This Document

Best AvailableFrom
Reproduced Copy

AD-AO22 998
SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR URBAN WARFARE

John C. Scharfen, et al
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, California
December 1975

DISTRIBUTED BY:

National Technical Infomatlon Service

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
v

0157041

SRI Project 2625

Technical Note Ducembe 1975

SSC-TN-2M2-16 Final

SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE

FOR URBAN WARFARE
LCC

By: JOHN C. SCHARFEN

MICHAEL J. DEANE

Pe"r for:
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
1400 WILSON BOULEVARD
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209

CONTRACT DAHC15-73-C-0380
ARPA Order No. 2520

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

S1RATE6C
STUDIS STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER

C" SRI Projct2625

Tchnical Note Dfcwbe 1975
SSSC- TN-2625-16 Final

SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE

FOR URBAN WARFARE

STANFORD By: JOHN C.

SCHARFEN MICHAEL J. DEANE

Pwewd for:
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
1400 WILSON BOULEVARD
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209

=.
CONTRACT DAHC15-73-C-0380 .

ARPA Order No. 2520

Richard B. Foster, Director

Strategic Studies Center
Ao f

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

 UNCLASSIFIED
@MOmNT CLAIPMCATON eof VMS PAGO 000,D. E,m,..
REMP T DOCUMENTATION PAGE Mm C 70
1. OPOT INOS1M GOV'T ACCOLUoU NO: S4 IPSUrS CATALLo MWuaoG
SSC-TN-2625-16
I& TITLE tmd Ase) S. TVP9e OF mepoT a PemO1 covEuso
SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR URBAN WARFARE Technical Note

S. POIsmNFae o. 019O0T mlrI a

T. A4JTwOUV IL CONTRACT OS GRANT M0114U.)'

John C. Scharfen DARC15-73-C-0380

Michael J. Deane AUPA Order No. 2520

,. *.IN.o..S Of.ANZAtTO NANs Ao aoo..AS 10. 0 "OGAs'" mT. PRCT. TA SK

WO. ww""S
Stanford Research Institute, Strategic Studies 55 a
Center, 1611 N. Kent Street, Arlington, SRI Project 2625
Virginia 22209 Teak 600_.
It. CO0TOLLIeS aPFl! NAeOiANADONIS1 It. AIPORT OATSAf
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency December 1975 Final
1400 Wilson Boulevard is. "UNER O cS
Arlington, Virginia 22209 _ _ _
14. MiMTOANIw A"igNC mAns a A00omaagsuui dl/ i comiongoeaOea ) I. S6CUmIV CLASS. (of IN Slp)
Defense Supply Service-Washington U CLASSIFIED
Room 1D245, The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20310 I4. s 1 4CATl0w/OOU0GmACINO

16. DISTROwU S ?rNT

?ATC
(o flte Aso

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unli.dted

I?. D'STms4OUTIO STATSUMNT (oet uhefrn mftwoEin We 26. ItodWm hIIm ........

I. SUPPt.EOU5TARY NOTES

IS. MEV 0onos

(C.,emb an..... .*,. n..ee
-,if mu, Ivmi.6 bl,.ck einb)
TACTICAL WARFARE MILITARY STRATEGY
WARFARE USSR
URBAN ENVIRONMENTS
MILITARY FORCES (FOREIGN)
2 AGSIWACT (Cmw.Euwso u..win eld If neeegoodp o fdS.IIIt by Woek 0006w
This is a study which analyzes the Soviet tactical doctrine for urban warfare.
The study was conducted in two parts. The first part was devoted to an
extensive research into extant, open source Soviet literature. The second
part was devoted to continuing research, an analysis and report of findings.
This report is based or. the second part of the study.

DO ,o'j, IM7 amnow r now, sor.is oesotg-

*
AN, 1 UNCLASSIFIED
 ABSTRACT

This is a study which awlyzes the Soviet tactical doctrine for urban
warfare. The study was conducted in tvo parts. The first part was devoted
to an extensive research into extant, open source Soviet literature. The
second part was devoted to continuing research, an analysis and report of
findings. This report is based on the second part of the study.

DISCLAIMR

The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of

the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing
the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency or the U.S. Government.

CONTRACTUAL TASK

This Techvical Note ie in partial fulfillment of research under

Contract DAftC15-73-C-0380, ARPA Orler No. 2520, SR1 Project 2625-600.
 FORMOLRD

This ix a Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute Report

of study results on Soviet Tactical Doctrine for Urban Warfare.

Tit overall study, which was conducted in two parts, was made under
the general supervision of Richard B. Foster, Director of the Strategic
Studies Center, and N. Hark Earle, Jr., Senior Economist and Assistant
Director. This report covers the second, analytical portion of the ef-
fort. Initially the project was undertaken by Mr. Jams T. Reitz, Senior
Soviet Area Specialist. Subsequently the project leadership was assumed
by Mr. John C. Scharfen, Senior Operations Analyst, and was researched/
authored by the interdisciplinary team of Mr. Scharfen and Dr. Michael
J. Dean*, a Soviet Area Specialist. Valuable assistance was provided by
Mr. Gerald Sullivan and LTC Ray N. Franklin, USMC, of the Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Lt. Gen. Julian J. Evell, USA (Ret.), (Consultant), Mr.
George Schecter (author of "Advanced Firepower Concepts for Military Oper-
ations in Built-Up Areas," a reference source document), and Gail Patelcuis,
Research Assistant.

Richu,-' B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center

preceding Page Blanyl

V
 PREFACE

in 1700, Charles XII of Sweden, with a highly disciplined army of

8,500, thoroughly routed a numerically superiot but tactically primitive
Russian army of 45,000, guining down the fleeing Russians like "wild
gees*."' Nine years later, the erratic Charles, allied with the Cosack
hetma, Mezeppa, led an army of about 24,000 against the fortified town
of Poltava. 2

Tsar Peter marched to relieve the garrison with a refurbished, well-

trained army of 50,000 to 60,000 men equipped with 120 artillery pieces..
Both leaders foresaw the significance of the battle: that it would be de-
cisive, and that it would determine not only the outcome of Charles' cam-
:aivn but the long-term future of their states as vail."

The battle, lasting several days, was fought courageously on both

sides. The Russia generals had innovated a new tactic of employing well-
trained, highly selective outposts in front of a main line of reoistance.
The 9weden exhausted themselves against the Russian defenses. 5 In an at-
tempt to outflank the defenders the left wing of the Swedish maneuver ale-
ments were encircled by the Russians. Peter's infantry and cavalry, supported

Richard Pipes (quoting Charles XII), Russia Lnder the Old Regime, p. 120
(Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1974).
4 Charles had originally left Saxony with 43,000 well-disciplined, well-
equipped troops, The campaign into the Ukraine seriously depleted his
forces as Peter laid waste the area and as Mezeppa failed to produce
the Cossack support which Charles hoped to secure.
Lynn Montross, War fhrousth the Ages, p. 372 (Harper and Brothers, New
York, 3rd Edition 1963).
""Sir Edward S. Creasy, The Fifteen Decisive Battles of tha World, p. 298
(J. M, Dent and Sons Ltd., New York, A851).
Moncross, p. 372.

vii

Preceding Page Blank

by their vastly superior artillery, routed the Swedes and their allies driv-
ing them back into a confluence of rivers where the wounded, litter-borne
Charles, with only a few hundred remmiinin troops, escaped into Turkey.
Peter wrote of the significance of hie victory& "Now by God's help, are
the foundations of Petersburg securely laid for all ties."l

This battle for a fortified town proved to be a turning point in Rus-

sian history. Poltava marked the ergence of Russia as the dominant power
of Northern Europe:

Few battles have had such far-reaching results, for

on that June day in 1709 a new European war power
came into being as an old one declined. 2

It seem prophetic that this watershed in Russian history should oc-

cur in the battle for a fortified city, for the history which follows is
punctuated with epic events of equally historic defenses at Sebastopol,
Stalingrad and Leningrad and the capture of Berlin. Because of these
historical precedents and faced with the growing urbanization of Central
Europe, the Soviet soldier has been conditioned to take urban warfare
merioualy. This work is dedicated to the conviction that NATu allies,
to successfully defend in Europe, must understand the Soviet tactics for
fighting for and within cities.

I.

J.F.C. Fuller, Decisive Battles: Their In'luence Upon History and

Civilization, p. 425 (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940).
2 Montrops, p. 372.

viii
 MIN
This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy
CONTENTS

ABST1CACr . . . . . . ................. . . .. .
. ..

PREFACE . . . .. ... .... .. .. ... . . . . . . . vii

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ x.

SUIMMARY . ............ . ............ . . . . . 1

A. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . .. 1
B. Approach . . . .......... . . . . . . . .. . 1
C. The Significance of Cities. ........ ............... 2

D. Conclusions . . . . . . . . ............... 4
E. Major Items to iote ...................... 7

1 INTRODUCTION ... ................. . . . . . . . 11

A. Urban Grovth ...... ...................... 11
B. Soviet Viers . . . . . ................. 14
C. Strategic Views . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 19
D. The Nature or Urban Warfare .. .......... . 22

I1 SOVIET MILITARY TACTICS: AN OVERVIEW . . ... ......... .... 27

A. Soviet Strategy, Operational Art, and Tactics ..... .. 27
B. Soviet Approach to Tactics ....... . ........... . 28
C. Principles &-i Form of Tactical Warfare ........ . 34
1. The Meeting Engagement ...... .............. ... 34
2. The Offensive ................ ......... 38
3. Defense .... . . . . . . ....... 42
4. The Wichdrawal ............... .................. 45

III SOVIET COMBAT TRAINING FOR URBAN WARFARE ....... .......... 47

A. Soviet Emphasis on Importance of Combat Training . . . 47
B. Soviet Urban Warfare Training .... ............ .... 51
I. Training Fiald No. I ....... .............. ... 51
2. Training Field No. 2 ... ............... 51
3. Training Field No. 3. .. ........................... 53
4. Training Field No. 4 . .............. 54
5. Training Field No. 5 ...... ............... ... 56

ix
III SOVIET COMBAT TRAINING FOR UR.U WARFARE (Continued)
6. Traiinng Feld No. 6 .... *..
........ 58
7. Traininp Field No. 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8. TrainingField No. 8 ............... 62
G. Sunmrt7. . . . .. . . . . . . 63'

IV SOVIET TACTICAL DOC17RJEE FOR URBAN WARFARE . . . . . . . . . 65

1. Soviet Guidelines of General Application in Urban
Warfare . . . . . . * . . . . . . o e e . o .* 66
a. Conduct of the Attack and Defense .. .. . . 67
b. Task Organization . . . . . . . . . .. .. . 76
c. Water Obstacles ................... 79
d. Night Operations . . . . . . .. . . .. 81
2. Soviet Guidelines for the Infant rymn in Urban
Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
. * 82
a. Missions, Objectives and Sectors . . .@. . . 83
b. Formations and Positions . . . . . *. .. 86
c. Maneuver * . . . . . . . * .. * *. * 93
d. Arm and Lquipment . . . . . . . . . . . .. 97
e. louse and Street Fighting .......... 102
f. Pursuit ........ ............. ... .. 108
g. Consolidation.... . . . . . . . *. . 108
3. Soviet Guidelines for the Engineer in Urban Warfare 109
4. Soviet Guidelines for Chemical and Radiation
Specialists . . . 0 a ..a. . . . . &. . . . .&.
. 120
5. Soviet Guidelines for the Logistician . . . . . . 122
6. Soviet Guidelines for the ArtIlleryman . . . . .. 125
7. Soviet Guidelines for the Employment of Aviation
and Anti-Aircraft Forces ................. e 132
8. Soviet Guidelines for Armor and Antitank Forces . 135
9. Soviet Guidelines for Signal Comunications . . . 142
10. Soviet Guidelines for Reconnaissance Forces . . . 143
Footnotes .. .. .. .. .. *.. .. .. .. .. .... 1.51

This Document
Reproduc From
BeSt Available Copy

x
 This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

LIST OF TABLEs

1 Dynamics of City Population by Main Regions of the World

From 1920-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . # . a 12

2 Big City Growth in the USSR .... ................ . 13

3 Big City Growth in Selected NATU Countries ..... ......... 15
4 Urban Agglomrate Growth in Selected MATO Countries . . .. 17
5 East European Population Density Estimates ..... .......... 18

xi
 SUMMARY

A. Background

The overall objective of this study was to conduct an extensive re-

view of the Soviet open literature and, consequentially, to report on Soviet
tactical doctrine and training for urban warfare.

Urban varfare is defined, for this purpose, as combat operations by

and against regular military forces in cities. The definition includes
both nuclear and nonnuclear combat. It includes the types of combat re-
ferred to in U.S. military publications as "combat in built-up areas,"
"city fighting," "street fighting" and "house-to-house fighting."' The
definition focuses upon the city rather than the town or village which
i'-iies mult..storied structures, paved thorougnfares, modern comunications
facilities, underground passages, factories, etc. The definition does not
include terrorist and gueirilla operations as principal considerations.

B. Approach

The study is concentrated upon Soviet tactical doctrine and training

although there are references to strategic considerations for background
and to U.S. doctrine largely for the purposes of comparison. Because the
study is oriented toward the Soviet approach to urban warfare it also
focuses upon potential combat in Central Europe, a principal area of con-
cern for both the NATO and Pact nations.

1 For example, see Department of the Arm Field Manual, "Combat in Forti-
fied and Built-Up Areas," FM 31-50 (March 1964).
C. The Significance of Cities

The Central Region of Europe has long been the focus of concern for
U.S. planners for it constitutes the frontier of the NATO-Warsaw Pact con-
frontation and has been considered the most critical area for defense
against potential Pact aggression. It is here in the Central Region of
Europe that there is the greatest potential for major combat action for
and in cities.

2
Most popular scenarios of a Warsaw Pact-NATO war portray a blitzkrieg
attack by the Soviets across the Northern European plains, the classic
East-West invasion route. Until recently, Northern Germany was principally
rural with a relatively low population density. In 1972 the Yederal Republic
of Germany (FRG) had a population of 59.6 million in an area of 95,727 square
miles for a density-per-square-vile figure of 620.8. The FRG population den-
sity is 10 times that of th~e United States and ranks second only to Japan
in this respect among the 26 most populous countries in the world. Tue an-
nual increase in population in the FRG over the 1963-70 period was 1.0 per-
cent, a relatively small growth rate but still larger than that of France,
Italy or the United Kingdom. Given a straight line population increase of
one percent to 1995, and all other variables remaining constant, the popula-
tion density of West Germany vouid be 483.5 persons per square mile, which

For a uetailed terrain analysis of Central Europe which gives special

attention to build-up areas and their impact on mobility see Terrain
Analysis Center, U.S. Army Engineer Topographic Laboratories, Phase I
Study, Built-Up Areas and Structured Landscapes, FRG. The Strategic
View (June 1975).
2 For example, the Martin-Marietta Corporation has developed the "Bar-
barossa" scenario to demonstrate a Soviet blitzkrieg assault against
Central Europe.

2
exceeds the contemporary populatiun density of Japan. The bulk of the FRG
population is urban and is becoiing more so. About 20 percent of the popu-
lace currently live in the 11 largest cities of the state, end three of tho
cities have populations of more than 1 million. '

Major General Stanier, Commanding General of the British lt Division

of the British Army of the Rhine (which will have a lion's share of the re-
sponsibility for defending the North German plains against a Warsav Pact
blitzkrieg attack), has provided an excellent aralysis of the problem cities
can pcse to the military tactician and strategist.

It is an easy misconception to think of the North German

Plain as a vast billiard table of agricti. ural land, in-
tersected here and there by great rivers and a certain
amount of forest land. That was indeed how it looked at
the end of the last war. Today, however, things are
chanagln fast. There can be very few countries in the
world where industry and housing is developing so quickly.
The great cities of Hamburg, Hanover, Bremen, Braunschveig,
Kassel and G;ttingen, to name but a few, are growing
enormously all the time. It has been estimated that
during the 1980s many of these great urbanisations are
in fact going to link up with each other, giving the
strategist a totally 2 different problem to face, let
alone the tactician.

The foregoing passage derived from John C. Scharfen, "Defense Planning

Guidelines," Appendix A to Ronald C. Wakeford and William C. Perry,
"Defense RDT&E Planning and Strategy Parameters: Methodological Con-
sideration," SSC-TN-2358-1, SRI/Strategic Studies Center, p. 134
(December 1974).
2 Major General J. W. Stavier, M.B.E., remarks during the conduct of a
seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies
on 26 March 1975, "A Conventional Strategy for the Central Front in
NATO" as reported in USAF Current News Special Edition, No. 32, p. 13
(26 August 1975).

3
 Stanier points out the problems of modern cities In war without elec-
tricity required for hospitals, refrigeration, transportation, commanica-
tions, "ewage, water and other essential services, He describes refugees
Jamming thoroughfares not with carts and wagons but with Opals, Mercecds
and Porsches. He asks, but does not atteept to answer the question:

What will the attacker do about the cities? Will he

try to by-pass then in order to speed up his arrival
at his final objectives, whatever they way be, or will
he use their streets as a safe concentration area for
his reserve forces where he can be sure that no Allied
nuclear weapons will be directed? This is a very dif-
ficult problem, rapidly coming home to roost.'

D. Conclusions

Based on, this research and analysis of Soviet literature, the follow-
ing conclusions are offered concerning Soviet tactical doctrine for urban
warfare.

1. General considerations.

" Fighting in cities is neither a preferred tactic nor strategy

for the Soviet armed forces. Soviet tactical doctrine, in the
broadest sense, provides that if possible, the attack or de-
fense of cities is to be avoided in warfare.

" The Soviets recognize that the growth of the urban population
in the cities of Europe and the consequent expansion of built-up
areas my make urban warfare an unavoidable contingency in a
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and they therefore afford it high
priority.

" The capture and defense of cities have been particularly signi-
ficant in Russian history from the battles of Poltava to
Stalingrad, Berlin, and Prague.

" The Soviet soldier has proven to be effective, resourceful,

tenacious and innovative in urban operations from the battles
of World War II to Budapest, Berlin and Prague in the post-
war era.

1 Major General J. W. Stanier, p. 13.

4
 9 If a city cannot be bypassed, the preferred method of attack
is either directly "from the march" or following an encircle-
ment of the city.

s In the attack "from the march" great emphasis is given to

speed and to traing the city by storm, rapidly bypassing and
isoating pockets of enemy resistance rather than a block-by-
block, section-by-section, methodical advance.

"* If an attack "from the march" should fail to seize a city

quickly, the most important objectives are seized and the
city is blockaded and taken under siege.

"e Urban warfare may be conducted with or without the employment

of nuclear or chemical weapons although the Soviets emphasize
the integrity, flexibility and duality of tactical concepts
and that future wars will entail nuclear, chemical and con-
ventional operations.

" From the materials reviewed in this study, Soviet treatment of

eMloyment of nuclear weapons in urban warfare is judged to be
superficial and in a one-dimensional view of a single Soviet
attack rather than a maltiple exchange of weapons between
adversaries.

2. Soviet urban tactics emphasize:

"e Small unit tactics

"* Task organization for combat
"e Uniqueness of each urban ccobat situation
"e Tank-infantry team cooperation
"e Antitank operations to include the destruction of supporting
infantry

"e Direct-lay fire of artillery

"* Wall breaching by direct fire weapons and engineer personnel
"e The role of the sapper
"* The top-down assault of a building where feasible
* Isolation of objectives (buildings/strongpoints) in the attack

Employment of automatic individual arms and grenades

5
 * The use of smoke and darkess to conceal movement

0 Continuity of operations through the ful 24-bour daily cycle

* Realistic training in urban area mockups with as much realism

a possible

* Thorough mativation and psychological preparation for city

fighting
* The rapid crossing of water obstacles

3. Relatively little emphasis was found in this research on Soviet

concern for or interest in:

"e The difficulties of operating in an urban nuclear environment

(asse casualty evacuations, pestilence, extensive contamina-
tion, blast-effects of rubble, etc.)

" Employment of fixed wing air support to include precision

guided weaponry

"e Remotely piloted vehicles

"e Use of the helicopter for attack, communication or logistic
support

"e Shoulder fired antiaircraft missiles

"a Employment of unattended ground sensors
"s Bloymsnt of off route mines.
4. There appear to be more similarities than differences between
the U.S. and USSR approaches to and experience In urban warfare.
The more explicit differences are:

"e The Sovieta appear to place greater emphasis upon the use of
nuclear weapons in the city

" The Soviets appear to have lass concern for the implications
of exposing a flank to a bypassed city

"e The Soviets appear to give less attention to the employment

of snipers than is found in U.S. tactical wmnuals

"e The Soviets appear to give more attention to the use of

armor and artillery in the reduction of urban defenses

6
 "* The city has &reater historical significance relative to the
Soviet military with a strong identification with epic
battles such as Poltava, Stalingrad, Lanisgrad and Berlin

" While past Soviet experiences In urban warfare have been quit.!
dramatic, recnt experience is limited to the Berlin, Budapest
and Prague operations while the United States forces have en-
gaged in active operations in Seoul, Hue, Santo Domingo and
Konttm

" The Soviets1 appear to give more emphasis to the use of chemical
aanitions.

Z. ,Maor Items to Note

It is unusual when one finds an article in a Western military jour-

nal on the subject of urban warfare. One of the objectives in initiating
this study effort was to determine if the Soviet literature reflected equal,
greater or less interest in this facet of combat. Without embarking upon
a detailed not assessment between Western and Soviet literature, it soon
became obvious from this review that the Soviets devoted far more space
in their publications to urban warfare than did Western writers. Our
literature survey focused upon the period 1967-74 although the review un-
covered relevant materials published as far back as the World War II era.
There were 365 Russian and English language documents which were found to
have particular value for this effort. Of the 365 items used in the survey,
60 or more provided sufficient detail on Soviet tactics to formulate a
fairly comprehensive view of their approach to urban combat. Of the 365
sources, 220 were in the origir.4l Russian while 145 had already been trans-
lated into English. About 275 of the sources were oriented to offensive
urban war while 190 focused upon defensive actions. About 245 concerned

This statement does accurately reflect the research of this study. However,
the number of references in Soviet literature to chemical warfare in an
urban environment is much less than what one finds in more general litera-
ture on strategy and tactics.

7
 y!

historical events while 95 dealt with mors contemporary ;roblem. Sam

of the material dealt with both. 1
The Soviet Uteratu-e collected for
this search covered a broad spectrum of detail from strategic to tactical
concepts at the army level to the tactics of the individual Soviet rifle-
man, eginear, artilleryman, at. al.

If there appears to be small concern for the ranifications of urban

warfare in Western writings it can hardly be laid to a lack of attention
in popular Soviet military journals. There are sufficient research mate-
rials available in open and classified sources to develop detailed eati-
mates and reports on how the Soviets would employ their units in combat
in cities today and in the near future.' In Chapter IV of this study is
a preliminary effort on an approach to generate such reports. It will be
noted that Chapter IV provides brief analyses and pertinent citations of
Soviet writings on urban warfare categorized by separate arms of the ser-
vice. This material assembled in the study archives are sufficiently rich
in substantive detail to warrant further study. It would be particularly
valuable if this =ncyclopaedic resource was further developed to generate
separate tactical handbooks on how Soviet infantrymen, artillerymen, en-
gineers, etc., plan to fight in cities. Such a method of presentation
should be instructive for U.S. personnel, not only from the standpoint
of acquiring knowledge of a potential adversary but for comparing and
assessing U.S. doctrine and technicues as well.

One measure of Soviet concern for urban warfare can be found in the
rather extensive training facilities which are devoted to preparing Soviet
forces for fighting in cities. Chapter III is devoted to a description
of these facilities. Eight training fields are described, each field

A more detailed report on this literature search may be found in the

publication: James T. Reitz, "A Review of Soviet Tactical Literature,"
SSC-TN-2625-4, Part I, p. 14, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (October
1974) CONFIDENTIAL.
2 Ibid.
/

meticulously prepared to replicate some condition or conditions which may

be found in city warfare. One of the fields is two kilometers deep, has
maltistoried structures and underground shelters. One sourcel describes
in some detail the roquisites of an ideal structure within an urban com-
bat training area which would ropresent in great detail the varied condi-
tions an assault force would meet in a built-up area. According to the
author, the structure should include, in its several stories, one floor
with several rooms emptying into a corridor, the building should have a
basement, Lhere should be a stone fence surrounding the structure and
there shottld be a second building in the near proximity.

Another training area, in a military engineer school, is divided into

three special sectors. One is devoted to reconnaissance and obstacle
breaching, another to contaminated areas and mined obstacles, and the
third to populated areas.

The single best indicator as to whether or not a national military

force takes urban warfare seriously is the degree to which they appear
willing to expend assets of time and material on training and training
facilities. This survey would indicate that the Soviet military forces
do indeed devote considerable resources to such endeavors. There is sub-
stantial evidence to be found in Soviet writings that the Soviets are con-
cerned with urban warfare. The evidence is confirmed and reinforced by
the attention they devote to training in urban tactics.

Colonel A. Romanenko, "Combat of a Motorized-Rifle Platoon in a City,"

Voyenny Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 40-44 (December 1969).

9
 I .INTRODUCTION

A. Urban Growth

The increase in urbanization in the USSR itself, and more gradual

increases in already heavily urbanized Western Europe since World War 11,
are impottant factors which keep urban conflict very much In the minds
of Soviet military writers (and probably military planners). According
to the 1972 edition of the Nstion&. EcVoM (Narodnoye Khozyalstvo), Sta-
tistika Press. Moscow, 1972, the Soviet urban population in 1940 was Just
over 63 million, forming about a third of the population. By 1972, this
figure had climbed to nearly 144 %illion or nearly 60 percent of the popu-
lation.

Soviet writers are equally aware of urbanization trends in other

areas of the world as indicated by Table I translated below from a re-
cent Russian-language publication.

Pravda reports, "In the Russian Federation alone. thr number of cities
with populations of more than 200,000 doubled within 25 years."' Table 2
demonstrates the Soviet growth from 1959 to 1974. Soviet literature indi-
cates that during this 15-year pariod the Soviet Union's urban population
throughout the country increased by 50 percent. The increase was not pri-
marily due to favorable birth and death ratios but, rather, to migration
from rural areas. The trends, of course, are not irreversible. The USSR
is making a concentrated effort to limit the growth of cities. Neverthe-
less, the increased concentration of populatlin in cities, which is visi-
ble in 1975, will probably continue even though the rate may be slowed. 2

1 A. Libkind, Pravda p. 3 (5 August 1975).

2 Victor Perevedentsev in Literaturnaya Gazeta (30 April 1975).

11

Prceding page blank

 Table 1
DYNMICS 01 CjrY POPU.IATION BY MAIN IN IONS
or To wom nm 192o-2000'

1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

*a P C

USSR 60 32 105 49 190 18 300 85

Europe (-USSR) 200 53 245 SR 310 65 375 71
East Asia 85 13 180 21 325 31 520 40
Africa 20 11 50 18 350 25 750 35

Worth Ame~rica (USA & Canadn) 85 59 140 70 215 81 310 87

Latti America 40 31 105 49 245 60 540 80
Australia & OCeani. 5 53 10 64 20 75 25 80
Eatlrt World 570 25 990 33 1780 46 3090 51

Euro: (U) From 1920-1960 estimated; from 1980-2000 projected. These

figures were determined by the Commission on Population of the
Economic and Social Councl of the UN.

nT. Tr . Urlands, ed., Population of the Countries of the World (Refer-

ence Book), p. 419 (Statistic Publishing House, Moscow, 1974).

12
 Table 2
BIG CITY GROWTH IN THE USSR

Population Increae Over the

(in T,,usand,, 15-Year Period
J1957 (In Tho..-nd-) Percent

MscoV 6,044 7,528 1,48,4 25

Lanin-rad 3,321 4,243 922 28
Kiev 1,110 1,887 777 70
Tashkent 927 1,552 625 67
Bku 968 1,359 391 40
Mar'kov 953 1,330 377 40
Gor'kiy 941 1,260 319 34
Novosibirsk 885 1,243 358 41
Kuybyshev 806 1,140 334 41
Sverdlovsk 779 1,122 343
N.unak 509 1,095 586 115
Total 17,243 23,759 6,516 38

Source: Perevedentsev In Litersturnaya Gazetj (30 April 1975).

13
 Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the pattern of big city growth In those
areas of Northern and Central Europe of principal concern. Generally,
the growth in built-up areas is most sa.riking in the eztemsion of suburbs
which is demonstrated in Table 4.

The population densities of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies are
displayed in Table 5. Note that the population density of East Germany at
but
408 persons per square mile is by far the largest of the Pact partners
falls short of that for West Germany at the 621 mark.

B. Soviet Views

The importance of cities in the overall scheme of warfare has been

writers. It
recognized and frequently commented upon by Soviet military
is pointed out in Soviet literature that in Central Europe ( a most
likely objective of a Soviet advance) there are numerous large cities.
For every 200 to 300 square kilometers of territory, will be found at

least one or two cities of 25.000 to 30,000 people, as well as numerous

other populated points. In soma highly developed economic regions, more-

over, these cities will have an area of several thousand square kilometers.

Consequently, one Soviet source has asserted that "under contemporary

conditions, combat aitivities in a city will be a frequent phenomanon"
and has estimated that "engaging in battle for the seizing of cities will
2
be held every 40 to 60 kilometers."

Voyennyy
Guards General Major L. Kuznetsov, "The Offensive in a City,"
Vestnik, No. 8, p. 36 (August 1969). See also 'coonel A. Sidorchuk,
"Combat Actions of Troops in the Seizure of Large Cities," Voyenno-
istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 10, p. 20 (October 1971).
2 General Hajor A. K. Shovkolovich, Colonel F. I. Konasov, and Colonel
S. I. Tkach, Boyevyye deystvi-a motostrelkovoio batal'ona v gorode
(Combat Activity of a Motorized-Rifle Battalion in a City), p. 5
(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971).

14
 Table 3
BIG CITY GROWlTH IN SELECTID NATO COUWTrIZS

Populationi Change Over The

(UnThousalEd) 15-Year Period
Country and CiLi 1959 1973 Percent

Brussels 170.4 103.72 -66.7 -39"

Antwrp 260.7 217.3 -43.4 -174
Liese 156.5 142.8 -13.7 - 9
Scbsarbeek 118.2 119.0' .8 1

Denmurks

Copewauge 942.1' 1299.0' 356.9 38

Aarhus 118UA 245.6 127.2 107
OdeWms 110.2 167.8 57.6 52

Wesa Geatvny

Aachen 165.0 239.6 74.6 45

Augsburg 204.3 257.0 52.7 26
loan 144.3 281.1 136.8 95
Breon 546.1 589.8 43.7 8
Bremerhaven 137.5 144.5 7.0 5
Darmstadt 133.1 140.9 7.8 6
Duisburg 500.4 441.5 -58.9 -12
Dusseldorf 689.1 637.1 -52.0 - 8
Essen 728.2 682.3 -45.9 - 6
Frankfurt 651.7 667.5 15.8 2
Freiburg 137.6 171.5 33.9 25
Gelsenkirchen 391.1 339.8 -51.3 -13
Hagen 190.0 197.9 7.9 4

Information for this table was calculated from data in the UN Demographic
Yearbook for 1962 and 1973 and from the Europa Yearbook for 1961 and 1975
(Europa Publications Ltd., London).
2 1971 estimate for Brussels.

3 1970 figure for Schaarbeek.

""Increasedin overall urban agglomerate (see Table 2).
s 1974 estimate for Denmark cities (Europa Yearbook 1975).
Includes Frederiksberg and Gentofte (from Europa Yearbook statistics).

15
 Population Change Over The J
(in ,Thousands) 15-Year Period
Country and City 1959 1973 (in Thousands) Percent

West Germany

Hamburg 1815.4 1766.2 -49.2 - 3

lHannover 568.0 511.3 -56.7 -10
Karlsruhe 232.8 263.5 30.7 13
Kamsel 200.4 213.0 12.6 6
Kiel 268.3 268.8 .5 0
Koln 770.7 840.3 69.6 9
Lubeck 231.5 237.7 6.2 3
Ludvigshafen 158.2 174.3 16.1 10
Mainz 128.2 181.1 52.9 41
Mannheim 302.7 328.4 25.7 8
?ulheim 180.A 191.8 11.4 6
Hunich 1047.7 1338.9 291.2 28
Munster 172.7 200.5 27.8 16
Nuremburg 444.0 515.0 71.0 16
Oldenburg 120.8 133.3 12.5 10
Osnabruck 133.6 164.0 30.4 23
Regensburg 123.0 133.5 10.5 9
Remacheid 123.0 135.5 12.5 10
Salzgitter 105.9 117.6 11.7 11
Solingen 167.2 176.7 9.5 6
Stuttgart 626.1 630.4 4.3 1
Wilhelmshaven 99.6 104.3 4.7 5
Wuppertal 418.5 413.2 -5.3 - 1
Luxembourg 72.6 78.0 5.4 - 7

Netherlandsl

Amsterdam 871.0 799.8 -71.2 - 82

Apeldoorn 102.0 128.3 26.3 26
Arnheime 123.7 130.5 6.8 5
Breda 106.4 121.8 15.4 14
Eindhoven 164.6 191.5 26.9 16
Enschede 122.9 143.2 20.3 17
Groningen 143.9 170.9 27.0 19
Haarlem 169.1 171.4 2.3 1
mijmegen 128.3 149.7 21.4 17
Rotterdam 731.8 662.0 -69.8 _102
The Hague 606.3 517.9 -88.4 -15
Tilberg 135.8 154.3 18.5 14
Utrecht 252.9 272.2 19.3 8

Netherland cities are 1972 estimates from UN Demo&raphic Yearbook 1973.

2 Increased in overall urban agglomerate (see Table 2).

16
 Table 4
URBAN AGGLOMERATE GROWTH IN SILECTED NATO COUNTRIES 1

2 Change Over the 10-

2
Population to'-Cnf; Period
Country and City (In Thousands) (In Thoussds) Percent

1961 1971
Belgium Estimate Estimate

Antverp 643.5 672.7 29.2 5

Brussels 1019.5 1074.7 55.2 5
Liege 448.2 440.4 -7.8 - 2

1960 1972
Denmark Estimate Estimate

Copenhagen 1262.2 1362.2 100.0 8

Aarhus 177.2 187.34 10.1 6
Odense 129.8 133.04 3.2 2

1959 1972
Netherlands Estimate Estimate

Amsterdam 917.5 1023.7 106.2 12

Groningen 157.0 206.0 49.0 31
HBarlem 215.0 238.6 23.6 11
The Hague 728.1 697.9 -30.2 - 4
Rotterdam 811.1 1059.6 248.5 31

I Source does not provide agglomerate data for the FRG.

2 Information calculated from data in United Nations Demographic Yearbook
of 1962 and 1973 (published in 1962 and 1974 respectively, New York).
3 5-year period.
" 1965 figure for Aarhus and Odense.

17
 Table 5
EAST EJROPEAN POPULATION DENSITY ESTIMATES

1973 Area
1973 Population (Thousands of 1973 Density
(1illions of People) Sq, Mile) (Perions Per Sq. Mile)

East Germany 17.0 41.6 408

Czechoslovakia 14.6 49.4 295
Hungary 10.4 35.9 290
Poland 33.4 120.6 277
Romania 20.9 91.7 228
Bulgaria 8.6 42.8 201
Average 17.5 63.6 283

Sources: Population estimates from Central Intelligence Agency; areas

from Associated Press Almanac (1974).

18
 Moreover, from the enormous nuaber of articles vritten by the Sovieta
since 1945 on the battles vaed In and around msjor cities, It is obvious
that they place considerable ephasis on the peychological value in winning
or losing the battle for a large city. It is stressed thet the successful
defende of a city can have significant consequences. As me source has
succinctly recalled frou the experience of World War ID

Skillful defense of the garrisons of Brest, Liyepsay

Mogilev, Sevastopol$ Odessa and other important popu-
lated points restrained and paralysed considereble
torces of the eneay. Injplitical respects, the suc-
cessful defense of the cities inspired confidence in
victory, strengthened the moral spirit of the Soviet
people at the front and in the rear. In military re-
spects, it diverted the enormous forces of the anew
and delayed his general offensAk".

C. Strateuic Vieas

Modern strategists, Russian or Western, must view cities from two

distinct perspectives--one offensive, one defensive. For the commander
of forces on the offense operating in seane territory, the city can be
viewed, inter alia, as:

P A hostage to an attacker's threat of destruction or wide-

spread damage

a An obstacle to advance, attack and maneuver

* A fortress for the defender

e A base for sorties against the attacker's exposed flanks

e A vital center of conmunications either essential to or

which would facilitate the attack

"1 "Combat Activities in a City," Starshina Serzhant, No. 6, p. 1 (June

1972). A further analysis of the importance of cities is provided in
Chapter II, paragraph D.

19
 "* A source of resources which are either coveted by the
attacker or which should be denied to the defender

"* A symbol of national will the retention of which i.

critical to continuing resistance

"* The locus of political power

"* A problem for defending and governing if occupied.

For the commander of defensive forces operating against a hostile

force which has crossed national borders, the city can be viewed, inter
alia, as:

" Of such cultural, historic value that it must be spared

destruction and consequently declared "open" as was Paris
in World War II.

" A trap in which to delay, impede or U lt the attacking

army and air forces

" An essential communications center without which continued

resistance is infeasible

" The stadt-geist of the country which requires defense at

all costs

" A potential locus of disease, pestilence, mass casualties

and hysteria on a large scale

"e Essential for economic survival

"e A source of political stability or instability

"* A strongpoint more easily defended than a position in

open terrain.

This brief and incomplete citation of opposing perceptions of cities

demonstrates the complexity of categorizing the significance of urban cen-
ters in modern war. Recognizing that there are many variables which influ-
ence the role cities play in war, there are, nevertheless, some overall
generalizations which can be drawn about their significance for the Soviet
Union and the United States:

20
0 Given circumstances of var In Central Burope Involving
a Warsaw Pact attack against the NATO allies;

Warsaw Pact forces are most likely to manilze speed,

maneuver and depth of penetration to the Rhine and
Weser Rivers' line and beyond, bypassing urban centers
wherever and whenever possible.
- As a strategic policy, the Warsav Pact would not likely
destroy the cities of Western Nurope for to do so would
denigrate the advantages of conquest, reinforce anti-
pathies and Invite retaliation by stand-off air and
missile forces.
- Notwithstanding the Warsav Pact preference to avoid
combat in cities in a blitzkrieg-style attack, the
deeper the penetration, the loager the period of at-
tack and the later the event occurs in this century,
the more likely It will be that they will be forced
to fight in cities.
- If Warsaw Pact forces are persistent In bypassing
cities in a march to the Phines, their lines of con-
munication could be vulnerable to those NATO forces
left within or shielded by cities.
- Once Warsaw Pact forces are committed to city fight-
ing, the effectiveneas of messed armor 1s reduced and
the overall advantage accrues to the defender. Assum-
Ing the defender has the will to persevere, the tempo
of var goes from the blitzkrieg measured in advences
of hundreds of mUies per phase to street fighting
measured in blocks per phase.

e Given circumstances of var in areas other than Central

Europe where the Soviet Union is likely to commit forces,
the potential for urban operations is dependent upon the
variables of where, when, objectivas, etc.

- iowever, the major Soviet commitmnts to military oper-

ations post-1945 are heavily weighted to urban areas to
include Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), and Prague (1968).
- All such operations have the common characteristic that
overpowering force was used to control and influence the
central apparatus of state power or the populace in capi-
tal cities.
- As the Soviets extend their Influence out from their
imediate borders and increase their capabilities to
project force into forward areas, they may increasingly
find that such operations as Beirut (1958), Santo
Domingo (1965), Belfast (1972 and later) and perhaps,
even Hue (1968) are characteristic of great power
operations in areas distant from its national base.

21
Do The Nature of Urban Warfare

Throughout the areas which have reasonable potential for Soviet co.-
bat operat ions there is a great diversity emong cities. They range from
ancient walled cities dating back to the Middle Ages to completely modern
citiee reconstructed from the ruins of World War 11. In size, they range
from the relatively mamll cities which are scattered across the North
of Europe to the half million plus of Braman, to the 3.2 million of the
Est-West Berlin complex. Sam of the smaller citiee are still surrounded
by rural areas with open approaches, while the larger cities tend to sup-
port suburban agloseretes with the approaches restricted by built-up
areas. The nature of urban warfare will obviously vary with conditions
of population density, the size, haeiht and density of buildings, sub-
terranesan commications system, architectural style, whether or not
there ws tint or disposition to evacuate the city, the plans of attack
and defense, the size and organisation of combat forces, climate and a
host of other variables which make it difficult to meke categorical state-
ments on the nature of urban warfare. Nevertheless, there are omen fairly
consistent lessons to be learned from recent history as there are insights
into the future which can be drawn upon to develop a list of Soms rela-
tively universal characteristics of city fighting.

Generally, combat in cities becomes a series of small-unit actions at

the squad, platoon, company and battalion level. Maneuver of these small
units become complex and detailed while larger unit movement at the bri-
gade and division level is limited and slow and there are few opportunities
for decisive maneuver. There may be excaptions to these generalizations
of focusing on smaller units in limited maneuver when the attacker elects
to storm a city by pushing armored columns through the streets or deliver-
ing troops by air, thus bypassing defensive positions. Extensive destruc-
tion of city structures by nuclear or conventional firepower may, on the
one hand, significantly reduce the capability of the defenders but the
resultant destruction and rubble of such fires may, on the other hand,
so impede movement that they prove to be a major obstacle to the attackers.

22
 Armor is vry effective in cities but mast be employed with care In
a menor which capitalizes ea its firepower and armor protection while
mimnisming its vulnerability due to lack of vision# restricted nobility
and the very close proximity of undetected eneW forces. Both In offense
and defense, direct fire support by tanks has been used to good advantage.
Both in offemse and defene", there mut be close tank-infantry coordination
to overcome the close-in vulnerability of the tank. Tank and armored
infantry columns are singularly effective in the attack when resistance
is light and the streets are relatively clear of obstacles.

Artillery employed within a city Is obviously restricted in its flexi-

bility and much greater emphasis must be given to direct lay, short-range
fire techniques. Mortars have an increased effectivenese as do flamathrowers
which have effective short-range capabilities. Chemical smoke, haze,
dust and darkness all may be used to mask movemt. Subterranean systems
(subways* severs, etc.), my become major avenues of movement although
they ar easily blocked or interdicted.

Conventional fixed and rotary wing aircraft close support is generally

limited due to the indiscriminate destruction and obstacles they may gene-
rate and due to vulnerability to hostile fire. from crew-served and new
handheld weapons such as the SA-7/Redeye. Ramotely piloted air vehicles
may reduce the significance of this vulnerability within the next two
decades.

Movement from one objective to another or assault upon a position

may be limited to well defined approaches unless effective barrier-reduciug
or wall-breaching systems are used.

The capabilities of the adividual soldier and small units may, with
effective training and employment, be maximized at the expense of opposing
forces to the extent that relatively small units may defeat, deter or im-
pede a substantially larger force.

23
 Where cities still contain noncombatants, distinct advantage may
accrue to the side which is less concerned with the safety of the populace.

The details of task oranisation become much more Important at the

lwmer levels of organization than in more open form of warfare. Infan-
try squads may be reinforced with flamethrowers, engineers or commnica-
tars. Tanks and artillery may be placed in direct support of platoons.

Observation is limited because of buildings, dust and smoks. Cover

and concealment are plentiful and there is less nsed for artificial canou-
flage. The aberrations of sound bouncing off structures and the lack of
long-range visibility and distinctive landmarks have a tendency to dis-
orient and confuse maneuvering forces.

There is a greater requirement for effective communications at the

small-unit level. Radio communications may be less reliable due to the
interference of buildings. Basic arm and hand signals, flares and wire
communications may become the principal means of communication for forces
in cont- it.

Precision guided munitions, comand detonated mines, unattended ground

sensors, remotely piloted vehicles both air and ground and other current
state-of-the-art technological advances may substantially change the nature
of urban warfare as it is currently envisioned.

The effects of selective use of small nuclear weapons to include those

of enhanced radiation are speculative as are the potential capabilities of
chemical munitions. It seems certain however that their use could also
change contemporary tacticians? views on fighting in cities.

In sumary, the tactics of urban warfare are unique whether viewed

from the perspective of the Soviet Union or the United States. There are,
however, many principles of control, coordination, techniques of fire,

24
maneuver, recomnaisance and air operations that are quite similar to more
open form of warfare along with the many divergencies. It Is thee diver-
pmcies end differences which make the study of Soviet tactical doctrine
for urban warfare a worthwhile pursuit.

25
 II SOVIRT MILITARY TACTICS: AN OVERVIEW

A. Soviet Stratesy. Operational Art. and Tactics

As background to this study of Soviet concepts of urban wcfare, it

seem important to understand that the place of tactics in the field of
Soviet military science is someuhat different from that of the U.S. prac-
titioner of the military arts.

In the volume on tactics published in the aid-1960@ as part of the

authoritative Officer's Library series, it is stated that, as a scienti-
fie theory, Soviet military art is divided into three parts: strategy,
operational art, and tactics. In the military dictionary, which also is
part of the Officer's Library series, strategy is described as "the high-
est are of military art, representing a system of scientific knowledge
on the occurrence and rules of armed struggle."' Strategy is concerned
with the investigation and e"aboration of questions related to the condi-
tions and nature of a future war, the prepaeraton and strategic utiliza-
tion of the armed forces, the forme and methods of conducting and leading
armed struggle, and the comprehensive strategic aafeguard of the troops'
combat activity. 2

Operational art is "a comonent part of military art" vhich is en-

gaged in working out the theory and practice of preparing and conducting
the joint or independent operations of strategic formations of the armed
forces. It is "the combining link between strategy and tactics." Guided

Slovar' oenovnykh voyennykh teruinov (Dictionary of Basic Military Term.),

p. 220 (Moscow: Voyanizdat, 1965).
2 Ibid., General Major V. G. Reznichenko, ed., Taktika (Tactics), p. 6
(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1966); and Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D.
Sokolovskiy, ed., Voyennaya strategiya (Military Strategy), pp. 16-17
(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968).

J_ . S.~......
Monk 27 j
 nature
by the requirements of strategy, operational art investitats the
of contemporary operations, defines the methods of preparing and conduct-
the
ing operations for the achievement of strategic goals, and determines
Opera-
matters of operational support, troop control, and rear support.
the
tional art also embodies the initial data for tactics by organizing
and
preparation and conduct of battle in coordination with the purposes
tasks of operations.'

Tactics, the principal concern of this study on Soviet urban doctrine,

which stud-
is "the particular area of theory and practice of military art,
for
is* the objective rules of fighting and works out methods of preparing
2
and conducting it on land, in the air, and on the sea." Consequently, as

compared to strategy and operational art, tactics "occupies a subordinate

position and is designed to work in the interests of operational art3 and
by operational art."1
strategy as well as to obtain the aims proposed
not
Given this role, it is recognized that "the principles of tactics are
eternal and immutable,"* and therefore the dynamic impact of postwar mili-
tary developments must be fully taken into consideration.

B. Soviet Approach to Tactics

Much attention in Soviet literature is directed to the influence of

the postwar "scientific-technological revolution" on military affairs.
This influence is particularly felt in such areas as military organiza-
tion, troop control, and weapons development. Writing on the 57th anni-
versary of Soviet Armed Forces Day, for example, first deputy Minister
of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy remarked thet:

I Slovar' osnovnykh voyennykh terminov, p. 150; and Reznichenko, op. cit.,

p. 6.
2 Slovar' osnovnykh vovennykh terminov, p. 224.
3 Gavrilov, op. cit., p. 22.
V. Zamorovskiy,SColonel
"Laws of Battle," Soviet Military Review, do. 3,
p. 19 (March 1975).

28
 Three decades have passed since the end of the war.
In this time our army and navy have substantially
changed. Their mobility, striking strength, and fire-
power have Increased Imeaasursbly. They have advanced
to a new stage of development. It is determined by the
fact that the combat power of the armed fares In the
conditions of a developed socialist society and on the
basis of a gigantic growth of the economy, rapid
scientific-technical progress, and the further consoli-
dation of the moral-political unity sand friendship of
the peoples of the USSR is steadfastly continuing to
strengthen. The nature of the army and navy has un-
recognizably transformed the modern types of arm and
combat equipment, which Soviet troops are skillfully
wielding.'

While the strategic missile forces may have been the primary bensfi-
ciary of rapid scientific-technical progress attained since World War II,
Soviet spokesmen strongly assert that this progress has been responsible
for a significant Increase In the combat capabilities of the other service
branches.' It follows that nuclear strikes will have a tremendous Impact
in a general war, especially in the Initial phase, but will not in them-
selves be decisive. Tactical armed conflicts will have an important role
in any war. As the tactical volume fro, the Officer's Library stated in
the aid-1960s:

Doubtlessly, with the presence of nuclear weapons at

the direct disposal of the strategic and operational
leadership, their capabilities have evidenced. At the
sam tine, it should be consldsred that armed struggle
has niw acquired a different character than before. It
has become mrs complex and covers not only the line of
direct contact of troops, but also the entire depth of
the theater of troop activity and even the entire ter-
ritory of the warring sides. Under these conditions,

1 rasnaya Zvezda (23 February 1975).

2 Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, "V. I. Lenin and the Armed
Forces of the Soviet State," Komist, No. 3, p. 22 (Februar- 1974).
Cf. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grschko, Vooruzhenniyo sily
sovetskozo aosudarstva (The Armed Forces of the Soviet State), pp. 95-
99 (Moscow: Veyenizdat, 1974); and Marshal of the Soviet Union K. S.
Moskalenko, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1503 QGM (14 May 1975).

29
 while nuclear strikes inflicted directly by the stra-
tegic and operational leadership may decide the mant
important taska, they are still but a part of the
general tasks of the armed struggle. For total vic-
tory, it is necessary to consolidate the results of
the nuclear strikes inflicted by the high command, to
complete the destruction of the enemy, to seize his
territory, and to deprive the enemy of the capability
to carry out resistance in any form. The attainment
of this objective is inevitably connected with the
conduct of intense combat activity.'

The continuity of Soviet thought on this line was demonstrated several

years later in a work on offensive warfare which states:

The uatual employment of nuclear weapons by the sides

will give modern combat an absolutely different charac-
ter in comparison with its former characters. Just as
combat became a combat of fire with the broad introduc-
tion of fast-firing weapons among the troops, modern
combat can be characterized as nuclear combat. Of
course, this does not repudiate its combined arms
character but only stresses the decisive role of
nuclear weapons in battle and the special features of
the battle itself which follow therefrom. The actions
of the troops on the battlefield are coordinated first
of all with the nuclear strikes and are directed toward
1
the exploitation of their results.

Similarly, stressing the combined-arms nature of a general war, a training

manual written in 1972 explained that:

Contemporary war is a combined arm war. Characteris-

tic of it are the use of nuclf ar weapons and the partic-
ipation of great numbers of ground troops with this
diverse combat equipment, rocket troops, eviation and
airborne troops, as well as the increased role of tanks...

1 Reznichenko, Taktika, p. 11.

2 Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive (A Soviet View), translated by
the United States Air Force, pp. 41-42 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1970).

30
 Combined-arms fighting is conducted by the combined
effort of all types of troops and special troops.I

The Soviets take chemical and bacteriological warfare seriously and

cite precedents of "American imperialists" employing such weapons. "The
Americans used this Ibacteriological] weapon in the war against the Korean
2
people (1950-53) and also on the territory of the Chinese Peoples' Republic."
According to the Soviet writers, these precedents should serve as object
lessons for Soviet military forcest

All this permits us to consider that troops will be

forced to conduct combat actions nct only during mas-
sive enemy use of nuclear weapons but also aring
wide use of toxic substances and bacteriological agents.
We must -. ,:'-ipatethat in this war the aggressor will
use chmical "d bacteriological weapons in combination
with nuclear weapons.4

In particular in a futute war one may expect the employ-

ment of cheatca! aad bacteriological weapons the devel-
opment of which is being given great attention in the
Western countries especially the United States.$

It is also pointed out by Soviet writers that the characteristics of

tactical fighting have undergone fundamental changes since World War II.
These changes, say the Soviets, preclude the possibility that a future
battle will be fought between two armies drawn up in continuous battle
lines stretching over long distances. As one source noted, protracted
battles are "definitely a thing of the past." whose place has been taken

General Lieutenant A. I. Odintsov, ad., Uchebnoye posobiye po nachalnoy

voyennoy podgotovke (Training Manual for Initial Combat Training), p.
127 (Moscow: DOSAAF Publishing House, 1972).
2 Reznichenko, Taktika, p. 30.
3 Ibid, p. 31.
""I. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, 3rd Edition, Stanford
Research Institute, edited by Harriet Fast Scott, p. 201 (New York,
Crane RPussak & Co., Inc., 1975).
s Ibid., p. 243.

31
 J

by ht~ly flexible combat actions.' Indeed, the Soviets envision that a

future conventional war will be a short camaign marked principally by the
following features:

* Mobility and high speeds of combat operations

e Concentration of superior forces only in the decisive

place and at the decisive time

e Rapid breakthrough

e Penutration and dispersal into the depth of the opponent's

defense

e Bepass and encirclement of enemy ntrongpoints and popu-

lated areas

* Destruction of bypassed points.

One of the most emphatic points made by Soviet tacticians is that

priority must be given to quick movement on the battlefield. "Quickness,
swiftness, and the decisiveness of the actions of subunits," noted one
such writer, '"have always been indispensable conditions of the successful
outcome of any sort of battle." 2 Similarly, another high ranking military
figure noted that:

Contemporary battle, characterized by high maneuvera-

bility and dynamic actions, is as a rule developed in
a short time and conducted at a high tempo. So, in
order to execute a bold and swift maneuver and deliver
a powerful blow into the flank and rear of the enemy a
high speed of movement is needed. 3

Colonel V. Savkin, "Traits of Modern Combat," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 3,

p. 25 (March 1974).
2 General Major of Tank Troops I. Skorodumov, "'he Guarantee of Success
in Battle is in the Swiftness of Actions," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 5,
p. 11 (May 1973).
3 General Lieutenant M. Ryb'yakov, "Long-Distance March," Voyennyy Vestnik,
No. 2 (February 1973).

32
 Well evwre that tactical nuclear weapons could annihilate-and thereby
cause the early defeat of-an opponent which mosses its forces too soon,
Soviet writers suggest that troops marching to the attack should be diu-
parsed (1) widely enough to prevent their destruction, but (2) closely
enough to permit their swift concentration along the main line of attack
at the proper time. Scenarios developed by SoSet writers suggest the
following subsequent actions: '

From a dispersed formation, troops are massed along the

main line of attack. The concentrated forces, either
alone or in conjunction with tactical nuclear strikes,
make a break in the defensive line of the enemy. Swiftly,
the troops break through the gap and move into the depth
of the enemy. The breakthrough is followed by a rapid
redispersal in order to prevent the enemy from full
utilization of his n'tclear weapons. Bypassing strong-
points and centers of resistance, the troops move quickly
into the depth of the enemy.

This theorizing on the nature of future wars can be invalidated to a

large degree should the Soviets choose or be forced to fight in cities.
As has been previously cited, city fighting is characterized by "limited
and slow" maneuvers which are hardly consistent with these prescriptions
for "high maneuverability,': "quickness" and "swiftness." While Soviet
writers view nuclear warfare as causing "dispersion," swift "breakthroughs"
and "rapid redisparsal," the use of nuclear weapons in cities could promote
such rubble and local contamination that there would be serious impediments
to any movement.

See, for example, Colonel V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Opera-
tional Art and Tactics (A Soviet View), translated by the United States
Air Force, pp. 167-239 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972); Colonel I.
Nikolayev, "Breakthrough of Enemy Defenses," Soviet Hilitsry Review,
No. 7, pp. 10-13 (July 1974); General Mlajor V. Matsulenko, "Breakthrough
of Enemy Defenses," Soviet Military Review, No. 1, pp. 54-56 (January
1974); Reznichenko, op. cit., pp. 74-89. Cf. P. H. Vigor and C. N.
Connelly, "The Soviet Threat to Europe," RUSI, Vol. 120, No. 1, pp.
69-73 (March 1975).

33
C. Principles and 1.)rm of Tactical Warfare

Soviet tactical doctrine Identifies four distinct form of combined

arm combat: the meting engagemnt, the offensive, the defensive, and
the withdrawal. There are characteristics of each of these four categor-
ins of tactical combat operations which will influence the Soviet approach
to combat in and for cities. These characteristics are discussed in more
detail in the following passages.

1. The Meeting Engeneet

Soviet writers point out that the probability of mating engage-

ments "has significantly increased" under contemporary conditions. Not
only will these engagements be more complicated than previously, but they
will also involve exposed flanks and sizable intervals between the various
elements of the combat formation.'

It is stressed that meting engagements my arise under numerous

different conditions. Warning against stereotyped tactical training, one
Soviet source explains that:

In addition to a march, a battalion my indepen-

dently conduct a meeting engagement under very
different combat conditions: after comitting
itself into action fox Ahe development of an of-
fensive, in the course of an offensive in the
depth of the enemy's defense, when overcoming a
security zone, when pursuing the enemy along a
parallel march, when operating on an exposed flank
and in disconnected sectors, and especially when
terrain conditions coupel it; in the course of
the advance of airborne troops from the landing
place to the object fixed for seizure; in the
second eahelon (in the reserve) in the defense;
as well as in all cases where there are large in-
tervals with adjacent elements along the front and

Lieutenant Colonel V. Kokhanov, "Meeting Engagement of a Motorized-Rifle

Battalion," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 3, p. 51 (March 1975).

34
 In the depth, when the actions of adjacent elements
are halted by active enemy resistance or they have
sustained great losses. I

Another Soviet vriter similarly points out that meeting engage-

ments vwil most likely develop (1) during an offenive, when the enemy is
counterattacking. (2) during a Soviet counterattack, and (3) during 4 meach.
In the first instance, fighting viii occur along the flanks with those enemy
reserve units and second echelons which may have been bypassed. In the
second, It is noted that a defensive counterattack an the Soviet pert will
2
"almost always" occur as a meeting engagement.

Special emphasis is given to the increased potential for meting

engagements at the outset of war where forces advance over long distances
before making initial contact. As the tactical manual of the Officer's
Library noted:

In a future war, if the imperialist aggressor. un-

leash it, the initial period acquires especially
important significance.

After massive nuclear strikae with strategic weap-

ons, using their results and acting with them, the
ground forces will immediately begin active and de-
cisive combat actions. Their actions will be char-
acterized by a large spatial sweep, dynamic and
swift development in separate directions, wide ap-
plication of different form of maneuver, and the
absence of solid fronts. Conflict will acquire an
extremely intensive character. The sides will strive
to fulfill their fundamental missions by a decisive
offensive, in consequence of which maeting battles
3
and engagements will frequently occur.

I Colonel V. Vinnikov, "On Meeting Engagement," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 1,

p. 22 (January 1973).
2 Colonel P. Kunitskiy, "On Meeting Engagement," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 8,
pp. 59-62 (August 1974).
3 Reznichenko, Taktika, p. 198.

35
 AmMg the traits whIch Soviet spokesman consider important for
conducting meting sangemagts two of the mat significant are the time
factor and dispersal. The very essence of this type of fighting, says
one author, "consists of each side's use of speed, mineuverability, and
speed of introducing troops and building up cowbat efforts.," With re-
gard to troop dispersal, it hba been stated that "strivia to reduce the
ffectivesesei 0of en nuclear strikes CoWael comauders to advance units
and subunits into regions of a meeti enSgagment in formations dispersed
along the front and in the depth."'

Urban warfare presents may opportunities for meting engagements,

particularly at the suall unit level. Soviet military writers ephasize
the advantages the defender has in meeting engagements under circumtances
*here he hbm msde good use of obstacles, has preregistered his artillery
support, has laid hi fields of fire and has organized his defensive posi-
tions. Such conditions are all characteristic of a well planned defea
In city fighting. The following are the features identified in Soviet
doctrine as being characteristic of meting ensgagments in the contemporary
period:s

"o There is continuous and intense combat to capture

and retain the initiative

"o Deployment for combat is chiefly made from a column

formation

"o There is great confusion at the initiation and during

meeting engagements

"o The situation changes rapidly and drastically during

meetin angeagaments

Colonel I. Vorob'yev, a professor and doctor of military science, in

Krasnaya Zvezda (5 March 1975).
2 Colonel A. Serov, "The Meeting Engagement of a Battalion," Voyeany
Vestnik, No. 3. p. 20 (March 1972).
Reznichenko, Taktika, pp. 204-211.

36
 "* There is normally high speed in maneuvering elements
" Combat formations change rapidly
"* There are vide fronts, open flanks and a high degree
of freedom of maneuver.

The requisite combat initiatives for success in a contemporary

1
meeting engagement are identified by the Soviets as:

"* The acquisition of continuous and thorough knowledge

of the enemy

"* Rapid decisionmaking and communicating such decisions

to the troops

"* Preemption in nuclear attacks and gaining fire super-

iority

"a Early occupation of favorable terrain

"* Flank security

"a Initiative and independence of unit commanders.

There are Cew discernible differences in detail between the

Soviet and U.S. tactical doctrines for meeting engagements. Both U.S. and
Soviet tacticians emphasize (1) the need to seize the initiative, (2) the
need to protect one's flanks while searching for the enemy's, (3) the high
incidence of confusion and (4) the lack of intelligence. In U.S. doctrine
there seem to be more emphasis on communication with higher and adjacent
headquarters while the Soviets tend to empha3aie the necessity of conuni-
2
cations down to the troops. The Soviets also tend to give more emphasis
to the "attack from the march" or meeting engagement.

Ibid., pp. 211-218.

2 See, for example, Headquarters, Department of the Army Field Manuil,
FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalions, pp. 4-24 (hereafter cited as FM 7-20)
and Reznichenko, Taktika, pp. 138-139.

37
 2. Th Of fesive
,

According to a leading Soviet military fi1pre, In general var,

of fessive operations "will be the basic mans of solving the task* of armd
conflict in land theaters of military operations."' Due to imroved weap-
onry in the postwar years, say the Soviets, the offensive will be excep-
tionally dynamic and highly maneuverable. Combat action will develop
extremly irregularly; that is, without a continuous front line. This
will result in many gape in the combat formation, as well as the presence
of open flanks. Consequently, rapid maneuvers will be characteristic of the
2
offensive.

Writing in mid-1972, one leading Soviet tactician defined maneu-

vers as consisting of five basic formt:

"* Envelopment

" .Encirclement

9 Frontal assault

" Maneuver by air

"o Withdrawal

Envelopment was described as a mnneuver whose objective is to

strike a blow at the enemy's flank. Encirclement was a deeper maneuver,
whose objective is to strike at the enemy's rear. Envelopment and en-.
ci.rclement are preferred types of maneuvers. However, it is sometimes
necessary to resort to a frontal attack when terrain is unfavorable for
flanking, when time for flanking is unavailable, and when enveloping enemy

1 Sokolovskiy, Voyennaya Strategiya, pp. 352-353.

2 Sidorenko, pp. 57-61.
3 Colonel V. Savkin, "Maneuver in Battle," Voyannyy Vestnik, No. 4, pp.
26-27 (April 1972).

38
units are unexpectedly encountered. Maneuver by air permits rapid move-
ment over great distances. Withdrawal is a "forced" maneuver, in which
troops are removed from the olove of a superior enemy force and trans-
1
ferred to a more favorable line.

In the Soviet view, the following advantages accrue to forces

which adopt the offensive:

9 They gain the initiative

* They achieve time in which to better

- plan
- mass forces at critical points
- prepare for future operations

s They are imbued with higher morale while the morale

of their adversary is degraded

o They are able to focus forces for maneuver in criti-

cal directions

e It takes them to the enemy

- positions
- resources

9 By closing with the enemy it deprives him of the

use ot his weapons of mass destruction against
forward forces. 2

Savkin's classifications were not without criticism. In 1972, several

other writers rose to challenge this description. See, Colonel F.
Sverdlov, Lieutenant Colonel R. Portugal'skiy, a.id Colonel N. Mal'ginov,
"On the Question of Maneuver in Battle," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 8, pp.
30-33 (August 1972); and General Lieutenant V. Reznichenko, "On Maneuver
in Bal'tle," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 39-49 (December 1972). Cf.
also, Y. Novikov and F. Sverdlov, Maneuver in Modern Land Warfare, pp.
28-36 (Moscow: Progress, 1972).
2 Reznichenko, Taktika, pp. 70-71; and Sidorenko, pp. 1-2.

39
 The "essence" of the Soviet offensive idicates a fairly stan-
dard concept of how tactical attacks will be planned and conducted In con-
tosporary war. Soviet tacticians describe the opening phases of combat,
cominsctag with a nuclear strike followed by aerial strikes, artillory
barrages and the rapid advance of forces into the depth of the enemy poei-
tice to seize and destroy personnel, materiel. equipment and critical ter-
rain.' It is, in effect, a modern, large-scale version of the German blitz-
krieg. The Soviets credit the introduction of nuclear weapons for employment
on the tactical battlefield with revolutionizing concepts of warfare. Nu-
clear weapons are recognized as providing the capability to completely
destroy enemy massed forces in very brief periods of tim. The "ratio of
forces" to which Soviet stratejists and tacticians refer is seen to be a
singularly unstable index in nuclear war. The first priority target in
such war is the enemy nuclear delivery capabilities.

The following are viewed as the chief characteristics of contem-

2
porary nuclear warfare for offensive operations:

"* There will be an increase in the "intensity", vio-

lence and destruction of combat

"e The "spatial sweep" of the offensive will be broad-

ened

"e The "struggle for firepower superiority" will be

intensified
"e The importance of the capability to maneuver will
be increased

"e There will be a fractionalization of the battlefield

with many separate actions taking place across a
broad area

"e Radioactive areas will provide effective barriers

to the maneuver of forces.

1 ieznichenko, Taktika, pp. 70-71.

2 Ibid., pp. 245-247.

40
 In urban varfare, Soviet emphasis upon initiative and aggressive-
ness on the part of offensive forces becomes particularly important. 11he
nature of urban combat with the profusion of obstacles, barricades, cover
and concealment encourages inertia. Should commanders not be aggressive,
lengthy iesges., stalemate, and slow attrition begin to take their toll on
the attackers.

The priucipal difference between the Soviet aud U.S. tactical

doctrines for offensive operations found in standard manuals is on the
employment of nuclear weapons. In Soviet doctrine, use of nuclear weap-
ons ie Lited as being "the most important and decisive act of offensive
1
combat." The employment of nuclear weapons is institutionalized in that
they are consistently identified as being the initial weapons to be used
in an offensive action. Compared to Soviet publications, U.S. field manuals
such as FH 7-30 (The Infantry Brigades) and FM 7-20 (The Infantry Battalions)
give very light treatment to nuclear fires in offensive operations, and
those references which are made seem incidental and breed on contingencies:

" When nuclear or chemical munitions are employed,

the battalion exploits these fire%

" The commander's concept may include ... use of nu-

clear and other fire support...

" Conventional, nuclear and chemical fires may be em-

ployed to accomplish tasks appropriate to a support-
ing attack

o When nuclear or chemical weapons are employed prior

to an attack, their delivezy is closely coordinated
with the time of attack. 2

It is not the purpose of the above citation of differences be-

tween Soviet and U.S. tactical doctrine on the offense to make a judgment
on either approach. An interpretation of the significance of the differ-
ence between the two approaches would require much more analysis than is

SSokolovskiy, Voyennaya Strategiya, pp. 347-348.

2 FM 7-20, op. cit., pp. 4-1 to 4-8.

41
merited here. It is sufficient to note that there is a very real and all-
nificant qualitative and quantitative difference in the epproech to the
employment of nuclear weapons in Soviet and U.S. tactical writings, with
Soviet literature institutionalizing the employment of such weapons and
U.S. literature seeming to doemphasie such employment.

3. Defense

Among Soviet tacticians, defense is not a preferred course of

action. Indeed, defens is described as a "forced type of combat," which
is to be used only when an attack is imposible or inadvisable or when it
is necessarl to economize on forces in one area in order to support an at-
tack in another area. 1 Under these conditions, it is explained that the
objectives of defending troops are "to repulse an offensive by a superior
force of the enemy, inflict heavy casualties on him, hold the secured posi-
tion, and create conditions for transformation to a decisive offensive."2

Soviet literature is emphatic on the point that defense must not

ba passive. As one Soviet general officer has stated:

... the Soviet Army never acknowledged passive

defense. Even the very structure of the defense
is used as the starting point for passing over
to the offensive. Any form of defense presup-
poses active combat operations, employment of
fire weapons and resolute counterattacks, S

Another general officer, similarly emphasizing activity as "one of the most

important requirements related to defense," notes that this activity "con-
sists in the continuous hitting of the eneay by fire and in carrying out

1Odintsov, p. 128.
2 Colonel A. Serov, "The Motorized-Rifle Battalion in Defense," Voyennyy
Vestnik, No. 7, p. 28 (July 1972).
3 General Lieutenant V. Reznichenko, "Combat Activity," Soviet Military
Reviv.E, No. 4, p. 24 (April 1974).

42
wide maneuvers by subuniti and fire weapons and with artificial obstacles,
as well as in conducting decisive counterattacks.'"

In Soviet tactical doctrine the defense, even while having the

advantage of selecting and preparing the terrain for combat, is categorized
as leading to inconclusive results, giving the defender the advantage of
selecting and preparing the terrain for combat, being subordinated to the
overall interests of the offensive, and being employed in areas of se.ondary
concern. The purpose of defensive combat is to:

"e Repel the attack of superior enew forces

"e Inflict losses on the enemy

e Hold critical terrain

a Create conditions
2
which will permit transition to
the offensive.

In addition to the heavy Soviet emphasis on the offensive directed

toward gaining enemy territory and destroying enemy forces and equipment,
another apparent reason for avoiding passivo defensive deployments whe.ever
possible is traceable to the Soviet desire to avoid the destructive poLen-
tial of nuclear weapons. Consequently, as in the offensive, troop disper-
sal in the defensive is given considerable attention. It has, for example,
been declared in one Soviet work on tactics that:

An important trait of modern defense is the fur-

thest dispersal of troops both along the front and
in the depth. Application of dispersal was one
of the first methods of solving the problem of
the prcservation of manpower and raising the
stability of defense under conditions of the at-
tacker using nuclear weapons. The opinion is ex-
pressad that, as nuclear ammunition of less

General Lieutenant P. Varushin, "Activity of the Defense," Voyennyy

Vestnik, No. 3, p. 26 (March 1971).
2 Reznichenko, Taktika, p. 319.

43
 caliber appear, the depee of dispersal
1 of troops
on the field of battle will increase.

The new methods developed for defense on the nuclear battlefield

are designed to provide eophasis on an "active" force which is "stable" and
which demonstrates a high degree of capability in antinuclear and antitank
operations. Maneuver become more important to the defense as do counter-
attacks to repel tank attacks and breakthroughs in depth into defensive
positions. The Soviets demonstrate concern for thQ effectiveness of re-
motely piloted vehicles and give priority to antiaircraft, antimissile and
antiairborne defens.

Defense, according to Soviet tacticians, will no longer be linear

but will have a character of all around 360* security with the front arbi-
trarily identified as the direction from which the enem launches his at-
tack. There will be dispersion of force in depth as well as laterally.
Fortifications should be designed to shield troops from nuclear blast and
radiation and must be developed over very brief periods of time. Defense
against nuclear attack alao will be achieved through camouflage and decep-
tion and intelligent use of the cover of darkness.

In studying Soviet defensive doctrine there appears to be equally

as much to learn of how the Soviets anticipate they will conduct offensive
operations in a nuclear environment. There is the great eaphasis, for ex-
ample, on defending against blitskrieg-style attack with deep penetrations
by armor and airborne forces. There may be some distinction between the
U.S. concepts of airborne operations and those of the Soviets. U.S. forces

1 Ibid., p. 326.

44
are light on airborne (i.e., paradrop) divisions vis-a-vis the Soviets
(at a 1 to 7 ratio). On the other hand, the United States lays more stress
1
on airmobile operations by heliborne forces.

Nevertheless, even though Soviet defensive tactics seem to re-

flect their predilection for offensive combat, they do recognize the dis-
tinctive characteristics of U.S. force structure. Very specifically the
Soviets single out 'aerial maneuver of troops" with helicoptere organic
to the U.S. army as being significant.

4. The Withdrawal

The Soviets postulate that greater reliance may be placed upon

withdrawal operations in contemporary war not as a consequence of a forced
retreat but as a deliberate tactic to draw an enemy into a position where
he is vulnerable to a nuclear strike or to buy time to bring up reinforce-
ments.

In U.S. tactical doctrine, withdrawal operations are grouped un-

der an overall category of retrograde operations which also includes delay-
ing, retiring and relief operations. The Soviets, while recognizing that
these categories reflect doctrine in other national armies, do not make
the same categorical distinctions. While withdrawal operations may be
initiated for any number of purposes, there seems to be a reluctance to
dignify the tactic by analyzing components of movements to the rear in
gr-at detail. There is emphasis, however, as in U.S. doctrine, that with-
drawals are accomplished only upon receipt of an order from the senior

It is always hazardous to make relative comparisons for forces without

a complete analysis of all the factors which contribute to combat effi-
ciency, such as strength, firepower, mobility, etc. In this instance
it is of interest that U.S. airborne divisions are at a 13,000-man
strength while Soviet airborne divisiops are manned at 7,000. NATO
fields 5(-) airborne divisions while Warsaw Pact countries have 9(-)
such divisions. Source: The Military Balance 1974-1975 (The Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1974).

45
 //

commander. Tim initial stage of vithdravwl is always disengagemeat which

is judged to be near impossible in daylight operations. When disengagement
must be executed during daylight hours, Soviet force are trained to make
maexima use of smoke, cover, demonstrationso concealment and deception. The
withdrawal in built-up areas is facilitated by natural conditions of cover
and concoalment and the characteristic lack of intelligence on the disposi-
tion of opposing forces.

46
p

Ill SOVIET COMBAT TRAINING FOR URBAN WAkFARE

This chapter is divided into three major sections providing:

" A discussion of the importance the Soviets attach to field

combat training.

" Illustrations of specific Soviet exercises and description of

exercise courses the Soviets have contructed for urban opera-
tions.

"* A brief sumation.

A. Soviet Emphasis on Importance of Combat Training

Offensive fighting in a large city is one of the most

complex types of troop combat activity and demands
thorough training.'

According to the first deputy counander-in-chief of the Soviet Ground

Forces, the attainment of success in a modern _:!mbined-arms battle "will
to a considerable extent depend on tactically knowledgeable, bold, and
* vigorous operations by small units-companies, platoons, sections, crews,
2
and teama." Such a battle is described as not only a confrontation of
material forces, but also a contest of brains and wills. With regard to
the mental factor, one candidate of pedagogical science has noted that
"the dependence of military skill on mental processes--thinking, imagina-
l
tion, attention, memory, etc.-increases as armies are supplied with more
technical equipment and the weapons and fighting itself becomes more com-
3
plicated."'

1 Colonel A. Sidorchuk, "Combat Actions of Troops in the Seizure of Large

Cities," Voyenno-lstoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 10, p. 27 (October 1971).
2 General Colonel V. Yakushin, "To a New Stage of Combat Skill," Znamenosets,
No. 12, p. 2 (December 1974).
3 Lieutenant Colonel I. Vydrin, "Developing Tactiril Thinking," Soviet
Military Review, No. 6, p. 25 (January 1971).
47
 Just as important for success is the will of the soldier, represented
by his moral-political and psychological qualities. As defined in a Journal
of the Main Political Administration, moral-political qualities are those
"qualities of Soviet soldiers which express their conscientious
attitude
towards the policies of the State and Party and their ability to proceed
and perform in the interest of reliably defending the socialist homeland." 1

It is these moral-political qualities, notes one training guide for political

workers, which form "the foundation of all other qualities essential to a
guardian of the Fatherland." 2
Psychological qualities include functional
reliability and a steadfast state of mind, which covers the ability to
concentrate attention for a prolonged period of time, the ability to accur-
ately recall something, speed of reaction, and maintaining self-control in
a dangerous situation, etc. Soviet writers constantly stress that these
psychological qualities are vitally important and must be increased through
training. As one source stated:

A soldier, deeply loyal to his homeland, but not possessing

these special psychological qualities, can lose his head
in battle, yield to panic, and not fulfill the combat mission.
Based on their own combat experience, participants of the war
know how it was difficult originally to adapt to a combat
situation and to overcome the psychological barrier of a
sense of danger. An "experienced" soldier acts confidently
in battle not because he is indifferent to danger, but rather
because he was taught "to subordinate passionate reason."
This circumstance evoked a special trend in the education of
troops-psychological training. 3

In Soviet military literature, moral-political aud psychological

training is quite closely tied with combat training in the field. One
military writer has described the field as "that laboratory, where military
skill is polished" and has observed that "here the unification of the

1 Colonel N. Tabunov, "V.I. Lenin-the Founder of the Theory of Communist

Education," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 2, p. 16 (January 1974).
"2 "Methodological Recommendations," Komnist Vooruzhennykb Sil, No. 7,
p. 24 (April 1974).
3 Tabunov, p. 16.

48
theoretical knowledge and practical skills acquired at the various objects
of training takes place and the high moral-combat and psychological quali-
ties of soldiers are formed."' Another has noted that field combat training
has "an appreciable effect" on the soldiers' stability becau" "it is
particularly in conditions of the utmost moral and physical strain that
the men's character becomes hardened, their will-power, self-possession,
fearlessness and staunchness grow, and they acquire the ability to act
2
boldly and resolutely in tense and dangerous situation of modern battle."
In even greater detail, the command of the Central Asian Military District
has explained that:

Moral-political and psychological preparation of troops

occupies an important place in field training under contem-
porary conditions. This is a complicated and lengthy process
of education. It continues the full length of military
service, but field exercises and tactical trainings offer the
most favorable conditions for it. Simulation of a nuclear
strike, driving tanks under complex mountain conditions,
rolling over personnel with tanks, throwing live hand
grenades, attacking after mine, shell, and bomb explosions,
while simultaneously firing all kinds of weapons during the
day and night, repulsing air raids, and dropping airborne
troops by parachute or landing by helicopter in the rear of
the "enezy"-this is far from a complete list of conditions,
which help 3form the high moral-combat qualities in troop
personnel."

No less emphasis is attached in Soviet literature to the importance

of field combat training for the acquisition of combat skills. Field
training is viewed as the foundation of troop combat preparations. For
this reason, it has been suggested that "students should be put in condi-
tions approximating combat as much as possible.""4 Within this field

I Major A. Raspopov, "When They Forgot About Tactics," Voyennyy Vestnik,

No. 10, p. 18 (October 1973).
2 "As in Real Battle," Soviet Military Revipw, No. 1, p. 21 (January 1975).

3 General of the Army N. Lyashchenko, "Field Training of Troops ls the Focus of

Attention," Komminist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 19. vp. 41-42 (October 1974).
""Colonel I. Sevryukov, "To Successfully Create a Target Layout,"
Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 10, p. 38 (October 1971).

49
training, note Soviet authors, the basic principle to be applied is:
"Teach troops that which is necessary in var."' Sumnin8 up the point,
the deputy chief of the admnnistration of combat training of the Far
Eastern Military District has claimed that field training must play an
important role.

As is known, fleld training is the foundation of high

combat readiness of troops. Only in the field can the
entire arsenal of weapons of fighting a powerful, well-
armed enemy be mastered. And thus one of the principles
of training says: teach troops that which is necessary
in war; then it is natural that field exercises and
training lessons occupy an Important place in the
2 combat
training of units and subunits of our district.

Furthermore, a March 1975 article in a military newspaper states that

greater attention and increased time is being devoted to the tactical
training of officers, especially by means of field exercises. According
to the article:

In past years in the training programs of military

schools, the proportion of tactical training has notice-
ably increased. This is a gratifying fact. Training
sections have begun to plan field exercises more pre-
cisely and to use the facilities of training centers
better and more fully. Tactical training departments
are also displaying more thought and creativity in
organizing lessons. Great attention is given to per-
fecting the methodological skills of the instructors.
The content and quality of lectures on tactics have
improved. 3

1 "To Utilize the Training-Material Base Skillfully," Vo-ennyy Vestnik,

No. 12, p. 2 (December 1971). See also Colonel V. Yegorov, "In the
Interests of Tactics," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 10, p. 11 (October 1974).
2 General Major A. Kozlov, "As Contemporary Battle Demands," Znamenosets,
No. 10, p. 2 (October 1974).
3 Krasnaya Zvezda (25 March 1975).

50
B. Soviet Urban Warfare Training

In order to approximate urban combat conditions as closely as possible,

the Soviet Armed Forces have developed training mock-ups which simulate
situations encountered in fighting in a built-up area. Based upon Soviet
descriptions in open source literature, these training fields range from
the simple to the very complex. On the less complicated fields, short
exercises are conducted which familiarize the troops with many diverse
and basic tactical techniques. On the more elaborate fields, protracted
exercises are conducted which acquaint troops with more difficult proce-
dures and missions requiring the coordination of several service arms.
Utilizing recent Soviet open-literature military journals, this section will
sunmarize several Soviet descriptions of training facilities.

1. Training Field No. 1

Describing various sectors of a training field in the Transcarpa-

thian Military District, an article in a Soviet military journal states:

A model of a populated point of a city type with

a center of resistance in its dimensions 500 meters
long and 300 meters deep, in which exercises with
platoons, companies, and batteries can be conducted,
has been created. 1

The same article goes on to describe other sectors of the training field
which are used for tank, low-flying target, nuclear weapon, and chemical
weapon training.

2. Training Field No. 2

One unit in Lhe Moscow Miilitary District is credited with having

constructed a training field, 2 which is aimed basically at working out

"To Utilize the Training-Material Base Skillfully," Voyennyy Vestnik,

No. 12, p. 4 (December 1971).
2 Colonel I. Afansov, "In Order to Attack in a City ,More Successfully,"
Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, pp. 101-103 (June 1970).

51
piobleme related to protection against incendiary devices. The field Is
40 meters by 200 meters. According to the Soviet description, the field
contains, inter alia, seven obstacles of the type "which are most fre-
quently encountered during fighting on streets of cities."

* DIAGRAM OF THE ASSAULT FIRE STRIP

0 V 2

714J 2OA% 0')A 2OA -1 A 2x

* C A.tl a pm.|
(' 10 | IJl I OJI 14'l..

Point 1 is a full trench profile, which serves as the starting

point for an infantry squad. Point 2 is a brick corridor, which is 6
meters long, 2 meters high, and 70 centimeters wide and has a 1350 angle
in its center. The corridor is designed to simulate an underground corri-
dor or a narrow passage between buildings. Point 3 is a shell crater, 2
meters wide at the top and 90 centimeters deep. Point 4 is a partially
burned bridge, 6 meters long and 4 meters wide. Point 5 is a damaged
building. According to the Soviet description of the building:

The frame of it is welded out of rod iron or pipe,

the front and back walls are made of brick, the
roof is iron or tin-plated. On the right and left
walls are fastened four U-shaped metal corners,
which are evenly distributed along the entire length
of the house, with two on the inside and two on the
outside. The dimensions of the house are: width,
3 meters; height, 2.5 meters; and length, 6 meters.1

1 Ibid., p. 102.

52
 Point 6 is a brick fence, 70 centimeters high and 5 miters vide.
This is followed by a ditch, 40 centimeters lonS end 30 centimeters deep.
Point 7 is a simulated mine field, 20 meters by 25 meters. Point
8 is a finiai trench. Point 9 is a tar-Let setup for hand grenade
throving.

Electric cables have been laid in the field so that explosions

and firing can be simulated and targets can be lifted.

One hour is allotted for training on the field.

3. Training Field No. 3

At the Kalingra4 Higher Command Military-Engineering School imeni

A.A. Zhdanov, a special field for sapper-reconnaissance training, "which
has the most characteristic objectives of engineer reconnaissance," has
been established. The field is divided into three sectors. The first
sector is for reconnaissance of obstacles and their breaching in the course
of an offensive. The secund sector has zones of heavy destruction, blockages,
Sector - L 14r 1" 1 ri .4a
C',.
H

Sector 2 2-i' twrOr X- O~hE KTb1D3aC 1K W

,m---. ' "F,
J!,jW .11, 0A. nC ~K
*4 , 50 . 1,0. _, 'I7 -
,.- ,'0
0 " in, ,- ,-.7 .,,7
" trzi
1_i 711
2" ) -\ . - . , ", 7 '

-IL

Sector 3 3 v 4.ACTO.K.O=,'.E,-0 PA,3r,,E_-,,K YH. 7n0 F 1- [nll 1v Z:,"..ltWt; (?n A

RT CTn 6;r . rg,A..
S/----'-r"E LE~4-.s H'c,,nEH'4w r".SH,,(TAA(

---- kin---
---------

Lieutenant Colonel V. Makurov, "Strip for Training of Sapper-Engineers," I

Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 83-85 (December 1972).

j3
contaminated areas, and mined obstacles. Tse third sector contains the
most frequent engineer reconnaissance objectives in populated points and
objectives for destruction in the enemy's rear area.

Sector 3 is described as having the following:

20. Wall of a demolished building

21. A telephone pole

22. A mined entrance to a building

23. A destroyed house

24. A drain pipe

25. A flue

26. A railway point

27. A wooden (stone) fence

28. A rope suspension

According to the author of the article, primary attention is

focused in the third sector on "methods of breaching various obstacles
and reconnoitering and disarming booby traps."' Squads rotate on the
three sectors during a three-hour exercise.

4. Training Field No. 4

At the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command School, 2

a tactical
training field for the training of future officers has been built. The
field, pictured below, is described as being two kilometers in depth.

1 Ibid., p. 85.
2 Colonel L. Tsarikov, "The Psychological Preparation of Future Officers,"
Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 55-59 (December 1972).

54
 /!

IVI
,I
II IrV;

I
- -i--
ji ,.5 -, ,,AI

,;.
. .;/ : j /
/'

/4
I

-
..
-"
4-. ".-
..
. I._-- ---
. __-
. .
..7..
r " ".- ..
i di,
o",;
55/ I
-,- m
,,,, --
- I
,

pp.3 r5

A ~t
g/ ~fm/ '
 iI

According to the article, the ileld has the following facilities (as
numbered in the original drwing):

1. Craters

2. Short picket wire obstacle

3. Collapsed brick vall

4. Pillbox

5. Collapsed building fortified for defense

6. Mockup of a single-story brick building

7. Underground shelter with entrance hatch

8. Obstacles

9. A maze of underground structures terminating in two manholes,

with a fire simulator, and full-length targets in each corner.

10. A tank in an entrenchment and a sector of controlled landmines

11. A command post set up in a demolished building

12. A firing position for a mortar subunit

13. Mockup of a two-story building with a collapsed first-floor

wall; interior contains a loudspeaker and fire simulator

14. Mockup of a two-story building fortified for defense

In addition to illustrating the layout of the training field, a

specific exercise on the field is described. Among other tasks, the troops
are required to assault the buildings, pass through a maze of underground
structures, cross between upper stories of the buildings, and endure simu-
lated shellbursts, shouts, and comnmands in foreign languages.

5. Training Field No. 5

A recent article in a Soviet military journal points out that

similar tactical training fields have been erected in several units of
the Transcarpathian, Leningrad, and Moscow Military Districts and at the

56
Military imeni the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. ' The fields are described as
2 kilometers wide and 4 kilometers deep. The author notes that the fields
are constructed to permit activities at any time of the year, day or night,
with or without the use of weapons of mass destruction, and coordinating
several subunits.

a 7. Sector of buildings of n populated

.- point of a city type with an aajacent
ing the organization and conduct of
/-, offensive and defensive fighting in
t) a city.

.
VI:"- 5. Complex of elements for psychological
training intended for teaching activi-
7 ties at high altitudes and under condi-

/ of the enemy's use of incendiary

INI

* ' 1

l Colonel V. Kalikhovich, "The Tactical Training Field," Voyennly Vestnik,

No. 11, pp. 48-51 (November 1974).

57
 With regard to urban combat, Points 5 and 7 are most important. As
depicted in the Soviet drawing, Point 5 inclides severer mockups of buildings,
wberein incendiary devices can be simulated. Point 7 is more complicated;
it coatains building found in rural and urban settings, as well as open
areas between buildings and diverse types of intersecting streets.

6. Training Field No. 6

In 1971, a Soviet general officer published in a military journal

an outline for a training field and a plan for "the advance by a reinforced
motorized-rifle company in a town." While the wording of the article leads
this writer to have doubts on the existence of the training field, the
article is sumarized here for its hypothetical importance. 1 According to
the Soviet author, the training field should include a mockup of a town,
500 meters wide and 300 meters deep. He also elaborated in detail a
field exercise for a motorized-rifle company, a tank platoon (three tanks),
and a sapper squad. The two-hour exercise is broken down according to the
following training issues and time allotments.

Issue Time

Organization of fighting in the city 15 mintles

Conducting fighting on the approaches

to the buildings 20 minutes

Storming and capture of buildings 30 minutes

Conducting fighting for capturing an open

space and the buildings behind it 25 minutes

Critique of the lesson 10 minutes

GGeneral Major N. Sergeyev, "The Tactical Training Field," Voyennyy

Vestnik, No. 7, pp. 41-48 (July 1971).

58
r 4

. I I !/

i I
AA

I. ,I, ,,
,(

59

fl?

59
 7. Trainins Field No. 7

In 1970, an article by a Soviet general officer presented a de-

tailed description of a protracted exercise on the topic "Offensive of a
motorized-rifle battalion in a populated point and the capture and rein-
forcement of advantageo,;s zone." 1 Lasting a total of six hours, the exercise
was to be held at a training center, the exact location of which was not
given. The plan specified for the battalion to be reinforced by tank
companies, artillery battalions, and sappers. The enemy was simulated by
a motorized-rifle platoon on armored personnel carriers with three tanks
and one rotor trench digger.

The exercise plan delineates four separate operations, with the

2
specific time allotted for each operation:

" Attack of the enemy and taking buildings on the outskirts

of the populated point (one-story buildings), 8:30-10:00

- Moving to the buildings under the cover fire of

artillery and tanks,
- Exit from captured buildings and continuation of
attacks.

" Conducting street fighting, 10:00-11:30

- Techniques for attacking along main streets and
through parks, gardens, and yards,
- Overcoming barriers, obstacles, and ruins, and
- Circling and blockading individual buildings.

" Attack on buildings in the center of a populated point and

fighting inside of them, 11:30-13:00

- Moving to buildings from the front and flanks under

the cover fire of artillery and tanks,
- Waging battle by the assault group, and
- Fighting on the first, second, and third floors.

General Major of Tank Troops A. Zyryanov, "Offensive of a Battalion

in a Populated Point," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, pp. 18-24 (June 1970).
Ibid., p. 21.

60
 1 0

"Al"

,., a'-. ,'-, =

*i r
------ v----
------- a

00 I
ol
Q, I,,\,- ',...; :.C ' ,

\'\ , .:. _. -\:, <K-

I .: II ar .... I .rI--

\161

I ./ . -- k '
S. \/e. _, i r--- -7.
K ,/

s Reinforcing captured buildings and repulsing a counterattack

of the enemy, 13:00-14:00

- Selecting and occupying posltions for fire weapons in

buildings and around them,
- Setting mined fields, and
- Repulsing a counterattack by the tanks and infantry
of the enemy.

Moreover, it should be noted that the author gives a detailed

account of the activities and techniques implemented during each phase of
the exercise by the infantry singly and in coordination with the other
service arm.

8. Training Field No. 8

A similar, though somwhat less elaborate, plan for an exercise

on the theme "Combat of a motortzed-rifle platoon in a city" was published
in a Soviet military journal in 1969.1 Unlike the previous plan which con-
cerned a multi-block area, this plan concentrates more closely on the
approaches to and inside of individual buildings. Devised for three
hours, the exercise is divided into three phases:
0704 of iehi OpwtQFo

Tf 7717"

\..
is
e Combat on approaches to building, 60
minutes

S- Line of departure lesson,

V' A'- Suppression of enemy fire weapons
\in the building and on the flanks, and

I h~,
Vi Attack and fight for securing the
first floor.

'\x' 1 /; e Destruction of the enemy in the huildinK,

\,!'j \ i1 hour and 50 minutes

S- Clearing the first floor,

III li J-_lit - Intensification of efforts to clear
the building, and
._.J
"- Consolidation of captured objective.
L . . .

. ... "Seeps . - 0 Critique of the exercise, 10 minutes.

':4 ; ' ..." ,, - , ,
...

Colonel A. Romaneno "Combat of a Motorized-Rifle Platoon in a City,"

Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 40-44 (December 1969).
b2
 In addition to an enumeration of specific equipment required for
such an exercise, the author describes in depth the tactical methods employed
in scaling buildings, moving along rooftops, assaulting a three-story
building, and seizing individual rooms within the building. An especially
'..teresting passage gives a recomendation for the type of structure to be
constructed in order to carry out exercises on approaching and fighting
within a building.

The approach to a building and the destruction of an

enemy in staircases, in garrets, and in basements is
very difficult. These methods must, therefore, be
worked out and first of all with the platoon (squad)
in tactical lessons. This can be done cn an especially
equipped tactical field, where there are mockups of
multistoried buildings. One of the floors should be
equipped with a corridor arrangement of rooms, and the
remaining floors, with individual entrances and stair-
cases. It should also be provided with a basement.
It is advisable to build a stone fence in front of the
house. A neighboring building should be designated by
a wooden mockup (of one wall). For an entrance into the
building, instead of windows and doors, breaches in
the walls of the ground floor are used; and for
passage from one floor to another, breaches in the
ceilings are used. It is recommended to destroy a
separate section of the staircase and to barricade
a part. In some windows and door openings are to be
built loop-holes and embrasures for machineguns,
automatic weapons, and other kinds of light weapons;
in separate open windows are to be mounted anti-
grenade nets. Between buildings should be built
trenches and communication trenches. For designation
as enemy activity, targets, part of which are con-
trollable and wit., firing simulators, are used.)

C. Summary

The Soviets emphasize the importance of preparing the soldier morally,

politically and psychologically as well as in tactical technical proficiency
irrespective of the nature of combat. Field training is considered to be

Ibid., p. 40.

03
the foundation of troop combat preparations. The Soviets describe a number
of training facilities devoted to techniques of urban combat a few of which
are described here. In general, the facilities and training routines appear
to be similar to thoso developed within the U.S. forces. Training field
number 4, described in these pages, is a particularly el~aborate course over
two kilometers in depth including a number of single and multistory
buildings, underground passages and extensive rubble.

The research conducted for this study has uncovered a significant

amount of information on Soviet urban warfare training. The findings con-
firm other indications that this form of tactical operations has a high
Soviet priority not only in doctrine but in training as well. There is
insufficient information available in open literature to make a detailed
comparison of emphasis and frequency between urban and other forms of
tactics; however, there is little doubt of the Soviet serious concern for
urban warfare.

b4
 /

-I

IV SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR URBAN WARFARE

This chapter provides a description of the rolee of several arms

of the Soviet services in urban warfare. The list does not correspond
to the categories of combat arms in either the USSR or U.S. armed forces
but rather to the general groupings of guidelines found in Soviet
literature. Therefore, the following list does not replicate the
division of Soviet forces but it is representative of the categories
Soviet authors cite as being significant to urban tactical operations.
There are also general guidelines which apply to all services and cannot
be identified exclusively with merely one or several service categories
and are therefore listed under the title "General Application." We
will consider guidelines for:

General Application

The Infantryman

The Engineer

The Chemical/Radiological Specialist

The Logistician

The Artilleryman

The Employment of Aviation and Antiaircraft Forces

The Armor and Antitank Forces

Signal Communications

Reconnaissance Forces

Includes airborne and helicopterborne forces.

65
 In the following paragraphs guidelines are developed from a
number of diverse Soviet sources. In many cases the guidelines apply
equally to the tank commander, the battery commander or infantryman.
In such cases, to facilitate each section standing on its own, the
guideline is identified with a separate arm wherever possible. Tn
some few cases the guidelines cited were not provided in the context
of urban warfare in the original Russian text but are listed here
because they are universal in application and are particularly relevant.
Footnotes refer to references found in the last pages of this chapter.

1. Soviet Guidelines of General Application in Urban Warfare

These guidelines of general application to the Soviet soldier

Arc divided into four categories:

Conduct of the Attack and Defense

Task Organization

Water Obstacles

Night Operations

The guidelives stress that in the attack, when Soviet forces are
confronted with a tow-n or city which cannot be bypassed, it is preferable
that the city be taken under siege and that direct assault should be
avoided. When assault of the city is required it is preferable to
attack it from the march or move to capitalize on the speed and momentum
of assault forces to carry them through the built up area as rapidly
a possible. The guidelines acknowledge that the conduct of attack
and defense of cities will change with many variable conditions and
that the difference between nuclear and conventional combat is substantial.
However, there is little elaboration found on this theme of disparity
in various operations and little evidence of detailed planning or
*raining for the conduct of operations in an urban nuclear environment.

66
 There is emphasis -non the singular nature of urban warfare and
the varying conditions which requires task organizing of units for the
mission and conditions of combat. Water obstacles and night combat in
cities were subjects which were found to be sufficiently important to
warrant separate treatment. The emphasis on night operations is
consistent with Soviet writings on other forma of combat and reinforces
the impression that Soviet tacticians are convincud of the necessity
for opt-rating during all conditions of visibility and on twenty-four
hour cycles in both attack and defense.

a. Conduct of the Attack and Defense

Of course, it is most advantageous to envelop, surround,

and blo-kade the enemy. However this is not always
possible and podrazdeleniya** will have to resort to
assaulting cities from the move. In this instance,
according to the decision by the senior commnander,
assault detachments may be created which repare for
carrying out the mission ahead of time. ( )
If the enemy offers weak resistance the tank-borne
motorized infantrymen approach the most important
objectives at high speed and capture them on the
move. (0)

The attackers capture a town by a surprise attack on

the move or by the method of planned preparation. An
attack on the move can be successful if the attackers
iaflict a decisive defeat on the enemy, destroying
his manpower and materiel, and thus prevent him from
organizing defences. (1)

In present-day combined arms combat seizing a city or

a part of it is accomplished, as a rule, by attack fro-i
the march or following envelopmer.l of it. In those
cases when this is impossible due to the situation,
troops will revert to the attack from a position of
direct contact with thc enemy and conduct the attack
simultaneously along different avenues of approach
(or the city may be taken by storm). (3 p. 13)

See, for example, Major L. Chyzankov, "Thevez Vcdn,iu Peregrady Noch'iu"

(Across Water Obstacles at Night), Voennvi Vestnik, June 1971.
**
A submit.

-7
 Am a rule, an attack for the purpose of seizing a city
from a position of direct contact with the enemy is used
if an attack from the march has failed. In this case
advance chast'* or yodrazdeleniYe, on approaching the
city, blockade it from several different directions
and by swift and decisive action seize the most important
objectives on the edge of the city, thereby supporting
the approach and formation of the main forces for the
attack. (3 p. 14)

If an attack on the move has not been a success, the

tovn is captured from a position of close contact with
the enemy. The advanced subunits block the town from
several directions. By vigorous and resolute actions
they seize the most important objectives on the outskirts
and ensure the approach and creation of the necessary
groupings of manpower and equipment for an advance. (1)

By vigorous and resolute actions througi gaps in the

enemy defences, advanced detachments, usually comprising
a reinforced motorized infantry battalion, (in the
attack) capture important objectives and main thoroughfares
on the move and hold them till the arrival of the main
forces. The latter, avoiding protracted fighting on
the approaches to the town, exploit the success of the
advanced subunits, envelop any stubbornly resisting
strongpoints and defence centres, isolating them one
from another. Then, depriving the enemy of the possibility
to manoeuvre and withdraw to the heart of the town or
outside its bounds, they destrby him and capture the
assigued area of the town. (1)

In those cases when a city is strongly fortified and

attempts to seize it from the march fail, seizing the
city is done by night or daytime assault with a simul-
taneous attack on the flanks and rear from a position
of direct contact with the enemy. Under these conditions
for the purpose of attack or assault attacking troops
surround the city, seize salients along the edge, and
occupy an initial position for attacking immediately
in front of the forward edge of the defensive position
in the city. (3 pp. 42-43)
An attack in a town is carried out without interruption
until the opposite outskirts are reached or a link-up
with own troops advancing in the opposite direction is
effected. (1)

A unit.

68
As a rule, a combat mission in a city was organized
less deeply than under ordinary conditions. (" p. 123)

The main method of attack under conditions where nuclear

wapons are emloyed is attack from the march. (1 p. 8)

The conditions under which an attack is organized and

conducted for the purpose of seizing a city or part of
it differ significantly from ordinary field conditions.
In both cases the nature of the action depends upon
whether nuclear weapons or only cnnventional weapons
are used. (1 p. 8)

In organizing for combat, podrazdelenive commanders

carefully study the city on large-scale maps (or city
maps), number blocks and individual objectives, analyze
information on the character of enemy defenses and
his fire system, and plot this on working maps. (5)

The following are necessary conditions for achieving

success in an attack: thorough and concealed preparation
of podrazdeleniye or assault groups to seize strongpoints
located on the edge of the city; sudden and decisive
action of podrazdeleniye in seizing them and swift
development of the attack deep within the city; and
rapid exploitation of the results of strikes delivered
on decision of senior commanders and capable employment
of weapons remaining at the disposal of podrqzdt-leniye
commanders. (3 p. 43)

The advance must be uninterrupted. Having captured

one objective subunits attack the next applying various
methods of action: storm, turning movement, blocking. ()

For the purpose of seizing a city by attack from a

march or encircling it podrazdeleniye may move out from
an assembly area. In this case organization for combat
is completed while podrazdeleniye are in the area. (3 p. 14)

Preparatory fires for the attack are delivered at the

designated time. During this period sapper podrazdelenlye,
under the cover of fire from artillery, mortars, tanks,
and guns designated for firing by direct lay and also
fire of motorized rifle podrazdeleniye, lay passages in
enemy obstacles. However, in the interests of achieving
suddenness of attack there may be no preparatory fires
and this is characteristic of a night attack. In this
case artillery will deliver fire for effect at the
start of the attack. (3 p. 43)

69
An attack of the FM is carried out simultaneoualy
by reinforced subunits of the first echelons at the
exactly appointed tm. (1)

Having captured the strong points on the outskirts

of the town, subunits advance along the streets from
one objective to another using gardens, yards, bresches
in wall& and underground structures, systematically
destroy the enmy, giving each other fire support, and
penetrate into the depth. (I)

To approach the flanks and the rear of the next objective

use is made of gaps in the enemy defence and dead
ground: gaps in the walls of buildings, yards, gardens,
roofs and underground passages. (1)

At the signal for the attack or assault motorized rifle

podrazdeleniye, under cover of fire and smoke, will
cross obstacles using the passages which have been laid,
reach the buildings occupied by the enemy which are
uider attack, ard enter then and destroy the enemy. At
,his time the fire from artillery, tanks, and guns
"vsignated for fire by direct lay, which is delivered
over the heads and from the flanks of attaching
podrazdeloniye, is intensified.
When the at tacking podrazdelcniye approach the buildings
artillery pieces and machinrguns shift fire to the upper
stories and attics, to adjaceut buildings, and to the
gaps between them. (3 p. 43)

In one case a strongpoint might be seized by assault

and in another it might be advantageous to bypass it
after blockading the defending enemy. Sometimes it
will be advisable to wipe out the garrison of a
stronfpoinL by demolio'ing it or setting fire to
it. ( p. 41)

When preparing to assault a block, the commander of

the battalion pointed out the house, which were to be
!-'eized first of all and were to be used then as a
K' 'geh.. d for taking the entire block. Usually, this
4, ;t'ui
;lding, the approaches to which were least
sil--'ted to the flank fire of the enemy. p. 27)

70 This Document
R epo d u c e Fro rn
eSt AVailable Copy
 /

Motorized rifle podrazdeleniye, on approaching a

structure, block armored turrets and cover embrasures
with bags filled with dirt. They occupy positions in
froat and to the sides of a structure in order to destroy
the enemy in case he leaves a building, prevent the
approach of enemy reserves from the rear, aad repulse
his counterattacks. (3 p. 44)

With successful development of the attack of our troops

advance podrazdaleniye relentlessly pursue the tetreeating
enemy, prevent an organiztd exit from the city, Aind,
delivering simultaneous blows from different directions
and using the gaps between hib combat formations, break
into the city, seize important objectives in it, and
develop the attack in depth, supporting rapid capture
of the city by the man forces. (3 p. 13)

Shortly thereafter, the combat order was received. From

it I understood that our assault group, including a
motorized-rifle platoon, a tank, a detachment of sappers
and chesical scouts attack along the highway. Its task:
in coordination with the neighboring assault group to
seize an adjacent block of homes and factories. Subse-
quently, to advance to the opposite side of the populated
point. An artillery battery supports the assault gruup.
The commander of the assault group to seize an adjacent
block of homes and factories. Subsequently, to advance
to the opposite side of the populated point. An artillery
battery supports the assault group.
The commander of the assault group ordered mte in the
period of fire preparation, together with the rRgh',5ritng
crew, to destroy the enemy tank in the trench at thu
corner of building No. 2 and to crush the gun at the
corner of building No. 1. Then, to attack along the
street.
At the appointed time, blew up green rockets. Rolls of
artillery cannonade shook the air. The outskirts of thv
populated point was covered with the smoke of explosions.
The sappers pushed ahead and under the cover of artillery
fire gaps in the mine fields.
We also pushed our tank into position for firing by
direct lay. I ordered Private V. Gomel. to open fire,
when had lifted the smoke of the explosions at build!ng
No. 2. Catching the right moment, he pushed the electronic
trigger. The hit was accurate. The tank in the trench

71

I ' 'U
"began to emit smoke."
Under the cover of the fire veapcna, the motorized
Infantryman moved into the created gaps. Combining
movement with firing on the u.1ve, he advanced to the
assault position.
Artillery at this time transferred into the defense
depth of "the enemy". F:%r some timn our crew took
intensive machinegun fire icou the window of the upper
stories of the building, securing the approaches of the
assault groups.
As only the motorized infantrymen started "fighting"
inside the building, we changed fire positions. Ad-
vancing, intensive Sun and machinegun fire was taken.
Covered by the corner of building No. 2, our tank opened
fire on the window and doorway openings of house No. 3.
Quickly, it was occupied by motorized infantrymen.
The neighboring assault group attacked in series.
Buildings No. 5 and 6, as was presupposed, "the enemy"
strongly fortified, and the approaches to them were
exposed to artillery-machinegun fire. It was impossible
to attack these strongpoints without the hope of
suppressing "enemy" weapon emplacements. Artillerists
opened fire. At the very same time from the underground
structures of the sewage system, the commander sent an
assault group into the rear of the "enemy" motorized
infantrymen and sappers in order to destroy his weapon
emplacement, hindering the advancement.
Combining fire and a strike from the rear, our assault
group withdrew to arouse the confusion of the enemy.
Taking advantage of it, he attacked the strongpoint
at the front and took the first story of the building.
The fire and dense smoke hampered observation and firing
from the tank. I decided to change the firing position.
But when we began to advance to building No. 6, then from
behind the right corner of house No. 7, the "enemy"
wheeled out a recoilless gun. The danger was first
noticed by the motorized infantrymen of the neighboring
assault group. They opened fire on the crew of the
recoilless gun.
A this moment, we all in only a second relaxed the
circuiar observation and because of this we almost paid
(with our lives). The neighboring crew, which destroyed
the target with the first shot, rescued (us).

72
 Silzing the strongpoint, the motorized infautrymen
began "fighting" on the approaches to the factory.
Otar crew supported them by fire. "Fighting" for tie
factory-building No. 10--was protracted; however
weapons withdrew to crush "enemy" resistance by assault
fire of all kinds. Under cover of a smoke-screen and
the firing of artillery and tanks, the motorized-ihfan-
trymen infiltrated into the basement of the building.
With the loss of the factory the resistance of the
defenders began to weaken. After some time, the ,iss.-l
groups knocked out the enemy of the remaining housea
in the northeastern region of the city.
The "fighting" in the populated point was difficult.
It demanded from each member of the crew skill, forti-
tude, resourcefulness, and psychological hardiness.
(11p. 8)

The lay-out of a town, the character of its struLcttIi',s,

the time of the day and climatic conditions considerably
influence the organization and conduct of defensive
operations. The commander takes account of all these
peculiarities. (6)

The main distinguishing aspect of organizing coordination

in defense of a city is that particular attention is
devoted to coordinating the actions of small
podrazdelcniye and sometimes even separate groups ol nd
position
soldiers when they maneuver by changing
whvn they maneuver by fire. Battle in n city break:
down into a series of local and separatf, bat tles.
rhl.r,.fore. ,very podrazdeleni, e or gnrri.or, fiut I t le
,ooir.q, of vombat enjoys great tactical Indepe.,ie,-e a'hd
th,.tr efforts must be directed toward carrying Otit. if
overal l battalion mission in accordance witll thc ,'Cn-",.it
for battle of the commander. (3 p. 65)

Defe~nsive operations on the approaches to , rown ir,

carried out as in field conditions. First thfi-nenmy
is attacked from the air. by artillery fire and
counterattacks. At this time it is very 1mp',rtaat t,
determine the character of the enemy action., the
direction in which his principal efforts are cn'ncentratoi(
and the rime at which he will pass over to the uffvn';iv,.
The comnandr employs all means of reconnaissance for
this purpose. (6)

73 This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

I I
Wich the approach of the enemy to the outskirts of the
town, the main aim of the fighting is to hold tactically
advantageous stone buildings (structures), turned into
stronspoints. (1)
With the beginning of the enemy artillery barrage and
air attacks all the personnel of the stronspoints are
in basements and other shelters. The crews of duty
weapons and observers stay at their stations. Sometimes
the subunits holding the defences take up their action
stations on the order of the commander and prepare to
repulse the enemy attack before the enemy opens fire,
begins his attack or lifts fire. (6)

The success of a defensive battle depends to a great

extent on the independent and courageous actions of
small subunits reinforced with artillery, tanks and
combat engineers. A town offers favourable conditions
for the operations of small units: the enemy attacks
in different directions separated from one another
by fires, buildings and blocks. As a result there
are usually open flanks and Saps in the enemy battle
orders. This allows the defenders to deliver blows
at the enemy and his flanks, to encircle and destroy
his. (')

The advancing enemy is destroyed at the approaches to

a strongpoint by the use of all weapons in coordination
with the neighbors and with artillery and mortar fire
from covered positions, by air strikes and demolition
of mined obstacles. If in separate areas the enemy
manages to penetrate the defences and to capture
several buildings or a str.agpoint, the commanders of
subunits stop him by well-organized fire. Artillery
and mortar fire prevents the enemy reserves from being
brought up and isolates the subunits which have pene-
trated the defences. (6)

Extensive use is made of ambushes along routes of

prob 3le enemy forward movement to deliver fire at his
tanks and armored personnel carriers. Even individual
soldiers armed with antitank hand grenades and antitank
grenade launchers can inflict significant losses on
enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers moving along
city streets which hamper maneuver. (3 p. 54)

74
1N1rvpuLi..ing thr enemy attack the Infanti y ,'miLa h.. ,it
off frorw the tan"a and destroyed &irst since seratr.tt o,,
or grt'upi of tanks which break Lnto the (iLy wltho,,.t
iloatitry can be rapidly destroyed by antitanpk weaI-iNi it
.,hort range. In this event the strength of tile batt'lii,.
defensive position will not be iMpUited. C p. 11)

Mhe defenders achieve the complete rout of ti en:v h

daring and surprise counterattacks at his flank and r, .I
rhe msbunits advance unnoticed to the deployment I aii,.,i.
mainlv%by imndsirground p.issages ,ind comrmuni. ;ition t t,.,r..
Iecause if the llmit.d field of sight In a town ind iia.
compikication of the situation in th-, area of the e.r'v\.
i-entatration, a reconnaisKance and Ri-cur[. eltvm:'enit.r
sent out in front of the subqin itna LI&ncInv, :,it !, . )ia,
ittac,. The rolnterjtttieki ng Subunti .'i+iahtitn f. r ,r
bh ildings frequeiitly Assuries the nature o, :aa assi;:.
lh-ri.)rv. thiit ,4c c,ind et-che]Ilon subuni~ts must b! ab1,1 ,
i, t -is '..,,t grouph.. (b')

, :,t L,1] L,..r ompary conrander can .431gn pait t ItI

l.)res ., .'over tite flanks and repulst' an en,..m, tiutitiLnt -
.Ittlick ind alI .i blockade individual buildings and utse ii
imiiin lores to develop the attack in the Intiu tt .ei ....

:lht..ri,!<', rifle pt>dr.-zdeleniye st up smuke, scrten, t.,

,sap~ort rapid Lrossing of certain -t-otor!.

Spi ci1 ll'.assigned l.,4'r,'zdel*-nlv.,

1 Iains r, ts.
5,
reserve chc.-k ,eizt-d j1ildid tnts cit14 I , ;.L j7
'i.i . ,
from rienain ng .;rutp.; -r lnd(Ividuai :.,, i r: I liv I t[
ett.nmy, clear mines, and Lii case o.f i.e.. :, it rt' 'olti
CIisil !.ite the nbjecti ves seIz.,. . +y

" sl
Siv , 15 l Ct,%tiktcaratt .ca "i ; tt" .' a .- ,.* 7. . tiot I
,itt tic .. ournieous ;ind ro,.o Iiu tt j. t I a 'i II , * ,

and t+rcsups of soidiers, ,)n tiLI i-

sepa r,-te 'I"i I I
-nan,)euvre, tL, use point-blank fire. t. I ; .ii ,
an(d courageilisly enA,agi, the enemy in l:i:h,- ' i *, ,':
3uildings and structurv, cleared )I tI!.' , . -... :--
, checked for mines and conso. Iid r.,i u
vteIy O-. .. i,, Ii is
detailed for this purpose. (6)

W4hit'l strong tenemy forces penetrate o, kLt i . , ai'

position a counter-itLack may not be au,.is ,
t,,tiditlons a battalion commander idopt; .:.llI .",.I r.
ineaslres to hold the enemy and striva;,.; Lo .tai Ili- pri
ily ilong that avenue where further ftrwar. i...,'
Ii.
the enemy can lead ti division of the battil in , ,t
formation or to isolation from adj..cent Iodr,
setth.
l v.

75
This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy
 (encirclement). To hold the enemy be uses his reserve ur
second echelon which occupies previously prepared huildings
and other structures or he adapts them for the defense
during the course of combat and repuses further attempts
by the enemy to move deep within the city.
When the counterattacks are launched by the next higher
commader the battalion takes all possible measures to
support the deployment of the advanced podrazdeleniye
and the counterattack which they launch. The battalion
attacks together with them using the second echelon or
the reserve.
When threatened with encirclement the battalion commander
regroups his podrazdeleniye as necessary. He uses his
reserve or second echelon to create a perimeter defense
and direct his main efforts toward destroying an enemy
who threatens encirclement or isolation of the battalion
from the rest of the chast'.

Combat in a city has an especially stubborn and fierce

nature. Buildings or separate regions in a city may change
hands several tines. But in every case every defended
building must be a fortress inaccessible to the enemy.
The one who possesses the stronger moral qualities such
as boldness, fortitude, endurance, and resourcefulness
and knows procedures and methods for fighting in a city
will be the victor. (S p. 75)

b. Task OrmaniIzation

Podrazdeleniye attacking in a city are separated by the

buildings and other structures between them. A need
arises to organize the control of small podrazdeleniye,
from squad to company. (3 p. 37)

Under these condittons, the combat formation of an assault

group may consist of the following elements: three
attacking subgroups (according to the number of platoons
in a company), reinforced with heavy machine guns and AThM;
fire support subgroup (howitzer artillery, mortars, tanks);
support subgroup (sappers, chemical specialists); a reserve
rifle squad), or in its place a subgroup for consolidating
success. The commander may assign one or two squads to
give help to gun crews and drivers of APCs in preparing
(clearing) routes of movement to the objective, as well
as for covering tanks against tank destroyers, (s)

76
In the composition of the assault group was detailed fro,
a platoon to a rifle company. They war& reinforced by ,.k
to two detachments of medium machineguns, one to two
detachments of f1.unethrowers, one to two platoons 4 art .
lery, a platoon of tanks or a self-propelled artillery tiiii
The assault groups were divided into subgroups: ol hviiar
(assault), support (fire weapons), consolidatinn and
reserve. In some groups, for example in the asiiaulL of
Berlin and Budapest, were created subgroups for obstacle
clearing, deaolition (arson), and smoke screening.
(Is p. 123)

For conducting battle in a city were created assault

detachments, which, as a rule, were divided into assatilt
groupn, and the latter into subgroups (of seizure, supporr.
and consolidation).

In the c:omposition of the assault det:ichment was t ,,ill,

included a rifle battalion, reinforced regiment.il and
division artillery units, morrars, tanks or self-pr, ,-cliti
1
instal lat mns, large caliber machineguns, sapper sutbunit.,
and portable flamethrowers...

To the assault detachment was assigned the task of selzit'

a strt.t or an individual block. It was, as a rule,
divided into I to 6 assault groups, a support group, and
:i reserve. The assault group was the foundation of th,
detachment. its Composition and armament in each split-., [t
case was determined bv the situation, the combat riji.,
andI the character of the enemy's deleuse.

I n the assgalt
I roup wa-4 I ti~bert.,lI rom .i I)I t(
o f ,, ,1
,,,mpany of Infantry, I to '. I a,lwt,
i.ent.; .)f medfiums ,iiiiiltt-

gin., I to 2 ia ShK machrneasins, a ment tay.Ich'in

(if ir'itank.
wea;ponls, 3 to' 4 guns fH
t vatrious. ,il Dim, r, I r,, 2 t nk,' -. !
qel t-prcipel led
Instkilaht iont, I to 2 detacitnit-tts iff 1
5 to A port.thle fl.tmethrowcr5, and 2'to 3 ch,'mlw sts with
smoke-screen and incendiairv 'lUi'up-nt. It w-v; ,apable ,,
destroying or setting fire rn k huil,linn, d,:nol!shing t;l.
enemy Inside of it, and capturing and liolding the :att.1,,
objective.

A support group Included an :irtilher% unit., rtoti.tr ;, t;,

heavy infantry gun. It was inteudi,:, for hi~nviing ;n tOle
objective of the attack by fir-, preventing tne i i rin;
the attack from neighboring b,,ildiai's. repellinng thu ,'nc.
counterattacks, and securing; the continuity (if tile tft,,-
sive.

This Document
Reproduced From
77 Best Available Copy
 7,

The reserve datacbment (a platoon to a company with support

means) was used for daveloping successes, repelling counter-
attack&, supplementing or replacing active assault groups,
blockading and destroying a ot-rounded enmy., as wall as
reinforcing captured buLldings, and other objectives.

A seizure subgroup is used for the direct attack of a

building and the destruction, in close connection with
neighboring subgroups, of the manpower and fire weapons of
the enemy.

It consists of I to 2 detachments.

A support subgroup during the attack prevents firing on

the flanks of the attackers from neighboring homes and,
by firing at windows, entrances, doors, and garrets,
destroyed the fire weapons of the defenders. After this,.
it protects artillerymen, tankiste, sappers, and flame-
throwers from the attack of the enemy's automatic gunners.,
and eliminates enemy observers.

As soon as the seizure subgroup seizes an objective, the

support subgroup immediately prepared for supporting an
attack on the next building.

The consolidation subgroup, following after the seizure

subgroup, cleared the captured objective of the remaining
soldiers and officers of the enemy, secured it, and prepared
it for defense, guarded the flanks, and coordirated its
fire for the development of the attack. (14 p. 27)

In our opinion, it is advisable to reinforce a company

which attacks usually along one street with two or three
tanks, a hovitzer battery, mortar platoon, two or three
PTURS (protivotankovyy upravlyayemyy reaktivinyy snaryad;
antitank guided missile], one or two sapper squads, and
two or three chemical specialists, and provide support
with the fire of a battery or rocket artillery. Such an
assault group rill be able to create fire superiority
over an enemy reinforced platoon usually defending a large
building, which will allow it to ac,.omplish the assigned
mission after fire preparation and air strikes and develop
the attack without stopping. (5)
Assault detachments and groups are created for the capture
of strongly fortified buildings, strongpoLnts, and centers
of resistance. To the detachme.-t is ordinarily detailed
a motorLzed-rifle battalion, reinforced by tanks, guns of
various calibers, and subunits of engineer and chemical
troops. In it, assault groups are formed consisting of a
reinforced motorized-rifle company or a platoon each.
Personnel are provided with an increased number of hand

78
 grenadr.r, cartridges, and smoka weapons, as wall as ii,,,
necessary devices for assaulting buildings-ladders, rol,'a
boat hooks, grapnels, etc. Tanks, guns, and subunit.. a,,
special troops operate directly in the combat format ion.
of the motorized-rifle subunits. (7 p. 37)

A motorized rifle battalion assigned as an assault detach-

sent is reinforced with artillery, tanks, and sapperg.
It is committed to combat on the outskirts or right withliv
the city for assaulting heavily fortified buildings.
Depending on the number of objectives being attacked in.'
the degree of enemy resistance, assault groups (up to a
reinforced motorized rifle company in strength) are formed
within the assault detachment. A portion of the podraz-
delenlya is assigned to the reserve. (5)

A bAtt:alion acting in the first echelon on a maJn avv'iu-

of approach may receive tor reinforcement an artillerv
battalion, . tank company or a battery ot SAU (.el f-pr.-
pelled artillery pieces), and a company of sappers and ,.:
be supported by the tire of an artillery battalion.

A battalion acting as an assault dttachment can receive

more sapper podrazdelenlye than inoicated above and thia
artillery in support of its attack will be stronger.

A motorized rifle company can receive for reinforcement

ai Lank platoon, an artillery battery, and a sapper piaou,',.
(a 1. 17)

lhe subunits detailed to defend strong points and ,..,t..-s

of resistance are trained to fight independently :al, i,i
encirclenent. Therefore they are reinforced withr ii . :.,
tanks, self-propelled guns ard subunits of combat a 'ia...-.
(I)

c. Water o}bstacles

During an attack a town subunits otrvn hr.t. ,

In ., , 'a
water obstacles. The assault crossin,-. of riv'rs ,iu. ,
has its peculiarities. The availability a't huildings ',n
bank already captured by the att.ickiiug suh,,iits Ill).W' th.
assault positions to be located 1i4)-150 m neairer th,- C.,;-
off line and ensures cover trim entv:,v fire. A lare
quantity of improvised materials and :ieans, utilizatioa -t
bridges, barges, river trams and steambuat- lilow tle.: .'.b-
units to speed up the assault crushing of "..ter a:rri. -.

At the same time high and steep hanks, f,,L&,-. With ';? 'lit 'r

concrete, with a Imiited number of '.pproachv. and a'.it'.

S9 rThis Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy
as well as the utilization by the enemy of high buildings
for delivering a multitier fir4e hamper tha assault
crossing. hoxzsty of the eno y FUA (56-M a from the
bank) excludes any possibility of concentrating subunits
for the attack after landing on rhe opposite bank.
More often than not an attack is carried out by small
groups immediately after negotiating the water barrier.

Fighting for a bridgehead in a town means, first of all,

storming the enemy in buildings (structures) adjoining the
enbanmkmnt. After capturing these buildings and con-
solidating the troops set about launching bridges for the
crossing of the main forces.

Wide canals and rivers floving through a city may prove

to be serious obstacles for attacking troops. To force
then successfully from the march podrazdeleniye reinforced
with sappers and diver-scouts are sent out ahead of time
to support successful forcing of them from the march.
These podrazdeleniye have the mission of determining
whether the enemy occupies the far bank, whether the
obstacle is mined on the banks and in the water, the
nature of the banks and the bottom, and the existence of
crossings and fords. Furthermore, provisions are made for
sending out podrazdeleniye (depending on the importance
of the water obstacles) to seize existing bridges and
crossings and secure them until the approach of the attack-
ing podrazdeleniye. These podrazdeleniye, without joining
with the enemy in combat and using underground structures,
reach the indicated objectives, hold them, and support
crossing of the water obstacles by the attackin& 2draz-
deleniye.

If bridges, dams, and other structures on water obstacles

are not seized or prove to be destroyed by the enemy and
if bridge-carrying tanks cannot be used, attacking
podrazdelenuye are obliged to force the water obstacles.
This entails a great amount of engineer work to make
entries and exits at the water's edge for equipment since,
as a rule, the banks of canals or rivers in a city are
steep and made of concrete. To support this work advance
motorized rifle podrazdeleniye, in forcing a water obstacle
by using means found at hand, will have to seize objec-
tives on the far bank. (3 p. 41)

The banks of rivers and canals in cities are, as a rule,

lined with stone and concrete. With the help of hydro-
technical facilities, the enemy can quickly change the level
of the water, increase the speed of the flow, and thus
create additional difficulties for managing crossings.
Therefore, advancing in a city, it is necessary to try to
capture existing bridges very rapidly. As experience

80
/

.4howh, it Is advisbiLe to create also special detachzb-in-t.;

or groups, having included in it tank, motrrized-ritle,
and engineering-sapper subunits for this purpoat. (I p.

It the couirse of an offensive In a city, it is ofti-n

necegmary to cross water obstacles. Best of all this I
to be done with a rush-by the surprise capture of bridgca,
crossings, fords, And various hydrotechnical stractures.

T'he forcing of a water obstacle in a city, on the one htii,

Is fa-ilitated since it is possible to approach the- hank
under cover and there are Improvised ineans and .onSLru,-
tiun material. On the other hand, it Is hlindered by shevr
banks, which are usually faced with stone or con,-rete,
as well :is by a limited number of approaches (exlts) and
-Ioseness to the enemy. (7 p. 39)

d,. jiht Operazions

.omb.t in a city dUes tiot CU.a14e at iaig;ot. lie or.i ni,,I.Lt

l.ill corwianders clarify the missions assigned their
jodrazdele.ive; appoint guides, .iz&Ointh men, in.1 h ise
:;oldiers and podrazdcteniye; provid,, ti.em wit illriu, .
devices, prepare illumination and also blinding of enemy
",ibjectives; and prescribo exactly methods to be ased tor
warning and target designation. (1 n. 42)

;iftn tlii coming of darkness, some of the observation poit.

transfer from the upper atore's of the building tLo the
lower stirey and the basement, since the destroyed stru:-
tuires, public gardens, and city streets are better mevn
against the background of the sky. (11 p. 24)

1ht s,%sttan of fire must be apable of carryingaPo.,t 01 al .

1i:;i,iiozs cven it the event the ent:e attacks ait ni,,'iit
,o1li, r -tiher condition-, of limited vi,ibi!iLt- and tit,,rt' ,r
weapons must be prepared for deliverin,, fire under tlbie
"0,'aditions. (C pp. 51-52)
lite oattalion occupies the initiai position ',or tsta-
ia accordance wit'. the decision of -he regir ,,o tal
durins the nignt or under other ctiitlti,,ns if llmltt I
vi.iihility and wrhile observitim camouflage mrcjP,irv,. C

Irep-iratox , fires for the attacik i,-. dejiv.tt-d :,t -'e

tl(si.;'.!te-l Lime. During tnis period a.:pj~vr ,'r,;:', ,
,dtar the cover cf -ire from irtille:, aorLars, 'anks,
-11d guccns deslgnart i for flrinr by dir-ct I-; ind al.,,. rv
of notorized rifle podrazdelen e, l.iv naqsags In 1
)OStjtLlt's. ftowever, in the interests of :-IkivvIn, :;,d
ness 1:" attack thert, nay be no preparator'. iires anro tr,
Is Lhi.r iteristic of a nilht .itt.,ck. In thi, t'.ase r
Aill .,iv-r fire for effect at the start of the itt

(i This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy
 2. Soviet Guidelines for the Infantuyman in Urban Varfare

a one would anticipate, the infantryman is the basic element

1n Soviet tactical doctrine for city fighting. In some cases the guide-
lines refer to mitorized or mechanized infantry, in othars to the infantry-
man on foot. The distinction i&, in all cases, obvious within the text.
The guldelines which follov are directed to the infantry comander as
vell as the Individual soldiar and, again, the distinction Is apparent
ln the text. For convenience this infantry section is broken down into
the following categories:

Missions, Objectives and Sectors Fire Techniques

Formations and Positions House and Street Fighting
Maneuver Pursuit
Arm and Equipment Consolidation

Soviet writers on tactics consistently maintain that sectors of

operations assigned to tactical units In urban warfare in both offense
and defense are considerably less than under other conditions where
visibility and the unobstructed range of direct fire weapons are greater.
In the assault a preferred formation for taking a city "by storm" is
the tank platoon wedge with a 3quad of motorized infantry following behind
each tank. The defense is organized by the infantryman around strongpointe
in selected buildings which are extensively fortified. Tactical airborne,
to include helicopter, assaults are favored for operations deep in the
enemy rear. Underground passages are recommended for the covered
maneuver of both offensive and defensive forces. The Soviets list
individual automatic weapons and grenades as having special significance
for urban warfare and indicate that the infantryman's combat load for
such a.u'nition will be increased for city fighting. There are consistent
references to control and coordination of small arms, artillery and direct
fire weapons and interlocking bands of multilevel, concentrated fire are
sought from defensive positions to mainimze the density of fire.
Barricades and obstacles are covered by fire and special attention is
devoted to antitank firing techniques and tank ambushes.

82
 The Infaatryana Is iastructed that fighting in buildings and
.tre..ts t-.q,,ir.s special techniques which are characterized by vioh4-nt
,ttion .it dLust. Iund to hand quiirters where small units have the
initiativ.. Wall bre.,chings are made using the nervices of the sappers
with th.ir explosive charges and employing direct fire weapons. There
ask- references to the preference for attacking buildings from the
up;per .ltortes first and concentrating on staircases, entrances and exits.

a. .4issions, Objectives and Sectors

One distinguishing aspect of an attack in a city Is

tmat podrazdelenlye are assigned missions to seize
objectives in the city and not line.. 0 p. 17)

In illustrating a tactical example of an attack (in

a city) the authors recommend designating in the
battalion special "groups for creating panic," sending
them for this purpose to the enemy rear. It is hirdly
possible to agree with this. Indeed, creating panic is
not a special but a concomitant mission and it may, and
even must, be carried out by all podrazdeleniye which
reach the enemy rear in order to destroy or seize one
objective or another. (4)

The rotorized rifle battalion and company, the ccohat

capabliltics of which have strongly increased, art
c:apalile of using one combat formatito to handle n,-. i,,,,-,
to .agreater depth than during the past war. 0

The frontage of the offersive in a town s;connidr..hiv

less than under usual conditions and reache.s ".i) .
for a battalion and 300 m for a company. 0)

A motrized-rifle platoon can attack alon6 vno *tre't

on both sides or assault an individual obh(,,tti,.t
(a building, a structure). A .'om.inv ,rditar iv
attacks along one or two street. or receivt the t..-
to seize a large industrial strzcture (a,.nin i.t tr, O,'-
building), and a battalion--on eev.0.l plrallel
streets, including 2 to 4 city blo~k-.. (7 p. 17)

This Document
83 Reproduced From
Best Available Copy
 The enemy objectives, depending on the size of buildings
end the degree of contact of the defenders, are attacked
by a reinforced platoon, company or battalion. Provision
is made beforehand for special groups to destroy and
block fortified structures. (1)

The Immediate task of a battalion ts to destroy the

enemy manpower and fire weapons located within the
bounds of ons or two blocks, or to capture one big
structure. Subsequently a battalion captures important
objectives in the depth of ene" defences. (1)

The Immediate mission of a battalion may be to destroy

enemy personnel and weapons located in one or two
blocks or to seize a single large structure. Then the
battalion may develop the attack for the putpose of
seizing important objectives deep within the enemy's
defensive position.
If a nuclear weapon is used on a battalion's route
of action, the battalion's Iisediate mission may be
greater. It may amount to destroying enemy personnel
and weapons and seizing several blocks and then
developing the attack for the purpose of reaching
min arteries or the center of the city. (3 p. 17)

The front of a battalion attack in a city and the

depth of a combat mission depend on conditions of
attack, the nature of the city and the way it is
built, the existence of obstacles, the nature of
fortifications prepared on the edge of the city and
within it, the degree to which the opposing enemy
is suppressed by fire, and the coqposition of the
battalion.
The width of the front of an attack in a city will
be such less than in the case of an attack under
ordinary field conditions. In view of the fact that
the width of a city block is about 200--400 u and
a battalion usually attacks along several parallel
streets, the front of an attack may be 400-600 a
or more. For a motorized rifle company attacking,
as a rule, along one street the width of front of
attack will be 200-300 a. (3 p. 16)

84

. ,'. , , 4 _
 /" No .I .-

The role a battalion plays in an attack is determined

by the combat mission it is carrying out and its
place in the combat formation of the regiment.
'rie most difficult mission is carried out by a battal,.'n
operating in the first echelon or on a main avnueW
of approach. In an attack launched for the pu 1pose
of seizing a city by attack from the march its mi.,.sIvn
is, by exploiting the results of the actions of the
advance detachment, advance guard, tactical air assa,!t
force, or enveloping detachment and air bitrikisJ autl
artillery fire and in conjunction with adjacent
podrazdeieniye, to destroy the podrazdeleniye covering
the approacheb to the city, enter the city, inflict
lovses on the opposing enemy, and thereby create
favorable conditions for seizing the city or part
of it. (3 p. 15)

An iTaaortant role Is allwttod to t.atic.,l -IrNbrri

troops, which are employed for the purpose of denying
the enemy the opportunity to close gaps ano intervals
!n combat formations, to seize and hold important
objectives (squa*res. boulevards, public gardens,
major crossroads, statlonb, bases, warehouses, etc.)
.and means of nuclear attack, and to disrupt Ltie couitrol
of troops. Their composition in each specific case
Is different, but most often it in a motorized-rifle
COmpdny or platoon. (7 p. 37)

Thus the assault group of the battalion first echaelon

can capture a fortified block. To seize one or two
more objectives (blocks) In the depth of a city.
live battalion commander ComMitS the aecond echelon. 1")

Me frontage and depth of defence areas in a Lown

are determined by the combat mission, Lite availabilit.
of friendly man; ow, r and eq ipment and the ,,ppoins"
enemv forces. as well as by :he iav-otit o tih town
and Lte str4-nvth of its buildings and !tructureq. 1!1
d town tOe f IVl ol sictat .ind botjbardmivnt at. i ;.,H ,i.
'ianoeuvring is rkvr, di,.Eicu!t anr~d cuoperat.,or, !, -nt.n
subunits ind troor .nt.:,,l artr ,,n.;1 '
m . 'l)ts
is WhI the front awe and depth uf !, enm -,, w 1i
naturally, !e less than in 'ield -,,nditi,' I.

This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy
 S' / #
/ A t""

In addition to carrying out Its smin mission which

is to Intensify the force of the blow struck by the
first echelon, a battalion in the second echelon must
be reedy to repulse enemy counterattacks, replace
vodrazdeleni2e which have lost their comat capability,
or act in capacity of enveloping detachment.
A battalion in reserve must be ready to carry out
missions arising suddenly during the course of battle
and also several of the missions assigned to a battalion
in the second echelon. (0 p. 15)

Usually a motorized rifle battalion defends several

blocks in a city. (3 p. 51)

A motorized rifle battalion assigned as an assault

detachment is reinforced with artillery, tanks, and
sappers. It is comitted to combat on the outskirts
or right within the city for assaulting heavily
fortified buildings. Depending on the ntmber of
ofjectives being attacked and the degree of enemy
resistance, assault groups (up to a reinforced motorized
rifle company in strength) are formed within the
assault detachment. A portion of the podrazdeleniya
is assigned to the reserve.

A company may defend several buildings prepared for

perimeter defense and tied in by fire. A platoon
defends one or two buildings within a company strong-
point. In some cases one large building may be
defended by a company and In this case a rFatoon
may defend part of the building or one floor. (1 pp. 51-52)

Today a motorized infantry company usually defends

a strongpoint. It includes one or several buildings.
one or two blocks and is a component part of a
battalion centre of resistance. The battalion centre
of resistance consists of two or three strongpoints.
Fire coordination is established between them, crmamica-
tion trenches are organized and ambushes are laid in
the gaps and on the flanks. (')

b. Formations and Positions

Motorized rifle podrazdelenlye reinforced by tanks,

sappers, and artillery, using the results of nuclear

86

.- . _ < ," . ... - ., , . , ..-. '

-y,::\ S'- . _ - .. .. ------A..
-
strikes, air strikes, and artillery fire, deploy
step-by-step into the approach march and then into
combat formation in order to go into the attack.
C1p. 40)
A battalion's battle formation consists of company
battle formation- with reinforcing means and the tire
weapons at the direct disposal of the battalion CO.
It is drawn up in single echelon formation. During
an offensive In a big town a battalion can asium,
two-echelon battle formation. In order that each
subunit may possess complete tactical independence
guns, tanks and combat engineers are attached to it. C)

An advance detachment can also be formed by a rein-

torced motorized rifle battalion. By swift, daring,
and decisive action and using air strikes it is able
to, seize two or three blocks and hold them securely
until the approach of the main forces. (' p. 13)

For an ltenmivo in a city, it is recommended to have

deper ,',mbat formations, since the defense is strongur
her(- thaIn under field conditions. Moreover, unoccupied
or poorly defended sectors may be detected which should
be utilized for the development of success by the
comimntment to action ot fresh forceq from the depth.
The deep echeloning of combat lormations is also
provoked by the continuity of the condutr of combat
activity day and night, and by the necessity to destrov
separate groups of the enemy left in the rear of the
attackers, to sec,,re captured buildings, and to replace
subunits which have suttered great losses. (' p. 37)

When advancing in a town command and observation

posts are located nearer the subunits attacking the
most Important objectives. (1)

Th,. KN' (kor,mndirsKiv nablyudatcl'nvy punkt; on hndvr' S

ohservaLion post) of the assault group coraander tis
situated In the Imnmediate vicinit" of the noterl-ed
rifle, podrazdeleniva and so that It is easy to se.
from there all the terraii. ahead, the attLack ,hj., i
and buildings adjacent to it. Trenches. bhunkert:, u..!
semihasements are good for these purposes. The (,oill 1 1
i'nst of the artilleory battery -rom-Lder is h,,t
placed with the 0P of the rmutoriz,.d rifle lvripany
ontmander. which increases efficiency of control of
podrazdeleniya. ()
ram attached taeks usually operate "n motorized
Infantry battle formations and, firing on the mave, X
destroy the smasy fire weapons. (')

Task podrazdelenive, as a rule, are attached to motorized

rifle companies and platoons and operate in their
cmbat formations. They fire by direct lay to clear
the path for motorized rifle Podrazdelenive. They
can be included in assault groups and groups for
destroying nuclear chargse. Usually the ilatoon is
the least subdivision of teak podrazdelenlye. However,
the posasibility of separate teaks acting with motorized
rifle platoons and squads cannot be precluded. Ixperi-
once gained in battle show, during the course of an
attack in a city a sound tactic is to employ a tank
platoon wedge formation wherein one tank or SAU moavs
donm the center of a street and other tanks or SAU
move behind it at soew distance on the right or left
side of the street, providing nutual fire support.
A squad of a motorized rifle platoon moves behind
each tank, protected by the armor. In this case tanks,
covering one another by fire, can successfully hit
weapons in strong Implacements, remove barricades and
rubble, and destroy enemy tanks and armor personnel
carriers. Motorized rifleman can effectively combat
enemy close-combat weapons and thereby support the
tanks in successfully carrying out a aisuion. (3 pp. 19-20)

A battalion acting in the first echelon on a main

avenue of approach may receive for reinforcemnt an
artillery battalion, a tank company or a battery of
SAU (self-propelled artillery pieces), and a company
of sappers and may be supported by the fire of an
artillery battalion.
A battalion acting as an assault detachment can receive
more sapper podrazdeleniye than indicated above and
the artillery in support of its attack will be stronger.
A motorized rifle coupany can receive for reinforcement
a tank platoon, an artillery battery, and a sapper
platoon. (3 p. 17)

Depending on the nature of the enemy defense and the

assigned mission, and also if the comamnder has not
succeeded in sufficiently exposing the disposition
of enemy strongpoints, particularly in the depth of
the city, the combat formation of a reinforced motorized
rifle battalion can be formed into two and sometimes

88
three echelons. The second echelon completes the
destruction of the enmy, consolidates the success
of V' trt echelon, and repulses possible counter-
attacks from the flank and rear. (S)

A battalion defensive position includes the combat

formations of podrazdelenlye and the battalion defensive
position, the system of fire, and fortifications of
the defensive area.
A battalion defensive area consists of the following
elements: company strongpoints prepared for perimeter
defense constituting the basis of the battalion
defensive positions; strongpoint of the reserve;
locations for preparing ambushes; firing posttlons of
mortars, artillery, and antitank weapons left in the
hands of the battalion comander; and places prepared
as control points for the battalion and its rear service
podrazdelenlye. Furthermore, in a defensive area
dumy strongpoints and podrazdelenive positions for
securing and defending entrances and exits of under-
ground structures and routes of commnication may be
prepared. Sometimes combat security positions are
prepared in front of the defensive position of a
battalion In the first echelon. (3 p. 51)

Wdhen selecting a building for a strongpoint one takes

into consideration, first of all, Its fitness for
carrying out all-round observation and fire. Multitler
fire is organized. The bulk of fire weapons are isited
in the lower stories and basements. Wooden buildings
which hamper fire are torn down. It is ad-risable to
use as strongpoints buildings lovated at crossroads
and in squares. The nunber of personnel for a strong-
point is determined by the significance of the defended
objective and the availability of manpower and equipment.
The experience of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45)
shows that a reinforced infantry company was detailed
for the defence of a four- or five-story building or
several two- or three-story buildings located along
the 200-600 a frontage and 200-400 a in depth. (6)

From the very first day the "Home of Pavlov" was

prepared for perimeter defense. All approaches to the
building were gradually mined and antitank and anti-
personnel minefields were prepared around tne building.
In some sectors land mines were put out. A communica-
tion trench was dug to the rear for the pturpoHe of

89
delivering ammition, food, end wter to the garrison.
A treach we dug In the rear of the building to give
personel proteotiea against enW artillery fire.
Furthermore, a drain pipe passing to the rear of the
buiLM' was adapted for the same purpose and two
commication trenches were dug to it. Soldiers
occupying a defensive position on the first and uuper /
stories of the building, during strong artillery lire,
used these routes to take cover In the drain pipe.
Soldiers defending sealbasement areas, during artillery
firs, remained In place at their weapona. Good
fortification helped our courageoua fighting ma hold
the building for 58 days, until the day our troops
reverted to the attack for the purpose of destroying
the enemy forces at Stalingrad. (I a. 70)

Strongpoints, organized in the first place in rein-

forced concrete end stone buildings, form the basis
of defence In a town. Prepared for all-round defence,
the strongpoints are connected with each other by
conmunication trenches. (6)

In dr fense of a city combat security is set out by

a battalion in the first echelon when reverting to the
defense and when not In contact with the enemy and when
In direct conta-t with his combat security may be set
out only on those avenues of approach where the distance
bet"ee the forward edge of the defenlve position end
the enemy Is greater than 1000 a. (I p. 68)

Buildings and other structures In the Saps between

stronspoints are prepared for blasting, mined obstacles
are prepared, log obstacles and barricades are set
up, and provisions are made for flanking and Interlocking
fire of all types to cover the flanks and the Saps
between strongpoints. (3 p. 55)

Podrazdelenive control points can best be locatei in

strong basements and on the lover floors of buildings
and they should be equipped to provide antinuclear
and antichenical protection. Observation posts are
established on the upper floors and on roofs.
Podrasdelenive 'comanders are given orienting. and
large-scale maps or plans of the city. (I p. 55)

90
The battalion command-observation post is located close
to company combat formations. Based an experience
gained in the war it is often 200-300 a from the
companies of the first echelon. (' p. 38)

The stability of a defensive position in a city is

greatly enhanced by fortifications. All kinds of
buildings and underground structures and basmanns
are prepared and fortified as shelters which provide
protection against nuclear and other weapons. Buildings
are adapted for the defense, windows and doors are
filled In with bricks and sandbags, firing embrasures
are made, holes are made and routes prepared in attics
and between floors for maneuver and Interaction among
podruadelenie. (1 P. 54)

Not all ijuildings are used for the defensive positions

of a company or platoon but only the more solid ones
which are located at intersections of min arteries
and at the entrances to squares, parks, bridges, and
other important sites. Buildings are selected for
strongpoints in light of the possibility of conducting
observation and fire from them and the possibility
of protecting personnel against weapons of mass
deqtruction. Wooden structures and also buildings
which hinder fields of fire are removed where
possible. (3 pp. 51-52)

Masonry and reinforced concrete buildings designated

for defenso are prepared for all-around defense. Door
and window openings in the buildings which are not
designated for use are filled in solid with brick or
sandbags. Embrasures for firing submachineguns,
machineguns, grenade launchers, and other weapons and
viewing slits for observation are prepared with
perimeter defense of the building in mind. Stairwells
are barricaded, mined, or destroyed. Hatches are
made through ceiling,, and ladderm are made. Corridors
within buildings are barricaded and prepared for small
arms fire. To decrease losses from shell fragments
which get irside buildings, partitions made from bricks
sandbags, or other material must be made between
embrasures and viewing slits.
Communication routes are prepared between strongpolnts
and defended buildings for which purpose use is first
made of underground structures (tunnels, subways,
water mains, etc.), and when these do not exist
trenches are dug, the most important sectors of which

91
are covered to protect ther wben buildings around than
are destroyed.
In those cases when there are no strong underground
structures or basn-mnt areas which might be used to
protect personnel against nuclear weapons, shelters
are dug In the ground away from defended buildings in
order to kMa then from becoming covered with rubble.
In preparing basement areas which are used for shelters
for protection against fire and to dilinish the dose
of penetrating rediation, the floor of the first story
is sprinkled with dirt to a thickness of 20--0 cm.
Shelters are built so that they will be under the
ruins of the upper stories following a nuclear blast.
The mein entrance is usually mede near a stairwell
and existing underground routes of comiuncation
between basemnt areas are used as alternate entrances.
The gaps between strongpoints, streets, squares, and
parks are filled with mined mnd other obstacles and
covered by fire. In a city all types of obstacles
can be used In conjunction with explosives or without
them: antitank ad antipersonnel mines, delayed action
amnes, fragmntation-barrier mines, barricades, anti-
tank steel hedgehogs and turnstiles, reinforced concrete
posts, tetrahedra, and also barbed wire obstacles.
Bridges over rivers and canals and also underground
structures running from the direction of the enemy
(tunnels, subways, drainage ditches) are prepared for
demolition. As a rule, they are blasted when the
enemy threatens to seize them. Som buildings should
be prepared for reduction to rubble for the purpose
of blocking streets In case of need. (3 pp. 69-70)

It Is most advantageous to select positions for weapons

as close as possible to the attack objective, and to
place machineguas, grenade launchers, and ATQI in semi-
basements and lower stories, and in windows or embrasures
of buildings adjacent to the attack objective. As a
rule, snipers and observers are situated in upper
stories, In attics, and on roofs of buildings. Firing
positions for mortars are assigned in courtyards,
gardens, building attics, and behind fences, and for
attached and supporting artillery-in gardens, parks,
and behind snelter on squares and in streets. In this
case the crews can fire not only from Indirect laying
positions, but by direct laying as well. Before the
attack begins, APCa are placed under cover, with their
mechinegunners ready to support the attack of the
podradelmeiya. (5)

A2
Camoufl~age in a city is greatly facilitated by the clseu1
nature of the terrain and does not require greet expendt-
ture of caouflage means. It is achieved by the location
of personnel and weapons in buildings, and window and dolr
openings, by the creation of dumy defensive locations In
blocks and in buildings not defended by podrazdelentye,
by observing sound and light discipline, by extensive une
of smoke agents, and by excluding the local populace from
Lte defensive area. A battalion comnander provides for
all these measures in organizing a defensive position and
fortifying it. (3 p. 70)
To facilitate fire fighting all inflammable objects are
removed from buildings, wooden floors are sprinkled with
"sand, and water supplies are established in case the
municipal water supply system is put out of operation.
Windows and other openings in buildings are covered vith
grills or fire-resistant plates so that the enemy will be
unable to throw incendiaries through them. The entrances
into dugouts and base=ent and smalbasoment areas are
covered with brick thresholds 15-20cm thick for the purpose
of preventing spread into these areas of napalm, pyrogel,
and other incendiary mixtures. Fire lanes not less than
50-70 m wide are prepared on the streets for the purpose
of preventing the spread of fires over the city. (3 p. 55)

Ambushes are prepared in addition to combat security on

some avenues of ap:roach for immediate security and for
preventing sudden enemy attack. Within a city patrols
are organized for streets, squares, and parks. An exten-
sive network of observers to established and at night
listening posts are used. (S p. 68)

Maneuver

In those cases when the enemy offers vea'- resistance along

a street, tanks with infantry mounted on them or inian-y
in armored personnel carriers and trucks move along the
stree. at a great speed, delivering fire on the move.
They reach important objectives In this way and seize them
from tV.- march.

93
An attack in a town is carried out without interruption
until the opposite outskirts are reached or a link-up
with ow troops advauncing In the opposite direction
Is effected. (I p. 12)

If the enaey offers weak resistance the tank-borne

motorized infsatrymim approach the most important
objectivew at high speed and capture them on the move. (1)

An attack from the merch directly sainst a city begins

after seizing the nearest outer trace of the city.
With successful development of the attack battalions
in the first echelon, pursuing a retreating enemy along
parallel routes, strive to prevent bin from leaving
the city and they attack indicated objectives from the
march as they approach the enemy. (2 p. 38)

Tanks usually advance togsther with motorized rifle

odrazdelenive in Liair formation. and, delivering fire
on the move, destroy enemy weapons hindering forward
movement of the infantry. (3 p. 40)

For the purpose of assisting advance chast' in rapid

selzure of a city and important otjectives along the
routes leading from the city to the rear, extensive use
will be made of tactical airborne assaults up to a
reinforced motorized rifle battalion In strength dropped
in the enear rear by helicopter. (I p. 13)

Having captured one objective, the subumits ceaselessly

develop the offensive into the depth and those specifi-
cally chosen check captured buildings and defensive
structures, clear them of the remaining small groups
and individual soldiers, carry out minse field clearance
and where necessary put out fires.
Objectives in the depth of the city are attacked as
a measure of the approach of the attackers. Their
disposition and the nature of the defense exclude the
possibility for simultaneous attack. Therefore,
commanders of the subunits must constantly and contin-
uously conduct reconnaissance, quickly assign additional
tasks to subordinates, coordinate their activities
among themselves, and with attacked and supporting
subunits, and employ mneuvers for the purpose of
intensifying the efforts in the directions of marked
success. First of all, It is necessary to try to
seize the main strongpoints and focal points on the

94
main roads of the city, centers of comunication,
bridges, overbridges, railway stations, subway stations.
For this, It is recommended to use tactical airborne
troops In helicopters. The landing of the subunits
should be accomplished under the cover of darkness
and smoke, and supported by the fire of artillery and
air support. They my be landed in squares, brotd
streets, public gardens, parks, flat roofs of
houses,
and using suspension ladders. (7 p. 38)

In Lirge squares where several streets converp, the

attack is carried out by the forces of several sub-
units. Commanders try to ensure that they simultane-
ously appr,,ach the centre of the square ftom different
streets. The corner buildings are the first to be
stormed. (1)

For the nubunits' manoeuvre in a town passages and

thoroughfares are organized inside the blocks. Under-
ground passages are aloo adapted for this purpose. (6)

Smoke agents are used to conceal the maneuver of man

and weapons between strongpoints, defensive areas,
and separate buildings not having concealed or under-
ground routes between them and also to prevent the
enemy from observing and conducting aimed fire. (3 p. 57)

After seizing strongpoints on the edge of the city and

developing the attack, podrazdeleiye move forward
along streets from one objective to another, using
garden.s, yards, gaps in walls, and underground structureR.
They destroy step-by-step the defending enemy while
supporting one another by fire as tney penetrate his
position. (3 p. 40)

Between strongpoints fire is coordinated, commuication

trenches are prepared, and ambushes are set up in the
gaps between strongpoints and on the flanks. Tunnels,
subways, drain pipes, and other underground structures
and routes of communication are used for maneuver by
men and weapons in a battalion defensive area and on
its flanks and foot and vehicle passages are prepared
within blocks. (3 p. 52)

During the course of an attack motorized rifle

po-irazdeleniye, moving on both sides of streets and
keeping close to buildings, deliver fire from small
arms at the windows of buildings located on the
opposite side. Weapons assigned to fire by direct lay

95
move behind the motorized rifle Podrandelan and
the tanks, from covered position to covered position.
Delvering fire along the streets, they hit targets
hindering the forward ovement of the Infantry and
tanks. p. 40)

For advancing from one objective to another, the sub-

units use gardus, kitchen gardens, parks, holes in
walls, underground structures, s well as uarrov streets.
In the latter case, advicing along both of its sides
they fire at the windows and loopholes on the oppoe 4re
side. Nachineguns and Sums advance from ona shelter
to another. Using the gaps between strongpoints and
umderground structures, the troops employ close and
deep envlopment for coming out In the flank and rear.
Amy penetration Into the depth mest be utIlixed for
the rapfd developsent of the success by the comitmut
Into battle of the second echelons or reserves. (7 p. 38)

Tanks equipped with anttine drags Act together with

sappers and lay passages in enemy mined obstacles.
Motorized rifle and sapper podrazdelaniye designated
for In--diate assault uove behind then. The tanks,
delivering fire at mbrasures or windows of a structure
under attack, approach it and cover the attacking
motorized riflemen aid sappers with their fire and
armor. (3 pp. 43-4)

The motorized infantry and tanks, moving from cover to

cover, are followed by Suns detailed for direct fire.
Firing along the streets, they destroy any targets
which hinder the advance of the infantry and tanks. (1)

As the attacking podragdelenite reach the artillery

safety line, fire is shifted to the rear of the enemy
posttion. After approaching to within band grenade
range, motorized rifle podrazdelente, throwing hand
grenades at the enemy, attack objectives on the forward
edge. At this time artillery and aviation destroy
the enemy located deep within the city and some of the
artillery delivers covering fire against enemy artillery
and mortar batteries and control points. (1 p. 40)

To handle missions which unexpectedly artse, the

battalion comender and even the company comander can
asasign up to a rifle platoon or squad respectively
as a reserve. (5)

96
 To develop the attack deep within a city battalion
commanders vial comit their second echelons or reserv,,;.
As a rule, they will be committed wiLh the permisaion
of the next higher coimnider after the battalion has
carried out its imediate mission. However, the situation
my force a battalion commander to cooat his second
echelon earlier. Most frequently this will be when
thc enemy offers stubborn resistance. Underground
structures and gaps through buildings will be used as
a covered approach for the second echelon to reach the
line of departure. One distinguishing aspect of
reaching the line of departure tinder the conditions
prevailing in the city is that second echelons or
reserves will wost frequently move in small podrazdeleniye
and even by separate groups. The line for entry into
combat is usually selected so that a second echelon
dill be commi.'ted around a battalion flank or in the
gaps between companies or assault groups. However, the
possibility cannot be precluded that entry into combat
will be by leap-frogging through the combat formations
of attacking units. This is advantageous in those
cases when companies in the first echelon have suffered
great losses or If buildings do not peramt deploying
the podrazdeleniye of the second echelon. (3 p. 42)

In our opinion, it is advisable to reinforce a company

which attacks usually along one street with two or
three tanks, a howitzer battery, mortar platoon, two
or three PTURS (protivotanko upravlyayemyy reaktivnyy
snaryad; antitank guided missile), one or two sapper
.qtiads, and two or three chemical specialists, and
provide support with the fire of a battery or rocket
-artillery. Such an assault group will be able to create
fire superiority over an enemy reinforced platoon
usiailly defending a large building, wnich will vllow
it to accomplish the assigned mission after fire pre-
paration and air strikes and develop the attack wihout
stopping. (s)

d. Arms and Equipment

In distinction from an attack under ordinary conditionq

podrazdeleniye In combat in a city are given additional
hand and antitank grenades, cartridges, shells, smoke

97
clirges, signalling equipment, and Bear for assaulting
buildings. Furthermore, sapper podrazdelaniye are
provided with Additional explosives, elongated charges,
and antitank and aatipersonnal alms. (I p. 17)

Combat action in a city, as a rule, is conducted at

close range and therefore the weapons of motorized
rifle podrasdeleniye, such as machineguns, submschineguns,
grenade launchers, and hand grenades will play an
Important role in inflicting damage on the enemy. In
a city where ssauver and fire of tanks are limited,
a large role will be played by manually operated anti-
tank grenade launchers, hand grenades, and recoilless
guns in the fight against eanmy tanks. (I p. 56)

In our opinion, two or three obstacle-clearing groups

included In the sapper squad on the armored personnel
carrier, one or two tanks with MTT and D4T-5s equipped
with ropes with grapnels are necessary. It is necessary
for sappers to have with them 400 to 500 kg of explosives,
20 to 30 components of distributed charges and several
cumulative charges, mine searchers, probes, detonating
means, and wooden mallets for tapping walls in order
to discover chambers with explosive charges. If there
are many narrow canals in the city, it would be advisable
to include in these groups a bridge layer.
The obstacle-clearing groups should follow directly
behind the companies of the first echelon, and, when
obstacles are met, they are moved forward under cnver
of fire to make gaps. (10 p. 95)

Assault detachments and groups are created for the

capture of strongly fortified buildings, strongpoints,
and centers of resistance. To the detachment is
ordinarily detailed a motorized-rifle battalion, rein-
forced by tanks, guns of various calibers, and subunits
of engineer and chemical t.-oops. In it, assault groups
are formed consisting of a reinforced motorized-rifle
company or a platoou each. Pers_mel are provided
with an increased number of hand grenades, cartridges,
and smoke weapons, as well as the necessary devices
for assaulting buildings-ladders, ropes, boat hooks,
grapnels, etc. Tanks, guns, and subunits of special
troops operate directly in the combat formations of
the motorized-rifle subunits. (7 p. 37)

98
General Major Babushkin stresses that flame throwers:
i. can kill many soldiers held up in strongly fortified
buildings
2. are especially useful at night
3. can have great psychological value by striking
fear into soldiers when used unexpectedly
4. are to be used in conjunction with other arms. (12)

When podrazdelenlye approach objectives under attack

guns and tanks on signal of the battalion or company
comander shift fire to the upper floors and to
adjacent buildings and prevent the approach of enemy
reserves. (3 p. 40)

At the signal for the attack or assault motorized rifle

podrazdeleniye, under cover of fire and smoke, will
cross obstacles using the passages which have been laid,
reach the buildings occupied by the enemy which are
under attack, and enter them and destroy the enemy.
At this time the fire from artillery, tanks, and buns
designated for fire by direct lay, which is delivered
over the heads and from the flanks of attacking
podrazdeleniye, is intensified.
When the attacking podrazdeleniye approach the buildings
artillery pieces and machineguns shift fire to the upper
stories and attics, to adjacent buildings, and to the
gaps between them. (3 p. 43)

After entering a building motorized rifle podrazdeleniye,

acting boldly, daringly, and decisively, destroy the
enemy by fire point-blank and with g.enades, clearing
one room or corridor after another, floor-by-floor.
Sappers attached to the rifle companies or assault
groups lay passages through walls and between floors
and in case of need they clear mines from the buildings
seized. After seizing a strongpoint or building or
other structure and carrying out an isnrediate mission,
every podrazdeleniyc receives a new mission and attacks
subsequent objectives without stopping. (3 pp. 40-41)

The system of fire in a defensive position in a city

is based on a combination of flanking and interlocking
fire of all types and is arranged in several layers
for the purpose of creating multfiayer fire on the
approaches to a defensive area and its strongpoints
as well as on the flanks and in the rear of podrazdeleniye.

99
The system of fire is tied in with artificial and
natural obstacles. It nmst provide for: destruction
of the enemy and mainly his tactical nuclear weapons
and artillery and tanks on the distant approaches to
the battalion defensive position; repulse of wase tank
and infantry attacks in front of the forward edge;
cover by fire of flanks and gaps when occupied by
podrazdeleniye and also artificial and natural
obstacles; and infliction of dmsaga on an enemy who
has penetrated the defensive position and rapid
concentration of fire at any threatened point or
sector. (3 p. 53)

To support a perimeter defense of a site, strongpoint,

or the defensive area as a whole the system of fire is
so organized that all streets, interiections, gaps
between buildings, entrances to squares and also parks
and public gardens, the approaches to bridges and
overpasses, and the approaches to water obstacles are
kept under flank:int and interlocking multilayer fire
and also concentrated fire of mortars and artillery
located in covered firing positions. Particular
attention is devoted to the organization of antitank
fire since ir will be possible to deliver fire ac
enemy tanks in the city itself only for a very limited
time. (' p. 54)

Weapons are concealed and distributed in the strongest,

buildings and structures, behind strong walls, and also
in positions prepared on squares, in parks, and in other
areas which are not built up. To increase the density
of fire it is advantageous to place weapons on all
floors, in several tiers. in so doing it must be
remembered that the upper floors will be destroyed
by enemy fire to a greater extent than the lower floors
and therefore most of the firing positions should be
placed on the lower fGoors and in the sealbacements
of buildings. For the weapons on upper floors shelters
as well as firing posit~ons are prepared. (S p. 54)

The reconnaissance and attack by lead enemy

podrazdeleniye are repulsed by the fire of designated
weapons and also by podrazdeleniye defending on the
avenues of approach involved. For the purpose of
deceiving the enemy with respect to the friendly
system of fire it is advisable to locate some of the

100
'9

weapons intended for the purpose of repulsing

reconnaissance and the attack of the enemy lead
podrazdeleniye outside the defended buildings and
strongpoints, for example, in dummy strongpoints
or in adjacent buildings. After an attack Is repulsed
the weapons whose positions have been revealed are
moved to new firing positions. Passages laid by the
enemy in our obstacles are inmediately covered by
mined obstacles or covered by strong fire of all
types. (3 p. 73)

The system of fire is closely tied in with the system

of obstacles. The battalion comander determines
exactly the location of minefields in front of the
forward edge of the defensive position, in the gaps
between company strongpoints, and on the flanks of the
battalion defensive positions and within it. He
determines the locations of barricades and log obstarlen
and the degree to which natural obstacles most be
reinforced.
Preparation of a system of fire at obstacles is not a
separate step in the work of a comander in organizing
a defensive position. It is part of the complex of
steps taken by a battalion cotusander in assigning
missions and organizing coordination among
podrazdeleniye. (3 p. 65)

Streets and gaps between strongpoints are barricaded

and approaches to them are swept with fire. To
prevent the enemy from enveloping these obstacles,
they are installed close to strongly built constructions
and fences. Loopholes and machin_,gun emplacements
for firing at the streets and squares are made in
the barricades. Passages for the manoeuvre of
friendly subunits and for mechanical transport are also
left in them. The passages are thoroughly guarded
"".
nd covered with fire and movable obstacles. (6)

The existence of numerous dead spaces not kept tuder

fire and sectors not kept tuder observation on the
approaches to defended buildings and other structures
and generally to all sites under conditions prevailing
in a city make it necessary to organize fire in several
layers. Firing positions are prepared on all floors
of buildings and in attic areas. To avoid large losses
in personnel and weapons firing positions on the upper
floors should be occupied only in case of need and

101
 only when In direct contact with the onemy when there
is little probability of employment of nuclear weapons
by the enemy. (I p. 63)

Buildings and other structures In the Saps between

stromgpoints are prepared for blasting, mined obstacles
are prepared, log obstacles and barricades are set up,
and provisions are made for flanking and Interlocking
fire of all types to cover the flanks and the gaps
between strongpoints. (3 p. 55)

Antitank podrazdeleniye remaining under the direct

control of the motorized rifle battalion commander
prepare firing positions In places from which they can
deliver fire along wide and long streets, main arteries,
squares, and expected routes of attack of the enemy
main forces. (I p. 57)

In repulsing the enemy attack the infantry should be

cut off from the tanks and destroyed first since
separate tanks or groups of tanks which break Into the
city without infantry can be rapidly destroyed by
antitank weapons at short range. In this event the
strength of the battalion defensive position will not
be mpaired. (3 p. 73)

Men in tank and motorized rifle ambushes do not open

fire at the enemy before he approaches the ambushes.
When the enemy gets close to them they destroy tanks
and infantry by opening fire suddenly, preventing the
enemy from making further progress within the defensive
position. After they have completed their mission
the tanks and motorized riflemen designated for ambush
occupy other positions and receive a new mission.
(3 p. 74)

e. House and Street Fightins

If battle is fought in a building having a large number

of rooms the commanders try not to disperse their forces.
In order to break down the enemy resistance quicker,
the troops capture, first of all, the upper stories
of the building, staircases, entrances and exits. The

102
 //

defenders on the lower floors and in basements are

* destroyed with grenades, submachine- and machinegrun
fire through holes in the cuilin&,.a. The main walls
are breached with hand grenaise or blown down. Inside
a building hand-to-hand fight~ng, employment of grenades
and point-blank fire acquire special importance. The
personnel of the advancing submits are provided with
an increased supply of hand grinadeas and cartridges. (1)

On the scrupulousness of preparing the subunits to

attack a building is indicated by the fact that
Immediately before the attack each soldier is shown
not only the direction of movement, but also into
which window, door, or opening he must break and where
he is to go subsequently. The commander of the
battalion personally checked the readiness of the
group for the attack, their understanding of their
tasks, knowledge of signals, readiness to fight with
fire weapons, and supply of ammunition. (i4 p. 27)

The advancing enemy is destroyed at the approaches

to a mtrongpoint by the use of all weapons in coordi-
nation with the neighbors and with artillery and mortar
fire from covered positions, by air strikes and demolition
of mined obstacles. If in separate areas the enemy
manages to penetrate the defences and to capture several
buildings or a strongpoint, the comnanders of subunits
stop him by vell-organized fire. Artillery and mortar
fire prevents the enemy reserves from being brought
up and isolates the subunits which have penetrated
the defences. (6)

If the building is set in a closely built-up street

barring a roundabout way, it is necessary to attack
the front. Sometimes it is advantageous to seize at
first an adjacent, less strong or an unoccupied
opposite building in order to then inflict a strike
simultaneously on the front and flank. For approaching
the rear of the enemy, to use underground structures.
In the building first of all to seize the stairs
between stories, entrances, and exits, in order to more
quickly cut the enemy garrison into parts and destroy It.
In the rooms can be employed different modes of activity.
For example, one of the soldiers, reaching the door
from one side, by a sharp movement opens it and hurls
a grenade. (16)

103
 I.
After entering a building motorized rifle Bodrazdeleniye
acting boldly, daringly, and decisively, destroy the
enemy by fire point-blank and with grenades, clearing
one room or corridor after another, floor-by-floor.
Sappero attached to the rifle eopanies or assault
groups lay passage. through walls and between floors
and in case of need taey clear mines from the buildings
seized. After seizing a strongpoint or building or
other structure and carrying out an inmediate mission,
every 9odrazdeleniYe receives a new mission and attacks
subsequent objectives without stopping. (I pp. 40-41)

They boldly burst into the houses and block all entrances
and exits, especially from basements. Making wide usa
of hand grenades and point-blank fire, they destroy
the enemy. Machinegunners fire at windows, embrasures,
garrets and roofs to cover the attacking subunits.
Success of fighting inside a building depends on the
speed, resolve, initiative and daring of each soldier. (1)

Motorized-rifle subunits should try to seize attacked

objectives from two or three sides. The success of
the fighting within a building depends on the quickness,
initiative, and bold actions of each soldier. Passage
from one story to another is performed along stairs
and through holes in ceilings. In order to paralyze
the resistance of the enemy and to deprive his separated
groups of mutual assistance and support, it is recomnended
first of all to seize the stairs between the floors,
entrances, and exits from premises, and then to annihi-
late isolated groups in detail. (7 p. 38)

Approaching a building, the soldiers on the run threw

grenades at windows, doors, and openings in the walls,
and after the explosion burst into the room.
Entering the house, the attackers first of all tried
to cover the staircases leading to the upper floors,
to locate the passage to the basement, and on the first
floor several room with windows to the yard. This
was done in order to isolate individual groups of the
enemy and to prevent then from conducting a maneuver
or rendering assistance to each other. (" p. 28)

Ascending the staircase to the upper floors, troops

threw smoke grenades ahead of themselves and swept
the area with automatic fire and the stairwell is

104
I ....

gotten over in one stroke. leaching the next floor,

the attackers burst into the rooma after throwing
grenades into them. If doors were closed, they were
blown up. It was not recommended to break down a door,
since the enemy attacked the attackers by automatic
weapon fire at this time.
For passage from .me room to another, walls were blown
up by grenades or TNT. (14 p. 28)

Thus, attacking along the streets, it is necessary to

move close to the sidewalk in order to corduct more
effective fire on buildings situated on the opposite
side. One motorized-rifle subdivision moves on the left
and right of the tanks firing at lover stories of
buildings, others-directly behind them firing higher.
(16)

A battalion or company cosmander can assign part of

his forces to cover the flanks and repulse an enemy
counterattack and also blockade individual buildings
and use his vain forces to develop the attack in the
indicated direction.
Motorized rifle podrazdeleniye set up smoke screens
to support rapid crossing of certain sectors.
Specially assigned podrazdeleniye or teama from the
reserve check seized buildings and structures, seize
them from remaining groups or individual soldiers
left by the enemy, clear mines, and in case of need
puc out fires and consolidate thi objectives seized.
(3 p. 41)

When the enemy penetrates the edge of the city defensive

combat breaks down into several local battles. Defending
podrazdeleni-e destroy an enemy who has penetrated
buildings by point-blank fire, hand grenades, and hand-
to-hand combat. An enemy who has seized a building
prepared for destruction is destroyed when the building
is blown up. (3 p. 74)

The existence of numerous dead spaces not kept under

fire and sectors not kept under observation on the
approaches to defended buildings and other structures
and generally to all sites under conditions prevailing
in a city make it necessary to organize fire in several

105
layers. Firing positions are prepared on all floors
of buildings and in attic areas. To avoid large losses
in personnel and weapons firing positions on the upper
floor- should be occupied only in case of need dad
only woen In direct contact with the enemy when there
is little probability of employment of nuclear weapons
by the enemy. 0 p. 63)

It is advisable to locate separate subanchinegunners

or snipers on the upper floors or In the attics. When
wvll canouflaged and sheltered, they can maintain
observation over the eanmy and with precise fire inflict
casualties on enemy personnel and prevent unhindered
movement by personnel over the territory occupied by
the enemy.
An example of capable distribution if weapons in a
city is provided by '"omeof Pavlov" which during battles
in the city of Stalingrad was defended by a garrison
consisting of 20 men. In addition to submachineguns
and rifles the garrison had as weapons: one hand and
one heavy machinegun, three antitank guns in the
sesibasement of the first doorway and the antitank
guns in the semibasement of the second doorway.
Alternate positions on the second fleet were prepared
for them. The hand machinegun was on the second floor
and the submachinegunners in rooms on the flrst floor.
The mortarmen occupied firing positions within the
buildIng and during the course of combat they often
changed position, moving from one floor to another.
Later two snipers were sent to the garrison from the
regiment and they occupiud positions in the upper
floors of the buiLding. Embrasures and viewing
slits were prepared on all floors to the front as well
as to the rear. The gatrison ms able to cover the
entire perimeter of the building.
The locations of weapons as indicated above was
dictated by the situation. (3 p. 64)

In defending a city fighting fires acquires very great

importance. The conditions prevailing in a city usually
abet fires and fires break up combat action of
podrazdeleniyva, hinder the delivery of counterattacks,
and make the defense of separate locations or buildings
impossible. As a result of fires, passages and
crossings appear where they formerly did not exist

106
 amid, on the other hand, ezisting passages may becom,
covered and LApaosable.
In view of this cosmanders take several special measures:
they create special detachments for fighting fires;
prepare subordinate podrazdelnniye and all personnel
to make capable use of fire-fighting equipment and
provide protection against enemy incendiaries; and
in places where fires are mout apt to break out they
establish stores of uacer in barrels, sand, ponchos,
etc. (S p.70)

If the enemy breaks through into a building he i,

destroyed by point-blank fire, hand grenades and hand-
to-hand fighting. During the fighting inside a building,
the fire of guns, machineguns and mortars is used to
prevent the approach of fresh enemy forces and the
delivery of ammnition.
The success of a counterattack depends to a great extent
on the courageous and resolute actions of small subunits
and separate groups of soldiers, on their skill to
manoeuvre, to use point-blank fire, to use hand grenades
and courageously engage the enemy in hand-to-hand
fighting. Buildings and structures cleared of the
enemy are immediately checked for mines and consolidated
by the subunits detailed for this purpose. (')

For the purpose of regaining buildings and strong-

points seized by the enemy the battalion comander
organizes a counterattack with his reserve or second
echelon. This counterattack must be launched immediately
sinte an enemy will be able to adapt seized buildings
or locations rpaidly for perimeter defense.
A counterattack in a city is executed rapidly to the
flanks and rear of an enemy who has penetrated.
* Podrazdeleniye prepare concealed routes to lines of
deployment, making primary use of underground routes
of communication and communication trenches. Because
of limitations on observation in a city and the
complexity and lack of clarity in the situation in a
sector where an enemy has penetrated, podrazdelenlye
* moving to the front in a counterattack must have
reconnaissance and security. Fighting by counter-
attacking podrazdelenive for strong and large buildings
may have the nature of an assault. Thereiore, comanies
in the second echelon or the reserve must be ready to

107
 //

//

act as assault groups. All buildings and other

structures freed of the eam during the course of a
counterattack are checked Immdiately for mines and are
occupied by "odrasdtlenive designated for this purpose.
The success of a counterattack will depend In large
measure on bold and decisive action by small
podrazdeleaie and separate groups of soldiers and
on their ability to execute maneuver, fire their
wapons point-blank, use hand grenades, and fight
hand-to-hand. (I p. 73)

f. Pursuit

Pursuit is begun Imediately upon the initiative of

the subunit commanders who discover the retreat. By
their decisive actions they eliminhate subunits of enemy
cover and, making use of breaks and intervals in his
combat formation, move swiftly to the flanks and to
the rear, attempting to prevent the enemy from capturing
Important road Junctions, commanding heights, and
crossings. What is most Important is not to give the
enemy any respite, to block all his attempts to with-
draw his troops from under attack, and to prevent him
from systematicall retreating or occupying defenses
at useful sites. ( )

g. Consolidation

After carrying out assigned miesions the battalion

or company commander imediately reports this to his
next higher commander. Depending on instructions a
podrazdeleniye may continue to develop the attack or
consolidate on a line which has been reached. (' p. 44)

Having fulfilled the assigned mission, the attackers

Immediately consolidate in the captured area. (1)
To keep order in a captured tow or in a part of it
a commandant and a duty subunit are appointed and
patrols are organized. A thorough check of all
captured buildings and their clearing of the enemy
personnel and demining is carried out. (1)

108
 Important objectives or structures seized are
consolidated by specially designated podrszde1erniy!
and are prepared for perimeter defense. Un this case
pi.rticular attnL ton to devoted to consolidating
street intersections, open sreas, squares, and exits
from underground structures and to preparing to repulse
emny Louwterattacks. (3 p. 42)

The objectives (buildings) captured are consolidated

by specially detailed subunits and prepared for pert-
water defence. Special attention is paid to street
crossings, squares, public gardens, exits from under-
ground structures, and to readiness for repulsing
enemy counterattacks. All-round support of combat
actions, especially active and continuous recownalssence,
acquires great Importance during fighting In a town. (1)

To assure the successful development of the attack

in the depth and the repelling of possible couate'-
attackers, captured objectives (positions) are contkll-
dated by forces of the reserve. Tactically important
objectives are improved as strongoints and streets
are prepared for mining. Special attention is devoted
to consolidating crossroads, main streets, squares,
bridges, and other important sectors. (7 p. 39)

Having destroyed the enemy who have penetrated and

re-established the situation the troops take measures
for the immediate organization of the disorganized
fire system, repair damaged obstacles and replenish
their stocks of ammunition. Buildings destroyed but
not occupied by friendly trnops are mined. In the
death of the defences the roads are cJleared and
bypasses for the manoeuvre of tanks, self-propelled
artillery and artillery are organized. (6)

3. Soviet Guidelines for the Engineer in Urban Warfare

The bulk of Soviet tactical writings on urban warfare indicate

that the Soviets normally attach angineer support unitsipersonnel to
the very small, units ita their task organizing for combat. In this
research a rather singular exception is uncovered which indicates

109
that wasa rule sapper wodrazdeleanie attached to a battalion are kept
centralized under the battalion comender." The quote Is Is the
contzt of defense however and the Implication is clear that in the
defense centralized control at the battalion leel Is preferred while
in the attack attacbment down to the mall unit level is considered
to be required. Engineer tasks include engineer reconnai/sence,
piomner work such *s general demolitions, route preparation,
constructing and clearing obstacles, barricades and fortifications, -*

the clearing of buildings and lines of c municatlons as weU as

the normal sapper functions of wall breaching and laying, detecting,
tuMrOVIN, detonating and disarming aies. Enginser support at the
mail =it level can be su'-itantial to include reinforcement of a
rifle coepany by as large a unit as an engineer platoon. Engineers
are assigned special tasks for "emrgency rescue work' following
nuclear detonations and as special fire fighters in cities.

Sapper godrazdeleniye in an attack in a city viii

often be attached to motorized rifle companies and
platoons designated for action as part of assault groups
and also groups for seizure and destruction of nuclear
charges.
Their main missions will be: preparing paths for
approach to the city; laying passages through rubble
and barricades; destroying individual buildings;
clearing mines from the most Important sites designated
by the attackers for setting up control points, aid
stations, storage areas, etc.; and preparing mined
obstacles for fortifying regions and sites which are
seized.
Acting as part of assault groups, sapper podrazdeleniye
conduct eng8neer reconnaissance, lay passages in
mined obstacles and barricades and rubble; support the
forward movement of tanks, armored personnel carriers,
and artillery; do demolition work in buildings and
other structures defended by the enemy; and participate

Shovkolavich, et &l., op. cit., p. 57.

110
 in the eliaination of the cousequemces of employment
by the enemy of nuclear veapons. (1 p.21)

Engineering support for an offensive in a city iacludeR

engineering reconnaissance of the fortifications and
obstructions of the enemy; making gaps in the obstructions
and ruins; making breaches in walls, fences, and ceilings
of buildings; supporting assaults of strongly fortified
buildings and strongpoints; arranging for river and
canal crossings within a city (usually with covered
banks); clearing streets and mining buildings;
localizing and extinguishing fires; and setting up
obstructions (including electrified obstructions
using energy from the city power stations) for rein-
forcing the captured targets and blocks. Furthermore,
it may be possible to adapt underground structures
for reinforced points and shelters and to rettore water
lines for supplying troops with water, etc. ( p. 93)

On the average, in our opinion, in the direction of

the offensive of each motorized-rifle battalion (or
tank bastalion),* it is necessary to send out one or
two lID (or IRC), supplying then with photographic
equipment, radio stations, and large scale plans of
the city. (00 p. 93)

Enjgneer support amounts to performing engineer recon-

naissance; preparation of routes for advance to the
city by attacking podrazdaleniye; laying passages In
cbstacles and obstructions in the streets, barricades,
and fences; destruction of buildings or other structures
prepared by the enemy for defense; setting up obstacles
and consolidating lines or objectives seized; clearing
lines from buildings or other structures to be adapted
as control points, aid stations, and food, clothing,
and equipment supply points.
Particular attention is devoted to checking for the
presence of nines in underground routes of communication.
Underground routes can be used for maneuvering
podrazdeleniye during the course of combat within
the city and for penetrating the city.
Sapper podrazdeleniye acting as part of motorized
rifle podrazdeleniye or assault groups support execution

Engineering reconnaissance patrol (eng. recon. group)

111
of the comhat mission by these iodrazdelaniye or
groups. They perform engineer reconnaissance of
approaches to objectives which might be mined; luy
panssang in barnicad.. and obstacles thereby providing
for forwerd movement of tanks, BTR (armored personnel
carriers), and artillery; destroy the enemy defending
in buildings and other structures by blowing then
up; and give help to attacking Podrazdelanie in
fighting fires and conducting rescue work. ( pp. 34-35)

It Is apparent that the methods and mens of conducting

e'gineering reconnaissance vwill be the same as under
ordinary conditions. However, direct inspection and
search should be considered the most effective. This
is emplaIned by the fact that, on the one hand, the
distance of observation and photographing is limited
in a city, and on the other hand, more favorable
conditions for the secret approach and activity of
scouts are created.
Therefore, in preparing an offensive in a city, it
sakes sense to reduce the number of engineering
observation posts and with these smn to create more
engineering reconnaissance patrols (groups) for reconnais-
sance by search. (10 p. 93)
A battalion acting in the first echelon on a main
avenue of approach may receive for reinforcement an
artillery battalion, a tank company or a battery of
SAU (self-propelled artillery pieces), and a company
of sappers and may be supported by the fire of an
artillery battalion.
A battalion acting as an assault detachment can
receive more sapper podrazdeleniye than indicated
above and the artillery in support of its attack will
be stronger.
A motorized rifle company can receive for reinforcement
a tank platoon, an artillery battery, and a sapper
platoon. (I p. 17)

Success of the actions of an assault group depends

largely on a rapid approach of podrazdeleniya to che
objective under attack, which in turn is connected with
crossing mine fields. In our opinion, one attached
squad of sappers can make 1-2 passages. This will
allow a company to occupy favorable positions for the
assault. A second sapper squad together with heavy

112
artIllery can be advantageously used for making
breaches in the walls of the objective being
defended. ()

A motorized rifle battalion assigned as an assault

detachment is reinforced with artillery, tanks, and
sappers. It is committed to combat on the outskirts
or right within the city for assaulting heavily
fortified buildings. (5)

In our opinion, it is adv.sable to reinforce, a com|pany

which attacks usually along one street with two or
tnee tanks, a howitzer battery, miortar platoon, two
or three PTURS (protivotankovyv upravlyayemy
reaktivnyy snaryad; antitank guided missile), one or
two sapper squads, and two or three chemical specialists,
and provide support with the fire of a battery or
rocket artillery. (5)

With the beginning of the artillery barrage, under

the cover of fire and smoke screers, subunits of
combat engineers make gaps in obstacles. For their
protection and to let the infantry and tanks paqs
through them, the combat engineers detail commandant's
posts. (1)

Preparatory fires for the attack are delive-ed at the

designated time. During this period sapper
podrazdeleniye, under the cover of fire from artillcry,
mortars, tanks, and guns designated for firing by
direct lay and also fire of motorized rifle
podrazde eniye, lay passages in enemy obstacles. (3 p. 41)

Sappers acting with attacking podrazdeleniyc lay

explosive charges and on signal of the podrazdelenlylo
conmander blast permanent structures or buildings.
(3 p. 44)
Sappers designated to lay passages move under cover
of fire to the objective under attack, reconnoiter
the obstacles around it, and lay passages to them.
(3 p. 43)

Sapper podrazdeleniye blast with elongated charges

and lay passages in enemy mined obstacles. (3 p. 40)

113
Tanks equipped with antimine draos act together with
sappers and lay passages in enemy mined obstacles.
Motorized rifle and sapper podrazdelenie designated
for Immediate assault move behind then. The tanks,
deliverinS fire at embrasures or windows of a structure
under attack, approach it and cover the attacking
uotorisgd rifleman and sappers with their fire and
armor. (I pp. 43-4)
After entering a building motorized rifle podrazdeleniye,
acting boldly, daringly, and dacisively# destroy the
enemy by fire point-blank and with grenades, clearing
one room or corridor after another, floot-by-floor.
Sappero attached to the rifle companies or assault
groups lay passages through walls and between floors
and in case of need they clear mines from the buildings
seized. (I pp. 40-41)

In our opinion, two or three obstacle-clearing groups

included in the sapper squad on the armored personnel
carrier, one or two tanks with BTY and OfT-5s equip;ed
with ropes with grapnels are necessary. It is necessary
for sappers to have with then 400 to 500 kg of explosives,
20 to 30 components of distributed charges and several
cumulative charges, mine searchers, probes, detonating
means, and wooden mallets for tapping walls in order
to discover chambers with explosive charges. If there
are many narrow canals in the city, it would be advisable
to include in these groups a bridge layer.
The obstacle-clearing groups should follow directly
behind the companies of the first echelon, and, when
obstacles are met, they are moved forward under cover
of fire to make gaps. (10 p. 95)
Wide canals and rivers flowing through a city may prove
to be serious obstacles for attacking troops. To force
then successfully from the march podrazdeleniye rein-
forced with sappers and diver-scouts are sent out ahead
of time to support successful forcing of them from the
march. These podrazduleniye have the mission of deter-
mining whether the enemy occupies the far bank, whether
the obstacle is mined on the banks and in the water,
the nature of the banks and the bottom, and the existence
of crossings and fords. Furthermore, provisions are
made for sending out podrazdeleniye (depending on the
importance of the water obstacles) to seaze existing

114
a

bridges and crossings and secure themn until the approach

of the attacking podrazdelenlye. These podrszdelenlye,
without joining with the enemy in combat and using
itsdergrouad structures, reach the indicated objectives,
hold them, and support crossing of the water obstacles
by the attacking podrazdeleniye.
If bridges, dams, and other structures on water obstscle,s
are not seized or prove to be destroyed by the enemy
and if bridge-carrying tanks cannot be used, attacking
podrazdoleniye are obliged to force the water obstacles.
This entails a great amount of engineer work to make
entries and exits at the water's edge for equipment since,
as a rule, the banks of canals or rivers in a city are
steep and made of concrete. To support this work
advance motorized rifle podrazdeleniye, in forcing a
water obstacle by using means found at hand, will have
to seize objectives on the tar bank. (3 p. 41)

In organis.ng fortifications of a defensive area a

battalion comander determines the extent of engineer
work needed, establishes sequences and terinz for
completion, indicates what machinery is available and
where it is to be used; he indicates locations for
setting out mined and other obstacles, what buildings
and other structures are to be prepared for blasting
and procedures for blasting them, and the locations
for log obstacles and barricades on streets; and he
determines procedures for using podrazdeleniye to rerform
engineer work and he also indicates necessary camouflage
measures. (3 pp. 68-69)
Sapper podrazdeleniye in defense of a city set out
mised obstacles; prepare log obstacles, barricades,
and other obstacles; destroy buildings or lay passages
through their walls and in fences and other structures;
and they lay routes for movement of podrazdeleniye
for executing counterattacks and maneuvering from one
position to another. Sapper podrazdeleniye are also
used for emergency rescue work in case the enemy uses
weapons of mass destruction and to put out fires in
the city.
As a rule sapper podrazdeleniye attached to a battalion
are kept centralized muder the battalion commander.
(3 p. 57)

115

I
Wasonry and reinforced concrete buildings designated
for defense are prepared for all-aroumd defense. Door
and window opensngs in the buildins which are not
designated for use are filled in solid with brick or
sandbap. habrasures for firing submachineguns,
mmchineuns, grenade launcher, and other weapons and
viewing slits for observation are prepared vith pear-
meter defense of the building in mind. Stairwells ar
barricaded, mined, or destroyed. Hatches are made
through ceillng@ and ladders are made. Corridors within
buildings a'e barricaded and prepared for small arms
fire. To decrease losses from shell fraents which
get inside buildings, partitions made from bricks,
sandbags, or other material must be made between
embrasures and viewing slits.
Conoaunication routes are prepared between strongpoints
and defended buildings for which purpose use is first
-ide of underground structures (tunnels, subways, water
mainsa, etc.), and when these do not exist trenches are
dug, the most Important sectors of which are covered
to protect them when buildings around then are destroyed.
In those cases when there are no strong underground
structures or basement areas which sight be used to
protect personnel against nuclear weapons, shelters
are dug in the ground away from defended buildings in
order to keep then from becoming covered with rubble.
In preparing basement areas which are used for shelters
for protection against fire and to diminish the dose
of penetrating radiation, the floor of the first story
is sprinkled with dirt to a thickness of 20-40 ca.
Shelters are built so that they will be under the ruins
of the upper stories following a nuclear blast. The
main entrance is usually made near a stairwell and
citisting underground routes of commnication between
basement areas are used as alternate entrances.
The gaps between strongpoints, streets, squares, and
parks are filled with mined and other obstacles and
covered by fire. In a city all types of obstacles can
be used in conjunction with explosives or without them:
antitank and antipersonnel mines, delayed action mines,
fragmentation-barrier mines, barricades, antitank steel
hedgehogs and turnstiles, reinforced concrete posts,
tetrahedra, and also barbed wire obstacles.
Brldses over rivers and canals and also underground
structures running from the direction of the enemy

116

4-
(tunnels, subways, drainage ditches) are prepared for
demolition. As a rule, they are blasted when the enemy
threatens to seize them. Some buildings should be
prepared for reduction to rubble for the purpose of
blocking streets in case of need. (' pp. 69-70)

Streets and gaps between strongpoints are barricaded

and approaches to them are swept with fire. To prevent
the enesy from enveloping these obstacles, they are
installed close to strongly built constructions and
fences. Loopholes and machinegun emplacements for firing
at the streets and squares are made in the barricades.
Passages for the manoeuvre of friendly subunits and
for mechanical transport are also left in then. The
paa4sages are thoroughly 1 uarded and covered with fire
and movable obstacles. ( )

Accessible underground routes of communication arc

prepared to serve as routes of supply and evacuation.
Furthermore, stores of materials and repair equipment
as well as aid stations are located in them.
In connection with the difficulty involved in bringing
up supplies and evacuation, stores of ammunition,
food, medicine, and drinking water are set up in strong-
points in the defensive area. (3 p. 55)

Not all buildings are used for the defensive positions

of # company or platoon but only the more solid ones
which are located at intersections of main arterles and
at the entrances to squares, parks, bridges, and other
Important sites. Buildings are selected for strong-
points in light of the possibility of conducting
observation and fire from them and the possibility of
protecting personnel against weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Wooden structures and also buildings which hinder
fields of fire are removed where possible. (3 pp. 51-52)

The stability of a defensive position in a city is

greatly enhanced by fortifications. All kinds of
buildings and underground 4tructures and basements are
prepared and fortified as shelters which provide
protection against nuclear and other weapons. Buildings
are adapted for the defense, windows and doors are filled
in with bricks and sandbags, firing embrasures are made,
holes are made and routes prepared in attics and between
floors for maneuver and interaction among podrazdelenlye.
(3 p. 54)

117
Buildings and other structures in the gaps between
strongpoints are prepared for blasting, mined obstacles
are prepared, log obstacles and barricades are set
up, and provisions are made for flakin8 and interlocking
fire of all types to cover the flanks and the gaps
between strongpoints. (I p. 55)

Land and other wines are laid on the main arteries on

the approaches to the defensive position and to defended
sites; barricades and other obstacles are erected on
streets and squares; and bridges, overpasses, subway
stations, separate buildings and sectors of underground
structures are prepared for blasting. (l p. 55)

To facilitate fire fighting all inflammable objects

are removed from buildings, wooden floors are sprinkled
with send, and water supplies ate established in case
the municipal water supply system is put out of operation.
Windows and other openings in buildings are covered
with grills or fire-resistant plates so that tho enemy
will be unable to throw incendiaries through them.
The entrances into dugouts and basement and semibasement
areas are covered with brick thresholds U5-20 cm thick
for the purpose of preventing spread into these areas
of napalm, pyrogel, and other inSendiary mixtures. Fire
lanes not lese than 50-70 a wide are prepared on the
streets for the purpose of preventing the spread of
fires over the city. ($ p. 55)

Camouflage in a city is greatly facilitated by the

closed nature of the terrain and does not require great
expenditure of camouflage man. It Is achieved by
the location of personnel and weapons in buildings,
arranging and carefully covering embrasures In the
corners of buildings, and window and door openings,
by the creation of dumy defensive locations in blocks
and In buildings not defended by podrazdeleniye, by
observing sound and light discipline, by extensive use
of smoke agents, and by excluding the local populace
from the defensive area. A battalion commander provides
for all these measures in organizing a defensive position
and fortifying it. (3 p. 70)

118
From the very first day the "Roam of Pavlov" was prepared
for perimeter defense. All approaches to the building
were gradually mined and ant'.tank and antipersonnel
mineftelds wore prepared around the building. In doue
sectors land mines were put out. A commnication trench
was dug to the rear for the purpose of delivering
ammunition, food, and water to the garrison. A trench
was dug in the rear of the building to give personnel
protection against enemy artillery fire. Furthermore,
a drain pipe passing to the rear of the building
was adapted for the same purpose and two communiciation
trenches were dug to it. Soldiers occupying a defensive
position on the first and upper stories of the building,
during strong artillery fire, used these routes to take
cover in the drain pipe. Soldiers defending semihasoment
areas, during artillery fire, remained in place at their
weapons. Good fortification helped our courageous
fighting men hold the building for 58 days, until the
day our troops reverted to the attack for the purpose
of destroying the enemy for.es at Stalingrad. (3 p. 70)

In organizing rear service support a battalion commander

determines: in which of the strongest underground
structures and basements to locate rear service
podrazdeleniye and what stores of materials and water
to establish in the strongpoints of companies in the
event of combat in encirclement; what fortifications
to prepare for the purpose of getting protection for
rear service units against nuclear weapons; and how
to provide continuous material, technical, and
medical support for podrazdeleniye during the course
of battle. (3 pp. 70-71)

The advancing enemy is destroyed at the approaches to

a strongpoint by the use of all weapons in coordination
with the neirhbors and with artillery and mortar fire
from covered positions, by air strikes and demolition
of mined obstacles. (6)

The success of a counterattack depends to a great extent

on the courageous and resolute actions ot small subunitm
and separate groups of soldiers, on their skill to
manoeuvre, to use point-blank fire, to use hand grenades
and courageously engage the enemy in hand-to-hand
fighting. Buildings and structures cleared of the enemy
are imediately checked for mines and consolidated by
the subunits detailed for this purpose. (4)

119
 Naving destroyed the enem who have penetrated and
re-established the situation the troops take measures
for the lmediate organization of the disorganized fire
system, repair damaged obstacles and replenish their
stocks of asnmnition. Buildings destroyed but not
occupied by friendly troops are mined. In the depth
of the defences the roads are cleared and bypasses for
the manoeuvre of tanks, self-propelled artillery and
artillery are organized. (4)

After an attack Is repulsed the weapons whose positions

have been revealed are moved to nem firing positions.
Passages laid by the enemy In our obstacles are immediately
covered by mined obstacles or covered by strong fire
of all types. (3 p. 73)

4. Soviet Guidelines for Chemical and Radiation Speeialists

Chemical and radiological reconnaissance Is conducted contin-

uously within the city according to Soviet tactical doctrine. There
are references to creation of dependable systems for warning of chemical,
bacteriological and radiation hazards. These specialists are also
charged with monitoring the quality of food and water before being
consomd by Soviet troops. Chemical smoke agents are cited as being
particularly effective In concealing troop maneuver within the city.

In toking his estimate of the radiation and chemical

situation the battalion cosmander decides: how to
organize radiation, chemical, and biological reconnaissance
and warning of danger of nuclear or chemical attack or
t-ploymant of biological weapons by the enemy; what
weasures must be taken to provide security and protection
for sources of water against contamination by radio-
active, chemLcal ard, especially, biological agents;
and where and in what quantity to establish stores of
.nrotective supplies and equipment. (S p. 62)

120
 II

In our opinion, it Is advisable to reinforce a company

which attacks usually along one street with two or three
tanks, a holitzer battery, mrtar platoon, two or three
PTURS (protivotankovyy upravlyayemy" reaktivnyy snaryad:
antitank guided misile), one or two sapper squads, and
tow or three chemical specialists, and provide support
with the fire of a battery or rocket artillery. ( )

As regards the attached chemical specialists, they will

support the sappers' work in preparing building' for
the assault, resorting when necessary to the placement
of smoke screens. For successful operations in a city,
personnel are issued an increased amount of ammunition,
hand grenades, and antitank grenades. The men are
provided with devices for assaulting reinforced buildings,
means of signalling, and smoke devices, while sagpers
are given a sufficient quantity of explosives. ( )

* Many measures are taken to organize protection against

weapons of mass destruction. A dependable system for
warning the garrisons in strongpoints employing all
ames of commnication is established, and continuous
radiation, chemical, and bacteriological reconnaissance
is conducted within the city. Provisions are made for
more complete use for protection of personnel of strong
underground structures and basements and in case of need
they are reinforced. Particular attention is devoted
to protection for sources of water and safeguarding
!
them against bacteriological contamination as well
as strict observance in strongpoints and in a battalion
defensive area as a whole of rules governing sanitation
and hygiene. Measures are taken to eliminate the conse-
quences of employment by the enemy of weapons of uass
destruction and measures are prescribed for putting
out fires and carrying out emergency resc'ae work.
Personnel are categorically forbidden from using food,
alcoholic beverages, and other things seized from the
enemy or left by him and also water from any source
without a preliminary test by medical workers. Partic-
ular attention is devoted to checking the quality of
food and water before consuming them. (S p. 68)

121
 ldMardelenmve for orotection asainst weapons of mass
da I if they are attaached to the battalion, are
used firstly for performing radation and chemical
recomnsiasgane and also for eliminating the consequences
of esumm employisent of weapons of mess destrurtion.
(I p. 57)

Radiation and chemical reconnaisesnce in a battalion is

conducted by observation organized, as a rule, at the
cinsnder-observation post of the battalion, combat
reconnaissance patrols which include attached chemical
troops, and chemical reconnaissance patrols. (I p. 68)

Smoke aments are used to conceal the imnuver of ame and

weapons between strongpoints, defensive areas, and
separate buildings not having concealed or undesrgromd
routes between them and also to prevent the enemy from
observing and conducting &ledfire. (2 p. 57)
Smoke is used, as a rule, when meteorological conditions
are favorable at the decision of the battalion commender.
(l p. 57)
Motorized rifle podrazdeleniye set up smoke screens to
support rapid crossing of certain sectors. (* p. 41)

Camouflage in a city is greatly facilitated by the closed

nature of the terrain and does not require great expend-
iture of camouflage meams. It is Achieved by the location
of personnel and weapons in buildings, arranging and
carefully covering embrasures in the corners of buildings
and window and door openings, by the creation of dummy
defensive locations in blocks and in Luildings not
defended by podrazdeleniye, by observing sound and light
discipline, by extensive use of smoke agents, and by
excluding the local populace from the defensive area.
(3 p. 70)

5. Soviet Guidelines for the Lozistician

The logistician is Instructed to anticipate such higher levels

of ordnance expenditures in city fighting. In defense the stocks are

122

S/
positioned vell forward to facilitate distribution down to the small
unit level at separate strongpoints (unit distribution system). In
defense, protection of rear area service support against nuclear attack
Is cited as a special concern for the commander. In the attack, rear
area service support is located outside or on the edge of a city prior
to attack. Helicopters are cited as having special utility for deliver-
ing supplies in city fighting. Cuidellnes for medical personnel
emphasizing the positioning of aid stations well forward (up to platoon
strongpoints) and special techniques to be employed for recovering and
evacuating the wounded.

Aminition expenditure is such greater during an attack

in a city. To conduct combat continuously it is neces--
sary to increase supplies of ammunition in possession
of personnel. For example, in the battles to seize the
city and fortress of Konigsberg riflemen and tankman
had as such as two units of fire. Usually bearers from
podrazdeleniye vii bring up additional amunition.
Vehicles carrying ammunition must be kevt imnmdiately
behind the second echelon or reserve. ( p. 42)

In doing this work the battalion coimander governs

himself primarily by the fact that under the conditions
prevailing in a city stores of supplies must be based on
calculations for extended combat by individual
podrazdeleniye isolated from battalion main forces. The
necessary stores of all supplies, including medical, are
established in every company strongpoint and in some
cases every 3latoon strongpoint. An aid station is
organized. ( p. 71)

Accessible underground routes of commication are

prepared to serve as routes of supply and evacuation.
Furthermore, stores of materials and repair equipment
as well as aid stations are located in them.
In connection with the difficulty involved In bringing
up supplies and evacuation, stores of asumition, food,
medicine, and drinking water are set up in strongpoints
in the defensive area. (' p. 55)

123

/
/'
 In orsanistng rear service support a battalion commider
determines: in which of the strongest underground
structures and basements to locate rear service
9odresal and what stores of materials and water
to establish In the stronpoints of companies in the
event of combat In encirclemnat; what fortifications
to prepare for the purpose of getting protection for rear
service units against nuclear waponm; and how to provide
continuous material, technical, and medical support for
Dodraedelenive during the course of battle. The coemanders
of support oodrasdelenive are told procedures for
replenishing ammnition and other supplies and preparing
hot food and delivering It to personnel. They are told
what roates to use for carrying out wounded and routes
of evacuation to aid stati.ons, procedures for performing
maintenance on combat equipment, refueling, lubricating,
and repair. (' pp. 70-71)
Rear service smport is organized In light of the nature
of the coming battle. Additional reserves of supplies
are established, especially amunition and food, and
procedures are prescribed for issuing then to personnel.
A rear service odrazdelen*vye Is located outside a city
or on the edge of it prior to the beginning of the attack.
In the case of attack deep within a city the battalion
aid station, amnition vehicles. and a water tank truck
are located close to combat formations. Different covered
places, Including basements and semibasements In buildings
and underground structures, are used to locate them after
these places have been checked for contamination and
mines. Amimtion and food are delivered directly by
'bearers designated In each platoon. Search and collectian
of the wounded in baemets, buildings, rubble, parks,
and gardens are organized. is p. 35)

St.ccessful use can be msade of helicopters in defense

of a city for delivering needed cargo to garrisons which
are defending the city or sites In It and which are
caught in enemy encirclement or are isolated from
friendly forces. (3 pp. 57-58).

Personnel designated for searching for the wounded are

provided with ropes, straps, and other gear for extracting
the wounded from places difficult to reach. Company
aid stations are set up in shelters in motorized rifle
companies or assault groups. (I p. 35)

124

L4
 - - -/

6. Soviet Guidelines for the Artillery.n

As indicated in the following guidelines, the moat significant

characteristic of the employment of artilery in urban warfare is decen-
tralization and the attachment of artillery units down to the single gun
as far as the platoon level. The citation of the statistic that in a
World War I1 precedent, 40 percent of all gun artillery was employed in a
direct-lay mode seems significant. There is little Soviet emphasis
in the following guidelines or in materI 1 researched in this investi-
gation on the varied characteristics of urban warfare which may warrant
varied approaches to attachment of artillery. While it would appear that
at one extreme (a slow, building-to-building operation in a very large
city) that decentralization of artillery assets was deirable while at
another extreme- (attack "from the march" against a sasLl town where
the assault is carried through the objective) that there would be a
greater centralization of assets. The guidelines uncovered here are lets
flexible and tend to emphasize attachment of artillery in the attack
as wei.1 as defense, in rapidly moving assaults aH wall as deliberate
defense. Tnere Is ample reference to the importance of artillery
preparation fires although there dre several citations of the possibility
of dispensing with such fires to capitalize on the principle of surprise.

Artillery. There are many important distinguishing

aspects about employing artillery podrazdeleniye in a
city. Btcau3e of the lack of wide fields of observation
and fire, since there are large buildings and other
structures, it is not possible to centralize the employ-
sent of artillery. Most frequently artillery
podrazdeleniye accompany infantry and tanks by separate
platoon or even separate gun during street fighting.
Part of the artillery will deliver fire from covered
firing positions while directly subordinate to the
battalion commander.

125
In the Great Patriotic War during combat action to
@eise the city of Budapest 40 percent of all Sun artillery
was used to fire by direct lay, Including 152-m guns.
In the battle for the city of Potnan' 203-m guns wvet
used to fire by direct lay.
In an assault detachment or group It is best to use
artillery nodracdelenive directly in combat formations
of motorized rifle podragdeleniye as accompanying guns
for destroying buildings and other structures with fire
by direct lay.
In this way artillery podrazdeleniye up to and including
the firing platoon will be attached to motorized rifle
companies and even to platoons.
In street fighting artillery firing positions are
selected in gaps in walls and in fences, ruins, public
ani other gardens, parks, and in the spaces between
buildings and structures. The coinnd-observation posts
of artillery comnanders should be located together with
those of the commnders of the motorized rifle
oodrazdelenive to which they are attached or which they
support. There muet be artillery scouts reconnoitering
for targets in the combat formations of the advance
podrazdeleniye. During combat a battery changes position
by platoon and a platoon acting separately by gun, leap-
frogging forward under the cover of fire from adjacent
guns and smake.
Preparatory fives may consist of one or several onslaughts
of fire depending on the nature of structures in the
city, the strength of the defending enemy, and the density
of fire needed to suppress him. The duration of this
fire can be very brief. For ezamle, in the battle for
Berlin the duration of preparatory fires in the zone of
attack of the 94th Guards Rifle Division and the Fifth
Shock Army fluctuated from 5 to 20 afn.
In comparison with preparatory fires conducted during
an attack under ordinary field conditions, in a city for
destroying various structures and the weapons located
in then more artillery or mortar systems mout be used,
especially guns designated for firing by direct lay at
targets located on the forward edge and i nediately behind
it. Separate batteries and even platoons delivering
fire from covered firfrg positions and high-power guns
for firing by direct lay are used to destroy enemy
targets. To carry out their firing missions they will
be given most of the tims allotted for delivering

126
preparatory fires.
Supporting fire is conducted by separate fire onslaughts
during the course of which separate en*W defensive
structures are destroyed ac attacking troops approach
them. The signal to shift fire is given by aotorized
rifle podrazdeleniye commanders.
Mortar and in many cases howitzer podrazdeleniye are
able with their high-angle fire to hit concentrations
of infantry, suppress artillery and mortars, and
deliver strikes at targets in the resr and enemy command
post located in buildings and other structures.
As a rule, organic and attached mortar podrazdeleniye
of the motorized rifle battalion are attached to
motorized rifle companies and platoons and act in direct
proximity to their combat formations. Some of the
mortars, especially the large-caliber mortars, will most
frequently be kept under the direct control of the
battalion commander.
To Increase the effectlveress of mortar fire when
firing at targets located behind high, close-in cover,
the firing positions for them can be located on roofs,
in attics, on balconies, in wide places, in trenches,
and even in basements. This is a distinguishing aspect
of combat employment of mortars in a city. (S pp. 20-21)

The suppression of the strongpoints in the forward area,

the fire weapons in buildings located to a depth of
500 to 800 m, command and command-observation points
on roofs and in garrets, and firing rasitions of mortar
subunits, and the destruction of individual structures
adapted for conducting flank fire are planred by the
artillery subunits attached to or supporting the
battalion (company) in the period of preparatory fire.
Suppression of artillery batteries and %ajor control
points is charged to the commander of a higher
commander. :0 pp. 28-29)

Attached to a motorized-rifle battalion attacking in a

city along several parallel streets for reinforcement
may be ma artillery division and sometimes, in addition,
a battery of antitank artillery. The attached artillery
battalion is used for firing not only from the covered,
but also from the open firing positicne. Batteries are
usually distributed for support of the companies in the

127
first echelon, and one of them Is left at the disposal
of the battalion commander. Battalion artf.llery and a
tank-destroyer battery also operate with coupanies of
the first echelon.
It can not be excluded that a motorized-rifle battalion
will be reinforced by only a oubunit of antitank
artillery. In this case, Its actions, a a rule, will
be supported by an artillery battalion. ( p. 28)

Due to the angle of mortar fire it Is possible to hit

an enemy located behind shelters.
However, It nust be kept In mind that stooe structures,
having basements, jerve as a reliable shelter from
mortar fire. Under these conditions, the most typical
msdsions for ,%mortar battery will be: hitting manpower
and firepower deployed on city squares, streets,
boulevards, vacant lots, in public gardwns and parks,
as well as command-observation points, manpower and fire-
power on the roofs and In the garrote of homes, behind
barricades, and In ruins; suppressing the maneuver and
counterattack of the enemy; covering the flanks of their
subunits; and suppressing mortar subunits. Purthermore,
mortars can also create centers of fires, and illminate
and screen objects in smoks. (11 p. 108)

Howitzer artillery and mortarr, which by their fire

destroy enemy personnel and weapons, destroy buildings
and other structures or make breaches in them, destroy
control points, and prevent the enemy frou maneuvering
his son and weapons, are used primarily to con4uct
preparatory fires or a fire onslaught. When nuclear
attack weapons are discovered all maasures are used to
destroy then immediately. The conduct of fire by direct
lay at Individual targets for which even large-caliber
guns are used acquires particular impoatance. (3 p. 39)
With the initiation of the attack, artillery subunits
by mans of concentrated fLre and firing on Individual
object'v'.s continuously support the attacking subunits.
Batter.es Implementing tasks from closed firing positions
transfer firing into the depth In order to disrupt the
fire coordination among them. Installations of PTURSs
and guns chosen for firing point blank transfer their fire
to objectives in neighboring buildings hindering the
forvard movement of attacking subunits. With the
development of the offensive, an artillery battalion
can be enlisted for firing point blank. (0 p. 29)

128
In our opinion, it is advisable to reinforce a company
which attacks usually aloag one street with two or three
tanks, a howitzer battery, mortar platoon, two or three
PTURS (grotivotankov upravlyayyy reaktivnyy snaryn,1;
antitank guided missile), one or two sapper squads, and
two or three chemical specialists, and provide support
with the fire of a battery or rocket artillery. Such an
assault group will be able to create fire superiority
over an enemy reinforced platoon usually defending a
large building, which will allow it to accomplish the
assigned mission after fire preparation and air strikes
and develop the attack without stopping. (5)

An attack against objectives located on the edge of a

city is preceded by preparatory fires delivered by
units under control of the next higher commander or by
fire onslaught. An onslaught will usually be brief but
will involve maximum use of all firepower of the
artillery involved. (3 pp. 38-39)

A battalion acting in the first echelon on a main

avenue of approach may receive for reinforcement an
artillery battalion, a tank company or a battery of
SAU (self-propelled artillery pieces), and a company of
sappers ard may be supported by the fire of an artillcry
battalion.
A battalion acting as an assault detachment can receive
more sapper podrazdeleniye than indicated above and the
artillery in support of its attack will be stronger.
A motorized rifle company crn receive for reinforcement
a tank platoon, an artillery battery, and a sapper
platoon. (3 p. 17)

With this method of attack a strongly fortified city

can be seized by a day or night assault by simultaneous
attacks on flanks and in the rear, as a rule, only after
long preparatory fires. However, the possibility cannot
be excluded that in the interests of gaining surprise
preparatory fires will not be used. Assault detachments
and groups are formed in troop combat formations for
the purpose of storming the city. (3 p. 14)

129
As the attacking uodrazdelansye reach the artillery
safety lUne, fire is shifted to the rear of the enemy
position. After approadhig to within hand grenada range,
motorized rifle godrasdelenive- throwing hand grenades
at the ems, attack objectivois on the forward edge.
At this tims artillery and aviation destroy the enom
located deep within the city and some of the artillery
delivers covering fire against enemy artillery and
mortar batteries and control points. (I p. 40)

The launching of an attack by the subunit Is preceded

by a short but pcverful fire onslaught, during which the
artillery and mortars neutralize and destroy the live
forces and firing means In buildings and strongpoints,
coumnd and observation points, radio and radar stations,
and prevent the maneuver of the enemy by forces and mens.
Por demolishing strong defensive structures and for
crushing the mans of mass destruction, reserves,
artillery, and control points may be used heavy artillery,
rocket artillery, and missiles. A part of the guns and
tanks, which have been moved up as close as possible
to the objective of the attack, by point-blank shooting
neutralizer the firing mane, demolishes defensive
structures, and knocks breaches into the walls of
buildings. (' p. 37)
Preparatory fires for the attack are delivered at the
designated time. During this period sapper podrazdelenive,
under the cover of fire from artillery, mortars, tanks,
and guns designated for firing by direct lay and also
fire of motorized rifle podrazdeleniye, lay passages in
enemy obstacles. However, in the interests of achieving
suddenness of attack there may be no preparatory fires
and this is characteristic of a night attack. In this
case artillery will deliver fire for effect at the start
of the attack. (3 p. 43)

Guns designated for firing by direct lay support

motorized rifle and cank podrazdeleniWe, preventing the
enemy from entering the building or leaving it. (3 p. 44)

The motorized infantry and tanks, moving from cover to

cover, are followed by guns detailed for direct fire.
Firing along the streets, they destroy any targets which
hinder the advance of the infantry and tanks. (l)

130

I\~
When podrazdelenlye approach objectives under attack guts
and tanks on signal of the battalion or company commander
shift fire to the upper floors and to adjacent buildings/
and prevent the approach of enemy reserves. p. 40)

At the signal for the attack or assault motorized rifle

podrazdeleniye, under cover of fire and smoke, will cross
obstacles using the passages which have been laid, reach
the buildings occupied by Lhe enemy which are under attack,
and enter them and destroy the enemy. At this time the
fire from artillery, tanks, and guns desbigated for fire
by direct lay, which is delivered over the heads and from
the flanks of attecking podrazdele4iye, is intensified.
When the attacking podrazdelaniye approach the buildings
artillery pieces and machineguns shift fire to the upper
stories and attics, to adjacent buildings, and to the
gaps between them. (I p. 43)

Success of the actions of an assault group depends largely

on a rapid approach of podrazdeleoiya to the objective
under attack, which in turn is connected with crossing
mine fields. In our opinion, one attached squad of
sappers can mke 1-2 passages. This will allow a company
to occupy favorable positions foi the assault. A second
saFper squad together with heavy artillery can be advan-
tageously used for making breaches in the walls of the
objective being defended. ()

Artillery in a city carries out most of its mission.i by

firing by direct lay. Therefore, more artillery than
under ordinary conditions, including heavy artillery
system, is attached to companies and platoons and is u;,.d
by platoon and by gun directly in strongpoints for
delivery of fire by direct lay. Every gun in a strong-
point, as is the case for a tank, has two or three
positions and routes of movement to them.
Artillery and mortars which remain under the direct
control or the battalion commander deliver fire from
covered firing positions. Mortars of al1 calibers find
highly effective employment in a city. They are able
to deliver fire at an enemy located behind cover,
buildings, fences, and walls. (3 pp. 56-57)

The firing positions of tanks, guns, and armored

personnel carriers are selected in corner buildings,
in structures standing alone, and behind masonry fences.
Door and window openings are used for firing and
embrasures are made in walls. (3 p. 54)

131

ILL
 Artillery and mnortars dalivering fIre froa covered
fUrin8 positions are located in yards, vegetable and
other gardens, on squares, and In stadius. (I p. 54)

It is advisable to locate fire positioms as close as

possible to the notoriaed-tifle subunit in wide yards,
parks, on squares and between buildings. With this they
should rake it possible to conduct fire with significant
variances from the assanpd basic direction, and have
good approach routes. p. 108)

The fire of artillery and mortars frou covered positions

is arranged in light of possibilities for destroying the
euimy on the distant approaches to the city, on the near
approaches to it, in front of the forward edge of the
defensive area, and also deep within the city. Sectors
for Lire concentrations are designated so as to destroy
the naem on all routes and lines, including enemy
positions behind shelters, buildings, fences, and walls.
The fire of mortars is eztensively used for this purpose.
Positions for firing by direct lay in case of enemy
breakthrough Into the city are prepared for an artillery
battery in addition to Its covered positions. (1 p. 65)

The advancing enem is destroyed at the approaches

to a stronupoint by the use of all weapons In coordination
with the neighbors and with artillery and mortar fire
from covered positions, by air strikes and demolition
of mined obstacles. If In separate areas the enemy
nages to penetrate the defences and to capture several
buildings or a strougpoint, the commnders of subunits
stop him by well-organized fire. Artillery and mortar
fire prevents the enemy reserves from being brought up
and Isolates the subunits which have penetrated the
defences. (6)

As a rule, counterattacks are supported by artillery

and mortar fire as well as by the tanks operating
directly in the subunits' battle formations. (6)

7. Soviet Guidelines for the Employment of Aviation and Anti-

aircraft Forces

As in U.S. Field Manuals there is little written in Soviet

open literature on the employment of flied wing, c'ose support aviation

132
* in urban warfare. There are obvdously limitationa on the employment
of high performance aircraft against posltions where FEBAs * re
obscure and irregular and where a singi. building may be occupied by
opposing forces for an extended period. Precision guided intuitions
will provide a greater capability to fixed wing aircraft in city
warfare but many of the limitations and operational restrictions will
remain. The Soviets do emphasize the use of aviation in counter air,
interdiction, reconnaissance, and artillery spotting role* and there
are citations of the flexibility and effectivenas3 of heliborne and
helicopter supply operations. The guidelines imply that antiaircraft
units are retained under centralized control. The principal missions
assigned in defense are to protect defensive forces from low-flylng
aircraft and helicopters although they are also used in a direct
fire role in support of infantry units. In the attack, antiaircraft
weapons are employed principally to prevent air resupply of besieged
forces within a city.

Aviation in fighting for a city I.; also used in accord-

ance with the plans of senior commanders. Depending on
its intended purpose it will be used to carry out varying
missions. Reconnaissance aviation takes aerial photos
of sites which are designated for destruction. Tt is also
used to adjust the fire of artillery and mortars firing
from c-overed firing positions and to keep track of
approach by the enemy from the rear and the actions and
dispiositions of his troop units. Fighter-bomber aviation
during preparatory fires suppresses the enemy occupying
defenses in especially strong buildings; delivers strikes
at his reserves; destroys his nuclear attack weapons,
control points, and rear service facilities; and combats
enemy aviation, preventing it from approaching the
city. (S p. 22)

During this period (preparatory fires) aviation suppresses

the enemy in strongpoints set up in especially solid
buildings or other structures located on the edge of the
city as well as within it. It destroys them: suppresses

Forward Edge of the Battle Area

133

/
reserves, artillery, end ene control points; destroys
nuclear attack wempone; protects advamncn Piotre e~n.e
(rp.t enem air strikes; sad adjusu artillery fire.
p-39)
Aviation delivers bomb stries at matn groups of enemy
forces attacking the city, at his nuclear attack wepons
end other weapons of smss destruction, and at 8goups
of artillery and forces trying to bypass or encircle the
city. Aviation is also used to cover defending troops
mnd the city itself against the air enamy by delivering
strikes against his aviation at airfields and In the
air. (I p. 57)

The advancing enemy ts destroyed at the approaches to

a strongpoint by the use of all weapons In coordination
with the neighbors and with artillery end mortar fire
from covered positions, by air strikes and demlition
of mined obstacles. If in separata areas the enemy
manages to penetrate the defences and to capture several
buildings or a strongpoint, the commanders of subunits
stop his by well-organized fire. Artillery and mortar
fire prevents the enemy reserves from being broght up
and isolates the subunits which have penetrated the
defences. (6)
As the attacking podrazdeleniye reach the artillery
safety line, fire is shifted to the rear of the enemy
position. After approaching to within hand grenade range,
motorized rifle podrazdelenive throwing hand grenades
at the enemy, attack objectives on the forward edge.
At this tim artillery and aviation destroy the enemy
located deep within the city and som of the artillery
delivers covering fire against enemy artillery and mortar
batteries and control points. (3 p. 40)

For the purpose of assisting advance chast_ in rapid

seizure of a city and important objectives along the
routes leading from the city to the rear, extensive use
will be msAe of tactical airborne assaults up to a
reinforced motorized rifle battalon in strength dropped
In the enemy rear by helicopter. (' p. 13)
Successful use can be made of helicopters In defense
of a city for delivering needed cargo to garrisons which
are defending the city or sites in it and which are
caught in enemy encirclement or are isolated from friendly
forces. (s pp. 57-58)

13
134\
 I-.

The senior codunder will use PVO (antlairctraft)

weapons to prevent delivery of materiel to the
surrounded enemy or evacuation of the garrison from
the city. This creates more favorable conditions for
seizing the city since the m ., not getting help from
outside, will not be able to offer resistance for an
extended period and will be forced to lay down his
arms. An example of this to provided by the liquidation
of fascist German forces at Stalingrad. The surrounded
forces, which had been cut into several places by the
attacking troops of the Twenty-First Army In conjunction
with the Sixty-Second Army, were forced to capitulate
at the end of oneweek. (' p. 14)

The antiaircraft weapons of a battalion are used mainly

to cover the artillery firing positions and the command-
observation post against low-flying enemy airplanes and
helicopters. In sown cases they can be used to suppress
enemy weapons located on the upper floors and in attics.
Firing positions are usually selected in public and other
gardens end on the roofs of buildings. (3 pp. 21-22)

Antiaircraft defense. Bly their fire antiaircraft

weapons block the enemy from approaching a garrison
under attack by air. During the course of the attack
antiaircraft podrazdelenlye attached to the battalion are
limed for immediate protection of it. In the battalion
weapons are assigned from the second echelon or reserve
for the purpose of combating low-flying enemy airplanes.
Antiaircraft podrazdelenlye are located in squares, public
gardens, and parks and some of then on the roofs of
buildings. Designation of front lines for friendly
podrazdeleniye is organized especially thoroughly.
C p. 35)

8. Soviet Guidelines for Armor and Antitank Forces

As stipulated for artillery, the Soviets prescribe attachwmnt

of tank units and even individual tanks down to rifle platoon level.
They do however prescribe in the following guidelines that the platoon
is the basic unit of combat for armor forces. Soviet tacticians
emphasize the need for operating in tank-infantry teams with the two

135
ars mutually supporting. These Soviet guidelines envasion armor as
providing the speed and fire power required for an attack "on the mow"
that carries through and into the depths of a city to @size Important
objectives. Tanks provide direct fire, vwel breaching and obstacle
destruct - capabilities in both attack and defense. Mine renoval
drap are aed to clear passages of enemy mines. In accordance with
the guidelines provided by one Soviet author, antitank forces .n the
defense are retained under the direct control of the infantry battalion
comander. The first priority in defense against a tank is given to
the separation of enmy infantry from tanks to permit antitank units
to close with the enea. This procedure would appear to be less a
tactical essential given introduction into the Scviet arsenal of the
long range and highly accurate 5agger wire guided antitank missile.
Nowhere in these guidelines is there a reference to the utility of
helicopters as antitank weapons. The guidelines are quite explicit
in detailing the manner in which tank ambushes are to be conducted
which appears to indicate a Soviet emphasis.

Tank Modrazdeleniie, as a rule, are attached to motorized

rifle companies and platoons and operate in their combat
formations. They fire by direct lay to clear the path
for motorized rifle podrazdelenie. They can be included
in assault groups and groups for destroying nuclear
charges. Usually the platoon is the least subdivision
of tank podrazdeleniye. Swever, the possibility of
separate tank acting with motorized rifle platoons and
squads cannot be precluded. Experience gained in battle
shows during the course of an attack In a city a sound
tactic is to employ a tank platoon wedge formation where-
in one tank or SAU moves down the center of a street and
other tanks or SAU move behind it at some distance on
the right or left side of the street, providin; mutual
fire support. A squad of a motorized rfle platoon moves
behind each tank, protected by the armor. In this case

For a discussion of the combat effectiveness of this AT missile see

Adelphi Paper number one hundred and eleven; Elizabeth Monroe and A.B.
Farrar-Hockley The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973 Background and Events,
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Winter
1974-75, pp. 33-34.

136
tanks, covering one another by fire, can successfully
hit weapons in strong implacements, remve barricades
and rubble, and destroy anemy tanks and armor personnel
carrierm. Motorized rifleman can effectively combat enemy
close-coubat weapons and thereby support the tanks in
successfully carrying out a mission. (I pp. 19-20)

Attached to a motorized-rifle battalion attacking In

a city along several parallUl streets for reinforcement
my be an artillery division and sometimes, in addition,
a battery of antitank artillery. The attached artillery
battalion is used for firing not only from the covered,
but also from the open firing positions. Batteries are
usually distributed for support of the companies In
the first echelon, and one of them is left at the
disposal of the battalion commnder. Battalion artillery
and a tank-destroyer battery also operate with companies
of the first echelon.
It cannot be excluded that a motorized-rifle battalion
will be reinforced by only a subunit of antitank artillery.
In this case, its actions, as a rule, will be supported
by an artillery battalion. (' p. 28)

In attacking a city enemy tanks will operate primarily

along streets, on squares, and in sectors which have not
been built up. Therefore, most antitank weapons will be
concentrated on the main tank-dangerous routes. The
positions of tanks and antitank Rins must be selected
so that they will be able to cove r by fire streets,
intersections, squares, and parks with flanking and
interlocking fire.
The fire of tanks and guns is reinforced by the fire V
of antitank grenade launchers and by hand grenades,
capable use of which under the conditions prevailing
in a city acquires exceptional importance in combating
enemy tanks successfully.
The positions of antitank guns are set up in masonry
and reinforced concrete structures and behind stone fences
in which embrasures are formed for delivering fire and
observing. Every position of a tank, gun, or antitank
grenade launcher is covered by fire from adjacent
positions and the fire of motorized rifle podrazdelenive.
(3 p. 65)

137
 /

In connection with the fact that during fighting in a

city, mneuver, vision, and firing are limited for tanks
and also that orisntation is hindered, they operate as
accompanying ms directly in comat formatious of the
motorized-rifle submit, and in close coordination
with the submits of the other types of troops. (7 p. 38)

A motorized rifle battalion assigned as an assault

detachment is reinforced with artillery, tanks, and
Sappers. (s)
In our opinion, it is advisabl* to reinforce a company
which attacks usually along one street with two or
three tanks, a howitzer battery, mortar platoon, two or
three PTURS (protivotankovyy upravlyayenyy reaktiw
MuZn antitak guided missile), one or two sapper
squads, and two or three chemical specialists, and provide
support with the fire of a battery or rocket artillery.

Preparatory fires for the attack are delivered at the

designated time. During this period sapper
podrasdelnlnye, under the cover of fire from artillery
mortars, tanks, and guns designated for firing by
direct lay and also firn of motorized rifle
pndraelLaniy*E lay passages in enemy obstacles. (s p. 43)

Thi attached tanks usually operate in motorized

infantry battle formations and, firing on the move,
destroy the enemy fire weapons. ()

Tanks usually advance together with motorized rifle

podrazdelanive Ln their forumtions and, delivering
fire on the move, destroy enemy vwe&ons hindering
forward movement of the infantry. (I p. 40)

In those cases when the enemy offers weak resistance

along a street, tanks with infantry mounted on then or
infantry in armored persotnel carriers and trucks move
along the street at a great speed, delivering fire on
the move. They reach important objectives in this
way and seize them from the march. (3 p. 40).

If the enemy offers weak resistance the tank-borne

motorized infantryman approach the most important
objectives at high speed and capture then on the nove.

138

/ K
The motorized infantry and tanks, moving from cover
to cover, are followed by Suns detailed for direct
fire. Flurng along the streets, they destroy any
targets which hinder the advance of the infantry
and tanks. (1)

At the signal for the attack or assault motorized

rifle podrasdeleniye, under cover of fire and smoke,
will cross obstacles using the peasages which have been
laid, reach the buildings occupied by the enemy which
are under attack, and enter then and destroy the enemy.
At this times the fire froa artillery, tanks, and guns
designated for fire by direct lay, which is delivered
over the heads and from the flanks of attacking
podrazdeleniye, it intensified.
When the attacking podrazdeleniYe approach the buildings
artillery pieces and machineguns shift fire to the upper
stories and attics, to adjacent buildings, and to the
saps between them. (3 p. 43)
When podrazdeleniye approach objectives under attack
guns and tanks on signal of the battalion or company
commander shift fire to the upper floors and to
adjacent buildings and prevent the approach of enemy
reserves. (3 p. 40)

Tanks equipped vith antimine drags act together with

sappers and lay passages In enemy mined obstacles.
Motorized rifle and sapper podrazdeleniye designated for
Imediate assault move behind them. The tanks, delivering
fire at embrasures or windows of a structare under attack,
appreach it and cover the attacking motorized riflemen
and sappers with their fire and armor. (3 pp. 43-44)

In organizing a system of antitank fire a battalion

commander provides for: repulsing mass enemy tank
attacks in front of the forward edge and destroying tanks
which enter the city; concentrating fire along streets,
squares, parks, gardens, and other sectors where enemy
tanks might move; providing an all-around defense of
sites and areas of the battalion an a whole; maneuver
by antitank weapons from one avenue of approach to
another; and cover of antitank and other obstacles by
antitank weapons. (3 p. 64)

139
Antitank podragdelenite remaining under the direct
control of the motorised rifle battalion commander
prepare firing positions In places from which they
can deliver fire along wide and long streets, main
arteries, squares, and ezpected routes of attack of
the esan main forces. (I p. 57)

Combat action In a city, as a rule, is conducted at

close range and therefore the weapons of motorized rifle
uodradelaneie- such as machineguns, submechineguns,
grenade launchers, and hand grenades will play an
Important role In inflicting damage on the enemy.
In a city where maneuver and fire of tanks are limited,
a large role will be played by manually operated
antitank grenade launchers, hand grenades, and recoilless
guns in the fight against enemy tanks. (3 p. 56)

To beat off the attack the subrults first of all cut off
the Infantry from the tanks and destroy it. Separate
tanks which have broken through into the town without
infantry are destroyed with antitank weapons at short
range. (6)
In repulning the enemy attack the Infantry should be cut
off from the tanks and destroyed first since separate
tanks or groups of tanks which break Into the city with-
out Infantry can be rapidly destroyed by antitank
weapons at short range. In this event the strength of
the battalion defensive position will not be impaired.
(S p. 73)

Ambushes of motorized infantry and tank subunits

open fire when the enemy approaches at a short
distance. By surprise fire they destroy his tanks
and infantry, preventing then from advancing deep
into the defences. After the fulfillment of their
mission the tanks and infantry detailed for ambush
take up other positions and are assigned new combat
missions. (6)

Tanks which are attached to a motorized rifle battalion

.rexused by platoon and by crew for operations from
ambush or they are attached to companies and platoons
to reinforce the antitank defense. In strongpoints
tanks operate as mobile or immobile weapons. One primary
and one or two reserve positions and routes for

140
movement to them are prepared for every tank.
Tank ambushes in a motorized rifle battalion may
consist of a crew or a platoon. An ambush in prepared
on a tank-dangerous approach in a well-camouflaged
position. The position is prepared in a gap between
strongpoints, behind one, or on a flank of the
battalion defensive area, as a r4le, at a street
intersection or square wherr beveral streets converge
and in buildings located on a main artery. (s p. 56)

The firing positions of tanks, guns, and armored

pc-sonnel carriers are selected in corner buildings,
in structures stmnding alone, and behind masonry
fences. Door and window openings are used for firing
and embrasures are made in walls. (S p. 54)

To support a perimeter defense of a site, strongpoint,

or the defensive area as a whole the system of fire is
so organized that all streets, intersections, gaps
between buildings, entrances to squares and also parks
and public gardens, the approaches to bridges and over-
passes, and the approaches to water obstacles are kept
under flanking and interlocking multilayer fire and
also concentrated fire of mortars and artillery
located in covered firing positions. Particular
attention Is devoted to the organization of antitank
fire since it will be possible to deliver fire at enemy
tanks in the city itself only for a very limited time.
(' p. 54)
As a rule, counterattacks are supported by artillery
and mortar fire as well as by the tanks operating
directly in the subunits' battle formations. (6)

Extensive use is made of ambushes along routes of

probable enemy forward movement to deliver fire at his
tanks and armored personnel carriers. Even individual
soldiers armed with antitank hand grenades and antitank
grenade launchers can inflict significant losses on
enemy tanks and armored personnel carrip-s moving
along city streets which hamper maneuver. (3 p. 54)

Men in tank and motorized rifle ambushes do not open fire

at the enemy before he approaches the ambushes. When
the enemy gets close to them they destroy tanks and

141
 infantry by opening fire suddenly, preventing the enemy
fromi amking further progress within the defensive
position. After they have completed their mission
the tanks and motorised riflman desixnated for
ambush occupy other positions and receive a
mission. (I p. 74)

9. Soviet Guidelines foi Simul Comunications

The guidelines describe the difficulties of communicating

by radio in the urban environ t to irclude problems of interference
and reduced ranges. Wire to include mIncipal systems is advocated
as an alternative with the caution that it ptrqvides problems of
security.

Conditions prevqiling in a city complicate the control

of podraedeleniye in imbat. LimitdtiOns on fields of
observation, the shielding effects of structures on radio
communication, and the difficulty of coordinating the
activity of units in strongpoints when there is extensive
destruction and rubble oblige coneanders to seek the most
reliable methods of effecring control and commication.
It is advisable to mask extensive use of signal systems
and use mmicipal underground cable networks for wire
communication and other means of conmmication existing
in the city. However, in this caoe it is necessary
to take measures to prevent the possibility of enemy
intercept of conversations. (S p. 55)

The radios in podrazdeleniye can best be locAted on the

upper floors of buildings and other etructures and
extensive use should be made of remote control of radio
equipment. If because of the prevailing situation they
must be kept in the lower stories, then a VCh (high
frequency) cable 10--15 m long is connected to an
antenna which is deployed on the roof of a building.
In an attack in a city the rt,-ber of R-105 and R-114
radios must be increased foi podrazdeleniye assigred to
conduct reconnaissance and also to support communication
for coordination between motorized rifle companies and
tank podrazdeleniye.

142

This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy
 The battalion comander effects amtrol of artillery
fire by personally assigning misslons to the coimmnders
of artillery podrazdeleniye. This can be achieved by
collocating their conand-observetion posts.
Extensive use is made of dobile mans of communications
such as armored personnel carriers and tanks, foot
mssengers, and lights and other signmas. (3 p. 38)

Under these conditions prcvailing in a city the

effective range of ultrashortwave radios is reduced since
the buildings and other structures in the city shield
and absorb Lhe radio waves. To control podrazdeleniye
in combat use will be made most frequently of portable
radios since the opportunity to move armored personnel
carriers with the radios mounted on thea wirl be very
limited in a city.
During combat in the city it will be necessary to us'
the bypass communication frequencies of attached
and supporting po[razdeleniye, especially artillery.
(' p. 37)

Missions to seize and fortify important locations in the

city, as a rule, are assigned by radio and from the
spot where the battalion comander will control the
podrazdeleniye in combat. (3 p. 61)

10. Soviet Guidelines for Reconnaissance Forces

The responsibility for continuous reconnaissince in Soviet

tactical units is extremely general from the division to the small unit
commander and individual soldier. The following gaidelines reflect this
broad spectrum. There are several types of reconnaissance identified
as providing information about the enemy, the terrain and objective
area to include combat patrol; reconnaissance groups, engineer,
radiation, chemical, bacterirlogical and officer reconnaissance. Foot
patrols are given priority in urban warfare; however observation and
listening posts are included in thia category. Reconnaissance forces
are, as with other tactical units, task organized and may include
infantry, artillery, engineer and chemical personnel. While cities

143
restrict loeg range visibility, the Soviet vriters indicate that
they also provide concealmnt for reconnaissance into en. positions.

Reconnaissance is organized in timely fashion, beginning

with receipt of the combat mission. Information about
the nature of the city, the system of defense, enemy
strength, system of fire, the existence of artificial
and natural obstacles and underground structures
and advantageous approache to objectives under attack
is obtained by studying information available at the next
higher staff, reference books, aerial photographs,
descriptions, large-scale maps and plans, observation,
search, ambush, combat, combat reconaissance pat1ols,
reconnaissance groups, and aniner, radiation, chemcal,
and officer reconnaissance ("p. 33)

Reconnaissance by observation is, as a rule, conducted

with an extremely limited view along the front and in
the depth. Observers of the subunits are assigned not
sectors, but Individual objectives (a house or part of
it, ruins, etc.). Observation points are selected with
such calculation that the scout has visual commication
with the comander of the subunit.
Posts are placed fatnly in the cembat formations of the
subunit as wall as in places securing a good view not
only of the adjacent streets, but also roofs of houses
and upper stories. With this, personnel must be well
camouflaged and reliably covered. Such places might be
high nultistoried buildings, garrets, breaches in
walls or roofs, stone fences into which holes are made
beforehand, destroyed buildings, and camouflaged tanks.

It is necessary to arrange posts so that they are exposed

as least as possible to danger from crumbling buildings
and so that personnel are constantly defended from
artillery and mortar fire. Therefore, it is not always
advantageous to place scouts on factory chimeys,
church towers, and water towers, since, being good
landmarks, they will be destroyed In the first instance.
For the equipping of a post, one must not forget about
the arrangement of an emergency exit and overhead cover
and walls reinforced by bricks and sandbags. Windows
and openings, which are not used by scouts, are stuffed
by these same materials. For implementation of the
mission, personnel are equipped with the periscope of

144
This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy
 a scout, and binoculars and other Instruments permittti1,
observation from the interior of a building or from
behind she2ter. (11 p. 24)

Preparing for reconnaissance in a city, it is necessary

beforehand to study the width and pattern of the streets
and the location of squares, gardens and public gardens,
residential, public, and industrial buildings, and
underground communication structures. For this are uoed
a large-scale map, a city plan, and aerl photographs.
The basic methods of reconnaissance, as also under
ordinary conditions, ate: observation, raid, ambush,
reconnai&sance in f 2 rce, officer reconnaissance, and
the activity of BRD and RG . (" p. 24)

The defenders achieve the complete rout of the enemy by

daring and surprise counterattacks at his flank and
rear. The subunits advance unnoticed to the deployment
lines, mainly by underground passages and communication
trenches. Because of the limited field of sight in a
town and the complication of the situation in the arva
of the enemy penetration, a reconnaissance and security
elements are sent out in front of the subunits advancing
for the counterattack. The counterattacking subunits'
fighting for big buildings frequently assumes the nature
of an assault. Therefore the second echelon subunits
must be able to act as assault groups. (6)

At the beginning of the fighting for the city, the RC,

operate in the combat formationsi of the assalilt derach-
ments and groups. After the taking of the strongpoints;
(centers of resistance) on the outskirts of the city,
they, using the breaks in the combat formations or
poorly defended streets, gardenu, and public gardens,
penetrate into the depth of the enemy's defense and
proceed in their own directions. Then the groups
advance along the streets. If they are sufficiently
wide that tanks move on both sides, and in the middle
on narrow streets. (13 pp. 25-26)

In addition to information obtained by the senior

commander's intelligence, each podrazdeleniye commandhr
must take all steps for continuous and active collection

BRD combat reconnaissance patrol; RG - reconnaissance group

145
 of supplement and new Infomttio. ec*imaissance
patrols and patrol vehicles can be sent out for this
purpose.- (5)
Most frequently combat recoanaiesamce patrols in a city
smo on foot. This pemits them to use concealed
route to reach the eaney's rear, using undargroud
structes. Saps In buildings and fences, etc. It is
advisable to Include artillerymen, sappers, and
chemical specialists in rteoaisnssce patrols for the
purpose of obtaIning more comlete informtion about
the aeW and the nature of objectives deep within
the ensTy's defensive position. (1 p. 34)

Reconnaismance in force Us conducted in a 1ity more

often th in other conditlons since possibilities
to procure Infomation by other methods are far less.
For participation in it, it is advisable to assipa
a motorized-rifle subunit consisting of a reinforced
platoon to a company, and sometimes up to a battalion.
They are reinforced by antitank grenades, tanks, and
artillery Sums for point-blank firing. In ordinary
conditions, It is preceded by preparatory fire, but in
a city it my not be. Sometimes, a quick dash of the
subunit from its initial position leads to a complete
surprise and a wel-tlmd detection of the enemy's
system of defense. (13 p. 25)

Great significance during the course of combat Li the

city is aazuired by coprehensive support of combat
action, especially the conduct of active, deep, and
continuous recomnaissance. Reconnaissance =uet be
conducted by commdars at all levels as well as by
Individual soldiers. Observation and reconmaissance
by fire are organized continuously and combat
recounnaissce patrols and patrol vehicles are sent
out. This makes it possible for a comder to be ready
to take appropriate action with any change in the
situation. (1 p. 42)

It is advlable~to apportion not less than three oj

four tanks (BTR ) in the composition of a PC (3WR)
Advancing in pairs, they provide fire for each other.
('s p. 25)

BTR - armored carrier; PG - reconnaissance group; BRD - combat

reconnaissance patrol

146

This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy
An a rule., information from reconnaissance in a
battalion is obtained by obaervation, listening, aal,.his.
receipt of data from adjacent units and higher staffs,
from interrogation of prisoners and refugee, questioning
of local inhabitants, and study of seized documents and
trophies. Furthermore, a search my be conducted in
the battalion on decision of the next higher commander.
Reconnaissance is conducted with the start of an enemy
attack by a combat reconnaissance patrol, patrol vehicles,
and also reconnaissance by fire when a battalion has
reverted to the defense while in direct contact with the
enemy and with the start of occupation of the defensive
position when not in contact with the enemy. (3 p. 67)

On a destroyed street, it is more advantageous to place

scouts not in surviving buildings, but among the ruins.
(13 p. 24)

Structures in a city limit reconnaissance by

observation and equipment. At the same time the
closed nature of the terrain in a city and the
network of underground routes of comunication create
favorable conditions for dispatch of our reconnaissance
deep within enemy combat formations. But enemy
reconnaissance also will try to use covered approaches
and underground routes of communication in a city for
the purpose of penetrating to our rear. Therefore, the
battalion commander must take account of and provide
for security and observation over possible routes of
penetration by enemy scouts and sabotage groups.
In reverting to the defense while in direct contact
with the enemy a battalion commander begins to devote
attention to the problems of reconnaissance while hl
is fortifying his lines. He assigns additional miu.ionu
to reconnaissance and directs it along lines of defensive
combat. In all cases podrazdeleniye commanders are
told: reconnaissance missions prior to the beginning
of the enemy attack and when he reverts to the attack,
forces for the conduct of reconnaissance, the beginning
of reconnaissance action, and periods and procedures
for submitting reports. (3 p. 67)

147
In defeameof a city coeeat recounaissance patrols
on emaoed pereeoml carriere my be seat out to
recommoter the am" and locations os the approaches
to the city. Directly In a city it I best to conduct
ar-cisemace on foot using groups ismalr In size
then ude ordinary field conditions. A foot patrol
under conditions prevailfng In a city is ahis to
penetrate everywhere. By using surfsce and amdar-
groud routes of commaiAtion it usually suffers fewer
losses end is abl, to reconnoiter amy objective, routs,
oa sector of the city. (1 pp. 67-8)

Radiation ad chemical reconaissance in a battalion

is conducted by obeerveti organie- d, as a rule, at
the comden-6r-o-eer,-tion poet of the battalion, combat
reconaisence patrols which Include attached chemical
troops, ad chemical reconnaissmce patrols. (1 p. 68)

Hany masures are taken to orgenis protection against

weapons of mass destruction. A depedable system for
werning the garrisons Lu strongpoints employing al
sues of comm.ication is established, and continuous
radiation, chemical, and bacteriological recounaissance
is conducted within the city. Provisions are made for
more coqplata use for protection of personnel of strong
underground structures ad basemts and in case of need
they are reinforced. Particular attention is devoted
to protection for sources of water and safeguarding them
against bacteriological contaminatioa as well as strict
observance in strongpoints ad In a battalion defensive
area " a whole of rules governing s-ultatiot and hygiene.
Measures are taken to eliminate the consequences of
orployment by the enemy of weapons of mss" destruction
and measures are proecribed for putting out fires and
carrying out seergency rescue work. Perso-nel are
categorically forbidden from using food, alcoholic
bewraSes, and other things seized from the enemy or
left by him ad also water from any source without a
preliminary test by medical workers. Particular
attention is devoted to checking the quality of food
and water before consuming them. (a p. 68)

It is moot advisable to arrange ambushes on the outskirts

of the city, at street crossings and the exits of buildings,
and somatimes in the buildings, thmselves, mainly on
the first floor. It is also advantageous to organize

148 This Document

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy
them at water fountains, at exits from undtrground
city tcolmicationo, on the mawition and food ouppl.
route, ot the enem and the advancement routes ot
his observers and listening group for Impementing
misaions at night. When an ambush is arranged on the
outskirts of the city or at the street crossings,
personnel 8sa3gned to the attack should be posted
outside of the buildings (structures), and the scouts
and combat vehicles for protecting the attackers may
be left in buildings or behind various types of cover.
The experience of the Groat Patriotic War indicates that
most successful in ambush acted reconnaissance group-
of force not larger than a section (otdeleniya), which
set up ambushes in the depth of the enesy's combat
formation and where his vigilance, as a rule, is
loy. (13 p. 25)

This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

149
 This Document
Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

FOOTNOTES

I Colonel V. Petrukhin, "Battle in a Town," Soviet Militar Review, No. 5,

pp. 10-12 (May 1974).
2 General Major V.G. Reznichenko, ed., Taktika (Tactics) (Moscow:'
Voyenizdat, 1966), translated by USAF System Command, Foreign Tech-
nology Division, 1967 (FTD-MT-67-35).
3 General Major A.K. Shovkolovich, Colonel F.I. Konasov, and Colonel 5.1.
Tkach, Boyevyye deystviya motostrelsovoto batal'ona v lorode (Combat
Activity of a Motorized-Rifle Battalion in a City) (Moscow: Voyenlzdat,
1971), translated by Joint Publications Research Service for Army Chief
of Staff for Intelligence (No. JPRS-55386, No. ACSI K-1400).
Colonel 1. Vorob'yev, "Combat Action in a City," Voyennyy Vestnik, 14,. 4
(April 1972).
Colonel A. Dorofeyev, "Combat in a Large City," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 3,
pp. 39-44 (March 1970).
6 Colonel V. Petrukhin, "Defence in a Town," Soviet Military Review, No. 8,
pp. 24-25 (August 1974).
7 Guards General Major L. Kuznetsov, "hoe Offensive in a City," Voyennyy
Vestnik, No. 8, pp. 36-39 (August 1969).
Colonel S. rhidarev, "Artillery Fights an Action in a City," Voyenny Vestiii.
No. 9, pp. 28-31 (September 1971).
1 Junior Sergeant V. Davydak, "In the Staff of an assault Group," Starshina i
Serzhant, No. 6, p. 8 (June 1973).
10 General Major of Engineering Troops R. Stepanov, "Engineering Support
for an Offensive in a City," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, pp. 93-96 (June 1970).
i Colonel V. Odnoletkov and Colonel M. Pankov, "Activity of a Mortar Battety
in a City," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, pp. 108-111 (June 1970).
"12 General Major of Technical Troops (Retired) A. Babushkin, "Flame Throwek!;
on the Streets of Blidapest," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, pp. 66-68 (June 19701i.
13 General Major P. Savinskiy, "Reconnaissance for an Offensive in a City,"
Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 4, pp. 23-26 (April 1969).
"14 Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Magayev, "The Offensive in a Large City,"
Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 3, pp. 25-29 (August 1972).
I General of the Army A.I. Radziyevskiy, Taktika v boyevykh prlmerakki.
Polk. (Tactics in Combat Examples. The Regiment.) (Moscow: Voyeni-
zdat, 1974).
16 "Combat Activities in a City," Starshina i Serzhant, No. 6, p. 1 (June
1972).

. P P lk 151