Ambil v.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 143398 (October 25, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern
Samar during the May 11, 1998 elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
petitioner as the duly elected Governor. Private respondent filed an election protest with the
COMELEC, which was assigned to the First Division.

Commissioner X prepared and signed a proposed resolution in the case. Commissioner Y

dissented, while Commissioner Z wanted to see both positions first before giving her
decision. On 2/15/00, Commissioner X retired and was replaced. On 2/24/00, petitioner and
respondent received a purported resolution in favor of private respondent promulgated on
2/14/00 and signed by Commissioners X, Y, and Z. The First Division later declared that the
parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. The Division later set a
date for promulgation of a resolution of the case, and said that the aggrieved party could then
challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a
certiorari case before the SC. The petitioner filed this case to annul the order for the
promulgation of the resolution and to direct the First Division to deliberate anew on the case.

HELD: The SC dismissed the case for prematurity. It ruled that it has no power to review via
certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections. The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in
certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In
truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc, whose final
decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.

The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner X as void for various reasons. First,
one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is
promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Second, the Clerk of the
1st Division denied the release or promulgation of the resolution on 2/14/00 resolution. Third, the
1st Division even later said that the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet
promulgated. Lastly, Commissioner Z could not have affixed her signature on the resolution,
since on the same date an order was issued where she said that she still wanted to see both
positions before making her decision
Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., GR.

In November 1972, Presidential Decree No. 51 was signed into law. PD 51 created a Civil
Service Unit (CSU) office in cities. Pursuant to said law, then Quezon City mayor Brigido
Simon appointed officers in the QC-CSU. Meanwhile, an ordinance in QC was passed
providing, among others, that the personnel of the CSU shall be automatically absorbed into
the QC Department of Public Order and Safety (QC-DPOS). During the term of the next
mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., it was determined that PD 51 never became a law because it
was never published. Mathay then did not renew the contracts of the QC-CSU personnel, at
the same time, they were not reappointed to the QC-DPOS. Mathay was then sued by the
QC-CSU personnel before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Eventually, the CSC
Commissioner ruled that based on the QC ordinance, Mathay should reinstate the CSU-
personnel to QC-DPOS.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CSC Commissioner is correct.

HELD: No. The ordinance is invalid for when it provided for automatic absorption of the QC-
CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS, it divested the mayor the power to choose as to who
should fill said office. Just like in the national government, the local sanggunian can only
create an office, it cannot choose the personnel who should fill such office that is a power
vested in the local chief executive (mayor). This is also clearly provided for in the Local
Government Code. The power to appoint is vested in the local chief executive. The power of
the city council or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited
to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions supported by local
funds. The city council has no power to appoint. Had Congress intended to grant the power
to appoint to both the city council and the local chief executive, it would have said so in no
uncertain terms.

On the other hand, the CSC Commissioner cannot order the mayor to reinstate the QC-
CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS. Such would be an encroachment of the mayors right to
choose as to who should be appointed. Further, the CSU never came into existence for it
has no legal basis to speak of. It created no right hence the QC-CSU cannot invoke any. It
is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by
virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.
 PNOC Energy Development
Corporation v.

201 SCRA 487 Business Organization Corporation Law Jurisdiction over GOCCs and
their subsidiaries in labor cases

In June 1985, Danilo Mercado was dismissed by PNOC-Energy Development Corporation

(PNOC-EDC) due to serious acts of dishonesty allegedly committed by Mercado. Mercado
then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PNOC-EDC. PNOC-EDC filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the Labor arbiter and/or the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) has no jurisdiction over PNOC-EDC because it is a subsidiary of the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), a government owned or controlled corporation,
and as a subsidiary, it is also a GOCC and as such, the proper forum for Mercados suit is
the Civil Service Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not PBOC-EDC is correct.

HELD: No. The issue in this case has been decided already in the case of PNOC-EDC vs
Leogardo. It is true that PNOC is a GOCC and that PNOC-EDC, being a subsidiary of
PNOC, is likewise a GOCC. It is also true that under the 1973 Constitution, all GOCCs are
under the jurisdiction of the CSC. However, the 1987 Constitution change all this as it now
provides:

The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. (Article IX-B, Section 2 [1]) [emphasis supplied]

Hence, the above provision sets the rule that the mere fact that a corporation is a GOCC
does not automatically place it under the CSC. Under this provision, the test in determining
whether a GOCC is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that
government corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those
incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage.

In the case at bar, PNOC-EDC, even though it is a GOCC, was incorporated under the
general Corporation Law it does not have its own charter, hence, it is under the jurisdiction
of the MOLE.

Even though the facts of this case occurred while the 1973 Constitution was still in force,
the provisions of the 1987 Constitution regarding the legal matters [procedural aspect] are
applicable because it is the law in force at the time of the decision.
Santiago vs. CSC

Facts: Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada appointed Santiago from Collector of Customs
I to Collector of Customs III. Respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the
Merit Systems Promotion Board against Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the
ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The Board decided to
revoke Santiago's appointment and directed that Jose be appointed in his stead. The Civil
Service Commission affirmed the Board Resolution. The Commission ruled that respondent
Jose has far better qualifications in terms of educational attainment, civil service eligibilities,
relevant seminars and training courses taken. It added that the Commission is empowered to
administer and enforce the merit system as mandated by the Constitution and to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service. Thus, Santiago
appealed.

Issue:

Should Santiago's promotional appointment be upheld?

Held:

Yes. There is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the Civil Service Law that persons
next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would
be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled
by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment."

One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher
vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule
neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing
authority to promote such person to the next higher position.
The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of
choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily
would impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that
among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative
of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment.

True, the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or

promotional, to positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the appointees do not
possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualification. However, "all the commission is
actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil
service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it
is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when
it acts on, or as the decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the
proper authorities. ...To be sure, it has no authority to revoke the said appointment simply
because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority."

There is no reason to disturb Santiago's promotional appointment. The minimum qualifications

and the standard of merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied as found by the appointing
authority. The latter has not been convincingly shown to have committed any grave abuse of
discretio

Aquino vs Civil Service Commission; [208 SCRA 240; GR 92403, April 22, 1992]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

(Public Officers, Appointments: Grounds for Protest, CSC)

Facts: Petitioner was designated as Officer-in-charge of the Division Supply Office by the DECS Regional Director in
view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I.
Two years thereafter, the Division Superintendent of City Schools issued a promotional appointment to private
respondent as Supply Officer I in the DECS division. The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her appointment
as permanent.

Petitioner filed a protest with DECS Secretary questioning the qualification and competence of private respondent for
the position of Supply Officer I.

Finding the petitioner better qualified than the respondent, the DECS Secretary in a decision sustained the protest
and revoked the appointment of private respondent, and petitioner was issued a permanent appointment as Supply
Officer by the DECS Regional Director. Said appointment was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV.

In an appeal to the CSC, public respondent CSC found the appeal meritorious, thus revoking the appointment of
petitioner and restoring private respondent to her position under her previously approved appointment.

In the case at bar, petitioner assailing the revocation of his appointment, invokes the rulings in previous jurisprudence
that the CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing
authority.

Issue: Whether or not appointment of the respondent can be revoked.

Held: No. It is well settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes position, he
acquires a legal, not merely equitable right, which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and
cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause and with
previous notice and hearing.

Said appointment cannot also be revoked on the ground that the protestant is more qualified than the first appointee.
The protest must be for a cause or predicated on those grounds provided for under Sect 19 (6) of the Civil Service
Law (PD 807), namely:

1) that the appointee is not qualified;

2) that the appointee is not the next in rank; and

3) in case of appointment transfer, reinstatement, or by original appointment, that the protestant is not satisfied with
the written special reasons or reason given by the appointing authority.

Note: for a cause means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for
removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may
deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of
removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of office and must be
restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public
#48 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. SALAS REYES
TOPIC: APPOINTMENT TO CIVIL SERVICE

DOCTRINE: The nature of the position, as may be ascertained by the court in case
of conflict, which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy-determining or highly technical.

FACTS:
1. Respondent Salas was appointed by PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security
Staff [ISS] member and assigned to the casino at Manila Pavilion Hotel.
2. His employment was terminated for loss of confidence after a covert
investigation of the Intelligence division of PAGCOR.
a. From affidavits of 2 customers of PAGCOR who were used as gunners
by the respondent, the latter was allegedly engaged in proxy betting.
b. 2 polygraph tests show corroborative and unfavorable results.
3. Salas submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman and the Board of Directors
of PAGCOR requesting for reinvestigation since he was not given an
opportunity to be heard. It was DENIED.
4. The appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board was denied on the
ground that as a confidential employee, respondent was not dismissed from
service but his term of office expired. CSC affirmed the decision of MSPB.
5. CA- Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he may not be dismissed on
the ground of loss of confidence.
a. CA applied proximity rule
b. Sec. 16 of PD 1869 has been superseded and repealed by Section 2(1),
Article IX-B of the Constitution.

ISSUE/S: WON respondent Salas is a confidential employee. NO.

RATIO:
1. The power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical as defined therein has subsequently been codified and
incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the
Administrative Code of 1987.
a. Serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section
16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. Such classification is not absolute
and all encompassing.
2. Two recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily
confidential:
a. When the President, upon recommendation of the CSC, has declared
the position to be primarily confidential;
 b. In the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions
of the office there exists close intimacy between the appointee and
the appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom of misgivings of betrayals of personal trust
or confidential matters of state.
3. It would seem that the case falls under the first category by virtue of Sec. 16
of PD 1869, but the second category shows otherwise.
4. Since the enactment of Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the
position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy determining, or highly technical. Executive pronouncements [like PD
1869] are merely initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of
conflict.

Piero doctrine -- notwithstanding any statutory classification to the contrary, it is

still the nature of the position, as may be ascertained by the court in case of
conflict, which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical -- is still controlling with the advent of the 1987
Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987, Book V of which deals specifically
with the Civil Service

YENKO AND MAYOR ESTRADA V. GUNGON, GR NO. 165450, August 13, 2009

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of
the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51093 dated September 28,
2004, reinstating Raul Nestor C. Gungon to his former position as Local Assessment Operations
Officer III in the Assessors Office of the Municipal Government of San Juan, Metro Manila,
without loss of seniority rights, at the discretion of the appointing authority and subject to Civil
Service law, rules and regulations; and ordering the payment to Gungon of back salaries
equivalent to five years from the date he was dropped from the rolls.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent's reassignment was a violation of his constutuional right for
security of tenure?
2. Whether or not respondent was validly dismissed.

HELD:
1. Yes. Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees
security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees
removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are
tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
Since Gungons reassignment order was void ab initio, his alleged failure to report for duty at
the POSO, where he was reassigned, had no legal basis. Gungon could not have incurred
absences in the POSO, because his reassignment was void. Thus, the cause of his separation
from the service, which was unauthorized absences from the post where he was reassigned,
was not a valid cause for dismissing him from the service. It is undisputed that Gungon
reported at the Municipal Assessors Office after his leave of absence, instead of the POSO.
Under the circumstances, Gungon is considered to have been illegally dismissed from the
service and entitled to reinstatement.

2. No. In this case, Gungon was not validly dismissed from the service. His reassignment to the
POSO, which involved a reduction in rank and status, was void for being violative of Executive
Order No. 292 and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Hence, Gungon could not
have incurred absences in the office where he was reassigned since the reassignment was
void. Consequently, his dismissal for unauthorized absences in the office where he was
reassigned was not valid.

RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner, vs. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.

G.R. No. 92008. July 30, 1990. En Banc

FACTS:
A memorandum designating Ramon Binamira as General Manager of Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA) was addressed and signed by the then Minister of Tourism and the Ex-officio
Chairman of PTA. The Minister sought the approval of the delegation to the president and the
same was granted. Concomitantly, Binamira assumed office as general manager on the same date
that the memorandum was sent.
Allegedly, Binamira discharged duties as the PTA general manager and ex-officio vice
chairman. Said discharged is even purported to have been acknowledge by the president.
However, after sometime, Peter Garrucho, as the newly appointed secretary of tourism
demanded for Binamira's resignation which was pursuant to a memorandum that then Pres.
Aquino sent to the former advising him of the invalidity of the delegation of the position to
Binamira as he was not appointed by the president which was what was required under PD 564.
PD 564 is the law that created the Ministry of Tourism. Under section 23-A of the decree, the
General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term
of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause.
 When Binamira was ousted, Garrucho took over his place as general manager, still in
pursuance with the memorandum sent by Pres. Aquino.
On account of the foregoing events, Binamira filed a petition for quo warranto question
Garrucho's post and prayed for reinstatement claiming unjust dismissal. Pending said case, he
filed a supplemental petition impleading Jose Capistrano who was the appointed general
manager.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Binamira is proper and thus does not warrant his
recall.

HELD:
Distinction between appointment and designation should be outlined; such that:
Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official - as where, in the case before us,
the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.
Also, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment,
which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot
sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly
provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall
be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the
exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was
not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the
President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or
ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this
case to be a member of the Cabinet.
Moreover, the argument that the designation made by Minister Gonzales was approved
by President Aquino through her approval of the composition of the Board of Directors of the
PTA is not persuasive. It must be remembered that Binamira was included therein as Vice-
Chairman only because of his designation as PTA General Manager by Minister Gonzales. Such
designation being merely provisional, it could be recalled at will, as in fact it was recalled by the
President herself, through the memorandum she addressed to Secretary Garrucho on January 4,
1990.
Furthermore, designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative,
he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it
could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment
that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason). In
either case, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must be rejected.