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SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR URBAN WARFARE
John C. Scharfen, et al
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, California
December 1975
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I?. D'STms4OUTIO STATSUMNT (oet uhefrn mftwoEin We 26. ItodWm hIIm ........
I. SUPPt.EOU5TARY NOTES
This is a study which awlyzes the Soviet tactical doctrine for urban
warfare. The study was conducted in tvo parts. The first part was devoted
to an extensive research into extant, open source Soviet literature. The
second part was devoted to continuing research, an analysis and report of
findings. This report is based on the second part of the study.
DISCLAIMR
CONTRACTUAL TASK
Tit overall study, which was conducted in two parts, was made under
the general supervision of Richard B. Foster, Director of the Strategic
Studies Center, and N. Hark Earle, Jr., Senior Economist and Assistant
Director. This report covers the second, analytical portion of the ef-
fort. Initially the project was undertaken by Mr. Jams T. Reitz, Senior
Soviet Area Specialist. Subsequently the project leadership was assumed
by Mr. John C. Scharfen, Senior Operations Analyst, and was researched/
authored by the interdisciplinary team of Mr. Scharfen and Dr. Michael
J. Dean*, a Soviet Area Specialist. Valuable assistance was provided by
Mr. Gerald Sullivan and LTC Ray N. Franklin, USMC, of the Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Lt. Gen. Julian J. Evell, USA (Ret.), (Consultant), Mr.
George Schecter (author of "Advanced Firepower Concepts for Military Oper-
ations in Built-Up Areas," a reference source document), and Gail Patelcuis,
Research Assistant.
Richu,-' B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center
V
PREFACE
Richard Pipes (quoting Charles XII), Russia Lnder the Old Regime, p. 120
(Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1974).
4 Charles had originally left Saxony with 43,000 well-disciplined, well-
equipped troops, The campaign into the Ukraine seriously depleted his
forces as Peter laid waste the area and as Mezeppa failed to produce
the Cossack support which Charles hoped to secure.
Lynn Montross, War fhrousth the Ages, p. 372 (Harper and Brothers, New
York, 3rd Edition 1963).
""Sir Edward S. Creasy, The Fifteen Decisive Battles of tha World, p. 298
(J. M, Dent and Sons Ltd., New York, A851).
Moncross, p. 372.
vii
I.
viii
MIN
This Document
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CONTENTS
ABST1CACr . . . . . . ................. . . .. .
. ..
D. Conclusions . . . . . . . . ............... 4
E. Major Items to iote ...................... 7
ix
III SOVIET COMBAT TRAINING FOR UR.U WARFARE (Continued)
6. Traiinng Feld No. 6 .... *..
........ 58
7. Traininp Field No. 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8. TrainingField No. 8 ............... 62
G. Sunmrt7. . . . .. . . . . . . 63'
This Document
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x
This Document
Reproduced From
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LIST OF TABLEs
xi
SUMMARY
A. Background
B. Approach
1 For example, see Department of the Arm Field Manual, "Combat in Forti-
fied and Built-Up Areas," FM 31-50 (March 1964).
C. The Significance of Cities
The Central Region of Europe has long been the focus of concern for
U.S. planners for it constitutes the frontier of the NATO-Warsaw Pact con-
frontation and has been considered the most critical area for defense
against potential Pact aggression. It is here in the Central Region of
Europe that there is the greatest potential for major combat action for
and in cities.
2
Most popular scenarios of a Warsaw Pact-NATO war portray a blitzkrieg
attack by the Soviets across the Northern European plains, the classic
East-West invasion route. Until recently, Northern Germany was principally
rural with a relatively low population density. In 1972 the Yederal Republic
of Germany (FRG) had a population of 59.6 million in an area of 95,727 square
miles for a density-per-square-vile figure of 620.8. The FRG population den-
sity is 10 times that of th~e United States and ranks second only to Japan
in this respect among the 26 most populous countries in the world. Tue an-
nual increase in population in the FRG over the 1963-70 period was 1.0 per-
cent, a relatively small growth rate but still larger than that of France,
Italy or the United Kingdom. Given a straight line population increase of
one percent to 1995, and all other variables remaining constant, the popula-
tion density of West Germany vouid be 483.5 persons per square mile, which
2
exceeds the contemporary populatiun density of Japan. The bulk of the FRG
population is urban and is becoiing more so. About 20 percent of the popu-
lace currently live in the 11 largest cities of the state, end three of tho
cities have populations of more than 1 million. '
3
Stanier points out the problems of modern cities In war without elec-
tricity required for hospitals, refrigeration, transportation, commanica-
tions, "ewage, water and other essential services, He describes refugees
Jamming thoroughfares not with carts and wagons but with Opals, Mercecds
and Porsches. He asks, but does not atteept to answer the question:
D. Conclusions
Based on, this research and analysis of Soviet literature, the follow-
ing conclusions are offered concerning Soviet tactical doctrine for urban
warfare.
1. General considerations.
" The Soviets recognize that the growth of the urban population
in the cities of Europe and the consequent expansion of built-up
areas my make urban warfare an unavoidable contingency in a
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and they therefore afford it high
priority.
" The capture and defense of cities have been particularly signi-
ficant in Russian history from the battles of Poltava to
Stalingrad, Berlin, and Prague.
4
9 If a city cannot be bypassed, the preferred method of attack
is either directly "from the march" or following an encircle-
ment of the city.
5
* The use of smoke and darkess to conceal movement
"e The Sovieta appear to place greater emphasis upon the use of
nuclear weapons in the city
" The Soviets appear to have lass concern for the implications
of exposing a flank to a bypassed city
6
"* The city has &reater historical significance relative to the
Soviet military with a strong identification with epic
battles such as Poltava, Stalingrad, Lanisgrad and Berlin
" While past Soviet experiences In urban warfare have been quit.!
dramatic, recnt experience is limited to the Berlin, Budapest
and Prague operations while the United States forces have en-
gaged in active operations in Seoul, Hue, Santo Domingo and
Konttm
" The Soviets1 appear to give more emphasis to the use of chemical
aanitions.
This statement does accurately reflect the research of this study. However,
the number of references in Soviet literature to chemical warfare in an
urban environment is much less than what one finds in more general litera-
ture on strategy and tactics.
7
y!
One measure of Soviet concern for urban warfare can be found in the
rather extensive training facilities which are devoted to preparing Soviet
forces for fighting in cities. Chapter III is devoted to a description
of these facilities. Eight training fields are described, each field
9
I .INTRODUCTION
A. Urban Growth
Pravda reports, "In the Russian Federation alone. thr number of cities
with populations of more than 200,000 doubled within 25 years."' Table 2
demonstrates the Soviet growth from 1959 to 1974. Soviet literature indi-
cates that during this 15-year pariod the Soviet Union's urban population
throughout the country increased by 50 percent. The increase was not pri-
marily due to favorable birth and death ratios but, rather, to migration
from rural areas. The trends, of course, are not irreversible. The USSR
is making a concentrated effort to limit the growth of cities. Neverthe-
less, the increased concentration of populatlin in cities, which is visi-
ble in 1975, will probably continue even though the rate may be slowed. 2
11
*a P C
12
Table 2
BIG CITY GROWTH IN THE USSR
13
Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the pattern of big city growth In those
areas of Northern and Central Europe of principal concern. Generally,
the growth in built-up areas is most sa.riking in the eztemsion of suburbs
which is demonstrated in Table 4.
The population densities of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies are
displayed in Table 5. Note that the population density of East Germany at
but
408 persons per square mile is by far the largest of the Pact partners
falls short of that for West Germany at the 621 mark.
B. Soviet Views
over, these cities will have an area of several thousand square kilometers.
Voyennyy
Guards General Major L. Kuznetsov, "The Offensive in a City,"
Vestnik, No. 8, p. 36 (August 1969). See also 'coonel A. Sidorchuk,
"Combat Actions of Troops in the Seizure of Large Cities," Voyenno-
istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 10, p. 20 (October 1971).
2 General Hajor A. K. Shovkolovich, Colonel F. I. Konasov, and Colonel
S. I. Tkach, Boyevyye deystvi-a motostrelkovoio batal'ona v gorode
(Combat Activity of a Motorized-Rifle Battalion in a City), p. 5
(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971).
14
Table 3
BIG CITY GROWlTH IN SELECTID NATO COUWTrIZS
Denmurks
Wesa Geatvny
Information for this table was calculated from data in the UN Demographic
Yearbook for 1962 and 1973 and from the Europa Yearbook for 1961 and 1975
(Europa Publications Ltd., London).
2 1971 estimate for Brussels.
15
Population Change Over The J
(in ,Thousands) 15-Year Period
Country and City 1959 1973 (in Thousands) Percent
West Germany
Netherlandsl
16
Table 4
URBAN AGGLOMERATE GROWTH IN SILECTED NATO COUNTRIES 1
1961 1971
Belgium Estimate Estimate
1960 1972
Denmark Estimate Estimate
1959 1972
Netherlands Estimate Estimate
17
Table 5
EAST EJROPEAN POPULATION DENSITY ESTIMATES
1973 Area
1973 Population (Thousands of 1973 Density
(1illions of People) Sq, Mile) (Perions Per Sq. Mile)
18
Moreover, from the enormous nuaber of articles vritten by the Sovieta
since 1945 on the battles vaed In and around msjor cities, It is obvious
that they place considerable ephasis on the peychological value in winning
or losing the battle for a large city. It is stressed thet the successful
defende of a city can have significant consequences. As me source has
succinctly recalled frou the experience of World War ID
C. Strateuic Vieas
19
"* A source of resources which are either coveted by the
attacker or which should be denied to the defender
20
0 Given circumstances of var In Central Burope Involving
a Warsaw Pact attack against the NATO allies;
21
Do The Nature of Urban Warfare
Throughout the areas which have reasonable potential for Soviet co.-
bat operat ions there is a great diversity emong cities. They range from
ancient walled cities dating back to the Middle Ages to completely modern
citiee reconstructed from the ruins of World War 11. In size, they range
from the relatively mamll cities which are scattered across the North
of Europe to the half million plus of Braman, to the 3.2 million of the
Est-West Berlin complex. Sam of the smaller citiee are still surrounded
by rural areas with open approaches, while the larger cities tend to sup-
port suburban agloseretes with the approaches restricted by built-up
areas. The nature of urban warfare will obviously vary with conditions
of population density, the size, haeiht and density of buildings, sub-
terranesan commications system, architectural style, whether or not
there ws tint or disposition to evacuate the city, the plans of attack
and defense, the size and organisation of combat forces, climate and a
host of other variables which make it difficult to meke categorical state-
ments on the nature of urban warfare. Nevertheless, there are omen fairly
consistent lessons to be learned from recent history as there are insights
into the future which can be drawn upon to develop a list of Soms rela-
tively universal characteristics of city fighting.
22
Armor is vry effective in cities but mast be employed with care In
a menor which capitalizes ea its firepower and armor protection while
mimnisming its vulnerability due to lack of vision# restricted nobility
and the very close proximity of undetected eneW forces. Both In offense
and defense, direct fire support by tanks has been used to good advantage.
Both in offemse and defene", there mut be close tank-infantry coordination
to overcome the close-in vulnerability of the tank. Tank and armored
infantry columns are singularly effective in the attack when resistance
is light and the streets are relatively clear of obstacles.
The capabilities of the adividual soldier and small units may, with
effective training and employment, be maximized at the expense of opposing
forces to the extent that relatively small units may defeat, deter or im-
pede a substantially larger force.
23
Where cities still contain noncombatants, distinct advantage may
accrue to the side which is less concerned with the safety of the populace.
24
maneuver, recomnaisance and air operations that are quite similar to more
open form of warfare along with the many divergencies. It Is thee diver-
pmcies end differences which make the study of Soviet tactical doctrine
for urban warfare a worthwhile pursuit.
25
II SOVIRT MILITARY TACTICS: AN OVERVIEW
J_ . S.~......
Monk 27 j
nature
by the requirements of strategy, operational art investitats the
of contemporary operations, defines the methods of preparing and conduct-
the
ing operations for the achievement of strategic goals, and determines
Opera-
matters of operational support, troop control, and rear support.
the
tional art also embodies the initial data for tactics by organizing
and
preparation and conduct of battle in coordination with the purposes
tasks of operations.'
28
Three decades have passed since the end of the war.
In this time our army and navy have substantially
changed. Their mobility, striking strength, and fire-
power have Increased Imeaasursbly. They have advanced
to a new stage of development. It is determined by the
fact that the combat power of the armed fares In the
conditions of a developed socialist society and on the
basis of a gigantic growth of the economy, rapid
scientific-technical progress, and the further consoli-
dation of the moral-political unity sand friendship of
the peoples of the USSR is steadfastly continuing to
strengthen. The nature of the army and navy has un-
recognizably transformed the modern types of arm and
combat equipment, which Soviet troops are skillfully
wielding.'
While the strategic missile forces may have been the primary bensfi-
ciary of rapid scientific-technical progress attained since World War II,
Soviet spokesmen strongly assert that this progress has been responsible
for a significant Increase In the combat capabilities of the other service
branches.' It follows that nuclear strikes will have a tremendous Impact
in a general war, especially in the Initial phase, but will not in them-
selves be decisive. Tactical armed conflicts will have an important role
in any war. As the tactical volume fro, the Officer's Library stated in
the aid-1960s:
29
while nuclear strikes inflicted directly by the stra-
tegic and operational leadership may decide the mant
important taska, they are still but a part of the
general tasks of the armed struggle. For total vic-
tory, it is necessary to consolidate the results of
the nuclear strikes inflicted by the high command, to
complete the destruction of the enemy, to seize his
territory, and to deprive the enemy of the capability
to carry out resistance in any form. The attainment
of this objective is inevitably connected with the
conduct of intense combat activity.'
30
Combined-arms fighting is conducted by the combined
effort of all types of troops and special troops.I
31
J
e Rapid breakthrough
32
Well evwre that tactical nuclear weapons could annihilate-and thereby
cause the early defeat of-an opponent which mosses its forces too soon,
Soviet writers suggest that troops marching to the attack should be diu-
parsed (1) widely enough to prevent their destruction, but (2) closely
enough to permit their swift concentration along the main line of attack
at the proper time. Scenarios developed by SoSet writers suggest the
following subsequent actions: '
See, for example, Colonel V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Opera-
tional Art and Tactics (A Soviet View), translated by the United States
Air Force, pp. 167-239 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972); Colonel I.
Nikolayev, "Breakthrough of Enemy Defenses," Soviet Hilitsry Review,
No. 7, pp. 10-13 (July 1974); General Mlajor V. Matsulenko, "Breakthrough
of Enemy Defenses," Soviet Military Review, No. 1, pp. 54-56 (January
1974); Reznichenko, op. cit., pp. 74-89. Cf. P. H. Vigor and C. N.
Connelly, "The Soviet Threat to Europe," RUSI, Vol. 120, No. 1, pp.
69-73 (March 1975).
33
C. Principles and 1.)rm of Tactical Warfare
34
In the depth, when the actions of adjacent elements
are halted by active enemy resistance or they have
sustained great losses. I
35
AmMg the traits whIch Soviet spokesman consider important for
conducting meting sangemagts two of the mat significant are the time
factor and dispersal. The very essence of this type of fighting, says
one author, "consists of each side's use of speed, mineuverability, and
speed of introducing troops and building up cowbat efforts.," With re-
gard to troop dispersal, it hba been stated that "strivia to reduce the
ffectivesesei 0of en nuclear strikes CoWael comauders to advance units
and subunits into regions of a meeti enSgagment in formations dispersed
along the front and in the depth."'
36
"* There is normally high speed in maneuvering elements
" Combat formations change rapidly
"* There are vide fronts, open flanks and a high degree
of freedom of maneuver.
37
2. Th Of fesive
,
"* Envelopment
" .Encirclement
9 Frontal assault
"o Withdrawal
38
units are unexpectedly encountered. Maneuver by air permits rapid move-
ment over great distances. Withdrawal is a "forced" maneuver, in which
troops are removed from the olove of a superior enemy force and trans-
1
ferred to a more favorable line.
- plan
- mass forces at critical points
- prepare for future operations
- positions
- resources
39
The "essence" of the Soviet offensive idicates a fairly stan-
dard concept of how tactical attacks will be planned and conducted In con-
tosporary war. Soviet tacticians describe the opening phases of combat,
cominsctag with a nuclear strike followed by aerial strikes, artillory
barrages and the rapid advance of forces into the depth of the enemy poei-
tice to seize and destroy personnel, materiel. equipment and critical ter-
rain.' It is, in effect, a modern, large-scale version of the German blitz-
krieg. The Soviets credit the introduction of nuclear weapons for employment
on the tactical battlefield with revolutionizing concepts of warfare. Nu-
clear weapons are recognized as providing the capability to completely
destroy enemy massed forces in very brief periods of tim. The "ratio of
forces" to which Soviet stratejists and tacticians refer is seen to be a
singularly unstable index in nuclear war. The first priority target in
such war is the enemy nuclear delivery capabilities.
40
In urban varfare, Soviet emphasis upon initiative and aggressive-
ness on the part of offensive forces becomes particularly important. 11he
nature of urban combat with the profusion of obstacles, barricades, cover
and concealment encourages inertia. Should commanders not be aggressive,
lengthy iesges., stalemate, and slow attrition begin to take their toll on
the attackers.
41
merited here. It is sufficient to note that there is a very real and all-
nificant qualitative and quantitative difference in the epproech to the
employment of nuclear weapons in Soviet and U.S. tactical writings, with
Soviet literature institutionalizing the employment of such weapons and
U.S. literature seeming to doemphasie such employment.
3. Defense
1Odintsov, p. 128.
2 Colonel A. Serov, "The Motorized-Rifle Battalion in Defense," Voyennyy
Vestnik, No. 7, p. 28 (July 1972).
3 General Lieutenant V. Reznichenko, "Combat Activity," Soviet Military
Reviv.E, No. 4, p. 24 (April 1974).
42
wide maneuvers by subuniti and fire weapons and with artificial obstacles,
as well as in conducting decisive counterattacks.'"
a Create conditions
2
which will permit transition to
the offensive.
43
caliber appear, the depee of dispersal
1 of troops
on the field of battle will increase.
1 Ibid., p. 326.
44
are light on airborne (i.e., paradrop) divisions vis-a-vis the Soviets
(at a 1 to 7 ratio). On the other hand, the United States lays more stress
1
on airmobile operations by heliborne forces.
4. The Withdrawal
45
//
46
p
48
theoretical knowledge and practical skills acquired at the various objects
of training takes place and the high moral-combat and psychological quali-
ties of soldiers are formed."' Another has noted that field combat training
has "an appreciable effect" on the soldiers' stability becau" "it is
particularly in conditions of the utmost moral and physical strain that
the men's character becomes hardened, their will-power, self-possession,
fearlessness and staunchness grow, and they acquire the ability to act
2
boldly and resolutely in tense and dangerous situation of modern battle."
In even greater detail, the command of the Central Asian Military District
has explained that:
49
training, note Soviet authors, the basic principle to be applied is:
"Teach troops that which is necessary in var."' Sumnin8 up the point,
the deputy chief of the admnnistration of combat training of the Far
Eastern Military District has claimed that field training must play an
important role.
50
B. Soviet Urban Warfare Training
The same article goes on to describe other sectors of the training field
which are used for tank, low-flying target, nuclear weapon, and chemical
weapon training.
51
piobleme related to protection against incendiary devices. The field Is
40 meters by 200 meters. According to the Soviet description, the field
contains, inter alia, seven obstacles of the type "which are most fre-
quently encountered during fighting on streets of cities."
0 V 2
* C A.tl a pm.|
(' 10 | IJl I OJI 14'l..
1 Ibid., p. 102.
52
Point 6 is a brick fence, 70 centimeters high and 5 miters vide.
This is followed by a ditch, 40 centimeters lonS end 30 centimeters deep.
Point 7 is a simulated mine field, 20 meters by 25 meters. Point
8 is a finiai trench. Point 9 is a tar-Let setup for hand grenade
throving.
-IL
---- kin---
---------
j3
contaminated areas, and mined obstacles. Tse third sector contains the
most frequent engineer reconnaissance objectives in populated points and
objectives for destruction in the enemy's rear area.
25. A flue
1 Ibid., p. 85.
2 Colonel L. Tsarikov, "The Psychological Preparation of Future Officers,"
Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 55-59 (December 1972).
54
/!
IVI
,I
II IrV;
I
- -i--
ji ,.5 -, ,,AI
,;.
. .;/ : j /
/'
/4
I
-
..
-"
4-. ".-
..
. I._-- ---
. __-
. .
..7..
r " ".- ..
i di,
o",;
55/ I
-,- m
,,,, --
- I
,
pp.3 r5
A ~t
g/ ~fm/ '
iI
According to the article, the ileld has the following facilities (as
numbered in the original drwing):
1. Craters
4. Pillbox
8. Obstacles
56
Military imeni the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. ' The fields are described as
2 kilometers wide and 4 kilometers deep. The author notes that the fields
are constructed to permit activities at any time of the year, day or night,
with or without the use of weapons of mass destruction, and coordinating
several subunits.
.
VI:"- 5. Complex of elements for psychological
training intended for teaching activi-
7 ties at high altitudes and under condi-
INI
* ' 1
57
With regard to urban combat, Points 5 and 7 are most important. As
depicted in the Soviet drawing, Point 5 inclides severer mockups of buildings,
wberein incendiary devices can be simulated. Point 7 is more complicated;
it coatains building found in rural and urban settings, as well as open
areas between buildings and diverse types of intersecting streets.
Issue Time
58
r 4
. I I !/
i I
AA
I. ,I, ,,
,(
59
fl?
59
7. Trainins Field No. 7
60
1 0
"Al"
*i r
------ v----
------- a
00 I
ol
Q, I,,\,- ',...; :.C ' ,
\161
I ./ . -- k '
S. \/e. _, i r--- -7.
K ,/
Tf 7717"
\..
is
e Combat on approaches to building, 60
minutes
I h~,
Vi Attack and fight for securing the
first floor.
C. Summary
Ibid., p. 40.
03
the foundation of troop combat preparations. The Soviets describe a number
of training facilities devoted to techniques of urban combat a few of which
are described here. In general, the facilities and training routines appear
to be similar to thoso developed within the U.S. forces. Training field
number 4, described in these pages, is a particularly el~aborate course over
two kilometers in depth including a number of single and multistory
buildings, underground passages and extensive rubble.
b4
/
-I
General Application
The Infantryman
The Engineer
The Logistician
The Artilleryman
Signal Communications
Reconnaissance Forces
65
In the following paragraphs guidelines are developed from a
number of diverse Soviet sources. In many cases the guidelines apply
equally to the tank commander, the battery commander or infantryman.
In such cases, to facilitate each section standing on its own, the
guideline is identified with a separate arm wherever possible. Tn
some few cases the guidelines cited were not provided in the context
of urban warfare in the original Russian text but are listed here
because they are universal in application and are particularly relevant.
Footnotes refer to references found in the last pages of this chapter.
Task Organization
Water Obstacles
Night Operations
The guidelives stress that in the attack, when Soviet forces are
confronted with a tow-n or city which cannot be bypassed, it is preferable
that the city be taken under siege and that direct assault should be
avoided. When assault of the city is required it is preferable to
attack it from the march or move to capitalize on the speed and momentum
of assault forces to carry them through the built up area as rapidly
a possible. The guidelines acknowledge that the conduct of attack
and defense of cities will change with many variable conditions and
that the difference between nuclear and conventional combat is substantial.
However, there is little elaboration found on this theme of disparity
in various operations and little evidence of detailed planning or
*raining for the conduct of operations in an urban nuclear environment.
66
There is emphasis -non the singular nature of urban warfare and
the varying conditions which requires task organizing of units for the
mission and conditions of combat. Water obstacles and night combat in
cities were subjects which were found to be sufficiently important to
warrant separate treatment. The emphasis on night operations is
consistent with Soviet writings on other forma of combat and reinforces
the impression that Soviet tacticians are convincud of the necessity
for opt-rating during all conditions of visibility and on twenty-four
hour cycles in both attack and defense.
-7
Am a rule, an attack for the purpose of seizing a city
from a position of direct contact with the enemy is used
if an attack from the march has failed. In this case
advance chast'* or yodrazdeleniYe, on approaching the
city, blockade it from several different directions
and by swift and decisive action seize the most important
objectives on the edge of the city, thereby supporting
the approach and formation of the main forces for the
attack. (3 p. 14)
A unit.
68
As a rule, a combat mission in a city was organized
less deeply than under ordinary conditions. (" p. 123)
69
An attack of the FM is carried out simultaneoualy
by reinforced subunits of the first echelons at the
exactly appointed tm. (1)
70 This Document
R epo d u c e Fro rn
eSt AVailable Copy
/
71
I ' 'U
"began to emit smoke."
Under the cover of the fire veapcna, the motorized
Infantryman moved into the created gaps. Combining
movement with firing on the u.1ve, he advanced to the
assault position.
Artillery at this time transferred into the defense
depth of "the enemy". F:%r some timn our crew took
intensive machinegun fire icou the window of the upper
stories of the building, securing the approaches of the
assault groups.
As only the motorized infantrymen started "fighting"
inside the building, we changed fire positions. Ad-
vancing, intensive Sun and machinegun fire was taken.
Covered by the corner of building No. 2, our tank opened
fire on the window and doorway openings of house No. 3.
Quickly, it was occupied by motorized infantrymen.
The neighboring assault group attacked in series.
Buildings No. 5 and 6, as was presupposed, "the enemy"
strongly fortified, and the approaches to them were
exposed to artillery-machinegun fire. It was impossible
to attack these strongpoints without the hope of
suppressing "enemy" weapon emplacements. Artillerists
opened fire. At the very same time from the underground
structures of the sewage system, the commander sent an
assault group into the rear of the "enemy" motorized
infantrymen and sappers in order to destroy his weapon
emplacement, hindering the advancement.
Combining fire and a strike from the rear, our assault
group withdrew to arouse the confusion of the enemy.
Taking advantage of it, he attacked the strongpoint
at the front and took the first story of the building.
The fire and dense smoke hampered observation and firing
from the tank. I decided to change the firing position.
But when we began to advance to building No. 6, then from
behind the right corner of house No. 7, the "enemy"
wheeled out a recoilless gun. The danger was first
noticed by the motorized infantrymen of the neighboring
assault group. They opened fire on the crew of the
recoilless gun.
A this moment, we all in only a second relaxed the
circuiar observation and because of this we almost paid
(with our lives). The neighboring crew, which destroyed
the target with the first shot, rescued (us).
72
Silzing the strongpoint, the motorized infautrymen
began "fighting" on the approaches to the factory.
Otar crew supported them by fire. "Fighting" for tie
factory-building No. 10--was protracted; however
weapons withdrew to crush "enemy" resistance by assault
fire of all kinds. Under cover of a smoke-screen and
the firing of artillery and tanks, the motorized-ihfan-
trymen infiltrated into the basement of the building.
With the loss of the factory the resistance of the
defenders began to weaken. After some time, the ,iss.-l
groups knocked out the enemy of the remaining housea
in the northeastern region of the city.
The "fighting" in the populated point was difficult.
It demanded from each member of the crew skill, forti-
tude, resourcefulness, and psychological hardiness.
(11p. 8)
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I I
Wich the approach of the enemy to the outskirts of the
town, the main aim of the fighting is to hold tactically
advantageous stone buildings (structures), turned into
stronspoints. (1)
With the beginning of the enemy artillery barrage and
air attacks all the personnel of the stronspoints are
in basements and other shelters. The crews of duty
weapons and observers stay at their stations. Sometimes
the subunits holding the defences take up their action
stations on the order of the commander and prepare to
repulse the enemy attack before the enemy opens fire,
begins his attack or lifts fire. (6)
74
1N1rvpuLi..ing thr enemy attack the Infanti y ,'miLa h.. ,it
off frorw the tan"a and destroyed &irst since seratr.tt o,,
or grt'upi of tanks which break Lnto the (iLy wltho,,.t
iloatitry can be rapidly destroyed by antitanpk weaI-iNi it
.,hort range. In this event the strength of tile batt'lii,.
defensive position will not be iMpUited. C p. 11)
" sl
Siv , 15 l Ct,%tiktcaratt .ca "i ; tt" .' a .- ,.* 7. . tiot I
,itt tic .. ournieous ;ind ro,.o Iiu tt j. t I a 'i II , * ,
75
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(encirclement). To hold the enemy be uses his reserve ur
second echelon which occupies previously prepared huildings
and other structures or he adapts them for the defense
during the course of combat and repuses further attempts
by the enemy to move deep within the city.
When the counterattacks are launched by the next higher
commader the battalion takes all possible measures to
support the deployment of the advanced podrazdeleniye
and the counterattack which they launch. The battalion
attacks together with them using the second echelon or
the reserve.
When threatened with encirclement the battalion commander
regroups his podrazdeleniye as necessary. He uses his
reserve or second echelon to create a perimeter defense
and direct his main efforts toward destroying an enemy
who threatens encirclement or isolation of the battalion
from the rest of the chast'.
b. Task OrmaniIzation
76
In the composition of the assault group was detailed fro,
a platoon to a rifle company. They war& reinforced by ,.k
to two detachments of medium machineguns, one to two
detachments of f1.unethrowers, one to two platoons 4 art .
lery, a platoon of tanks or a self-propelled artillery tiiii
The assault groups were divided into subgroups: ol hviiar
(assault), support (fire weapons), consolidatinn and
reserve. In some groups, for example in the asiiaulL of
Berlin and Budapest, were created subgroups for obstacle
clearing, deaolition (arson), and smoke screening.
(Is p. 123)
I n the assgalt
I roup wa-4 I ti~bert.,lI rom .i I)I t(
o f ,, ,1
,,,mpany of Infantry, I to '. I a,lwt,
i.ent.; .)f medfiums ,iiiiiltt-
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7,
It consists of I to 2 detachments.
78
grenadr.r, cartridges, and smoka weapons, as wall as ii,,,
necessary devices for assaulting buildings-ladders, rol,'a
boat hooks, grapnels, etc. Tanks, guns, and subunit.. a,,
special troops operate directly in the combat format ion.
of the motorized-rifle subunits. (7 p. 37)
c. Water o}bstacles
At the same time high and steep hanks, f,,L&,-. With ';? 'lit 'r
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as well as the utilization by the enemy of high buildings
for delivering a multitier fir4e hamper tha assault
crossing. hoxzsty of the eno y FUA (56-M a from the
bank) excludes any possibility of concentrating subunits
for the attack after landing on rhe opposite bank.
More often than not an attack is carried out by small
groups immediately after negotiating the water barrier.
80
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2. Soviet Guidelines for the Infantuyman in Urban Varfare
82
The Infaatryana Is iastructed that fighting in buildings and
.tre..ts t-.q,,ir.s special techniques which are characterized by vioh4-nt
,ttion .it dLust. Iund to hand quiirters where small units have the
initiativ.. Wall bre.,chings are made using the nervices of the sappers
with th.ir explosive charges and employing direct fire weapons. There
ask- references to the preference for attacking buildings from the
up;per .ltortes first and concentrating on staircases, entrances and exits.
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The enemy objectives, depending on the size of buildings
end the degree of contact of the defenders, are attacked
by a reinforced platoon, company or battalion. Provision
is made beforehand for special groups to destroy and
block fortified structures. (1)
84
. ,'. , , 4 _
/" No .I .-
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S' / #
/ A t""
86
88
three echelons. The second echelon completes the
destruction of the enmy, consolidates the success
of V' trt echelon, and repulses possible counter-
attacks from the flank and rear. (S)
89
delivering ammition, food, end wter to the garrison.
A treach we dug In the rear of the building to give
personel proteotiea against enW artillery fire.
Furthermore, a drain pipe passing to the rear of the
buiLM' was adapted for the same purpose and two
commication trenches were dug to it. Soldiers
occupying a defensive position on the first and uuper /
stories of the building, during strong artillery lire,
used these routes to take cover In the drain pipe.
Soldiers defending sealbasement areas, during artillery
firs, remained In place at their weapona. Good
fortification helped our courageoua fighting ma hold
the building for 58 days, until the day our troops
reverted to the attack for the purpose of destroying
the enemy forces at Stalingrad. (I a. 70)
90
The battalion command-observation post is located close
to company combat formations. Based an experience
gained in the war it is often 200-300 a from the
companies of the first echelon. (' p. 38)
91
are covered to protect ther wben buildings around than
are destroyed.
In those cases when there are no strong underground
structures or basn-mnt areas which might be used to
protect personnel against nuclear weapons, shelters
are dug In the ground away from defended buildings in
order to kMa then from becoming covered with rubble.
In preparing basement areas which are used for shelters
for protection against fire and to dilinish the dose
of penetrating rediation, the floor of the first story
is sprinkled with dirt to a thickness of 20--0 cm.
Shelters are built so that they will be under the
ruins of the upper stories following a nuclear blast.
The mein entrance is usually mede near a stairwell
and existing underground routes of comiuncation
between basemnt areas are used as alternate entrances.
The gaps between strongpoints, streets, squares, and
parks are filled with mined mnd other obstacles and
covered by fire. In a city all types of obstacles
can be used In conjunction with explosives or without
them: antitank ad antipersonnel mines, delayed action
amnes, fragmntation-barrier mines, barricades, anti-
tank steel hedgehogs and turnstiles, reinforced concrete
posts, tetrahedra, and also barbed wire obstacles.
Bridges over rivers and canals and also underground
structures running from the direction of the enemy
(tunnels, subways, drainage ditches) are prepared for
demolition. As a rule, they are blasted when the
enemy threatens to seize them. Som buildings should
be prepared for reduction to rubble for the purpose
of blocking streets In case of need. (3 pp. 69-70)
A2
Camoufl~age in a city is greatly facilitated by the clseu1
nature of the terrain and does not require greet expendt-
ture of caouflage means. It is achieved by the location
of personnel and weapons in buildings, and window and dolr
openings, by the creation of dumy defensive locations In
blocks and in buildings not defended by podrazdelentye,
by observing sound and light discipline, by extensive une
of smoke agents, and by excluding the local populace from
Lte defensive area. A battalion comnander provides for
all these measures in organizing a defensive position and
fortifying it. (3 p. 70)
To facilitate fire fighting all inflammable objects are
removed from buildings, wooden floors are sprinkled with
"sand, and water supplies are established in case the
municipal water supply system is put out of operation.
Windows and other openings in buildings are covered vith
grills or fire-resistant plates so that the enemy will be
unable to throw incendiaries through them. The entrances
into dugouts and base=ent and smalbasoment areas are
covered with brick thresholds 15-20cm thick for the purpose
of preventing spread into these areas of napalm, pyrogel,
and other incendiary mixtures. Fire lanes not less than
50-70 m wide are prepared on the streets for the purpose
of preventing the spread of fires over the city. (3 p. 55)
Maneuver
93
An attack in a town is carried out without interruption
until the opposite outskirts are reached or a link-up
with ow troops advauncing In the opposite direction
Is effected. (I p. 12)
94
main roads of the city, centers of comunication,
bridges, overbridges, railway stations, subway stations.
For this, It is recommended to use tactical airborne
troops In helicopters. The landing of the subunits
should be accomplished under the cover of darkness
and smoke, and supported by the fire of artillery and
air support. They my be landed in squares, brotd
streets, public gardens, parks, flat roofs of
houses,
and using suspension ladders. (7 p. 38)
95
move behind the motorized rifle Podrandelan and
the tanks, from covered position to covered position.
Delvering fire along the streets, they hit targets
hindering the forward ovement of the Infantry and
tanks. p. 40)
96
To develop the attack deep within a city battalion
commanders vial comit their second echelons or reserv,,;.
As a rule, they will be committed wiLh the permisaion
of the next higher coimnider after the battalion has
carried out its imediate mission. However, the situation
my force a battalion commander to cooat his second
echelon earlier. Most frequently this will be when
thc enemy offers stubborn resistance. Underground
structures and gaps through buildings will be used as
a covered approach for the second echelon to reach the
line of departure. One distinguishing aspect of
reaching the line of departure tinder the conditions
prevailing in the city is that second echelons or
reserves will wost frequently move in small podrazdeleniye
and even by separate groups. The line for entry into
combat is usually selected so that a second echelon
dill be commi.'ted around a battalion flank or in the
gaps between companies or assault groups. However, the
possibility cannot be precluded that entry into combat
will be by leap-frogging through the combat formations
of attacking units. This is advantageous in those
cases when companies in the first echelon have suffered
great losses or If buildings do not peramt deploying
the podrazdeleniye of the second echelon. (3 p. 42)
97
clirges, signalling equipment, and Bear for assaulting
buildings. Furthermore, sapper podrazdelaniye are
provided with Additional explosives, elongated charges,
and antitank and aatipersonnal alms. (I p. 17)
98
General Major Babushkin stresses that flame throwers:
i. can kill many soldiers held up in strongly fortified
buildings
2. are especially useful at night
3. can have great psychological value by striking
fear into soldiers when used unexpectedly
4. are to be used in conjunction with other arms. (12)
99
The system of fire is tied in with artificial and
natural obstacles. It nmst provide for: destruction
of the enemy and mainly his tactical nuclear weapons
and artillery and tanks on the distant approaches to
the battalion defensive position; repulse of wase tank
and infantry attacks in front of the forward edge;
cover by fire of flanks and gaps when occupied by
podrazdeleniye and also artificial and natural
obstacles; and infliction of dmsaga on an enemy who
has penetrated the defensive position and rapid
concentration of fire at any threatened point or
sector. (3 p. 53)
100
'9
101
only when In direct contact with the onemy when there
is little probability of employment of nuclear weapons
by the enemy. (I p. 63)
102
//
103
I.
After entering a building motorized rifle Bodrazdeleniye
acting boldly, daringly, and decisively, destroy the
enemy by fire point-blank and with grenades, clearing
one room or corridor after another, floor-by-floor.
Sappero attached to the rifle eopanies or assault
groups lay passage. through walls and between floors
and in case of need taey clear mines from the buildings
seized. After seizing a strongpoint or building or
other structure and carrying out an inmediate mission,
every 9odrazdeleniYe receives a new mission and attacks
subsequent objectives without stopping. (I pp. 40-41)
They boldly burst into the houses and block all entrances
and exits, especially from basements. Making wide usa
of hand grenades and point-blank fire, they destroy
the enemy. Machinegunners fire at windows, embrasures,
garrets and roofs to cover the attacking subunits.
Success of fighting inside a building depends on the
speed, resolve, initiative and daring of each soldier. (1)
104
I ....
105
layers. Firing positions are prepared on all floors
of buildings and in attic areas. To avoid large losses
in personnel and weapons firing positions on the upper
floor- should be occupied only in case of need dad
only woen In direct contact with the enemy when there
is little probability of employment of nuclear weapons
by the enemy. 0 p. 63)
106
amid, on the other hand, ezisting passages may becom,
covered and LApaosable.
In view of this cosmanders take several special measures:
they create special detachments for fighting fires;
prepare subordinate podrazdelnniye and all personnel
to make capable use of fire-fighting equipment and
provide protection against enemy incendiaries; and
in places where fires are mout apt to break out they
establish stores of uacer in barrels, sand, ponchos,
etc. (S p.70)
107
//
//
f. Pursuit
g. Consolidation
108
Important objectives or structures seized are
consolidated by specially designated podrszde1erniy!
and are prepared for perimeter defense. Un this case
pi.rticular attnL ton to devoted to consolidating
street intersections, open sreas, squares, and exits
from underground structures and to preparing to repulse
emny Louwterattacks. (3 p. 42)
109
that wasa rule sapper wodrazdeleanie attached to a battalion are kept
centralized under the battalion comender." The quote Is Is the
contzt of defense however and the Implication is clear that in the
defense centralized control at the battalion leel Is preferred while
in the attack attacbment down to the mall unit level is considered
to be required. Engineer tasks include engineer reconnai/sence,
piomner work such *s general demolitions, route preparation,
constructing and clearing obstacles, barricades and fortifications, -*
110
in the eliaination of the cousequemces of employment
by the enemy of nuclear veapons. (1 p.21)
111
of the comhat mission by these iodrazdelaniye or
groups. They perform engineer reconnaissance of
approaches to objectives which might be mined; luy
panssang in barnicad.. and obstacles thereby providing
for forwerd movement of tanks, BTR (armored personnel
carriers), and artillery; destroy the enemy defending
in buildings and other structures by blowing then
up; and give help to attacking Podrazdelanie in
fighting fires and conducting rescue work. ( pp. 34-35)
112
artIllery can be advantageously used for making
breaches in the walls of the objective being
defended. ()
113
Tanks equipped with antimine draos act together with
sappers and lay passages in enemy mined obstacles.
Motorized rifle and sapper podrazdelenie designated
for Immediate assault move behind then. The tanks,
deliverinS fire at embrasures or windows of a structure
under attack, approach it and cover the attacking
uotorisgd rifleman and sappers with their fire and
armor. (I pp. 43-4)
After entering a building motorized rifle podrazdeleniye,
acting boldly, daringly, and dacisively# destroy the
enemy by fire point-blank and with grenades, clearing
one room or corridor after another, floot-by-floor.
Sappero attached to the rifle companies or assault
groups lay passages through walls and between floors
and in case of need they clear mines from the buildings
seized. (I pp. 40-41)
114
a
115
I
Wasonry and reinforced concrete buildings designated
for defense are prepared for all-aroumd defense. Door
and window opensngs in the buildins which are not
designated for use are filled in solid with brick or
sandbap. habrasures for firing submachineguns,
mmchineuns, grenade launcher, and other weapons and
viewing slits for observation are prepared vith pear-
meter defense of the building in mind. Stairwells ar
barricaded, mined, or destroyed. Hatches are made
through ceillng@ and ladders are made. Corridors within
buildings a'e barricaded and prepared for small arms
fire. To decrease losses from shell fraents which
get inside buildings, partitions made from bricks,
sandbags, or other material must be made between
embrasures and viewing slits.
Conoaunication routes are prepared between strongpoints
and defended buildings for which purpose use is first
-ide of underground structures (tunnels, subways, water
mainsa, etc.), and when these do not exist trenches are
dug, the most Important sectors of which are covered
to protect them when buildings around then are destroyed.
In those cases when there are no strong underground
structures or basement areas which sight be used to
protect personnel against nuclear weapons, shelters
are dug in the ground away from defended buildings in
order to keep then from becoming covered with rubble.
In preparing basement areas which are used for shelters
for protection against fire and to diminish the dose
of penetrating radiation, the floor of the first story
is sprinkled with dirt to a thickness of 20-40 ca.
Shelters are built so that they will be under the ruins
of the upper stories following a nuclear blast. The
main entrance is usually made near a stairwell and
citisting underground routes of commnication between
basement areas are used as alternate entrances.
The gaps between strongpoints, streets, squares, and
parks are filled with mined and other obstacles and
covered by fire. In a city all types of obstacles can
be used in conjunction with explosives or without them:
antitank and antipersonnel mines, delayed action mines,
fragmentation-barrier mines, barricades, antitank steel
hedgehogs and turnstiles, reinforced concrete posts,
tetrahedra, and also barbed wire obstacles.
Brldses over rivers and canals and also underground
structures running from the direction of the enemy
116
4-
(tunnels, subways, drainage ditches) are prepared for
demolition. As a rule, they are blasted when the enemy
threatens to seize them. Some buildings should be
prepared for reduction to rubble for the purpose of
blocking streets in case of need. (' pp. 69-70)
117
Buildings and other structures in the gaps between
strongpoints are prepared for blasting, mined obstacles
are prepared, log obstacles and barricades are set
up, and provisions are made for flakin8 and interlocking
fire of all types to cover the flanks and the gaps
between strongpoints. (I p. 55)
118
From the very first day the "Roam of Pavlov" was prepared
for perimeter defense. All approaches to the building
were gradually mined and ant'.tank and antipersonnel
mineftelds wore prepared around the building. In doue
sectors land mines were put out. A commnication trench
was dug to the rear for the purpose of delivering
ammunition, food, and water to the garrison. A trench
was dug in the rear of the building to give personnel
protection against enemy artillery fire. Furthermore,
a drain pipe passing to the rear of the building
was adapted for the same purpose and two communiciation
trenches were dug to it. Soldiers occupying a defensive
position on the first and upper stories of the building,
during strong artillery fire, used these routes to take
cover in the drain pipe. Soldiers defending semihasoment
areas, during artillery fire, remained in place at their
weapons. Good fortification helped our courageous
fighting men hold the building for 58 days, until the
day our troops reverted to the attack for the purpose
of destroying the enemy for.es at Stalingrad. (3 p. 70)
119
Naving destroyed the enem who have penetrated and
re-established the situation the troops take measures
for the lmediate organization of the disorganized fire
system, repair damaged obstacles and replenish their
stocks of asnmnition. Buildings destroyed but not
occupied by friendly troops are mined. In the depth
of the defences the roads are cleared and bypasses for
the manoeuvre of tanks, self-propelled artillery and
artillery are organized. (4)
120
II
121
ldMardelenmve for orotection asainst weapons of mass
da I if they are attaached to the battalion, are
used firstly for performing radation and chemical
recomnsiasgane and also for eliminating the consequences
of esumm employisent of weapons of mess destrurtion.
(I p. 57)
122
S/
positioned vell forward to facilitate distribution down to the small
unit level at separate strongpoints (unit distribution system). In
defense, protection of rear area service support against nuclear attack
Is cited as a special concern for the commander. In the attack, rear
area service support is located outside or on the edge of a city prior
to attack. Helicopters are cited as having special utility for deliver-
ing supplies in city fighting. Cuidellnes for medical personnel
emphasizing the positioning of aid stations well forward (up to platoon
strongpoints) and special techniques to be employed for recovering and
evacuating the wounded.
123
/
/'
In orsanistng rear service support a battalion commider
determines: in which of the strongest underground
structures and basements to locate rear service
9odresal and what stores of materials and water
to establish In the stronpoints of companies in the
event of combat In encirclemnat; what fortifications
to prepare for the purpose of getting protection for rear
service units against nuclear waponm; and how to provide
continuous material, technical, and medical support for
Dodraedelenive during the course of battle. The coemanders
of support oodrasdelenive are told procedures for
replenishing ammnition and other supplies and preparing
hot food and delivering It to personnel. They are told
what roates to use for carrying out wounded and routes
of evacuation to aid stati.ons, procedures for performing
maintenance on combat equipment, refueling, lubricating,
and repair. (' pp. 70-71)
Rear service smport is organized In light of the nature
of the coming battle. Additional reserves of supplies
are established, especially amunition and food, and
procedures are prescribed for issuing then to personnel.
A rear service odrazdelen*vye Is located outside a city
or on the edge of it prior to the beginning of the attack.
In the case of attack deep within a city the battalion
aid station, amnition vehicles. and a water tank truck
are located close to combat formations. Different covered
places, Including basements and semibasements In buildings
and underground structures, are used to locate them after
these places have been checked for contamination and
mines. Amimtion and food are delivered directly by
'bearers designated In each platoon. Search and collectian
of the wounded in baemets, buildings, rubble, parks,
and gardens are organized. is p. 35)
124
L4
- - -/
125
In the Great Patriotic War during combat action to
@eise the city of Budapest 40 percent of all Sun artillery
was used to fire by direct lay, Including 152-m guns.
In the battle for the city of Potnan' 203-m guns wvet
used to fire by direct lay.
In an assault detachment or group It is best to use
artillery nodracdelenive directly in combat formations
of motorized rifle podragdeleniye as accompanying guns
for destroying buildings and other structures with fire
by direct lay.
In this way artillery podrazdeleniye up to and including
the firing platoon will be attached to motorized rifle
companies and even to platoons.
In street fighting artillery firing positions are
selected in gaps in walls and in fences, ruins, public
ani other gardens, parks, and in the spaces between
buildings and structures. The coinnd-observation posts
of artillery comnanders should be located together with
those of the commnders of the motorized rifle
oodrazdelenive to which they are attached or which they
support. There muet be artillery scouts reconnoitering
for targets in the combat formations of the advance
podrazdeleniye. During combat a battery changes position
by platoon and a platoon acting separately by gun, leap-
frogging forward under the cover of fire from adjacent
guns and smake.
Preparatory fives may consist of one or several onslaughts
of fire depending on the nature of structures in the
city, the strength of the defending enemy, and the density
of fire needed to suppress him. The duration of this
fire can be very brief. For ezamle, in the battle for
Berlin the duration of preparatory fires in the zone of
attack of the 94th Guards Rifle Division and the Fifth
Shock Army fluctuated from 5 to 20 afn.
In comparison with preparatory fires conducted during
an attack under ordinary field conditions, in a city for
destroying various structures and the weapons located
in then more artillery or mortar systems mout be used,
especially guns designated for firing by direct lay at
targets located on the forward edge and i nediately behind
it. Separate batteries and even platoons delivering
fire from covered firfrg positions and high-power guns
for firing by direct lay are used to destroy enemy
targets. To carry out their firing missions they will
be given most of the tims allotted for delivering
126
preparatory fires.
Supporting fire is conducted by separate fire onslaughts
during the course of which separate en*W defensive
structures are destroyed ac attacking troops approach
them. The signal to shift fire is given by aotorized
rifle podrazdeleniye commanders.
Mortar and in many cases howitzer podrazdeleniye are
able with their high-angle fire to hit concentrations
of infantry, suppress artillery and mortars, and
deliver strikes at targets in the resr and enemy command
post located in buildings and other structures.
As a rule, organic and attached mortar podrazdeleniye
of the motorized rifle battalion are attached to
motorized rifle companies and platoons and act in direct
proximity to their combat formations. Some of the
mortars, especially the large-caliber mortars, will most
frequently be kept under the direct control of the
battalion commander.
To Increase the effectlveress of mortar fire when
firing at targets located behind high, close-in cover,
the firing positions for them can be located on roofs,
in attics, on balconies, in wide places, in trenches,
and even in basements. This is a distinguishing aspect
of combat employment of mortars in a city. (S pp. 20-21)
127
first echelon, and one of them Is left at the disposal
of the battalion commander. Battalion artf.llery and a
tank-destroyer battery also operate with coupanies of
the first echelon.
It can not be excluded that a motorized-rifle battalion
will be reinforced by only a oubunit of antitank
artillery. In this case, Its actions, a a rule, will
be supported by an artillery battalion. ( p. 28)
128
In our opinion, it is advisable to reinforce a company
which attacks usually aloag one street with two or three
tanks, a howitzer battery, mortar platoon, two or three
PTURS (grotivotankov upravlyayyy reaktivnyy snaryn,1;
antitank guided missile), one or two sapper squads, and
two or three chemical specialists, and provide support
with the fire of a battery or rocket artillery. Such an
assault group will be able to create fire superiority
over an enemy reinforced platoon usually defending a
large building, which will allow it to accomplish the
assigned mission after fire preparation and air strikes
and develop the attack without stopping. (5)
129
As the attacking uodrazdelansye reach the artillery
safety lUne, fire is shifted to the rear of the enemy
position. After approadhig to within hand grenada range,
motorized rifle godrasdelenive- throwing hand grenades
at the ems, attack objectivois on the forward edge.
At this tims artillery and aviation destroy the enom
located deep within the city and some of the artillery
delivers covering fire against enemy artillery and
mortar batteries and control points. (I p. 40)
130
I\~
When podrazdelenlye approach objectives under attack guts
and tanks on signal of the battalion or company commander
shift fire to the upper floors and to adjacent buildings/
and prevent the approach of enemy reserves. p. 40)
131
ILL
Artillery and mnortars dalivering fIre froa covered
fUrin8 positions are located in yards, vegetable and
other gardens, on squares, and In stadius. (I p. 54)
132
* in urban warfare. There are obvdously limitationa on the employment
of high performance aircraft against posltions where FEBAs * re
obscure and irregular and where a singi. building may be occupied by
opposing forces for an extended period. Precision guided intuitions
will provide a greater capability to fixed wing aircraft in city
warfare but many of the limitations and operational restrictions will
remain. The Soviets do emphasize the use of aviation in counter air,
interdiction, reconnaissance, and artillery spotting role* and there
are citations of the flexibility and effectivenas3 of heliborne and
helicopter supply operations. The guidelines imply that antiaircraft
units are retained under centralized control. The principal missions
assigned in defense are to protect defensive forces from low-flylng
aircraft and helicopters although they are also used in a direct
fire role in support of infantry units. In the attack, antiaircraft
weapons are employed principally to prevent air resupply of besieged
forces within a city.
133
/
reserves, artillery, end ene control points; destroys
nuclear attack wempone; protects advamncn Piotre e~n.e
(rp.t enem air strikes; sad adjusu artillery fire.
p-39)
Aviation delivers bomb stries at matn groups of enemy
forces attacking the city, at his nuclear attack wepons
end other weapons of smss destruction, and at 8goups
of artillery and forces trying to bypass or encircle the
city. Aviation is also used to cover defending troops
mnd the city itself against the air enamy by delivering
strikes against his aviation at airfields and In the
air. (I p. 57)
13
134\
I-.
135
ars mutually supporting. These Soviet guidelines envasion armor as
providing the speed and fire power required for an attack "on the mow"
that carries through and into the depths of a city to @size Important
objectives. Tanks provide direct fire, vwel breaching and obstacle
destruct - capabilities in both attack and defense. Mine renoval
drap are aed to clear passages of enemy mines. In accordance with
the guidelines provided by one Soviet author, antitank forces .n the
defense are retained under the direct control of the infantry battalion
comander. The first priority in defense against a tank is given to
the separation of enmy infantry from tanks to permit antitank units
to close with the enea. This procedure would appear to be less a
tactical essential given introduction into the Scviet arsenal of the
long range and highly accurate 5agger wire guided antitank missile.
Nowhere in these guidelines is there a reference to the utility of
helicopters as antitank weapons. The guidelines are quite explicit
in detailing the manner in which tank ambushes are to be conducted
which appears to indicate a Soviet emphasis.
136
tanks, covering one another by fire, can successfully
hit weapons in strong implacements, remve barricades
and rubble, and destroy anemy tanks and armor personnel
carrierm. Motorized rifleman can effectively combat enemy
close-coubat weapons and thereby support the tanks in
successfully carrying out a mission. (I pp. 19-20)
137
/
138
/ K
The motorized infantry and tanks, moving from cover
to cover, are followed by Suns detailed for direct
fire. Flurng along the streets, they destroy any
targets which hinder the advance of the infantry
and tanks. (1)
139
Antitank podragdelenite remaining under the direct
control of the motorised rifle battalion commander
prepare firing positions In places from which they
can deliver fire along wide and long streets, main
arteries, squares, and ezpected routes of attack of
the esan main forces. (I p. 57)
To beat off the attack the subrults first of all cut off
the Infantry from the tanks and destroy it. Separate
tanks which have broken through into the town without
infantry are destroyed with antitank weapons at short
range. (6)
In repulning the enemy attack the Infantry should be cut
off from the tanks and destroyed first since separate
tanks or groups of tanks which break Into the city with-
out Infantry can be rapidly destroyed by antitank
weapons at short range. In this event the strength of
the battalion defensive position will not be impaired.
(S p. 73)
140
movement to them are prepared for every tank.
Tank ambushes in a motorized rifle battalion may
consist of a crew or a platoon. An ambush in prepared
on a tank-dangerous approach in a well-camouflaged
position. The position is prepared in a gap between
strongpoints, behind one, or on a flank of the
battalion defensive area, as a r4le, at a street
intersection or square wherr beveral streets converge
and in buildings located on a main artery. (s p. 56)
141
infantry by opening fire suddenly, preventing the enemy
fromi amking further progress within the defensive
position. After they have completed their mission
the tanks and motorised riflman desixnated for
ambush occupy other positions and receive a
mission. (I p. 74)
142
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The battalion comander effects amtrol of artillery
fire by personally assigning misslons to the coimmnders
of artillery podrazdeleniye. This can be achieved by
collocating their conand-observetion posts.
Extensive use is made of dobile mans of communications
such as armored personnel carriers and tanks, foot
mssengers, and lights and other signmas. (3 p. 38)
143
restrict loeg range visibility, the Soviet vriters indicate that
they also provide concealmnt for reconnaissance into en. positions.
144
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a scout, and binoculars and other Instruments permittti1,
observation from the interior of a building or from
behind she2ter. (11 p. 24)
145
of supplement and new Infomttio. ec*imaissance
patrols and patrol vehicles can be sent out for this
purpose.- (5)
Most frequently combat recoanaiesamce patrols in a city
smo on foot. This pemits them to use concealed
route to reach the eaney's rear, using undargroud
structes. Saps In buildings and fences, etc. It is
advisable to Include artillerymen, sappers, and
chemical specialists in rteoaisnssce patrols for the
purpose of obtaIning more comlete informtion about
the aeW and the nature of objectives deep within
the ensTy's defensive position. (1 p. 34)
146
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An a rule., information from reconnaissance in a
battalion is obtained by obaervation, listening, aal,.his.
receipt of data from adjacent units and higher staffs,
from interrogation of prisoners and refugee, questioning
of local inhabitants, and study of seized documents and
trophies. Furthermore, a search my be conducted in
the battalion on decision of the next higher commander.
Reconnaissance is conducted with the start of an enemy
attack by a combat reconnaissance patrol, patrol vehicles,
and also reconnaissance by fire when a battalion has
reverted to the defense while in direct contact with the
enemy and with the start of occupation of the defensive
position when not in contact with the enemy. (3 p. 67)
147
In defeameof a city coeeat recounaissance patrols
on emaoed pereeoml carriere my be seat out to
recommoter the am" and locations os the approaches
to the city. Directly In a city it I best to conduct
ar-cisemace on foot using groups ismalr In size
then ude ordinary field conditions. A foot patrol
under conditions prevailfng In a city is ahis to
penetrate everywhere. By using surfsce and amdar-
groud routes of commaiAtion it usually suffers fewer
losses end is abl, to reconnoiter amy objective, routs,
oa sector of the city. (1 pp. 67-8)
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FOOTNOTES
. P P lk 151