B.M. No.

712 March 19, 1997 After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
RESOLUTION In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral
fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties
PADILLA, J.: and public service.
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation temerarious and uncalculating.
rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer
homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation. lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation. be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order
of his discharge from probation.
SO ORDERED.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by
among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise
submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, [G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000]
through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of Branch 12,
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that: Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents.
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather
than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the RESOLUTION
neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only
out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on PARDO, J.:
Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident. On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision in
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of
who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the
demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death. Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent
matter to the sound discretion of the Court. Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers
which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable. This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in the residence
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No.
uncalled for. 4262,[1] the latter accepted cases and continued practicing law.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion seeking
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's del Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never
child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a
cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be issued?" [2]
parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy
and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness. In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal Cases
Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent
Javellana in the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion seeking to clarify
whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for clarification filed by the State
Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is
deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private
respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his official capacity
as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the
personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the
same undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial courts order dated
August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial
Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice
his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial courts order was clear that
private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition
to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private
respondent would appear in court to defend himself. HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the
law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense.[3] He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court
to be released on bail or on recognizance. [4] Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all
the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10) years, the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said
criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of
Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise,
except upon prior written permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San Jose, Antique
and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title, filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25,
against what he therein asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme Court. He indicts SC, in
his own phrase, as a tribual peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. His clients he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Courts unjust judgment, has become one of the sacrificial victims before
the altar of hypocrisy.
He ridicules the members of the Court, saying that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb. He then vows to argue the cause of his client in the peoples forum,
so that people may know of the silent injustices committed by this court and that whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed must never be repeated. He ends his petition with a prayer that:
a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice
of the noblest profession.
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was
counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive
acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and
plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For lack
of proof of service, the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his
first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however,
was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier,
that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty
to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended
from the practice of law until further orders.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In
L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one
of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice,
he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum,"
so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs
and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the
noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967,
the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme
Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present
members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit"
or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who
ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In
connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that
the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, 1 in which
Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client.
On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its
reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For
"lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of
his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which
he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn
by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22,
1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and
appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the
appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice
of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of
time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same
time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,"
citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the
applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of
the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8,
1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied
upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest
case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning
the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal,
based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was
much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was
June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme
Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision
in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio
presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of
which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no
authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied
the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the
second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its
individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have
actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So
he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court
could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R.
No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967
resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court
on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons
and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court
resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such
request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer
questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He
also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him
the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty.
Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and
innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge,
you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be
measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and
yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy
brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam
in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and
then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for
this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the
underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member
of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with
NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of
justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various
pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from
this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of
the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our
particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to
its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be
before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a
marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court
has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in
the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client
and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence
and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his
Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be
prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's
famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say,
"O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are
committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct
such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in
the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word
was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only
describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has
been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this
Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms 2 expressed
against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to
state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought.
For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously
marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most
petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do exhibit a
first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due
course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable
to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions
whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is
the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons
may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons
for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge
its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within
the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases,
respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260,
1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be
feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be
required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular
time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through
the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel
urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we
held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They
merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule
46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right,
but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its heavy
docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review
are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the
benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be
moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of
Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor.
The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by
the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of
the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law
and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no
need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known
that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a
copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of
hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu
Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4
and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing
and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according
to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such
notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of
paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42
Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of
Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of
hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any
period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame.
His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift
away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he
assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying
this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no
justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is
natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious
case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts'
rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is
especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6 because then the court's actuations are
thrown open to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize
and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions
before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with
"imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on
those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members
of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and
fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the
court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings
and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of
appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines ( Hill v.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have
the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant
attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am.
Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the
character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other
class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best
position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound
silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity
... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
 ... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and
laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein
up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it
may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline
and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal
appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And
he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's
decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of
right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course
of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of
justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in
office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct
of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the
application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide
comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not
aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the
likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous
accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a
prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also
DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer,
had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the
court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney
who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office
to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the
bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends
to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations
against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W.
212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep.
637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an
attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a
nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made
by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are
permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the
principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that
the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness
of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been
granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter
and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the
libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such
drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said
that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the
attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper
authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should
have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to
bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot
be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him
in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the
write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with
the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and
greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any
of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered
suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
 A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against
whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen.
The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination,
are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends
the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech.
We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an
affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said,
constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and
withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered
grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the
motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on
the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt
or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it
is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial
officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or
would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties
devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or
the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced
for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official
duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends
to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of
justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to
protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional
misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it
might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing
here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged
criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives
and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a
lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good
fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he
impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a
sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days,
saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public
good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as
well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance
under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment
that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial
capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But
such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly
and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if
administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly
misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the
bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a
polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the
filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its
duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the
protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such
conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action
using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates,"
"colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be
allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief
Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants.
The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his
plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or
umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning
to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the
state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law
School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the
court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which
shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every
right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as
follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the
Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of
insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a
communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case
would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not
and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with
due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law;
and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the
judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the
accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of
a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to
which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be
enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary,
willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the
judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And
there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an
assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause
by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere.
Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or
spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority.
It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully
sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that
one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of
the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the
court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his
passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect
to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the
evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly
man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An
attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining
of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held
in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that
the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in
which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The
result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which
has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted
by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and
with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may
feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will
be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as
the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge,
which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which
referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been
one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully
failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath
as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of
this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State,
22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3
Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa.
270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it
our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to
others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter
in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for
two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge,
but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court
in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for
courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of
years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an
intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable:
Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether
amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and
thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly
constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as
those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under
the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different
end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
"absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees
the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very
shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the
laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power
and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item
carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High
Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far
cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced
that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his
invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was
then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress,
of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of
Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case,
who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many
blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that
the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the
decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court,
and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme
Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon,
and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court
and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their
own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an
officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct
and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra , where counsel
charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous"
pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of
counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this
Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into
question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of
the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly
adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this
Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed
error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one
which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this
Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and some former members of this
Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
18
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases which, in the interest of brevity, need not now
be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious statements
made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt
may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending
case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge
by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court
had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this
was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs.
Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice
Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to
be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical
manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this
was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still
be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily
punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public
confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise
criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of
contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of
the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt,
the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to
bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt
where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by
the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as
what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if
public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under
consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable
for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation
utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have
confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn
duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent
in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case
in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others,
to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to
discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership
in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power
in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny
its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients
is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot
be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is
vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude
them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court
which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to
withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and
disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his
functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior
and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power.
It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not
the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox
though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In
haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court.
The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and
disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to
pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused
the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no
apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The
vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate
criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to
himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in
them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less
than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons
of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is
thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a
viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent
and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is
by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only
through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must
be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen
would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in
this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand
but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a
body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only
as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real
sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof
as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave
hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons
to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just
as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the
members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases
which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one
entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his
transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be
scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the
end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence
of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology
therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to
decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us
discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we
have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension,
which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of
this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how
short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that
he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from
the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for
their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act
to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to
have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its
title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact
that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in
force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the
law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying
admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972,
popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order
that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must
have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule
127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held
since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70
per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling
conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who
obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in
1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying
with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, although as has been already
shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows: administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN constitutional.
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE. We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies
assembled: of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M.
of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty- Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya,
one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy- Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly
two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American
nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal,
bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as
take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
included as part of the next whole number. insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students
or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take. reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. liberation.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval. Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading
provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly
of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted
filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals
detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that
realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth: there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private
as follows: enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
1946 (August) 206 121 18 published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law
books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of
1946 (November) 477 228 43 Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new
1947 749 340 0 volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
1948 899 409 11 The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of
1949 1,218 532 164 the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from the
jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been
1950 1,316 893 26 directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which
1951 2,068 879 196 we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century?
From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been
1952 2,738 1,033 426 sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon
1953 2,555 968 284 (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of
Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168 which the postponement of the contested law respects.
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration. immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These law.
candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable
them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the
marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972. Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the
petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
 They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any elective
office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not
exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good
moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to
admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the
judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the
judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted
was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in
this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory
clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of
their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the
word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that
to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and
of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to
admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a
diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal
qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote
the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of
the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established
reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a
certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by
the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as
rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary
and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere
purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have
had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that
the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and
the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as
to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of
which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-
existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order
to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply
prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note
only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be
admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission
of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by
this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial,
and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be
revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and
conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which
the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed.
From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking
people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the
power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly
committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act
purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far
as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose of
legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate
branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to
its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective
functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which
we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p.
445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice is
maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty
to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it
immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial
department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts.
The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An
unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts
themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English
speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had
exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter
of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts
and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is
a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is
either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the
court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but
made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along
with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no
express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the
framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by
prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making
the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the
absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public
interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that
public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the
class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the
ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary
 by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts
to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p.
450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the
legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However,
the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial
function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of
the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex
parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan,
48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep.
1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having
been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the
court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely
judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that
State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of
the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important,
also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing
mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162
N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted
to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever
justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department
of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys
under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is
almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other
proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a
decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in
this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L.
Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively
with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and
for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue
of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be
unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private
character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of
the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which
they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the
possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the
court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to
appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere
ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held
by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22
N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose
duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with
propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as
engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial
function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also
been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172
Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court.
A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature
respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of
the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of
the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to
transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the
distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial
decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the
government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the
law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments,
compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps
shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not
a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may
be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case
with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this
Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning
the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to
reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter
and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the
exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit,
suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its
power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need
for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to
admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the
respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture,
training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient
administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as
the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is
desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is
realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took examination and failed by a few points to
obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal
may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guaria and he
discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the
bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for
the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby
amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of
Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this
act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice
of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land
Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant
Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the
Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact
to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received
an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus
falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our
duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in
the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for
admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be
admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the
Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain
in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and
especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which
specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No.
136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of
Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed,
by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of
Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid
and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular
emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute
have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe
that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had
been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial
fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when
he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to
the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the
Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary
grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the
responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such
marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to
the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597
in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory
evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon
his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the
ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court,
and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of
being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year,
to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had
studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office
and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools
issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is
made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys
and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in
the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a
license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the
time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be
granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". In re Day et al, 54
N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this
court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law
school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and
requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the
student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a
law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining
board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by
virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts
and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be
received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could
only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice
law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon
him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring
such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different
one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35
N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for
classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided
and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an
enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes
 to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must
have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first,
to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two
classes First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899;
and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law
school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the
present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between
the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school,
but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-
sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting
upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who
began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who
began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would complete two years before the time
limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed
course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural
reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole
purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to
reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of
the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field
in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession
he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of
livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or,
as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is, the right to continue their prosecution is
often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or
personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the
practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his
proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously
considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the
enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle.
State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101
Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute
him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once
established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other
qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select
from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the
practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States
during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or
thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's
Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act."
This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution
of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon
material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based
upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be
founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore,
any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some
reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation
and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members
of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for
the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on
that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general
average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and
those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average
of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is
fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were not
included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify
the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither
is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has
no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his
right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is
curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949
were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general
average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or
more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was
considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed
to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be objected
to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done cancel the license that was issued to those who did
not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly,
it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per
cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is
the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the
effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general
average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said
law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or
judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter
or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not
included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this
system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate
finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations
of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the
article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates
and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire
law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress
to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms
that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore,
void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who,
it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years.
It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they
are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to
reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates,
without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may
reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In November, 1946
attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was
admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall Number of candidates 481
consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19
essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court (72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing Minutes of March 31, 1947)
rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which Number of candidates who passed 249
are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The Number of candidates who failed 228
pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43
being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void. Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said
part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force. Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80
Passing grade (per cent) 72
(By resolution of the Court).
RESOLUTION October, 1947
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the
contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio
hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty.
decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same: Number of candidates 749
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of
article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect. Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to 70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1
the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with
section 10, article VII of the Constitution. 69 per cent 40
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 68 per cent 2
inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per
cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they Number of candidates who passed 409
have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and Number of candidates who failed 340
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set.
So ordered. Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur. Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59

ANNEX I Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 Passing grade (per cent) 69
A resume of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
(by resolution of the Court).
August, 19461 Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at all by the bonus of 12
Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.
Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members. August, 1948
Number of candidates 206 Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12 Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G.
Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
73'S 6
Number of candidates 899
72'S 6
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64
Number of candidates who passed 85
71's 29
Number of candidates who failed 121
70's 35
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
Number of candidates who passed 490
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
Number of candidates who failed 409
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11
Passing grade (per cent) 72
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60 Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon.
Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Passing grade (per cent) 70
Number of candidates 2,738
(by resolution of the Court).
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 163
August, 1949
Number of candidates who passed 1,705
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor,
Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Number of candidates who failed 1,033
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426
Number of candidates 1,218
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 55
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73
Number of candidates who passed 686
Passing grade (per cent) 75
Number of candidates who failed 532
August, 1953
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique
Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28 Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix,
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72
Number of candidates 2,555
Passing grade (per cent) 74
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 100
(by resolution of the Court).
Number of candidates who passed 1,570
August, 1950
Number of candidates who failed 986
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique
Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284
Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04
Number of candidates 1,316
Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38
Passing grade (per cent) 75
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority he Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado). As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar examination
Number of candidates who passed 432 of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the
prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused
Number of candidates who failed 894 the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12,
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the
profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately
Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14 concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86 SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
Passing grade (per cent) 75 subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights: Civil
August, 1951 Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law,
10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful
Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a
Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members. rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general
Number of candidates 2,068 average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general
average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 112 subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
Number of candidates who passed 1,189 SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any applicant who has obtained a general average
of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of
Number of candidates who failed 879 July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196 and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49 It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even
Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51 those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other government examination.
The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any
Passing grade (per cent) 75 subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
August, 1952 Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this
Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:
 The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar
candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need not
be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the
installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that
although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination
prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the
last required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs
subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only
those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there
is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in
succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening between
each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the Court in
admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed
that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in
bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal
service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have obtained
a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year later, and the last two
subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing
general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires
one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of
law.
xxx xxx xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any
application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per
cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their
non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in
any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its
effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in favor of
reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to the
validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the
fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the
effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general
passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of
the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court
remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the
basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the
sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the courts,
including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly
regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied
admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70
per cent but less than that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly
considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The
present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to all
these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a candidate not
accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and
unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer.
We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal
profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a
special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find
serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall
be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class
legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in
accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme Court
passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing
general average but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The
provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said
provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as medicine,
engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each
House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It
reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING
1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate
who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August
1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations;
73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average
shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any
exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after
July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to those
who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would
otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74
in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties
concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per
cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the
candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard
75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the
Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of
the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the
preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not
improved from those years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well
as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to the
practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered the bill a class legislation.
This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing
what the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing
mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be
enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established
precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which
they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been altered,
constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or
 vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect,
was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which
Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against class legislation, is
very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common disability,
attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between those
included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it
cannot be again split and then have the dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules
established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for
by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must
apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as
the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there
are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain
the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of
discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In
Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the care of
correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent
in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked the
comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with
respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on
Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned
dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it
became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No.
974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill
were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect
Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question
sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of
Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a
Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in
the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in
Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1
September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must
submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election
Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing
that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May
1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his
oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof
of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine
citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be
so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option
to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG
adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by
election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must
concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the
person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age
of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But
in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he
does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to
the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing
rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school
records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino
citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth
Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a
notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to ( sic) the Civil
Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he
has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by
election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution
when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was
subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under
Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election
of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21)
years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship
was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to
the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3)
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional
provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of
age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had
reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon
reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when
he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he
had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances
invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal
election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent
portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare
was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was
about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference
for Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different
from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and
procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship
would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out
by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was
already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino,
and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May
12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-
5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is
a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here
in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting
during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar
nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien .
Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in
this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an
absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special
circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief
that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the
recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he
delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit
of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden
privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission
to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas
free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume
his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission
to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of
the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident
of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that
no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship,
in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the
lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both
a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. 3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the
rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise
of his professional privilege. 4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the
bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines. 5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and
other qualifications; 7 passing the bar examinations; 8 taking the lawyers oath 9 and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing requirement. This
means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the
annual professional tax; 12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the
loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a
privilege denied to foreigners. 16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]. 17 Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in
the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice. 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and
as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake
his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been
rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), CotabatoCity,
namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for
Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly
uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people.Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary
to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an
indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
 Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from
a single incident and involving the same parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and
adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word
Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure
against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations
are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge
nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these
cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which
constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty
of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware
that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney whoever may have typed the
letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications
as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the
unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. [6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the
Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing
the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as
a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character.[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of,
any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the
declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court
in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of
the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the
Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title Attorney by
members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in
connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law
before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.[12]
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of
administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the
lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and
integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
 In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar
examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit
and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron
S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine
Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys
as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar
examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor
General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be
erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he
(Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department
of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which
contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that
although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to
civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that
effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second
charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his
A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a
graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had
his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it
in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our
Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he
had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations,
he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been
obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed
courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is
required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
G.R. No. 000 July 18, 1975
IN RE: PEDRO A. AMPARO (1974 Bar Candidate), petitioner,
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Pedro A. Amparo of Guindulman, Bohol filed a petition to take the 1974 Bar examinations. This petition was granted.
In the afternoon of December 1, 1974 he was at his assigned seat no. 17, room 401, fourth floor, Manuel L. Quezon
University Building on R. Hidalgo, Manila. The Bar examination that afternoon was in Criminal Law.
While the examination was in progress, the headwatcher in room 401, Lilian Mendigorin, reported that examinee
Amparo was found reading, at approximately 3:15 o'clock, a piece of paper containing notes in Criminal Law. He at first
refused to surrender the paper, but later gave it to Mendigorin when she threatened to report the matter to the
authorities. A verbal report was relayed to the Bar Chairman who forthwith gave instructions that no investigation be
then made in order to forestall any commotion that might disturb the other candidates. Amparo was permitted to
continue answering the questions. Headwatcher Mendigorin thereafter submitted a special report on the incident.
On the following day, Clerk of Court Romeo Mendoza filed a formal report. Acting thereon, the Court en banc, on
December 3, 1974, unanimously resolved "to disqualify Pedro Amparo from taking the Bar examinations still to be
given, namely, in the subjects of Remedial Law and Labor and Social Legislation, on Sunday, December 8, 1974,
without prejudice to allowing him to take the Bar examinations after this year."
In a letter dated December 5, 1974, Amparo requested that "before final action is or becomes effective" he "be given a
chance to explain" his side. On December 5, 1974 the Court reconsidered its prior resolution and allowed Amparo to
take the Bar examinations on the coming Sunday, December 8, 1974, without prejudice to further action by the Court
after a formal and more detailed investigation of the incident.
As ordered, the Clerk of Court conducted an investigation on December 9, 1974 at which the respondent Amparo (a)
appeared in his own behalf, (b) cross-examined the witnesses against him.(c) presented himself as his own witness,
and (d) presented as his witnesses three Bar candidates who in the afternoon of December 1 were seated near him in
the examination room.
At the investigation, headwatcher Mendigorin identified Amparo as the Bar examinee whom she saw reading a piece of
paper inside the examination room in the course of the examination in Criminal Law. The piece of paper, later marked
as exhibit C, contains handwritten notes, on both sides, on the durations of penalties and a formula of computing them,
particularly reclusion temporal. Mendigorin testified that she approached Amparo and asked for the piece of paper; that
he refused and put the paper in his pocket; that when she approached him a second time, he fished the paper from his
pocket and gave it to her; that when, at the end of the examination period, Amparo submitted his examination
notebook, he told her that he really had intended to cheat. On cross-examination, she elaborated that Amparo gave the
piece of paper only when she told him that she would bring the matter up to higher authority.
Vernon B. Vasquez, a watcher under headwatcher Mendigorin, corroborated the latter's testimony. He declared that
from a distance of five meters, he saw Amparo reading a piece of paper on his lap; that he wanted to approach him but
his headwatcher was already ahead of him; and that Amparo thereupon placed the paper in his pocket, but when
Mendigorin threatened to report the matter, Amparo yielded exhibit C with a smile.
In his testimony, Amparo admitted having in his possession, in the course of the examination, the piece of paper, exhibit
C, explaining that because he was perspiring, he took his handkerchief from his pocket, and out also came the piece of
paper which fell to the floor; that the notes were not in his handwriting as they were given by a friend, and that it was by
accident that he picked up the paper to find out what it was, as he had forgotten about it, but had no intention to use it;
that while he was reading it, the headwatcher saw him and demanded it from him, but he refused because he thought
that he might need it for "future reference," but when the headwatcher insisted as otherwise she would report the matter
to her supervisor, Amparo surrendered the paper. On cross-examination, he declared that exhibit C had been in his
pocket a long time before December 1; that he had not changed his pants for three weeks; that when the first bell rang
for the examination in Criminal Law, he was required to put "all his things" out of the room; that he forgot about the
paper inside his pocket; that when he took out his handkerchief to wipe his perspiration, the paper fell to the floor, and
he wondered what it was and then recalled upon reading it that it had been given by a friend; and that as he was
reading it, "that diligent headwatcher came and asked for that paper." He further admitted that he knew it is contrary to
the rules to bring notes and books inside the examination room.
Bar candidates Jovencio Fajilan, Norman M. Balagtas and Apolinario O. Calix, Sr., who were seated near Amparo in
room 401, were presented by the respondent as his witnesses, but all of them professed lack of knowledge about the
incident as they were engrossed in answering the examination questions.
It is clear that Amparo, in the course of the examination in Criminal Law, had possession of the piece of paper
containing notes on the durations of penalties and that he knew that it is contrary to the rules to bring notes and books
inside the examination room. It thus results that he knowingly violated Section 10, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
pertinently provides that "Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination
rooms."
Amparo's impression that the notes had no "material use" to him is correct, in the sense that they bore no reference to
any question asked in the examination in Criminal Law; even so he committed an overt act indicative of an attempt to
cheat by reading the notes, His refusal to surrender the paper containing the notes when first demanded; his eventual
surrender of it only after he was informed that he would be reported; and the facts that the notes pertained to Criminal
Law and the examination then in Criminal Law all these override and rebut his explanation that he merely read the
notes to find out what they were as he had forgotten about them.
We find the respondent Amparo guilty of (1) bringing notes into the examination room and (2) attempted cheating.
According to the official report of the Bar Confidant, approved by the Court, Amparo did not pass the 1974 Bar
examinations.
ACCORDINGLY, it is the sense of the Court that Pedro A. Amparo should be as he is hereby disqualified from taking
the Bar examinations for the year 1975.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., and Martin,
JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL
MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo,
Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during the
1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of
his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar
Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The
starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or
another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed,
according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D.
Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to the release of the results.
Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If
the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so
now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not
one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered
'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these
matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I,
rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that
the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and
Remedial Law of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however,
were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that
the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in
the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by
virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and
the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-
checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the
authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution
dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name
should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation
of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not
obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him
"to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm.
Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten
(10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo,
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-
41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was
required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,)
rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-
checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee
Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who
was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law
to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.
was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a
respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent
re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another
successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-
evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from
4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a
student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same
university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent
Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case.
(Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is
required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973.
Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo
submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to
be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony,
submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers
earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation
conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or
re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C.
Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination
notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in
bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and
if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one
in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of
grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so,
I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon
verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same
standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades
of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with
8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following
additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to
make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence,
Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the
identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the
identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to
do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that
with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I
have always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the
rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same;
that I have no alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to
me as reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not
bother any more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of
the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear
that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and
as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I
was not the one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International
Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two
hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my
record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a
Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with
him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he
requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the
said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall
correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had
submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same
was still within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar
Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661
had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a
particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was
humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the
same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used
throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an
increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not
been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and
the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized
grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;
emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted
and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered
661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of
the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him
personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had
repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so
assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity
revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the
regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and
the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much
as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my
residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me
that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in
the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions,
which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the
same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted
the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I
committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it
entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December
31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I
recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of
the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code
numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of
66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to
make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other
subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject
would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first
meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the
motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the
present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my
residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and
was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought
back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised
a few points to 75%then he would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember
correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the
mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in
good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total
stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal.
 He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and
submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the
said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade
that I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his
general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were
reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall,
Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed
himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I
would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my
discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a
request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded
tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-
evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items,
and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had
totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few
points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement,
adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the
examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good
faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the
Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein
respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not
having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every
right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar
Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook.
Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it
was only in that particular subject that the said examine failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher
grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should
also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from
9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations
were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of
this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing
a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar
candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17,
1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the
examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in
direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners
Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make
a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation
that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting
on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This
led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the
basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-
checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the
examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their
notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their professors.
Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right
now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the
Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because
the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those
notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that
the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the
trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned;
that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he
does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having
brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law.
As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the
grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is
one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as
would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the
examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the
notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all
good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and
marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was
circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February,
1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of
buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I
think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that
comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment,
the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical
contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post
 standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme
Court building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-
eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the
number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to
which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the
number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a
ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then
bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number became
doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket
number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try
somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever
possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of
examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end
with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-
Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo;
1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of
the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971
Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as
Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in
my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a
result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941.
While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From
then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me
having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On
February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of honorable
discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we
begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed
my work which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus
checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954".
As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me
to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing
and language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby,
believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-
evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the respective
examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and
judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases
which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee
agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and
the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the
original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-
Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15%
with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out
that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in
Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the
original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-
Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the
same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject
or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only
Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the
Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved
to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19,
or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and
that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the
outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In
his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because
he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks,
checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973,
he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never
met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers
necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases;
after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a
situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met
only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt
to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5,
1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which
are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor,
had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution,
which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent,
these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar
Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards the
paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of
Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and,
therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of
Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of
Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To
assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of the
Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of
their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the
narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy
of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or
answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar
Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of
their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and
prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving
separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the
Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,
who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day,
respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting
examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in
one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-
evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is
on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a
passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really
the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing
so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular
notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This
examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the
examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such
revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to
the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in
Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested
respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and
representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial
Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo
to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent
Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as
follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and
ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of
papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely
within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the
authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the
examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular
subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made
by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as
earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2-
Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing
marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International
Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number
1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns
the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and
that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the
bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible the respondent Bar Confidant
informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject
respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was
increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the
grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged
to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade,
because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent
Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the
correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination
notebooks in his assigned subject Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed
the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to
75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the
justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz
raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general
list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is
954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter
approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate
had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is
applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of
the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the
same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his
failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in
Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where
an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook .
Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent
Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the
meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made
known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo
then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The
matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in his
subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p.
33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated
by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to
the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with
Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to
obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a
Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo,
this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee.
respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if
possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with
respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine
concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number.
It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-
30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-
evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of
Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or
less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing
average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took
his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto
steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees. Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration
the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the
Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the
Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he
in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to
do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and
1162, pp. 35-37, rec.). cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the
solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who
even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the
such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy. Court.
We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian whose declarations on the Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and
matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact
as corroborate each other. that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could
extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good
Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than
confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by
and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the
Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the
in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of
the Philippine Bar. grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well- His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the
calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of
examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away.
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the
his general average was only 66.25% which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one
the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter shown.
referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first
Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47.
before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows: rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
BAI consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it
1. Political Law Public was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts. months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing
or 30 weighted points that it was just an after-thought.
BAI B
Labor Laws and Social REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE
Legislations 67% 67% = no re- OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK
evaluation made. IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
or 33 weighted points. Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law
Taxation 74% 74% = no re- and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
evaluation made. The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts. referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to
or 30 weighted points. the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
22 weighted points. disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) = the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the
11 pts. or 44 weighted points. Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was
Legal Ethics and Practical made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and
Exercises 81% 81% = no re- record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him,
evaluation made. he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar
results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15% Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74,
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law
weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.).
According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was
changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law,
Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the
Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence. It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral,
Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in
Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the
the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated
aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the
was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of
said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.
Galang. III
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that A
there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of
answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him. Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves
failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or
1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.). principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial
said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows: Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
Labor Laws 3% In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the
Taxation 69% Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with
Mercantile Law 68% one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand,
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows: and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk
BA of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27 examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be
weighted points subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and
Civil Law 75% 75% = " circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
Taxation 69% 69% = " The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects,
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = " as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious
Criminal Law 78% 78% = " breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that
Remedial Law 85% 85% = " enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = " Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is
not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5% whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.) connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are: B
Political Law 70% Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character
Taxation 72% requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows: Bar must be ... of good moral
BA character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to
Labor Laws 75% 75% = " 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
Civil Law 89% 89% = " testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before
Taxation 72% 72% = " the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9 ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the
weighted points supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more
Remedial Law 88% 88% = " compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year
1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant
but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by
respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of
good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court
can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's
criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could
not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or
applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and
1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided
by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused
of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the
application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases
whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that
"he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for
or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him"
(Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court
his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and
thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967,
1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from
the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966,
1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court.
By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been
charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled
(see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the
board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission,
information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon
the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for
admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge
would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709
710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the
license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.'
In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters
tending to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which
he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of
his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as
were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165
NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised
by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that
case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his
continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack
of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of
the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his
name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of
his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar
examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the
surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re
Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the
criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable
as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him
to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any
precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar
candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses
relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court
striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators
contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of
good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs.
Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil.
42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were
falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon
Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in
question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that
they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned
the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records
clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the
re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the
respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should have
been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the
Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the
respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades
and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was
really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been
avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of
respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with
the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it
would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one
paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something,
I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I
agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure . ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also
allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he
told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-
evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar
examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before
to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with
me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient
as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the
answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did
was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo,
Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the
examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence
of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p.
33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17,
 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh.
A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so,
I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to
do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully
evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid
down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given
the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant
that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84%
in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to
make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was
impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-
evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted
in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not
warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE
are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar
is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so are
required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-
examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was
motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend
a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will
show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian,
who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension
that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of
such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia
"until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a
favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does
not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he
deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in
that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in
connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was
re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous
act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute
adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to
impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang
to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house
and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of
sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however,
respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in
favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80, Entry
No. 90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972: Second
mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription
April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the
amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the
purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was
his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a
loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp.
41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are
not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which
he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of
only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of
P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement
under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00
receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction
therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo
from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in
Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not
reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the
alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not
even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo
himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no
mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said
sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of
money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was
either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to
the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date of
instrument; August 23, 1972 date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in
favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently
cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first
mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and
thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage
in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to
respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that
since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house
and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in
his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued
at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972
could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and
liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets,
 excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November,
1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the
said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the
acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the
illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's
examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of
the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious
irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent
Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo
surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His
resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities,
is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent
Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in
lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down
payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined that
his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were
not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father
and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine
Veterans Board from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational
Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected
with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans
including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held
the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims
Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had
direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was
approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A,
Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the said
educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution
from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as
a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation,
he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however,
that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution
on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective
the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at
2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up
his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know
whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board
every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS
and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V,
pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely
across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the
several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however,
whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for
educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII,
pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in
Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans
Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese
occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla
organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having
attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a
member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital
as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December
13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the
Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the
rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US
Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in
the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same
cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court
expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as
above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the res
FACTS:
Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo for disbarment.
1. Admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective
examiners for re-evalution or re-checking.
2. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant,
stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular
subject and was on the borderline of passing.
3. Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears
that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
4. Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law
student of MLQU.
RULING:
The court disbarred Lanuevo has no authority to request the examiners to re-evaluate grades of examinees w/o prior
authority from Supreme Court.
He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the bar. He does not a
have any business evaluating the answers of the examinees.
Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt of 1964, candidates for
admission to the bar must be of good moral character. Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this resulted him to revoked his
license.
Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749
23JUL
FACTS:
Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP dues.He was also cited in the complaint as not paying his
professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his pleadings filed in court. It was also an alleged falsity
when he included his IBP-Rizal 259060 where in fact he was not in good standing. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas
was dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was subsequently
promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal case involving estafabut was appealed pending in the Court of
Appeals. In the numerous violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the
IBP dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.
RATIO:
Even if he had limited practice of law, it does not relieve him of the duties such as payment of IBP dues. Rule 139-A
provides:Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice.
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of
P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed
IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the
practice of ones profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was
working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment [3] stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not
based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he
continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as
determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and
10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as
necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no
exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help in
defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of
annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of
membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to
stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation
of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt
inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of
Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not
they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of
annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive
to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds
that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without
due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious
to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-
members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the
time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was
working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of
the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of
his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. [7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar [8] - which
power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the
judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership
fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight
inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
 There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as
correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad
before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In
the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow
to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, [11] one
of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the
gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from
the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case
No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall
deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment:
on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove
cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas
the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as
the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support
of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending
that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature
pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of
such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar
is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of
the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject
to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual
fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public
welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes
upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly
and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is
not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts
explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted
power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the
explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution
of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking
solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent
of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and
regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring members
of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer
to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11 of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan
City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay, 2 while in Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911
and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated, 3 this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from the service of
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
respondent. 4
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers Now he faces disbarment.
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
The records reveal the following facts:
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant and
13 respondent married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must
their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced
his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll
of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen)
and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
Sembrano Pea.

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The
power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds.
It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of
justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the
legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an
unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed.
It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable
profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that
the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power
to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against respondent for
immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted
by this Court upon respondent. 5
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and
other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These
cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. 6
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted
in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely
abandoned complainant and his children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two
children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge
Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as
nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from the government
service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered
because of their father's acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously
withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment
under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their
own father. Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent
her in this case.

A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998

Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be
vs. disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent. notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the
illicit liaison with Elena. 7
PER CURIAM:
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him, respondent
displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her
husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain
Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances. 1
 I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for having a
mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later
administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will
constitute triple jeopardy. If that's the law so be it. 8
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a
Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
of the Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L.
Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of
Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the
recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in
agreement that respondent's actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession,
but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. 9 There is
perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of
law. 10 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied.)
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal
profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers
must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For
they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state,
those whose conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates his
professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be
free from any appearance of impropriety. 11 For a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law. 12 Indeed, a judge
should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to
others. 13Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral
imperatives. 14
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, 15 an attorney-at-law is also invested with
public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must
ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral
integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in
an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 16 Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged
with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as "moral character." To achieve such end,
every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only
the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus
proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 17
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar. 18For
disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before
disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice
are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 19 a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his wife.
She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a
married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was
guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case, 20 a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by this Court, respondent
continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned
to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier
attitude, even arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether
he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For
indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a
mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating
complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's
oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his
moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but
put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for
strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike
out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment
of respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of the parties and their witnesses who were
residing in the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said province was authorized to conduct the
investigation and to submit a report, together with transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits submitted by the
parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Report and Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that
when she was still a teenager and first year in college she came to know respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house being a friend of her sister Norma;
that they also became friends, and she knew the respondent as being single and living alone in
Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently transferred his residence to the ZANECO
compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked her to be one of the usherettes
in the Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told
respondent to ask the permission of her parents, which respondent did, and her father consented;
that for three whole days she served as usherette in the convention and respondent picked her up
from her residence every morning and took her home from the convention site at the end of each
day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and invited her for
a joy ride with the permission of her mother who was a former classmate of respondent; that
respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and then they strolled along the beach, and in the
course of which respondent proposed his love to her; that respondent told her that if she would
accept him, he would marry her within six (6) months from her acceptance; complainant told
respondent that she would think it over first; that from then on respondent used to visit her in their
house almost every night, and he kept on courting her and pressed her to make her decision on
respondent's proposal; that on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and
respondent continued his usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they agreed to get married
in December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with the consent of her father, to a
party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her from her house
and went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening they
left the party at the Lopez Skyroom, but before taking her home respondent invited her for a joy
ride and took her to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked the jeep by the beach
where there were no houses around; that in the course of their conversation inside the jeep,
respondent reiterated his promise to marry her and then started caressing her downward and his
hand kept on moving to her panty and down to her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she
then said: "What is this Trans?", but he answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you"
and reminded her also that "anyway, December is very near, the month we have been waiting for"
([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid), and again
reiterated his promise and assurances, at the same time pulling down her panty; that she told him
that she was afraid because they were not yet married, but because she loved him she finally
agreed to have sexual intercourse with him at the back seat of the jeep; that after the intercourse
she wept and respondent again reiterated his promises and assurances not to worry because
anyway he would marry her; and at about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat outside usually at the Honeycomb
Restaurant in Dipolog City about twice or three times a week, after which he would take her to the
airport where they would have sexual intercourse; that they had this sexual intercourse from
August to October 1973 at the frequency of two or three times a week, and she consented to all
these things because she loved him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant noticed that her menstruation which
usually occurred during the second week of each month did not come; she waited until the end of
the month and still there was no menstruation; she submitted to a pregnancy test and the result
was positive; she informed respondent and respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted but
she objected and respondent did not insist; respondent then told her not to worry because they
would get married within one month and he would talk to her parents about their marriage (pp. 129-
132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and talked to her parents about
their marriage; it was agreed that the marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not to create a
scandal as complainant was already pregnant; complainant and her mother left for Manila by boat
on October 22, 1973 while respondent would follow by plane; and they agreed to meet in
Singalong, Manila, in the house of complainant's sister Delia who is married to Ernesto Serrano
(pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant and her mother at Singalong,
Manila, respondent told them that he could not marry complainant because he was already married
(p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and said: "Trans, so you fooled my daughter and
why did you let us come here in Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent
reassured complainant not to worry because respondent had been separated from his wife for 16
years and he would work for the annulment of his marriage and, subsequently marry complainant
(p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent told complainant to deliver their child in Manila and assured her of a
monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog City and actually sent
the promised support; he came back to Manila in January 1974 and went to see complainant; when
asked about the annulment of his previous marriage, he told complainant that it would soon be
approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and in March 1974 and told
complainant the same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila
when she delivers the child, but her mother answered her that she cannot come as nobody would
be left in their house in Dipolog and instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is
nearer; complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, her sister Norma took her to the Good
Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual
Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148,
tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and tried to contact respondent by
phone and, thru her brother, but to no avail; as she was ashamed she just stayed in their house;
she got sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for medical treatment; she came back after
two weeks but still respondent did not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a
lawyer and filed an administrative case against respondent with the National Electrification
Administration; the case was referred to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO)
and it was dismissed and thus she filed the present administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and one exhibit, the birth certificate
of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent declared substantially as follows: that he was born on August 6,
1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he
 had a son who is now 20 years old; that because of incompatibility he had been estranged from his used to visit Norma at her residence; that he also befriended complainant and who became a close
wife for 16 years; that in 1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby embraced the Islam friend when he invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes during the
Religion (pp. Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's father since 1952 because he her residence in the morning and took her home from the convention site after each day's
was his teacher; likewise he knew complainant's mother because they were former classmates in activities;
high school; that he became acquainted with complainant when he used to visit her sister, Norma,
in their house; they gradually became friends and often talked with each other, and even talked
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship, complainant accepted
about their personal problems; that he mentioned to her his being estranged from his wife; that with
respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with her
the consent of her parents he invited her to be one of the usherettes in the Masonic Convention in
parents' permission was respondent's partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez
Sicayab, Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the arrangement was
Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the place but before
for him to fetch her from her residence and take her home from the convention site; that it was
going home, they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach,
during this occasion that they became close to each other and after the convention, he proposed
where there were no houses around; that after the usual preliminaries, they consummated the
his love to her on July 7, 1973; that (sic) a week of courtship, she accepted his proposal and since
sexual act and at about midnight they went home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used to
then he used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
have joy ride with complainant which usually ended at the airport where they used to make love
twice or three times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant became
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited complainant to be his partner during the pregnant;
Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening after
the affair, complainant complained to him of a headache, so he decided to take her home but once
5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and complainant's parents, it was
inside the jeep, she wanted to have a joy ride, so he drove around the city and proceeded to the
agreed that complainant would deliver her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on
airport; that when they were at the airport, only two of them, they started the usual kisses and they
October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law
were carried by their passion; they forgot themselves and they made love; that before midnight he
Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th and 28th
took her home; that thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse many times whenever they went
of October 1973, and again in February and March 1974; that later on complainant decided to
on joy riding in the evening and ended up in the airport which was the only place they could be
deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974
alone
and her sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14,
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
1974, she delivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named her
"Dureza Barrientos"; that about the last week of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that complainant told him of her pregnancy; during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed some of her
that they agreed that the child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and respondent would take expenses; that she filed an administrative case against respondent with the National Electrification
care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with the parents of complainant regarding the Administration; which complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she instituted the present
latter's pregnancy, he told him he was married but estranged from his wife; that when complainant disbarment proceedings against respondent.
was already in Manila, she asked him if he was willing to marry her, he answered he could not
marry again, otherwise, he would be charged with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment of
xxx xxx xxx
his marriage as he had been separated from his wife for 16 years; that complainant consented to
have sexual intercourse with him because of her love to him and he did not resort to force, trickery,
deceit or cajolery; and that the present case was filed against him by complainant because of his In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after hearing, respondent
failure to give the money to support complainant while in Cebu waiting for the delivery of the child Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
and, also to meet complainant's medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical
check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the
Solicitor General.
FINDING OF FACTS
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed by respondent attorney of his real status
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are not disputed: as a married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant
became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been
estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, and was about 20 years
annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said
and 7 months old during the time (July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent, having
marriage. More importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere fact of separation alone is not a ground for
been born on December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married, General
annulment of marriage and does not vest him legal capacity to contract another marriage.
Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the time of the said
relationship, having been born on August 6, 1932;
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son, who was also studying in Dipolog City,
lived separately from him. He never introduced his son and went around with friends as though he was never married
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that the marriage
much less had a child in the same locality. This circumstance alone belies respondent's claim that complainant and her
ceremony was solemnized on September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic
family were aware of his previous marriage at the very start of his courtship. The Court is therefore inclined to believe
priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that said respondent had been
that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It
separated from his wife for about 16 years at the time of his relationship with complainant;
is not in accordance with the nature of the educated, cultured and respectable, which complainant's family is, her father
being the Assistant Principal of the local public high school, to allow a daughter to have an affair with a married man.
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite sometime, having been a
former student of complainant's father in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see
the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with complainant's sister,
nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he
Norma in 1963 and eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he
even suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's moral sense is so seriously impaired that we cannot maintain his
membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage
still valid and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple
marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo, p. 15). As records indicate, however, his
claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony. In
this regard, we need only to quote the finding of the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could not because he was already
married and would open him to a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he were a
moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming, why did he not marry
complainant? The answer is supplied by respondent himself. He said while he was a moslem, but,
having been married in a civil ceremony, he could no longer validly enter into another civil
ceremony without committing bigamy because the complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January
13, 1977). Consequently, if respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being a moslem convert, he
cannot marry complainant, then it was grossly immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with
complainant because he knew the existence of a legal impediment. Respondent may not,
therefore, escape responsibility thru his dubious claim that he has embraced the Islam religion.
(Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply
demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral character is a
condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon
admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682
[1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181
SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such
respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the
court retains the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court against a lawyer who convinced a woman that
her prior marriage to another man was null and void ab initio and she was still legally single and free to marry him (the
lawyer), married her, was supported by her in his studies, begot a child with her, abandoned her and the child, and
married another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to complainant, then still
a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having
carnal relations with complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise to marry
her, and then deserted her and the child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral
fitness. Respondent having exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon him the most severe
disciplinary action disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality. The members are,
in fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient
either moral character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships
or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo
vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be allowed continued membership in
the ancient and learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a
member of the Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies
of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent Daarol.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang
(admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of
marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino
Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical
technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos
College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January,
1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their relationship. After
they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house
since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why
she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with
another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did
not mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena
were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City.
.Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown,
Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino
convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He
secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in
Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations.
He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital.
He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-
taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something
amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married
for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on
November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife,
Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in
a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. He
also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of
Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate
child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the
complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated
when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a
married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not
subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous.
It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether
a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as
"grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well
knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well
cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion
is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has
become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of
marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in
consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her
to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not
agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100
Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in
the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs.
Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a
child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs.
Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to
spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying
another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money
from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the
latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123
Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by
him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because,
anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant
and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February
28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of
marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina
and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will
bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in
death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a
married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a
child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs.
Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before
his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951
several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them
unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the
respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In
1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs.
Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz,
Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the respondent
is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
CLETO DOCENA, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM
On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena against Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr.,
on grounds of malpractice, gross misconduct, and violation of attorney's oath.
It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyers on appeal in Civil Case No. 425 for Forcible
Entry. While the appeal was pending before the then Court of First Instance of Eartern Samar, Branch I, respondent
required therein defendants-appellants Docena spouses to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,000.00
allegedly to stay the execution of the appealed decision.
To raise the required, complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from the Borongan, Eastern
Samar Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines; borrowed P2,140.00 from a private individual; and applied
for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00 from the Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein
respondent himself acted as guarantor (tsn, Session of July 8, 1983, pp. 33-34). The amount of P4,860.00 was
produced by complainant in response to respondent's letter dated September 2, 1979 (Exh. "C", tsn, p. 26, ibid.)
demanding delivery of the aforesaid amount, thus:
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Docena:
I wish to remind you that today is the last day for the deposit of the balance of P4,860.00.
Atty. Batica was in court yesterday verifying whether you have deposited the said balance and the Honorable
Judge informed him that you have until today to deposit the said amount.
I wish to inform you that the Honorable Judge will be in Sta. Fe tomorrow for rural service.
We will be waiting for you tomorrow September 22, 1979, at Sta. Fe as you promised.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar rendered a decision on the appealed case
in favor of the Docena spouses.
After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas bond of P10,000.00 but
he thereupon discovered that no such bond was ever posted by respondent.
When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never complied with such undertaking
despite repeated demands from the Docena spouses.
In his answer the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the P10,000.00 was his attorney's fees for
representing the Docena spouses in their appeal. But this self-serving allegation is belied by the letter (quoted above)
of respondent himself demanding from the Docena spouses the balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in
court to stay the execution of the appealed decision of the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to return
the P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also an admission that the money was never his, and that it was only
entrusted to him for deposit.
After due investigation and hearing, the Intergrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year and ordered to return the amount of P8,500.00 (he had earlier paid
complainant P1,500.00, but nothing more) within 1 month from notice, and should he fail to do so, he shall be
suspended indefinitely.
The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount involved may be small, but the nature of
the transgression calls for a heavier sanction. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Canon 1. x x x
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 16. x x x
Canon 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received from the client.
Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in
the exclusive and honored fraternity (Villanueva vs. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707 [1995]).
It has been said time and again, and this cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a trade nor a craft but a
profession (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983, p. 1). Its basic ideal is to render public service and to secure justice for those
who seek its aid. [Mayer vs. State Bar, 2 Call2d 71, 39 P2d 206 (1934), cited in Agpalo, id.] If it has to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, by their live, accord continuing fidelity to them. (Agpalo, id) By extorting money from his
client through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so base, so
low and dishonorable, and most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly,
eroded the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his depraved
character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys. He should be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent is likewise ordered to return the amount
of P8,500.00, the balance of the money entrusted to him by complainant Docena, within one (1) month from the finality
of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4680. August 29, 2000]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P.
SALAYON, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
 This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross
misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyers oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as
members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City
Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.[1] Complainant, now a senator, was
also a candidate for the Senate in that election.
Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), [2]respondents tampered with the votes received by
him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to
1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio
Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes which were above the number of
votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enriles votes
were in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice
recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents knowledge that
some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers oath.
Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by
the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the
errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the illegal
padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the
election returns was done under their control and supervision.
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred pursuant to
Rule 139-B, 13, in relation to 20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c).
It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the COMELEC (E.O. Case
No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed
complainants charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant,[4] this
Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges against
respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed late. He
contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B, 12(c) [5] and, therefore, the filing of
such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further
contends that, assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the
April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his
petition was filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c).
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not
under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,[6] in which this Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history
suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing
of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed
through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence. [7]
On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 139-
B, 12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has not shown when petitioner
received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration. It would appear,
however, that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar
Confidant of this Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by
mail, it is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be
assumed that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the
burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15-day
period for filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the same date a
copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay would only be two days.[8]The delay may
be overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The
sole question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.[9] For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy [10] or prescription[11] or with procedure like verification of
pleadings[12] and prejudicial questions[13] have no application to disbarment proceedings.
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and equity
where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals even though filed six,
[14]
four,[15] and three[16] days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious.
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of the following: (1)
respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because when the Statements of Votes
(SoVs) were given to them, such had already been accomplished and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the
canvassing was done in the presence of watchers, representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general
public so that respondents would not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A.
No. 6646, 27(b) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the part of
respondents.[17]
The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear
preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability.[18] As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that
taken judicial notice of by the Court[19] is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto,[20] the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.
In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig
City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be due to
honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared
the SoVs.
This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.[21] In rejecting this allegation and
ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this Court said:
There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the
performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only in the total number of votes garnered by the
aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election
returns, but also in the total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total number
of voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of honest mistake
or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.[22]
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as
reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs [23]but a
systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard
of the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at least
24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in
the said precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted
in Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in
the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the SoVs. [24]Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the
double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs
and CoC, were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes,
respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.
Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the SoVs but not
their correctness is belied by the certification which reads:
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and correct. IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province of ____________ this
_______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added)
Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals preclude the
commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and
thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies therein.
 Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in
the discharge of his duties as a government official.[25] However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer
or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such
misconduct.[26]
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the
Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By express
provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated
their oath of office as lawyers to do no falsehood.
Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings better
expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag[27] in which this Court said:
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a manner consistent
with truth and honor. It is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to
speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a common reality. . . .[28]
It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to observe this
basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust.
Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in general, and on
lawyers in government, in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official duties, involving no less than the
ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not
for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public service.
[29]
Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be
sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of misconduct
and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral
relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin,
all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was
carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986,
and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City.
Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine
Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her
office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent
admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and
Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on
and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued, and
that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met
again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with
Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent
had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant
against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and
had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese
woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad,
Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 [3]. Upon their return
to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills
residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his
second marriage before they would live together.[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the
Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988,
respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui.
Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii
sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after
she reported to work with the law firm [5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of
Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that
after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent
averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio;
and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents funds. [6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought
moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present
allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui
was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the
reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui,
and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No.
89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship"
between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same
evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter
part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was
discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at
No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly,
continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when
respondent Carlos left the same.
 From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The
statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of
cohabitation does not make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs.
Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective
positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for
want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same
was dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived
together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in
Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for
submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent
filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22,
1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly
certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by
respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent
wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. [12] It is the
contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 [13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code,
and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and
submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her
unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), [15] respondent averred that she did not have the original
copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy
because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16]
on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has
conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent
averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good
moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an
immoral manner.[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui
because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the
civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his
courtship.[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have
knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent
reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either
in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted
respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it
was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage
certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this
matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of
respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a
picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, [19] does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have
no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and
who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged [20]and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21] to
bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In
fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be
considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom
she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris
Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which
resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally
knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio
was the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986,
would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that
respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an
intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient
proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing
that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew
Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation,
finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in
the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single,
separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui,
she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr.
Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed
to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent
that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To
be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather
than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and
happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated
December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against
Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly
and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession
simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process,
once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held -
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession
of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him
to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to
two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they
will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in
our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal
affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found
herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about
Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss in
her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she
knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest
effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui
never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal
affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed
was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the
moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[27] Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards." [29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering
his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law
and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit.
After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to
believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was
provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the
date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget
the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so
when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage
Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, virtue of a compromise agreement. [7] It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the
with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on Affidavit.
her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit
and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her
SO ORDERED.
problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent
CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG A.C. No. 6313
allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him
Present:
as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to
appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondents aforementioned
- versus - Chairperson,
acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), particularly
CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR.
Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. [8] Hence, she filed the instant complaint[9] dated 2 February
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL,
2004.
Respondent. Promulgated:
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who
DECISION
would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainants former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales,
TINGA, J.:
who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former
lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child.[10] Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such,
learned that because of Aquinos infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the
close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of
spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino
disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer
is not the father of her daughter.
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is establishedby clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[1]
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant)
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the
against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of he said, she said, the parties conflicting versions of
proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the
the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.
case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less
than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a
to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four
lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino (Aquino), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former
months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total
classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant,
of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.
respondent sent a demand letter[2] in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child
support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared,
congenital heart ailment.
the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her
allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her
At around this point, by complainants own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual
the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank
relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had
employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the
sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had
settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00,
promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support
not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorneys
against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by respondents claim that
fees.
the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however,
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of
denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a chemistry of (sic) two
Disclaimer[3] (Affidavit) categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate [4] of her
consensual (sic) adults,[11] complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his
daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she
marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant
claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that
very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that,
Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured
first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second, they
complainant that despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is
had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called
not a public document. Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document without even taking
his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to
a glance at it.[5]
beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected
President of the Association of Barangay Council (ABC) and as such was an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash
Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his
and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter.Instead of turning
locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she lived no more
them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check[6] in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her
than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his campaign.
the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he
could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out,
of Provincial Board Member of the 2ndDistrict of Pampanga.
complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval
Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the
money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial
money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case
assistance and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he
against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. (Atty. Tolentino).
also advised her to look for the right man [12] and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her
that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however,
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well as a
referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by
 In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give her
monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have
communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance
until June when her alleged fianc from the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she
again asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating
to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she
was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to
respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would
file with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request.Sensing that he was being blackmailed,
respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.[13] After the parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents, the
Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation [14] dated 2 September 2005. After presenting
the parties conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and
concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in
good moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and
renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are
(sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual
honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage
of time have been compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice
complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling
complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the
reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all
because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional
dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x[15]
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that
he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution [16] dated 17 December 2005, finding the
same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents
obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,[17] respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with a
stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to returnP58,000.00
to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning[18] (Motion) dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory
Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more
detailed account of the events that transpired between him and complainant.Altogether, he portrays complainant as a
shrewd and manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what
she wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainants bare allegations that she failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to
determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution[19] dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more
jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant,
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree[20] in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. [21] As officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.[22] The Court has held that to justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. [23] A grossly immoral act is one that is
so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.[24] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.[25]
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried
adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,[26] it is not so with respect to betrayals
of the marital vow of fidelity.[27] Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. [28]
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which
states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.The next question to consider
is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and
in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires.While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we
find otherwise.
Complainants allegations that she succumbed to respondents sexual advances due to his promises of
financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient
to conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself
who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual
congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering
from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part. [29] Respondents
numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it
proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is
rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her
financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainants allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We
find credence in respondents assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She
herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay
official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there. She
also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously,
she never refuted respondents allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several occasions, that she lived
near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known
of his marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would
be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a
short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred to change [her] life for the better, [30] as
alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear
preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.[31] We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and
wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his
part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to
force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to her its
repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainants assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially
that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent
who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a
document she knew was related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences
contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
 Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and
the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not
give the money for Alexandras medical and educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer.[32] If
her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the
settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was
pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she knows
and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a
layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on
the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document
disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining
all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes
which might otherwise be filed in court. [33] Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father
of complainants daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a
settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the
record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquinos counsel in the settlement of the
case. Again, we only have complainants bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence. [34] Suspicion, no matter
how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent
has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.[35]
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her
daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount
of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return the
amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainants
claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However,
complainant insists that she should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00
that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more
than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his
attorneys fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks
issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount
of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement for attorneys fees to justify his presumption that he can keep
the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant
for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He
avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did not
want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either
party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions
of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and
answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to
ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP
for further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainants prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her childs
DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainants claim for moral damages and attorneys fees. Suffice it to state that
an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action. [36] It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as
such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence. [37] As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance.[38] The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyers alleged misconduct is in
no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.[39]
Respondents misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the
extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous
marriage,[40] abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour,[41] cohabited with a married woman, [42] lured an innocent
woman into marriage,[43] or was found to be a womanizer.[44] The instant case can be easily differentiated from the
foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, would accomplish the end desired. [45] In Zaguirre v. Castillo,[46] respondent was found to have sired a child
with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the
polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his
reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,
[47]
where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a
child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the
pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over his
indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a
character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor. [48] Considering
further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without
prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose
on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report
and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar,
and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.