WRITING A PROTEST LETTER ON THE IRREGULAR APPOINTMENT OF A CLERK

OF COURT IS TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND

INSUBORDINATION?

Judge A was charged with Disrespect and Disregard of Authority tantamount to Grave
Misconduct and Insubordination by an administrative office of the Supreme Court as the
complainant for allegedly accusing in the protest letter against the Selection,
Nomination and Promotion Board (Board) of certain irregularities committed by
nominating court employee B who has a pending case involving grave offenses who
did not secure court clearances and court employee C who did not comply with the
basic requirements for application as Clerk of Court such as favorable recommendation
of a Judge and Position Description Form (PDF) even going to the extent of branding
the appointment of court employee C as "void ab initio and a big joke," to name a
few, thereby casting doubts on the integrity of selection, nomination and promotion
board; that even Judge A casts aspersion on board by saying "Board is funny, and it
made me laugh. I rather laugh than be angry, than feel helpless, than look powerless in
this awful and mean situation" ; that Judge As act of ascribing ill motives to the Board
degrades the integrity and confidence reposed by the public in it and her language used
in expressing her displeasure is hardly the kind of circumspect words expected of a
magistrate; and considering that the main function of the Board is merely to screen,
evaluate and assess the competence and qualifications of a candidate for the
appointment to a vacant position, the authority to appoint is still vested on the Chief
Justice and the two (2) Senior Associate Justices; that Judge As impugning the
appointments of court employees B and C is a denigration of the actions of the Chief
Justice and the two (2) Senior Associate Justices. Complainant prayed for a show
cause order why Judge A will not be held administratively liable for Grave Misconduct
and Insubordination.

Did Judge A commit Disrespect and Disregard of Authority tantamount to Grave

Misconduct and Insubordination in writing a protest letter on the irregularly appointed
Clerk of Court? The answer is in the negative.

Judge A did not commit a misconduct and insubordination in writing a protest letter
that is a mere exercise of ones cherished freedom of speech, a constitutional right. In
US vs. Bustos 37 PHIL 731, our Supreme Court said, "The people not obliged to speak
of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, by
only in a despotism. Even if the statements are found to be false, if there is probable
cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
1
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. The ultimate test is that of bona
fides. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men
is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust
accusation; the wound may be assuaged by a balm of a clear conscience. A public
official must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts."

Judge A has exercised the statutory right of a Judge to question the appointment of an
applicant for a branch clerk of court who did not comply with the basic requirements
under the laws thus it can be considered as an irregular appointment. The lack of ill
motive of Judge A in questioning the appointment can be gleaned from the various
letters pertaining to the questioned appointment filed before the Supreme Court.

Judge A lamented in one of the letters submitted to the Supreme Court that it is only in
the Philippines that an applicant for branch clerk of court, who was rejected personally
and in writing several times, and who previously has withdrawn her application, signed a
petition for transfer with prayer for the dismissal of Judge A, more or less a month prior
to her appointment, then criminally charge Judge A more or less prior to her oath-
taking before the Office of the Executive Judge that can be considered as a Grave
Misconduct committed by court employee C. Likewise, there is nothing on record that
Judge A committed insubordination in writing the questioned letter and subsequent
letters thereto because a right to protest an appointment that is perceived to be irregular
is inherent in every court.

Judge As letters to the administrative office of the Supreme Court, just like other
persons' typical correspondences are susceptible to different interpretations so it is quite
unfair that bad motive will be ascribed in writing them. Because of the varying
interpretations of the letters, there is uncertainty whether the words constitute as a
misconduct and an insubordination. To conclude misconduct and insubordination on
Judge As part, there must be certainly on the interpretation of the exact import of the
words in the correspondences that is impossible to happen in this case.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a

forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior(Camus, Jr. v. Alegre, A.M. No. P-06-2182, August 12, 2008). It is any
unlawful behavior by public officers in relation to the duties of their offices, willful in
character. The term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts
2
performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act (Joaquin
vs. Dela Cruz, A.M. No. P-07-2321, April 24, 2009). It is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer (Bureau of Internal Revenue v.
Organo, G.R. No. 149549, February 26, 2004). Simple misconduct has been defined as
an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public
officers [Castelo v. Florendo, 459 Phil. 581 (2003)]. In Grave Misconduct, as
distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest (Villanueva v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 167726, July 20, 2006) and established by substantial evidence.
Grave Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of Simple Misconduct (Civil
Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, September 30, 2005). Thus, a
person charged with Grave Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct if the
misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave
(Santos v. Rosalan, G.R. No. 155749, February 8, 2007). Section 52(B)(2), Rule IV of
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies simple
misconduct as a less grave offense punishable with a corresponding penalty of
suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense.

Writing a complaint letter and a protest letter on the irregular appointments of court
employees B and C cannot be considered as the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful
in character, improper or wrong behavior. It is a legitimate action of a Judge to bring to
the proper authorities the irregularities surrounding their appointments as provided
under The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, CANON 2,
SECTION 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against
lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have
become aware.

The contents of the complaint letter and the protest letter on the irregular appointments
of court employees B and C are privileged communications that are not actionable
when made in good faith. The complainant failed to adduce any proof that Judge A
was impelled with disreputable motive and bad faith in writing them the protest letters.

In Sison vs. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28, 1961: The terms "absolute privilege"
and "qualified privilege" have established technical meanings, in connection with civil
actions for libel and slander. In the language of Corpus Juris Secundum: For the sake of
clearness of application privileged communications are often divided into two classes:
Absolute privilege; and conditional or qualified privilege, the second sometimes being

3
called 'quasi privilege.' In cases of absolutely privileged communications, the occasion
is an absolute bar to the action; whereas, in cases of conditionally or qualifiedly
privileged communications, the law raises only a prima facie presumption in favor of the
occasion. In the former class the freedom from liability is said to be absolute or without
condition, regardless of the existence of express malice, as contrasted with such
freedom in the latter class where it is said to be conditioned on the want or absence of
express malice (53 C.J.S., 141- 142).

An absolutely privileged communication is one for which, by reason of the occasion on

which it is made, no remedy is provided for the damages in a civil action for slander or
libel. It is well settled that the law recognizes this class of communications which is so
absolutely privileged that even the existence of express malice does not destroy the
privilege although there are some dicta denying the rule, and some eminent judges, in
dealing with particular applications of the rule, have doubted or questioned the rationale
or principle of absolutely privileged communications. As to absolutely
privileged communications, a civil action for libel or slander is absolutely barred (53
C.J.S., p. 142).
.
Qualified privilege exists in a larger number of cases than does absolute privilege. It
relates more particularly to private interests, and comprehends communications made
in good faith, without actual malice, with reasonable or probable grounds for believing
them to be true, on a subject matter in which the author of the communication has an
interest, or in respect to which he has a duty, public, personal, or private, either legal,
judicial, political, moral, or social, made to a person having a corresponding interest or
duty. Briefly stated, a qualifiedly privileged communication is a defamatory
communication made on what is called an occasion of privilege without actual malice,
and as to such communications there is no civil liability, regardless of whether or not the
communication is libelous per se or libelous per quod (53 C.J.S., pp. 143-144). In the
case of communications qualifiedly privileged, there must be both an occasion of
privilege and the use of that occasion in good faith (53 C.J.S., p. 145).

To the same effect is the American Jurisprudence, from which we quote: On the ground
of public policy, the law recognizes certain communications as privileged and, as such,
not within the rules imposing liability for defamation. A privileged communication or
statement, in the law of libel and slander, is one which, except for the occasion on which
or the circumstances under which it is made, would be defamatory and actionable.

4
Privileged communications are divided into two general classes, namely: (1) those
which are absolutely privileged; and (2) those which are qualifiedly or conditionally
privileged, as defined in subsequent sections (33 Am. Jur., p. 123). An absolutely
privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion on which
or the matter in reference to which, it is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action,
however hard it may bear upon a person who claims to be injured thereby, and even
though it may have been made maliciously (33 Am.. Jur., pp. 123-124). A publication is
conditionally or qualifiedly privileged where circumstances exist, or are 'reasonably
believed by the defendant to exist, which cast on him the duty of making a
communication to a certain other person to whom he makes such communication in the
performance of such duty, or where the person is so situated that it becomes right in the
interests the person of society that he should tell third persons certain facts, which he in
good faith proceeds to do. This general idea has been otherwise expressed as follows:
A communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains
matter which, without this privilege, would be actionable, and although the duty is not a
legal one, but only a moral or social duty of imperfect obligation. The essential elements
of conditionally privileged communication may accordingly be enumerated as a good
faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper
occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only (33 Am. Jur.,
pp. 124-125).

Newell, in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the following
language:
Absolute Privilege In this class of cases it is considered in the interest of public
welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their sentiments and speak their
minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects; and all actions for words so
spoken are absolutely forbidden, even of it be alleged and proved that the words were
spoken falsely, knowingly and with express malice (Section 350, pp. 387388).

In the less important matters, however, the interests and welfare of the public do not
demand that the speaker should be freed from all responsibility, but merely require that
he should be protected so far as he is speaking honestly for the common good. In these
cases the privilege is said not to be absolute but qualified; and a party defamed may
recover damages notwithstanding the privilege if he can prove that the words were not
used in good faith, but that the party availed himself of the occasion wilfully and
knowingly for the purpose of defaming the plaintiff (Section 389, p. 415).

5
Apart from the occasion in which or the matter in reference to which it is made, what
distinguishes an absolutely privileged communication from one which is only qualifiedly
privileged is, therefore, that the latter is actionable upon proof of "actual malice",
whereas its existence does not affect the exemption attached to the former, provided
that, in the case of judicial proceedings, the derogatory statements in question are
pertinent, relevant or related to or connected with the subject matter of the
communication involved. Under peculiar situations, a few decisions have required
probable cause for the enjoyment of the absolute privilege, but such decisions not only
do not reflect the view of the clear weight of authority, but, also, have acknowledged the
wisdom of such view, although its non-application was sought to be justified by the
special conditions obtaining in each case (See Harshaw vs. Harshaw, 136 ALR, 1411,
1413).

The reason underlying the general rule on absolutely privileged communications is set
forth in the American Jurisprudence as follows: "The class of absolutely privileged
communications is narrow and is practically limited to legislative and judicial
proceedings and other acts of state, including, it is said, communications made in the
discharge of a duty under express authority of law, by or to heads of executive
departments of the state, and matters involving military affairs. The privilege is not
intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the
enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the
purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and
witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without
incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages" (33
Am. Jur., 123-124). It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial
including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of
communications that are absolutely privileged (Newel on The Law of Slander and Libel,
4th ed., pp. 388, 391392, 407; 53 C.J.S. 165, 167, 173; 33 Am Jur., 142-143, 144-145,
147; Tupas vs. Parreno, L-12545 [April 30, 19591). As the Supreme Court of
Tennessee has put it: "For reasons of public policy which looks to the free and
unfettered administration of justice, it appears to be the prevailing rule in the United
States that statements made in a pleading in a civil action are absolutely privileged and
no action for libel may be founded thereon when pertinent and relevant to the subject
under inquiry, however false and malicious such statements may be (33 Am. Jur. 144,
145, Libel and Slander 149; 16 ALR 746, supplemented in 42 ALR 878 and 134 ALR
483." (Hayslip vs. Weliford, 195 Tenn. 621, 263, SW 2d 136, 42 ALR 2d 820). Hence,
the "Petition for bond" of defendant herein is absolutely privileged, and no civil action for
libel or slander may arise therefrom, unless the contents of the petition are irrelevant to
the subject matter thereof.

6
The contents of the complaint letter and the protest letter on the irregular appointments
of court employees B and C are protected by Judge As right against self-
incrimination enshrined and guaranteed by Article III, Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution , to wit: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In Pascual Jr. vs. Board of Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969: We affirm the
lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by
us in Cabal v. Kapunan 6 SCRA 1059 (1962). In that proceeding for certiorari and
prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that an administrative
charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft
Act, the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to
take the witness stand, which request was granted. Upon petitioner's refusal to be
sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of
respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this
proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that
"the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions,
but, also, to take the witness stand."It was noted in the opinion penned by the present
Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an a administrative charge of unexplained
wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public
officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other
lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture
while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case
before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer
not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner,
for some an even greater deprivation. The argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus
distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American Supreme Court opinion highly
persuasive in character (Spevack v. Klein, 385 US 511, 1967). In the language of
Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to
lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by
imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for
asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that
could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession. The
appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and
intervenors-appellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should
be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead
to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right,
to follow the language of another American decision, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission
of New York, 378 US 52 (1964), is the protection against "any disclosures which the
witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which
could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it

7
becomes diluted. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As
far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Only last
year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, speaking through Justice Sanchez,
we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony,
to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted,
unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." Why it should be thus is not difficult to
discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused,
stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More
and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even
those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief
Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens" (Criswold v.
Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965). It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier
decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding
as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial
opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus
according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to
surrender to his detriment." So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who
spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the
hallmark of our democracy." In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no
possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision
now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner
for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently
with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the
witness stand without his consent.

There is no proof offered by complainant that the protest letter is intended to threaten
the Board of being filed with formal charges. A Judge cannot issue threats to the
officials of the Supreme Court because they can make a report and a recommendation
adversely, with or without any basis against him or her. They can abuse their authority
and misuse their powers including the prerogatives of their office against a Judge
whom they perceive to be antagonistic to their liking, opinions and policies.

There is no proof offered by complainant that the protest letter is intended to denigrate
the actions of Chief Justice and the two (2) Senior Associate Justices constituting

8
disrespect and disregard of authority tantamount to Grave Misconduct and
Insubordination.

There is no proof offered by complainant that the protest letter is intended to ascribe ill
motives to the Board that degrades the integrity and confidence reposed by the public in
it.

It is not true that the language used in expressing the displeasure against the Board is
hardly the kind of circumspect words expected of a magistrate rather the language used
is a reasonable expression of grievances of an oppressed and harassed first level court
Judge. The use of the words void ab initio and a big joke are allowed under our
Constitution, there is no proof that these words cast doubts on the integrity of the Board.
There is no proof that the words, "Board is funny, and it made me laugh. I rather laugh
than be angry, than feel helpless, than look powerless in this awful and mean situation"
cast aspersion on the Board. In fact, one of the members of Board was smiling (who
appeared to try to contain her laughter of the contents of my letter questioning the
irregular appointment of Clerk of Court) while reading the subject protest letter in front of
Judge A, proof she was not offended at all of what Judge A wrote.

Moreover, the language Judge A employed in the questioned protest letters are vague
and ambiguous, and this lack of certainty as to their true import and meaning, should be
reason that the complaint must be dismissed for failure to meet the quantum of proof
required to sanction a Judge, that is, the proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the true semantics of the words in
the protest letters of Judge A that can be interpreted differently by people coming from
all walks in life. The words void ab initio and big joke describe the frustration
experienced by Judge A on the irregular appointment of court employee C whose
application as Clerk of Court was repeatedly rejected orally and in writing.

With respect to the show cause order requested by complainant against Judge A, it
was held in Marantan vs. Diokno et al., G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014: For a
comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice (People v. Castelo,
114 Phil. 892, 900 (1962); citing People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265, 1939). . What is, thus,
sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the
decision of a pending case (People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265, 271 1939). The specific
9
rationale for the sub-judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies (Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105,
April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 396, 403; citing Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez, 238 Phil. 543,
1987). The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct
their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the
impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As
important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid
in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights (Cabansag
v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152, 161, 1957). The "clear and present danger" rule means
that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a
clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice.
Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of
contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an
imminent, not merely a likely, threat (Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 161, 162,
1957). The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the
merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to
its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462. As to the merits, the comments seem to be what
the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were
murdered by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462,
which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The
Court detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of
their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the
Court. As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals
that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There was no
complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had passed since the
petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on
the dignity of the Court either. "A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a
judicial proceeding still pending in the court is, upon the theory that in such a case, it
must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice"
(Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 162, 1957). By no stretch of the imagination could
the respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration
of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice can be inferred from the comments of the respondents. Freedom of public
comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to
influence pending cases (Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 162, 1957). The power to
punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be

10
resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice (Austria v. Masaquel, 127 Phil.
677, 691, 1967). In the present case, such necessity is wanting. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition.

In Heck vs. Gamotin Jr., A.C. No. 5329, March 18, 2014: Secondly, we cannot sanction
the respondent for having angrily reacted to Hecks unexpected tirade in his presence.
The respondent was not then reacting to an attack on his person, but to Hecks
disrespectful remark against Philippine authorities in general. Any self-respecting
government official like the respondent should feel justly affronted by any expression or
show of disrespect in his presence, including harsh words like those uttered by Heck.
Whether or not Heck was justified in making the utterance is of no relevance to us.
Lawyers may be expected to maintain their composure and decorum at all times, but
they are still human, and their emotions are like those of other normal people placed in
unexpected situations that can crack their veneer of self-control. That is how we now
view the actuation of the respondent in reacting to Hecks utterance. The Court will not
permit the respondents good record to be tarnished by his having promptly reacted to
Hecks remark. Moreover, Heck could have sincerely perceived the respondents
actuations to be arrogant and overbearing, but it is not fair for us to take the respondent
to task in the context of the events and occasions in which the actuations occurred in
the absence of a credible showing that his actuations had been impelled by any bad
motive, or had amounted to any breach of any canon of professional conduct or legal
ethics.

The complainant, showing double standards of justice, did not conduct an investigation
and submit a report, evaluation and recommendation on the bad or mean opinion
allegedly expressed by members of the Supreme Court against a fellow SC Justice or
against the SC itself, stating in its report:

1. Ascribing ill motives to other SC Justice(s) or to the Decisions of other SC Justice(s)

that degrade the integrity and confidence reposed by the public in it.
4. The language used in expressing the displeasure against the other SC Justice(s)
or to the Decisions of other SC Justice(s) is hardly the kind of circumspect words
expected of a magistrate.
5. Accusations against other SC Justice(s) or to the Decisions of other SC
Justice(s) to name a few thereby casting doubts on the integrity of the judiciary as an
institution.
6. The other SC Justice(s) or to the Decisions of other SC Justice(s) cast aspersion
on the judiciary as an institution.
11
Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, Dissenting Opinion by Justice
Arturo Brion: xxx Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be without
basis and out of our sense of delicadeza (which we should have), the Court should at
least hear and consider both sides before making a ruling that would favor the son of a
Member of the Court. xxx If this Court is indeed SERIOUS IN ADMINISTERING
JUSTICE or at least to BE SEEN TO BE ADMINISTERING JUSTICE in the way
described in the speeches of many a Justice of this Court, it should not deliver the kind
of hasty and imprudent action that it did in this case. The proper course of action, if the
Court indeed honestly wants to achieve this objective in the present case, is to require
the COMELEC to COMMENT on the petition and to decide matters from that point.

Regina Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013 Dissenting Opinion
by Justice Antonio Carpio: The Court's ruling today is a double flip-flop: (1) it reverses
the well-settled doctrine that upon proclamation of a winning congressional candidate,
the HRET acquires sole jurisdiction over any contest relating to the "election, returns
and qualifications" of House Members; and (2) it also reverses the well-settled doctrine
that any question on the validity of such proclamation falls under the sole jurisdiction of
the HRET.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, April 12, 2011, Dissenting Opinion by
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales: Saying that Cojuangco was not a subordinate or close
associate of the Marcoses is "the biggest joke to hit the century" especially with
Cojuangco's own personal admission that he left the Philippines with Marcos and family
on February 25, 1986 on the Marcoses' way to their exile in the United States following
the first EDSA people power revolt. "Clearly, the intimate relationship between
Cojuangco and Marcos equates or exceeds that of a family member or cabinet member,
since not all of Marcos's relatives or high government ministers went with him in exile on
that fateful date. If this will not prove the more than close association between
Cojuangco and Marcos, the Court does not know what will."

League of the Cities of the Phils. vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and
178056, April 12, 2011, Dissenting Opinion by Justice Antonio Carpio: This Court has
made history with its repeated flip-flopping in this case.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC.,

AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO, October 15, 2010,
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno: The unfortunate ruling of the
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majority Decision that no plagiarism was committed stems from its failure to distinguish
between the determination of the objective, factual existence of plagiarism in the Vinuya
decision and the determination of the liability that results from a finding of plagiarism.
Specifically, it made malicious intent, which heretofore had not been relevant to a
finding of plagiarism, an essential element. The majority Decision will thus stand against
the overwhelming conventions on what constitutes plagiarism. In doing so, the Decision
has created unimaginable problems for Philippine academia, which will from now on
have to find a disciplinary response to plagiarism committed by students and
researchers on the justification of the majority Decision. It has also undermined the
protection of copyrighted work by making available to plagiarists lack of malicious
intent as a defense to a charge of violation of copy or economic rights of the copyright
owner committed through lack of attribution. Under Section 184 of R.A. 8293 (An Act
Describing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing the Intellectual Property
Office, Providing for Its Powers and Functions, and for Other Purposes), or the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, there is no infringement of copyright in the
use of another's work in: (b) the making of quotations from a published work if they are
compatible with fair use and only to the extent justified for the purpose, including
quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries:
Provided that the source and the name of the author, if appearing on the work, are
mentioned. Because the majority Decision has excused the lack of attribution to the
complaining authors in the Vinuya decision to editorial errors and lack of malicious
intent to appropriate and that therefore there was no plagiarism lack of intent to
infringe copyright in the case of lack of attribution may now also become a defense,
rendering the above legal provision meaningless.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, February 8, 2011: Justice Sereno castigates
the majority in the Court for lowering the standards for judicial scholarship, negating the
educative and moral directional value in the writing and publishing of decisions, bending
over backwards to deny the objective existence of gross plagiarism, and condoning
dishonesty in the exercise of a function central to the role of the courts. But our courts
are in the business, not of judicial scholarship, but of deciding fairly and honestly the
disputes before them, using precedents and legal literature that, according to American
scholars, belong to the public domain. If this is not honest work for a judge, I do not
know what is. And Justice Sereno has no right to preach at the expense of the majority
about educative and moral directional value in writing published articles. For one
thing, her standards are obviously for work done in the academe, not for the judge
plodding at his desk to perform government work. For another, I note that on occasions
she has breached those very standards, lifting from works of others without proper
attribution. xxx The ideas were from GATT but the presentation was original Sereno.
Down the line, however, without introduction or preamble, she copied verbatim into her

13
work portions from Understanding on Dispute Settlement, without citing this specific
source. More, she did not use quotation marks to identify the copied portions. She thus
made ordinary readers like me believe that she also crafted those portions. To borrow a
word from the civil code, she co-mingled the work of others with hers, erasing the
identity of the lifted work. Justice Serenos explanation is that, since she was drawing
from the rules embodied in GATTs Understanding on Dispute Settlement, she did not
have to make attributions to those rules at each turn of her writing. She may be correct
if she in fact properly cited those rules the first time she copied from it and, further,
indicated a clear intent to do further copying down the line. But she did not. xxx Further,
she did not identify the portions she copied verbatim in order to set them apart from her
own writing. Under the rule that she foists on Justice Del Castillo, quotation marks must
be used whenever verbatim quotes are made. This requirement is all the more
important since, unlike domestic rules, the rules of GATT are unfamiliar terrain to most
readers. xxx Using the severe standards she sets for Justice Del Castillo in Vinuya, i.e.,
objective existence of plagiarism, I am afraid that any explanation of good faith or lack
of malicious intent on Justice Serenos part in copying without proper attribution from
the work of Judge Posner would not be acceptable. Still I can concede that Justice
Sereno may not have intended to plagiarize the work of others even if she copied
verbatim from them without proper attribution or quotation marks. Her above articles
were, taken as whole, essentially hers. I regret, however, that since she wrote them as
an academician bound by the high standards that she and the University of the
Philippines where she taught espouse, she may have failed, borrowing her own phrase,
to set the correct educative and moral directional value for the young.
Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006: he Constitution, as the
fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the
citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or
revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision
laid down in the Constitution itself. To allow such change in the fundamental law is to
set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every
dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the
Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant
political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of
law in this country. No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures
gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific
modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the
Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting
the peoples sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court
cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is
sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which
embodies the real sovereign will of the people. Incantations of peoples voice,
peoples sovereign will, or let the people decide cannot override the specific modes
14
of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the
Constitution the peoples fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our
society becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups
gathering signatures through false promises.

XXX XXX XXX

Do the above- quoted Supreme Court texts of the Decisions merit administrative
sanctions? The answer is in the negative unless the concerned parties will file
administrative or criminal charges against those who are responsible for publishing
offensive opinion in the media that must be proven beyond reasonable when the
charges are made against a Judge.

Citizens of a democratic country have constitutionally protected right to free speech as

held by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bustos, In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen, and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of
Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.

The values served by the protection of Free Speech are:

1. The Discovery of Truth - This value was first suggested by Milton, who first
suggested that when truth and falsehood are allowed to freely grapple, truth will win out.
2. Facilitating Participation by Citizens in Political Decision-Making - It has been
suggested that citizens will not make wise and informed choices in elections if
candidates and proponents of certain policies are restricted in their ability to
communicate positions.
3. Creating a More Adaptable and Stable Community (The "Safety Valve" Function)
- It has been suggested that a society in which angry and alienated citizens are allowed
to speak their mind--"vent"--will be more stable, as people will be less likely to resort to
violence. It has also been pointed out that allowing the alienated and discontented to
speak freely enables government to better monitor potentially dangerous groups who
would otherwise act more clandestinely.
4. Assuring Individual Self-Fulfillment - Free speech enables individuals to
express themselves, create and identify--and, in the process perhaps, find kindred
spirits. Freedom of speech thus becomes an aspect of human dignity.

15
5. Checking Abuse of Governmental Power - As Watergate, Irangate, Clintongate
(and all the other "gates") demonstrate, freedom of the press enables citizens to learn
about abuses of power--and then do something about the abuse at the ballot box, if they
feel so moved.
6. Promoting Tolerance - It has been argued that freedom of speech, especially
through our practice of extending protection to speech that we find hateful or personally
upsetting, teaches us to become more tolerant in other aspects of life-and that a more
tolerant society is a better society.
7. Creating a More Robust and Interesting Community - A community in which free
speech is valued and protected is likely to be a more energized, creative society as its
citizens actively fulfill themselves in many diverse and interesting ways ( Exploring
Constitutional Law by Doug Linder, 2014).

Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is

entitled to give and have obeyed (BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY WITH
PRONUNCIATIONS, 6th ed.).
The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable
instructions of the employer (Porter v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Columbia, 246 S.C.
370, 146 S.E.2d 620, 622).
Willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must concur:
(1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge (Realda vs. Mirasol Jr., G.R. No. 192190, April 25, 2012).
The elements of Insubordination are not present in the protest letter on the irregular
appointments of court employees B and C. There is no proof presented by
complainant that insubordination was committed pertaining to the protest letter on the
irregular appointments of court employees B and C.

Complainant should be reminded: Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence

because mere allegation is definitely not evidence (General Milling Corporation v.
Casio, G.R. No. 149552, March 10, 2010). The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence. Considering that complainant has failed
to substantiate her allegations, failing even to attest to her claims before the investigator
appointed by this Court, elementary justice dictates respondents exoneration of the
charge (Alegria vs. Judge Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019, April 4, 2007). In Alcuizar vs.
Judge Carpio, A.M.-RTJ-07-2068, August 7, 2007: In administrative or disciplinary
16
proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint rests on the
complainant (Susa v. Pena, A.M. No. P-03-1740, September 17, 2003, 411 SCRA 182).
While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule
is a bit different where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense.
Administrative proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and
are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof
required to support the administrative charges or to establish the ground/s for the
removal of a judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt (Duduaco v. Laquindanum, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601, August
11, 2005, 466 SCRA 428, citing In Re Impeachment of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212 (1922).
To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575, January 31, 2005, 450
SCRA 27. Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a
misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum
of proof required should be more than substantial.

The actual case is A. M. No. MTJ 13-1836 formerly A.M. No. 11-11-115-METC
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Eliza B. Yu
The charge was reiterated in A.M. MTJ 12-1815 Leilani A. Tejero Lopez vs.
Judge Eliza B. Yu
The charge was reiterated in OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ Eleanor Bayog, Leilani
Tejero - Lopez, Manolo Garcia, Jasmine Lindain, Fetronillo Primacio Jr., Evelyn
Depalobos, Benjie Ore, Erwin Russ Ragasa, Bien Camba, Marlon Suligan, Arnold
Obial, Ronald Quijano, Eduardo Ebreo, Chanda Tolentino, Ronalyn Armarvez, Ma.
Victoria Ocampo, Elizabeth Lipura, Maryann Cayanan, Ma. Luz Dionisio, Maribel
Molina, Edward Eric Santos, Emilio Domine, Ferdinand Molina, Ricardo Lampitoc,
Jerome Aviles, Ana Lea Estacio, Cristina l.ampitoc, Melanie Ragasa, Evangeline
Ching, Lawrence Perez, Edmundo Vergara, Lanie Aguinaldo, Karla Mae
Pacunayen, Domingo Hocosol, Edwin Ubana, Elizabeth Villanueva, lgnacio
Gonzales, Zenaida Geronimo, Soledad Bassig, Marvin Balicuatro, Aida Josefina
lgnacio, Benigno Marzan, Marissa Mashoor Ratsgoor, Marie Luz Obida, Joseph
Pamatpat, Fortunato Diezmo, Norner Villanueva, Edwin Jurok, Fatima Rojas, Armina
Almonte, Anna Marie Francisco, Ma. Cecilia Getrudes Salvador, Zenaida
Geronimo, Virginia Galang, Elsa Garnett, Amor Abad, Emelina San Miguel, Maxima
Sayo, Romer Aviles, Froilan Robert Tomas, Norman Garcia, Dennis Echegoyen vs.
Judge Eliza B. Yu
The Philippine Supreme Court sustained the legal arguments of Judge Eliza B. Yu
on appeal because the Office of the Court Administrator omitted them in its report
and recommendation dated February 11, 2016.

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