-
proclamation controversy and the COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to hear
and decide a pre-proclamation controversy. It must first be heard by a COMELEC
Division. Third, the questioned decision is actually a "hodge-podge" decision because of
the peculiar manner in which the COMELEC disposed of the case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility has
been categorically affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed
against her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043, entitled "Paciano Travero vs. Ma.
Victoria Locsin," on the ground that "the allegations stated therein are not proper
grounds for a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of
Representatives under section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the
HRET Rules, and that the petition was filed late."67
In his Reply,68 petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the
COMELEC decision was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to
seek an opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House of Representatives; that the
HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation which is
based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate proclaimed as
winner did not obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for annulment of
proclamation is a pre-proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881 69 and section 3,
Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia himself
recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to
the Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a final
decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial act and does not encroach on the
legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine who will sit as Member of
the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is vested in the
sovereign will of the electorate.
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by
the COMELEC Second Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the
COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity of
said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
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I 2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of
respondent Locsin is null and void for the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading
to the proclamation of respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 340270 sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant
to section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF
QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack
of qualifications or possessing same grounds for disqualification, may be filed
any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than
the date of proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of voting age,
or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties
against any candidate who in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of:
2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions;
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by the Omnibus Election Code;
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office.
xxxxxxxxx
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of P20.00,
the offices concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a docket number
which must be consecutive, according to the order of receipt and must bear the
year and prefixed as SPA with the corresponding initial of the name of the office,
i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01-001;
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall
issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition
and its enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons within
which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition in ten
(10) legible copies, serving a copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for
Motion to Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the
parties shall submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary
evidences including their position paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the filing
of the answer. The hearing officer concerned shall submit to the Clerk of the
Commission through the fastest means of communication, his findings, reports
and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and
reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and
recommendation of the hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the Commission
shall immediately docket the case consecutively and calendar the same for raffle
to a division;
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(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the
same to a member who shall pen the decision, within five (5) days from the date
of consultation."
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election
Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the
petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for
disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the opportunity to
answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with this
requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the summons
together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service
has been completed, viz:
"Rule 14. Summons
xxxxxxxxx
Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by personal service, the
server shall give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and
shall return the summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who issued it, accompanied
with the proof of service.
Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall be made in the manner
provided for in the Rules of Court in the Philippines."
Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer,
must be conducted. The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the
Commission his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the
completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records
of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the
service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.
The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They
do not contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its
corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted
petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for his
disqualification because he never received summons.71 Petitioner claims that prior to
receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001,
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend his proclamation, he was never
summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his disqualification. He was able to
obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division by
personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able
to file his Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of section 72 of
the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election
in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent
his proclamation and assumption to office." (emphases supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the
elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to
conduct hearing on the petition for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was
voted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001, however, respondent
Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. The
Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy was served to the
petitioner through registered mail. The records reveal that no registry receipt was
attached to prove such service.72 This violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring
notice and service of the motion to all parties, viz:
"Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties
concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the
motion. For good cause shown, the motion may be heard on shorter notice, especially on
matters which the Commission or the Division may dispose of on its own motion.
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place
of the hearing of the motion.
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Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission without
proof of service of notice thereof, except when the Commission or a Division is satisfied
that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected."
Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and
service of motions. First, the suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a
matter which the COMELEC Second Division can dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 of
R.A. No. 664673 requires that the suspension must be "upon motion by the complainant
or any intervenor", viz:
"Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial
or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
(emphases supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly affected.
Given the lack of service of the Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a
mere scrap of paper.74 It cannot be acted upon by the COMELEC Second Division.
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m., 75 respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent
Motion for the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of
the Second Motion again by registered mail. A registry receipt 76 was attached evidencing
service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner but it does not appear when
the petitioner received a copy thereof. That same day, the COMELEC Second Division
issued an Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was not
given any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the petition for
disqualification. The Order was issued on the very same day the Second Most Urgent
Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent Motion,
let alone answer the same on time as he was served a copy thereof by registered mail.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when
evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC
Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of petitioner's
guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the
"seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of
the Order reads:
"Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission (2 nd Division), pursuant to
Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646
xxx and considering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of
respondent, if winning, until further orders."77 (emphases supplied)
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong,
the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his
proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner
to adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his
disqualification.
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for
disqualification in gross violation of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins
the COMELEC to "continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest." This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the
Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of evidence within
ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and
recommendations within the five (5) days from completion of the hearing and the
reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May
25, 2001. Although an oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were
allowed to file their respective memoranda, the Motion was not acted upon. Instead, the
COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution on the petition for disqualification
against the petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the affidavits attached
to the Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the
respective memoranda of the parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension cannot be substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although
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intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed that the evidence of the parties in the main
disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension.
The parties may have other evidence which they may deem proper to present only on
the hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence which are
unavailable during the hearing for the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which
may be available during the hearing for the disqualification case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to
support his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. It was not intended to answer and
refute the disqualification case against him. This submission was sustained by the
COMELEC en banc. Hence, the members of the COMELEC en banc concluded, upon
consideration of the additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that the
evidence to disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of the
challenged Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division held:
"Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC (Second
Division) concerns only the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of
Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission of the parties' respective
memoranda was in lieu of the parties' oral argument on the motion. This would explain
the fact that Codilla's Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of the issuance of the
order of suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record of any hearing on the
urgent motion for the suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the filing of
the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the Members of the Commission (Second
Division) and other Members of the Commission en banc had the opportunity to
consider Codilla's affidavits. This time, Codilla was able to present his side, thus,
completing the presentation of evidentiary documents from both
sides."78 (emphases supplied)
Indeed, careful reading of the petitioner's Memorandum shows that he confined his
arguments in support of his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said Memorandum,
petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he was utterly deprived of procedural due
process, and consequently, the order suspending his proclamation is null and void; (b)
the said order of suspension of proclamation has no legal and factual basis; and (c)
evidence of guilt on his part is patently inexistent for the purpose of directing the
suspension of his proclamation.79 He urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct a
full dress hearing on the main disqualification case should the suspension be lifted. 80
(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is
not based on substantial evidence.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on
substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for
disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the
affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the COMELEC en
banc correctly observed:
"Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions
based mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this
lopsided evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission (Second
Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified." 81
Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence
coming from the petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was
charged.82
Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:
"Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions, xxx shall be
disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding office"
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be
proved: (a) the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given money
or other material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or other material
consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions.
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the
extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to induce
and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him. Pertinent
portion of the petition reads:
"[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his
current elective position as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using
during the prohibited period, public equipments and vehicles belonging to and owned by
the City Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and distributing gravel and
sand to the residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte,
well within the territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were
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executed without period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing or directly
corrupting various voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, within the 4th legislative district of
Leyte, for the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the voters/beneficiaries of
Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast their votes for said respondent." 83
The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these
allegations. For instance, Cesar A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) ten-
wheeler dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the markings "Ormoc City
Government" extracting and hauling sand and gravel from the riverbed adjacent to the
property owned by the Codilla family.84
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that they
saw white trucks owned by the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on
the road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader then scattered the sand
and gravel unloaded by the white trucks.85
On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City Government
of Ormoc assigned to check and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different
barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
"3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the City
Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the
source of the sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to Kananga but Engr.
Padayao said that it's not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. who
ordered this and the property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to deliver
sand and gravel to whoever requests from Mayor Codilla." 86
Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the
petitioner. He alleged that on April 18, 2001, a white truck with the marking "City
Government of Ormoc" came to his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and unloaded
mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told him to "vote for Codilla as a (sic)
congressman during election."87 His statement is hearsay. He has no personal knowledge
of the supposed order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the purpose of
inducing the voters to vote for him. The same could be said about the affidavits of Randy
T. Merin,88 Alfredo C. De la Pea,89 Miguel P. Pandac,90 Paquito Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez
, Glicerio Rios,91 Romulo Alkuino, Sr.,92 Abner Casas,93 Rita Trangia,94 and Judith
Erispe95attached to respondent Locsin's Memorandum on the Motion to Lift the
Suspension of Proclamation.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses 96 of respondent Locsin, all similarly
worded, which alleged that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6,
Barangay San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area where the
cockfights were to be held. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in the petition
for disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground to
disqualify the petitioner based on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against
the petitioner, particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises
money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment,
franchise or grant, public or private, or make or offers to make an expenditure,
directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person,
association, corporation, entity or community in order to induce anyone or the
public in general, to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the
election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.
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(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or
controlled by the government for an election campaign.- Any person who uses
under any guise whatsoever directly or indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment, vehicle,
facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the government or by its political
subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled corporations,
or by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any
partisan political activity x x x."
However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to
those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. 97 They are criminal and
not administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of
prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
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"Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized
legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to
act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file
the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code,
except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be
under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification
case based on section 261 (a) and (o), and not on section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of
respondent Locsin was done with undue haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner
the opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said Resolution excluding the
votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received the highest
number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of
June 15, 200198 when everything was already fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not
able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of
respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of
that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and
respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains two
dispositions: (1) it ruled that the petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the position
of Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the
exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being
violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming,
however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC
Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray,
and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number
of votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of
the petitioner cannot be considered "stray."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final
judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered
"stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during
the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray.
To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides.99 For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment
during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to
misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to
be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. 100
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner
has not been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but
even after the elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence, could not be executed,
because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and Resolutions reads:
"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary actions, special
proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.
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(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days in Special Actions and Special
Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other proceedings, following their promulgation.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or
resolution of a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5)
days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other
actions or proceedings, following its promulgation." (emphasis supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, 101 issued in relation to the finality of
resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, provides:
"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or
division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions
or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission,
RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on
disqualification cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become
final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed;
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence,
citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day
of the election the resolution has not become final and executory the BEI shall
tally and count the votes for such disqualified candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly
whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate
shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly
where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate
shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be
considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed."
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second
Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the
petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for Reconsideration
shall suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution, viz:
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from
the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling." (emphases supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine
that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. 102 In every election, the
people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times
be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving
him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be
declared elected in his place.103 In Domino v. COMELEC,104 this Court ruled, viz:
"It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
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proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received that (sic) other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be
considered the first among the qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the
qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.
xxxxxxxxx
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the
election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified
winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration
in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the
defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection
by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect
officials of their choice."105
Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal
circumstances such as age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based on
election offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later disqualified based
on election offenses like those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
should be invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as such, the
votes cast in his favor should not be considered.106
This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC,107 this
Court ruled that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the
election, based on personal circumstances or section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
is the same: the second placer could not take the place of the disqualified winner.
II
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of
jurisdiction to review its validity.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul her
proclamation. She maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of
jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation because she has become a member
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
of the House of Representatives. Thus, she contends that the proper forum to question
her membership to the House of Representatives is the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion
for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued
that the COMELEC Second Division erred thus:
"(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and
(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure
and in directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest
'vote getter.'" (emphases supplied)
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that "the Second Division's
directive for the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature
considering that the Resolution has yet to become final and executory." 108 Clearly, the
validity of respondent Locsin's proclamation was made a central issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without doubt, the COMELEC en
banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue.
The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC
en banc is of no moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still
rule on the nullity of respondent's proclamation because it was properly raised in the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to
review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
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decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided
by the Commission en banc."
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
"Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.-
Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for reconsideration
may be filed on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision, order or ruling, or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to
law.
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days
from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling."
Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.- The motion shall
be verified and shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the
decision, resolution, order or ruling which are not supported by the evidence or
which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or
documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such
findings or resolutions.
Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.- A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro forma, suspends
the running of the period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing of a
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk
of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof,
notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter
certify the case to the Commission en banc.
Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for
Hearing.- The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for
reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days
from the certification thereof." (emphases supplied)
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en
banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the
Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has
not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its
execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no
jurisdiction in the instant case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election
and eligibility should be brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.109
We reject respondent's contention.
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua,110 even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a
proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal
that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of
Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue
regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This is
because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the
COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent
Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition
for quo warranto with the HRET.
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A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines.111 In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the
respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There
is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly
elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose
eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent
Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the
elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her
premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte
was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to
tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla,
Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice
respondent Locsin.
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 112 For a petition for
mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is
a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer
or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 3
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.113
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district
of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The
facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against
respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The
COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on
Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second
Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC
en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said
Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all
officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of
chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA,
SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public
respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office.
This decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
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