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Torts and Damages:

II. Concept of Quasi-Delict

Casis, 27-41

A. Elements

Quasi-delicts: Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to


another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter

Barredo vs. Garcia

Facts: At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a


kalesa therebykilling the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a
criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit.
Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit
against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based
on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their
employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and
that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and
not him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.

HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action
against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He
reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because
by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has
no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees
because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already
before he hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia
not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been
subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a
criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting
his employee (Article 1903).

Elcano vs. Hill

Facts: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano
filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent
coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad
(Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that
the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever,
his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already
an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a
separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the
marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He
can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however
ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability
should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.

Cinco vs. Canonoy

FACTS:
Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and
operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit,
invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered
City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
CFI by certiorari: dismissed

ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during
the pendency of the criminal action

HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for


nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally
on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant
primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence
are principles calculated to protect society
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the
criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only
injuries to persons but also damage to property
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for
the harm done

Baksh vs. CA

FACTS: In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan,


Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old
exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got
really close and intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem later offered
to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her
parents where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilous parents then
started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for
animals to slaughter for the occasion.

Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had
sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began
maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou
and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou
went home and later sued Gashem for damages.

The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he
cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being
an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really
because of his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil
Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the
deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of
the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her
into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose
morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered
herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashems blatant
disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is
contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying
the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study
here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the
concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case
where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was
meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books
such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.

The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to
marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral
damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if
there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses
for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.

Dulay vs. CA

FACTS:
December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children filed an action for damages against
Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp.
(Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence
of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to
avoid the injury
Superguard:
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor
is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person


criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses


under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay

ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be
civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits

Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:


Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting
from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only
acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused
It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon
Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela
was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's
employer and responsible for his acts.

Garcia vs. Florido

FACTS:

August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,


his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital,
hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven
by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City for the purpose of attending a conference
August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on
the national highway at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger
bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro
Tumala
Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their
medical treatment and hospitalization
Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their
owners for driving in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers
aboard the PU car
RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is
a violation of law or traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding
ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a
criminal action.

HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is
directed to proceed with the trial of the case
essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of
the New Civil Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the
operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in
the collision of the bus with the passenger car
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of
the collision
d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or
prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the
parties
violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to
observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure
resulted in the injury on petitioners
petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of
Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action
been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the
present civil case
petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one
where reservationto file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the
law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the
failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for
respondent court's order of dismissal

Andamo vs. IAC

Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC
UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.

Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang,
Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of
Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners land, caused a young man to drown, damagaed
petitioners crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the
livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other destructions.
This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means
of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.

Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction
caused by respondents waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.

Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil
action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There
is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article
431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM
NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of
an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed
and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If
the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Taylor vs. Manila Electric Company

Facts: David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he
was also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical
drawing from his dads office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was
mature well beyond his age.

One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric
power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an
effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening
the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the
caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.

Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed
to children, they are liable for damages due to the companys negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.

HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person


for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off
the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages
to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the companys negligence and
the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which
led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple
attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and
hence the injuries.

Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a
cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after
the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for
doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce
an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the
use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and
the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to
the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can
there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion
might be dangerous.

The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through
his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation therefore from another.

Tayag vs. Alcantara


Facts:

September 2, 1974 a.m.: Philippine Rabbit Bus bump Pedro Tayag Sr. was
riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac driven by
Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his
instantaneous death
Judge granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil
Case while criminal case is pending judgment
RTC: acquitting the Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of
reasonable doubt
subsequently, the civil case was dismissed

ISSUE: W/N the civil case based on quasi-delict should be barred by the acquittal in
a criminal case

HELD: NO. order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside


Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely:
(1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private
respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission;
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4)
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties

CASIS 41-42

B. Distinctions

1. Torts and Quasi-delict

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner


Vs.
LIFETIME MARKETING CORPORATION, respondent
GR# 176434

FACTS:

On October 22, 1981, Lifetime Marketing Corporation (LMC) opened a current


account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Greenhills-EDSA Branch. The
account was for LMC sales agents to deposit their collections or payment in favor
of LMC. On opening the said account BPI and LMC made a special agreement that
LMC agents will accomplish three (3) copies of the deposit slips, the third copy to be
retained and be held by the teller until LMC authorized representatives shall retrieve
them on the following banking days.

Since LMC have several agents around the Philippines, sometime in 1986,
LMC availed of the BPIs inter-branch banking network services in Manila, where the
LMC agents could make deposits to any BPI branch in Metro Manila under the same
account. Under this system, BPI bank tellers were no longer obliged to retain the
extra copy of the deposit slips and BPI would send LMC a monthly bank statement
relating to the subject account. This practice was observed and complied with by
the parties.

It has been LMCs practice that it requires its agents to present a validated
deposit slip and on that basis, LMC would issue to the latter and acknowledgement
receipt.

The complaint for Damages against BPI came before the court upon
discovery of fraud when one of the LMCs Educational Consultants deposited 33
checks amounting to 2,675,594.00 in favor of LMC account at different branches of
BPI where thirteen (13) of which bore no machine validation. Upon verification with
BPI by LMC showed that LMC sales agent made the 13 check deposits and
requested to reverse the transaction after it was machine validated upon verbal
request of the sales agent even after the deposit slips were already received by BPI
tellers.

The Regional Trial Court ordered defendant bank to pay plaintiff actual
damages of 1,000,000.00 plus attorneys fees amounting to 100,000.00 and upon
appeal before the Court of appeals, the court increased the amount of damages to
2,075,695.50 and deleted the amount of 100,000.00 for attorneys fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BPI is liable for Damages for the loss of LMC?

RULING:
Yes. BPI is liable for damages for the loss of LMC.

The cause of action is based on Tort. Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict.
The three elements (3) elements of quasi-delict are: a) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or dome other person for whose acts must respond; b) damages suffered
by the plaintiff; and c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
The reversal of the transaction was unilaterally undertaken by BPIs tellers
without following normal banking procedures which requires them to ensure that all
copies of the deposit slips are surrendered by the depositor. The machine-validated
transactions do not show that the transactions have been cancelled; leading LMC to
rely on those slips and consider the account has already been paid. The fact that
were it not for the wanton reckless negligence of BPIs tellers in failing to require the
surrender of the machine-validated deposit slips before reversing the deposit
transaction, the cause of loss would have not occurred.

Coca-Cola Bottlers vs. CA

Facts: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland


Canteen in Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained
to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter
and other foreign substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH
and it was found out that the soft drinks are adulterated. As a result, her per day
sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12
December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC
which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of
Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks
manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article
1561 of the CC which prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.

RULING: Petition Denied.


The SC agrees with the CAs conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is
found on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years
and not on breach of warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is
supported by the allegations in the complaint which makes reference to the reckless
and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."

Casis, pp. 42-45

2. Quasi-delict v. Delict

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.(n)
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE: Quasi Offenses

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who, by reckless


imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty ofarresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
impos

Case: Revert back to Barredo vs Garcia

PADILLA, ROY ET AL vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioner Roy Padilla is the mayor of the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Province
of Camarines Norte, while the other petitioners are policemen of the same
municipality.
An information for the crime of grave coercion was filed against herein petitioners
for brutally demolishing and destroying the market stall and seizing the goods and
furniture contained therein which is owned by Antonio Vergara and his family
located in the Public Market, Building No. 3 of the Municipality on February 8, 1964;
since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from
the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known.
Vergara alleged in the information that the petitioners took advantage of their
government positions in the said demolition and that the same is unlawful.

Petitioner contended as a defense that the act was not unlawful but was in
compliance of a municipal ordinance declaring the market stalls as nuisance per
se and that they gave Vergara 72 hours to vacate the place, but to no avail.

The Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioners for the crime of Grave Coercion,
sentencing them to an imprisonment of five months and one day and an obligation
to pay Vergara P10,000 for actual damages, P30,000 for moral damages and
P10,000 for attorneys fees. The court held that the couple has been paying rentals
for the premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is,
therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be
summarily abated. The petitioners appealed to the higher court.

The Court of Appeals acquitted the petitioners on the ground that the crime was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, but still held them liable to pay P9,600 to Vergara
as actual damages. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending
that the extinction of the criminal offense was an extinction of the civil liability as
well. The motion was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are still liable for the civil indemnities imposed against
them even though they were acquitted in the criminal case.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners were still liable for the civil
indemnities. There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action
to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already
been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. To
require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would
mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

Under Rule 111, Sec. 3(C) of the Revised Rules of Court, the extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability does not arise where: a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; b)
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal
but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and,
where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted. Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only
a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it
may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to
that ground.

What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides was a remedy for the plaintiff in case
the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a
civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of
only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no
statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment
of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two
can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal
liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear
showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.

Petition denied.
CRUZ V CA (UMALI)
CRUZ VS CA

NATURE
Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit.

FACTS
- Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic
and General Hospital. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner
who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy
operation on March 23, 1991.
- Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the
latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. According
to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were
very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the
floor with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her
mother not to proceed with the operation.
- The following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be
postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a
conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must
be operated on as scheduled.
- Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia
underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating
room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister
immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again
this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood and the
same was brought by the attendant into the operating room.
- After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was
finished. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their
snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a
stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional
blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order
as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank.
- Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia.
Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for
breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together
with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get
oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived.
- At around 10pm, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50.
Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District
Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. The
transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of
Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended
transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District
Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the
ambulance.
- Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the
operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there
was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending physicians summoned
Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the
San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in
shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. While petitioner
was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Her death certificate states
"shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular
Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.

ISSUE WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction


against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

HELD NO
- The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do
an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be
without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking
into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
- WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other
members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present
state of medical science.
- For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and
care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert
opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems
from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in
most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should
have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are
constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other
physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It must be
remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the
instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the
necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending
to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is
rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
- Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the
exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these
circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of
reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence
of the reckless imprudence.
- In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence,
there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual
connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient.
Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines

Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court
further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable
for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had
become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the
institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising
from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-
employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.

Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may,
upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused
jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in
court when they abscond.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to
the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the
judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising
from the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may
-- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this
fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist
their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present
case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend
the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency. Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the
subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind
the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a
criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable
them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their
employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending,
nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a
criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to
the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an
employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary


civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has
become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary
civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in
arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition
of the primary civil liability.

PEOPLE V LIGON

NATURE

Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila

FACTS
- February 17, 1986, RTC convicted Fernando Gabat, of Robbery with Homicide and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua where he robbed and killed Jose Rosales y
Ortiz, a seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette
vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box containing cigarettes worth
P300.00 more or less. Rogelio Ligon,the co-accused, was never apprehended and is
still at large.

- October 23, 1983 - at about 6:10 p.m. Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen
Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused, Ligon which was
coming from Espaa Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. At the
intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the
underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, they stopped. While waiting, Gabat beckoned a
cigarette vendor, Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the
Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was
occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon
suddenly moved forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and
Rosales at the crucial moment, and immediately thereafter, is the subject
of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is not controverted,
however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to
the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the
pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General
Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined
thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.

- Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the incident was
a taxicab driven by Castillo. He was traveling on the same lane in a slightly oblique
position. The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the
foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard,
beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the
Rizal monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. He sought
their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao." The two
men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas
Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red.
He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two
men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao
and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his
companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there
was a third person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at
the rear seat.

- The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and
turned over to Pfc. Fermin Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went
along with them. Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23,
1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the
following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's
Office for further investigation.

- December 6, 1983 - Investigating Fiscal Cantos, filed an information against


Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.

- October 31, 1983 - an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of NBI
which stated the cause of death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral,
secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."

- June 28, 1984 - Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio
Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on a Supplemental
Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo
Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident . These affidavits
were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17,
1984.

- prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver that
Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand
from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the
pavement.

- The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there
can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales
because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi
and hang on to its window. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat
forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the
Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down, having already been able to
balance himself on the stepboard.

- On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat
that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi,
holding it with his left hand, while he was trying to get from his pocket the change
for the 5peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of common knowledge that
cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette
box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bill
given by a customer.

ISSUE WON the prosecutions set of facts should be given credence

HELD NO

- a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances
had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the
result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt
which would entitle the accused to acquittal.
- While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no
motive, according to the court a quo, "other than to see that justice be done," his
testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely free from doubt because his
observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab which
Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was
riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial.

- Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978
Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying approximately one-third (1/3)
of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe
clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated.
These are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating
Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette
vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. As the taxicab was
right behind the Kombi, following it at a distance of about three meters, Castillo's
line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony
that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the
latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt,
specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds, and
both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic.

- Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral
certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's
conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this
case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.

- However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free
from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required
in a civil action for damages.

- Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:

"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It
has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal
was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot
be demanded.
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result
of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other, One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by
the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that
article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved
only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less
private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and homicide, but
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz

CASIS 46-60

3. QUASI DELICT VS BREACH OF CONTRACT

Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages. (1101)

Article 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any
waiver of an action for future fraud is void. (1102a)

Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every


kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the
courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
(1104a)
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)

Article 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-
delict.

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad

On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He
was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the
train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his
seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from
the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of
watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused
him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train
and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the
train slowed down.

It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of
watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as
he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to
stop.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common
practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco
has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him
to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an
aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons
were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.

The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under
Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:
NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the
selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter,
whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by
the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and
the person injured.

The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary
act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention,
has caused damage to another.

These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that
a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-
contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.

Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance


of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-contractual
undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.

Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law, or the right of the obligee to
enforce a civil matter in a court of law.

Fores v. Miranda

Facts: Defendant-petitioner Paz Fores brings this petition for review of the decision
of the court of appeals awarding to plaintiff-respondent Ireneo Miranda the sums of
P5000 by way of actual damages and counsel fees, and P10,000 as moral damages.
Story goes, respondent was a passenger on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga.
While the jeepney was descending Sta.Mesa Bridge, at an excessive rate of speed,
the driver lost control and hit the bridge wall. 5 passengers including the
respondent suffered injuries. Respondent for emphasis suffered a fracture on the
upper right humerus to which he underwent 3 surgeries at the Orthopedic Hospital.
The first was to attach wire loops were wound around the bones and screwed in
place, the second, to insert a metal splint, and the third, to remove such splint. The
driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and
was convicted thereof because he pleaded guilty. The jeepney on the otherhand was
registered under the name of Paz Fores. The vehicle even had the name plainted
below its windshield. Petitioner contended that one day before the accident, she
allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen
Sackerman. The question interposed by petitioner is whether or not the approval of
the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle
even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same. The petitioner
seems to argue that if it was valid then petitioner should not be made liable. The SC
also passed upon the justness of the damages awarded in particular moral
damages.

Issue : whether or not the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for
the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority
to operate the same.
Whether or not the moral damages may be awarded in this case.

Held: The court of appeals found that the alleged sale was merely dubious and
fake, but still answered the query in the affirmative. A transfer contemplated by the
law if made without the requisite approval of the public service commission is not
effective and binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under the
franchise in relation to the public is concerned. It does not contemplate the vehicle
itself, but rather the fact that the vehicle shall be used to engage in public service,
as public service property.
No, moral damages are generally not recoverable in damage actions predicated on
a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219, 2220 and 2176
of the New Civil Code.
Article 2219: Moral damages may be recovered in the ff analogous cases: 1) A
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; 2) quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries.
Article 2220, Will injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that under the circumstances such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
Article 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is
called a quasi-delict, and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Hence with the above, we realize that: 1) to recover moral damages from
breach of contract, there must be proof of bad faith, fraud or deliberate injurious
conduct; 2) breach of contract however does not fall under the term analogous
cases in article 2219, because of the definition of quasi-delict in Article 2176
expressly excludes cases where there is a pre-existing contractual relation bet. the
parties. In this case, there is a contract. To recover moral damages though we resort
to Article 1764.
The exception to the rule however is Article 1764, which makes the
common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Article 2206 that entitles the
spouse, descendants, and ascendants of the deceased passenger to demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of death of the deceased. Hence, in
summation where the passenger does not die, moral damages are not
recoverable, unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. In
this case, there is no showing of malice or bad faith. Even the in cases of injury, the
presumption against the common carrier is just negligence and not malicious. Since
in this case, Miranda is still alive, and no evidence proves maliciousness, the award
of moral damage must be dropped. The actual and attorneys fees amounting to
P2000 is deemed fair.

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS CA

Doctrine: In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the


defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the
contract

Facts: Private respondent Luis Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD
issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch.
Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent
Clarita S. Luna. however, Clarita lost her credit card and FEBTC was informed. In
order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this
nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to be to
meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or
"Cancelled Card" in its master file.
Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close Filipino-American friend and another
guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay
for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who
promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card
Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill
amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident. In a letter,
private respondent Luis, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of
damages. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank expressed the bank's apologies to
Luis. In his letter that when a card is reported to the office as lost, FAREASTCARD
undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use (such as tagging the
card as hotlisted), however, FAREASTCARD failed to inform you about its security
policy.
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents filed a complaint for damages
against FEBTC wherein the trial court rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay
private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary
damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this
Court with this petition for review.

Issue: Whether Luis Luna is entitled to damages

Held: NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the
defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the
contract. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Concededly,
the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's
cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court,
however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to
cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to
give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad
faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful
act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea
of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or ill will. Also, Article 21 states "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or
as correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed
when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art.
2230, Civil Code). In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is
shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. In
contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code). Given the above premises and the
factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to sustain the
exemplary damages granted by the courts.
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card
issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of
damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated
or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery
to be just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound discretion
on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court.
The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary
damages to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay private
respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages.

Air France v. Rafael Carrascoso + CA (1966) / Sanchez

Facts
Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. Air France,
through PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket. From Manila to
Bangkok, he traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced
him to vacate his seat, because a "white man" had a "better right" to it. He refused
and even had a heated discussion with the manager but after being pacified by
fellow passengers, he reluctantly gave up the seat.
Air France asserts that the ticket does not represent the true and complete intent
and agreement of the parties, and that the issuance of a first class ticket did not
guarantee a first class ride (depends upon the availability of seats). CFI and CA
disposed of this contention.

Issue and Holding


WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims. YES

Ratio
On CA's decision
Air France charges that CA failed to make complete findings of fact on all
issues presented. SC says that so long as CA's decision contains the facts
necessary to warrant its conclusions, there is nothing wrong in
withholding any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for
the defense.

On the seat issue


If a first-class ticket holder is not entitled to a corresponding seat, what
security can a passenger have? It's very easy to strike out the stipulations
in the ticket and say that there was a contrary verbal agreement. There
was no explanation as to why he was allowed to take a first class seat
before coming to Bangkok if indeed he had no seat or if someone had a
better right to it.

On contract to transport, QD, etc.


This is different in kind and degree from any other contractual obligation because of
the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation as they have a right to be treated by the employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy, consideration. What happened was a violation of public
duty by Air France--a case of QD, so damages are proper. A case was cited wherein
it was said that although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual in
origin and nature, the act that breaks the K may be also a tort.

On the issue of award of damages


Air France assails CA's award of moral damages, claiming that since Carrascoso's
action is based on breach of contract, there must be an averment of fraud or bad
faith in order to avail of said award. While there was no specific mention of "bad
faith," it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth. Deficiency in the
complaint, if any, was cured by evidence.

Allegations in the complaint on this issue:


There was a K to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering the Bangkok-Teheran
leg
This K was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transpo at Bangkok
There was bad faith when the manager compelled Carrascoso to leave his seat after
he was already seated and to transfer to the tourist class, thereby making him
suffer inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation, etc.
bad faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes

See NCC 21. Upon the provisions of NCC 2219 (10), moral damages are recoverable.
Exemplary damages are well awarded also, since NCC gives the court power to
grant such in K and QK, with the condition that the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Phil School Of Business Administration V. CA

Facts: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos
Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the RTC
of Manila, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time
of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It
was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic
community but were elements from outside the school.
The Bautista Spouses (private respondents herein) sought to adjudge PSBA officers
liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness
and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the
attack on the victim.
PSBA officers sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides in part:
teachers, or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody., the complaint states no cause of action against them, because they are
beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The RTC overruled petitioners' contention and denied their motion to dismiss. The
CA affirmed the RTCs order.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming RTCs order

Ruling: While we agree with the CA that the motion to dismiss the complaint was
correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not
however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.
CA anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code. It had been stressed that the damage should have been
caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be
held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for the assailants of
Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made
liable.
This, however, does not exculpate petitioners from liability.
Because the present case evinces a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article
2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court
from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
What comes to mind is Article 21, which provides that any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
There is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had
been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures.
This would be for the trial court to determine. The negligence of the school cannot
exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of
schools, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
students against all risks. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the
security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs.
Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the
breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence.
Hence the petition to dismiss is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is
hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court.

SYQUIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY,
INC.,
(digest by Katrina Gutierrez)

FACTS:
On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed Syquia,
plaintiff-appellants herein, filed a complaint for damages against defendant-
appellee, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (MMPC for brevity)
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale and Interment
Order No. 7106 executed between Juan J. Syquia and MMPC, the former, father of
deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed MMPC to inter the
remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery conformably and in
accordance with MMPC interment procedures;
That preparatory to transferring the said remains to a newly purchased family plot
also at the cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was
removed from its niche underground with the assistance of certain employees of
MMPC;
That as the concrete vault was being raised to the surface, the Syquias discovered
that the concrete vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in diameter near
the bottom of one of the walls closing out the width of the vault on one end and that
for a certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water drained out of the hole;
That pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Paraaque,
plaintiffs with the assistance of licensed morticians and certain personnel of MMPC
caused the opening of the concrete vault . That upon opening the vault, the
following became apparent to the Syquias (a) the interior walls of the concrete vault
showed evidence of total flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely damaged by water,
filth and silt causing the wooden parts to warp and separate and to crack the
viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased; (c)
the entire lining of the coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of
the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by the action of the water and silt
and were also coated with filth.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that there could be no quasi-delict
because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there
was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and defendant MMPC.
The Syquias appealed to the Court of Appeals, however, the latter affirmed the
judgment of dismissal. Hence the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON MMPC breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether
private respondent was guilty of a negligent act which constituted a quasi-delict
HELD: No breach. No tort.
On issue of BREACH of contract: Although a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find
no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict.
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the MMPC entered into a
contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care" That agreement
governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and
obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict orculpa
aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in
the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault
would be waterproof. Private respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained
that the term "sealed" meant "closed." On the other hand, the word "seal" is
defined as . . . any of various closures or fastenings . . . that cannot be opened
without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized
opening." The meaning that has been given by private respondent to the word
conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear that
"sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when the
terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.
Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be
interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.
On issue of NEGLIGENCE:
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision
providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the
obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act boring of the
hole negate the allegation of negligence. The reason for the act was explained by
Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said that: A day before Juan Syquia was
buried our personnel dug a grave. After digging the next morning a vault was taken
and placed in the grave and when the vault was placed on the grave a hole was
placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining
heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would
be filled with water and the digging would caved in and the earth, the earth would
(sic) caved in and fill up the grave.
Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a
heavy rainfall, from the above-mentioned explanation, private respondent has
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation
of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around
the grave filling the same with earth.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find
no reason to award damages in favor of petitioners.
AFFIRMED in toto the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals

Calalas v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga , a college freshman majoring in Physical
Education took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente
Calalas. Since the jeepney was filled to capacity, Sunga was given an extension
seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. When
the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off, she gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and
owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney causing
Sunga to sustain several injuries. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-
party complaint against Salva, the owner of the truck. The lower court rendered
judgment against Salva and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the
driver of the truck who was responsible for the accident. The same court also held in
Civil Case No. 3490 that the truck owner and its driver are jointly liable to Calalas
for quasi-delict. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the lower court on the
ground that Sunga's cause of action is based on contract of carriage and adjudged
Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The third-party complaint against Salva and
Verena was dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not the judgment in the case for quasi-delict (Civil Case No. 3490) filed
by Calalas against Salva and Verena constitutes res judicata to the case at bar.
Whether or not the bumping of the jeepney by the truck was a caso fortuito.
Whether or not the award of moral damages in the instant case is proper.

Held:
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the instant case. The issues involved
in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The former is
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana which has as its source the negligence of
the tortfeasor while the latter is based on breach of contract or culpa contractual
which is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common
carries, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. The ruling in the
civil case for quasi-delict finding Salva and Verena liable for damages to Calalas
does not bind Sunga. The doctrine of proximate cause applies only in actions for
quasi-delict and not in actions involving breach of contract.
Petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito is untenable. The requisites of caso fortuito are: (a)
the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will,; (b) the event is
unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor did not take
part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger
of improperly parking his jeepney. Further, upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arose and petitioner failed to prove that he
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. As found by
appellate court, petitioner violated R.A. No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. Hence, petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage with Sunga.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract except where mishap results in the death of a
passenger or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith. In the case at bar,
there was no basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding
that the petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

CASIS 61-104

III. Negligence

A. Concept of Negligence
Definition; Elements

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and
2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, Petitioner, vs. ETHEL BRUNTY and


JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA, Respondents

FACTS:

Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American


citizen, came to the Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980.
Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M.
Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan driven by
Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980.
By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on itsway to
Tutuban, Metro Manila as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m.,
January 24, 1980. By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita
were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal,Moncada,
Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle,
unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to collide
with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the
Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered
serious physical injuries. A certain James Harrow brought Rhonda
Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital in Tarlac, where she was
pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered
severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He
was transferred to the Manila Doctors Hospital, and later to the Makati
Medical Center for further treatment. PNR insisted among others that
the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence and
recklessness of Garcia and Mercelita. It insisted that it had
provided adequate warning signals at the railroad crossing and had exercised
due care in the selection and supervision of its employees.

ISSUE#1: W/N the contention of PNR as to the proximate cause correct?

HELD: NO.

RATIO: In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the


parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following test:
Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. Petitioner was found
negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary safety device to
ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track. As such, it is
liable for damages for violating the provisions of Article 2176 of the New Civil
CodeIt was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents
herein) sustained damage or injury as a result of the collision. That there was
negligence on the part of PNR is, likewise, beyond cavil. Considering the
circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, the
alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not
only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in
transportation. Pictures presented in evidence revealed that: 1)
there were no flag bars or safety railroad bars;2) warning signals were
inadequate;3) the place was not properly lighted such that even if a flagman
was stationed at the site, it would be impossible to know or see a railroad
track ahead. A vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have
difficulty in knowing that there is an approaching train because of
the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is
imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in
the area. Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of
exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and
property a trail road crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of
trains and in the maintenance of the crossings.

Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make


and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road,
good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient
elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every
kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give
notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of
looking out for trains.

Note: In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a claim
based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (1) damage to
plaintiff;(2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some
person for whose acts he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of
cause and effect between such negligence and damage. Applying
the foregoing requisites, the CA correctly made the following conclusions: It
was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents
herein)sustained damage or injury as a result of the collision.
That there was negligence on the part of PNR is, likewise, beyond cavil.
Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, the
alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad
crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled
safety standards in transportation. x x xISSUE#2: W/N there was a
contributory negligence on Merceditas part?

HELD: YES.

RATIO: Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,


contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove
contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link,
although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the
succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only
when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for
its occurrence. Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it was also
established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes Benz at a
speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards
before reaching the railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven the
car the way he did. However, while his acts contributed to the
collision, they nevertheless do not negate petitioners liability. Pursuant to
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, the only effect suchcontributory
negligence could have is to mitigate liability, which, however, is not
applicable in this case since the relationship between Mercelita, the driver,
and Rhonda Brunty was not alleged.

DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE: Negligence is the omission to do


something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In
Corliss v. Manila Rail road Company, this Court held that negligence is
want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance
which the circumstances reasonably require. In determining whether
or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation,
jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in
doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
the person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
pater familias of the Roman law

*CASIS 106-116

B. Degrees of Negligence

Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the


defendant acted with gross negligence.
Marinduque VS. Workmens

Lessons Applicable: Degrees of Negligence (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

August 23, 1951 6:00 am: In Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together
with other laborers of the Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. rode a truck driven
by its employee Procopio Macunat and on its way to the mine camp at
Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it
turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of Mamador and injury
to the others
In a criminal case, Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased but has paid nothing
Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of the
Workmens Compensation Commissioner confirming the referees award of
compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death
Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. maintains that this claim is barred
by section 6 of the Workmens Compensation Law because
(a) Macunat was prosecuted and required to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased
for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamadors widow promised to
forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him before the
authorities for prosecution
(b) an amicable settlement was concluded between said heirs
and Macunat
Nava vs. Inchausti Co.: indemnity granted the heirs in a
criminal prosecution of the other person does not affect the liability of the
employer to pay compensation

ISSUE: W/N Mamador having violated the employers prohibition against laborers
riding the haulage trucks was notorious negligence thereby precluding recovery

HELD: NO. award of compensation is hereby affirmed


under the circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with
negligence since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the
riders
Getting or accepting a free ride on the companys haulage truck
couldnt be gross negligence - no danger or risk was apparent
notorious negligence = gross negligence
conscious indifference to consequences
pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result
in injury
utter disregard of consequences
Seperate Opinion by Montemayor:
Injury was not in the course of the employment but was not raised on the
lower courts or in the appeal

CONCEPCION ILAO-ORETA v. SPOUSES EVA MARIE and BENEDICTO NOEL


RONQUILLO, et al.

FACTS: Respondent spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo and Noel Benedicto


Ronquillo had not been blessed with a child despite several years of marriage. They
thus consulted petitioner Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician-gynecologist-
consultant and chief of the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section at the
St. Lukes Medical Center. Dr. Ilao-Oreta advised Eva Marie to undergo a
laparoscopic procedure whereby a laparascope would be inserted through the
patients abdominal wall to get a direct view of her internal reproductive organ in
order to determine the real cause of her infertility.

The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. to be


performed by Dr. Ilao-Oreta. Eva Marie, accompanied by Noel, checked in at the St.
Lukes Medical Center and underwent pre-operative procedures including the
administration of intravenous fluid and enema. However, Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not
arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure and no prior notice of its cancellation
was received. It turned out that the doctor was on a return flight from Hawaii to, and
arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in, Manila.

The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St.
Lukes Medical Center for breach of professional and service contract and for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City. They prayed for the
award of actual damages including alleged loss of income of Noel while
accompanying his wife to the hospital, moral damages, exemplary damages, costs
of litigation, attorneys fees, and other available reliefs and remedies. The RTC
decided in favor of Ronquillo spouses and awarded Eva Marie actual damages but
ruled that the failure of the doctor to arrive on time was not intentional. It found no
adequate proof that Noel had been deprived of any job contract while attending to
his wife in the hospital. The spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals and found
that Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Ilao-Oreta is guilty of gross negligence for her failure to
arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure

HELD: It bears noting that when she was scheduling the date of her performance of
the procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and was preparing for her
honeymoon, and it is of common human knowledge that excitement attends its
preparations. Her negligence could then be partly attributed to human frailty which
rules out its characterization as gross.

Dr. Ilao-Oretas negligence not being gross, Ronquillo spouses are not entitled to
recover moral damages. Neither are the spouses entitled to recover exemplary
damages in the absence of a showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, nor to award of attorneys
fees as, contrary to the finding of the CA that the spouses were compelled to
litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest, the records show that they did
not exert enough efforts to settle the matter before going to court.

*CASIS 116-125

C. Standard of Conduct: Casis 126-175

1. Ordinary Prudent person/The Fictitious Person

Amado Picart VS Frank Smith

37 Phil 809 Civil Law Torts and Damages Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

Facts: In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his horse and while they were
on a 75 meter long bridge, he saw Frank Smith Jr.s car approaching. Smith blew his
horn thrice while he was still at a distance away because Picart and his horse were
on Smiths lane. But Picart did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he
moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith continued driving towards Picart without
slowing down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved to the other
lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the bridge; the horse
struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which required several
days of medical attention while the horse eventually died.

ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent.

HELD: Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But
Smiths negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew
his horn that Picart and his horse did not move to the other lane so he should have
steered his car to the other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute.
He therefore had the last clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When
Smiths car has approached the horse at such proximity it left no chance for Picart
extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore
recover damages from Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of his
contributory negligence.

ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC. vs. SPOUSES JORGE
G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007

FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia
de R. C. Sicam located in Paraaque to secure a loan.

On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away
whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault.
On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry
due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu then wroteback
expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for
withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed to return the jewelry.

Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with the RTC of
Makati seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of AD,
MD and ED as well as AF.

The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents complaint as well as


petitioners counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the CA which
reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual value of the
lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners MR denied, hence the instant petition for review on
Certiorari.

ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their
possession? (Petitioners insist that they are not liable since robbery is a fortuitous
event and they are not negligent at all.)
HELD: The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

YES

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:


Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or


avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen
or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or
to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee
the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if
it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
obligations in a normal manner; and,
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
or loss.

The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who
invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is
necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss.
Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the time of
the robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the pawnshop business in
1983, he thought of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of
safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned
articles should only be stored in a vault inside the pawnshop. The very measures
which petitioners had allegedly adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery
was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated. Sicams testimony,
in effect, contradicts petitioners defense of fortuitous event.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any negligence by
which the loss of the pawned jewelry may have been occasioned.

Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose
the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners.

Petitioners merely presented the police report of the Paraaque Police Station on
the robbery committed based on the report of petitioners employees which is not
sufficient to establish robbery. Such report also does not prove that petitioners were
not at fault. On the contrary, by the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err
in finding that petitioners are guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence as
provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages.

**
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and other
establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special
laws and regulations concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiarily, the
provisions on pledge, mortgage and antichresis.

The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides that the
creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of a
family. This means that petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a prudent
person would as to his own property.

In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides:


Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. It is want of care required by the circumstances.

A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable
care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop
business. Sicams testimony revealed that there were no security measures adopted
by petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient precaution
and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the pawnshop from unlawful
intrusion. There was no clear showing that there was any security guard at all. Or if
there was one, that he had sufficient training in securing a pawnshop. Further, there
is no showing that the alleged security guard exercised all that was necessary to
prevent any untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious individuals were
allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is even doubtful that there was a security
guard, since it is quite impossible that he would not have noticed that the robbers
were armed with caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly poked at the
employees. Significantly, the alleged security guard was not presented at all to
corroborate petitioner Sicams claim; not one of petitioners employees who were
present during the robbery incident testified in court.

Furthermore, petitioner Sicams admission that the vault was open at the time of
robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners failure to observe the care, precaution and
vigilance that the circumstances justly demanded.

The robbery in this case happened in petitioners pawnshop and they were
negligent in not exercising the precautions justly demanded of a pawnshop.

NOTES:

We, however, do not agree with the CA when it found petitioners negligent for not
taking steps to insure themselves against loss of the pawned jewelries.

Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374, Rules and Regulations for
Pawnshops, which took effect on July 13, 1973, and which was issued pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 114, Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is provided that pawns
pledged must be insured, to wit:

Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building and Pawns- The place of business of a
pawnshop and the pawns pledged to it must be insured against fire and against
burglary as well as for the latter(sic), by an insurance company accredited by the
Insurance Commissioner.
However, this Section was subsequently amended by CB Circular No. 764 which
took effect on October 1, 1980, to wit:

Sec. 17 Insurance of Office Building and Pawns The office building/premises and
pawns of a pawnshop must be insured against fire. (emphasis supplied).
where the requirement that insurance against burglary was deleted. Obviously, the
Central Bank considered it not feasible to require insurance of pawned articles
against burglary.

The robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987, and considering the above-quoted
amendment, there is no statutory duty imposed on petitioners to insure the pawned
jewelry in which case it was error for the CA to consider it as a factor in concluding
that petitioners were negligent.

Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence shows that petitioners failed to


exercise the diligence required of them under the Civil Code.

Corinthian Gardens Association vs Spouses Tanjangcos and Spouses


Cuasos
June 27, 2008
Nachura, J.

Torts and Damages:


* (ELEMENTS/REQUISITES)
In every tort case filed under Article 2176, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for
whose act he must respond; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred.
* (DEFINITION)
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done
from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a
situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of
nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the
actor's position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee
such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the
act or to do it in a more careful manner.
* (TEST)
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
person would have used in the same situation?

Facts:

Tanjangcos owned joined lots in Corinthian Gardens. Spouse Cuasos, on the


other hand, own a lot adjacent to the formers.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house, it was surveyed by De Dios Realty
(surveyor) as per recommendation of the petitioner association. Later on, the
petitioner approved the plans made by CB Paras Construction (builder).
Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine
compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and
Regulations of Corinthian (MRRC). Unfortunately, after construction, the
perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached upon the Tanjangcos lot.

Issue:

Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and, if so,


whether such negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

Decision:

Corinthian is negligent. Its approval of the plan is tainted with negligence.

Ratio:

Petitioner is found negligent under the TEST. The MRRC provides that no new
constructions can be started without the approval of the petitioner association.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in
the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-
going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring
compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter
walls.

Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter


wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted
constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury
suffered by the Tanjangcos.

NB

- The court here categorized the case as falling under tort. Take
note that there are discussions regarding similarity or difference
of a QD and a tort. (just thinking out loud)
- This is another case where the court ruled using Article 2176
despite the fact that there is an existing contractual obligation
between the parties. (just a thought to ponder on)

2. Special Circumstances

Heirs of Completo v. Albayda, Jr.

Facts Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the taxi
driver of a Toyota Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on
his way to the office, when Completos taxi bumped and sideswept him, causing
serious physical injuries. He [Albayda] was brought to the PH Air Force General
Hospital, but he was transferred to the AFP Medical Center because he sustained a
fracture and there was no orthopedic doctor available in the first hospital. He was
confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb 1998, and again in 23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998
[approx. 7 months].

Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed a complaint for physical
injuries through reckless imprudence against Completo before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay. Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through
reckless imprudence against Albayda. The Office of the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of an information for Albaydas complaint, and Completos
complaint [against Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda manifested his reservation to
file a separate civil action for damages against Completo and Abiad.

Albayda alleged that Completos negligence is the proximate cause of the


incident. He demanded the following damages and their respective amounts: Actual
damages 276,550; Moral damages 600,000; Exemplary damages
200,000; Attorneys fees 25,000 + 1,000 per court appearance.

On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab
when he heard a strange sound from the taxicabs rear right side. He found Albayda
lying on the road, holding his left leg, so he brought Albayda to PH Air Force General
Hospital. Completo asserted that he was an experienced driver, and that he already
reduced his speed to 20km even before reaching the intersection. In contrast,
Albayda rode his bicycle at high speed, causing him to lose control of the bicycle.
Completo said that Albayda had no cause of action.

Several people testified for each side, but here are some notes on the testimony
of the owner of the taxi driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a soldier, he
also held franchises of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys, and being a taxicab
operator, he would wake up early to personally check the taxicabs. When Completo
applied as a taxicab driver, Abiad required him to show his bio-data, NBI clearance,
and drivers license. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since he was
employed, and according to Abiad, he [Completo] was a good driver and good man.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the defendants are ordered to
pay actual [46k] and moral [400k] damages, and attorneys fees [25k]. Upon appeal
at the CA, the court affirmed RTCs decision with modifications [no more actual
damages; awarded temperate damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k; Completo
and Abiad are solidarily liable to pay Albayda; added legal interest].

Issues and Holding

1. WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the collision.
NO
2. WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of
the family. YES
3. WON the award of moral and temperate damages and attorneys fees for
Albayda had no basis.

Ruling: NO / NO / YES

Ratio
On Negligence
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorists breach in his duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required
to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury suffered. NCC 2176 quoted, and said that the question of the motorists
negligence is a question of fact. Usually, more will be required of a motorist
[25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist [10mi/hr = 15ft/sec] in discharging the duty of
care because of the physical advantages the former has over the latter.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise
reasonable diligence.

He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albaydas bicycle; he did not slow
down even when he approached the intersection
Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the injuries sustained
by Albayda
It was proven that Albayda had the right of way since he reached the
intersection ahead of Completo

NCC 2180 cited obligation imposed by NCC 2176 is demandable also for those
persons for whom one is responsible. Employers are liable for damage caused by
employees, but the responsibility ceases upon proof that employers observed the
diligence of the good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
employees. The burden of proof is on the employer. The responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for QD is solidary. The employers civil liability for his
employees negligent acts is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in
selecting and supervising them, and this liability attaches even if the employer is
not in the vehicle at the time of collision.

In the selection of employees, employers are required to examine them as to


their qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to supervision,
employers should formulate SOPs and monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches. To establish these factors in a trial involving the
issue of vicarious [secondary] liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.
ABIADS EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, AND THIS IS
INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT
IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF COMPLETO.

On Damages
CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages because Albayda failed to
present documentary evidence to establish the amount incurred. Temperate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. Moral damages are
awarded in QDs causing physical injuries, so the award is proper. The award of
attorneys fees is deleted for failure to prove that petitioners acted in bad faith in
refusing to satisfy respondents just and valid claim.

SPOUSES PACIS VS. MORALES


G.R. No. 169467
February 25, 2010

FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against
respondent Morales.

Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a
shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City.
Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales
agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun
which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with Morales
for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to
Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the
caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted
by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred
to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off,
the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was
acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of
accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.

By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for
homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their
evidence in the instant case.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant
to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the
hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory
damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial courts Decision and
absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR
denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?

HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial courts Decision
reinstated.

YES

This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners son.
Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for
damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the
RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil
Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case
filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for
damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibags employer.
Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code.

**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the
liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own negligence. Article 2176
states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under
PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of
firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a
gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or
canceled.

Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or
under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as
dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of
dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent
any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which
involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the
exercise of a higher degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms


safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure
that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and
separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not
be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental
discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent
when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without
ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should
have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair,
respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward
accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person,
until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon
is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded,
respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case
whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair
defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade
firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a
good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing
with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

3. Children

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - the following are
exempt from criminal liability:

A person under nine years of age.

A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance
with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.

When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in


conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit
him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance
and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or
person mentioned in said Art. 80.
Taylor VS Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.

Elements of quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)


Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son
of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and
having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor,
for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and
promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine
After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they
walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the
company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces
they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on
the ground
These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of
small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of
which it may be discharged by the use of electricity
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of
dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power
the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took
end, and carried them home
After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years
old, and they went to Manuel's home
The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps
trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no result
break the cap with a stone - failed
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches
David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents
An explosion followed, causing more or less serious
injuries to all three
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a
match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away,
received a slight cut in the neck
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded
David was struck in the face by several particles of
the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the
necessitate its removal by the surgeons
Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable

ISSUE:

1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light
Company liable - NO
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they employed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage - NO

HELD: reversing the judgment of the court below

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit
acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they
should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or on account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed
in a safe and proper place.

in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by


competentevidence:
1. Damages to the plaintiff
2. Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person
for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
3. The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
while we hold that the entry upon the property without express invitation or
permission would not have relieved Manila Electric from responsibility for injuries
incurred, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to his
negligence, the negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not
the proximate cause of the injury received
cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was
the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted
Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus
incurred
2 years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on
one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office,
learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after
his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued
in that employment for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that
he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both
mentally and physically than most boys of 15
The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion, as described by Jessie who even ran away
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature
of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the
cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred;
but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected
from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and
capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be
required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly
responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the
necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences
of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care
and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be
impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things
the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to
understand the character of his own acts and their consequences
he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of
caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the
direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it
may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury
rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non
intelligitur sentire
just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him
through his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from
another
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.

Jarco Marketing Co. v. CA

Facts: Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners
Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager,
operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents Conrado and
Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.

On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store. Criselda was
signing her credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and
beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter structure. She was
crying and shouting for help. He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she
died after 14 days. She was 6 years old.

Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the


hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had
incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a
complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual
damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an
unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. The trial court
dismissed the complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter
was Zhieneths act of clinging to it. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally
dangerous counter. The counter was defective, unstable and dangerous. It also
ruled that the child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now
seek for the reversal of this decision.

Issues:

(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence

(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private
respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for
failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises

Held:

(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence


attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly
through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or
unexpected by the person to whom it happens." On the other hand, negligence is
the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in determining the
existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. We rule that the
tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could
only be attributed to negligence.

(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and


statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and
admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that
they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the
declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person
who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for
ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor
whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales'
testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic
death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or
make stable the counter's base.

Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally
informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any
concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's
employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have
done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge
the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Anent the negligence
imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children
below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even
if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed
over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory
that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old
could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter
by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record
reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the
counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the
customer waiting area and its base was not secured. CRISELDA too, should be
absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the
child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise
moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at
the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from
her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her
mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even
admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything;
the counter just fell on her.

Julian Del Rosario V. Manila Electric Co

Lessons Applicable: Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
August 4, 1930 2 pm: trouble developed in a wire used by Manila Electric
Company on Dimas-Alang Street for the purpose of conducting electricity used in
lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs
Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda nearby, first noticed that the wire
was burning and its connections smoking
the wire parted and one of the ends of the wire fell to the ground
among some shrubbery close to the way
Noguera went to the nearby garage and asked Jose Soco, the
timekeeper, to telephone the Malabon station of the Manila Electric Company
2.25 p.m.: Soco transmitted the message and the station told him that they
would send an inspector
4 p.m.: neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home
Saturnino Endrina made a motion as if it touch the wire
Jose Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his father
had cautioned him never to touch a broken electrical wire, as it might have a
current
Alberto del Rosario said that "I have for some time been in the habit of
touching wires" and so feeling challenged put out his index finger and touch the
wire
He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre"
The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell
near the post
A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire and
disengaged the body
Upon arrival at St. Luke's Hospital he was pronounced
dead.
Trial Court: absolved Manila Electric Company

ISSUE: W/N Manila Electric Company should be held liable for negligence that
caused the death of Alberto

HELD: YES. judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the plaintiff will
recover of the defendant the sum of P1,250, with costs of both instances

The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to
make a special inspection of these wires at least once in six months, and that all
of the company's inspectors were required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout
for trouble of this kind.
presumption of negligence on the part of the Manila Electric Company from
the breakage of this wire has not been overcome, and it is in our opinion
responsible for the accident
It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the
deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child
would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the
deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in
our opinion, alter the case. But even supposing that contributory negligence
could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, a proposition
upon which the members of the court do not all agree, yet such negligence
would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the
determining cause of the accident.

Federico Ylarde V. Edgardo Aquino

Lessons Applicable: Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
1962: Sergio Banez started burying huge stones which were remnants of the
old school shop that was destroyed in World War II because they were serious
hazards to the schoolchildren
October 7, 1963: Edgardo Aquino gathered 18 of his male pupils, aged 10 to
11, after class dismissal and ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block
in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried.
The work was left unfinished.
October 8, 1963: Aquino called Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael
Abaga and Novelito Ylarde of the original 18 pupils to continue the digging
they dug until the excavation was 1 meter and 40 centimeters deep
Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the
pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block,
they got out of the hole
Aquino left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole
while he went to see Banez who was about 30 meters away to key to the school
workroom where he could get some rope
A few minutes after Aquino left, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully
jumped into the pit.
without any warning at all, Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block
causing it to slide down towards the opening.
Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time
unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could
get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position
Ylarde sustained the following injuries:
1. Contusion with hematoma, left inguinal region and suprapubic region.
2. Contusion with ecchymosis entire scrotal region.
3. Lacerated wound, left lateral aspect of penile skin with phimosis
4. Abrasion, gluteal region, bilateral.
5. Intraperitoneal and extrapertitoneal extravasation of blood and urine about 2
liters.
6. Fracture, simple, symphesis pubis
7. Ruptured (macerated) urinary bladder with body of bladder almost entirely
separated from its neck.
3 days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
Ylarde's parents filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano,
principal
lower court:
1. digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education
2. Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person
3. demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence
CA: affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Aquino and Soriano should be held liable for negligence

HELD: YES. the petition GRANTED. Edagardo Aquino to pay petitioners the
following:
(1) Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30,000.00
(2) Exemplary damages 10,000.00
(3) Moral damages 20,000.00

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2180. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the
death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a
school of arts and trades
Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging
GR: teachers shall be liable for the acts of their students
EX: where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable
Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he:
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers
(2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished
digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily
pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent
that the huge stone was at the brink of falling
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety
(5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
negligent act of Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has
a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde
it was but natural for the children to play around
the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe
situation created by Aquino
the excavation should not be placed in the category of school gardening,
planting trees, and the like as these undertakings do not expose the children to
any risk that could result in death or physical injuries
A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to
an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may
result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a
simple warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious
danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to
the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would
have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.
4. Experts/Professionals

Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet


articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers.

Culion vs. Philippine

Lessons Applicable: Experts and Professionals (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
January, 1925: Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on
the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner,
expecting thereby to effect economy in the cost of running the boat
He made known his desire to McLeod & Co., a firm dealing in tractors,
and was told by Mc Kellar that he might make inquiries of the Philippine Motors
Corporations
Cranston repaired to the office of the Philippine Motors Corporation and
had a conference with C.E. Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job, with
the understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work.
The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged in business as an
automobile agency, but, under its charter, it had authority to deal in all sorts of
machinery engines and motors, as well as to build, operate, buy and sell the
same and the equipment therof.
Quest, in company with Cranston, visited the Gwendoline while it lay at
anchor in the Pasig River, and the work of effecting the change in the engine was
begun
Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the
conclusion that the principal thing necessary to accomplish the end in view was
to install a new carburetor, and a Zenithcarburetor was chosen as the one most
adapted to the purpose.
After this appliance had been installed, the engine was tried with
gasoline as a fuel, supplied from the tank already in use. The result of this
experiment was satisfactory.
The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel,
consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate.
In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its
connections, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the
gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to
the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he
appeared to think lightly of the matter and said that, when the engine had gotten
to running well, the flooding would disappear.
January 30,1925 5 pm: The first part of the course was covered without any
untoward development, other than the fact that the engine stopped a few times,
owing no doubt to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the
trial Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and occupied himself
with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two
elements would give best results in the engine.
7:30 pm: and when passing near Cavite, the engine stopped, and connection
again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had
been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the
new mixture.
A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a
flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and
adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the
crew were unable to subdue. They were therefore compelled, as the fire spread,
to take to a boat, and their escape was safely effected, but the Gwendoline was
reduced to a mere hulk. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the
sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occurred, as the court
found, was P10,000.
ISSUE: W/N the incident was due to the negligence of Phil. Motors as experts.

HELD: YES. It results that the judgment appealed from, awarding damages to the
plaintiff in the amount of P9,850, with interest, must be affirmed; and it is so
ordered, with costs against the appellant.
Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster,
but in this case the leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had
created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of
this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been
due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly
mixed.
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself
out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held
liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled
in the particular work which he attempts to do.
The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines
of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in
the doing of similar work on boats.
Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats = negligence.
The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but
whether Quest was free from blame
accident is chargeable to lack of skill or negligence in effecting the changes
which Quest undertook to accomplish; and even supposing that our theory as to
the exact manner in which the accident occurred might appear to be in some
respects incorrect, yet the origin of the fire in not so inscrutable as to enable us
to say that it was casus fortuitus.

US vs. Pineda

Lessons Applicable: Experts and Professionals (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription
obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to
his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. (Santiago Pineda,
the defendant, is a registered pharmacist)
Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned
to Santos in the form of 6 papers marked Botica Pineda
Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate
which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water the doses to two of his
sick horses.
Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not
used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly
afterwards.
Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau
of Science forexamination. Drs. Pea and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on
analysis found that thepackages contained not potassium chlorate but barium
chlorate.
At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the
drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed
was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a
poison; potassium chlorate is not.)
Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses,
and found that death was the result of poisoning
RTC: held Pineda liable

ISSUE: W/N Pineda should be liable for negligence

HELD: YES. The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine
of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is
affirmed with the cost of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to
any civil action which may be instituted
Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals,
medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for
any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any
prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name,
direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so
used, sold or offered for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be
held to be adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning of this section if it
differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States
Pharmacopoeia.
The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains the following
penal provision: "Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollar." The
Administrative Code, section 2676, changes the penalty somewhat by providing
that: Any person engaging in the practice of pharmacy in the Philippine Islands
contrary to any provision of the Pharmacy Law or violating any provisions of said
law for which no specific penalty s provided shall, for each offense, be punished
by a fine not to exceed two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than
ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court.
As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and
poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to
sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the one word
"fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to
convey by this restrictive adjective?
Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant
vigorously insists upon, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any
druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a
reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation;
that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it
recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion; that he
made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the
purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered
injury.
Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we
consider are civil in nature, the question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant.
The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. Instead
of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION AND AURMELA GANZON, Petitioners, VS.


RAUL DE LEON, Respondent.

Facts:
1 Raul T. De Leon noticed that his left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty
reading. On the same evening, he met a friend who happened to be a doctor
and had just arrived from abroad for dinner.
2 De Leon consulted Dr. Milla about his irritated left eye.The latter prescribed
the drugs "CortisporinOpthalmic" and "Ceftin" to relieve his eye problems.
3 Before heading to work the following morning, De Leon went to the
Betterliving, Paraaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the
prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to petitioner
AurmelaGanzon, a pharmacist assistant.Subsequently, he paid for and took
the medicine handed over by Ganzon.
4 De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops.As
instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on respondent's left eye.
5 Instead of relieving his irritation, respondent felt searing pain so
immediately, he rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not
subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine,
"CortisporinOtic Solution.
6 De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch and confronted Ganzon
why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did
not apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read
the prescription. In fact, it was her supervisor who apologized and informed
De Leon that they do not have stock of the needed CortisporinOpthalmic.
7 De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its president about the day's incident.
It did not merit any response. Instead, two sales persons went to his office
and informed him that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having
been denied his simple desire for a written apology and explanation,De Leon
filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.
8 MERCURY DRUGS CONTENTION- Mercury Drug and Ganzon pointed out that
De Leon's own negligence was the proximate cause of his injury. They argued
that any injury would have been averted had De Leon exercised due diligence
before applying the medicine on his eye. Had he cautiously read the
medicine bottle label, he would have known that he had the wrong medicine.
9 RTC- rendered judgment in favor of De Leon.
a The proximate cause of the ill fate of plaintiff was defendant Aurmila
(sic) Ganzon's negligent exercise of said discretion. She gave a
prescription drug to a customer who did not have the proper form of
prescription, she did not take a good look at said prescription, she
merely presumed plaintiff was looking for CortisporinOtic Solution
because it was the only one available in the market and she further
presumed that by merely putting the drug by the counter wherein
plaintiff looked at it, paid and took the drug without any objection
meant he understood what he was buying.
b Although De Leon may have been negligent by failing to read the
medicine's label or to instruct his sheriff to do so, Mercury Drug was
first to be negligent. Ganzon dispensed a drug without the requisite
prescription. Moreover, she did so without fully reading what medicine
was exactly being bought.In fact, she presumed that since what was
available was the drug CortisporinOtic Solution, it was what De Leon
was attempting to buy
CA dismissed the appeal and the motion for reconsideration on the ground that if
statement of fact is unaccompanied by a page reference to the record, it may be
stricken or disregarded all together. Hence the petition.

TORTIOUS ACTS: Pharmacist gave the wrong medicine


WHAT IT IS: Culpa-Contractual
LEGAL BASIS: Druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence
and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards
consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not
constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons
for harmless medicines.

ISSUE: Mercury Drug and Ganzonhad exercised the degree of diligence expected of
them.

HELD: NO

RATIO: Mercury Drug and Ganzon failed to exercise the highest degree of diligence
expected of them. Mercury Drug and Ganzoncan not exculpate themselves from any
liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the
highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them.

The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must
exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to
practical men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest
practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and
reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business,
so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from
the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.
one holding himself out as competent to handle drugs, having rightful access
to them, and relied upon by those dealing with him to exercise that high
degree of caution and care called for by the peculiarly dangerous nature of
the business, cannot be heard to say that his mistake by which he furnishes a
customer the most deadly of drugs for those comparatively harmless, is not
in itself gross negligence.

In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly


arises a presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the
employer, either in the selection or supervision of one's employees. This
presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to
overcome such presumption. Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live
up to high standard of diligence expected of them as pharmacy professionals. They
were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed eye drops
to De Leon. Worse, they have once again attempted to shift the blame to their
victim by underscoring his own failure to read the label.

As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its
employees in dispensing to him the right medicine. This Court has ruled that in the
purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There
exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent
death or injury to any person who relies on one's absolute honesty and peculiar
learning. Mercury Drug and Ganzon's defense that the latter gave the only available
Cortisporin solution in the market deserves scant consideration. Ganzon could have
easily verified whether the medicine she gave De Leon was, indeed, the prescribed
one or, at the very least, consulted her supervisor. Absent the required certainty in
the dispensation of the medicine, she could have refused De Leon's purchase of the
drug.

The award of damages is proper and shall only be reduced considering the peculiar
facts of the case. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or
omission. However, the award of damages must be commensurate to the loss or
injury suffered.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest.
This cannot be more real for Mercury Drug, the country's biggest drugstore chain.
This Court cannot tolerate any form of negligence which can jeopardize the health
and safety of its loyal patrons. Moreover, this Court will not countenance the
cavalier manner it treated De Leon. Not only does a pharmacy owe a customer the
duty of reasonable care, but it is also duty-bound to accord one with respect.

Dr. Ninevetch Cruz v. CA and Lydia Umali


1997 / Francisco / Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision
Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals

FACTS
Medical malpractice suit - type of claim which a victim has available to him/her
to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily
harm; most often brought as a civil action for damages under NCC 2176 or
a criminal case under RPC 365, with which a civil action for damages is
impliedly instituted.

Lydia Umali was examined by Dr. Cruz who found a myoma [benign tumor] in her
uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation [removal of uterus] on
23 Mar 1991. Rowena Umali de Ocampo accompanied her mother to the hospital a
day before the operation, and they spent the night there. Rowena noticed that
the clinic was untidy, so she tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the
operation. The following day, Rowena asked Dr. Cruz if the operation could be
postponed, but Lydia told her daughter that Dr. Cruz said that the operation must go
on as scheduled.
While Lydia's relatives were waiting, Dr. Ercillo (anesthesiologist) told them to
buy tagamet ampules, and Rowena's sister went out to buy some. An hour later,
Dr. Ercillo asked them to buy blood for Lydia, so they did. A few hours later, the
operation was finished, but later, Dr. Cruz asked the family to buy additional
blood, but there was no more type A blood available in the blood bank. A person
arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena noticed that
her mother was gasping for breath--apparently, the oxygen supply had run
out, so the family went out to buy oxygen. Later in the evening, she went
into shock and her blood pressure dropped. She was then transferred to
another hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined.
However, this transfer was without the consent of the relatives, who only
found out about it when an ambulance came to take Lydia to the other
hospital.
In the new hospital, she was re-operated upon by Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo
because blood was oozing out from her incision. They summoned Dr. Angeles, Ob-
Gyne head of the new hospital, but when he arrived, Lydia was already
in shock and possibly dead (BP: 0/0). Dr. Angeles told Drs. Cruz and Ercillo that
there was nothing he could do. Lydia died while Dr. Cruz was closing her abdominal
wall. Immediate cause of death is shock; disseminated intravascular
coagulation (DIC) as antecedent cause.
Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and
negligence resulting in homicide of Lydia Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) found Dr. Ercillo not guilty for insufficiency of evidence against her,
but held Dr. Cruz responsible for Umali's death. RTC and CA affirmed MTCC.

Manifestation of negligence
untidiness of clinic
lack of provision of supplies
the fact that the transfer was needed meant that there was something wrong
in the way Dr. Cruz conducted operation
no showing that pre-surgery procedure (clearance, blood typing/tests) was
conducted
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against
Dr. Cruz for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. NO. DR. CRUZ IS
ACQUITTED, BUT SHE IS STILL CIVILLY LIABLE (50K civil liability; 100k moral
damages, 50k exemplary damages).

RATIO
Elements of reckless imprudence
1. Offender does / fails to do an act
2. Doing / failure to do act is voluntary
3. Without malice
4. Material damage results from reckless imprudence
5. There is inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into consideration offender's
employment, degree of intelligence, physical condition, other circumstances re:
persons, time, place

Standard of care
Standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing
under similar circumstances, bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession
at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science
When the physician's qualifications are admitted, there is an
inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution
and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless
the contrary is sufficiently established by expert testimony.

Expert testimony
Expert testimony is essential to establish standard of care of the profession, as
well as that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such
standard. It is also usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
There is an absence of any expert testimony re: standard of care in the case
records. NBI doctors presented by the prosecution only testified as to the possible
cause of death.
While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the lower
courts constitute reckless imprudence, this conclusion is still best arrived
not through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including
judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. The
deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from
the realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen are
incapable of intelligently evaluating.

Burden of establishing medical negligence on plaintiff


Plaintiff has the burden to establish this, and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as
well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of
patient. Negligence cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause
of the injury complained of (Chan Lugay v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc.). In this case, no
cogent proof exists that the circumstances caused Lydia's death, so the 4th
element of reckless imprudence is missing.
The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution
establish hemorrhage / hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death, which may be
caused by several different factors. Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood
vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut blood vessel that became loose. The findings
of the doctors do not preclude the probability that a clotting defect (DIC)
caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death.

The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate
Dr. Cruz' allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC, which cannot be
attributed to Dr. Cruz' fault or negligence. This probability was unrebutted during
trial.

BPI VS CA

FACTS:

1. A phone call to BPI's Money Market Department was made by a woman who
identified herself as Eligia G. Fernando, owner of a money market placement as
evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981.
2. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but Reginaldo Eustaquio, the
Dealer Trainee who received the call and who happened to be alone in the
trading room at the time, told her that trading time was over for the day.
3. Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who before had
handled Eligia G. Fernando's account but Eustaquio was left to attend to the
pretermination process.
4. The caller followed up with Eustaquio, by phone again, on the pretermination of
the placement. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G.
Fernando, Eustaquio made certain that the caller was the real Eligia G. Fernando
by verifying that the details the caller gave about the placement tallied with the
details in the ledger/folder of the account.
5. Neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's account, nor
anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando to verify the request for
pretermination.
6. Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare the requested pretermination as required
by office procedure. From his desk, the papers, following the processing route,
passed through the position analyst, securities clerk, verifier clerk and
documentation clerk, before the two cashier's checks, both payable to Eligia G.
Fernando, covering the preterminated placement, were prepared.
7. The same caller called again to give delivery instructions that instead of the
delivering the checks to her office at Philamlife, she would send her niece,
Rosemarie Fernando, to pick them up.
8. It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the dispatcher,
as shown by the delivery receipt. Actually, as it turned out, the same
impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando. Although the
checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G. Fernando's placement,
the dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note
evidencing the placement. There is also no showing that Eligia G. Fernando's
purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter
authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks, both of which letters
were presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie Fernando, was
compared or verified with Eligia G. Fernando's signature in BPI's file.
9. The story's scene now shifted whena woman who represented herself to be Eligia
G. Fernando applied at CBC's Head Office for the opening of a current account.
10.The application form shows the signature of "Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of
birth, sex, civil status, nationality, occupation ("business woman"), tax account
number, and initial deposit of P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current
account is indicated on the application form by the initials of the CBC Cashier
who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials on the application
form after reviewing it.
11.The following day, the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando
deposited the two checks in controversy. The two checks were forthwith sent to
clearing by CBC and BPI cleared both on the same day.
12.Two days after, withdrawals began. All withdrawals were allowed on the basis of
the verification of the drawer's signature with the specimen signature on file and
the sufficiency of the funds in the account.
13.When the maturity date of Eligia G. Fernado's money market placement with BPI
came, the real Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement.
She disclaimed having preterminated her placement. She executed an affidavit
stating that while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy, she never
received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back of the
checks was not hers but forged. With her surrender of the original of the
promissory note evidencing the placement which matured that day, BPI issued
her a new promissory note to evidence a roll-over of the placement.
14.Investigation of the fraud led to the filing of criminal actions for "Estafa Thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents" against four employees of BPI and the
woman who impersonated Eligia G. Fernando.
15.BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's
endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks for reason "Beyond
Clearing Time".
16.RTC ruled in favor of CBC and ordered BPI to pay CBC.
17.CA affirmed.

ISSUE(S):Whether or not it was BPI or CBCs negligence which was the proximate
cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor?
HELD:The proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was
due to the negligence of petitioner BPI. Nevertheless, the negligence of the
employees of CBC should be taken also into consideration.

RATIO:

The test by which by which to determine the existence of negligence in


a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it
from liability is not well-taken. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud
perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination of Eligia G.
Fernando's money market placement. Moreover, Fernando is not a
depositor of CBC. Hence, a comparison of the signature of Eligia G.
Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G. Fernando, which
respondent CBC did, could not have resulted in the discovery of the
fraud.
Applying the doctrine of proximate cause, petitioner BPI's contention
that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. The gap of one (1) day
between the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the impostor's name as
payee and the impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an
account and depositing the same with respondent CBC is not controlling. It is
not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating
Eligia G. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees, the
impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged
checks. There is therefore, greater reason to rule that the proximate
cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due to
the negligence of petitioner BPI. This finding, notwithstanding, we are
not inclined to rule that petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss. Due
care on the part of CBC could have prevented any loss.
The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their
eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counter
withdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. The
opening of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts
clearly showing negligence.
Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very
nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care and
trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater
than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the
banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees
resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. Both banks
were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. It was the gross negligence of the employees of
both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss.
The Court applies Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while
respondent CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by
the courts.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:The test by which by which to determine the existence of


negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.

5. INTOXICATION

Wright vs. Manila Electric

Lessons Applicable: Intoxication (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

August 8, 1909 night time: Wright who was intoxicated drove in his calesa
and as his horse leap forward along the rails of the Manila Electric company and
it fell
Wright was thrown and got injured
that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half
of their depth out of the ground making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or
more above the level of the street
RTC: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not
as great as defendant's and under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. &
P. Co. apportioned the damages and awarded Wright a judgment of P1,000

ISSUE: W/N Wright's negligence contributed to the 'principal occurrence' or 'only to


his own injury (NOT contributory) thereby he cannot recover

HELD: NO. Affirmed

Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence. It is but a circumstance to be


considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general
rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary
care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is
required than by a sober one.
Manila Electric or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the
rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a street where there is a large amount of
travel
If the Wright had been prudent on the night in question and had not
attempted to drive his conveyance while in a drunken condition, he would
certainly have avoided the damages which he received
Both parties were negligent and both contributed to the resulting damages,
although the Wright, in the judgment of the court, contributed in greater
proportion to the damages
no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the Wright was
negligent
It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the
vehicle under the conditions described
It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to
discuss the question presented by the appellant company with reference to the
applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. and we do not find facts in the
opinion of the court below which justify a larger verdict than the one found.

Dissenting Opinion by Carson:


if the case is to be decided on the findings of fact by the trial judge, these
findings sufficiently establish the negligence of Wright
The fact finding of the RTC judge, the fact that there is negligence
though not fully sustained should be assumed that there were evidentiary facts
disclosed which were sufficient to sustain that there is negligence

6. INSANITY

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

US vs. Baggay

Lessons Applicable: Insanity (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

October 14, 1909: During the holding a song service called "buni", the non-
Christian Baggay Jr. attacked a woman Bil-liingan with a bolo inflicting a serious
wound on her head causing her to die immediately.
He inflicted the same to the women named Calabayan, Agueng,
Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan.
February 15
provincial fiscal filed a complaint for murder
This cause was instituted separately from the other for lesiones
RTC: Baggay was suffering from mental aberration and was exempt
from criminal liability but obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman,
Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined
in an institution for the insane until further order of the court.

court declared said appeal out of order and dismissed it


counsel for Baggay resorted to this court with a petition praying that a writ be
issued directing judge Chanco, to admit the appeal and forward it, at the same
time annulling all action taken for execution of the judgments rendered in the
causes for murder and for lesiones
Attorney-General: writ inappropriate and that it should be remedy
of mandamus
ISSUE: W/N Baggay was exempt from criminal liability making him exempt
from civil liabilityas well

HELD: NO.
Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable
Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject to
the following:

(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a
lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and under 15,
who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have them under
their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was no
blame or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or
power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall
answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their
support in accordance with the civil law.
even when they hold the accused exempt from criminal liability, must fix
thecivil liability of the persons charged with watching over and caring for him or
the liability of the demented person him self with his property for reparation of
the damage and indemnification for the harm done
UNLESS: the offended party or the heirs of the person murdered
expressly renounce such reparation or indemnification

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