Avenging terror

IN a prescient statement to the UN Security Council on Feb 13, Pakistans permanent representative, after
describing the actions taken to restrain terrorism in Pakistan, asserted: What Pakistan continues to face today are
externally supported terrorists. As if on cue, successive terrorist attacks occurred in Lahore, Peshawar and
Sehwan over the next three days.

Immediately after the atrocity at the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, the ISPR spokesman said:
Recent terrorist acts are being executed on directions from hostile powers and from sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
We shall defend and respond. The army chief himself declared: Each drop of the nations blood shall be
revenged ... immediately. No more restraint for anyone.

It is not always easy to avenge terror, or eliminate it, since the terrorists are often unknown or in hiding. This is
not so in case of the recent terror strikes in Pakistan. We know the terrorists. The attacks have been claimed by the
militant Islamic State group and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistans subsidiary, Jamaatul Ahrar. We know where they
are based: in sanctuaries in Afghanistan adjacent to Pakistans border. We know the hostile powers that have
sponsored these attacks: the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan and India.

Revenge is serious business. It must be exacted after cold calculation of the options, their effectiveness and
probable consequences.

The sponsors of the terror war against Pakistan cannot be allowed impunity.

As a first step, the Torkham border crossing has been closed. This will punish the Afghan regime economically.
But it may not punish the terrorists or their sponsors directly, nor meaningfully restrain their cross-border
movement.

This will require full implementation of the plan to seal the border with selective fencing, check posts and
technological means to monitor cross-border infiltration. Adequate funds must be allocated to implement this plan
expeditiously.

The speedy repatriation of the millions of Afghan refugees is another component of defensive measures. Many
terrorists are hiding in plain sight among the refugees. Repatriation has been slowed by UN appeals and by some
Pakistani agencies on the refugee gravy train. Their resistance must be overcome. People or groups associated
with militant movements and drugs and criminal mafias and the relatives of hostile Afghan leaders should be
expelled forthwith.

GHQ has initiated a more direct response by demanding from the Afghan representatives in Islamabad that they
take action against or hand over 76 identified terrorists who have been provided sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The
demand made to Kabul was also conveyed to the US commander of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, since they
exercise dominant influence over the Afghan regime and especially the Afghan intelligence agency, which is the
main local sponsor of the anti-Pakistan terrorists. American whining about the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani
network should not be entertained until the US obliges its Kabul clients to take action against the TTP and IS
terrorists targeting Pakistan.

Sartaj Azizs phone call to the Afghan national security adviser to urge cooperation against the common threat of
terrorism is unlikely to produce any result and may have detracted from the more robust message conveyed by
GHQ to the Afghans. Pakistans counterterrorism cooperation with Kabul and the coalition to stabilise
Afghanistan should be made conditional on their acting against the anti-Pakistan terrorists operating from Afghan
territory.

Following the Foreign Office protest after the Lahore Mall atrocity, the Afghan charge daffaires in Islamabad
reportedly argued that the Kabul authorities could not be held accountable since there are large areas of Afghan
territory that are outside its control. If this is indeed the case, and the Afghan National Army and the US-led
coalition forces cannot act against the TTP and IS safe havens, Pakistans forces should be allowed to cross over
and eliminate them. Most of these safe havens are within striking distance of the Pakistan-Afghan border.

If Kabul and the US refuse to act, or to facilitate a Pakistani operation, Pakistan may be left with no option but to
take unilateral action against these safe havens and the terrorists hiding there. Other countries, like Iran or Turkey,
would not hesitate to resort to such action if targeted by foreign-based terrorists. India is unlikely to use this as a
pretext for cross-LoC strikes, given its vulnerability in held Kashmir.

The sponsors of the terror war against Pakistan the Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies cannot be
allowed impunity. With the evidence in its hands, Pakistan can move the relevant UN Security Council bodies to
have both these agencies declared sponsors of terrorism. At the very least, Pakistan should move the UN to
conduct an impartial investigation into the role of these agencies in supporting the IS-linked TTP and its
associates, as well as the Baloch insurgents. Pakistans agencies should no longer hesitate to reveal their sources
in establishing the sponsorship of terrorism by the Afghan and Indian agencies.
Nor can India be allowed to attack Pakistan with impunity in the west through Afghanistan. Pakistan should not
foreclose the option of extending moral and material support to the ongoing indigenous Kashmiri freedom
struggle. This struggle cannot be equated with terrorism; it is a legitimate movement for self-determination and
implementation of UN Security Council resolutions. Pakistans support to the Kashmiri struggle is now both a
political and moral responsibility and a strategic compulsion.

Threats and blandishments from India or its American friends cannot deflect Pakistan from protecting and
promoting its own interests, objectives and security. An equitable peace with India whether in the West or the
East can be negotiated only if Pakistan displays courage and determination.

Everything must be done to avoid US sanctions. But many of the penalties entailed by sanctions have been
already imposed against Pakistan, such as the halt in US military assistance and blockage of the so-called
Coalition Support Funds. Unless Pakistan changes the equation, the price for restoring American largesse will be
acceptance of the Indian-US agenda in South Asia. In the past, when under US sanctions, Pakistan has mobilised
nationally to achieve its strategic goals, such as its nuclear and missile capabilities. These capabilities are its
ultimate defence against external blackmail and aggression today. Pakistans leaders and its people must again rise
to face the strategic challenges the nation confronts now.

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Trump has adjusted his position, endorsing the creation of safe zones in Syria. This will put the US at odds with
Russia and Iran and erode the tenuous ceasefire they imposed after defeating the rebels in Aleppo. The Syrian
war is likely to become further extended and more complex.

Iraq: Even if IS is ousted from Mosul and Raqqa, and mopped up in the Syrian-Iraq desert, it will spread
elsewhere. Iraq is likely to witness renewed internal rivalry between Shia, Sunni and Kurdish parties and a contest
between Iran and a US-GCC coalition for influence in Iraq.

Iran: A shooting war between the US and Iran is a real possibility. US Republicans and the military are hostile to
Iran. Israels Benjamin Netanyahu sees Iran as an existential threat. Americas Arab allies oppose Irans growing
influence and interventions in the region. These constituencies are convinced Obamas nuclear deal with Iran has
allowed it to retain nuclear weapons capability and expand its aggressive regional role. New US sanctions have
now been placed on Iran after the latters missile test last week. Irans reactions will provide grounds to ratchet up
sanctions and pressure. A US-Iran confrontation even if short of a shooting war would lead to
intensification of conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Global conflicts and tensions are set to intensify as Trump begins his presidential journey.

Israel-Palestine: Trump appears to have backed away from unconditional support for Netanyahus settlements
expansion in occupied West Bank. The US embassy shift has also been put in slow motion. Yet, prospects for a
two-state solution are fast eroding; the likelihood is rising that Fatah, even Hamas, may be marginalised and
replaced by more extreme groups aligned with IS or Al Qaeda.

There are other areas where shooting wars and crises may erupt or be exacerbated.

Ukraine: Fighting has recently resumed in Ukraine between government forces and the pro-Russian opposition in
the east, perhaps to ensure the crisis is not ignored as Trump and Vladimir Putin seek to normalise ties. However,
Trump has backed away from lifting anti-Russia sanctions unilaterally. The new US UN ambassador repeated US
denunciation of Russias takeover of Crimea and role in Ukraine. The reset of US-Russia ties is likely to prove
more complicated than Trump presumed.

Eastern Europe: Similarly, Nato, pressed by the Baltic states and Poland, has gone ahead with planned military
deployments and exercises along Russias borders. Trump has stepped back from dismissing Nato as obsolete.
His defence secretary staunchly supports the alliance. Thus, European concerns will have to be factored into the
US-Russia reset. The main bone of contention may not be either Ukraine or the limited Nato military
deployment in Eastern Europe but US plans to instal a strategic ballistic missile defence system in Poland.

North Korea: Trumps claim he will neutralise North Koreas nuclear and missile programmes is unlikely to be
realised. China cannot be pressured to tighten sanctions against Pyongyang to a point that threatens North Koreas
political collapse. Korean unification would bring US troops to Chinas borders. A US military strike on North
Korea would destroy prosperous South Korea. A regional crisis is, however, brewing due to planned US
deployment of the THAAD ballistic missile defence system in South Korea which China and Russia believe
would neutralise the strategic nuclear balance.

South and East China seas: From a neutral stance, the US has moved to challenge Chinas claims in the South and
East China seas. US Freedom of Navigation patrols have expanded and 70 per cent of the US navy is now
deployed in the Pacific. The US Pacific commander has said his forces are ready to fight tonight. The incoming
US secretary of state commented in Senate hearings that Chinas access to the disputed South China Sea islands
could be blocked by the US. This was casually endorsed by the White House spokesman. The Chinese
responded that to do so the US should be prepared to go to war with China. The US posture may be moderated
after sober reflection.

Taiwan: Trump has called into question US endorsement of the One China policy, the foundation of Sino-US
relations for over four decades. Some Chinese officials have privately declared the day Taiwan declares
independence is the day Chinese troops will land on its beaches. However, Taiwanese fully understand the
danger and Trumps posture is apparently designed to extract trade and other concessions from China rather than
actually discard the policy. Still, a Sino-US crisis is possible over trade, missile defence and the South China Sea.

Pakistan-India: Blissfully, South Asia has not figured prominently in the Washington policy turmoil. The US
administration will persist in seeking to co-opt India into its strategy to contain China but is likely to be less
accommodative of Indias attempts to hedge its bets with China, Iran and Russia. India could face problems on
trade and immigration. Pakistan will be pressed for cooperation on Afghanistan and terrorism. The US
administration is likely to be more decisive in rewarding cooperation and penalising non-cooperation. Trumps
ego may propel him to attempt a mediatory role between India and Pakistan. However, in the event of a Pak-India
crisis, the US will side with India. A Sino-US confrontation could result in a knock-on crisis in Pakistan-US ties.

The strategic environment: Today, arms expenditures are rising; military rhetoric is rampant; global and regional
cooperation is eroding. After Trumps election, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved up its Doomsday Clock
to two and half minutes to midnight. The last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev observed recently that it looks as
if the world is preparing for war. He urged world leaders to focus on preventing war, phasing out the arms race
and reducing weapons arsenals. Unfortunately, no one seems to be listening.

Iran: ascendant power

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
IT is remarkable that, despite three decades of extensive Western embargoes and sanctions, Iran has not only
managed to avert regime change but has emerged today as the dominant power player in West Asia and the
Middle East. Iran has done so through national resilience, ruthless action, deft diplomacy and good luck.

Irans resilience was amply demonstrated during the long and murderous Iran-Iraq war and its unyielding
endurance of multiple Western embargoes and sanctions.

Tehrans ability to take ruthless action against adversaries has been equally demonstrated, such as its creation of
Hezbollah in Lebanon; alleged recourse to terrorist attacks; support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan
against Mullah Omars Taliban; sponsorship of the three main Iraqi Shia parties during Saddam Husseins rule;
and financial and political assistance to Shia groups everywhere.

Tehrans determination is matched by its deft diplomacy.

Irans determination is matched by its deft diplomacy. Although it did not directly support the Mujahideen
insurgency against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iran insisted on an influence-sharing arrangement with
Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Iran expressed public support for the Kashmiri insurgency when it erupted in
the 1990s, until it secured several important concessions from India. After 9/11, despite official antipathy, Iran
cooperated with the US in utilising the Northern Alliance to oust the Taliban and, at the Bonn Conference, Tehran
convinced the Northern Alliance warlords to accept the then powerless but Pakhtun Hamid Karzai as
Afghanistans president.

Irans adroit diplomacy was on full display during the long and complex negotiation of the nuclear deal with the
six major powers. A joint comprehensive understanding, once endorsed by the UN Security Council, secured
relief for Tehran from the most onerous UN and Western sanctions while preserving its technological
infrastructure, essential to acquiring nuclear weapons capability if it chose to do so in the future.

Irans ascendancy owes a lot to good fortune, mostly in the form of Americas strategic errors. US military
interventions removed two of Tehrans regional adversaries: the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Husseins
Sunni-led regime in Iraq. Both were replaced by Irans friends: the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and Shia
parties in Iraq.

Western blunders continued during the Obama era. A major Western objective in sponsoring the mainly Sunni
revolt against Hafez Assads Alawite regime in Syria was to cut off Tehrans direct land access through Iraq and
Syria to Lebanon and to Hezbollah, the only credible direct military threat to Israel. However, the ensuing Syrian
civil war saw the resurrection of Al Qaeda in Iraq, rebranded as the Islamic State, which challenged both Iranian
and Western objectives in Iraq and Syria.

History may offer a clearer explanation why IS emerged, almost overnight, as Americas primary enemy in Syria.
Conspiracy theories abound. Did the secret US-Iran talks held over two years in Oman cover only the nuclear
issue, or was an understanding also reached on Syria and Iraq? In any event, tactical military coordination
between the US and Iran has existed for sometime in Iraq and may have been extended to Syria.

Whatever their antecedents, the nuclear deal and Americas tactical alignment with Irans goals in Iraq and Syria
have created an unprecedented strategic divergence between the US and Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies. Far from
being the possible target of US military strikes, Tehran has emerged as an informal US ally in the region.
Officially sponsored Shia militias are triumphant after Aleppo and the recent battles around Mosul, while
extremist Sunni entities (IS, Al Qaeda) are outlawed and moderate groups face defeat in Syria and exclusion in
Iraq.

Fortune has continued to smile on Tehran. Russias confrontation with the US over Ukraine and Crimea has
reinforced Moscows de facto alliance with Iran. The use of Russian air power and special forces, combined with
Irans Revolutionary Guards, Hezbullah and Shia militias, have tipped the civil war in favour of Assad. The US
and its allies failed to either adequately support their proxies or to oblige them to make pragmatic compromises
with Damascus and its patrons.

Iran has also benefited from the sharp differences between Turkey and the US over Western support for the Syrian
and Iraqi Kurds in the fight against IS. Turkeys strategic aim is to prevent a consolidated Kurdish enclave on its
borders with Syria and Iraq, which could link up with Turkeys Kurdish insurgency. Ankaras suspicions about the
US have been exacerbated by Washingtons alleged support to the Gulenist coup against President Erdogan.
Turkey has made the best of a bad situation by joining Russia and Iran in imposing a ceasefire in Syria, which
implies the survival of the Assad regime and the sacrifice of the moderate Sunni rebels. One unintended
consequence of the Aleppo defeat may be to drive these moderates into the arms of IS and Al Qaeda.

Iran has sought to intensify Saudi Arabias pain through discreet support to the (Shia) Houthis in Yemen who, in
coalition with former president Saleh, have expelled the Saudi-supported government of president Hadi from
Sanaa. So far, the Saudi-led Arab coalition has been unable to defeat the rebel forces despite a massive bombing
and military campaign by the Arab coalition. Riyadh now faces a direct threat on its northern and southern
borders.

Some commentators believe the new US president will scuttle the Iran nuclear deal as desired by hawkish
Republicans and Israel. Indeed, Trumps impromptu positions may revive tensions with Iran. But his nominees for
secretary of state and defence have expressed a preference for keeping the Iran nuclear deal alive. Trump also
wishes to join Russia to fight IS rather than Assad in Syria. This would bring US policy in sync with Irans
priorities. US-Iran relations may thus turn out to be less turbulent than currently anticipated by Western and Arab
analysts.

However, Iran is unlikely to be powerful enough to impose its dominance over West Asia and the Gulf. It will be
challenged from within and outside the region, generating further strife and instability. A new security order
should be evolved through dialogue by the regional states, an order that assures the security and territorial
integrity of all regional states. It is in Pakistans interest to take the lead in promoting such an equitable collective
security arrangement.
Twitter Trump
DESPITE its high-market valuation, Twitter is reportedly losing money. It may be a blessing for the world if it
was to shut down. Then, the bellicose ignoramus (in the words of Martin Wolf in the Financial Times) who has
been elected as the 45th president of the United States would not be able to try and express impromptu US
policies in less than 140 characters. Trump appears addicted to this medium as the channel to communicate his
feelings, facts, and non-facts, reducing the discussion of serious policy issues to the level of farce.

Even prior to assuming office, Trumps tweets have moved markets, cowed corporations into making wrong
decisions, provoked official dmarches from China, evoked praise from Vladimir Putin, and created an
unprecedented public disagreement between the incoming US president and the entire US intelligence
community.

If Twitter does not fold, it may be in the national security interest of the US, and indeed of world security, if these
US intelligence agencies could prove their prowess by somehow shutting down Trumps Twitter account or
making his smartphone disappear. While they are at it, perhaps the telephone lines to the White House could also
be put on automatic response mode with a recording of Trumps effusive call with the Pakistan prime minister to
ensure that he does not accidentally threaten war against India or one of Americas remaining friends if they call.

If Trumps tweeted prescriptions are translated into policy, it could yield a diversity of disasters for America and
the world. Here are some examples.

If Trumps tweeted prescriptions are translated into policy, it could yield a diversity of disasters.

Build a wall on the US-Mexican border to halt illegal immigrants. It is now to be funded ($20 billion) from the
US federal budget (since Mexico has predictably refused to pay for it). The wall, if it is ever built, is likely to be
circumvented by tunnels and bribery and corruption.

Question the One China policy as a means of coercing trade concessions from China. This crude proposal
would destroy the foundation of the Sino-US relationship, often described as the most important bilateral
relationship in the world. It could spark a crisis in the Taiwan straits, and possibly an unwanted war.

Impose punitive tariffs on Chinese imports. This would invite Chinese retaliation, increase prices for American
consumers and fail in reviving outdated US manufacturing jobs.

Coerce China to reverse North Koreas nuclear brinkmanship. This may end current Chinese cooperation and
embolden Pyongyang to accelerate its nuclear and missile programmes.

Take military action against Pyongyang. Another Korean war would devastate both North and South Korea,
Americas ally. The possibility of North Koreas collapse will lead to pre-emptive Chinese intervention.

Align with Russia in Syria to fight the militant Islamic State group (not Assad). Unless the US is prepared to
induct ground troops, this alignment also implies acceptance of Irans overwhelming influence in Syria and Iraq.
This would contradict Trumps endeavour to restrain Irans role in the region and to strengthen if not scuttle the
Iran nuclear deal. It will also further alienate Saudi Arabia and other Arab allies.

Lift US sanctions imposed on Russia (for its takeover of Crimea and role in eastern Ukraine). This will face
strong opposition from both the Democrats and influential Republicans like Senators McCain and Graham.

Engage in a nuclear arms race (with Russia). This tweet appears to contradict the desire for normalisation with
Moscow. In any case, both Russia and the US are already engaged in significant nuclear modernisation. The real
bone of contention is the US plan to deploy a strategic anti-missile system in Eastern Europe.

Reduce financial subsidies for Nato allies and Japan. This could reduce US influence in Europe; intensify the
vulnerability of the Baltic states, and enhance Russias influence and role in Europe. Japan may turn to greater
militarisation or seek accommodation with China and Russia.

Align with anti-European Union nationalist parties in Europe, like Frances Front National. This may
contribute to the swing under way in Europe towards the right-wing, xenophobic and Islamophobic groups. It
could erode the EU, divide Europe and remove a main pillar of the Western power structure.

Support Israels illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank, thus undermining the two-state solution, the
only viable prospect for durable peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The proposal to move the US embassy
to (occupied) Jerusalem would confirm US alignment with Israels occupation and confirm the narrative of
terrorist groups, like IS and Al Qaeda, that Muslims can secure justice only through the force of arms.

Trumps approach to foreign policy is a reversion to the ruthless use of US military power and economic coercion
in the 19th and 20th centuries to secure the strategic advantages that made America great. But the world is no
longer one where the US can dictate its will. Military and economic power is more widely distributed today,
between the US, China, Europe, Russia and several emerging nations. Foreign military interventions, unless
undertaken with local support, can be disastrous, as evident from the quagmires in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.
Asymmetric warfare has emerged as an effective avenue for the weak to inflict pain on more powerful
adversaries. The world today is also interdependent. Trade is a complex web of discrete and mutually reinforcing
cross-national production and consumption. Mercantilist policies can disrupt these production/consumption chains
to mutual detriment. The world also confronts several common challenges climate change, poverty and nuclear
conflict which can only be addressed collectively by the international community.

It is uncertain if Donald Trump will be made cognisant of these realities once in office. The team he has chosen
consists of mostly those who have shaped his regressive positions. There is thus little assurance that Trumps
tweets will give way to well-considered policies.

Ignorant aggression has caused the downfall of many great nations and empires in the past. Does Donald Trump
herald the decline and fall of the American empire?

The tame tiger

IN the midst of major global transitions, Pakistan confronts multiple challenges: domestic discord, terrorism,
Indian hostility and subversion, Afghan chaos and American pressure. The low energy response of Pakistans
ruling classes to these challenges displays an absence of self-confidence and an assumption that Pakistans destiny
will be determined by forces and factors other than ourselves.

Such attitudes are ill-suited to the worlds fifth largest country by population; one defended by the sixth largest,
nuclear equipped, armed forces; with an economy growing at 5pc annually despite terrorist violence, political
turmoil and dysfunctional governance.

It is universally acknowledged that Pakistanis are a resilient and resourceful people. Yet Pakistan has become a
soft state because its elites have embraced selfish goals nationally and a subservient posture internationally.

Over the decades, our ruling classes have become inured to the patronage of our Cold War ally, the United
States, and other rich benefactors. They cannot contemplate the consequences of cutting the umbilical cord of
external dependency. For most of Pakistans common people, who do not benefit from this largesse, the impact
of the oft-threatened termination of external financial or political support would be marginal and bearable.

Pakistans elites have embraced selfish goals nationally and a subservient posture
internationally.

If the interests of the elite are set aside and national interest guides policy exclusively, Pakistan has the intrinsic
capacity to withstand external pressure, overcome most of its present challenges and exploit the vast opportunities
offered by the current strategic transition in world affairs.

In Pakistan today, domestic terrorism and violent extremism can be eliminated if the National Action Plan is
implemented without regard to the political umbrellas that protect some of these violent elements.

Action against the TTP safe havens in Afghanistan is held back by concern about Americas reaction. Yet, unless
the US-Nato forces themselves eliminate these safe havens, Pakistan will have to do so if it is to stop Indias
subversion from Afghan territory.

The Kabul government can surely be persuaded to stop its constant abuse and perfidious collaboration with India
against Pakistan if Islamabad utilises its considerable leverage. Once Kabul is cooperative, the Afghan Taliban,
including the Haqqanis, should be either convinced to join a peace dialogue or ejected totally from Pakistans
territory. Pakistan does not need strategic depth; it has nuclear weapons.

India is a hegemonist power. If it is to preserve the rationale for its creation, Pakistan cannot accept Indian
domination. It must maintain credible nuclear and conventional deterrence but avoid war with India. However,
until the Kashmir dispute is resolved, a conflict could be triggered by a popular Kashmiri revolt like the present
one. If India imposes a war on Pakistan, the latter should not rely entirely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. India
could also be defeated conventionally with the help of our people.

Somewhere in our foreign ministrys archives is the record of a conversation between the then foreign minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Chinas premier Chou En-lai soon after the 1965 war. When Bhutto explained that
Pakistans offensive on Akhoor had to be halted and its forces redeployed to protect Lahore after India attacked
across the border, the Chinese premier opined that Pakistan should not have redeployed. Pakistani forces, he said,
would have been welcomed in Kashmir; on the other hand, the people of Lahore would have fought Indian
occupation on the streets and, with this peoples struggle, you would have made your nation. There is a lesson
here for our strategists.

There is considerable anxiety in Islamabad about US policy under Trump. Despite the prime ministers effusive
phone conversation with Trump, Pakistan is likely to suffer collateral damage from the growing US rivalry with
China and its strategic partnership with India. However, unless the US seeks Pakistans submission to Indian
domination or attempts to neutralise its nuclear deterrence, a cooperative or at least non-hostile relationship can be
established with Washington. If appropriately negotiated, common ground can be found in combating terrorism,
on Afghanistan, reciprocal nuclear restraint with India and mutually beneficial investment and economic
cooperation.

Chinas emergence as a global economic and military power offers a historic opportunity for Pakistan. It must be
grasped with both hands. The CPEC project is critical, economically and strategically, for Pakistan. If pursued
with vision, the opportunity can encompass: investment in all sectors of the Pakistan economy; rapid
modernisation of Pakistans defence capabilities; stabilisation of Afghanistan; and creation of an economic
network under the One Belt, One Road initiative integrating Pakistan with Iran, the GCC, Central Asia and
Russia, apart from China.

Yet Pakistan should not rely on China or any other country for its development. The Pakistani state has to play a
central role. Some important goals that Islamabad can secure are:

One, achieve financial independence. Tax revenues can be doubled, from the present 9pc of GDP to the global
norm of 18pc. Savings of 1-2pc of the federal budget can be realised by divesting major loss-making government
corporations. Pakistans capital markets can be enlarged to provide local development finance. The additional
fiscal capacity can be used to eliminate extreme poverty, expand education and health programmes, support small
farmers and small and medium enterprises.

Two, adopt a Pakistan first industrial policy and reverse the unilateral disarmament of the countrys trade regime.
Nascent industries need to be nurtured through higher tariffs and a clampdown on smuggling. They can meet the
high domestic demand for consumer and durable goods, which is the main driver of Pakistans growth and, once
competitive, contribute to expanding Pakistans dismally small exports.

Three, support agriculture. This sector still supports 60pc of Pakistans population. Our crop yields are one-eighth
of those in industrial countries. With adequate financial and technical support, especially to smaller farmers,
Pakistan can emerge as a regional breadbasket.

Improved governance is essential. In todays globalised world, no country can progress without an efficient
bureaucracy. Pakistans administrators should be functionally competent, competitively chosen, handsomely
remunerated and fully accountable.

None of these goals can be adequately achieved without decisive national leadership. Our electoral democracy,
chained to feudal and industrial power structures, requires to be reformed to enable clean and competent leaders to
secure office. Only then will the Pakistani tiger be able to leave the cage in which it has been confined.

Gluttons for punishment

IT was sad to witness the humiliation of Pakistans adviser on foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz, by his Indian hosts and
the Afghan president in Amritsar. Mr Aziz is one of Pakistans elder statesmen. His treatment at the so-called
Heart of Asia Conference by India is yet another example of the brutish nature of the ruling regime in New Delhi.

The conference was misused by India, the rotational host, to promote its single agenda of portraying Pakistan as a
terrorist state in order to isolate it. The Indian prime minister played a duet with Afghan President Ghani, the
ostensible beneficiary of the conference, who launched an aggressive indictment of Pakistan for alleged support to
the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan; interrogated the Pakistan delegation leader from the floor of the
conference; and rejected Pakistans offer of $500 million in economic assistance. To add injury to insult, the
Indians barred the Pakistan leader from meeting the media and even from leaving his hotel.

The mystery is why the Pakistan government chose to expose its most senior diplomat to the hostility and insults
which should have been expected from India and Afghanistans president. Since India scuttled the Saarc summit
in Islamabad, Pakistan could have reciprocated by refusing to attend the Amritsar conference and persuading its
close friends, China and Turkey, from doing so. At the very least, Pakistans representation should have been at a
low level.

At a Non-Aligned Summit a few decades ago, Egypts foreign minister interrupted the president of the host
country when he made a critical comment about the recently concluded Camp David agreement. In Amritsar,
Pakistan would have been well within its rights to interrupt the speeches by Modi and Ghani, on a point of order,
for transgressing the agenda and purpose of the conference. If its protest was ignored, the delegation should have
walked out of the conference. At the very least, Pakistan could have countered with its own accusations against
India and Afghanistan.

Instead, by all accounts, Mr Aziz sat through Modis attack and Ghanis interrogation. He even called
subsequently on the Afghan president.

In Amritsar, Pakistan would have been well within its rights to interrupt the speeches by
Modi and Ghani.

Mr Azizs display of self-restraint is no doubt admirable. But the Indian and Afghan insults were not merely to his
person; these were insults to the national dignity of Pakistan and, as such, they ought not to have been tolerated.
According to diplomatic norms, such insults are expected to evoke a strong response. It is unclear if formal
protests have been lodged with the two governments.

A failure to respond strongly to such insults to our country not only signifies a lack of national self-respect, it
implies tacit acceptance of the serious allegations advanced against Pakistan.

Unfortunately, this is not the first time that Pakistans diplomacy has failed to anticipate events and avoid political
traps and reversals. For instance, Pakistan should have postponed the Saarc summit, anticipating Indias effort to
scupper it. Instead, Islamabad waited in the vain hope that Modi would magnanimously grace the summit,
resulting in the humiliation not only of Indian withdrawal from the conference but also the regrets of most the
other South Asian states, no doubt under heavy pressure from India.

Pakistans timorous and ingratiating posture in external relations, especially towards India, has become a recurring
feature of its high-level diplomacy, symbolised by the desperate calls for dialogue with India, even after it
launched its latest repression in India-held Kashmir last July.

Pakistan has also sustained, with little complaint, the repeated intemperate accusations from Afghanistan, a nation
whose millions of refugees we still continue to host, whose goods are allowed to transit our territory, including its
exports to India, whose civil wars have brought terrorism to our country and for whom Pakistan has made
persistent efforts for internal peace and reconciliation, even as its intelligence agencies collaborate with India to
foment TTP terrorism and Baloch insurgency.

The question arises: what is the purpose of this patience with punishment? There could be several answers:

Islamabad may expect that one day India and Afghanistan will see reason and reciprocate Pakistans quest for
dialogue and compromise. I would not hold my breath.

There may be an expectation that an accommodative stance will elicit understanding and support from Kabuls
patron and Indias new ally, the US. But Indian and Afghan allegations against Pakistan are being echoed if not
originated in Washington.

There may be fear that a more robust stance could evoke American sanctions. But sanctions will be avoided only
if the US believes that the cost of imposing these on Pakistan outweighs any possible benefit.

There may be a desire not to provoke India into committing cross-border aggression against Pakistan. Again,
aggression can be avoided only if India (and other powers) are convinced that its cost will be unacceptable.

Or there may unknown reasons that compel our rulers to suffer Modi and Ghanis slings and arrows without
flinching.

History teaches that weakness invites aggression. Timidity will invite further abuse and pressure. Pakistan must
adopt a more robust posture in defence of our national interests.

Following Amritsar, Pakistan should strictly limit the activities and access of Indian diplomats in Pakistan;
designate the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh as terrorist organisations; provide
finance to the Kashmiri Hurriyat Conference for humanitarian and material support to the Kashmiri victims of
Indian repression.

Pakistan should also formally approach the Security Council to: investigate and condemn Indias human rights
violations in Kashmir; call for a halt to Indian violations of the LoC ceasefire; and agree on steps to implement the
Security Council resolutions on Jammu and Kashmiri.

The screws can be turned harder against Afghanistan. Pakistan can accelerate Afghan refugee repatriation; slow
the transit of Afghan goods and halt their transit to India; fence the border as planned and strictly limit cross-
border traffic. The Afghan and Indian sponsorship of the TTP and its links with the militant Islamic State group
should be actively projected in world capitals and the media. If US-Nato forces in Afghanistan do not terminate
the TTPs safe havens in Afghanistan by a specific date, Pakistan must consider direct action to do so. Eliminating
the threat on the western border will enhance Pakistans ability to face the more enduring threat in the east.

A united national front

INDIA is maintaining its daily shelling along the LoC in Kashmir. As advised editorially in this paper, Pakistan
must keep its nerve. Yet, Pakistans response cannot be passive. It must dissuade India from pursuing its
aggressive designs against Pakistan, now and in the future.

Pakistani officials and analysts have opined that Indias LoC firing is designed to divert attention from the
ongoing popular revolt in India-held Kashmir (IHK) and/or prevent Pakistans armed forces from acting robustly
against terrorism on our western border. These are reasonable assumptions.

However, Pakistans response should take account of Indias comprehensive strategy against it, not merely its
current LoC belligerence. India seeks to isolate Pakistan by portraying it as a terrorism sponsor while it sponsors
TTP terrorism and separatism in Balochistan; it seeks to demonise and delegitimise Pakistans nuclear weapons;
and attempts, directly or through western friends, to co-opt Pakistani politicians, businessmen and intellectuals to
accept Indian dominion over Pakistan.

Pakistans response should take account of Indias comprehensive strategy against it.

Through such military, diplomatic and political avenues, and combined with the economic and diplomatic
pressure from the US and its allies, India hopes to wear down Pakistans resistance to Indian domination. The
scent of defeat reeks already within parts of Pakistans elites. If India believes that Pakistan is sufficiently
isolated and internally divided, it may feel emboldened to embark on a military adventure against it.

Pakistans response should encompass well-prepared, determined diplomatic and media campaigns to neutralise
Indias propaganda, expose the reality of its militarism and oppression in IHK and signal its determination to
defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the Kashmiri peoples rights.

It is regrettable that the prime ministers bold speech at the UN General Assembly in September has not been
followed by promised actions, including formally approaching the UN Security Council. Pakistan should
approach it with three clear proposals:

One, a call to end Indian brutality and grave human rights violations in occupied Jammu & Kashmir and the
dispatch by the UN high commissioner for human rights of a UN fact-finding mission to India-held Jammu &
Kashmir to investigate and secure an immediate end to these violations.

Two, a proposal that the Security Council demand an end to ceasefire violations on the LoC and instal other
measures of mutual and reciprocal restraint and arms control to prevent the outbreak of a Pakistan-India conflict.

Three, a proposal for adopting specific steps by the Security Council to implement its own resolutions on Jammu
& Kashmir, including the appointment of a special representative of the UN secretary general to update and
activate the approved arrangements for its demilitarisation and organisation of the promised plebiscite there.

Other diplomatic moves that Pakistan can make to exert pressure on India include:

First: a proposal in the Security Councils counterterrorism committee to investigate links between TTP and the
militant Islamic State group, and the relationship between TTP and the intelligence agencies of India and
Afghanistan. These two countries are, in effect, sponsoring the IS terrorists.

Second: an approach to international human rights groups to press for the release of Kashmiri political prisoners
and repeal of Indias emergency laws, which enable Indian security forces to oppress Kashmiris with complete
impunity.

Third: an approach to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the extensively documented
evidence of Narendra Modis responsibility for the 2002 massacre of 2,000 Muslims in Gujarat.

Pakistan may be obliged to consider options beyond diplomacy. India has claimed, falsely, that it conducted
surgical strikes across the LoC. This claim provides Pakistan with a legitimate right to reciprocate. It should
refrain from doing so since this is likely to provoke a general conflict. However, if India does cross the LoC,
Pakistan should be prepared to respond decisively, for instance, by cutting off the road between the Kashmir
Valley and Jammu.
Pakistan is also well within its rights to respond to Indian and Afghan sponsorship of terrorism by attacking and
eliminating TTP safe havens in Kunar and other parts of Afghanistan. If the US-Nato forces do not eliminate these
safe havens, Pakistan will need to do so.

While Pakistan has disavowed support for the outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, Kashmiris have
an internationally recognised right to seek self-determination from alien occupation through all available means at
their disposal, including armed force. There is nothing to stop them from forming a Kashmir liberation army.

Many Pakistanis, including some in our ruling circles, are concerned about the economic implications of possible
US sanctions and appear willing to sacrifice the Kashmiris and accept Indian diktat to avoid such sanctions. If
such fears had prevailed in the past, Pakistan would not have established its strategic relationship with China,
developed its nuclear capability, nor conducted the 1998 nuclear explosions in response to Indias tests.

Pakistan should be prepared to face pressure from India and its Western friends. There can be no development
without security and sovereignty. Sanctions against Pakistan, if imposed, will be unjustified. Their impact will be
limited and temporary. The preservation of national dignity and Pakistans commitment to the Kashmiri people
make the possible cost worthwhile.

Some Pakistani analysts have pointed to the lack of international response to Pakistans demarches on Kashmir
and India to argue that Pakistans positions are unpalatable. In fact, other countries are unlikely to respond
positively so long as they perceive that Pakistans leadership is itself not fully committed to the objectives its
diplomats and envoys propagate.

Pakistans politicians appear to be more preoccupied by their own petty squabbles over Panamagate, MQM
divisions and CPEC projects.

Instead of advocating united national action against Indian subversion and aggression, many of Pakistans
Western-oriented intellectuals argue that the fault lies with Pakistan and especially its armed forces. Pervez
Hoodbhoys recent denunciation of Pakistans so-called establishment is a case in point.

When a nation faces an existential external threat, unity is its ultimate strength and weapon. National unity can be
promoted by mobilising the people, as Churchill did to enable Britain to resist Hitler. But, at times, national unity
has to be imposed. Chiang Kai-shek agreed to form a united national front with Maos communists against the
Japanese invader only after the generalissimo was incarcerated by one of his own commanders.

Today, Pakistan needs a united national front to confront an aggressive India.

Trumps America
The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
THE election of an inexperienced, egotistical and volatile tycoon as the 45th president of the United States is as
surprising as was the victory of a black candidate eight years ago. Barack Obamas election was uplifting for
America and confirmed faith in its democracy.

Trumps triumph, secured by rhetoric reflecting racial and religious prejudice, xenophobia, strategic incoherence
and sweeping promises to make America great again, has divided the country as never before since the
American Civil War. This time the division is along racial, religious and intellectual lines between the
progressive eastern and western coastal states and the mostly white and conservative middle America.

Trumps conciliatory victory speech, promising to bind the wounds of division, the generous concession by
Clinton and President Obamas gestures of cooperation have not stilled the fear and loathing of Trumps
opponents: the minorities, millennials and progressive Democrats. If Trump pursues the policies he outlined in the
campaign, as he can with Republican control of the US Congress, social and political divisions within the US
could intensify.

The domestic battle lines are fairly clear.

Trumps policies would clearly erode the progress made on civil rights and reverse efforts to advance the
economic and social position of blacks and other disadvantaged minorities. Stop and frisk (of mainly black
youth) may be institutionalised. Police violence may be tolerated. The FBI, having helped to defeat Clinton,
would be more empowered. The US supreme court would remain conservative for the foreseeable future.

Although Trump has stepped back from his Muslim ban, immigration from Islamic countries (almost all affected
by terrorism) would slow to a trickle; Muslim Americans subjected to close monitoring for terrorist tendencies,
and discrimination against them institutionalised.
It is obvious that Trumps external policies will be subservient to his domestic agenda.

Millions of illegal immigrants could be hounded out of the country, wrenching families and livelihoods. Most of
the menial jobs they do will not be taken by white Americans. Wages would rise; the US economy contract. The
US-Mexico border wall, if constructed, would do little to stop desperate people from crossing the border. An
attempt to make Mexico pay for the wall would obviously lead to a diplomatic crisis.

Obamacare, which has provided health insurance to 20 million poor Americans, would be repealed. Its
replacement by a better system appears improbable.

Trumps declared economic policies will have domestic and global consequences.

Protectionist barriers, such as punitive duties on imports from China and Mexico, will provoke trade retaliation;
while increasing the cost of consumer goods, it will bring few jobs back to Americas uncompetitive
manufacturing industries.

Lifting restraints on coal and fossil fuels will restore some jobs in the mining and energy sectors, but at a very
high cost: environmental damage in the US; abrogation of US commitments to the Climate Change Treaty; the
treatys likely collapse; the predicted rise in the planets temperature and accompanying global environmental
disasters. Infrastructure development could generate jobs and growth. But it cannot be financed without raising
revenues and savings.

The proposed lower taxes on corporations and the rich would make this difficult; escalate inequality; expand the
US budget deficit and, if accompanied by higher interest rates, squeeze the ability to sustain the weak US
economic recovery.

Slower US growth, accompanied by protectionist policies and resultant trade conflicts, will act as a brake on the
world economy and create another global economic and financial crisis.

Trump has outlined his approach to global challenges in general, often uninformed terms. Even if his approach
does not add up to US isolationism, it is obvious that Trumps external policies will be subservient to his domestic
agenda.

Apart from trade and energy policies, Trumps positions may be different from the present administration on five
major issues.

First, relations with Russia. Trumps expressed admiration for Putins strong leadership may open the door to
cooperation in addressing the Syrian conflict. If Trumps priority is to crush IS, he could agree to allow Syrias
Assad to survive, thus coalescing with Moscows approach.

Second, Europe. Trumps call for European allies to pull their own weight financially could result in weakening
the Nato alliance. If anti-EU and anti-immigrant right-wing parties, like the Front National in France, are
bolstered by Trumps example and secure power in the forthcoming elections, Europe could turn down the same
revanchist road as Trumpian America, with significant strategic consequences.

Third, the Iran deal. Trump and the Republican Party, both closer to Israel than Obama, have been sceptical of the
nuclear deal with Iran. They may seek to strengthen its non-proliferation elements, evoking a hostile response
from Tehran, and probable rejection by the other powers party to the agreement. An angry Iran could complicate
the conflicts in the Middle East, although it may revive US strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and the GCC
countries.

Fourth, China. Trump has excoriated Chinas trade policies and currency manipulation. However, he has been
silent on the South China Sea and human rights. He wants to lighten the burden of US alliances with Japan and
South Korea. He has criticised Obamas opposition to Chinas new development bank. It is not inconceivable for
China to strike a deal with Trump, offering concessions on trade and economic issues in exchange for
accommodation of Chinas regional and domestic priorities.

Fifth, the UN. Like previous Republican leaders, Trump has expressed disdain for the United Nations and
multilateralism. Drastic cuts in US contributions to UN organisations and multilateral processes and treaties could
lead to a decline in global cooperation, unless other powers, such as China, assume the mantle of leadership in
multilateral forums.

South Asia has not figured prominently in Trumps pronouncements. However, India has been acknowledged as a
geopolitical ally and has well-established ties with the Republicans. The further deepening of the relationship
will depend on the future direction of Sino-US relations. India could face complications with Trumps
administration on trade, immigration and outsourcing of US IT jobs to India.
Pakistan starts with the disadvantage of inherited problems with the US Afghanistan, terrorism and nuclear
issues where Republican positions are even more hostile than those of the Obama administration. Nevertheless,
the change of guard in Washington offers Pakistan an opportunity to present a clear message of willingness to
forge a constructive relationship with the US that accommodates the interests and priorities of both countries.

The Washington consensus

OVER the past decade, a hostile consensus has emerged in Washington against Pakistan. The main reasons for
this adverse evolution are: growing Islamophobia after 9/11; visceral opposition to a Muslim nuclear weapon
state; the divergence on Afghanistan; and, most importantly, Pakistans strategic relationship with China.

This hostile trend was first signalled by the 2006 de-hyphenation of US relations with India and Pakistan;
exacerbated by the blame game for US failure in Afghanistan; confirmed by the 2011 US military interventions
against Pakistan; and consolidated by Americas overt strategic alignment with India.

The hostile perception of Pakistan has been magnified by the incessant and sophisticated Indian political and
propaganda campaign against Pakistan. Islamabads incoherent and timorous response to US policies, and to
Indias campaign, has reinforced the anti-Pakistan consensus.

The hostile perception of Pakistan has been magnified by an Indian propaganda campaign.

Under Americas strategic cover, India has pursued its hegemonic aims in South Asia; a massive arms build-up; an
aggressive posture towards Pakistan; and a brutal campaign of repression in India-held Kashmir. Modi now seeks
to isolate Pakistan on the presumption of US support.

In the circumstances, Pakistan is obliged to further strengthen its strategic relationship with China, build
countervailing relationships with other powers and reduce its vulnerability to US political and economic pressure.

However, the US is still the most powerful country in the world. Like alcohol, it has the capacity to do some good
and much harm. Thus, despite its grievances, Pakistan cannot afford an open confrontation with the US.

The impending inauguration of a new US administration may be an appropriate moment to explore if Pakistan can
change, or at least soften, the negative Washington consensus. To do so, Pakistan will need to adopt a clear
agenda, develop a coherent narrative, exercise diplomatic patience and display the political resilience required to
defend its national interests.

Islamabad should first identify those core interests on which it cannot compromise: Indian hegemony;
conventional and nuclear deterrence; Kashmiri self-determination; strategic relations with China.

Second, Pakistan should identify those US demands which can be accommodated without compromising
Pakistans vital interests, such as action against terrorism; a negotiated peace in Afghanistan; avoidance of war
with India; nuclear non-proliferation.

Third, Pakistan should press for acceptance of its own objectives. The US can accommodate at least some of these
without compromising its strategic interests: protection of Kashmiri human rights; elimination of Indian-Afghan
sponsored terrorism in Pakistan; equal treatment on civil nuclear cooperation; access to advanced technologies;
economic development.

The potential compromises should be reciprocal, negotiated in a package deal by the two sides. Terrorism and
nuclear deterrence remain central to a Pakistan-US relationship. Pakistan needs to fully explain and articulate its
position on the various facets of terrorism.

One, Pakistans extensive internal counterterrorism campaign deserves global support which it has not received so
far.

Two, after 9/11, designating the Afghan Taliban as terrorists along with Al Qaeda was a mistake. It made the
Afghan insurgency inevitable. Peace in Afghanistan can be restored only through negotiations between Kabul and
the Afghan Taliban. Instead of being threatened, Pakistan should be encouraged to revive its contacts and
influence with the Afghan Taliban to facilitate a negotiated peace.
Three, Pakistan has expelled the Haqqanis from almost all of Pakistans territory. The evidence is available, if the
US wants to see it. However, peace will not be possible without the Haqqanis. Ways will have to be found to bring
them into the negotiating process.

Four, the components of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are not really Taliban, and many are not
Pakistanis but Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs and Arabs. The TTP is closely linked to Al Qaeda and parts of it with
the so-called Islamic State. The Indian-Afghan support to the TTP threatens not only Pakistan but the global fight
against terrorism.

Five, the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaishe-e-Mohammad participated in the legitimate post-1989 Kashmiri freedom
struggle. They were placed on the Security Councils terrorist list once they went rogue. However, unlike the
TTP, they are not attacking Pakistan and enjoy a degree of popular support. Confronting them militarily could
exacerbate terrorist violence within Pakistan. It will become easier to shut them down once there is progress in
addressing the plight of the Kashmiris and the TTP threat has been eliminated.

Six, while seeking an internal political accommodation with the Baloch, Pakistan has every right to respond to
Indian-sponsored terrorism in Balochistan from Afghan territory.

On nuclear non-proliferation, Pakistan has adopted state-of-the-art measures to ensure the safety and security of
its nuclear assets and prevent proliferation. The recent US demands that Pakistan halt its deterrence-driven
deployment of theatre nuclear weapons, development of long-range missiles and production of fissile material are
clearly one-sided. Pakistan could, however, consider restraint if the reason for these programmes Indias
military and missile deployments is removed.

However, the possibility of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is real and must be urgently addressed. This
danger arises from: Indias threat to resort to a limited war in response to a terrorist attack (which Pakistan may
not be able to prevent) and the growing asymmetry in conventional weapons (which has increased Pakistans
reliance on nuclear weapons to ensure deterrence). In the absence of an India-Pakistan dialogue, the US can help
to promote reciprocal restraint by the two countries to avoid a conflict and promote strategic stability.

Apart from a clear and imaginative approach to a dialogue on policy issues, Pakistan needs to undertake a
concerted public relations campaign in the US, explaining Pakistans positions and perspectives, highlighting its
vital role in addressing regional and global issues and responding to Indias vilification campaign.

Due to the current Sino-US strategic rivalry, the Washington consensus may not change dramatically despite
Pakistans best efforts. Yet, if the Sino-US equation changes; if India does not adhere to US strategic goals; if
Pakistan contributes to regional stability and offers new economic opportunities, the consensus in Washington
may swing into greater balance between India and Pakistan.

Indias sound and fury

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
IN the current crisis, it is tempting to dismiss Indias dire threats, outlandish propaganda, childish antics and
illusory surgical strikes, in Shakespeares words, as a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying
nothing. The clamour from India is certainly replete with idiocy and delusional nonsense. Yet, Indias aggressive
posture and propaganda may signify a more ominous portent.

It is clear that India has been encouraged by its new alliance with the US to conclude that it can suppress the latest
revolt in India-held Jammu and Kashmir with brutal impunity. America and other Western powers are not
prepared to speak out against Indias massive violations of human rights in Kashmir.

The fictional surgical strikes across the LoC have led some Indian analysts to assert that New Delhi has
established a new threshold for military action against Pakistan without evoking retaliation. Do the Modi
government and Indian military leaders actually endorse this thesis? Was India prevented from carrying out cross-
LoC strikes because of its own assessment that Pakistan would retaliate, or because of the cautionary advice of the
US and other powers? If this is not clear, Pakistan will need to evaluate what it needs to do to re-establish the
mutual deterrence inducted after the 1998 nuclear tests.

Pakistans policymakers must restore focus on the real challenge posed by Indias hostility.

The high-level meeting convened in Islamabad to review the current crisis with India should have focused on such
strategic issues and the challenge of defending the hapless Kashmiris. Instead, if the report in this newspaper is
correct, it appears that the meeting focused on Indias thesis that Pakistan will be isolated because of its
incomplete action against terrorist groups. Apart from the legal and political complexity of the issue, action on
this issue at this time would be interpreted as capitulation to Indian military pressure and threats and, that too,
while India openly supports insurrection in Balochistan and sponsors the TTP from Afghan territory. To confound
confusion, the sensitive internal deliberations were leaked to the press.

Pakistans policymakers must restore focus on the real challenge posed by Indias hostility and its oppression in
occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The prime minister made a bold speech at the UN General Assembly, proposing an
investigation of Indias human rights violations in occupied Kashmir; Pakistan-India arms control and military
restraint; and consultations with the Security Council to demilitarise Kashmir and implement the Security Council
resolutions.

These proposals must be actively promoted by Pakistans diplomacy in the Security Council, the Human Rights
Council and other relevant forums. The major powers should be apprised of the ground realities. The 20 political
envoys dispatched by the prime minister, with some exceptions, are unlikely to be equal to this task. There are at
least a dozen experienced and respected diplomats available in Islamabad who could be used for this purpose.

There are three essential messages that need to be conveyed to the international community.

One: Kashmir remains a nuclear flashpoint. India has been unable to extinguish the Kashmiri demand for self-
determination in 70 years; it will be unable to do so in the foreseeable future. Every generation of Kashmiris will
keep rising against Indian rule. Indian violence will be met by Kashmiri retaliation. India will always blame
Pakistan for this. A Pakistan-India war will remain an ever-present threat.

Two: India is obviously being encouraged in its brutality and belligerence by its new-found alliance with the US.
New Delhi may convince itself that it is in a position to engage in a limited or punitive war against Pakistan. This
would be a catastrophic mistake. Pakistan and India need to adopt measures for mutual restraint to avoid any
conflict, now or in the future.

Three: since bilateral efforts have failed for 70 years, it is essential that the international community intercedes
forcefully to promote a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute and prevent a war between Pakistan and India, by
design or accident.

Our leaders and people should be clear: Pakistan is not isolated, nor likely to be. In fact, there are several current
opportunities for Pakistans diplomacy to shift the strategic balance in its favour.

First, Pakistan should open an early dialogue with the incoming US administration to underline the need for a
balanced US policy to prevent an Indian threat to Pakistans security and to sustain Pakistan-US cooperation on
Afghanistan, counterterrorism, non-proliferation as well as trade and investment.

Second, while US support for Indias military build-up is aimed against China, it is Pakistan which faces the
primary threat from this build-up. As Pakistans strategic partner, China must be asked at the highest level to
intensify its strategic cooperation with Pakistan and enable it to effectively counter the advanced military
capabilities India is deploying against Pakistan.

Third, Islamabad needs to take full advantage of Russias new openness to a strategic relationship with Pakistan
and build a relationship covering defence, technology, energy, Afghanistan and countering terrorism.

Fourth, Pakistan and Iran have a common interest in stabilising their Baloch provinces. This can be the foundation
for a restored strategic relationship encompassing trade, energy, defence and Afghanistan.

Fifth, Saudi Arabia is strategically adrift due to the erosion of its alliance with the US. Pakistan can extend support
to the House of Saud without becoming involved in the competition between Riyadh and Tehran.

Sixth, Turkeys ties with the US and Nato are also frayed. Pakistans already close relationship with Ankara can be
expanded across the board.

Last, while the threat from India is existential, it is potential. The hostile intervention from Afghanistan by the
TTP and BLA is operational. In the absence of Kabuls cooperation, surgical strikes against TTP safe havens and
BLA safe houses should be an active option for Pakistan. Moreover, if Ghanis government continues to refuse a
negotiated peace, Pakistan is well placed to promote an alternative peace process involving those Afghans who are
ready to reach a peace settlement based on power-sharing and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.