CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF MWSS v.

VASQUEZ (1995) by Or
VITUG, J.
OMBUDSMAN

FACTS
1. To provide daily water to MM, MWSS launched Angat Water Supply Optimization (AWSOP),
financed by Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan. Projects APM-01 and APM-02 needed
the installation of new watermains which would need pipe and valve materials.
2. 30 August 1991, MWSS caused the publication of an "Invitation for Pre-qualification and Bids"
and opened the projects for international competitive bidding. [1] The major factors considered
were applicants' financial condition, technical qualifications and experience.
3. respondent Phil. Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers' Assoc (PLDP), sent letters to
MWSS requesting clarification on the technical specifications, esp. with regard to the steel pipes.
4. PLDP later filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint protesting the public
bidding conducted, detailing charges of an "apparent plan" on the part of the MWSS to favor
suppliers of fiberglass pipes
5. MWSS Board recommended that APM-01 be awarded to F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., being the lowest
complying bidder. (Technically a joint venture group which included PLDP was the lowest bidder,
but was found not to have complied with standards.)
6. Ombudsman referred the letter to the MWSS for comment along with a directive to it to hold
in abeyance the awarding. MWSS asked for an extension of time within which to submit its
comment but also pointed to PD 1818 prohibiting restraining orders/injunctions on government
infrastructure projects.
7. Ombudsman directed MWSS to
a. Set aside the recommendation to award Contract APM-01 to a contractor offering
fiberglass pipes;
b. Award the subject contract to a complying bidder pursuant to the provisions of PD
1594[2]

ISSUE
1. OMBUDSMANS JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUE NONE.
The petitioners believe this issue falls under (1) and (4) of the exceptions to the Ombudsmans
jurisdiction (see below), while SolGen argues that even if no criminal act could be attributed to
MWSS, the report could still be embraced in "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-
feasance" capable of review by Ombudsman.

RULING
1. The Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over the issue. RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)
states:
Sec. 20. The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of
any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
(1) The Complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial
body;
(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman;
(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous interest in the subject matter of the
grievance; or
(4) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexations or made in bad in bad faith;
 (5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act
complained of.
2. Rationale for creation of an office of the Ombudsman and grant to it of broad investigative
authority:
to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate
judges' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and
through the exertion of official influence, quash/delay/dismiss investigations into
malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was necessary, therefore,
to create a special office to investigate all crim. complaints against public officers
regardless of whether or not the acts complained of are related to the performance of the
duties of their office.
3. But it has no veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an
agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. It even pre-empted
the exercise of discretion by, MWSS.
4. The assailed 1992 Order is an undue interference in the adjudicative responsibility of the
MWSS rather than a mere directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with law.
The report submitted by the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Ombudsman
reveals its predisposition against the use of fiberglass pipes, a technical, rather than a
legal, matter. (Ombudsman considered three issues: (1) WON the technical specifications
were designed to favor Fiberglass Pipes-Contractors/Bidders; (2) WON MWSS has the
technical knowledge and expertise with fiberglass pipes; and (3) WON contractors of
fiberglass pipes have the experience for APMs.)
The MWSS, a GOCC, is charged with the construction, maintenance and operation of
waterwork system. It is the agency that should be in the best position to evaluate the
feasibility of the projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with its
development plans. The exercise of this discretion is a policy decision that necessitates
among other things, prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation
matters that can best be discharged by it. MWSS has passed resolution to show
approval of technical specifications. All these should deserve weight.

[1] 14 contractors submitted, out of which 11 were qualified.

[2] Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government Infrastructure
Contracts.
LASTIMOSA V. VASQUEZ (1995) by BAYUDAN
Mendoza, J.
Control of Administrative Action

FACTS
1. BACKGROUND: Nurse Jessica Dayon filed a criminal complaint against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrisimo for frustrated rape, plus an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority, and grave misconduct. The graft investigation officer found no prima facie
evidence and recommended the dismissal of the complaint. However, Ombudsman
Conrado Vasquez disapproved this recommendation and directed that the Mayor be
charged with attempted rape in the RTC. The criminal complaint was eventually assigned
to petitioner Provincial Prosecutor Gloria Lastimosa.
2. Lastimosa conducted a preliminary investigation and found that only acts
lasciviousness had been committed and hence filed an information for said offense was
filed at the MTC, with the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar.
3. Since no information for attempted rape was filed per the Ombudsman, the
Ombudsman asked Lastimosa to show cause why she and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
should not be punished for contempt for not following his orders.
4. It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two
prosecutors with the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident
of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative complaint for RA 6713 and PD 807
violations, and another was a criminal complaint for violation of 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code. Said complaints were based on the alleged
refusal of the prosecutors to obey the Ombudsmans orders to charge the mayor with
attempted rape.
5. Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas placed Lastimosa and Kintanar under preventive
suspension for 6 months, pursuant to Rule III, 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
6. Lastimosa then filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside
orders of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice
7. On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition to set aside the orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and
Department of Justice directing her to file the appropriate action vs. Mayor Illustrisimo, to
show cause why she should not be punished for not doing so, putting her on a 6-month
preventive suspension, etc.

ISSUE
W/N the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor
to assist it in prosecuting the rape case against Mayor Ilustrisimo - YES

RULING
1. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its
own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any
crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions
complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his
official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official.
Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is
within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
2. The Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. 31 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
a. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may
utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
 prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his
supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
3. It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy
Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an
information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.
4. It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted
the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court.
a. 31 of the Ombudsman's Act: when a prosecutor is deputized, he
comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he
is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or
modify his (prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and
refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.
5. 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to
"punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." Petitioner and Kintanar can be
held liable for contempt - preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in character.
6. W/N petitioners refusal to follow Ombudsmans orders constitutes defiance is for
respondents to determine after appropriate hearing.
7. No doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be
found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of
the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension. The
pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state:
a. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
b. 22. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in
his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
8. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office
of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence
or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted
in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
9. Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but
only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
10.It is true that, under 24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive
suspension of a public official, the evidence against him should be strong, and any of the
following circumstances is present:
a. the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
b. the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
c. the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
11.As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is
left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before
him.
12.Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension on the following
grounds: evidence on record of guilt is strong and the charges involved offenses of grave
 misconduct, gross neglect of duty and dishonesty which will warrant respondents
[Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] removal from the service and their
unabashed attitude of respondents in openly announcing various false pretexts and alibis
to justify their stubborn disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman as their
official position in their pleadings filed and in print and broadcast media.
13.Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive suspension
pursuant to 24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive
suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but
not more than six months, without pay." Their preventive suspension for six (6) months
without pay is thus according to law.
14.No merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved
before any action in the administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt
case involves a prejudicial question. There is simply no basis for this contention. The two
cases arose out of the same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be
heard before the other. Whatever order is followed will not really matter.
15.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order
of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.

BIR v. OMBUDSMAN (2002) by Alimpolos

DE LEON, Jr., J.
Control of Administrative Action

FACTS
1. Graft Investigation Officer Soquilon of the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMBUDSMAN) received information regarding an allegedly anomalous grant of tax
refunds to Distillera Limtuaco & Co. (Limtuaco) and La Tondea Distilleries Inc.
2. Soquilon recommended to then Ombusman Vasquez that the case be docketed and
assigned to him for investigation.
3. Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to the Legal Dept. of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) ordering them to appear before the Ombudsman and
to bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to Limtuaco and La
Tondea.
4. BIR asked that it be excused from complying.
5. Ombudsman issued another subpoena duces tecum now addressed to BIR
Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.
6. BIR moved to vacate the subpoena.
7. Ombudsman denied.
8. BIR moved to reconsider.
9. Ombudsman denied and reiterated its directive to the BIR.
10.BIR filed before the SC the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order.
11.BIRs contentions:
a. The investigative power of the Ombudsman is not unbridled. The
Ombudsman could validly exercise its power to investigate only when there exists
an appropriate case and subject to the limitations provided by law. The fact-finding
investigation by the Ombudsman is not the proper case as it is only a step
preliminary to the filing of recover actions on tax refunds.
 b. The determination of granting tax refunds falls within its exclusive
expertise and jurisdiction and that its findings could no longer be disturbed by the
Ombudsman. It should have filed an appeal to the CTA.
c. The subpoena duces tecum did not describe with particularity the
documents sought to be produced.
d. The production of the subpoenaed documents would contravene Sec
269 of the Natl Internal Revenue Code on unlawful divulgence of trade secrets and
Sec 277 of the same on procuring unlawful divulgence of trade secrets.
e. The investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman violated
due process in as much as it commenced investigation by issuing the subpoena
duces tecum without first furnishing BIR with the summary of the complaint and
requiring it to submit a written answer.

ISSUE #1: WON pending action is required before the Ombudsman could wield its
investigative power
HELD: NO
1. No less than the 1987 Constitution enjoins that the Ombudsman and his Deputies,
as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and shall, in appropriate case, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof
2. The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own or upon a
complaint filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written,
unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.
3. It is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints in any form and manner,
the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of
the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As
this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from other
investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its
jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are
more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
4. The phrase in an appropriate case in Art. XI, 12 means any case concerning
official act or omission which is alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The
phrase subject to such limitations as may be provided by law refers to such limitations as
may be provided by Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be
imposed by courts. (Almonte v Vasquez)

ISSUE #2: WON the fact that that the determination of granting tax refunds falls
within the exclusive expertise of the BIR bars the Ombudsman from investigating the
same
HELD: NO
1. The power to investigate and to prosecute which was granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly clear that
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee xxx during his tenure of office.
2. Concededly, the determination of whether to grant a tax refund falls within the
exclusive expertise of the BIR. Nonetheless, when there is a suspicion of even just a tinge
 of impropriety in the grant of the same, the Ombudsman could rightfully ascertain whether
the determination was done in accordance with law and identify the persons who may be
held responsible thereto. In that sense, the Ombudsman could not be accused of
unlawfully intruding into and intervening with the BIRs exercise of discretion

ISSUE#3: WON the subpoena duces tecum did not describe with particularity the
documents sought to be produced
HELD: YES
1. BIR knew precisely what records were being referred to as it even suggested that
the documents sought to be produced may not contain evidence material to the inquiry
and that it has already submitted the same to another graft investigation officer

ISSUE#4: WON the production of the subpoenaed documents would necessarily

contravene Sec 269 and Sec 277 of the NIRC (refer to Item 11(d) of facts to know
content of these provisions)
HELD: NO
1. The documents sought to be produced were only the case dockets of the tax
refunds granted to the two companies which are public records
2. The subpoena were directed to the public officials who have official custody of the
said records
3. Assuming arguendo that the case dockets contain trade secrets, this fact would not
justify non-production before the Ombudsman.

ISSUE#4: WON the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman violated due process
HELD: YES
1. The law clearly provides that if there is a reasonable ground to investigate
further, the investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman shall first furnish the
respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and
require him to submit a written answer within seventytwo (72) hours from
receipt thereof (Sec. 26, (2) of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989) . In the
instant case, the BIR officials concerned were never furnished by the respondent with a
summary of the complaint and were not given the opportunity to submit their counter -
affidavits and controverting evidence. Instead, they were summarily ordered to appear
before the Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to
Limtuaco and La Tondea.

DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Ombudsman is prohibited and ordered to desist from

proceeding with the case.
OMBUDSMAN V. ENOC (2002)
by Foronda
MENDOZA, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS

FACTS
1. Respondents were employed at the Office of the Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC), Davao del Sur, Provincial Office, Digos, Davao del Sur with salaries
below grade 27
2. Respondents were charged with 11 counts of malversation through falsification,
based on alleged purchases of medicine and food assistance for cultural community
members, and one count of violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e), in connection with the
purchases of supplies for the OSCC without bidding/canvass. As none of the respondents
has the rank required under R.A. No. 8249 to be tried for the said crimes in the
Sandiganbayan (SB), the informations were filed by the Ombudsman (OMB) in the RTC of
Digos, Davao del Sur.
3. Respondents moved to quash the informations invoking the ruling in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute graft cases falling
within the jurisdiction of regular courts. Motion granted by the RTC and the cases were
dismissed without prejudice to their refiling by the appropriate officer. Ombudsman filed
instant petition with SC

ISSUE & RULING

1. Is the jurisdiction of the SB parallel to/ to be equated with, the broader jurisdiction
of the OMB? (No direct answer, sorry)
a. Power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the OMB plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause any illegal act or
omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a
public officer or employee.
2. Is the phrase primary jurisdiction of the office of the ombudsman over cases
cognizable by the sandiganbayan as used in section 15 RA 6770 a delimitation of its
jurisdiction solely to SB cases? No
a. Section 15(1) (giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the SB) and Section 11(4) (granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan) should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory
and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
b. Section 15, RA 6770 gives the OMB primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the SB. Primary jurisdiction authorizing the Ombudsman to take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The
grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of
cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise
by the OMB of his/her primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the SB is not
incompatible with the discharge of his/her duty to investigate and prosecute
other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The powers granted
by the legislature to the OMB are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and
employees during their tenure of office.
 3. W/N the authority of the Office of the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases before
the SB can be confused with the broader investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the
office of the ombudsman? No
a. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the
lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To
carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.
Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The
law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
HELD: OMB has authority to investigate and prosecute the Criminal Case against respondents in
the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared
by him with the regular prosecutors. Uy Ruling reconsidered. RTC SET ASIDE.

FUENTES v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Clyde Tan
Pardo, J.
Those not covered by ombudsmans power to investigate

SUMMARY: The Ombudsman filed a case against Judge Fuentes before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of RA 3019. Judge Fuentes alleged that the Ombudmans encroached on the power of
the SC of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. SC ruled in favor of Judge
Fuentes.

DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative

complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public
officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
It is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.

FACTS:

1. Pursuant to the governments plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the
Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties
affected by the project. The expropriation case was presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes.
The government won an expropriation case.
2. DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners. To satisfy their debt, the lower court
granted Tessie Amadeos (one of the lot owners) motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution against all scrap and iron/junks found in the premises of the DPWH property. The
auction sale pushed through and Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder.
Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to
withdraw the auctioned properties but were prevented from doing so by the custodian of
 the subject DPWH properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office was
totally unaware of the auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the properties
within the holding area of the depot were still serviceable and were due for repair and
rehabilitation.
3. Alex Bacquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance of a break through
order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned properties. The motion was
granted by Judge Fuentes on the same date.
4. Alex Bacquial and Sheriff Paralisan returned to the depot, armed with the lower
courts order.
5. Thus, Bacquial succeeded in hauling off the scrap iron/junk equipment in the depot,
including the repairable equipment within the DPWH depot. He hauled equipment from the
depot for five successive days until the lower court issued another order temporarily
suspending the writ of execution it earlier issued in the expropriation case and directing
Bacquial not to implement the writ.
6. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A.
Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts
unbecoming of a judge.
7. Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss
complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.
8. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal
complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he
conducted an investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on
the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel.

ISSUES/HELD: W/N the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the
exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.

RULE:
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases.
Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions.- The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and
its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.
RATIO:
1. The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative
complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate
public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.
 2. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
3. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court
personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of
separation of powers.
4. Petitioners questioned order directing the attachment of government property and
issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official
functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However,
whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be
inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked
to supervise the courts. No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution
or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence
to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it
erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an
unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
LEDESMA V. CA by Otchengco

LEDESMA v. CA
July 29, 2005 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Ombudsman

PETITIONERS: Atty. Ronaldo Ledesma

RESPONDENTS: Hon. CA, Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, Hon. Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera, and Ombudsman Fact Finding and Intelligence
Bureau

SUMMARY: Atty Ledesma, the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special
Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, was alleged to be linked to
certain anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas of
foreign nationals. This was founded to be true by the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman, leading to both administrative and criminal
complaints. The criminal complaint did not prosper, but the administrative complaint
did, leading to Ledesmas suspension. Now, Ledesma questions before the Court the
binding power of the decisions and findings of the investigations of the Ombudsman,
arguing that these are purely recommendatory in character. The Court did not agree.

DOCTRINE: Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject

constitutional provision. First, the Courts pronouncement in the case of Tapiador was
just obiter dictum. Second, the provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents
theory. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an
order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is
not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
Third, It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide
the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively
carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and corrupt
government officers and employees. Lastly, The foregoing interpretation is consistent
with the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the
Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).
2. In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an investigation was
requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident
Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals.
3. The FIIB investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of TRV extensions tainted
with similar irregularities.
4. As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against
herein petitioner. The complaint was treated as both a criminal and an administrative
charge and docketed as OMB-0-98-0214 (criminal aspect), for nine (9) counts of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of public
documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038 (administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of
Duty.
5. (Side note, not the topic but still including here. In case sir asks) A complaint
was also filed against Atty. Arthel Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board Member
and Executive Assistant, respectively, in petitioners division but this was later
dismissed. The complaints were because of these acts: (a) irregularly granting TRVs
beyond the prescribed period; and (b) using recycled or photocopied applications for
a TRV extension without the applicants affixing their signatures anew to validate the
correctness and truthfulness of the information previously stated therein.
6. Graft Investigation Officer suspended Ledesma for 1 year.
7. Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera and respondent Ombudsman
Desierto approved.
8. Ombudsman also approved a resolution of another graft officer dismissing the
criminal charge against Ledesma (only the administrative charge was meritorious)
9. In an MR, ombudsman reduced suspension from 1 year to 9 months.
10. CA reduced suspension from 9 months to 6 months.
11. Primary argument of Ledesma: Ledesma questions the Court of Appeals
pronouncement that the findings of the Ombudsman may not be said to be merely
recommendatory upon the Immigration Commissioner. He argues that to uphold the
appellate courts ruling expands the authority granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman and runs counter to prevailing jurisprudence on the matter,
particularly Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUES/HELD
WoN the order or decision that emanates from the Office of the Ombudsman after it
has conducted its investigation has binding power? Yes.

RATIO:
1. The controversial provision of law in this case is Sec 13(3) of Article XI:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:

...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)

2. Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its literal meaning; that is,
that the Ombudsmans action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any
binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman where the Court said in
part:
The Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the
government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13,
subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only
recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the
public official concerned

3. On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue
that the word recommend must be taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure
compliance therewith. The proper interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador
should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative
liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the
office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it
merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its
jurisdiction.
4. The Court agreed with the SolGen and the Ombudsman. Several reasons
militate against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional provision.
a. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case
was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove
the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the
power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum.
b. The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents theory. Section 15 is
substantially the same as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which provides for
the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We note that the proviso
qualifies the order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer
or employee akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal,
without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong
indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but
is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as
usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer
concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive
authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

...

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or
employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without
just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote,
fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary
action against said officer; (Emphasis supplied)

c. It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide

the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively
carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and corrupt
government officers and employees. The Office was granted the power to punish for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers,
members of Congress and the Judiciary
d. The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the wisdom and spirit behind
the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman. Pertinent Constitutional Commission
deliberations:
Mr. Monsod: With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like
to say that we are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are also
saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by law in
accordance with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We did not
think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at
some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the
Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
SC said that: It is thus clear that the framers of our Constitution intended
to create a stronger and more effective Ombudsman, independent and beyond the
reach of political influences and vested with powers that are not merely persuasive in
character. The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower the
Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted.
ESTARIJA v RANADA (2006) by ANG
QUISUMBING, J.
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

FACTS
1. On August 10, 1998, respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots
Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an
administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao, against petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City.
2. The complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary
berthing permit for all ships that dock in the Davao Port, had been demanding money
ranging from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and P5000
as monthly contribution from the DPAI. The complaint alleged that prior to August 6, 1998,
in order to stop the mulcting and extortion activities of Estarija, the association reported
Estarijas activities to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On August 6, 1998, the
NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 marked money used by the NBI to entrap
Estarija.
3. Consequently, the Ombudsman ordered petitioners preventive suspension and
directed him to answer the complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case against
Estarija for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch No. 8.
4. In his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter-affidavit, petitioner denied
demanding sums of money for the approval of berthing permits. He claimed that Adrian
Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, called to inform him that the DPAI had payables to the
PPA, and although he went to the associations office, he was hesitant to get the P5,000
from Cagata because the association had no pending transaction with the PPA. Estarija
claimed that Cagata made him believe that the money was a partial remittance to the PPA
of the pilotage fee for July 1998 representing 10% of the monthly gross revenue of their
association. Nonetheless, he received the money but assured Cagata that he would send
an official receipt the following day. He claimed that the entrapment and the subsequent
filing of the complaint were part of a conspiracy to exact personal vengeance against him
on account of Ranadas business losses occasioned by the cancellation of the latters sub-
agency agreement with Asia Pacific Chartering Phil., Inc., which was eventually awarded to
a shipping agency managed by Estarijas son.
5. On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative
case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
6. Estarija filed a motion for reconsideration. Estarija claimed that dismissal was
unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to
remove government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not removable by
impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsmans
administrative authority is merely recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", is unconstitutional because it gives
the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the
Constitution.
7. The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order dated October
31, 2000. Thus, Estarija filed a Petition for Review with urgent prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction before the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on February 12, 2003, dismissed the petition and
affirmed the Ombudsmans decision.
8. In his petition for review on certiorari, Estarija contends that he can not be liable for
grave misconduct because he did not commit extortion as he was merely prodded by
Adrian Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, to receive the money and that it makes no sense
why he would extort money in consideration of the issuance of berthing permits since the
signing of berthing permits is only ministerial on his part. He also maintains that Rep. Act
 No. 6770 is unconstitutional because the Ombudsman has only the powers enumerated
under Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, which powers do not include the power to
directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure a government official. According to
him, the Ombudsmans power is merely to recommend the action to the officer concerned.
The Solicitor General maintains otherwise, arguing that the framers of the 1987
Constitution did not intend to spell out, restrictively, each act which the Ombudsman may
or may not do, since the purpose of the Constitution is to provide simply a framework
within which to build the institution.

ISSUE 1
WON the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service
an erring public official? YES, he does.

RULING
1. Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the
Office of the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed
the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and
employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with
broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.
2. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals: Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution. They gave Congress the discretion to give the
Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in character. Thus, in addition to the
power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations, the lawmakers
intended to provide the Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and
preventively suspend any officer under his authority pending an investigation when the
case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
except members of Congress and the Judiciary
3. The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would
spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770,
specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to
sanction erring officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The powers
of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render
this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under
Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional
power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a
member of Congress and the Judiciary.

ISSUE 2
Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold Estarija liable for dishonesty and grave
misconduct YES, there is.

RULING
1. In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt
is only substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Further, precedents tell us that the
factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive, and such findings made by an administrative body which has acquired
expertise are accorded not only respect but even finality.
2. As shown on the records, Estarija called the office of the DPAI and demanded the
payment of the monthly contribution from Captain Zamora. Captain Zamora conveyed the
demand to Ranada who in turn reported the matter to the NBI. Thereafter, an entrapment
operation was staged. Adrian Cagata called Estarija to confirm the payment, and that the
money was already available at their office. Accordingly, Estarija went to the DPAI office
and collected the P5,000 marked money. Upon departure of Estarija from the office, the
NBI operatives frisked him and recovered the P5,000 marked money.
3. Estarija is liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct. Estarija did not deny that he
went to the DPAI office to collect, and that he actually received, the money which he
demanded from the DPAI as monthly contribution. Since there was no pending transaction
between the PPA and the DPAI, he had no reason to go to the latters office to collect any
money. Even if he was authorized to assist in the collection of money due the agency, he
should have issued an official receipt for the transaction, but he did not do so. Patently,
petitioner had been dishonest about accepting money from DPAI. Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. And when the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest, the
public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.
OMBUDSMAN V. MASING
Ombudsman vs. Masing (2008) by Amil Tamano
PUNO, C.J.
Control of Administrative Action

FACTS
1. The main issue in this case is whether the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school
teachers or merely recommend appropriate disciplinary action to the Dept. of Education,
Culture, and Sports.
2. The principal (Florita Masing) and office clerk (Jocelyn Tayactac) of Davao City Integrated
Special School were administratively charged before the Ombudsman in Mindanao for allegedly
collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit the authorized fees, and not accounting for public
funds
3. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss saying that the OMB has no jurisdiction over them,
that DECS has jurisdiction over them via Sec. 9 of RA 4670 or The Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers. The motion and subsequent MR were denied.
4. The OMB found the respondents guilty, Masing for gross miscounduct and Tayactac for
simple negligence. CA reversed, saying respondents should be reinstated and given backwages.
5. OMB: Contends that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the OMB
has no authority to discipline the erring members of DECS.

ISSUE
1. W/N the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and
employees.

RULING
1. Yes. OMB has authority to act on complaints filed against public officers and employees
pursuant to Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution. Article XI, Section 13 delineates the
powers of the OMB and such enumeration is non-exclusive, which was expanded by RA 6770.
2. The manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations. It plays an
active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses
committed by public officers and employees.
3. The OMB must be an activist watchman. It can order, remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who fails in performing his duty (OMB vs. Laja).
4. Even though the OMB role is not merely advisory, the implementation of the order should
still be coursed through the proper officers.
5. The principal and primary complaints and action center against erring public officers and
employees, thus Masing and Tayactac are within the ambit of the OMBs powers. Section 13 (1),
Article XI of the Constitution and Sec 19, RA 6770 grants the OMB the authority to act on
administrative complaints against erring public officers and employees.
SAMSON V. RESTRIVERA
Samson V. Restrivera (2011) by Lacson
Villarama Jr., J.
Extent of Ombudsmans Investigatory and Disciplinary powers

FACTS
1. Petitioner Filipina Samson, a government officer from the Population Commission,
agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia Restrivera, to have the latters land located in
Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System.
2. Petitioner accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses for the titling of
the land.
3. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found out that the land is
government property.
4. When the petitioner failed to return the P50,000 respondent sued her for estafa.
Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming
a public officer against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.
5. The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and
suspended her from office for six months without pay which was reduced to three months
suspension without pay.
6. According to the Ombudsman, the petitioners acceptance of respondent's payment
created a perception that she is a fixer. Her act fell short of the standard of personal conduct
required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 which provides that public officials shall endeavour to
discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
7. The CA affirmed, and added that contrary to petitioner's contention, the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction even if the act complained of is a private matter.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act was private or
not related to the performance of official duty? YES

RULING
1. The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondents complaint against petitioner although
the act complained of involves a private deal between them.
2. Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can
investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official.
3. Section 16 of R.A. No. 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed
by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure.
4. Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the
complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the
case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
5. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or
employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. The law does not require that the act or
omission be related to or be connected with the performance of official duty. Since the law does
not distinguish, neither should we.
Compania General v. Board of Public Utility - Zedy Macatiag
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS v. BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY
COMMISSION
MARCH 6, 1916 | MORELAND, J. | NON DELEGATION DOCTRINE

SUMMARY: Compania is a common carrier by water. The Board requires Compania to present a
detailed report of the latters finances and operations of its vessels within the country. Compania
claims that the board has no authority to require the report asked. It argues that Act No. 2307
relied on by the board as authority for such requirement is INVALID as constituting an unlawful
attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. SC rules that
the assailed provision (see Ratio No. 1) is very general and unduly delegates legislative power to
the Board.

DOCTRINE: The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but,
having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may
require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the
investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid
down by the Congress

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Compania is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and
engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a common carrier of passengers and
merchandise by water.
2. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners ordered petitioner to show cause why petitioner
should not be required to present a detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels as
are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands.
3. Petitioner claimed that the board has no authority to require the report asked. It argued
that Act No. 2307 relied on by the board as authority for such requirement was INVALID as
constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to
the board.
4. Petitioner also maintained that the requirements of the report are "cumbersome and
unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of the same would entail an immense amount of
clerical work."
5. Nevertheless, the Board ordered petitioner to present its detailed report on or before
March first of each year.
6. Petitioner filed petition for review before the SC, reiterating its arguments.

ISSUE: WON Act No. 2307, Sec. 16(e) has delegated the legislative power of Congress to the
Board YES

RATIO:
1. The assailed provision states:
Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing,
to require every public utility as herein defined:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and
containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe.
2. Dealing with the question of whether a power is strictly legislative, or administrative, or
merely relates to the execution of the law, the true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. &
Z. R. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs)
3. The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having
laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of
that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of
facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the
Congress (Schaezlein vs. Cabaniss).
4. The provision conferring authority on the board is very general. It does not law "down the
general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in
detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and
discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall
act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.
5. A statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed
reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general
lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters
whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of
the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
US v Ang Tang Ho - Maria Veronica Manalo

US v Ang Tang Ho (1922)

Johns, J.
Non-delegation doctrine

FACTS
1. At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose.
2. Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the
meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
3. August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice
should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the
sale of rice at an excessive price
4. The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that
section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any
cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and
promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act.

ISSUE
1. WON Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. YES.

RULING
1. Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as
it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be
noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and
emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
2. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for
what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be
issued for any cause, and leaves the question as to what is any cause to the discretion
of the Governor-General. The Act also says: For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not specify or
define what is an extraordinary rise. That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-
General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, is authorized to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures
for carrying out the purposes of this Act. It does not specify or define what is a temporary
rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures
shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the
Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but
has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or
what is not a cause, and what is or what is not an extraordinary rise in the price of
rice, and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out
the purposes of the Act.
3. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a
proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with
or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any
cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an
emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a
proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
4. A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it
is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
5. The law says that the Governor-General may fix the maximum sale price that the
industrial or merchant may demand. The law is a general law and not a local or special
law.
6. The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and
different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the
power to determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their
deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-
General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies,
who are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating
from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities. The issuance of the
proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated
power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.\
7. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime
to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the
Governor-General to say what was and what was not any cause for enforcing the act,
and what was and what was not an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,
and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold,
without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if
so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced,
and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was
any cause, or what was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn, Neither
did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the
absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime,
if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation
does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is
charged with the sale of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is
a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.
8. Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in
violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a
crime, is unconstitutional and void.
 People v Vera - Irvette Abary
PEOPLE V VERA (11/16/1937)
P: People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation
R: CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera and Mariano Cu Unjieng
(Laurel, J.)

SUMMARY: The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 Probation Act is being assailed for being
contrary to the doctrines of equal protection, undue legislative delegation, and encroachment of
exclusive powers of the Chief Executive. The SC held that the law is unconstitutional for unduly
delegating legislative powers onto provincial boards.

FACTS:
1. In a previous criminal case (People v Cu Unjieng), Cu Unjieng, herein private respondent, was
convicted for forgery. The case at bar stems from his subsequent application for probation under
Act No. 4221.
2. HSBC and People contended that such application would be:
a. (3rd) Contrary to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws
because Sec. 11 of the Act endows provincial boards with the power to make the
law effective or not in their respective provinces.

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided
for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice
and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

b. (2nd) Undue delegation of legislative power to provincial boards of several

provinces make such Act unconstitutional.
3. Respondent Judge Vera denied Cu Unjiengs application for probation.
4. However, Cu Unjieng filed for a MR.
5. In their issuance of extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, HSBC assigns fault on Vera
for:
a. Acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction in continuing to entertain the MR and
by failing to commit Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution.
6. Petitioners also added another contention:
a. (1st) Act 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive
to grant pardons and reprieves.
7. Now, the constitutionality of the Probation Law is put into question as Cu Unjieng draws his
privilege herein.

ISSUES:

The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds:

(1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; - NO, it does not
encroach upon such power.
(2) That its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power; and YES, undue
delegation of power. Because the Provincial Boards are free to decide whether or not they
Probation Law will be applicable to their province by simply appropriating funding for salaries of
its probation officers. If there is no appropriation => no money => no salary => no probation
officers => no one to execute => no Probation Act. (PERTINENT to topic, Valid Delegation of
Legislative Power)
(3) That it denies the equal protection of the laws. YES, denies equal protection.

RULING:
1. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full
and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.
2. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is - that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
However, the rule is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. In testing whether a
statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether
the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature
so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
Judge Ranney provides that, The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law (which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be) and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made."
3. In regard to the declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: The legislature
determines that certain executive or administrative action is to be taken. What is left to the
administrative official is simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be
done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed. The efficiency of an Act as a
declaration of the legislative will must come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the
contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may
designate. The legislature may provide that some other person or body be left with the power to
determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature
has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to
be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the law
upon the provincial board. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited.
A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any
specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, limited by no principle of expediency announced by
the legislature.
4. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any
rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. There is an absence of such and none has
been pointed to the Court by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of
its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial
boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not extend
the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various
provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial
boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but,
considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the
necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute
discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their
respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the
legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces. The
validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its
provisions. Subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
5. In the case at bar, the inequality comes from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power.
As earlier stated, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation
Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. In this instance, a person
coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one
province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same
benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
6. Section 11 of Act No. 4221 herein constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
DECISION:
Act 4221 is unconstitutional and void.
Pelaez v Auditor General - Jose Ramon Ampil
PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL (1965) by Ampil
CONCEPCION, J.
NON DELEGATION DOCTRINE

SUMMARY
Vice Pres. Emmanuel Pelaez assails Pres. Diosdado Macapagals issuance of Executive Orders
Nos. 93-121, 124, and 126-129, which created thirty-three municipalities. According to Pelaez,
the said executive orders are null and void as Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
pursuant to which the executive orders were supposedly issued, has been impliedly repealed by
R.A. No. 2370. The Court held that the said Sec. 68 constituted an invalid delegation of legislative
power, and had been repealed not by R.A. No. 2370, but by the Constitution.

DOCTRINE
1. Test to determine whether a law provides for a valid delegation of legislative power:
a. The law must be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed or implemented by the delegate; and
b. It must fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate to which the
delegate must confirm.

2. Whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.

3. Par. 1, Sec. 68, Revised Administrative Code. The (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province,
subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and
increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more
subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may
berequired, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision
so created,and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein
as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature)
Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or
subprovince is to be defined or anyprovince is to be divided into one or more subprovinces.
When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith
makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or
any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation
and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict
the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so
formed.

FACTS
1. From September 4 to October 29, 1964, Pres. Diosdado Macapagal, purporting to act
pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93-121,
124, and 126-129, creating thirty-three municipalities throughout the Philippines.
2. On November 10, 1964, Vice Pres. Emmanuel Pelaez (petitioner herein) instituted a special
civil action against respondent Auditor General to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the disputed
executive orders, as well as any disbursement by the said municipalities.

3. Pelaez contends that the executive orders are null and void as Sec. 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code has been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 2370 (Barrio Charter). Applying the
third paragraph of Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 2370, which provides that barrios can only be created by the
provisions of the said act or by an act of Congress, Pelaez argues that even more so can the
President not create municipalities.

4. On the other hand, the Auditor General alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities under Sec. 68 does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, citing
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan.

ISSUE
WON Executive Orders Nos. 93-121, 124, and 126-129 are null and void YES (by virtue of the
Constitution)

RULING
1. In the first place, Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan involved a mere
transfer of territory between already existing municipalities, and not the creation of an entirely
new municipality. It is obvious, however, that whereas the power to fix common boundaries of
municipalities may be administrative in nature, the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature.

2. Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet the requirements for a valid
delegation of legislative power. It does not provide for any policy to be implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a precise standard to safeguard the doctrine of separation of
powers.

3. While Calalang v. Williams and People v. Rosenthal suggest that public welfare and
public interest are sufficient standards for a valid delegation of legislative power, both cases
are not on all fours with the present controversy, since they deal with grants to administrative
officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions.

4. It must also be noted that the disputed executive orders were issued after the legislative
bills for the creation of the thirty-three municipalities failed to pass Congress.

5. Art. VII, Sec. 10(1) of the 1935 Constitution granted the President control over executive
departments, bureaus, or offices. However, the same provision denies the power of control to the
Executive insofar as local governments are concerned. Moreover, such control does not include
the authority to abolish an executive department or bureau, or create a new one.
Edu v. Ericta - Genesis Leal

EDU v. ERICTA (1970)

Fernando, J. | Police power; valid delegation of legislative power

SHORT STORY: Attack on the Reflector Law and the accompanying AO. Court sustains the law as a
valid exercise of police power it promotes public safety. The AO is valid, too it is well within
the standards set by the law.

FACTS
1. The constitutionality of the Reflector Law, and the Administrative Order No. 2 enforcing it,
is assailed by Teddy Galo. Judge Ericta issued a writ of preliminary injunction against such.
Romeo Edu of the Land Transportation Commission files petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the judge.
2. Galo asserts that the law is an invalid exercise of police power for being violative of due
process; the AO must be struck down as undue delegation of legislative function.
3. The Reflector Law reads: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate
parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the
vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is
placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall
be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted,
painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one
hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this
subsection shall be registered."

ISSUES/RATIO
The necessity of ruling on this case
1. Since the special civil action for certiorari & prohibition filed before him before respondent
Judge would seek a declaration of nullity of such enactment by the attribution of the violation
the face thereof of the due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it would
follow that there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should prevail.
2. If we do so, further effort need not be wasted and time is saved moreover, the officials
concerned as well as the public, could know the definitive answer and act accordingly.

The law is a valid exercise of police power.

1. Calalang v. Williams identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Justice
Malcolm meanwhile has said that it is the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of
powers, extending to all the great public needs.
2. To accept Galos petition would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the
evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for
public safety. The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of
whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public need.
3. Galo relies on the doctrine of laissez-faire, once a fundamental postulate in American
public law, which gives emphasis on the liberty of individuals to contract. But Galo misses that
even in the United States, such doctrine is losing ground:
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (US case): We must transplant these
rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has withered at least
as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer
integration of society and through expanded govt. controls.
4. True, such doctrine had its day in Philippine jurisprudence (People v. Pomar, where a
provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty days after
confinement was struck down for being violative of liberty to contract). But that was when
we were still in American control. The 1935 Constitution entrusted to government the
responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of
control over economic affairs, so it could promote general welfare thru state action.

Administrative Order No. 2, constitutional.

1. The AO provides that No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or
denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be
factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The
luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if
struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night. Then came a section on
dimensions, placement and color. Noncompliance would result to refusal of vehicle registration
and/or fine.
2. Under RA 4136 (Land Transportation Code), of which the Reflector Law is an amendment,
the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not
conflict with its provisions. It is likewise an express provision of the above statute that for a
violation of its provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a fine of not less than
P10 nor not less than P50 could be imposed.
3. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter
and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when
it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when
it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what the scope of his authority is.
4. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental
policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it.
5. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection
is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety.
6. Justice Concepcion: One thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall
be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.
GRANTED. Writ of preliminary injunction against questioned law and AO, lifted.
Agustin v Edu - Verlin Amarante Entena

AGUSTIN V. EDU (1979) by Entena

FERNANDO, J.
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMIN. AGENCIES

SUMMARY
President Marcos issued a Letter of Instruction providing for an early warning device requirement
for motor vehicles. Petitioner assails this and the IRR for violating due process and (that its IRR)
transgress the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. The Court ruled that the
imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification. That the LOI is a valid police
power measure. Furthermore, the implementing rules and regulations as embodied in the
Administrative Order issued by respondent Edu cannot be considered as amounting to an
exercise of legislative power.

FACTS
1. Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, direct all
owners/users/drivers of motor vehicles to have at all times in their vehicles at least one pair of
early warning device (triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors) to be
installed whenever the vehicle is stalled/disabled/parked for 30 or more minutes on any street or
highway. The LOI also provides that the Land Transportation Commissioner shall promulgate
implementing rules and regulations as are appropriate.
2. It was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise: The Land Transportation
Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure and present at the registration
of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized triangular early warning device.
3. R (Edu) issued implementing rules and regulations in an Administrative Order, which were
not enforced as President Marcos ordered a six-month period of suspension, which was
eventually lifted.
4. On August 29, 1978 Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, which implements the
Administrative Order (issued in #3, provided that the device may come from whatever source
and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications) AND a pair of serially
numbered stickers shall be attached to each EWD.
5. P (Agustin), an owner of a Beetle (with blinking lights which could very well serve as an
EWD) alleged that the LOI and the implementing rules violate the Constitutional provisions on
due process, equal protection and delegation of police power. That the assailed provisions are
"one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral in favoring EWD manufacturers/dealers at
expense of car owners who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or
a better substitute to the specified set of EWDs." The SC issued a TRO.
6. R in Answer: It was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation
of legislative power, citing Calalang v. Williams, Morfe v. Mutuc, and Edu v. Ericta, as well as to
the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of
which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified.

ISSUES
1. Is the LOI a valid exercise of the police power? YES
2. Is the Administrative Order (implementing the LOI) issued by Edu an undue
delegation of legislative power? NO

RULING
On issue #1
1. The broad and expansive scope of the police power, as said in Calalang v Williams,
includes that persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens
in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' This was reiterated in
the 1948 case of Primicias v Fugoso. Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.
2. In this case, the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to
promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character
3. P failed to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. Court
cites the Answer (SolGen): That the EWD requirement is not an expensive or oppressive
redundancy for car owners already equipped with blinking lights/petroleum lamps because any
motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular
early warning device will conclude, without thinking, that there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic, unlike other EWDs
(where one would still wonder what the blinking light is for). It decreases the confusion and the
incidence of collision.
4. Also, nothing in the LOI (and the Administrative Order) requires/compels owners to
purchase the prescribed EWD. All that is required is for them to equip their motor vehicles with a
pair of this from whatever source. In fact, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or
produce this EWD.
5. P's fear that the early warning device requirement is 'a more subtle racket' is an
unfounded speculation. Likewise, the bare allegation of contravention of equal protection
deserves scant consideration.
6. P's objection to this Letter of Instruction is premised on his negative view as to its wisdom.
However, this Court does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
7. Furthermore, the LOI adheres to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals. It
is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept
of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.
On issue #2
8. (PERTINENT TO TOPIC IN SYLLABUS) The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle
of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support in well-settled legal
doctrines. Citing Edu v. Ericta: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It
is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be
either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.
The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
9. The principle of non-delegation has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation," but keeping in mind that the completeness of the statute is assumed
upon leaving Congress.

J. TEEHANKEE, dissenting:
1. The Administrative Order in some grounds do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives
and spirit of the LOI, considering that it is a big financial burden to require owners of motor
vehicles with built-in and more effective and efficient EWDs to purchase the prescribed EWD,
whose effectivity/utility have yet to be demonstrated and where the public necessity of it has yet
to be shown.
2. Furthermore, it has not been shown that Rs have availed of the powers and prerogatives
vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicle (the main
cause of the deplorable highway accidents), establishing an honest and foolproof system of
examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers (to ban the reckless and irresponsible) and a
sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out
for much less than the P50 million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order.
3. A greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to P instead of throwing
the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar
as it may affect the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.
 FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION
OCTOBER 30, 1981 | FERNANDO
PETITIONERS: FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION
RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and THE PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY
SUMMARY: A notice of strike with the ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices. Ministry
notified the compliance of 2/3 strike vote and other requierments of law. The ministry then called
for several conciliation meetings Respondent certified the labor dispute to the National Labor
Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private
respondent's establishment. The labor dispute was set for hearing byrespondent National Labor
Relations Commission. Petitoner now assails constitutionality of the amendment to the Article of
the Labor Code regarding strikes "affecting the national interest" SC not undue delegation. The
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the certain guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. All that is required is that the regulation should
be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction
with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be
any clearer, the coverage being limited to "strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest.

DOCTRINE: To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it.

Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive. Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various
departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.

FACTS:

1. A notice of strike with the ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices .
a. Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct
b. Illegal terminations and suspensions of officers and members as a result of the
implementation of said Code of Conduct
c. Automatic treatment of sick leaves as AWOL with corresponding suspension, in
violation of CBA.
2. Ministry notified the compliance of 2/3 strike vote and other requierments of law. The
ministry then called for several conciliation meetings with petioners manifesting
willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with
a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended a position
that failed to meet the approval of private respondent.
3. Respondent certified the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission for
compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private respondent's establishment. The
labor dispute was set for hearing by respondent National Labor Relations Commission.
 4. Private respondent, following the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the
controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the
petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension
apparently the principal cause of the labor dispute.

5. Petitioner now assails constitutionality of the amendment to the Article of the Labor Code
regarding strikes "affecting the national interest" in this petition which partakes of the nature of a
prohibition proceeding filed by the Free Telephone Workers Union.
a. Argument: Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in so far as it amends article 264 of the Labor
Code delegating to the Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment the power and
discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to
the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on
free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative powers.

ISSUES/HELD
Whether BP 130 amending Art. 264 of the Labor Code is an undue delegation of legislative
powers?- NO
RATIO:
1. Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely
affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same the
National Labor Relations Commission is not on its face unconstitutional for being
violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. To repeat, there is no
ruling on the question of whether or not it has been unconstitutionally applied in this case, for
being repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free collective bargaining, as on the facts
alleged, disputed by private respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It must
be stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable
under the Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a
national interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality, must be exercised in
accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. The arbiter then is
called upon to take due care that in the decision to be reached, there is no violation of "the rights
of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work.
a. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. The executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law;
that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that
the law prescribes. Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any clearer, the coverage
being limited to "strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest."
b. Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person
or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various
 departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President.

Additional notes from cases discussed in the case (because sometimes sir asks these
connected info but these were technically discussed already kasi cited yung cases we
discussed na):
1. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature, To determine whether or riot there is an undue delegation of
legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may
indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has
rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to
which no valid objection can be made.
2. While the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are responsible to the Batasang Pambansa for the
program of government, it must be one "approved by the President. While conceptually, there
still exists a distinction between the enactment of legislation and its execution, between
formulation and implementation, the fundamental principle of separation of powers of which non-
delegation is a logical corollary becomes even more flexible and malleable.
3. 'What possesses significance for the purpose of this litigation is that it is the President who
"Shall have control of the ministries. It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy a
dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent, however, that what is involved is the
execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an official of the executive branch of the
government.
4. Recognition of the important role he (primes minister) plays in the implementation of the policy
of the government, the legislation duly enacted in pursuance thereof, and the decrees and orders
of the President. To the Prime Minister can thus be delegated the performance of the
administrative functions of the President, who can then devote more time and energy in the
fulfillment of his exacting role as the national leader.

2. Philippine Communications v Alcuaz - Iris

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS v ALCUAZ

Dec. 18, 1989 | Regalado, J. | Non-delegation doctrine

PETITIONERS: Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation

RESPONDENTS: Jose Luis Alcuaz (as NTC Commisioner) and the NTC

SUMMARY: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission(NTC). The Order
required petitioners to reduce their rates by 15%. Said order was issued without prior notice and
hearing. Petitioners argue that nowhere in E.O. 546 (creating NTC) and in E.O. 196( placing
PhilComSat under the NTCs jurisdiction) can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any
standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. Specifically that, Executive
Order No. 546 of NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications
does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an
undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. SC
declared that there was NO UNDUE DELEGATION;sufficient standard can be found in
both E.O.s. (NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates) BUT, as to rate-fixing, NTC
has no authority issue the Order without prior notice and hearing.
DOCTRINE:
Delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for
its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the
manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
- When NTC establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have
been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence
of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional.
- In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the RATE BE
REASONABLE AND JUST.
- BUT, even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard
may be implied.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Philippine Communications Satellite Corp(PhilComSat) provided

telecommunications services and charged certain rates for specified lines
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then
Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. But E.O. no 196 placed PhilComSat under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of NTC. In implementing this E.O.,respondents required
PhilComSat to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its
facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates
therefor.
2. Later, PhilComSat applied with the NTC for authority to continue operating and maintaining
the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue
providing the international satellite communications services, and to charge the current rates
applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority
so that it can continue to operate and maintain its facilities, provide the services and charge the
applied rates. Provisional authority was granted (valid for 6 mos) and it was later extended for
another 6 months.
3. What is in issue is the NTC order that AGAIN extended the provisional authority of
Philcomsat for another six (6) months, (so: 2nd extension) , but it directed the PhilComSat to
charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the
present authorized rates.
4. PHILCOMSAT assails the order, arguing that(among others): Executive Order No. 546 of
NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not provide the
necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue delegation of
legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC; And that Assuming
arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally conferred, it was
exercised in an unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires, for violating procedural due
process (for having been issued without prior notice and hearing) and violating substantive due
process (rate reduction as unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory)
5. That nowhere in E.O. 546 (creating NTC) and in E.O. 196( placing PhilComSat under the
NTCs jurisdiction) can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the
exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutionalNO.

RATIO:
1. Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, NTC is empowered to determine and
prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily
include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith.
- Under Executive Order No. 546:
o be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility
of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting
facilities. (Sec. 15)
o provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the
communications systems should be maintained at reasonable rates. (Sec.6)

Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission : although the rule-making
power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character.

Here: While Alcuaz contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication, the Order pertains
exclusively to PhilComsat and no other.

2. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application
of petitioner, it is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and
hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness.
- Cannot exercise this in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.
- Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and
hearing the Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with
the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and
saving provisions to the contrary:
3. As to WON confiscatory: YESVOID and should be nullified. An undue reduction
may practically lead to a cessation of PhilComSats business. While the primacy of the public
interest in an adequate and efficient service, this is not necessarily to be equated with
reduced rates.
- Reasonableness in the rates assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and the
consumer.
- A commission has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate
them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates
which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive
o Here:no merit for a rate reduction without any explanation on what implications and
conclusions were. Also there was no explanation as to NTCs decision to impose a rate reduction.
o Plus: the Court considered the effects to the consumer public.
- In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given
situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. In determining reasonableness: can
consider the fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility and competition.
- What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business
judgment based upon the evidence (question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good
sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment)
_________________________________________
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
- reservations as to the dictum that in the exercise of quasi-legislative power, notice and
hearing are not required. (believes that this doctrine is ripe for re- examination.)
- believes that in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, administrative
agencies, much, much more than Congress, should hold hearings and should be given
guidelines as to when notices and hearings are essential even in quasi-legislation
- That while Senators and Congressmen are directly elected by the people,Administrative
officials are not so that they are often appointed not on the basis of competence and
qualifications but out of political or personal considerations. (so lacks in the sense of personal
responsibility to the electorate + in expertise and experience needed for the issuance of sound
rules and regulations)
- Congress never passes truly important legislation without holding public hearings. Yet,
administrative officials who are not directly attuned to the public pulse see no need for hearings.
3. Santiago v. COMELEC (non-delegation) - mary

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (1997) by Or

DAVIDE, JR., J.
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION > NON-DELEGATION

SUMMARY: Special civil action for prohibition, praying that Delfin and other founding members
of the Movement for Peoples Initiativea group of citizens intending to exercise the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Sec 2, Art XVII, 1987 CONSTI
under the control and supervision of the COMELECbe permanently prohibited from exercising
such power as it can only be exercised/implemented by law to be passed by Congress. R.A. 6735
as it stands is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution. And anyway, the Delfin petition is not the
initiatory petition under R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, thus cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC.

ISSUE
1. WON Sec. 20, R.A. 6735 (which empowered COMELEC to promulgate COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 on peoples initiative) sets a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power. NO.

RULING
1. R.A. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and
regulations to carry it out.
2. The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated.[1] The recognized
exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Sect 28(2) of Art VI, CONSTI;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Sec 23(2) of Art VI, CONSTI;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. (Empowering the COMELEC as an administrative body
with quasi-judicial functions to promulgate rules and regulations falls under this item.)
3. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be implemented by the delegate;
(b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable -- to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
4. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. RA 6735 fails on both standards of subordinate legislation, thus
invalid.

PUNO, dissenting:
1. R.A. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in
promulgating the law's IRR.
a. Sec. 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed."
b. Spread out all over R.A. 6735 are the standards to direct the delegated power.
Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, directs how
initiative proceeding is commenced, what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for
initiative, how a proposition is approved, when a plebiscite may be held, when the amendment
takes effect and what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. By any measure, these
standards are adequate.
2. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent a total transference of legislative power
from the lawmaking body to the delegate (Isagani Cruz). In enacting R.A. 6735, it cannot be said
that Congress totally transferred its power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to
COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided the
procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative to amend
the Constitution.

[1] potestas delegata non delegari potest

4. Panama Refining Co. v Ryan - Beatriz

PANAMA REFINING CO. VS. RYAN by Bayudan (1935)

CJ Hughes
Non-delegation doctrine
US Case

SUMMARY: Panama, an oil refining company, attacks the validity and enactment of various rules
concerning the petroleum industry. SCOTUS held that the EOs and laws granting the President to
enact such, in addition to delegating his powers to the Secretary and Department of Interior is an
undue delegation of legislative power by the Congress, as there are no limitations set regarding
the Presidents authority. NOTE: This is known as the Hot Oil case!

DOCTRINE: Congress may lay down its policies and establish its standards and leave to selected
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules, within prescribed limits, and the determination
of facts to which the policy, as declared by Congress, shall apply, but the constant recognition of
the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority
which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the
authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.

FACTS
1. 11 July 1933 - President enacted EO 6199, prohibiting the transportation in
interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or
withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn
from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any
board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.
2. EO was based on Sec. 9(c), Title 1, National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. This
says that
a. Sec. 9. ...'(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation
in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced
 or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or
withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed
thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a
State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this
subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for
not to exceed six months, or both.'
3. 14 July 1933 - EO 6204: President authorized Secretary of Interior to exercise all
powers vested in him to enforce Section 9c and EO 6199. Thereafter, the SOI issued
regulations to carry out the Presidents orders.
a. Regulation IV - every petroleum producer should file a monthly
statement under oath, with info re: address of producer, location of wells, daily
production, petroleum deliveries, etc.
b. Regulation V - every purchaser, shipper, refiner to file a similar
statement containing the same abovementioned, plus parties from whom petroleum
was received, amount held in storage, etc.
c. Regulation VII - all persons covered by Sec 9(c) to keep books and
records available for inspection by the Division of Investigations of Dept. of Interior
4. EO 6256: President approved a Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry.
Again he designated the SOI and Dept. of Interior to exercise all powers vested in him
under the Code.
a. Sec 3f, Title 1, National Industrial Recovery Act - when a code of fair
competition has been approved, any violation shall be a misdemeanor and offender
shall be fined not more than $500 for each offense
5. Panama Refining Company, owner of Texas oil refining plant, sued to restrain
defendants from enforcing Regulations IV, V, and VII -- unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power
a. Was granted an injunction by District Court, but Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and directed that the bills be dismissed.
b. Hence this petition on certiorari
ISSUE: W/N Section 9c is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power - YES. EOs enacted
are without authority.
RATIO
1. Section 9(c) does not state whether or in what circumstances or under what
conditions the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of petroleum or
petroleum products produced in excess of the state's permission. It establishes no criterion
to govern the President's course. It does not require any finding by the President as a
condition of his action. The Congress in section 9(c) thus declares no policy as to the
transportation of the excess production. It gives to the President an unlimited authority to
determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see
fit.
2. If Congress can grant such powers as attempted by 9(c), then there would be no
ground for denying a similar prerogtive of delegation with respect to other subjects of
legislation.
3. Authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of
ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed have constantly been
sustained. Moreover the Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine
specific facts, but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to
carry out the declared legislative policy.
4. Congress has conferred upon executive officers the power to make regulations-'not
for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern.'
Such regulations become, indeed, binding rules of conduct, but they are valid only as
subordinate rules and when found to be within the framework of the policy which the
Legislature has sufficiently defined.
5. The Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no
constitutional authority to transcend. We think that section 9(c) goes beyond those limits.
As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the Congress has
 declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no
requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is
to be allowed or prohibited.
6. If section 9(c) were held valid, it would be idle to pretend that anything would be left
of limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate its lawmaking function. The
reasoning of the many decisions we have reviewed would be made vacuous and their
distinctions nugatory. Instead of performing its lawmaking function, the Congress could at
will and as to such subjects as it chooses transfer that function to the President or other
officer or to an administrative body. The question is not of the intrinsic importance of the
particular statute before us, but of the constitutional processes of legislation which are an
essential part of our system of government.

CARDOZO DISSENT
1. Section 1 in the statute should be used as an index to the meaning of everything
that follows. The powers granted to the President to forbid the transportation of the oil
when he believes, in the light of the conditions of the industry as disclosed from time to
time, that the prohibition will tend to effectuate the declared policies of the act -- not
merely his own conception of its policies, undirected by any extrinsic guide, are guided by
the policies announced by 1.
2. All that Congress could safely do was to declare the act to be done and the policies
to be promoted, leaving to the delegate of its power the ascertainment of the shifting facts
that would determine the relation between the doing of the act and the attainment of the
stated ends. That is what it did. It said to the President, in substance: you are to consider
whether the transportation of oil in excess of the statutory quotas is offensive to one or
more of the policies enumerated in 1, whether the effect of such conduct is to promote
unfair competition or to waste the natural resources or to demoralize prices or to increase
unemployment or to reduce the purchasing power of the workers of the nation. If these
standards or some of them have been flouted, with the result of a substantial obstruction
to industrial recovery, you may then by a prohibitory order, eradicate the mischief.
3. When it clothed the President with power to impose such a restriction -- to prohibit
the flow of oil illegally produced -- it laid upon him a mandate to inquire and determine
whether the conditions in that particular industry were such at any given time as to make
restriction helpful to the declared objectives of the act and to the ultimate attainment of
industrial recovery. If such a situation does not present an instance of lawful delegation in
a typical and classic form, categories long established will have to be formulated anew.
4. The President, when acting in the exercise of a delegated power, is not a quasi-
judicial officer, whose rulings are subject to review upon certiorari or appeal or an
administrative agency supervised in the same way. Officers and bodies such as those may
be required by reviewing courts to express their decision in formal and explicit findings to
the end that review may be intelligent.
5. Abakada Guro v. Exec (non-delegation issue only) - Irish

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, ETC., ET AL. v. EXEC. SEC. ERMITA ET AL. (2005) by
ALIMPOLOS
J. Austria-Martinez

SUMMARY: Petitioners assail the provisions of RA 9337 (VAT law) authorizing the President upon
the recommendation of the Sec of Finance to raise the vat after any the two conditions given has
been satisfied on the ground that said grant of authority amounts to an undue delegation of
legislative power. SC held that what was delegated by the legislature was not legislative power
but power to ascertain facts which is constitutionally permissible.

DOCTRINE: The legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully
exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated.

FACTS:
1. Congress enacted RA 9337 law which provides for the imposition of value added
tax (VAT)
2. Abakada Guro Party List, et al., and other groups filed petitions for prohibition and
certiorari questioning, among others, the constitutionality of Sec 4, 5 and 6 of RA 9337
amending Sec 106, 107 and 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
3. The questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance to raise the VAT rate to 12% after any of
the following conditions have been satisfied:
a. valued added tax collection as percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds 2 4/5%; or
b. national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds 1%.
4. They question the authority granted to the President on the ground that it amounts
to an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: WON the assailed provisions unduly delegate legislative power

HELD: No.

RATIO:
1. The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are
strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative.
2. The legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully
exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated.
3. The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the
enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to
legislation.
4. The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the
12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition.
5. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the
 word shall connotes a mandatory order. Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to
immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by
Congress.
6. (NOT THAT RELEVANT TO NON-DELEGATION BUT JUST IN CASE: In answer to the
argument forwarded by the petitioners that any recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego
of the latter) In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of
the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President
or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. Thus,
being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify
or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
7. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of
the President is to simply execute the legislative policy
6. review center v ermita - Baba

REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs Exec Sec Ermita & CHED) 1
(2009) by Foronda
CARPIO J.
NON-DELEGATION

SUMMARY: Following the leakage of the 2006 Nursing Board Exams among reviewees in certain
review centers, PGMA enacted EO 556, which authorized the CHED to supervise the
establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines, while
CHED approved the corresponding RIRR, which effectively compels independent review centers
to tie-up with Higher Educational Institution for their operations to be valid. The review centers
assailed these laws as unconstitutional for expanding the CHEDs powers and being an executive
usurpation of legislative functions. SC struck the laws down as unconstitutional.

FACTS:
1. June 2006 licensure applicants wrote the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) to report that handwritten copies of 2 sets of Nursing Board Exams were circulated
during the examination period among the reviewees at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and
Inress Review Center. Cordero, Inress Review Centers President, was then the incumbent
President of the Philippine Nurses Association. The examinees were provided with a list of
500 questions and answers in two of the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III
(Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage
and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. After the release of the results, the CA
restrained PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the passers.
2. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) replaced all the members of the PRC
Board of Nursing and ordered the examinees to re-take the exams
3. On 8 September 2006, PGMA issued EO 566 (authorized the CHED to supervise the
establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines).
On 3 November 2006, the CHED approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of
2006 (IRR).

1 CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND TRAINING CENTER, INC. (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW
SCHOOL, INC. (ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE), Petitioners-Intervenors. PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor.
 4. In a letter, Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization
of independent review centers, asked the CHED to amend, if not withdraw the IRR arguing,
among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively
abolish independent review centers. CHED replied that suspension would be contrary to
EO 566.
5. Chairman Puno invited petitioners representatives to a dialogue on 14 March 2007.
Petitioner submitted to the CHED its position paper on the IRR. The CHED did not reply to
the letter.
6. 7 May 2007 the CHED approved the RIRR; petitioner filed before the CHED a
Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations praying for a ruling:
(1) Amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from the coverage of the
CHED; (2) Clarifying the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up
or be integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and PRC-recognized professional
associations with recognized programs, or in the alternative, to convert into schools; and
(3) Revising the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs coverage to
public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in
post-secondary educational institutions.
7. Reply of CHED Chairman Neri: No review center or similar entities shall be
established and/or operate review classes without the favorable expressed indorsement of
the CHED and without the issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct
review classes. x x x To exclude the operation of independent review centers from the
coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No.
566.
8. Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for
the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and
the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR.
9. 21 May 2008 the CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008
(CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing
independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the
RIRR.
10. SC resolved to require the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the
issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008.
RULES
1. (RIRR relevant provisions) Rule VII, Section 1. Authority to Establish and Operate Only
CHED recognized, accredited and reputable HEIs may be authorized to establish and
operate review center/course by the CHED upon full compliance with the conditions and
requirements provided herein and in other pertinent laws, rules and regulations. In addition,
a consortium or consortia of qualified schools and/or entities may establish and operate
review centers or conduct review classes upon compliance with the provisions of these
Rules.
2. (RIRR relevant provisions) Rule XIV, Section 1. Review centers that are existing upon
the approval of Executive Order No. 566 shall be given a grace period of up to one (1) year,
to tie-up/be integrated with existing HEIs, consortium of HEIs and PRC recognized
Professional Associations with recognized programs under the conditions set forth in this
Order and upon mutually acceptable covenants by the contracting parties. In the
alternative, they may convert as a school and apply for the course covered by the review
subject to rules and regulations of the CHED and the SEC with respect to the establishment
of schools. In the meantime, no permit shall be issued if there is noncompliance with these
conditions or non-compliance with the requirements set forth in these rules.
3. (RIRR relevant provisions) Rule XIV, Section 2. Only after full compliance with the
requirements shall a Permit be given by the CHED to review centers contemplated under
this Rule.
4. (RIRR relevant provisions) Rule XIV, Section 3. Failure of existing review centers to
fully comply with the above shall bar them from existing as review centers and they shall
 be deemed as operating illegally as such. In addition, appropriate administrative and legal
proceedings shall be commenced against the erring entities that continue to operate and
appropriate sanctions shall be imposed after due process.
5. (IMPORTANT, MOST LIKELY THE DOCTRINE!) Ople vs Torres: The line that delineates
Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is the authority, under
the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the will of
the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general
and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as
limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all
subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. Xxx While
Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The
executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance. Xxx As head of the Executive Department, the President is
the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws
are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of
supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to
enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the
work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and
check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations. x x x. An administrative order is: Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts
of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance
of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. An
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law
and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy.

ISSUES & RATIO

1. W/N EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as
it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction YES
a. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA
7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions
of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-
secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a
framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.
b. The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which
offers a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal
school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC. It
also covers the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by individuals
whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC.
c. A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722.
It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the
CHED. A review course is only intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees. A reviewee is not even required to enroll in a review
 center or to take a review course prior to taking an examination given by the PRC. Even if
a reviewee enrolls in a review center, attendance in a review course is not mandatory. The
reviewee is not required to attend each review class. He is not required to take or pass an
examination, and neither is he given a grade. He is also not required to submit any thesis
or dissertation. Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered programs
x x x of higher learning that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
d. Further, the similar entities in EO 566 cover centers providing review or tutorial
services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include,
although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and
tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher
learning.

2. W/N the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power

YES
a. Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO 292 2 (cited by the OSG in arguing for the
EOs constitutionality) speaks of other powers vested in the President under the law.
The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under this provision requires
legislation, as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the Presidents other
powers and functions has to be provided for under the law. There is no law
granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President
may not amend RA 7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation
granting her such power.
b. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the
functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make
laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is vested with the Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Consti.
c. See Rule #5 (Ople vs Torres)

Petition GRANTED. EO 566 & CHED Memo 30 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

2 Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law.
7. ALA Schecter v US - Clyde Tan

ALA Schecter v US (1935) by Tan

C.J. Hughes
Non Delegation Doctrine

Summary: The National Industrial Recovery Act empowered the President to make codes with
the sole limitation that it should effectuate the policy stated in the act. On that authority,
President Roosevelt promulgated the Live Poultry Code. Schecter is being prosecuted for
violating such code. He is assailing its constitutionality for being an undue delegation of
legislative power.

Doctrine: Congress may leave to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules
within prescribed limits, and the determination of facts to which the policy, as declared by
Congress, is to apply; but it must itself lay down the policies and establish standards.

Facts.
1. Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act 3 empowered the President to
implement industrial codes to regulate weekly employment hours, wages, and minimum
ages of employees and gave the president authority to approve such "codes of fair
competition."
2. Pursuant to such Act, The Live Poultry Code was written and promulgated by the
Roosevelt administration in 1934 to regulate companies as a means to combat the Great
Depression. Roosevelt's poultry code fixed the maximum number of hours a poultry
employee could work, imposed a minimum wage for poultry employees, and banned
certain methods of "unfair competition."
3. Schechter Poultry Corporation, the defendant in the case, purchased live poultry
from commissioners in New York City and Philadelphia and sold slaughtered poultry to
retailers and butchers in Brooklyn. Schechter was charged by the U.S. government with
violating the poultry code by selling "unfit chickens," illegally selling chickens on an
individual basis, avoiding inspections by local poultry regulators, falsifying records of
poultry sold, and selling poultry to nonlicensed purchasers. Schechter was convicted in a
federal district court, lost an appeal to the circuit court, and appealed to the Supreme
Court, which reviewed the case in 1935.

3Section 1... It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which
tend to diminish the amount thereof, and to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of
cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under adequate governmental
sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity
of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and
agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to
rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resource.

Sec. 3 (a) Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code
or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or subdivision thereof The President may, as a condition of his approval of any such
code, impose such conditions (including requirements for the making of reports and the keeping of accounts) for the protection of consumers,
competitors, employees, and others, and in furtherance of the publiinterest, and may provide such exceptions to and exemptions from the
provisions of such code as the President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy herein declared.

(d) Upon his own motion, or if complaint is made to the President that abuses inimical to the public interest and contrary to the policy herein
declared are prevalent in any trade or industry or subdivision thereof, and if no code of fair competition therefor has theretofore been approved
by the President, the President, after such public notice and hearing as he shall specify, may prescribe and approve a code of fair
competition for such trade or industry or subdivision thereof, which shall have the same effect as a code of fair competition approved by the
President under subsection (a) of this section.
Issue. Did Congress, in authorizing the codes of fair competition establish the standards of
legal obligation, thereby performing its essential legislative function? NO

Held.
1. The code-making authority conferred was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. Under Title 1, Section 1 of the Act there was a broad Declaration of
Policy, and the Presidents approval of a code was simply conditioned on his finding that it
would tend to effectuate the policy of this title. The Act imposed no limitations on the
scope of the new laws, and there was a very wide field of legislative possibilities. The
delegated power of legislation was unconfined and vagrant.
2. Section 3 of the Act was without precedent in that it supplied no standards for any
trade, industry or activity. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorized the
President to make the codes to prescribe them. Congress made an unconstitutional
delegation because it vested in the President a clearly legislative function without
imposing necessary standards and restrictions.
3. Congress is not permitted by the Constitution to abdicate, or to transfer to others,
the essential legislative functions with which it is vested.
4. Congress may leave to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules
within prescribed limits, and the determination of facts to which the policy, as declared by
Congress, is to apply; but it must itself lay down the policies and establish standards.
5. The delegation of legislative power sought to be made to the President by 3 of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, is unconstitutional and the Act is also
unconstitutional, as applied in this case, because it exceeds the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce and invades the power reserved exclusively to the States.
8. federal energy v. al gonguin - Albertson Otchengco

FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION v. AL GONQUIN SNG, INC.

June 19, 1976 | Marshall, J. | Non delegation doctrine

SUMMARY: This case revolves around the powers granted to the President by Section 232(b) of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (contents at Facts#1). Here, the Secretary of the Treasury
initiated an investigation on the existing program regarding adjustments of oil imports and found
that the importation of crude oil and other related products were threatening the national
security of the United States. Hence, the Secretary of Treasury recommended to President Ford to
take appropriate action to reduce the imports. hence, the President issued a proclamation raising
the license fees on imported oil. The respondents in this case, consisting of States, governors,
utility companies, and a congressman challenged the license fees, arguing that they were
beyond the Presidents authority. The pertinent issue in this case is whether or not 232(b)
constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President. The Court said
that no, it is not. The Court cited the test that is in the Doctrine, and said that the provision in the
case at bar clearly satisfies this test. Section 232(b) establishes clear preconditions to
Presidential action, namely: a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that an "article is being
imported into the United States in such quantity/es or under such circumstances as to threaten
to impair the national security. Furthermore, the President can act only to the extent "he deems
necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not
threaten to impair the national security."

DOCTRINE:
The Court cited the case of Hampton Jr & Co. v. United States, where the Court laid out this test:
"If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the (President) is
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."

FACTS:

1. This case revolves around the powers granted to the President by Section 232(b) of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, which provides that that if
the Secretary of the Treasury finds that an "article is being imported into the United States in
such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security," the
President is authorized to "take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust
the imports of the article and its derivatives so that . . . imports (of the article) will not threaten
to impair the national security."
2. In this case, the Secretary of the Treasury initiated an investigation on the existing
program regarding adjustments of oil imports and found out that crude oil and its derivatives and
related products were being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security. Hence, the Secretary of the Treasury
recommended to the President Ford that appropriate action be taken to reduce the imports.
3. Following this recommendation, the President issued a Proclamation, raising the license
fees on imported oil.
4. The respondents in this case consist of eight States and their Governors, 10 utility
companies, and a Congressman. They brought suits against challenging the license fees on the
ground that they were beyond the President's authority under 232(b).
5. District Court (in favor of respondents) - denied the respondents petition, claiming that
that 232(b) is a valid delegation to the President of the power to impose license fees on
imports.
6. The Court of Appeals (in favor of petitioners) - reversed. Hence, this petition. The related
issue to our discussion is based on a preliminary attack made by the respondents that 232(b)
constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

ISSUES/HELD
WoN 232(b) constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power? No.

RATIO:
1. Even if 232(b) is read to authorize the imposition of a license fee system, the standards
that it provides the President in its implementation are clearly sufficient to meet any delegation
doctrine attack.
a. The Court cited the case of Hampton Jr & Co. v. United States, where the Court laid out this
test: "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the (President)
is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."
b. Applying this, the Court said that Section 232(b) clearly fulfills this test. First, It establishes
clear preconditions to Presidential action: A finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that an
"article is being imported into the United States in such quantity/es or under such circumstances
as to threaten to impair the national security.
c. Also, the leeway that the statute gives the President in deciding what action to take in the
event the preconditions are fulfilled is far from unbounded. The President can act only to the
extent "he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such
imports will not threaten to impair the national security."
d. Furthermore, 232(c), see n. 1, Supra, Articulates a series of specific factors to be
considered by the President in exercising his authority under 232(b).
e. Lastly, the Court said, that aside from these factors, they recognized that "necessity . . .
fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe
detailed rules.
WHITE V ROUGHTON (1976) by ANG
PER CURIAM
NON DELEGATION DOCTRINE

SUMMARY
Supervisor C. Vaughn Roughton terminated the general assistance grants received by White and
Walker, and denied Silagys application for such grant. White, Walker, and Silagy then filed a
complaint against Roughton, alleging that the latter determines eligibility arbitrarily, without any
established written standards and regulations. The Court held that the lack of established
standards and regulations for the determination of ones eligibility for the general assistance is
violative of due process. Roughton failed to give plaintiffs adequate notice and an evidentiary
hearing before their benefits were terminated and did not state the reason for the denial of the
application.

DOCTRINE
Procedural due process requires that welfare recipients must be provided with adequate notice
and an evidentiary hearing before benefits may be discounted.
Due process requires that welfare assistance be administered to ensure fairness and freedom
from arbitrary decision-making as to eligibility. Fair and consistent application of eligibility
requirements, requires established written standards and regulations.

FACTS
1. C. Vaughn Roughton (defendant) is the supervisor of the town of the City of
Champaign Township. He administers the general township assistance program which
provides locally collected taxes for distribution as welfare to needy township residents. He
terminated general assistance grants to Leon White and Elester Walker (plaintiff) and
refused to provide the same general assistance to Beatrice Silagy.
White received general assistance in the form of 'food orders' for five
periods of one week each in 1974. He received this last allotment of assistance on
October 8, 1974. Subsequent to that, his assistance was terminated. He was given
neither a written notice of his termination nor any explanation as to the reason for
the termination. White was not informed of his right to appeal or provided with
information as to how he might appeal.
Walker was provided assistance in the form of a food order for $14 on
August 23, 1974. Defendant Roughton also paid $65 for Walker's rent from October
1 to November 1, 1974. Subsequent to that payment, Walker's assistance was
terminated without written notice and without informing him of his right to appeal.
Silagy applied for township general assistance on at least three
occasions in 1974. She was denied assistance but was never informed of the
reasons supporting the rejection of her application nor informed of her right to
appeal.
2. Leon White, et. al sued Roughton allegedly for violating their procedural due process
rights under the 14th Amendment.
They allege that Roughton committed the following violations: (1) he operates the general
assistance welfare program without published standards for eligibility or the amount of aid
given; (2) he terminates general assistance without giving the recipient notice and a
hearing prior to that termination; (3) he denies applications for general assistance welfare
without giving the applicant notice and a hearing after the denial of the application; (4) he
fails adequately to inform recipients and applicants of their right to appeal.
3. On the other hand, Wesley M. Schwengel (defendant) is Chairman of the Champaign
County Board of Supervisors. He has assumed the responsibility of the County Board in
receiving appeals from decisions of the township supervisors granting or denying general
assistance, allegedly he has failed to establish a consistent and orderly appeal procedure.
4. Lower court: denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction hence this appeal.
ISSUE
1. WON there was a violation on the right to due process of the petitioners
because of the lack of standards the agency failed to employ when it decides
whether to approve or terminate welfare grants YES

RULING
1. Goldberg v. Kelly: Procedural due process requires that welfare recipients must be
provided with adequate notice and an evidentiary hearing before benefits may be
discounted.
2. Due process requires that welfare assistance be administered to ensure fairness and
freedom from arbitrary decision-making as to eligibility. Federally subsidized public
assistance is governed by statute and extensive regulations. The Illinois Public Aid
Department maintains specific regulations governing procedures and standards to
determine eligibility. Defendant Roughton is apparently not bound by the regulations of the
Illinois Public Aid Department. Certain basic eligibility requirements, however, are provided
in the General Assistance statute itself.
3. Roughton as administrator of the general assistance program has the responsibility
to the program to ensure the fair and consistent application of eligibility requirements. Fair
and consistent application of such requirements requires that Roughton establish written
standards and regulations.
4. At the hearing in the district court on the preliminary injunction, Roughton admitted
that he and his staff determine eligibility based upon their own unwritten personal
standards. Such a procedure, vesting virtually unfettered discretion in Roughton and his
staff, is clearly violative of due process.
5. The district court erred by failing to consider the relevant evidence presented at the
hearing on the preliminary injunction. At issue was whether plaintiffs procedural due
process rights were violated by the method by which they were denied general assistance,
not whether they were entitled to the same.
6. Defendants contention that the hearing in the district court provided plaintiffs
sufficient due process cannot be sustained. The requirements of due process include a
determination of the issues according to articulated standards. The lack of such standards
in this case deprives any hearing, whether before an agency or a court, of its meaning and
value as an opportunity for the plaintiffs to prove their qualifications for assistance.
1. Lovina v. Moreno - Amil Tamano

Lovina v. Moreno (1963) by Tamano

Reyes, JBL, J.
Permissible Delegation - Ascertainment of Fact

SUMMARY
Moreno, as the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, ordered that constructions in a
navigable river be removed by Primitivo Lovina and Nelly Montilla. Lovina and Montilla petitioned
in the CFI of Manila. Their appeal was granted. Hence, this appeal. Sps Lovina maintain their
contention that RA 2056 grants Moreno sweeping and unrestrained authority, and is an unlawful
delegation of power, and is therefore unconstitutional. SC held that it was not an unlawful
delegation of power.

FACTS
1. This case started by a petition of numerous residents of the Municipality of Macabebe
Province in Pampanga, to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, complaining that
the appellees had blocked the Sapang Bulati, a passable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and
asking that the obstructions be ordered removed Under the provisions of RA 2056 (An Act to
Prohibit, Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams).
2. After notice and hearing, the said Secretary found the constructions to indeed be a public
nuisance and, in his decision, ordered that the landowners (Sps Lovina) remove five closures of
Sapang Bulatil otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the expense of the
respondent.
3. The spouses filed a petition in the CFI of Manila to restrain the secretary from enforcing said
decision.
4. The TC, after hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which led to this appeal.
5. Sps Lovina, in the lower court, contended that RA 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests
the Secretary of Public works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final, and
unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and
navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance,
and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby constituting an alleged unlawful
delegation of judicial power to the aforementioned secretary.

ISSUE
1. W/N the objections to the unconstitutionality of RA 2056 are valid, not only as an undue
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary, but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary? NO

RULING
1. No. The RA merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions upon
public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make, because the
bed of navigable streams is PUBLIC property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse
possession.
2. Though the secretarys powers here involves determination of questions of fact, these
functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power
granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and
authorities are clear that they are validly conferred upon executive officials as provided the party
affected is given opportunity to be heard, as required by RA 2056 sec.2.
3. Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great value
can not be done except through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary
abatements without previous hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before us where the law
provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to the complainants and the,
appellees, who appeared therein.
4. It is noteworthy that Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as
"public nuisances or as prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams, and those of
appellees clearly are in the latter class. Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact
in executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in
the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion, none of which has been shown to
exist in this case, we agree with appellant that the court below erred in rejecting the findings of
fact of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
5. The judicial power which may be exercised by administrative agencies is a restricted one,
limited to what is incidental and reasonably necessary to the proper and efficient administration
of the statutes that are committed to them for administration. Arbitrary powers or uncontrolled
discretion may not be conferred upon administrative agencies either in the exercise of rule-
making or adjudicatory functions.

2. Alegre v. Collector of Customs - Gressa Lacson

Alegre v. Collector of Customs (1929) by Lacson

Johns, J.
Permissible delegation Filling in of details

SUMMARY
Petitioner was denied the issuance of a permit to export abaca since he did not have a certificate
from the Fiber Standardization Board. Now hes assailing the constitutionality of the
Administrative code provisions regarding the grading, inspection, and certification of fibers. SC
said the Fiber Standardization Board was created to carry out the purpose and intent of the law,
which is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power, not a delegation of legislative
power. The legislature cannot do the inspection themselves so the power would have to be
vested in a Board.

FACTS
1. The petitioner has been engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign
markets for a number of years.
2. He applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to
England, which was denied, and he was advised that he would not be permitted to export the
abaca without a certificate from the Fiber Standardization Board.
3. He then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for a writ of mandamus,
alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and
certification of fibers and, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are
unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the authority vested in the board is a delegation of legislative power?

RULING
1. Act No. 2380 is entitled "An Act providing for the inspection, grading, and baling of abaca
(Manila hemp), maguey (cantala), sisal, and other fibers," and was enacted by the Philippine
Legislature, February 28, 1914.
2. The purpose and intent of the original law was to provide in detail for the inspection
grading and baling of abaca, maguey, sisal and other fibers, and for a uniform scale for grading,
and to issue official certificates as to the kind and quality of the hemp, so that an intending
purchaser from an examination of the certificates might be assured of the grade and quality of
the hemp offered for sale.
3. The original law, as enacted, was later amended and carried into, and made a part of, the
Administrative Code, section 1244.
4. The law provides in detail how the inspection is to be done and provided the Fiber Board
with the power and authority to devise ways and means to execute its provisions. In legal effect,
the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands it must be
inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board for that purpose and vested it with the
power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation of legislative power. It
is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power to carry out the purpose
and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and
bale the hemp themselves, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in
a board of commission.
5. The petitioner's contention would leave the law without any means of enforcement. If the
law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission, how and by whom could it be enforced?

3. Olsen v Aldanese - Zedy Macatiag

4. Syman v. Jacinto

SYMAN v JACINTO (1953) by Manalo

Montemayor, J
LIMITS ON RULE-MAKING POWER

Summary: Alfredo Jacinto, the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila ordered the seizure of
two shipments of textile and a number of sewing machines consigned to SyMan. After due
hearing, Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila rendered a decision that the articles covered
are delivered to the importer after payment of the necessary customs duty, sales tax and other
charges except the sewing machines which are hereby declared forfeited to the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines to be sold at public auction in conformity with law if found
saleable. Otherwise, it will be destroyed. SyMan received a copy of the decision of the Collector
of Customs for the Port of Manila. The counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to the Collector of
Customs for the Port of Manila and asked/requested for the execution of the decision, in view of
the fact that it had become final and could no longer be reviewed by the Commissioner of
Customs after the lapse of fifteen days from the date of notification thereof was given to the
herein petitioner who did not appeal from said decision to the Commissioner of Customs within
the aforesaid period of time.

Doctrine: Under the current laws at the time, the Commissioner does not have the power to
revise unappealed decisions of the Collector in seizure cases. if the law does not give the
Commissioner the power to review and revise unappealed decisions of the Collector of Customs
in seizure cases, then the memorandum order even if duly approved and published in the Official
Gazette, would equally have no effect for being inconsistent with law.

Facts
1. On January 2, 1952, Alfredo Jacinto, the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila ordered the
seizure of two shipments of textile and a number of sewing machines consigned to SyMan.
2. After due hearing, Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila rendered a decision that the
articles covered are delivered to the importer after payment of the necessary customs duty,
sales tax and other charges except the sewing machines which are hereby declared forfeited to
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to be sold at public auction in conformity with
law if found saleable. Otherwise, such will be destroyed.
3. SyMan received a copy of the decision of the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila. The
counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila and
asked/requested for the execution of the decision, in view of the fact that it had become final and
could no longer be reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs after the lapse of fifteen days from
the date of notification thereof was given to the herein petitioner who did not appeal from said
decision to the Commissioner of Customs within the aforesaid period of time.
4. Counsel also urged that the goods be released because of the decision.
5. Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila sent a letter and to the counsel of petitioner and
informed them that such was endorsed to the Commissioner of Customs on July 13, 1951,
requesting information whether the merchandise may now be delivered to the owner upon
showing that the decision has become final and executory after fifteen (15) days from the receipt
of a copy of the same by the claimant.
6. Sy Mans petition sought two things: (1) to declare null and void that portion of the
Memorandum Order promulgated by the Insular Collector of Customs dated August 18, 1947,
which provides that as in protest cases, decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure cases,
whether appealed or not, are subject to review by the Insular Collector (now commissioner); that
such decisions and their supporting papers be submitted to his office, and that pending action by
him on such decisions, final disposal of the goods involved shall not be made; and (2) to order
the Collector to deliver to the petitioner the shipments of textiles claimed to be final and
executory.
7. The trial court granted the petition.

Issue
WON the Commissioner has the power to revise unappealed decisions of the Collector in seizure
cases. NO

Held
1. NO. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that every chief of bureau shall
prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law to carry into full
effect the laws relating to matters within the bureau's jurisdiction. But to become effective said
forms and regulations must be approved by the Department head and published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated. Because of this failure of approval by the department
head and of publication, the memorandum order of August 18, 1947 has therefore no legal
effect. Moreover, a form or regulation promulgated by a Bureau Chief must not be inconsistent
with law. Therefore, if the law does not give the Commissioner the power to review and revise
unappealed decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure cases, then the memorandum order
even if duly approved and published in the Official Gazette, would equally have no effect for
being inconsistent with law.

2. The Commissioner may order a reliquidation if he believes that the decision of the Collector
was erroneous and unfavorable to the Government; and the Department Head in his turn if he
believes that the decision of the Commissioner in any unprotested case of assessment of duties
is erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, may require the Commissioner to order a
reliquidation or he may direct the Commissioner to certify the case to the CFI.

3. The logical inference is that the lawmakers did not deem it necessary or advisable to provide
for this supervisory authority or power of revision by the Commissioner and the Department
Head on unappealed seizure cases; and it is highly possible that up to and until 1947, when the
memorandum order of August 18th of that year was issued, it was not the practice of the Bureau
of Customs to have unappealed seizure cases sent up by Collectors to the Commissioner's office
for review and revision. This is seen in the memorandum order where the Commissioner
observes that in seizure cases some collectors of customs merely submit to him their reports of
their seizure and the subsequent final disposition thereof without transmitting the records of
their proceedings, and he therein asserts the right of the Commissioner of Customs to review
decisions of Collector of Customs in seizure cases though unappealed.

4. If that right and that practice had existed from the beginning, it is not likely that Collectors
would disregard and ignore it, to the extent that it was necessary to remind them of it by means
of a memorandum order. In a seizure case, the Collector transmits all the papers in the cause to
the Commissioner only when and after the importer notifies him in writing signifying his desire to
have the matter reviewed by the Commissioner. The section does not say that without the notice
of appeal, the Collector is called upon to transmit the papers of the case to the Commissioner. If
this be true, then legally, a case of seizure unappealed ends right in the office of the Collector,
without prejudice of course to the Collector subsequently making a report of his action to the
Commissioner.

5. In a seizure case the owner or agent may, while the cause is yet before the collector, pay the
fine imposed, or in case of forfeiture, pay the appraised value of the property, and thereafter
such properties shall be surrendered and all liability which may attach to said property by virtue
of the offense causing the seizure is to be deemed discharged, the conclusion to be drawn is that
it is within the power and right of an importer, owner or agent to end the case in the office of the
Collector, thereby precluding any intervention by the Commissioner in the way of reviewing and
revising the decision of the Collector

6. The rule is and the law presumes that in seizure cases Collectors of Customs act honestly and
correctly and as Government officials, always with an eye to the protection of the interests of the
Government employing them. If mistakes are committed at all more often than not they are in
favor of the Government and not against it, and that is the reason why when the importer feels
aggrieved by their decision, he is given every chance and facility to protest the decision and
appeal to the Commissioner. Cases of erroneous decisions against the interest of the
Government of decisions rendered in collusion and connivance with importers are the exception.

7. If the seizure is important or unusual, the Commissioner may, if he so desires, order the
Collector as his subordinate to withhold action on the seizure, or hold in abeyance, within a
reasonable time, the promulgation of his decision until after he had conferred with the
Commissioner or the latter had studied the case and given suggestions. At that stage of the
proceedings before definite action is taken by the Collector, and a decision rendered by him, it
would seem that any action by him as a subordinate is still subject to the supervisory authority
and control of the Commissioner as his Chief, and the latter may still influence and direct the
Collector's action if he finds occasion for doing so. If the Government deems it necessary to
provide for review and revision by the Commissioner or even by the Department Head of the
decisions of the Collector of Customs in unappealed seizure cases, the Legislature may be
requested to insert a section in the Revised Administrative Code similar to Section 1393 which
applies to unprotested cases of assessment duties.

8. The decision of the Collector of Customs in a seizure case if not protested and appealed by the
importer to the Commissioner of Customs on time, becomes final not only as to him but against
the Government as well. Neither the Commissioner nor the Department Head has the power to
review, revise or modify such unappealed decision. The memorandum order of the Insular
Collector of Customs of August 18, 1947, is void and of no effect, not only because it has not
been duly approved by the Department Head and duly published as required by section 551 of
the Revised Administrative Code but also because it is inconsistent with law.
 5. People v. Maceren - Irvette Abary
People v Maceren (1977)
P: People
R: Hon. Maceren (CFI Laguna), Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario
Aquino and Carlito del Rosario

SUMMARY:
Private respondents were charged for violating an administrative order which prohibits electro
fishing. Now being assailed is the validity of the order for being in excess of the authority granted
by the legislative. SC held that the Secretary exceeded his authority in providing said order and
its punishment. The law from which the Secretary is granted authority didnt prohibit electro
fishing so the order. THus, being devoid of basis, said order is void.

FACTS:
1. The question of the validity of the 1967 regulation penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries arose when herein private respondents were charged by a constabulary investigator
with violating the said regulation (Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1).
2. It is alleged that private respondents caught fish thru electric current which destroyed the
aquatic animals within its reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace.
3. The municipal court quashed the complaint. CFI affirmed.
a. CFI held: electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance. Since the law (Sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law
prohibits the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing.) does not
clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot
consider it unlawful.
4. Initially enacted was the Fisheries law which does not expressly punish electro fishing.
Nonetheless, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (SANR) promulgated the now
assailed order (Fisheries AO No. 84), prohibiting electro fishing in all PH waters. Said order
also provided for a penalty of a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or
imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court.
a. AO was later amended: prohibition was limited from PH waters to fresh water
fisheries.
b. Note: Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty.
5. Prosecution cites as the basis for the legal sanctions against electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries the following:
a. Rule-making authority of the Department Secretary (herein SANR) under Sec. 4 of
the Fisheries Law
b. Function of the Commissioner of Fisheries (COF) to enforce the provisions of the
Fisheries Law
c. Declared national policy to encourage, promote, and conserve our fishing
resources
d. Sec. 83 of the Fisheries Law providing, that any other violation shall subject the
offender to a fine

ISSUES: W/N the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded his authority/rule-
making power in criminalizing electro fishing and providing for its penalty? YES, exceed authority.

LAWS:
1. Fisheries Law or RA 3512 (promulgated by Congress)
2. Fisheries AO 84 and 84-1 (promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources)

RULING:
1. The SANR and the COF exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries AO Nos. 84 and 84-1 and
that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Law. RA 3512 does not expressly prohibit
electro fishing. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. As electro fishing is
not banned under that law, the SANR and COF are powerless to penalize it. Therefore, AO Nos. 84
and 84-1 are devoid of any legal basis.
2. As well, the amendment limiting the prohibition of electro fishing to fresh water fisheries
created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in
marine waters. That circumstance strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all
forms of electro fishing.
3. There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making
powers. Sec. 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue
instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry
into effect the provisions thereof." However, he should not transcend the boundary provided by
the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising
legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.
4. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule
or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
5. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself. Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making
powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is
required is that the regulation should be:
[1] germane to the defects and purposes of the law; and that
[2] it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.
6. Finally, to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested
exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency. Herein
regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law because
the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing. A penal statute is strictly construed.
While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a
law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal
statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly
or by necessary implication conferred upon it. In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative
order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority
conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care.

DECISION:
Herein private respondents are acquitted. Secretary deemed to have exceeded his authority.

6. toledo v. civil service commission - Jose Ramon Ampil

TOLEDO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (1965) Ampil

PARAS, J.
LIMITS ON RULE-MAKING POWER

SUMMARY
Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed as Manager of the Education and Information
Department of the COMELEC when he was already more than 57 years old. However, the
COMELEC later declared his appointment to be void because it violated Sec. 22, Rule III of the
Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP), which prohibited the appointment
of persons 57 years old or above into government service without the prior approval of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). The Court declared the said provision to be invalid for two reasons: a)
it had no basis in P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) and was purely the CSCs creation; and b) it
was not published.

DOCTRINE
The power vested in the Civil Service Commission is to implement the law or put it into effect,
not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it.
By administrative regulations, the law itself cannot be extended; said regulations cannot amend
an act of Congress.

FACTS
1. Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then-COMELEC Chairman Ramon Felipe
as Manager of the Education and Information Department of COMELEC on May 21, 1986. At the
time of his appointment, Toledo was more than 57 years old, having been born on July 8, 1927.

2. Toledos appointment papers and his oath of office were endorsed by the COMELEC to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) for approval. However, no prior request for exemption from the
provisions of Sec. 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP)
was obtained. The said provision prohibited the appointment of persons 57 years old or above
into government service without the CSCs prior approval.

3. On January 29, 1989, upon discovery of the lack of authority under the aforementioned
provision as well as CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1993, the COMELEC issued a
Resolution declaring Toledos appointment to be void.

4. On appeal, the CSC declared that Toledos appointment was merely voidable, and that he
was a de facto officer from the time he assumed office on June 16, 1986 up to the issuance of the
COMELECs Resolution on January 29, 1989.

ISSUE
WON Sec. 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) is
invalid YES

RULING
1. Historical background: Pres. Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) on
October 6, 1975, which established the CSC. P.D. No. 807 empowered the CSC to prescribe,
amend, and enforce rules and regulations for implementing the decrees provisions. The same
law also provided that the said rules and regulations shall become effective thirty (30) days
after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. Pursuant to
P.D. No. 807, the CSC adopted the CSRPAP on November 20, 1983.

2. Sec. 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP provides that No person shall be appointed, reinstated, or
reemployed in the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President, or the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, in the case of employees in the judiciary, determines that he possesses
special qualifications urgently needed by the hiring agency.

3. There is no provision in P.D. No. 807 dealing in any manner with the appointment,
reinstatement or re-employment of any person already 57 years, or any particular age, in the
government service. Sec. 22 is purely a creation of the CSC, having no reference to any provision
of P.D. No. 807.

4. Moreover, the CSRPAP was never published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of
general circulation at the time its provisions were applied to Toledos case. This fact was
admitted by CSC Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas in a letter to Toledo dated February 12, 1989, as
well as in a Certification issued by the Director of the National Printing Office on January 30,
1989.

5. Even assuming that the assailed prohibition was enforceable, it can only apply expressly to
employees under the supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the President.

7. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA - Genesis Leal

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. CA (1995)

Vitug, J. | Rules and regulations contrary to intent of law

Summary: BIR insists that the general amnesty declared by EO 41 for taxable years 1981-1985
does not include assessments already made before its promulgation. Court said BIRs MO 4-87
implementing EO 41 ran contrary to the clear intent of the latter, that is, to declare a general
amnesty.

Facts:
On August 22, 1986, Executive Order No. 41 (a law, since it was promulgated when
Pres. Aquino still exercised legislative powers) was promulgated declaring a one-time tax
amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes and
taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985.
R.O.H. Auto Products filed in October 1986 and November 1986, its Tax Amnesty
Return and Supplemental Tax Amnesty, and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due.
Prior to this availment, Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed ROHs deficiency
income and business taxes for fiscal years 1981 and 1982 in an aggregate amount of Php
1,410,157.71. The taxpayer wrote back that since it availed itself of the tax amnesty, the
deficiency tax notice should be cancelled.
BIR insists that according to Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87 which
implements EO 41, only assessments issued by the BIR after the promulgation of the
executive order are covered by the amnesty, not assessments made before.
Court of Tax Appeals: rule in MO 4-87 is beyond the contemplation of Executive
Order No. 41; such administrative legislation was quite contrary to the mandate of the law
which the regulation ought to implement. CA uphelds CTA. Hence this appeal by CIR.

Issue/Held:
WON Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87 is valid - NO

Ratio:
It cannot be disputed that agency rules and regulations, as well as administrative
opinions and rulings, ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts. Much
more fundamental than that, however, is the rule that all such issuances must not
override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and
implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out,
neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.
EO 41 is quite explicit on its scope (Sec. 1: A one-time tax amnesty covering unpaid
income taxes for the years 1981 to 1985 is hereby declared) and exceptions.
 If EO 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed
(administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its
exclusionary clauses. It did not. Hence, the EO has been designed to be in the nature of a
general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it, to which
exceptions ROH does not qualify.
Rationale for the amnesty: there were calls for civil disobedience during the period
covered, as protest to the Marcos regime.
DISMISSED.
8. land bank of the philippines v ca (1995) - Verlin Amarante

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CA (1995) by Entena

FRANCISCO, J.
LIMITS ON RULE-MAKING POWER

SUMMARY
Landowners question the validity of DAR AO No. 9 series of 1990 in permitting the opening of
trust accounts by Landbank instead of depositing IN CASH OR BONDS in an accessible bank as
mandated by Section 16e of RA 6657. The Court held that the DAR overstepped the limits of its
rule-making power, as the law (which the DAR by its rule-making power must simply implement,
and the scope of which it CANNOT EXTEND) explicitly provides that the mode of deposit can only
be in cash or LBP bonds.

DOCTRINE: See underlined in RATIO (on issue #1)

FACTS
1. Landowners (Private Rs) whose land was acquired by DAR under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (and were aggrieved by DAR and Landbanks lapses in valuation and
payment of just compensation) filed suit with the SC, to (A) question the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,
and (B) to seek to compel the DAR to expedite proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts
respectively earmarked for them.
On (A)
2. Private Rs position: AO No. 9, in permitting the opening of trust accounts by Landbank
(instead of depositing in cash/bonds in an accessible bank the compensation for the land before
it is taken and the titles are cancelled (despite clear mandate in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 that
compensation must be deposited in cash/bonds), was issued without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion.
3. DARs position: AO No. 9 is a valid exercise of rule-making power pursuant to Sec. 49* of
RA 6657, that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act
of depositing without excluding trust accounts as a form of deposit, so DAR through the AO
merely implemented the declared policies of RA 6657.
On (B)
4. The landowners also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked",
"deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners, such that they
are unable to withdraw the amount pending final valuation.
5. Meanwhile, the DAR in effect distinguishes between deposit of compensation under
Section 16(e) and payment of final compensation under Section 18. Following this, the right of
the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final valuation
as agreed upon or that adjudged by the court, and that the deposit is only provisional and
intended to secure possession of property pending final valuation. Therefore, the issuance of the
"Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was substantial compliance with Section 16(e).

ISSUE
1. (PERTINENT) Did DAR clearly overstep the limits of its rulemaking power in issuing AO No.
9? YES
2. Are the landowners entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf
pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties?

RATIO
On issue #1
1. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private
Lands - (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection
or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. Looking at the above provision, it is very explicit that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere can it be inferred that deposit can be made in any other form.
If it were the intention to allow a "trust account," that should have been made express, or at
least apparent from the phrasing.
3. The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an
error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
4. The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for
the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled
is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. In
case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is
the former that prevails.
5. DAR cannot likewise invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing
regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.

On issue #2
1. The distinction between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final
compensation under Section 18 is unnecessary. To withhold the right of the landowners to
appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties
simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already
been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain. The immediate effect in both situations is that the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.
2. Association of Small Landowners case (which Ps cited) in allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation, DID NOT however, dispense with the settled rule
that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated
property is transferred.
3. The irresistible expropriation of the landowners' properties was painful enough for them.
But DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private
respondents in exchange for the taking. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents,
which the Court must rectify.
*Sec. 49: The PARC and the DAR shall have the power to issue rules and regulations, whether
substantive or procedural, to carry out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take
effect ten (10) days after the publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
 OLSEN v. ALDANESE
APRIL 28, 1922 | JOHNS, J. | LIMITS ON RULE-MAKING POWER

PETITIONER: Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc.

RESPONDENTS: Vicente Aldanese, as Insular Collector of Customs, and W. Trinidad, as Collector
of Internal Revenue

SUMMARY: Olsen & Co. assails provisions of Act. No. 2613 and Administrative Order No. 35, for
limiting the export of cigars to those manufactured from long filler tobacco exclusively the
product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya. SC rules that neither the
Collector of Internal Revenue nor the Legislature itself has any power to discriminate in favor of
one province against another in the production of tobacco or of any other product of the Islands.

DOCTRINE: Under Clause A, Sec. 6 of said Act, the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue is
specified and defined to the making of rules and regulations for the classification, marking and
packing of leaf or manufactured tobacco of good quality and the handling of it under conditions.
Any rules or regulations which are not within the scope of the Act are null and void.

FACTS:
1. On February 4, 1916, the Philippine Legislature enacted Law No. 2613 entitled "An Act to
improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippines and to develop
the export trade therein."
2. Clause B of section 6 of the Act empowers the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) to
establish rules defining the standard and the type of leaf and manufactured tobacco that may be
exported into the United States.
3. CIR promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations."
Section 9 thereof limits the exportation into the United States of Philippine cigars to those
manufactured from long filler tobacco exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya.
4. Act No. 2613 also directs the Internal Revenue Collector to certify to the Insular Collector
that any tobacco or cigars offered for export to the United States shall comply with the Act.
5. Petitioner Olsen & Co., Inc. an exporter export of tobacco cigars grown from the
Philippines, applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for such a certificate to the Insular
Collector of Customs for a consignment of 10,000 cigars manufactured by it from tobacco grown
and produced in the Philippines, which was then and there offered for export to the United
States, and was submitted for inspection and the issuance of the proper certificate of origin.
6. The Collector of Internal Revenue refused to issue such certificate of origin on the ground
that said cigars were not manufactured of long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the
provinces of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Vizcaya.
7. Petitioner now files a petition with the Supreme Court, praying that the abovementioned
provisions of Act. 2613 and Administrative Order No. 35 be declared void.

ISSUE: WON Act No. 2613 or AO No.35 may limit the export of tobacco within certain provinces
NO

RATIO:
1. Clause A of section 6 of Act No. 2613 provides:
"To establish general and local rules respecting the classification, marking, and packing of
tobacco for domestic sale or for exportation to the United States so far as may be necessary to
secure leaf tobacco of good quality and to secure its handling under sanitary conditions and to
the end that leaf tobacco be not mixed, packed, and marked as of the same quality when it is not
of the same class and origin."
2. The power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make rules and regulations is confined to
what is stated in Clause A. Hence, it must follow that any rules or regulations which are not
within the scope of the Act are null and void.
3. Provisions of the legislative act are not limited to the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or
Nueva Vizcaya, or to any province, and that there is no limitation as to the place where the
tobacco should be grown in the Philippine Islands. The only power conferred is to establish
general and local rules for the classification, marking, and packing of tobacco and the standard
and the type of tobacco which may be exported to the United States.
4. Neither the Collector of Internal Revenue nor the Legislature itself has any power to
discriminate in favor of one province against another in the production of tobacco or of any other
product of the Islands. The purpose and intent of the Legislature was that a proper standard of
the quality of tobacco should be fixed and defined, and that all of those who produce tobacco of
the same standard should have equal rights and opportunities. It was never intended that a
standard should be fixed which would limit the manufacture of cigars for export to certain
provinces of the Islands, or that the tobacco produced in one province should be measured by
another and different standard than the tobacco produced in any other province. That would
amount to discrimination and class legislation, which, even the Legislature, would not have the
power to enact. Again, the legislative Act does not say anything about the "filler," or whether it
should be short or long. Neither does it say anything about the weight of the cigar. It is a matter
of common knowledge that standard cigars are of different sizes, weights, and lengths, and that
the purity and standard of the cigar does not depend upon either.

NONRELEVANT PART
1. Defendants likened Act No. 2613 to the US Act of Congress entitled An Act to prevent the
importation of impure and unwholesome tea.
2. That Act of Congress makes it unlawful to import into the United States any tea which is
inferior "in purity, quality and fitness for consumption to the standards provided in section three
of this act." That after its passage, the Secretary of the Treasury shall appoint a board of seven
members, each of whom shall be expert in teas, and who shall prepare and submit to him
standard samples of tea, etc., and that, upon the recommendation of the said board, he "shall fix
and establish uniform standards of purity, quality and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas
imported into the United States."
3. SC ruled that Act No. 2613 is not similar to the US Act because the former does not provide
any standard to determine the purity, quality and fitness of cigars exported from the Philippines.
GMCR v bell telecommunications - Mikee Resultan
GMRC v Bell Telecom
April 30, 1997| Hermosisima | Limit to Rule-Making power

PETITIONER: GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

CORP.; ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC.
RESPONDENTS: BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON. SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the National Telecommunications

SUMMARY: BellTell applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure,
Install, Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge
Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority. Eventually
given a favorable recommendation of CCAD and approved by 2 of 3 members of the NTC
commission but chairman of the commission denied application overriding the votes of the 2
deputy commissioners. Belltel avers said decision and argues the collegial nature of NTC which
requires a majority vote to decide issues before them. CA and SC agreed with BellTels contention
citing NTC as a collegial body and stating that NTC is not a 1-man commission to be headed
solely by the chairman.

DOCTRINE: Being collegial in nature requires a majority vote in deciding issues before
it. The collegial nature of the commission can be inferred from the language of the laws
governing it. In this case Sec 16 of EO 546 and section 15 of Rules of Procedure of BOC clearly
show the intent of law-maker to have a majority vote as decisive to NTCs decision in
cases/application they are to resolve.

FACTS:
Oct 9,1993: Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc (BellTel) filed with the NTC an Application for
a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate and Maintain
Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge Rates Therefor and with
Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority.
At the time of the filing of this application, private respondent BellTel had not been granted a
legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications service.
BellTel being an unenfranchised applicant was excluded in the deliberations for service area
agreements for local exchange carrier service, (only petitioners were beneficiaries of formal
award of service are assignments)
March 25, 1994: RA 7692 enacted, granting BellTel congressional franchise which gave BellTel the
privilege and authority to carry on the business of providing telecommunications services in the
Philippines.
July 12, 1994: BellTel Filed 2nd app. With NTC. (notable here is the addition of a proposal to install
2.6M telephone lines in 10 years using modern equipment to provide a100% digital local
exchange tel. network.
BellTel filed a formal evidence which was referred to CCAD which after its own investigation gave
a favorable recommendation
In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two members of the NTC, the
Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft ] of the order granting provisional authority to
BellTel.
Draft signed by 2 (dumlao and perez) deputy commissioners but not by the commissioner
(kintanar).
While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three members composing a quasi-
judicial body is entitled to promulgation, petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy
and the corresponding procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign,
validate and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is lodged in the
Chairman
only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC Secretariat as the sole authority to
sign any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy
Commissioners Dumlao and Perez have allegedly no voting power.
Because of NTCs inaction Belltel files an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for
the Issuance of a Provisional Authority and a motion to promulgate citing CCADs favorable
recommendation and already made working draft order. Motion denied
BellTel argues that NTC is a collegial body and that 2 favorable votes out of a maximum 3 votes
by the members of the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision.

ISSUES/HELD: WoN NTC is a collegial body and thus needing the majority vote of the 3
commissioners to validly decide any case before it.-YES , vote of chairman alone not
enough.

RATIO:
Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not
speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three
members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or
any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.
When one considers the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency
it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man commission
and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC
under Executive Order No. 146, one is left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial
body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
Also, sec 16[1] of EO 546 and Rule 15[2] of Rules of Procedure of BOC now the NTC are collegial
in nature.
Section 16 of EO 564 must be interpreted together with the whole EO. Basically, if
Marcos intended a 1-man governmental body he did not need to make a commission and
explicitly add the 2 deputy commissioners.
While it may be true that the aforesaid Rules of Procedure was promulgated before the
effectivity of Executive Order No. 546, however, the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the
rules of practice and procedure before the NTC when it was established under Executive Order
No. 546. This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Philippine Consumers
Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission

[1] The Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy Commissioners,
preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an economist
[2] In every case heard by the Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions and resolutions
disposing of the merits of the matter within its jurisdiction shall be reached with the
concurrence of at least two regular members after deliberation and consultation and
thereafter assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion. Any member dissenting from the
order, ruling, decision or resolution shall state in writing the reason for his dissent.
In all other cases, a duly assigned Member shall issue all orders, rulings, decisions and
resolutions pertinent to the case assigned to him. Copy of the decision on the merit of the case
so assigned shall be furnished the Chairman of the Board.
10. assoc of phil. coconut desiccators v phil coconut auth. - Iris
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS v. PHILIPPINE COCONUT
AUTHORITY
Feb. 10, 1998 | Mendoza, J. || en banc |

PETITIONERS: Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators

RESPONDENTS: Philippine Coconut Authority
SUMMARY: Philippine Coconut Authority(PCA) issued a Resolution which no longer require
those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses to engage in said business..
The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and
unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. The Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD)
then filed a petition for mandamus. SC ruled that PCA Resolution and all certificates of
registration issued under it are NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power..
PCA acted in plain disregard of its legislative purpose when it adopted the Resolution which
allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual
dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure where the PCA limits its function to the "monitoring"
& compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of production. (So PCA
would simply be compiling statistical data, but in case of violations of standards there would be
nothing much it would do.)

DOCTRINE: Any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the
government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an
administrative agency to dismantle it.

FACTS:
1. On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the
APCD brought suit RTC to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the
establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants in areas considered "congested"
as such would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991.
2. TC issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction;
3. While the case was pending in the RTC, the Governing Board of the PCA issued on
March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the PCA
from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the
registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the
"monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality
standards.
4. The PCA then issued "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated
coconut processing plants, so petitioner appealed to the Office of the President(OP) but
received no reply. (even inquired twice afterward, but still no reply)
5. PETITIONER alleges: that (1) PCA Boards resolution is null and void for being an undue
exercise of legislative power by an administrative body; (2) that it is a violation of both
substantive and procedural due process. (Of substantive: for being without any basis,
arbitrary, and unreasonable.|| Of procedural: for being done without consultation.
6. RESPONDENT: petition should be denied on the ground that petitioner has a pending
appeal before the OP, for forum-shopping in filing this petition and of failing to exhaust
available administrative remedies before coming to this Court.

ISSUES/HELD: WON the PCA can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law
creating itNo. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby
declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of PCA to adopt or issue.
RATIO: By limiting the purpose of registration to merely "monitoring volumes of production [and]
administration of quality standards" of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its
role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop
 PCA acted in plain disregard of the legislative purpose when it adopted the
Resolution (which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing
plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure)where the PCA limits its
function to the "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and
volumes of production. (So PCA would simply be compiling statistical data, but in case of
violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do.)
<note: ff lines are mentioned in Romeros dissent>
The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free enterprise
degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling,
the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign
trade performance of the coconut industry.
That Instead of determining the qualifications of market players and
preventing the entry into the field of those who are unfit, the PCA now relies entirely
on competition with all its wastefulness and inefficiency to do the weeding out,
in its naive belief in survival of the fittest.

Our Constitutions, (starting w/ 1935 one), have repudiated laissez-faire as an

economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a
policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare. (Sec. 6 and 19 of Art. XII of the Constitution: )
Sec. 6. . . . Individuals and private groups, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have
the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the
duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands.
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies
when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or
unfair competition shall be allowed.
History of coconut industry:
1982: A total phase-out of some existing plants was ordered considering the limited
market was not adequate to support all the existing processing plants. It was only in
1987, when the PCA started deregulating the industry. This form of "deregulation" was
approved by President Aquino in her memorandum.
These measures the restriction in 1982 and then the lifting of the restrictions in
1987 were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law "to
promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil
industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth." Power given to the
PCA is not a roving commission to adopt any program deemed necessary to promote the
development of the coconut and other palm oils industry, but one to be exercised in the
context of this regulatory structure.

As to the rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may

seek judicial review:
- no application here. The resolution was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making
or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies
made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The
exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete and it is clear, in
the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of
the desiccated coconut industry became effective.
___________________________
MENTIONS THE DISSENT: That contrary to what the Dissent thinks: There really is a
renunciation of the power to regulate. (When the PCA no longer requires a license as condition
for the establishment or operation of a plant, If a number of processing firms go to areas which
are already congested, the PCA cannot stop them from doing so; If there is overproduction, the
PCA cannot order a cut back in their production
____________________________
Pertinent laws:
- PD No. 232 created the PCA.
- Revised Coconut Code (P.D. No. 1468)made PCA into "an independent public
corporation . . . directly reporting to, and supervised by, the President of the Philippines,"
and charged with carrying out the State's policy "to promote the rapid
integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry
in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth." through a
regulatory scheme set up by law. The establishment of new plants could be authorized
only upon determination by the PCA of the existence of certain economic conditions and
the approval of the President of the Philippines.

- Sec. 1, EO No. 826 : Sec. 1. Prohibition. Except as herein provided, no

government agency or instrumentality shall hereafter authorize, approve or grant any
permit or license for the establishment or operation of new desiccated coconut processing
plants, including the importation of machinery or equipment for the purpose. In the event
of a need to establish a new plant, or expand the capacity, relocate or upgrade the
efficiencies of any existing desiccated plant, the Philippine Coconut Authority may, upon
proper determination of such need and evaluation of the condition relating to:
a. the existing market demand;
b. the production capacity prevailing in the country or locality;
c. the level and flow of raw materials; and
d. other circumstances which may affect the growth or viability of the industry
concerned, authorize or grant the application for, the establishment or expansion of
capacity, relocation or upgrading of efficiencies of such desiccated coconut
processing plant, subject to the approval of the President.

____________________________
ROMERO, J., DISSENTING: Sees no merit in the petition; believes that the PCA did not
overstep the limits of its power in issuing the assailed resolution.
The past decade, a distinct worldwide trend towards economic deregulation has
been evident.
PCA's authority to the Resolution is clearly provided in Section 3(a) of P.D.
No. 232 ( To formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and
other palm oil industry.) Considering the responsibilities and powers assigned to the PCA,
as well as its underlying policy, the Resolution is a valid exercise of delegated legislation
by the PCA-; in harmony with the objectives of the legislature

Sufficient standards to guide the PCA[1]: & measures to achieve these policies
are better left to the administrative agencies tasked with implementing them.

DID NOT DISREGARD LEGISLATIVE SCHEME: While the ponencia argues that the
"legislative scheme" was disregarded when the PCA , this was actually effected pursuant
to the PCA Board Resolution laying down the policy of deregulating the industry and
authorizing the creation of additional desiccated coconut plants.
NO RENUNCIATION OF THE POWER TO REGULATE: PCA did not limit itself
"merely to monitoring . . ." as the ponencia states, but to "registering the . . . processors
for the purpose of monitoring their volumes of production and administration of quality
standards. . . . In trimming down its functions to registration is not an abdication of the
power to regulate but is regulation itself
That actually, the relevant provisions in the disputed resolution reads:
Resolved further, that the PCA shall limit itself only to simply registering the
aforementioned coconut product processors for the purpose of monitoring their
 volumes of production, administration of quality standards with the corresponding
service fees/charges.

Legislative discretion, as to the substantive contents of a law, cannot be delegated.

What may be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law is to be enforced, not
what the law should be, a prerogative of the legislature which it can neither abdicate nor
surrender to the delegate. (based on the separation and allocation of powers)
The policy of deregulation must be determined by the circumstances
prevailing in a certain situation. This Court is only concerned with the question of
authority, not the wisdom of the measure involved which falls within the province of
the Legislature.
The ponencia in saying: "The result can very well be a repeat of
1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a 'free-for-all,' resulting " & that such
policy as one characterized by "wastefulness and inefficiency . . . based on its naive
faith in survival of the fittest --> Is not this a blatant incursion by the Court into
the economic arena which is better left to the administrative agency
precisely tasked to promote the growth of the industry, through the exercise of its
studied discretion? Encroaching on legislative domain in questioning the wisdom of
the action taken by the PCA which was accorded a broad mandate by the Congress?
PBCOM vs. CIR (1999) by Bayudan
J. Quisumbing
Limits of rule-making power

SUMMARY: PBCom sought to refund an overpayment of their income tax return. They relied on a
BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular which stated that the prescriptive period for filing an action
for such has been extended from 2 years to 10 years. However, the CTA denied their petition,
saying that it was filed beyond the reglementary period and that they opted for a tax credit to be
applied to the succeeding years taxes and cannot ask for a refund. SC said that the BIR RMC
should be nullified as it was inconsistent with the National Internal Revenue Code, and that
PBCom cannot indeed ask for a refund as they themselves specified that they opted for a tax
credit instead of a refund.

DOCTRINE: Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense
of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed
upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect
by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially
found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override,
instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.

FACTS
1. PBCom filed its quarterly income tax return for 1st and 2nd quarter 1985, paying
P5,016,954 total income tax. This was settled by applying PBComs tax credit memos.
2. PBCom suffered losses, however, so it declared a net loss of P25M when it filed its
annual income tax return. In 1986, it also reported a net loss of P14M. For both years,
PBCom declared no tax payable for the year.
3. PBCom earned rental income from leased property in 1985-86. Lessees withheld
and remitted P285,795 (1985) and P234,077 (1986) to the BIR. Hence, PBCom requested
the CIR for a tax credit due to overpayment of taxes. Pending the CIRs investigation,
PBCom filed a petition for review at the Court of Tax Appeals.
4. CTA denied the tax refund, as it was filed beyond the 2 year reglementary period.
The 1986 refund was denied as it was assumed that it was automatically credited to
PBCom for the next year. PBCom filed an MR but was denied.
5. PBCom filed a petition for review of the CTA decision, but the CA affirmed it. Hence
this petition for review.

ISSUE
W/N CA erred in denying PBComs tax refund on the ground of prescription, despite PBComs
reliance on BIR RMC 7-85 which changed the prescriptive period from 2 years to 10 years - NO

RATIO
1. The relaxation of revenue regulations by RMC 7-85 is not warranted as it disregards
the two-year prescriptive period set by law.
2. Basic is the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the nation. The primary purpose
is to generate funds for the State to finance the needs of the citizenry and to advance the
common weal. Due process of law under the Constitution does not require judicial
proceedings in tax cases. This must necessarily be so because it is upon taxation that the
government chiefly relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations and it is of utmost
importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection of taxes levied should be
summary and interfered with as little as possible.
3. From the same perspective, claims for refund or tax credit should be exercised
within the time fixed by law because the BIR being an administrative body enforced to
collect taxes, its functions should not be unduly delayed or hampered by incidental
matters.
4. Section 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977 (now Sec. 229,
NIRC of 1997) provides for the prescriptive period for filing a court proceeding for the
recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected, viz.:
a. Sec. 230. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. -- No suit or
proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal
revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of
any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until
a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit
or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has
been paid under protest or duress.
b. In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the
expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of
any supervening cause that may arise after payment; Provided however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax,
where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment
appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Italics supplied)
c. The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or credit
with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, within two (2) years after payment of
tax, before any suit in CTA is commenced. The two-year prescriptive period
provided, should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return and
final payment of the tax for the year.
5. When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the
prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax
payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of
1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated
guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.
6. Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense
of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to
time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation
placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to
great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be
ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance
administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony
with, the law they seek to apply and implement.
7. People vs. Lim: rules and regulations issued by administrative officials to implement
a law cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter.
8. The State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents. The nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977
NIRC, for being contrary to the express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation
could not be given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute.
 9. The non-retroactivity of rulings by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not
applicable in this case because the nullity of RMC No. 7-85 was declared by respondent
courts and not by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. A claim for refund is in the
nature of a claim for exemption and should be construed in strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer.
10.Sec. 69 of the 1977 NIRC (now Sec. 76 of the 1997 NIRC) provides that any excess
of the total quarterly payments over the actual income tax computed in the adjustment or
final corporate income tax return, shall either (a) be refunded to the corporation, or (b)
may be credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the quarters of
the succeeding taxable year.
a. The corporation must signify in its annual corporate adjustment return
(by marking the option box provided in the BIR form) its intention, whether to
request for a refund or claim for an automatic tax credit for the succeeding taxable
year. To ease the administration of tax collection, these remedies are in the
alternative, and the choice of one precludes the other. In this case, PBCom opted for
an automatic tax credit hence it can no longer ask for a refund.
CHINA BANKING CORP. v. THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF HDMF (1999)
by Alimpolos
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
LIMITS ON RULE-MAKING POWER

SUMMARY: Under PD 1752, employers who have their own provident and/or employee housing
plans superior to that of the HDMF may apply for exemption from the coverage of the Fund. In
the rules issued by the HDMF Board pursuant to its rule-making powers under the law, in order to
be entitled to waiver/exemption, it required an employer to have both a retirement/provident
and a housing plan which both superior to that of the Fund. SC held that these issuances are
invalid insofar as they impose a more stringent condition not envisioned by the law. The words
and/or should be taken in its ordinary signification. The existence of either plan is sufficient; the
concurrence of both is more than sufficient.

DOCTRINE: While it may be conceded that the requirement of the concurrence of both plans to
qualify for exemption would strengthen the Home Development Mutual Fund and make it more
effective both as a savings generation and a house building program, the basic law should
prevail as the embodiment of the legislative purpose, and the rules and regulations issued to
implement said law cannot go beyond its terms and provisions.

FACTS:
1. Under Sec 19 of PD 1752*, employers who have their own existing provident
and/or employees-housing plans may register for certification for waiver or suspension
from coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
2. RA 7742, amending PD 1752 was approved (no change introduced to Sec 19).
3. HDMF Board (the Board) issued implementing rules (an amendment to the Rules
and Regulations Implementing RA 7742** and HDMF Circular No. 124-B or the Revised
Guidelines and Procedure for filing Application for Waiver of Suspension of Fund Coverage
under PD 1752***).
4. Under the implementing rules, a company must have a provident/retirement and
housing plan superior to that provided under the PAG-IBIG Fund to be entitled to
exemption/waiver from fund coverage.
5. CBC and CBC-PCCI are employers who applied for renewal of waiver coverage from
the fund but their applications were disapproved on the ground that (1) their retirement
plan is not superior to that of the Fund and (2) that, to qualify for waiver, a company must
have retirement/provident and housing plans both superior to that of the Fund.
6. CBC and CBC-PCCI filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC
seeking to annul and declare void the implementing rules alleging that, in requiring the
employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an employee housing plan in
order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage from the HDMF,
the Board exceeded its rule-making power.
7. RTC, upon the Boards motion, dismissed the petition on the grounds (1) that the
denial or grant of an application for waiver is within the power and authority of the Board
and (2) that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal.
8. CBC and CBC-PCCI filed this petition for review.

ISSUE
1. PROCEDURAL: WON certiorari is the proper remedy- YES
2. WON the Amendment and the Guidelines are valid- NO
RULING
1. (PROCEDURAL) Certiorari (not appeal) is the appropriate remedy to question
the validity of the challenged issuances of the HDMF which are alleged to have been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. CBC and CBC-PCCI
sought the annulment of the Amendment and Guidelines and not merely of the denial by
the Board of their applications for waiver/exemption.
2. The Amendment and Guidelines should be set aside insofar as they require that an
employer must have both a superior retirement/provident plan and a superior
employee housing plan to be entitled to exemption from the coverage of the fund.
a. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words and/or in
Sec 19 of PD 1752. The legal meaning of the words and/or should be taken in its
ordinary signification, i.e., either and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter and
eggs or butter or eggs.
b. Sec 19 of PD 1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or
an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from
the coverage. If the law had intended that the employer should have both in order
to qualify for exemption, it would have used the word and instead of and/or. The
existence of either plan is sufficient; the concurrence of both plans is more than
sufficient.
c. To require the existence of both would impose a more stringent
condition not envisioned by the law. The Board has exceeded its authority by
removing the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules.
d. While it may be conceded that the requirement of the concurrence of
both plans to qualify for exemption would strengthen the Home Development
Mutual Fund and make it more effective both as a savings generation and a house
building program, the basic law should prevail as the embodiment of the legislative
purpose, and the rules and regulations issued to implement said law cannot go
beyond its terms and provisions.

___________________________________________
*Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752: Existing Provident/Housing Plans. - An employer and/or
employee-group who, at the time this Decree becomes effective have their own provident
and/or employee-housing plans, may register with the Fund, for any of the following purposes:
(a) For annual certification of waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Fund,
xxx

**Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act 7742: RULE
VII. SECTION 1. Waiver or Suspension Because of Existing Provident/Retirement and Housing
Plan. Any employer with a plan providing both for a provident/retirement and housing benefits
for all his employees and existing as of December 14, 1980, the effectivity date of Presidential
Decree No. 1752, may apply with the Fund for waiver or suspension of coverage xxx The
provident/retirement and housing benefits as provided for under the plan must be superior to the
provident/retirement and housing benefits offered by the Fund.

***DMF Circular No. 124B entitled Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing
Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7742: ANY EMPLOYER WHO HAS A PROVIDENT, RETIREMENT,
GRATUITY OR PENSION PLAN AND A HOUSING PLAN, EXISTING AS OF DECEMBER 14, 1980, THE
EFFECTIVITY OF P.D. NO. 1752, may file an application for waiver or suspension from Fund
coverage xxx

Maxima Realty Management & Devt Corp. v Parkway Real Estate Devt Corp by Bernabe
FERNANDO, J.

SUMMARY: Parkway and Maxima entered into an agreement to buy and sell a condominium unit. Maxima was not able to
pay and thus Parkway cancelled the agreement. Maxima filed with HLURB a complaint for specific performance, HLURB
sustained the nullification; The Board of Commissioners of HLURB modified the decision but still sustained the nullification
of the Deed. The OP dismissed the appeal of Maxima for having been filed out of time. The Court held here that the
applicable reglementary period was 15 days which is stipulated in PDs 957 and 1344 and not the 30 day regelementary
period provided in the rules of procedure of the HLURB [f]or it is axiomatic that administrative rules derive their validity
from the statute that they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with [the] statute itself is null and
void.

FACTS
1. Parkway and Maxima entered into an agreement to buy and sell, on installment basis Unit #702 of Heart Tower
Condominium for 3 Million Pesos
2. Maxima defaulted but was granted several grace periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00, leaving a
balance of P1,820,000.00.
3. On May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the consent of Segovia (original owner), executed a Deed of Assignment
transferring all its rights in the condominium unit in favor of Maxima to enable Maxima to use the same as security for
P1,820,000.00 loan with RCBC, which amount will be used by Maxima to pay its obligation to Parkway.
4. On the other hand, Segovia and Maxima agreed to transfer title to the condominium unit directly in Maximas name
subject to the condition that the latter shall pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00, representing transfer fee, utility
expenses, association dues and miscellaneous charges
5. June 5, 1990, RCBC informed Parkway of the approval of Maximas P1,820,000.00 loan subject to the submission
of, among others, the Condominium Certificate of Title transferred in the name of Maxima and the Certificate of
Completion and turn over of unit
6. Maxima failed to pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00 for fees and charges. Thus, Segovia did not transfer the
title of the condominium unit to Maxima.
7. Since Parkway was not paid the balance of P1,820,000.00, it cancelled its agreement to buy and sell and Deed of
Assignment in favor of Maxima
8. May 2, 1991- Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), a complaint for specific performance to enforce the agreement to buy and sell Unit #702.
9. December 17, 1992 - the HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of the Deed of Assignment and ordered
Parkway to refund to Maxima the amount of P1,180,000.00.
10. Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB (Board)
a. During the pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay the balance of P1,820,000.00, which was accepted by
Parkway.
b. The Board then ordered Maxima to deliver said amount in the form of managers check to Parkway; and directed
Segovia to transfer title over the property to Maxima
c. Maxima failed to make good its offer, which compelled Parkway to file a Manifestation that the appeal be resolved
11. March 14, 1994 - the Board rendered judgment modifying the decision of the HLURB Arbiter by forfeiting in favor
of Parkway 50% of the total amount paid by Maxima and ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the amount of P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees. (receipt: April 19)
12. May 10, 1994 - Maxima appealed ]to the Office of the President which dismissed the appeal for having been filed
out of time
13. Maxima filed a petition for review with CA - affirmed in toto the Decision of the Office of the President.
14. Maxima filed a petition for review on certiorari w/ SC

ISSUE: WN petitioners appeal before the Office of the President filed within the reglementary period -NO

RATIO:
1. SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President:
a. it was settled that the period within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the
Office of the President is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to Section 15 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 (otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Decree) and Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1344.
b. the thirty (30) day period to appeal to the Office of the President from decisions of the Board as provided in Section 27
of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure is not applicable, because special laws providing for the remedy of appeal to the
Office of the Presidentmust prevail over the HLURB Rules of Procedure.
2. Ps relied on a literal reading of cited rules without correlating them to current laws as well as presidential decrees
on the matter.
a. Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure. Appeal to the Office of the President. Any party may, upon notice
to the Board and the other party, appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners or its division to the Office of the
President within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof pursuant to and in accordance with Administrative Order No. 18, of
the Office of the President dated February 12, 1987. Decision of the President shall be final subject only to review by the
Supreme Court on certiorari or on questions of law.
b. Administrative Order No. 18, reads: Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of
the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order
complained of or appealed from.
c. The thirty-day period is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicableThis is
in line with the rule in statutory construction that an administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not
contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law.
3. there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of fifteen (15) days within which to appeal a case to public
respondent.
a. First, Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 provides that the decisions of the National Housing Authority (NHA)
shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of the decision.
b. Second, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 states that decisions of the National Housing Authority shall
become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. The latter decree provides that
the decisions of NHA is appealable only to the Office of the President.
c. Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty (30) days set forth in Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no
longer holds true for being in conflict with the provisions of aforesaid presidential decrees. For it is axiomatic that
administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not
consistent with [the] statute itself is null and void.
4. In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994, the fifteenth day from receipt of the decision of the Board on
April 19, 1994 to appeal to the Office of the President. The appeal which was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearly beyond
the reglementary period.

BARTOLOME V. SSS by Clyde Tan

Velasco Jr., J.
Limits on Rule Making Power

DOCTRINE:
Rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law
as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because
any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.

FACTS:

1. During his employment as electrician in Scanmar Martitime Services, John Colcol was hit by steel plates
and died. Since John was childless and unmarried, his biological mother Bernardina P. Bartolome claimed death
benefits under PD 626 with the SSS.
2. Both the SSS and the Employees Compensation Commission, on appeal, denied her claim because
John ColCol was legally adopted by Cornelio ColCol, his great grandfather. They denied petitioners claim on the
ground that she is no longer the deceaseds legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by
the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the
status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
RULE:
LABOR CODE
ART. 167. Definition of terms. As used in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:

(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.

AMENDED RULES ON EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION BY ECC

RULE XV BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and
not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self -
support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.

ISSUES/HELD: W/N Bernardina P. Bartolome is entitled to the death benefits? YES (this issue is hinged the issue of w/n
the amended rules issued by ECC unduly restricted the term dependent parents in the Labor Code to legitimate
parents)

RATIO:
1. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation deviates from the clear
language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
2. Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to
refer to "legitimate parents."
3. As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or
expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations
must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
4. The term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code
is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the
ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate
and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly,
"dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of
support or assistance.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS by Manalo

Ynares-Santiago, J.
Publication and Effectivity

Summary: On December 29, 1992, the International Communications Corporation (now

Bayantel) filed an application with the NTC for a CPCN to install, operate and maintain a digital
Cellular MobileTelephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA).
However, ExpressTelecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC an Opposition praying for
the dismissal of Bayantels application. On May 3, 2000, the NTC issued an Order in favor of
Bayantel, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed
with the CA a petition seeking the annulment of the Order of the RTC, which was eventually
granted by the CA. The CA ruled the petition in favor of Extelcomm and dismissed the petition of
reapplication of Bayantel. Aggrieved, Bayantel brought the case to the SC. Extelcom contends
that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the NAR
on February 3, 1993.. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to the effect that
inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general
circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.

Doctrine: Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties.

Facts:
1. December 29, 1992, International Communications Corporation (now Bayantel) filed an
application with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of
Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular
Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA).
2. Jan 22, 1993 (24 days after): NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 4-1-93 directing all
interested applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file before the Commission on/or
before February 15, 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any application filed after said
date until further orders.
3. May 6, 1993: Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application.
4. Hearings were conducted but before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its
evidence, the NTC issued the December 19, 1993 Order
a. Archiving the application in view of the PAs granted to ISLACOM and GMCR which
resulted in closing of frequencies for CMTS
5. From 1998 to 1999, the NTC reallocated 10 MHz frequencies for CMTS service
6. Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case. NTC granted and hearings were
conducted.
7. Extelcom, filed an Opposition
a. Case was archived 8 years ago thus, the documentary evidence and the allegations
of Bayantel are all outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity
for the proposed CMTS service
b. There were enough service providers: Extelcom, Globe Telecom, Inc., Smart
Communication, Inc., Pilipino Telephone Corporation, and Isla Communication
Corporation, Inc.
c. No sufficient frequencies
d. Bayantel application undermines Extelcomm operations
8. March 9, 2000: NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 9-3-2000 re-allocating radio
frequencies to existing CMTS operators
9. NTC granted Bayantel application and gave PA
10. Extelcom filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition. CA granted.

Issue:
WON the NTC has the power to grant PA on its own initiative without Bayantel having to move for
its issuance. YES.

Ratio:
1. NTC has the sole authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN)
for the installation, operation, and maintenance of communications facilities and services,
radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph systems. Such power includes
the authority to determine the areas of operations of applicants for telecommunications
services.
2. In issuing the PA, the NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and
Procedure: Upon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or at any stage
thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief
prayed for,...
3. ExtelComm argues that NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with
the Office of the National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993.
a. SC rules otherwise as the same was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation
b. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February
3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which
implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that
gives the rules force and effect.
c. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition
sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect.
d. Executive Order No. 200: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
e. Tanada v Tuvera: Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The
only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or
those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning
the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
4. In any event, the records show that the amended application filed by Bayantel in fact
included a motion for the issuance of a provisional authority. The CA erred when it found
that the NTC issued its Order of May 3, 2000 on its own initiative.

Irrelevant to the topic:

1. The Court of Appeals also erred when it declared that the NTC's Order archiving Bayantel's
application was null and void.
a. archiving of cases is a widely accepted measure designed to shelve cases in which
no immediate action is expected but where no grounds exist for their outright
dismissal, albeit without prejudice
2. Contrary to CAs ruling, SC ruled that ExtelComm was accorded due process.
3. On the publication of Bayantels application:
a. The requirements of notice and publication of the application is no longer necessary
inasmuch as the application is a mere revival of an application which has already
been published earlier.
b. All of the 5 CMTS operators in the country were duly notified and were allowed to
raise their respective oppositions to Bayantel's application through the NTC's Order
dated February 1, 2000.