A.C. No.

L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for

complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with

malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday
Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance

of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged
to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having

published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his
attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for
"the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat
such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to
the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in
theTribune and that he never had any case at law by reason
thereof.Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for
decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant

violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a
brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome
of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)In In re
Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the
practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his
services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because
there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more
elaborate and insistent.Considering his plea for leniency and his
promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion
and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is,
reprimanded.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-1582 October 10, 1947

TEOFILO PAAR, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO V. BORROMEO ET AL., respondents.

The petitioner in his own behalf.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor
Francisco Carreon for respondents.

MORAN, C.J.:

Teofilo Paar is charge in Manila with treason before the People's

Court, and prayed that he be assisted in his defense by Andres R.
Camasura who is not a member of the bar. The People's Court
denied the petition, hence, this action for mandamus.

Section 3 and 4 Rule 112 are as follows:

SEC. 3. Duty of court to inform defendant of his right to have

attorney. If the defendant appears without a attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney before
being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney.
If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must
 assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be
allowed for procuring attorney.

SEC. 4. Who may be appointed attorney `de oficio'. The attorney

so employed or assigned must be a duty authorized member of the
Bar. But in provinces where duly authorized members of the bar are
not available, the court may, in its discretion, admit or assign a
person, resident in the province and of good repute for probity and
ability, to aid the defendant in his defense, although the person so
admitted or assigned be not a duly authorized member of the Bar.

Section 29 and 31 of Rule 127 read:

SEC. 29. Attorney for destitute litigants. "A superior court may
assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any
party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is
destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of
counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect
the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so
assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused there
from by the court for sufficient cause shown."

SEC. 31. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the

peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.lawphil.net

It is clear form these provisions that in Manila where there are many
members of the bar, defendants in the People's Court may be
assisted only by members of the bar.

Petition denied, without costs.Paras, Feria, Perfecto, Hilado,

Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.MORAN, C.J.:

I certify that Mr. Justice Pablo concurs in this decision.

G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna,
charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief
before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced
by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was
represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having
entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the
trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of
absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his
services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor
was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case
of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney
had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or
City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to
engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP
Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the
case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP
issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a

"Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this
Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this
limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of
Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually
enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the
CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which
rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of
which read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no

reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil
action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to
intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel
because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the
court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice
of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party.
It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or
 that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or
intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes
committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because
the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are
handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the
City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict
in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this
criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the
offended party in this criminal case had a right to be
represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the
civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the
criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City

Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the

Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of
Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without
costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without

merits.1wph1.t

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge,

heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy
of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of
Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as
private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of
the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law
to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on
one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor
General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one

must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had
been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed

from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs
against appellant..

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,

Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949

BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB
ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, respondents.

Delgado, Dizon and Flores for petitioner.

Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.

TUASON, J.:

It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought

an action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several
houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs.
Hilado's now deceased husband.

On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer

on behalf of the defendant; and on June 15, Attorneys Delgado,
Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for
the plaintiff. On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended
complaint by including Jacob Assad as party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as
attorney of record for the defendant in substitution for Attorney
Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the case.

On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney
Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the defendants on
the ground that their client had consulted with him about her case,
on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to
Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not
receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorney Delgado, Dizon,
Flores and Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the
court, wherein the case was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney
Francisco.

Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and

identified as Exhibit A, is in full as follows:

VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila

July 13, 1945.

Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado

Manila, Philippines

My dear Mrs. Hilado:

From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil

case No. 70075 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled "Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J. Assad," I find that
the basic facts which brought about the controversy between
you and the defendant therein are as follows:

(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property

described in the complaint, as the same was purchased and/or
built with funds exclusively belonging to you, that is to say,
the houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;

(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was
with your husband, Mr. Serafin P. Hilado; and

(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your
knowledge on the aforesaid date of May 3, 1943.
 Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action
against Mr. Assad will not ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the
right to presume that your husband had the legal right to
dispose of the property as the transfer certificate of title was
in his name. Moreover, the price of P110,000 in Japanese
military notes, as of May 3, 1943, does not quite strike me as
so grossly inadequate as to warrant the annulment of the sale.
I believe, lastly, that the transaction cannot be avoided merely
because it was made during the Japanese occupation, nor on
the simple allegation that the real purchaser was not a citizen
of the Philippines. On his last point, furthermore, I expect that
you will have great difficulty in proving that the real purchaser
was other than Mr. Assad, considering that death has already
sealed your husband's lips and he cannot now testify as to the
circumstances of the sale.

For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advise you that I cannot

appear in the proceedings in your behalf. The records of the
case you loaned to me are herewith returned.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO

VJF/Rag.

In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney Francisco

alleged that about May, 1945, a real estate broker came to his office
in connection with the legal separation of a woman who had been
deserted by her husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there
was a pending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian
to annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado
had made to the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this
woman asked him if he was willing to accept the case if the Syrian
should give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales of real
property during the Japanese regime were valid even though it was
paid for in Japanese military notes; that this being his opinion, he
told his visitor he would have no objection to defending the Syrian;

That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a
suit she had instituted against a certain Syrian to annul the
conveyance of a real estate which her husband had made; that
according to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado
and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away from them; that as he
had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not hesitate to
tell her frankly that hers was a lost case for the same reason he had
told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis of her action
was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military
notes, but that the premises were her private and exclusive
property; that she requested him to read the complaint to be
convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked
Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property and she
answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he told Mrs. Hilado
that if the property was registered in her husband's favor, her case
would not prosper either;

That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada
street, he was informed by Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant,
that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him and that when he,
Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned legal matters he
attended to her and requested her to leave the "expediente" which
she was carrying, and she did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the
firm should not handle Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the
papers, calling Agrava's attention to what he (Francisco) already had
said to Mrs. Hilado;

That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo
Ragodon, showed him a letter which had been dictated in English by
Mr. Agrava, returning the "expedients" to Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon
told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava's request that
Agrava thought it more proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons
why her case was rejected; that he forthwith signed the letter
without reading it and without keeping it for a minute in his
possession; that he never saw Mrs. Hilado since their last meeting
until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed
extrajudicial settlement of the case;

That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to

handle his case stating that his American lawyer had gone to the
States and left the case in the hands of other attorneys; that he
accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his
appearance.

Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in

corroboration of his answer.

The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later
promoted to the Court of Appeals, dismissed the complaint. His
Honor believed that no information other than that already alleged
in plaintiff's complaint in the main cause was conveyed to Attorney
Francisco, and concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff
and the respondent did not attain the point of creating the relation
of attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is
undoubted: That Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed to the plaintiff
a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that
this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted
at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers
was to secure Attorney Francisco's professional services. Granting
the facts to be no more than these, we agree with petitioner's
counsel that the relation of attorney and client between Attorney
Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following rules accord with
the ethics of the legal profession and meet with our approval:

In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a

professional one and not merely one of principal and agent,
the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a
legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of
justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as
deeds, bills, contracts and the like. (Atkinson vs. Howlett, 11
Ky. Law Rep. (abstract), 364; cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)

To constitute professional employment it is not essential that

the client should have employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. . . . It is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward undertake the case about which the consultation
was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established. . . . (5 Jones
Commentaries on Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)

An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his

professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is
listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or
when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is
drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause
in open court. (Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 20 Colo., 107;
36 P., 848.)

Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an

attorney. The contract may be express or implied and it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is
sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An
acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the
attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of
a request by the latter. (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see Hirach Bros.
and Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L. R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment;" and section 19
(e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty "to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve
the secrets of his client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of
Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of
both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each
other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions
above quoted. (In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact the prohibition
derives validity from sources higher than written laws and rules. As
has been aptly said in In re Merron, 22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B,
378, "information so received is sacred to the employment to which
it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the interest of another,
or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the
element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the
essential security in, the relation of attorney and client."

That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to

Attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no secret communication
was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary the situation
even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers,
personal and private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents
are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere relation of
attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting
the opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of
what information was received by him from his first client.

The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged

to represent a client from thereafter appearing on behalf of
the client's opponent applies equally even though during the
continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential
nature was revealed to the attorney by the client. (Christian
vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J.
S., 828.)

Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in

litigation, had formerly represented the adverse party with
respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court
need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney
acquired from his former during that relationship, before
refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party.
(Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)

In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing

against a former client, it is unnecessary that the ascertain in detail
the extent to which the former client's affairs might have a bearing
on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the
attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.) This rule has been so strictly that it has
been held an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot
thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general
matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired
no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in
the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31
R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)

Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number

of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant
and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of
what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a
client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation,
in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further
prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be
productive of other un salutary results. To make the passing of
confidential communication a condition precedent; i.e., to make the
employment conditioned on the scope and character of the
knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to
change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is
to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they
believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity
call for an investigation of what information the attorney has
received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new
position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an
attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceedings, if an
investigation be held, the court should accept the attorney's
inaccurate version of the facts that came to him. "Now the
abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is by
hypothesis an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice."
(John H. Wigmore's Evidence, 1923, Section 2285, 2290, 2291.)

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare

relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as
well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n, 183 Ill.,
97; 47 L.R.A., 792.) It is founded on principles of public policy, on
good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only
to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
So without impugning respondent's good faith, we nevertheless can
not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party
who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not
necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above
reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar.
Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt,
or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly
in expedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which
he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and suspicion
and undermine the integrity of justice."There is in legal practice
what called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the
realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for
the other side after he has given professional advice to the opposite
party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated
services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on
the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a
separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was
conceived and authorized. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given
to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services,
and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate
counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the
opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay
from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an
express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received
in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no
relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the
services which he has retained him to perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)

The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that
Attorney Francisco did not take the trouble of reading it, would not
take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was written under
the circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was
unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs.
Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore
demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. This
letter binds and estop him in the same manner and to the same
degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained
from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere
fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our
case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his
information, by the nature of his connection with the firm is
available to his associates or employers. The rule is all the more to
be adhered to where, as in the present instance, the opinion was
actually signed by the head of the firm and carries his initials
intended to convey the impression that it was dictated by him
personally. No progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that
the client in consulting his legal adviser ought to be free from
apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the prohibition were
not extended to the attorney's partners, employers or assistants.The
fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed
from the date Attorney Francisco first appeared for the defendants
does not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for his
disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance of an
attorney was allowed even on appeal as a ground for reversal of the
judgment. In that case, in which throughout the conduct of the
cause in the court below the attorney had been suffered so to act
without objection, the court said: "We are all of the one mind, that
the right of the appellee to make his objection has not lapsed by
reason of failure to make it sooner; that professional confidence
once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional
employment." (Nickels vs. Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A. L. R.
1316.)

The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and not by

certiorari deserves scant attention. The courts have summary
jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from
any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of the
justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not
confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but
embraces authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts
may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to
perform. The courts from the general principles of equity and policy,
will always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and
guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a
situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts acts on the
same principles whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that
matter, not to appear, to answer declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718 C.J.S.,
1005.) This summary remedy against attorneys flows from the facts
that they are officers of the court where they practice, forming a
part of the machinery of the law for the administration of justice and
as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the courts and to its
orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as
well as to their clients. (Charest vs. Bishop, 137 Minn., 102; 162,
N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.) Attorney stand on the same
footing as sheriffs and other court officers in respect of matters just
mentioned.

We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be

allowed. It is so ordered, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,

Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. 131803. April 14, 1999]

SOTERA PAULINO MARCELO, GABRIELA M. ANGELES,

SIMEONA CUENCO, EMILIA MARCELO and RUBEN
MARCELO, petitioners, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
FERNANDO CRUZ and SERVANDO FLORES, respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

The reversal of the 28th November 1996 decision[1] of the Court

of Appeals setting aside that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 19, of Malolos, Bulacan, is sought in this petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners seek the reinstatement of the RTC decision
which has ordered respondents Fernando Cruz and Servando Flores
to return the ownership and possession of a portion of unregistered
and untitled land located in Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan, to herein
petitioners.
It would appear that on 06 October 1982, herein petitioners,
heirs of the deceased Jose Marcelo, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, an action for the recovery of a portion
of unregistered land in Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan. The complaint,
later amended on 12 October 1983, averred that two parcels of land
in Sta. Lucia, declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declarations
No. 2880 and No. 2882, owned by the late Jose Marcelo and his
spouse, Sotera Paulino-Marcelo, had been encroached, to the extent
of 7,540[2] square meters thereof, by respondents Fernando Cruz and
Servando Flores.
In their answer, respondent Cruz and Flores denied the
allegations of petitioners, assailing at the same time the jurisdiction
of the trial court to act on the complaint which, it was claimed, had
effectively asserted a cause of action for ejectment (unlawful
detainer).
The appellate court adopted the summary of evidence made by
the trial court; thus:

Evidence adduced by the plaintiffs through the testimony of plaintiff

Gabriela Angeles showed that the parcel of land subject of litigation
covering Lot 3098 and embraced under Tax Declaration No. 2882
(Exh. A) was originally owned by spouses Jose Marcelo and Sotera
Paulino and they had been in continuous possession of said property
since 1939.Following the death of plaintiffs father in 1965, they
discovered in 1967 that a portion of said property had been
encroached by defendant Fernando Cruz. Plaintiffs caused the
relocation survey of said property and per plan of Lot 3096 and Lot
3098 of the Angat Cadastre as surveyed for the heirs of Jose Marcelo
(Exh. B), 7540 square meters of Lot 3098 had been encroached by
defendant Fernando Cruz as indicated in the shaded portion of said
plan (Exh. B-1).

Defendant Fernando Cruz sold his property with an area of 13,856

square meters to defendant Servando Flores pursuant to a deed of
sale (Kasulatan ng Bilihan) dated November 3, 1968 (Exh. C) which
sale, includes the encroached portion (7,540 square meters of
plaintiffs property) Defendant Fernando Cruz heretofore purchased
the said property from Engracia dela Cruz and Vicente Marta and
Florentino all surnamed Sarmiento, pursuant to a Kasulatan ng
Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang Patulayandated
November 19, 1960 (Exh. D) covering an area of 6,000 square
meters. The Tax Declaration No. 4482 (Exh. E) covering the property
in the name of Jorge Sarmiento and Engracia Cruz covered an area
of 6,800[3] square meters. As soon as the said property was sold to
Fernando Cruz, the adjoining property described and classified
as parangwith an area of 7,856 square meters was declared by said
Fernando Cruz in his name which circumstance, increased his
landholding to 13,856 square meters (Exh. F). The said property was
subsequently sold by defendant Fernando Cruz to defendant
Servando Flores.

According to Gabriela, they attempted to cultivate the disputed

portion sometime in 1968, but were barred from doing so by
defendant Servando Flores who claimed that the area was part of
the land he bought from co-defendant Fernando Cruz.

On the other hand, both defendants testified to refute plaintiffs

evidence. They invariably declared that the portion sought to be
recovered by plaintiffs is part of the land which defendant Fernando
Cruz acquired in 1960 from the Heirs of Jorge Sarmiento; that as
stated in their document (Exh 2), the land sold to defendant
Fernando Cruz contained 6,000 square meters of palayero or
riceland and 7,856 square meters of parang or pasture land; that
defendant Fernando Cruz caused the entire parcel to be surveyed
sometime in 1967 (Exhs. 3 & 4), which he then declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 8505 (Exh. F); that on
November 3, 1968 defendant Fernando Cruz sold the whole lot to
defendant Servando Flores (Exh. I), who thereupon occupied and
cultivated it.[4]

Evaluating the evidence of the contending parties, the trial court

found and ratiocinated:

The crux of the matter at issue apparently resolves on the so-called

pasture land (parang) supposedly sold by the Sarmientos and
Engracia de la Cruz to defendant Fernando Cruz. The
said 'parang' was never included and/or embraced in the Tax
Declaration No. 4882 (Exh. E) of the Sarmientos at the time of the
said sale in favor of defendant Fernando Cruz pursuant to an
extrajudicial partition with sale dated November 19, 1960 (Exh.
D). This is evident as indicated by the fact that the same was only
declared by Fernando Cruz in his name in 1961 as evidenced by the
tax declaration issued in his favor (Exh. F). On the other hand, the
said parang is a part and parcel of plaintiffs property to which they
had been in possession thereof prior to World War II and evidenced
by Tax Declaration No. 2882 (Exh. A). The plan of Lot 3096 and Lot
3098 of the Angat Cadastre (Exhs. B and B-1) inevitably
indicated that what has been encroached by defendants refers to
the parang of 7,540 square meters which defendant Fernando Cruz
declared the same in his name in 1961. This explains the
unnecessary increase of his property from 6,000 square meters
which he purchased from the Sarmientos pursuant to extrajudicial
partition with sale and embraced under Tax Declaration No. 4882
(Exh. E), to 13,856 square meters.[5]
The trial court thereupon ruled in favor of petitioners; the dispositive
portion of its decision concluded:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants

ordering the following:

a. To return the ownership and possession of 7,540 square

meters to the plaintiffs as indicated in the relocation
survey plan; and

b To pay attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00;

No actual and/or moral damages (sic) is awarded for lack of factual

evidence.

The counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of factual and/or legal

basis.[6]

Respondents Cruz and Flores went to the Court of Appeals; in its

now assailed decision, the appellate court reversed the judgment of
the court a quo. Petitioners moved for a consideration; the motion,
however, was denied.
In this latest recourse, petitioners assail the holding of the Court
of Appeals that the action initiated in 1982 by petitioners against
respondent Flores would not prosper on the theory that Flores
already has acquired ownership of the disputed land by ordinary
acquisitive prescription. Petitioners argue that

1. The respondent court erred in not applying the doctrine laid down
by this Honorable Court in Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 105 considering
that respondents never acquired the 7,540 square meters lawfully,
as the respondent court already stated that what was sold to
respondent Cruz was the 6,800 square meters which he then sold to
respondent Flores, hence respondents can not account as to how
they acquire said lot, whereas the petitioner proved the 7,540
square meters formed part of 19,231 square meters of their parents
in their possession since 1939.

2. The respondent court erred in disregarding the findings of facts of

the trial court, and substitute its own perception of the facts
contrary to the incontrovertible evidence.[7]

Petitioners assert that the property sold by the Sarmientos to

respondent Cruz on 19 November 1960, under a Kasulatan ng
Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan, covers only
the palayero or riceland, which measure about 6,000 square meters,
and that the parang, containing 7,856 square meters, has not been
included.
 The petition must be denied.
Contrary to the insistence of petitioners, the Kasulatan ng
Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan. executed on
19 March 1960 by Engracia dela Cruz (widow of Jorge Sarmiento)
and her children Vicente Sarmiento, Maria Sarmiento and Florentino
Sarmiento, pertained not only to the palayero but also to
the parang as well; this agreement provided thus:

1. Na akong si Engracia de la Cruz at ang aking yumao ng asawang

si Jorge Sarmiento (nuong nabubuhay ito) ay nakapagpundar ng
isang lupa na ang buong description ay gaya ng sumusunod:

Isang parselang lupang PALAYERO na may kasamang

PARANG (Cogonales) na matatagpuan sa Barrio Ng Santa Lucia,
Angat, Bulacan, P.I.

Ang Palayero ay may sukat na 6,000 metros

cuadrados, klasipikado 2-b, amillarado P270.00 Tax No. 4482; at
ang parang ay may sukat na 7,856 metros
cuadrados.Humahangga sa Norte, kay Antonio de la Rosa; Este,
kina Fabian Garcia at Juan Geronimo; Sur, Kina Miguel Illescas,
Ciriaco Reyes, y Juan de la Cruz; Oeste, Juan de la Cruz hoy Jose
Marcelo y Mariano de la Cruz hoy Felip de Leon. Walang mejoras at
ang hangganan sa paligid ay makikilala sa pamamagitan ng
matutuwid na sikang o pilapil na buhay.

2. Ayon sa Tax No. 4482 ay lupang palayero lamang ang nakatala,

subalit itoy mayroong kasamang parang na hindi lamang
naipatala niyang nakaraang pasukan ng lupa sa tanggapan ng
Assessor Provincial, kayat ngayon ay magalang naming hinihiling na
matala ang naturang parang.[8] (Emphasis supplied)

Shortly after the execution of the deed of sale in his favor,

respondent Cruz declared both parcels, i.e., the palayero and
the parang, for taxation purposes in 1960 in the Office of the
Provincial Assessor and forthwith a new tax declaration was issued
in his name for the entire 13,856 square meter property. The trial
court itself likewise found that the sale by the Sarmientos to
respondent Cruz covered both the riceland and the pasture land; it
said:

x x x. It is worthy to note that the ownership of the adjoining

property by defendant Fernando Cruz originated from an
extrajudicial partition with sale (Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng
Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan dated November 19, 1960 x x
x. Under the said document, Engracia de la Cruz and her children
Vicente, Marta, and Florentino, all surnamed Sarmiento, sold to
defendant Fernando Cruz a rice land containing an area of 6,000
square meters and embraced under Tax Declaration No. 4482 and a
pasture land (parang) containing an area of 7,856 square meters. x
x x[9]

In turn, respondent Cruz sold, on 03 November 1968, the 13,856

square meters of land to respondent Flores under a Kasulatan ng
Bilihan. Respondent Flores immediately took possession of the
property to the exclusion of all others and promptly paid the realty
taxes thereon. From that time on, Flores had been in possession of
the entire area in the concept of an owner and holding it in that
capacity for almost fourteen (14) years before petitioners initiated
their complaint on 06 October 1982.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a
possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into
ownership, possession must be in theconcept of an owner, public
peaceful and uninterrupted.[10] Thus, mere possession with
a juridical title, such as, to exemplify, by a usufructuary, a trustee,
a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not being in the concept of an
owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription,
[11]
unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such
repudiation has been communicated to the other party.[12] Acts of
possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance
of the owner would likewise be inadequate.[13] Possession,
to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en
concepto de dueno, or, to use the common law equivalent of the
term, that possession should be adverse; if not, such possessory
acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.[14]
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time
fixed by law;[15] without good faith and just title, acquisitive
prescription can only be extraordinary in character.
As regards, real or immovable property, Article 1134 of the Civil
Code provides:

ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property
are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten
years.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands, as aforesaid, that the

possession be in good faith and with just title. [16] The good faith of
the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from
whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof and could
thereby transmit that ownership.[17] There is, upon the other hand,
just title when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the
property through any of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but that the grantor is
neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the right.
[18]
In Doliendo vs. Biarnesa,[19] the Supreme Court has explained the
law in Article 1130 of the Civil Code which states that the title for
prescription must be true and valid. Thus:

We think that this contention is based on a misconception of the

scope and effect of the provisions of this article of the Code in its
application to ordinary prescription. It is evident that by a titulo
verdadero y valido in this connection we are not to understand a
titulo que por si solo tiene fuerza de transferir el dominio sin
necesidad de la prescricion (a title which of itself is sufficient to
transfer the ownership without the necessity of the lapse of the
prescription period); and we accept the opinion of a learned Spanish
law writer who holds that the titulo verdadero y valido as used in
this article of the code prescribes a titulo colorado and not merely
putativo; a titulo colorado being one which a person has when he
buys a thing, in good faith, from one whom he believes to be the
owner, and a titulo putativo being one which is supposed to have
preceded the acquisition of a thing, although in fact it did not, as
might happen when one is in possession of a thing in the belief that
it had been bequeathed to him. (Viso Derecho Civil, Parte Segunda,
p. 541)[20]

The records of the case amply supports the holding of the

appellate court that the requirements for ordinary prescription
hereinabove described have indeed been duly met; it explained:

In the instant case, appellant Servando Flores took possession of the

controverted portion in good faith and with just title. This is so
because the said portion of 7,540 square meters was an integral
part of that bigger tract of land which he bought from Fernando Cruz
under public document (Exh. I) As explicitly mentioned in the
document of sale (Exh. I) executed in 1968, the disputed portion
referred to as parang was included in the sale to appellant
Flores. Parenthetically, at the time of the sale, the whole area
consisting of the riceland and pasture land was already covered by a
tax declaration in the name of Fernando Cruz (Exh. F) and further
surveyed in his favor (Exhs. 3&4). Hence, appellant Flores
possession of the entire parcel which includes the portion sought to
be recovered by appellees was not only in the concept of an owner
but also public, peaceful and uninterrupted. While it is true that the
possession of the entire area by his predecessor-in-interest
(Fernando Cruz) may not have been peaceful as it was indeed
characterized with violence which resulted in the death of Jose
Marcelo, this cannot be said of appellant Flores possession of the
property, in respect of which no evidence to the contrary appears on
record.[21]
This Court finds no cogent reasons to reverse the above findings of
the appellate court and thus gives its affirmance to the assailed
decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner for review
on certiorari is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990

E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.

A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990

ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO R.

RODRIGUEZ, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pea & Marcos for
complainants in AC No. 2033.

Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf.

PER CURIAM:

We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants

Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative Case
No. 2148 1 and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in
Administrative Case No. 2033 2 seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice and gross
misconduct.

In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the

Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted to this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the
suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law during
the pendency of these cases. 3

The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to

our resolutions of February 14, 1975 and September 13, 1976 in
G.R. Nos.
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With commendable
thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports were submitted
which, in order to vividly portray the scope and magnitude of
respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the
anomalous transactions complained of, we quote extensively from
said reports which are sustained by the evidence of record.

I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is

premised are reported by then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,
as follows:

PREPATORY STATEMENT

This unnumbered administrative case against

respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (hereinafter called
respondent NAVARRO, for short) originally stemmed
from the letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan to the
Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25, 1975 which
reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

 I wish to respectfully inform your good office
that I bought a few lots on installment basis
from Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby Hills
Subdivision as evidenced by the attached
OR Nos. 0512 and 0519 and a "Contract of
Sale".

Atty. Navarro, some officials and

representative of the said company claim
that although there is a pending case No. L-
39386 under Decree No. 1425 on the
property being sold, the case is almost won
in their favor and are just waiting for your
final decision within a couple of months or
even less.

In this connection, I am respectfully writing

you this letter in order to bring to your
attention this transaction and to protect my
rights in the event that any unfavorable
circumstances may arise in the future.

xxx xxx xxx

Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per

Resolution dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of
Mr. Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General for
"investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to
proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
(whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas
District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from
the office of attorney and for appropriate action." The
resolution reads as follows:

L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid

Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.)
The court NOTED the letter dated January
25, 1975 of Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan with its
attachments (copy thereof has been
furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, counsel for
respondents) and RESOLVED to instruct the
Clerk of Court to inform him of the status of
the cases at bar.

It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been
selling the lots in litigation herein on installment basis to the public
(among them, Mr. Cayanan) as "absolute owner by virtue of this
contract of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc. of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Contract of
Sale), which lots are titled in the name of herein petitioner and not in
Atty. Navarro's name and that the unwarranted claim is made on his
behalf that 'the case is almost won in their favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's
letter), the Court RESOLVED FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's
said letter with its attachments to the Solicitor General under Rule
139, Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the existence of
sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District,
Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of attorney
and for appropriate action.

Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is directed to

communicate in the premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the
law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with address at 10th Floor, Ortigas
Bldg. Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of June 10, 1974 on
file in Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to make available
documents in their possession showing other sales made by Atty.
Navarro of properties titled in the name of other persons, involving a
total selling price of P75 million and down payments of almost P 0.6
million.

On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the

Court of Appeals) Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B.
Cayanan asking him to submit his affidavit embodying the
circumstances surrounding the matters contained in his letter dated
January 25, 1975, especially the second paragraph thereof. The
letter was sent to Mr. Cayanan by registered mail but the same was
returned unserved for the reason that the addressee had moved to
another address.

On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General

Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez requesting him
for copies of the documents evidencing the sales made by
respondent Navarro.

On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in L-

39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr.
dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the existence of
sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for
suspension or removal from office and for appropriate action" and
directing "Mr. Ortigas, Jr., to furnish the Office of the Solicitor
General for the purpose with a copy of said letter and all its
pertinent attachments."

The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated

January 13, 1976 reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

 Dear Justice Teehankee,

This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of Atty. Felipe C.

Navarro who has previously been reported to the Supreme Court as
selling properties titled in the name of this Company.

We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty. Navarro

showing that the lots he is now selling to the public include those
titled in the names of the heirs of the late Don Vicente Madrigal and
this Company in Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus expanded his
activities despite recent detention by the Military. As could be seen
from the attached "plan", Navarro claims to be the owner of that
huge property (actually titled in the name of the Madrigals and this
Company) bounded by Ortigas Avenue, E. delos Santos Avenue,
White Plains Road and R. Rodriguez Avenue, comprising
approximately of 260 hectares.

As reported in our previous letters to the Court, Navarro claims to be

the owner of some 4,000 hectares of land in the Greater Manila Area in
virtue of his handling the case of some squatters on a 1.2-hectare lot
in Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer. He contends that whereas his squatters-clients occupy only
about a hectare, he has become, in virtue of his contract of legal
services' with them, the owner of thousands of hectares of land as
these are allegedly0 covered by void titles. Navarro thus started to
openly sell these properties.

Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for instance, cover

properties already with buildings and other improvements. He has
nevertheless been quite successful in selling portions thereof, as when
he sold lots within the De La Salle College, Wack-Wack Golf & Country
Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus operandi is described in this
Company's letter complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero
Olivas, copy of which is attached hereto for ready reference.

Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is
now again openly selling titled properties of other persons. We have
provided more than sufficient documentary evidence to the Court and
the Solicitor General and we hope that formal administrative charges
can now be filed against Navarro to prevent him from further
perpetrating a large scale fraud upon the public.

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.

COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE
The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents, most
of which were presented in Criminal Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal and in the various civil cases before the
said court involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Complainants'
sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely identified the various
documentary exhibits presented by the complainants.

From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a

certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (hereinafter called HABERER,
for short) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22)
cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2 hectare property in
Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to eject the twenty-two (22)
families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of these cases were raffled to
Judge Emilio Salas, while the other eleven (11) cases were assigned to
Judge Pedro Navarro. All the twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters were
represented by respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients,
respondent NAVARRO interposed as principal defense, the alleged
nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title from which
it emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O.
Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent.

The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven
(11) cases, Judge Salas rendered a decision on August 31, 1970
sustaining the validity of the HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction
of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO (Exhibit W).
In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas stated as follows:

After due consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, this

Court finds that most of the documentary evidence submitted by
defendants are irrelevant to the case since they pertain to defendants
claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of land when the area of the
property subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700 square meters.
This Court also believes that the above-mentioned claims of defendants
are untenable.

Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is evidenced by the

issuance in her name, since 1929, of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one-
year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which
it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan vs. San
Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of Lands,
50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, et al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186,
April 15,1957; Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas, 53 O.G., p.
2822, May 15, 1957).

Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land in question by

adverse possession is without merit considering that title to land
becomes non-prescriptible Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Corporation de Pp.
Agustines vs. Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once registered cannot
be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession.
Registered title under the Torrens System cannot be defeated by
prescription. The title, once registered, is notice to the World. All
persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of registration
(Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).

Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership over the property in

question when they filed a petition with the People's Homesite &
Housing Corporation wherein they sought the latter's intervention for
the acquisition of the property and for the subdividing thereof into small
lots to be sold to them at nominal cost. In said petition defendants not
only named the plaintiff as the owner of the property in question but
they also indicated therein her title to the land as Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote
hereunder the pertinent facts and data concerning the property in
question in defendants' petition submitted to the General Manager of
the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong, Rizal

2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer

3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or c/o Bausa,

Ampil, & Suarez Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila

4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 15043

5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square meters(Exh
G).

As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate of Title No.

15043 issued since 1929 in the name of plaintiff is null and void, this
Court is of the opinion that defendants cannot assail the validity of
said title in this proceeding, which is for recovery of possession. Any
attack on the decree of registration of title must be direct and not by
collateral proceeding. The title which may be issued in pursuance of
said decree cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or
diminished in a collateral proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31
Phil. 590). In the case of Director of Land vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664,
May 30, 1951, our Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the trial
court where the registered owner was considered disqualified to
acquire land under the Constitution and consequently was denied the
right to constitute his title, said: "That the disqualification raised by
 the Court is untenable in the light of the theory that a Torrens title
cannot be collateraly attacked. That issue can only be raised in an
action instituted expressly for that purpose". (See also Ramon Chua Yu
Sun vs. The Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347,
November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No. L-4013, Dec. 29,1951;
Samonte, et al. vs. Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb. 29,1960).

In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme Court, it is our

opinion that there is no need to discuss the merits of the reasons
claimed by defendants why Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in
the name of plaintiff is null and void. (Exh. W) Decision in Civil Cases
Nos. 8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691, 8693, 8696 &
8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).

In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided in
favor of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In
his decision dated May 26, 1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge
Navarro stated as follows:

Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel of land

containing an area of 12,000 square meters situated at the corner of
A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C. Zuluete Streets, Mandaluyong,
Rizal, which is covered by, and more particularly described in, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and
indicated in the sketch plan attached to the complaint as Annex A.

xxx xxx xxx

It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have been filed in the

Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, and in the City Court of Quezon City
against several persons occupying other parcels by Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership, where decisions have been rendered in
favor of said Partnership. In order to forestall executions of these
decisions defendants in said ejectment cases filed class suit before this
Court by the occupants of the land which was heard and tried before
Branch XV in which the Director of Lands was impleaded as a party-
defendant. The decision of Branch XV in said class suit is made part of
the evidence of these defendants in the herein eleven cases for
whatever the same may be worth as aid in the determination of the
merits of the issues raised herein.

As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV plaintiff therein

assailed the validity of Decree No. 1425 as null and void and or fictitious
and the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon which the decree was
based as also null and void. The Court sustained the herein plaintiffs
claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the proceedings in GLRO
Rec. No. 917 null and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and void; (3) all
original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
judgment in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4)
all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of
title declared void under No. 3 above, particularly but not exclusively,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate
of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, null and void; (5)
that the rightful owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the
herein plaintiffs . . . and so forth.

The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch XV and observed
findings of facts too ponderous to be ignored.

That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the

proceedings leading to the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 and,
as an inevitable corollary, the nullity of Decree No. 1425 issue by
virtue of such void proceedings as well as the original certificates of
title issued as consequence thereof.

In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among other things,

found that while the decision in GLRO 917 was supposedly rendered on
April 25, 1905, the survey of the property subject matter of therein
application was not made until June 16 to August 16, 1906, or some one
year after the decision. It found no proof of initial hearing of the
application for registration being published as required by law without
which the Land Registration Court could not have acquired jurisdiction
over the case. Said decision also made inference that since the survey
of the property was not made until a year after the rendition of the
judgment the technical descriptions appearing in the original
certificates of title issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree No. 1425,
could not have been those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if
any. Publication of accurate technical description being an essential
jurisdictional requirement which cannot be dispensed with and non-
compliance with this requirement renders the proceedings and the
decision and decree and titles issued arising therefrom null and void.

The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings that James Ross
who was said to have penned the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917,
never was a judge of the Court of Land Registration at the time the
decision was supposedly rendered because the Gaceta Official for the
year 1905 does not show that James Ross was listed as Judge of the
Land Registration Court or that he was ever appointed in that capacity.
Furthermore, the Court found that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of
Court on April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree and he
signed it as Clerk of Court. The Court even found the supposed
decision in that proceedings missing and made its conclusion that
since the decree which was supposedly issued by a person who was
not the Clerk of Court at the time and which decree did not contain the
description of the property ordered in the decision to be rendered
because the survey of the property was only made some one year
later and that said decree cannot now even be found, the decision
rendered therein is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts are too

ponderous to be ignored. It is indeed a truism that a void original
certificate of title cannot be the source of a valid transfer certificate of
title and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the law, inexistent and
cannot give source to any legal right.

The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. 7-
M(10339) before Branch XV of this Court are also the defendants in the
herein eleven cases in which their properties are also involved. Since
the case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the
proceedings by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the alleged title
of the plaintiff over the parcels of land occupied by the herein eleven
defendants is a derivative from such decree, it is the considered
opinion of this Court that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of
this Court is reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer
to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate
the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses
are built has become premature. It goes without saying that if said
decision of Branch XV will be finally affirmed, or that the same
becomes final and executory, all the claims of rights to ownership and
possession of properties embraced in the decision in GLRO Rec. No.
917 and Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute nullities. Possessions
by actual occupants of all these properties had better be maintained
until after final decision in Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) shall have been
rendered. (Exh. R, Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326,
8369, 8379, 8383, 8385, 8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).

On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by

respondent NAVARRO, issued an order cancelling HABERER's title over
her property in question and directing the issuance of a new title in
lieu thereof in favor of respondent's clients Thus

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

dismissing the complaints in the above-entitled cases (Nos. 8320,
8321, 8326, 8329, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and 8700) all
with costs against the plaintiff and hereby ordering the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer and in view thereof issue new certificates of
title in favor of the defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in
favor of Attorney Felipe Navarro in accordance with the terms of the
"Kasunduan Hinggil sa Serbisyo ng Abogado" which is quoted in
his ex-parte motion for clarification and/or modification of the decision.

As so modified the decision stands in all

other respects.
 SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).

On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for

reconsideration of the aforesaid order, and on
September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro issued the following
order:

In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court

had occasion to reiterate that its decision in
this case was mainly predicated on the
decision of Branch XV of this Court that the
certificate of title emanating from the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were
null and void and plaintiffs title happened to
be one of them. The Court opined that until
said decision is reversed the actual
occupants had better be maintained in their
possessions of the land.

Pursuant to the same order the motion for

reconsideration and new trial was set only
for reception of alleged newly discovered
evidence.

The Court now understands that the

decision of Branch XV is now under review
by order of our Appellate Court.

It has also come to the understanding of the

Court that the order of June 21, 1971,
sought to be reconsidered insofar as it
ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the
plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests
of other persons and entities like the Ortigas
& Company, Limited Partnership, which is
not a party herein, because the certificate of
title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of
GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which
Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership,
derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is
not a party in this case whatever orders or
decisions are made in this case cannot be
made to affect the said company. Decisions
and orders can only affect parties to the
case.
 The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion
that the order dated June 21, 1971, must be
reconsidered on two grounds (1) because
the decision of Branch XV is now being the
subject of further proceedings and (2)
because it has the effect of adversely
affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership, which is not even a
party herein.

WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated

June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the
decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it
denies the ejectment of the present
occupants of the land as stated in the
decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).

HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro

while the defendants-clients of respondent NAVARRO
appealed from the decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro
order of June 21, 1971 was not appealed by respondent
NAVARRO's clients.

After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made

reference to the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio
Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV,
respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times on
July 4, 1971 the following:

LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:

PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS

INTERPRETED BY OUR SUPREME COURT
RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND
LATIFUNDIO COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN
JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY,
THE DECISION DATED MAY 26, 1971
REITERATING AND REPEATING THE
DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT ALL
ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN
FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE
UNDERSIGNED HAS AUTOMATICALLY BY
MERE LAPSE OF THE REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD) BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

But to every possessor in good faith there

comes a time when he is considered a
possessor in bad faith. When the owner or
possessor with a better right comes along,
when he becomes aware that what he had
taken for granted is at least doubtful, and
when he learns the grounds in support of the
adverse contention, good faith ceases. The
possessor may still believe that his right is
more secure, because we resign ourselves
with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing
hopes, but when the final judgment of the
court deprives him of the possession, all
illusion necessarily disappears. (Tacas vs.
Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-362 citing Manresa
and Articles 528, 545, and 1123 of our
present Civil Code).

He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on

the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity
(Art 449, Civil Code)

HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE

UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING PARTY AND
SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER THE
ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS
CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND
FOR THE DEMOLITION OR REMOVAL OF THE
IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH FOR:

The Civil Code confirms certain time-

honored principles of the law of property.
One of those is the principle of accession
whereby the owner of property acquires not
only that which it produces but that which it
united to it either naturally or artificially.
Whatever is built, planted or sown on the
land of another, and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner
of the land. Where however, the planter,
builder or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners
and it becomes necessary to protect the
owner of the improvements without causing
 injustice to the owner of the land. In view of
the impracticability of creating what
Manresa calls a state of "forced co-
ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law
has provided a just and equitable solution by
giving the owner of the land the option to
acquire the improvements after the
payment of the proper indemnity or to
oblige the builder or planter to pay for the
land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It
is the owner of the land who is allowed to
exercise the option because his right is older
and because, by the principle of accession,
he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing." Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66
Phil. 598, 602; see also Filipinas Colleges,
Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247,
254).

So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of

possesors in bad faith as we are ready to
ask for the execution of the decision
pursuant to law and avoid a scire
facias Ordinary prudence requires that those
involved may please make some kind of
arrangements with the undersigned before
execution by calling through the following
telephones:

xxx xxx xxx

BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN

THEMOTORCADE OF OUR PEOPLE'S VICTORY
WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL
STREETS OF MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN,
PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM
9 A.M. TO 12 NOON TODAY, SUNDAY, JULY 4,
1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN FROM
NO. 61 AMADO T. REYES STREET, BARRIO
BUROL, MANDALUYONG, RIZAL RETURNING
TO THE SAME PLACE AT NOON FOR LUNCH
CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.

(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO

Counsel for the Defense

60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City

 (Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).

Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of

properties originally covered by Decree 1425 including
the parcels of land owned by Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership (hereinafter called ORTIGAS, for
short), and started selling them.

In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued

among the lot buyers of ORTIGAS and among the
property owners whose titles were derived from Decree
No. 1425. As a counter measure to allay the fears of the
panicky lot buyers and owners, ORTIGAS caused the
publication in the Manila Times on July 19 and 17, 1971
the following:

WARNING

SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW

In reply to numerous inquiries received by

Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership
with reference to an advertisement
published in the Manila Times on July 4,
1971 supposedly affecting the validity of all
original certificates of title and transfer
certificates of title derived from Decree No.
1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership wishes to announce that it is not
a party to ANY case allegedly decided on
May 26, 1971 by the Supreme Court or any
other court and therefore ALL ITS TITLES
DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT
IN ANY WAY AFFECTED BY SAID DECISION.

The public is hereby requested to be wary of

any person selling lands and/or rights to
lands belonging to and in the name of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.

The public is also warned to be wary of

MISLEADING adverstisements and/or
persons basing their rights to lands of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership on
such "decision" of May 26, 1971 which is
claimed to be "final and executory."

ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

 (Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).

After the publication of the foregoing notices,

respondent NAVARRO filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, two (2) complaints for libel
against the officers of ORTIGAS and the officials of the
defunct Manila 'times. Respondent NAVARRO sought to
recover in said cases damages allegedly sustained by
him on account of his failure to consummate thousands
of sales by reason of the publication of the above notice.
In support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO
presented 169 deeds of sale over lots in his various
subdivisions, the locations of which overlap the
properties owned by ORTIGAS (marked as Exhibit F, F-1
to F-168 in the instant proceedings).

On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino

dismissed these two cases for libel for lack of merit
(Exhibit D).

Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER

cases and the libel cases, the complainants also
presented documents relating to Civil Case No. 7-
M(10339), Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV,
entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, et al." and Civil Case No.
Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro."

In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein

sought to enjoin ORTIGAS from ejecting them. Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in favor of the plaintiffs,
arguing that (1) there was no publication for the Notice
of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there was no survey of
the property sought to be registered; (3) the judge
presiding over the defunct Court of Land Registration
was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of the said Court
was also fake. The dispositive portion of the Ruiz
decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the

foregoing, the Court hereby declares and/or
orders:

1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No.

917 are null and void;
2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void
and/or fictitious;

3. That all the original certificates of title

issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
judgments in G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and
Decree No. 1425 were utter nullities;

4. That all transfer certificates of title

derived from the original certificates of title
declared void under No. (3) above,
particularly but not exclusively, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
126575 and its derivative Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null
and void;

5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the

litigated lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653,
126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs,
the portions owned by them being as
indicated in Exhibit P;

6. That the defendant Partnership cease and

desist from molesting the plaintiffs in the
enjoyment and peaceful possession of their
respective landholdings;

7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding

Judge, Municipal Court, Pasig, Rizal, and
Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding Judge,
Branch II, City Court of Quezon City, and the
defendant Ortigas and Company, Limited
Partnership, their agents, representatives
and any and all persons acting in their
behalves, refrain and desist absolute (sic)
and perpetually from proceeding with or
taking any action on Civil Cases Nos. 1134, II
13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-
13921 filed by the herein defendant
Partnership against some of the herein
plaintiffs;

8. That the case be dismissed as against

defendant Director of Lands;
 9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the
plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees;

10. That the defendant Partnership pay to

the plaintiffs the costs of the suit; and

Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is

hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).

ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of

Appeals. On November 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision setting aside the decision of Judge
Ruiz and ordering a new trial to enable the petitioner to
introduce newly discovered evidence. The case was then
remanded to the lower Court. On November 3, 1973,
Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place of Judge
Ruiz who was separated from the service by the
President of the Philippines, rendered a decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the defendant, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
as against the plaintiffs:

1. Dismissing the amended complaint;

2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in

Expediente 917 and all titles emanating therefrom;

3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the

defendant Company:

(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied

by them from the time of the filing of the complaint on
October 20, 1967, with legal rate of interest, until they
surrender the possession thereof to defendant
Company;

(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest,

agents or any person or persons acting in their behalf,
who are found to be in possession of defendant
company's land to vacate the same and remove and
 demolish their improvements thereon at plaintiffs
expenses;

(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the

attorney's fees in the amount of P 1,030.00 he
prematurely collected from defendant company, with
interest; and

(6) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).

The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the

pendency of the approval of the record on appeal,
ORTIGAS filed a motion for immediate execution of
judgment. After exchange of pleadings by the parties,
the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara granted the
motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution
in favor of Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of
P250,000.00. Del Rosario, et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Despite
opposition by Ortigas, Judge Florellana Castro-
Bartolome, who was appointed to Branch XV vice Judge
Alcantara, granted the motion for reconsideration and
set aside the order of Judge Alcantara. Ortigas contested
the order of Judge Bartolome through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060.

On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in

the aforesaid case, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of the

respondent Judge dated February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled and set
aside and the order of Judge Arsenio Alcantara, granting immediate
execution, is hereby revived, with instructions to the respondent judge
to fully implement the latter order, including the approval of the
petitioner's bond and the issuance of the necessary writ or writs of
execution. The restraining order issued at the inception of this action is
hereby (sic) permanent.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).

This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by
respondents Del Rosario, et al., but the same was denied. So also with
the motion for reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court (Annex "A"
of Exhibit FF)

In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled properties,

ORTIGAS also filed Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.

On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a decision in

favor of Ortigas as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad faith and fraud
in claiming and selling plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to attomey's
fees. This court finds the amount of attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00 to be fair and reasonable considering the extent and value
of the property involved and the nature of the case.

Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss, alleged that as a

result of the issuance of the restraining order, he suffered damages in
the amount of Pl,000,000.00 daily.

Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim. Therefore, this

court can only treat it as an affirmative defense.

Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this claim of damages.

Under the same authorities cited in support of the denial of plaintiffs
claim for damages, therefore, he has failed to establish what damages
he had suffered.

Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction
prayed for. It follows, therefore, that the issuance of the restraining
order was proper and, hence, can not be the basis for a claim for
damages.

This court cannot help but end this decision with a note of admonition
and hope. The people who will ultimately suffer the most from
defendant's acts in question are his buyers, who in all probability are
middle class people who themselves wanted to make money out of the
apparent sad predicament that defendant had brought upon the
plaintiff. It is the fervent hope of this court, therefore, that with the
advent of the NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new page and make
a fresh start in life.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of plaintiffs Transfer
Certificates of Title over the land in question;

2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and barring the

defendant, his successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or any person or
persons acting for or in his behalf, from selling and advertising,
verbally, or in writing, the sale of the lands in question and from
asserting any claim or dominion or possession whatsoever on or over
the said property, directly or indirectly, adverse to the plaintiff; and

3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of

P50,000.00 plus cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II).

The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals,

docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-53125-R.

On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision

in the aforesaid case affirming the decision of Judge Apostol.

Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable Tribunal

(G.R. No. L-50156). Again, his petition was denied for lack of merit. His
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. Consequently,
the issue brought forth in the sala of Judge Apostol has now been laid
to rest.

EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT

Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and documentary

evidence. His testimonial evidence consist of his testimony and those
of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez, one of the complainants; and Arsenio de
Guzman, Chief of Section of the Bureau of Lands. His documentary
evidence consist of Exhibits 1 to 13, inclusive.

On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the present

charges are the same as the charges in administrative Case No. 1154,
entitled, "In Re: Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, respondent", which was
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. He
further declared that this Honorable Court deferred action on the said
administrative case until such time that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709, the
heirs of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. is terminated. Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only
on these two matters and on the identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9.

On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified

that he is the counsel for the defendants in the twenty-
 two (22) cases before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge
Emilio Salas of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that
he became the owner of the lands not occupied by his
clients by virtue of his contract of legal services signed
by them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, t.s.n.,
Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for legal services, which
appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit "1", reads as
follows:

KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG ABOGADO SA

MGA KINAUUKULAN NA ANG MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY
MALAMAN AT MAKARATING

Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at nagbibigay-bisa hinggil

sa serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro tungkol sa aming karapatan
sa lupaing nasasakop ng diumanoy Kautusan-Blg. 1425 (Decree No.
1425) sa diumanoy Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip (Cases Nos. 699,
875, 917, etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng Lupain
defunct Court of Land Registration) na ang nasabing diumano'y
Kautusan Blg. 1425 na siyang pinagbatayan ng ipinapatalang
gawagawang dalawanput anim (26) ng mga Original Certificates of
Title ng Register of Deeds ng Pasig at nagbunga ito ng maraming
Transfer Certificates of Title na sa kasalukuyan iginigiit ng mga
mayhawak ngunit yan ay wala namang bisa at katuturan (Viz., City
of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil. 324, 340) dahil sa kapaltosan ng
nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na sa mula't sapul
magpahanggang ngayon sa kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga
nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati
at ibang mga kliyente ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ngayon ay
siyang nararapat maging kalahok sa animnapung usapin na sa
kasalukuyang hawak ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (Civil Cases Nos.
8322, etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branches I, II, and
VI contesting the genuineness and due execution of Decree No.
1425 of the defunct Court of Land Registration) upang mabigyan
ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng mga kanikaniyang katibayan o
kung sila man ay mayhawak ng titulo na sakup ng diumano'y
Kautusan Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o mapapalitan ng maybisa
galing sa Hukuman upang matahimik at mapayapa ang dahilan
paninirahan kanilang mula't sapul ay kanila nang pinamamayanan
sa buong kaalaman ng sambayanan at walang paglilihim ng
kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain na sa mula't
sapul ay pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang
ito at ng kanilang ninuno o nagpamana (predecessors-in-interest)
na siyang mga pangyayari ay sapat na upang maigawad ang
mabisang titulo sapagkat ang nasabing lupain kailanmay di naging
pambayan kungdi pribado o di kaya'y sariling pag-aari ng
nakalagdang may-ari sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito, dahil sa mga
nabanggit ng mga pangyayari na 'natamo sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay-bisa ng batas di lamang ng karapatan sa pag-aangkin
ng lupain kungdi maging ang karapatang ipinagkaloob sa kanila ng
pamahalaan ay nagsasaad na ang aktuwal na pagkakaloob sa
kanila ng pamahalaan ng titulo ay di na kinakailangan upang ang
nasabing karapatan ay di kilanlin o pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi
vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 242; Director of Lands vs.
Abaldonado CA-G.R. No. 177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz 2188).
Ngunit sa dahilang mayroon huwad na titulo ang mga nag-aangkin
ng mga lupain at nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito
upang ang Hukuman magpatibay at magbigay-bisa ng mga titulo
sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ayon sa Section 10
ng Rule 39 ng Rules of Court. Sapagkat ang pamumusisyon sa
isang bagay ang batayang di mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan
ng pagmamay-ari nito ng makalipas ang mahabang panahong
takda ng batas, maging ito man ay walang karampatang titulo o
mabuting hangarin ay nagpapahina at sumisira sa saklaw-bisa at
halaga ng pinakamahusay na titulo na maaring nasa bagay na iyon
na pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi nagmamay-ari. Bunga nito,
ang pamumusisyon ng mahigit sa tatlumpung (30) taon na
tinatamasa ng isang tao bilang may-ari kahit na walang
karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng sapat
na titulo upang makuha ang pag-aari ng lupaing tangan sapagkat
ang lampas-bisa o ang panahong itinakda ng batas sa
pamamagitan ng pamumusisyon ng mahigit na tatlumpung (30)
taon ay tiyakang hadlang na maging ang pinakamahusay na titulo
na kinikilala ng batas ay hindi makatitinag o makapangingibabaw
(Kincaid vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).' Hindi maaring sabihin o
ipagmalakdan ng mga nangamkam na sa pamamagitan ng
kanilang huwad na titulo ay naangkin na nila ang lupain o di kayay
gawing batayan ang kanilang huwad na titulo upang masabing sila
ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi ito maaring maganap sapagkat
ang krimen at panlilinlang ay hindi maaring maging batayan ng
panimula ng ay isang tunay at mabisang titulo kahit na ipinagbili at
nabili sa isang mabuti ang hangarin ng bumili ng karampatang
halaga ng lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419, 439). Dahil sa
itinuring ng batas na sila ay 'constructive trustees, lamang kaya
hindi maganap ang lampas-bisa (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the
Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244-249). Subali't dahilan sa ilang
katiwalian ng katotohanan na di nabatid ng mga nakalagda sa
ibaba ng kasunduang ito na di-umano'y siyang naganap na
pangyayari ngunit ang tunay na katotohanan ay di naman ito
naganap at naliligaw sa paniniwalang nararapat silang nagbayad
ng rentas o alkila at ang ilan ay binili ang lupain gayong ang
katotohanan ay sila ang nararapat at tunay na may-ari sa di-
umano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425) ng defunct Court of
Land Registration na nagbunga ng gawa-gawang titulo na
sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng humigit kumulang ng 4,000
hectares na samakatuwid ay apatnapung (40) milyong metro
kuwadrado ng lupaing ngayon ay matatagpuan sa buong bayan ng
Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan ng San Juan sapagkat sakop ito
noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act No. 942, ang bahagi ng
Punta sa Maynila sapagkat sakop ito noon ng Mandaluyong na
ngayon, kalahati ng bayan ng Pasig, kalahati ng bayang Mariquina,
at kalahati ng Lungsod ng Quezon sapagka't pinilas lamang ito
buhat sa bayan ng Mariquina, Pasig, San Juan at Mandaluyong sa
pamamagitan ng Commonwealth Act No. 502 na pinagtibay noong
Oktubre 12, 1939 at sang-ayon sa mga paglalarawan ng di-
umano'y pagsusukat o survey nagsimula sa Maytunas creek
patungong ilog ng San Juan patungong dakong ibaba ng agos ng
ilog ng San Juan hanggang sa bahaging matatagpuan ang ilog ng
Pasig sa Punta, Maynila at lumilisya sa patungong itaas ng agos ng
ilog Pasig na nababanggit ang sapa ng Buayang Bato sa Namayan,
Mandaluyong pagkatapos ay pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong pataas
ng agos ng ilog hanggang sa ilog ng Mariquina at pagsunod sa
dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog ng Mariquina hanggang sa sapa ng
Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw hanggang sa pinagmulan ng
sapa ng Diliman na umaagos ng pababa patungong ilog ng San
Juan at pabalik sa sapa ng Maytunas na ang nasabing baybay-
sukat o survey sa abot makakaya ng sino mang may sapat ng
kakayahang agrimensor (surveyor) ay di makabuo ng ni isa man
lamang maramihang-gilid na hugis o anyo (polygon).

Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang mga nakalagda sa

ibaba ng Kasunduang ito ay sumasang-ayon na kasunduin ang
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena, Roxas
District, Quezon City upang gumawa ng karampatang hakbang sa
Hukuman ng Unang Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon City hanggang
sa Corte Suprema kung kinakailangan at gawin ang anumang
paraang isinasaisip niyang tumpak at nararapat gawin sang-ayon
sa batas upang matamo ng mga makalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo ayon sa paraang
minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa kanyang pangalan at kung sa
kanino man niya naising ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi ng lupain
na aming minana o pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest)
nguni't ipinaubaya na namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro bilang
bahagi ng buong kabayaran ng kanyang serbisyo at karapatang
maangkin niya sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng kasunduang ito
maliban na lamang doon sa bahagi ng lupaing nais naming
mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at
sumasangayon kami sa pagbabayad ng karampatang halaga sa
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nang naayon sa isinasaad
ng kasunduang ito. Na sa bawa't kilos na magaganap sa
pagpapatitulo ng aming mga ariarian ang mamamahala sa mga
gastos o kabayaran ay si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig
sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat (survey) ng mga ari-arian
hanggang sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng mga sukat upang
mapagtibay ito ng Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands),
paghahanda at pagnonotaryo ng mga affidavit' ng pagmay-ari,
pagkuha ng mga katibayan ng pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok
sa husgado (filing fees), pagpapatala (registration), paggawa ng
mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin ng mga rekord
(transcripts), pagpapatunay (certifications) at iba pang mga
kinakailangang bayaran at pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na pagpasiyahan ng naaayon sa kaniyang
sariling kagustuhan na ang nilalayon sa bandang huli at ang
tunay na hangarin ay ang mapatituluhan ng ayon sa batas ang
aming kani-kaniyang mga lupain sa aming kani-kaniyang
pangalan na sa pamamagitan ng mga tungkuling iniatang namin
kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa pamamagitan ng kasunduang ito,
sumasang-ayon kami at natatalian o nabibigkisan ng kasunduang
ito na magbayad ng halagang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00)
sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng lupaing matitituluhan sa aming
pangalan bilang kabayaran sa serbisyo o paglilingkod ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro; ang halagang Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawat
metro kuwadrado ay aming magiging paunang-bayad upang ang
proyektong ito ay mapanimulan kaagad sa lalong madaling
panahon at ang matitirang dapat bayarang halaga na Labing-
limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't metro kuwadrado ay aming
babayaran kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng lupa sa amin sa
kasunduang kapag buhat sa isang taon mula sa petsang
ipinagkaloob ang titulo ng lupa ay hindi kami nakababayad ng
buo sa halagang natitira o balanse na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00)
sa bawat metro kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay mapupunta sa
pangalan ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nguni't ang kasunduang ito na
isang taong pagbibigay-palugit ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang
siya ay mabigyan ng kabuuang kabayaran sa kanyang mga
paglilingkod sa usaping ito at sumasang-ayon si Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro na kami ay pahintulutang isangla ang aming mga ari-
ariang may karampatang titulo na di huwad at pinagtibay ng
batas sa alinmang bangko upang ito ang magsilbing bayad sa
mga paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa usaping ito at iyon
lamang ang natatanging sandali o panahong kami ay mawawalan
na ng obligasyon o tungkuling bayaran ang Dalawampu't Limang
Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ikinasundo
namin ang serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang matituluhan
nang naayon sa batas. Sumasang-ayon din si Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro na ang sinuman sa aming nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito na hindi kayang magbayad ng paunang-halaga na
Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa't metro kuwadrado ay bibigyan
ng karampatang magbayad ng makahalintulad na halaga sa
bawa't buwan sa loob ng sampu (10) o dalawampung (20) taon
sang-ayon sa mga hinihingi ng pangyayari, ang titulo ng lupain ay
ipagkakaloob lamang sa nagnanais umangkin nito kung
mababayaran na ang kabuuan ng paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro kasama na ang "legal interest" at ang amortization nito
ngunit kinakailangan magbigay sila ng paunang bayad na
 Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang panimulan ang pagbabayad
buwan-buwan (monthly installment condition) at magiging mabisa
lamang ito kung matutupad ng buong katapatan ang pagbabayad
ng hulugang buwan-buwan (monthly installment) na maaring
magbuhat sa halagang Limang Piso (P5.00) hanggang
Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa bawat buwan nang naayon sa laki o
kalawakan ng lupaing nararapat na mapasa-amin ayon sa batas.
Sa dahilang ang buhay ng tao ay walang katiyakang magtatagal
na habang panahon ay isinasalin namin ang aming mga
karapatan at tungkulin sa aming tagapagmana lamang at gayon
din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na maaring manahin ang kanyang
karapatan sa kasunduang ito sa mga tagapagmana lamang niya
upang itaguyod nila ang paglilingkod sa anumang paraan ayon sa
batas.

SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT NG NABANGGIT NA

KASUNDUANG ITO

ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming tutuparin ang

lahat ng isinasaad sa kasunduang ito na sinasang-ayunan din ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kanyang tuparin ang kanyang tungkulin
bilang manananggol na tutulong sa amin upang kami ay
mapagkalooban ng Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang
lupain ng naayon sa batas at siyang isinasaad din ng kasunduang
ito at kasama ng paglagda ng aming mga pangalan na siyang nais
naming pangalang lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming kani-kaniyang
tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain, paraang pagbabayad at petsa na
kami'y lumagda sa kasunduang ito bilang pagpapatunay sa aming
taos-pusong pagsang-ayon at hangarin tumupad sa lahat ng
napapaloob sa KASULATANG ITO.

In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO

admitted that he has sold, and is still selling, properties covered by
Torrens titles in the names of ORTIGAS & CO., Madrigal, and others,
but he claims that the titles of said parties are null and void
because they emanated from Decree No. 1425; that he has no title
over the properties sold by him except the contract of legal
services which his clients allegedly signed; that he has no
approved plans for the various subdivisions allegedly owned by
him; that he has not obtained any certificate of registration or
license to sell from the National Housing Authority; that he has not
declared for taxation purposes the thousands of hectares of prime
lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and Marikina,
allegedly owned by him; and that he has not filed any case directly
attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-33, t.s.n., Sept. 9,
1977; Exhibit J).

Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the

defendant in the "25-Billion-peso-case" before Judge Sergio
 Apostol, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas &
Company Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that said case covers
lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and Quezon City
including those involved in the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July 7,
1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).

Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the

validity of the Ortigas Transfer Certificate of Title and enjoining
respondent NAVARRO from selling lots covered by said title,
NAVARRO still continued selling properties covered by the
injunction claiming that the said decision is ineffectual because the
same has been appealed. (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). 4

On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a

complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that
respondent Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the
roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of admission to the bar be
recalled.

On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer
to lift the order of suspension. 5 Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an
opposition to said motion to lift suspension . 6 Respondent Navarro
reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated August 8, 1980. 7 In a
resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the motion to
lift the order of suspension.8

On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex

parte motion praying for the lifting of the order of
suspension 9 which was denied by this Court on November 13,
1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer in another motion filed on January
5, 1981 11 but the same was likewise denied in our resolution of
January 22, 1981. 12

II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated

March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, charging respondent
Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and
blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was thereafter
referred to this Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President
(now Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action. 13

Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro

filed his answer with motion to dismiss on June 29, 1979. 15 The
corresponding
reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of
this Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the Office
of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 18
On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its
report, with the following findings and recommendation:

CHARGES

In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants

charged respondent with deceit, malpractice and gross conduct in
office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath, for having
deliberately misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as
counsel for the defendants in the following civil cases:

a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of

the land subject of the cases mentioned above; he falsely alleged
that to his personal knowledge the title to the land is in the name
of one Leopoldo Cojuangco. This false allegation was made despite
the final decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII,
in Civil Case No. Q-18221 entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin
vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring the transfer of the lot
to Leopoldo Cojuangco was fraudulent and had been effected thru
falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation of the title issued to
Cojuangco and the reversion of the title to our clients. Copies of
the Complaint and the Decision in said case are hereto attached as
Annexes "B" and "C", respectively.

b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our

clients' title was rendered null and void by virtue of the expiration
of the Parity Amendment and the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. Our clients' title to
the aforesaid property was acquired by hereditary succession from
the late Dr. Luther Bewley who acquired said land in 1925. The
ownership therefore of our clients is protected both under the 1935
and 1972 Constitutions. Any lawyer, even a law student, knows
that the Parity Amendment and the decision in the Quasha
case, supra, covers cases where property was acquired by virtue of
the Parity Amendment. Mr. Navarro is either guilty of abysmal
ignorance of the law or of complete and unabashed contempt for
facts, the law of the land and for the Courts.

c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court

that the title covering the land subject of the above cases had
been declared null and void in the "final and executory" decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately omits
to give the title of the case and its docket number for the obvious
and malicious reason that the case he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42699-42709) is still pending
resolution before the Supreme Court and hence cannot be "final
and executory."
 d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of
the cases heretofore enumerated is not within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and hence the court has no
jurisdiction. Further, that title thereto having described the land to
be part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. He
cannot disclaim knowledge however of the fact that the area in the
vicinity of Santolan Road in Quezon City was originally part of the
Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of Quezon City when
the latter was created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this fact, Mr.
Navarro's representation is false and malicious.

e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for basic
norms of honesty and decency in that having prejudiced the interest of
his clients because of his gross neglect to appeal in a timely manner
from the decision of the court and having adopted the wrong remedy,
in complete ignorance of the law, he had influenced his clients into
commencing a case before the Tanod Bayan against the Presiding
Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva
Genovea The case is obviously calculated to harrass and coerce the
Honorable Presiding Judge. Mr. Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his
respect for the law and the courts.

f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did not

stop before the City Court of Quezon City. He continues to do so in the
petition he filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals docketed as
CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus, et al. 'vs. Hon. Minerva
Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and the undersigned attorney's
Comments thereto are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and "E",
respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record)

RESPONDENTS ANSWER

In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:

1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the undersigned
respondent was never furnished with a copy of the complaint, it can be
gathered therefrom that the complaint is clearly intended to prevent
the undersigned respondent to proceed in defending his clients' cause
in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C.
Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin,
et al.) still pending at this writing before the Court of Appeals. To allow
complainants to harass respondent while the case (is) still pending in
our courts of justice is an act in contempt of court for which
complainants and their counsel is (sic) liable.

2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo

Corpuz, et al. gave his entire devotion to the interest of his clients,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or be withheld from his clients, save by the rules of law, legally
applied; for his clients are entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by law as was done by the
undersigned respondent in the ejectment case filed by the
complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin against the
several clients of the undersigned. (pp. 42-43, Record)

After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out that
respondent's Answer does not deny any of the six (6) counts of
charges specified in the Complaint, respondent filed a Rejoinder dated
September 7, 1979, wherein he averred:

1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B.

Geeslin who are citizens of the United States of America held TCT No.
153657 which was cancelled on December 31, 1970 by TCT No.
180231 issued in the name of Leopoldo A. Cojuangco both of which
TCTs are described to be located at Santolan Road, Municipality of San
Juan, Province of Rizal, (now part of Metro-Manila) filed ejectment
proceedings before the City Court of Quezon City against my clients
Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and twenty others in Civil Case
Nos. I-29872 to I-29931 which later were elevated to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et
al. vs. Hon. Minerva C.Genovea the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and
Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.

2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the

defendants Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty (20)
other defendants did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and
exerted his utmost learning and ability within what the law allows that
at this stage, the controversy is still under litigation before the courts
as stated above.

3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action must

have been resorted to by the complainants at the instigation of their
counsel who failed in wanting to defeat the defendants of their God-
given rights to the land in litigation that there can be no other
conclusion left but that the administrative complaint against the
respondent is 'pure' harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record)

FINDINGS

When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor
General, the parties agreed that there is no dispute as to the fact of
the case. Hence, they were granted a period of thirty (30) days within
which to file their respective memoranda, if they so desire, after
which the case will be considered submitted for resolution.

Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and
in fact admitted during the hearing of the case set by the Office of
 the Solicitor General that there is no dispute as to the facts of this
case, it follows that the specifications of the charges against him,
which are duly supported by documents, are deemed sufficiently
proven.

The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his

entire devotion to the interest of his clients" and that he "did his
bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost
learning and ability.

Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed

the misrepresentations specified by complainants, as
quoted above.

RECOMMENDATION

Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148

entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has been suspended from the practice
of law since May 5, 1980. His suspension is still in effect.

The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the suspension
of respondent from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.

Felipe C. Navarro be likewise suspended from the practice of law.
19
Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989.

No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as

respondent Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in the
complaint of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.

The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative

Case No. 2148 are:

1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the

names of other persons without the consent of the latter; and

2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient

grounds for suspension or disbarment.

Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of

title of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared null and void in the decision
dated March 31, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al.
vs. Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated
June 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil
Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686
and 8700 entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico
Martinez, et al." Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of
ownership over all parcels of land (including those of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917,
which was declared null and void in the decision dated March 31,
1970 of Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he asserts ownership over the subject
properties as payment for his legal services rendered in the
ejectment cases filed against his clients in Branches I and II of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal.

1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the

then Court of First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the nullity of
the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which
Decree No. 1425 was issued, as well as the original certificates of
title issued as a consequence thereof. These original certificates of
title include the properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31,
1970, Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV
rendered a decision declaring Decree No. 1425, as well as the
original certificates of title issued pursuant thereto, null and void.
Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals which set
the same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial.
On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced
Judge Ruiz, rendered a decision confirming the validity of Decree No.
1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The said decision was
pending appeal with the Court of Appeals when the investigation of
respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted.

We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in toto the November
3, 1973 decision of Judge Alcantara, which became final and
executory on May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs-appellants Pascual
Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del
Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for
review on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18,
1985. The denial became final and executory on April 10, 1985.
Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded to Branch XV of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal for execution.

The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch
XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the decision
rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which
dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by Haberer against the
clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro in his
decision categorically stated that "it is the considered opinion of this
court that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is
reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the
herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the
parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses are
built has become premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge
Navarro's order of September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that:

In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion
to reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly
predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court
that the certificate of title emanating from the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void
and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The
Court opined that until said decision is reversed the
actual occupants had better be maintained in their
possessions of the land. 21

However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was

set aside by the Court of Appeals which remanded the case for new
trial and another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on
November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all
titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent cannot feign
ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the
March 31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients
who appealed the former decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite
thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he stubbornly continues to
invoke the decision of March 31, 1970 as the source of his alleged
ownership rights over the Ortigas properties.

2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II

ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043
issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the
name of the defendants, subject to the lien for attorney's fees in
favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his
legal services. However, the same judge issued an amendatory
order dated September 15, 1972, which provides in part that:

It has also come to the understanding of the Court that

the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered
insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also
adversely affects the interests of other persons and
entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited
Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the
certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of
GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide
tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders
of decisions are made in this case cannot be made to
 affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only
affect parties to the case.

The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the

order dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two
grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now
being the subject of further proceedings and (2)
because it has the effect of adversely affecting the
interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
which is not even a party herein.

WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971,

is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971,
insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present
occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands.
(Emphasis supplied) 22

It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was
set aside, the inescapable conclusion is that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Consequently, the defendants therein
never acquired title to the property covered by the title of Haberer.
And, since respondent Navarro merely derives his supposed title to
the properties as a mere transferee, with more reason can he not
validly become the owner of the above properties.

3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services

executed with his clients, the defendants in the Haberer case, as
another basis of his claim of ownership over the entire property
covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted that the said contract
was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against
respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an
aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, more or less. It appears
that the defendants assigned rights to respondent Navarro over
properties which they did not actually occupy and which virtually
extended to all the properties covered by titles issued under Decree
No. 1425. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, said
defendants have not presented any document evidencing their
ownership of the parcels of land they assigned to their lawyer.

From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that

respondent's pretended ownership rights over the parcels of land
covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in
fact or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume that he was
not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations.

In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on

the degree of integrity and respectability required and expected of
the law profession. There is no denying that membership in the legal
profession is achieved only after a long and laborious study. By
years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed
means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say,
however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this
profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing
necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the
fact that everyone is deemed an officer of the court. 23

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been
judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States
Supreme Court in this wise:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great

importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may
depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be
lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is
extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be
maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be
preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some
discretion, ought to be exercised with great moderation and
judgment, but it must be exercised.24

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed

that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to
deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended
to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence. 25 Its objectives are to compel
the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove
from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him
unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney. 26

As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is

innocent of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an
officer of the court, he has performed his duty in accordance with
his oath. 27 Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant 28, and for the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 29

We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of

these two administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong
and unassailable evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to
impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment on respondent.
Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal
services, executed by his clients whom he represented in the
twenty-two ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in the
earlier part of this discussion.

It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two

branches of the trial court made no finding as to the validity of the
claim of ownership favorable to the defendants therein. On the
contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and ordered
the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the premises.

In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was
dismissed merely on the ground that "since the evidence is
uncontroverted that the defendants in all these eleven cases have
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of their
respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in interest,
their possession must be maintained and respected. 30

Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal

dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds was
thereafter ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in
favor of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name of defendants
subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein respondent
in accordance with the contract for legal services hereinbefore
discussed.

Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and

set aside in the order of September 15, 1972, "because it has the
effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd.
Partnership, which is not even a party herein," but it reinstated the
decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the
present occupants.

As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the

defendants in the ejectment cases were declared the true owners of
the land subject of said cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled
upon, and what the courts recognized was merely the defendants'
right of possession. They, therefore, never become the owners of
the subject lots in any sense of the word in the absence of any
declaration to that effect, by reason of which they could not have
legally transmitted any ownership rights or interests to herein
respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that any further claim of
ownership on their part was finally settled by the order of
September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971,
wherein the trial court correctly held that the earlier order
unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership. In addition, said court specifically excluded the
title of said partnership from the effects of its decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the
defendants-clients agreed to convey to respondent whatever
properties may be adjudicated in their favor in the event of their
failure to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore
stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except
the right to possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying,
nothing more. That respondent acquired no better right than the
defendants from whom he supposedly derived his claim is further
confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, 1971,
denying the issuance of new certificates of title to herein respondent
who, to further stress the obvious, was not even a party but only a
lawyer of the defendants therein. It follows that his act of selling the
Ortigas properties is patently and indisputably illegal.

Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the

puerile theory that his title is his contract of legal
services. 31 Considering that the effectivity of the provisions of that
contract is squarely premised on the award of said properties to the
therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication,
respondent's pretense is unmasked as an unmitigated deception.
Furthermore, it will be recalled that the land involved in the two
ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares whereas respondent is
claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the sheer
absurdity of which he could not be unaware.

Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously

selling, up to the present, the entirety of the land covered by Decree
No. 1425 32 pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970, declaring the said
decree null and void as well as the titles derived therefrom.

It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge

Navarro recognizing the defendants' right of possession is subject to
the final outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV
which nullified Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at the time the
decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is
precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a
third time by setting aside the order of registration of the land in the
name of the defendants. He could not properly rule on the
ownership rights of defendants therein pending a final
determination of the validity of said decree, which thus prompted
him to find merely on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere
declaration of nullity cannot, per se justify the performance of any
act of ownership over lands titled in the name of other persons
pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier discussed, that
decision dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and set aside,
and a new one entered confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425,
which latter decision has long become final and executory.
In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership
vs. Navarro," herein respondent was enjoined from selling, offering
for sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein. We have
seen that a decision was subsequently rendered therein on
December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal upholding the validity of the transfer certificates of title issued
in the name of Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership which became
final and executory after respondent's petition for review was denied
by this Court. However, respondent continued to sell properties
belonging to Ortigas in blatant disregard of said decision. This was
categorically admitted by respondent himself during the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General. 33

Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during

the pendency of the appeal therefrom. Even if this were true, the
fact that respondent was enjoined by the court from selling portions
of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason enough for him to
desist from continuing with his illegal transactions.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:

Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge

Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of titles
emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He
knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance
exempted Ortigas & Company from the effects of his decision. He
also knew that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First
Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates of
title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all these pronouncements and
his awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell
properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the
Madrigals. 34

Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is

hereby, denied for lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably posits that
the charges against him should be dismissed on the ground that his
suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of our resolution,
dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads:

The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other

things that the complaint against respondent could not prosper if
respondent's manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-
42699-42709 and his request for certification by the Chief Justice
to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is
deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the
Constitution are granted, are NOTED.
There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's
typical distortion of facts. On the contrary, our resolutions dated
September 2, 1980, November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981
repeatedly denied respondent's motions for the lifting of his
suspension.

It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension

of respondent Navarro from the practice of law, he continues to do
so in clear violation and open defiance of the original resolution of
suspension and the aforestated resolutions reiterating and
maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that
in G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.," a Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987,
counsel for private respondents therein questioned herein
respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the case since he
was under suspension, to which respondent Navarro rejoined by
insisting that his suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In
G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,"
the petition wherein was filed on December 2, 1988 and assigned to
the First Division, respondent Navarro also appeared as counsel for
therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the same was
prepared, signed and verified by respondent Navarro, a suspended
member of the Philippine Bar. Over his expostulation that his
suspension had already been lifted, the Court directed the Bar
Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the same. Again, in
G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.," the Second Division, in a resolution dated January
31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent for
appearing therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on
February 5, 1990.In at least three (3) other cases in the Second
Division, respondent Navarro appeared before the Court as counsel
for petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et
al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11, 1986
and decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.),
filed on November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987; and (3)
G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on
January 30, 1988 and decided on February 15, 1988. The rollos in
said cases show that he also appeared as counsel for the petitioners
in the Court of Appeals, but since the lower courts' original records
were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether
he also appeared before the different courts a quo.Such acts of
respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of
constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for an
attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself
unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by law and by
this Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer
of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED
and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a
copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records
of respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.

December 7, 1920

In re CARLOS S. BASA

Pedro Guevara for respondent.

Attorney-General Feria for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of

Attorney Carlos S. Basa.

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to

the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was
charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of Manila with the
crime of abduction with consent, was found guilt in a decision
rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance,
and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years,
eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal,
this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the
second division of the Supreme Court. 1

The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by
the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented, therefore, is
whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article
446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude.

"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is

done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no
decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it
cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral
turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against
good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins
[1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops.
Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)
When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action
which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully and
reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the
respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other
hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the
uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly
ruined.

It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos
S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be suspended from his
office of lawyer for one year. So ordered.lawphi1.net

Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-

TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C.
Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8
September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of
"hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr.
Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with
the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to
the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This
plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application for
probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation
was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial
report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a

Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this
Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then
probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations
in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He
passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take
the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to

allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to
the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April
1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than
ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago
granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino
has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right

to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character,
with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who
would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we
quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive
effect:
3
In Re Farmer:

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition

precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law
in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to
make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of
bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired,
or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright
character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is

eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He
is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate
effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his
care; he is the recipient ofunbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at
law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such,
is to aid the administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx 4

In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926

(1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater

temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the
multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession.
For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore
becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an
arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be
made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as
to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for
admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met
at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been
admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established
himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the
court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan: 6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every
citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is
a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not
all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the
unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed
to remain in it.
 Re Rouss: 7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with

conditions, and a fair private and professional character
is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy
applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an
examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and

ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and
interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in
the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give? They
are required to be of good moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court, which they are, may
not bring discredit upon the due administration of the
law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that
both those who have not such qualifications in the first
instance, or who, having had them, have fallen
therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to
aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral

character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1,

10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always

been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he
covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the
proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are
that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a
disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse
instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a
Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in

respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such
inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the
moral proceedings for disbarment:
 10
Re Stepsay:

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a

proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in
scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
11
Re Wells:

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application

for admission to the California Bar the court cannot
reject him for want of good moral character unless it
appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be
cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than
that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the
applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and
general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission
upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of
the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those

who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more
stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general
perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals
with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know
it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities

certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral
character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately
led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly
indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted
such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a
"neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the
very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court
has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question
of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress
that good moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for
permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and
to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its

examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His
evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a good reputation
for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant
period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to
the family of the deceased student and to the community at large.
Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show
that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for
admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by

appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of
the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if
any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let
a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and
sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ.,
concur.

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,

vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.

Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been

commuting to this Court for more than a decade.

In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson

filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance
of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to
return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago
appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-
14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued
on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87.
Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and
levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. The
sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961.
Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this
Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the
dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution
"to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the
sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest
bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to
redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of
sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their
petition, the Court of First Instance ofManila issued a writ of
possession to the properties.

However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife,

Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the
sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon
which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was
his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in
their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and
sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of
the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was
not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and
the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and
that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the
logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and
which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of

preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of
Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's
final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of
title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out
any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what
the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court
countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court
lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the
Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents'
certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners.
But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the
Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which
it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally,
and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.

While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the
restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the
Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court
under date of May 26, 1966, docketed asL-26116, praying for a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ
of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and
dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration
was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August
2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The
respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1wph1.t We
dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.

The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where
they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due
course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After
hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from

enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is
made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil
Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the
 merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as
to costs.

Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and

Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid
decision.

1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere
with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession,
ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order
it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila
court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in
part, the enforcement of the writ.

2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a

party in one case and the husband was a party in another case and
a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would
have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment
against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be
answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present case.
In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection
of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the
Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the
husband's business venture.

3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals
held that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third
person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined, the
said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger"
or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course
obviously wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she
does not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant
cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by
the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling
in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the
claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of
possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge
with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the
former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the
issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the
property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly
inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no
change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein
from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of
possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P.
San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents
Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable
because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is
normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made
and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives
in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to
stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in
1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary
injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution;
(7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when
Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the
conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his
family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it
was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint
for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's
share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that
she was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the
replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the
issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not;
laches now effectively bars them from raising it.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2

5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two
fatal infirmities.

(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and

ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is
merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither
legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon
liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the
community. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that
injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which
may never arise. 4

(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the
impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live
together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property. By the
Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the
house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment
of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by
Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The
absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate
husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect
divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the
dissolution of the conjugal union.

6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary
justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their
victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of
the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of
the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another
(5 times in the Supreme Court).

We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,

far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who

seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very
ends of justice. 6

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his

exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed
himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of
conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and

honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to
be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily

a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on
the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts
for purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate
further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again
come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we
have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the
mother case of the present case). We find that

(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago)
but trial on the merits has not even started;

(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a
counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint
where they impleaded new parties-defendants;

(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed
a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which
impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been
taken on this motion);

(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted

supplemental complaint; and

(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974,
grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer.
(Expediente, p. 815)

We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint,

supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are
all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied
upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that
the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and
the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the
replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's
inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue
that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down
the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction,
the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This
ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.

Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5,
1959 the Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of
seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries,
depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of
P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to
state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of
seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the
conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the
sheriff did not require the Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the
sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties
at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the
back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the
Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties
for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago
contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of
P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos
suffered P174,877.08 in damages.

Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation
to require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale
because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third-
party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if
it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39,
Rules of Court)

The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the

vendees Castaedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the
cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.

Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08

out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on
January 31, 1966.

This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause

of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment.

The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly

suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the
preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its
life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are
baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.

The Counterclaim

As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the

action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were
compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P7,500;
that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining
the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the
Castaedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the
properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being
20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the
unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of
which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the
complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of
the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith
and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the
registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more
damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the
parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the
properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two
other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the
defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought
by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted
in bad faith.

The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional

damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the
aforesaid agreements and transactions.

The Amended Supplemental Complaint

The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the

supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph
averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs,
Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land
they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also
in bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad
faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy
Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge
that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Action

of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of

action of the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would
depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original
complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their
rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of
the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castaedas and
their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is
also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that
the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the
transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have
already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the
original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow
that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the
amended supplemental complaint is also barred.

For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining
cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is

set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is
ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the
petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble
costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu
Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a
copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty.
Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,

vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.

Roger Castuciano for complainant.

Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against

her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or
grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples

Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with
Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow.
They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on
November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso
came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was
subsisting or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972,
Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The
marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December
30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)

The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street,
Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13,
1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked
permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a
vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he
has never returned to the conjugal abode.

Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much

patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was
living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A
Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to
that place.

The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was
corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios
Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors
staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits,
Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their testimonies.

Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced

himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His
name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves
Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr.
Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where
respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.

Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was

terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to
time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of
giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio
Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.

He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the

plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared that
he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress
Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the

conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of his wife,
their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she
allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her
interference with his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He
filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did
not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional
evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.

After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has

sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of
her and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated
from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that
he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife
and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married
woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959;
Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106
SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife

and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. He
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the

Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

Makasiar, Actg. C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De

Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and
De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as
that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining
to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as

follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041

CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN
Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam

Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration

Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
 Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila

nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above

reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of

publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is
not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the

issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP),
and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their
respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and
extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether
or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this

case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by
them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent

endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common
sense would readily dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial distinction. For who could
deny that document search, evidence gathering,
assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish

to make issue with respondent's foreign citations.
Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view
espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is
alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its

opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative

supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers

legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is offering
legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this
to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this
(is) the effect that the advertisements have on the
reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a
medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the

advertisements subject of the present case, appears
with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being operated by
members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In
addition, the advertisements in question appear with a
picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the
service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely

offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in
question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce

the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the

advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the
Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign
divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen

and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
 by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code

(defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of

permanent union between a man and
woman entered into accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within
the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is

obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going
to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine
law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At
worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or

abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that

advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems
to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the
"special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code
describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy,
which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it
can readily be concluded that the above impressions
one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with
impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal

support services" respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of
an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals,
good customs and the public good, thereby destroying
and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be

enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements
similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing or offering
some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in
general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized

legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly
benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon
the practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at

bar can be better performed by specialists in other
fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field
cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to
the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed,
a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in
skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful

not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may
be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring
prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is

allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively,
the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in
general and which should be made available exclusively
to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of
the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of

respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise
illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent
may not be prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it
is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of
action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that
a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which
course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend
any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should

be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a
clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term
being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without
any adequate and effective means of regulating his
activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered,
the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws
must conform to each and every provision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the

practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is
absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding
out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice
which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a certainAtty. Don Parkinson to be handling
the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications,
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It
has been held that the practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of
deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising
clients as to their legal right and then take them to an
attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p.
39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in

the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device
by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out
itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially
so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to persons who have
been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members
to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the
lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish
to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5
Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons
who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows
that not only respondent but also all the persons who
are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer

to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only

unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral;
and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to

supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice

of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s)
of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's
Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory

services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the

application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based
thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the

aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall
squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen
equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court,

paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of
being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who
may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a

rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many

jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice,
there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal
with the general public as such. While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these
do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those
who may be dealing with the general public in the guise
of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be

protected from the dangers which may be brought about
by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears
in the instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to
protect the general public from falling prey to those who
advertise legal services without being qualified to offer
such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of

Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not
help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed,
staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic,
when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very

admissions of its President and majority stockholder,
Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly

advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are)
illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an

advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in
bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could
work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage
which is not only illegal but immoral in this country.
While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency
and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling
the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under
the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and

other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
 advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements
such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one
(cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so
that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem

to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible
in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are
highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about

how they could go about having a secret marriage here,
when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek
advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be
able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and)
by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme

Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law,

such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies,
whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered
by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law)
involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can

render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes
and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not
only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features
of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate or
inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when we are acting
for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge
of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire

tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure
that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they
are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate
and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of

custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land

to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect
to the building code and the like, then an architect who
performed this function would probably be considered to be
trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of
the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most
important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it
has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter,
and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized

profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class
 of men who customarily perform a certain function have no
right to do so, or that the technical education given by our
schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should

consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along
economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits
the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant
may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of
law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members
of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of
a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the

employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns
on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends
on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be
that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by
the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before

administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
 representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative.
Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel'
here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a

lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-

legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to

members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any

particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code
of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or

occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to
his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render

wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic,
renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce,

absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of
law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the
customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving
information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the
particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which

publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the
public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS
THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on
common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on
a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated
or readily identified person in a particular situation in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed
material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in
the memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact
with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit,
the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation
and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore
sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by
the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals
in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348,
NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly
non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if
the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that
FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give

the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a
secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second

paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of

law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues
raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and
doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires

the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It

includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally

engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice
and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman,
and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a

lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients,
advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to
an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also
practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to
that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the

doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the

application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients.
It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.

(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23,
193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of
law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising

person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right under
the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association
v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or

litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of

work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill,
a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in

and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at
bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as
advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support

services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready

information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are
strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of
computers and modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information
and communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared
by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations;
and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services
from government or non-government agencies, like birth,
marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or
employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters
that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and
installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts
and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation

merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids
and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal

information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function
is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a
copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law
and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and
be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered
by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article

published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday
Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal

Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along
U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and
even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are
"specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic,
Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend
in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who
cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come,
we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also.
They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take
your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on.
That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or

follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter
of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-
patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or
diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt

with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you
her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property,
we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real
estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and
your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her
property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained
to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting
your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in
the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P.

WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered

by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those

individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom

respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines
there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of
law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of
court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously acquired through education and
study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with,
protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with
respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those
not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar
from competition, but in the protection of the public from being
advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise
little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position

that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation
separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that
this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action,
and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As

admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there
which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the
major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal
Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of
paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional
ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited

acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law
are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another
or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in
scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in

the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who
has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into
the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of
encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements,
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the
code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics
had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or
is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's

advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law
is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs.
vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant

violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being
a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to
a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product
of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product
of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited.

The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule
against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those
which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists,

in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by
the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the
lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists;
the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive
or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of
the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted.

The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the
law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the

advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which
even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of

Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to
the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to
the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee
to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons
of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the
general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can
be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar

Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public
about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our
legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately
by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of
utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional
conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain
the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer,

subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is
the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or

illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created
should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly
not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative
that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and
jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in
the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing
some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by

respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who
can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse
thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein

respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which
is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B"
of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of
Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate
action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

Duran & Lim for respondent.

Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the
Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a

member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to
the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale

for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can
renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application
and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind
 of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans
although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you.
Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter

addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written
in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching

date for our induction into office as member of the Provincial Board,
that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into office I
should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations
for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in
particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague,
to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you
may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will

have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of the
Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here
in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public.
Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will
exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case
you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you
can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I
will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of
contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary
public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that
some people are in the belief that my residence as member of the
Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to
exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not
the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in
Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this

information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social
gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to
serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the
people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of
other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I
would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only
three pesos for every registration.
 Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA

Attorney
Notary Public.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the

applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure
as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the
bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said
codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end
thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of

Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in
1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and
28 of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy

and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct.
The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being
a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is
equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through
touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or
offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be
influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner
of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation,
defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS.

It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust
make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable
to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform
thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having
any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to
employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward
directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of
such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison
officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed,
under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing
the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek
his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such
practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform
thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and

quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and
one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney
was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have
been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of
the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason
behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a
profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be
unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann.
Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L.,
1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly

practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the
honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation
and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for

disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the

admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited
cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only
remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should
here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the
representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of
the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We
think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our
attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the
respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature
would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as
mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there
are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of
his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third,
his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest
period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring
attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the
court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should,
therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of
practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.inn view of
all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that
the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the
practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April
1, 1929,

Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

OSTRAND, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would

have been sufficient punishment.

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979

SANTA PANGAN, complainant

vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:

This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to

cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It appears from the
record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings
in this administrative case were postponed on the basis of
respondent's motions for postponement. These motions were
predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a
case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906).
Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case
is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas
Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D.
Ramos" before said court in connection with Criminal Case No.
35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his Birth
Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his
parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in
"Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his
other given name and maternal surname.

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in

the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or
register is the official record containing the names and signatures of
those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized
to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys
in his practice of law.

The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will
do no falsehood". As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney
has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and
frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the
conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so because the
court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In
representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of
"Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath.

The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of

maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are
consistent with truth and honor cannot be overempahisized. These
injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the
attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case,
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He
violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to deception or permits
his client to do so." 2

In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead
of the name by which he was authorized to practice law - Dionisio D.
Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The
circumstance that this is his first aberration in this regard precludes
Us from imposing a more severe penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D.

Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of
the same overt act may warrant his suspencion or disbarment from
the practice of law.

It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed,
the Investigator of this Court is directed forthwith to proceed with
the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The request of
complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by
her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED

Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concur in the result.

Santos, is on leave.

G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992

B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES, NICANOR G.
SALAYSAY, in his capacity as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and
ANTONIO MARINAS, in his capacity as Deputy
Sheriff, respondents.

Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.

Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for

preliminary injunction, to review the Resolution dated 10 November
1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R
denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, earlier dismissed
for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.

The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from the

pleadings of the parties, are not disputed.

Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages with

the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal,
Pasay City Branch, against the Director of Public Works, the Republic
of the Philippines and petitioner herein, B. R. Sebastian Enterprises,
Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 757-R. 1

On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner

liable for damages but absolving the other defendants. 2

Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and
Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent
Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-
R. 3

During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee therein,

Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon prior leave of the respondent Court, he
was substituted by his heirs Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R.
Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie N. Ryes who
are now the private respondents in this present petition.

On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record,

received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt
thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply.

Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July 1974,
respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the
Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. 4 A copy of this
5
Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974.

As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution, respondent

Court, on 9 September 1974, issued another Resolution this time
dismissing petitioner's appeal:

It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed

to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed
(for failure to file the appellant's brief within the
reglementary period which expired on April 5, 1974)
within the period of 10 days fixed in the resolution of
July 9, 1974, copy of which was received by said counsel
on July 17, 1974; . . . 6

On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW

OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the resolution
dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty.
Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled
between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby
Alberto, the latter having established her own law office;
furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case
in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the
preparation of the Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through
oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.

In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied the

motion for reconsideration, stating that:

Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for

defendant-appellant, praying, on the grounds therein
stated, that the resolution of September 9, 1974,
dismissing the appeal, be set aside, and that appellant
be granted a reasonable period of time within which to
file its brief: considering that six (6) months had elapsed
since the expiration of the original period and more than
two and one-half (2-) months since counsel received
copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause why
the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file
brief; Motion Denied. 8

No action having been taken by petitioner from the above

Resolution within the period to file a petition for review, the same
became final and executory, and the records of the case were
remanded to the court of origin for execution.

The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October

1975. 9 Pursuant thereto, respondent Provincial Sheriff and Deputy
Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel
Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a Notice of Sheriff's Sale,
scheduling for Friday, 14 November 1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the
morning, the auction sale thereof. 10

On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a

Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975, and containing
the following allegations:

1. That late as it may be, this Honorable Court has the

inherent power to modify and set aside its processes, in
the interest of justice, especially so in this case when
the case was dismissed on account of the untimely
death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas, counsel of BRSEI (B.R.
Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.).

2. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the

appellant's brief owing to the untimely death of the late
Atty. Crispin D. Baizas would be tantamount to denying
BRSEI its (sic) day in court, and is, therefore, a clear and
unmistakable denial of due process on the part of BRSEI.

3. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the

rights of the parties, since all that BRSEI is asking for, is
a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have the
unfair, unjust and unlawful decision, set aside and
reversed.

The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10

November 1975: 12

. . . it appearing that appellant was represented by the

law firm of Baizas, Alberto & Associates, and while Atty.
Baizas died on January 16, 1974, his law firm was not
dissolved since it received the notice to file brief on
February 19, 1974, and the copy of the Resolution of July
9, 1974, requiring appellant to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed was received by the law
firm on July 17, 1974 and no cause was shown; . . .

Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original

petition 13 in this case against the Court of Appeals, Eulogio B.
Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and
Antonio Marinas, as Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, and issued a Temporary Restraining Order. 14

On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment on the

Petition with a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings 15 on the ground
that respondent Eulogio B. Reyes is already dead and his lawful
heirs had already been ordered substituted for him during the
pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals.

In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered petitioner to

amend its petition within then (10) days from receipt of notice, and
suspended the filing of respondents' Comment until after the
amendment is presented and admitted. 16

In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a

Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it attached the
said Amended Petition. 17 The amendment consists in the
substitution of Eulogio B. Reyes with his heirs.

This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the

respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days from notice
thereof, which they complied with on 5 April 1976. 19 Petitioner filed
its Reply to the Comment on 29 April 1976.20

In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the petition for
lack of merit: 21

L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of

Appeals, et. al.). Considering the allegations, issues
and arguments adduced in the amended petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, respondents' comment thereon, as well as
petitioner's reply to said comment, the Court Resolved
to DENY the petition for lack of merit.

However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its

reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was deprived of the right to
appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given due
course.
23
Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment to said
Motion for Reconsideration.

On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its

Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both parties to submit
simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days
from notice thereof.
Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25 while
respondents submitted theirs on 22 November 1976. 26 On 29
November 1976, this Court deemed the present case submitted for
decision. 27

The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent

Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for
failure to file the Appellant's Brief.

Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on respondent

Court's authority to reinstate dismissed appeals and cites as basis
thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 28Indeed, in said case, this Court affirmed
the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating an appeal after
being dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their
brief, and after entry of judgment and remand of the records to the
lower court and cancelled the entry of judgment, requiring the
lower court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit
appellant's brief. Said case, however, had a peculiar or singular
factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the
relief and which this Court found sufficient to justify such action. As
this Court, through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino, said:

We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual

situation in this case and to forestall a miscarriage of justice the
resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should be
upheld.

That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken

belief that they had abandoned it because they allegedly failed to
give to their counsel the money needed for paying the cost of
printing their brief.

But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might
have been practised on appellants Pagtakhans since their
oppositions were not included in the record on appeal. In (sic)
sensed that there was some irregularity in the actuations of their
lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing the
appeal.

Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies
of his motions for extension of time to file brief so that they would
have known that the Court of Appeals had been apprised of their
alleged failure to defray the cost of printing their brief and they
could have articulated their reaction directly to the Court. Counsel
could have moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to
withdraw from the case or that the Pagtakhans be required to
manifest whether they were still desirous of prosecuting their appeal
 or wanted a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs.
Cawili, L-30543, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 728). Since counsel did
none of those things, his representation that the appellants had
evinced lack of interest in pursuing their appeal is difficult to
believe.

If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may exercise
its discretion in reinstating an appeal, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of
substantial justice (Alquiza vs. Alquiza, L-23342, February 10, 1968,
22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G. 276; C. Vda. de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 62
Phil. 275; Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6).

But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason
of the remand of the record to the lower court, it, nevertheless, has
the inherent right to recall the remittitur or the remand of the record
to the lower court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolution
which was induced by fraud practised upon it. Such a right is not
affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been
remanded, the appellate court has no further jurisdiction over the
appeal (5 Am Jur. 2nd 433 citingLovett vs. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So.
176; 84 ALR 595; State vs. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279).

In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtain is simple

negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel, which is neither
excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate
sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.

As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al., 29 and reiterated

in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 30 We said:

Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had

been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or
discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must
be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, in like
manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to
allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a
showing which would call for, prompt and justify its exercise (sic).
Otherwise, it cannot and must not be upheld.

To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief, petitioner relies

mainly on the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas and the supposed
confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES.
It says: 31

Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Sebastian, engaged the

services of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas to handle its defense in Civil Case
No. 757-R; however, it appears that Atty. Baizas entered petitioner's
case as a case to be handled by his law firm operating under the
name and style "Crispin D. Baizas & Associates." Hence, the Answer
to the complaint, Answer to Cross-Claim, and Answer to Fourth-party
Complaint filed for petitioner in said case, evince that the law firm
"Crispin D. Baizas & Associates" represents petitioner in the action.

After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court, petitioner's

counsel appears to have changed its firm name to "Baizas, Alberto &
Associates." The appeal was thus pursued for petitioner by the law
firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates."

On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as a result of a brief

heart attack. In consequence (sic) of his death, the law firm "Baizas,
Alberto & Associates" was in a terribly confused state of affairs. In
effect, said law firm was dissolved. Atty. Ruby Alberto formed her own
law office and other associates left the dissolved law firms (sic)
joining other offices or putting up their own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of
deceased Crispin D. Baizas, took over the management of why may
have been left of his father's office, it appearing that some, if not
many, cases of the defunct office were taken over by the associates
who left the firm upon its dissolution.

But, none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the

dissolved law firm filed the required appellant's brief for herein
petitioner in its appealed case before the respondent Court of
Appeals. No notice was served upon petitioner by any of the surviving
associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant's brief was due
for filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law
office had been dissolved and that none of the lawyers herein
formerly connected desired to handle the appealed case of petitioner.
...

The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates"
was dissolved and that none of the associates took over petitioner's
case, and no notice of such state of affairs was given to petitioner
who could have engaged the services of another lawyer to prosecute
its appeal before respondent Court, constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE
CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. On the other
hand, the non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas, Alberto &
Associates" will not defeat petitioner's claim for relief since, in such
event, the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner's cause, which act
constitutes fraud and/or reckless inattention the result of which is
deprivation of petitioner's day in court. In the abovementioned
Yuseco case, this Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully
declared that it will always be disposed to grant relief to parties
aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright
incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving
their day (sic) in court.
We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel was
the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty.
Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the
lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.

In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the appeal filed by
the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on behalf of
respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the
requisites enumerated in the Rules of Court; the excuse presented
by said counsel was also the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas. This Court
held therein that:

The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of
his associates for not attending to Alvendia's appeal,
supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the
task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney
Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating
with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal
appearance in the Court of Appeals.

Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of

petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. As revealed
by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to file Brief on 19 February
1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. Said law firm
also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July
1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period.
Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the
respondent Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution
dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also received.
Then, on 28 September 1974, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for
reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court
denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974. Nothing more was heard
from petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November 1975, it filed
the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution
by the trial court following receipt of the records for the respondent
Court.

The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of
Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the
Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and
his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal
by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the
Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled
the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts.
That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was designated to handle the
case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no
moment since others in the firm could have replaced him.. Upon
receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-
assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn
as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the
petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.

In the Negros Stevedoring case, supra., this Court held:

The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered

excusable, nor (sic) is it unavoidable. Time and again the Court has
admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings
and notices, whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly
notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they will always be
informed of the status of their cases. Their Court has also often
repeated that the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the
cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter.

Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW

OFFICE, which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for reconsider
the Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any further appropriate
action after the respondent Court denied said motion on 9 October
1974. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly
authorized by petitioner. The latter has neither assailed nor
questioned such appearance.
33
The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client.

Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to

make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. As pointed out by
respondents, the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the
intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of the latter
must have been known to the former. 34 This fact should have made
petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner
failed to act with prudence and diligence, thus, its plea that they
were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit
either approval or sympathy. 35

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a

good and sufficient cause which would justify the reinstatement of
petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them
commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's
motion to reinstate its appeal.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary

restraining order issued in this case is lifted.

Costs against petitioner.

IT SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 100513. June 13, 1997]

SEVERINO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 111559. June 13, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintif-appellee, vs.

CARLITO ANTONIO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

These cases have been consolidated in a Resolution [1] by this

Court dated September 19, 1994 to avoid possible conflicting
decisions that may arise as they involve the same facts and
incidents.
G.R. No. 100513 is a petition for review of the decision [2] of the
Court of Appeals[3] promulgated on April 30, 1991 in CA-G.R. CR No.
07956, affirming with slight modifications the decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72, finding the petitioner
Severino Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.
On the other hand, G.R. No. 111559 is an appeal from the
decision[5] dated December 11, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Branch 74, in Criminal Case No. 6741-MN, finding also the
accused-appellant Carlito Antonio y Linao guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder by direct participation.[6]
Antecedent facts follow:
On July 25, 1988, an Information [7] was filed against both
Severino Antonio and Carlito Antonio, blood brothers, charging them
with the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code,[8] before the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 6741-MN, committed as
follows:

That on or about January 20, 1988, in the Municipality of Navotas,

Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring, and confederating together with
one (1) alias Oryo and one (1) John Doe, whose true named (sic) and
whereabouts are still unknown and who are still at large, mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, armed with gun, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said
firearm one GONZALO GUTIERREZ, thereby inflicting upon the victim
gunshot wounds at the back and head, which directly caused his
death.

Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against both

accused, but only Severino Antonio was arrested on August 18,
1988 and subsequently tried. At that time, his co-accused Carlito
Antonio, an overseas contract worker, was abroad. Hence, the arrest
warrant could not be served against him and trial had to proceed
without his participation.
Petitioner Severino Antonio pleaded not guilty and thereafter
trial proceeded as to him.
On September 18, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment
finding Severino Antonio guilty of murder, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

finding the accused Severino Antonio GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Art. 248
of the Revised Penal Code. There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, and applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused is hereby sentenced to a
prison term ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor,
as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, asmaximum, together with all
the accessory penalties thereof. He is also ordered to pay the heirs
of GONZALO GUTIERREZ the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
( P 30,000.00 ) PESOS as indemnification for the latters death.
Cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[9]

From this Decision,[10] petitioner Severino Antonio appealed to

the Court of Appeals.[11] On April 30, 1991, the appellate court
affirmed the aforesaid decision[12] of the court a quo with slight
modifications, appreciating the presence of conspiracy and
treachery, but not the circumstance of evident premeditation. The
decretal portion of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding appellant

Severino Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, qualified by treachery. The imposable penalty is
fromreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. (People vs. Melgar, 137 SCRA 718), since death penalty,
which was prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, has
already been abolished by the 1987 Constitution (People vs.
Guevarra, 155 SCRA 327, 335). There being no other modifying
circumstances attending the commission of the crime, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, appellant Severino
Antonio is sentenced to the penalty of, from fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years ofreclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Gonzalo Gutierrez the sum of P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, G.R. No.
86453, September 14, 1990) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

With this modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby

affirmed in all other respects.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[13]

Petitioner Severino Antonio moved to have the decision

reconsidered, but the same was denied in a Resolution [14] dated June
20, 1991; hence, he filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari[15] with this Court.
Before us, petitioner pleads for his acquittal by raising the
following errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE VERY

CONVINCING REAL EVIDENCE OF THE GUNSHOT WOUNDS
BELYING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTIONS
EYEWITNESSES.

II
 THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE STORIES OF THESE EYEWITNESSES IN THE LIGHT OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS CASE.

III

IT WAS ALSO AN ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO

SACRIFICE TRUTH FOR A DUBIOUS TECHNICALITY AND IGNORING
THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE IN THE ONGOING TRIAL OF CO-
ACCUSED CARLITO ANTONIO.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN STATING FINDINGS OF

FACTS WITHOUT STATING FROM WHICH THEY ARE BASED; AS
INDEED IT MADE FINDINGS OF FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANYTHING
ON RECORD.[16]

Carlito Antonio was in turn arrested on June 23, 1990 pursuant to

an alias warrant of arrest dated June 18, 1990. He was tried under
the same Information,[17] by the lower court.
When arraigned, accused-appellant Carlito Antonio, assisted by
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. After the prosecution rested its
case, the appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence dated April 16,
1991, but the same was denied by the trial court in its
Order[18] dated July 16, 1991.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision dated December
11, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, and finding the accused,

CARLITO ANTONIO y LINAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder by direct participation, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased the amount of Thirty Thousand ( P 30,000.00 )
Pesos Philippine Currency. With costs of suit against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Aggrieved by the trial courts decision,[20] accused-appellant

Carlito Antonio appealed his case to us.
In his appellants brief, the herein appellant raises the following
assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE IMPORTANCE TO THE GUNSHOT

WOUNDS.
 II

IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN EXCUSING THE ADMITTED

CONTRADICTIONS AND INCONSISTENCIES OF THE
PROSECUTIONS WITNESSES AS TRIVIAL, INSIGNIFICANT AND
UNIMPORTANT.

III

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEMURRER TO

EVIDENCE.

IV

NO SUFFICIENT MOTIVE FOR THE KILLING WAS SHOWN. [21]

On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that the trial
courts decision[22] convicting accused-appellant Carlito Antonio
should be affirmed and further prays that the civil indemnity
awarded by the court a quo should be increased to P50,000.00 from
the award of P 30,000.00.[23]
The undisputed facts involving the charge of murder against
both accused, as culled from the records of both the trial
court[24] and appellate court[25] follows:

The accused CARLITO ANTONIO and SEVERINO ANTONIO are the

brothers-in-law of the victim, Gonzalo Gutierrez, the latter being the
husband of the accused elder sister, Mrs. Priscilla Antonio-Gutierrez
x x x. The victim and his family together with Carlito and his family,
Severino, Areng, Betty and Erly lived in separate houses situated in
the Antonio compound which is owned by the mother of the
Antonios.

At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of July 20, 1988, Jaime Robles, a
candidate for councilor but lost, was in Barangay Wawa, Tangos,
Navotas, Metro Manila, on a house to house visit to thank people or
voters who supported him in the local election. He was then
conversing with Luis Pantaleon and Jonathan Narciso. On the other
hand, Reynaldo Gutierrez was also there on Santos Street, and was
talking to one Sony Sengco, when his father Gonzalo Gutierrez
arrived in the place on his way to their residence nearby. Reynaldo
followed his father. Suddenly Carlito Antonio, x x x appeared from
behind of the latter, and at close range fired at him in the
back. When Gonzalo stumbled after walking a few steps, he was
picked up by appellant Severino Antonio, brother of Carlito Antonio,
and one Oryo, held him by the two arms and dragged him across
the street near the gate of the Abalos compound. Oryo held a
knife. Both Severino Antonio and Oryo forced Gonzalo to kneel
down, and while the latter was in that position, Carlito Antonio,
grabbing Gonzalos head by the hair, poked a pistol on his left
temple. Gonzalo pleaded for forgiveness and that he be brought to
the hospital.

It appears that Gonzalo Gutierrez was claiming ownership of the

compound which belonged to the mother of Gonzalos wife and the
Antonio brothers; Gonzalo was saying that he was the master or
boss naghari-harian of the place, which the Antonio brothers
strongly resented. To the plea of Gonzalo, Carlito replied that he
must die now, and fired his gun at the head of Gonzalo. Reynaldo
could not do anything to protect his father because he was afraid,
and another one, a companion, was holding a gun warning him not
to move or else he would also be killed. All that he could say was a
plea to stop the shooting; tama na, tama na. Still not
satisfied, Carlito fired his gun, hitting Gonzalo on the neck. All the
four (4) assailants fled from the scene. Gonzalo was brought by
Reynaldo to the house, together with his brother Camilo Gutierrez,
who arrived, while Robles went to the Office of the Barangay to seek
the assistance of the police, but there was no officer around, so he
went home. Robles auntie Sonia arrived, and informed Robles that
Gonzalo (Along) was killed. Robles told her that he already knew
about it and suggested that he already be brought to the funeral
parlor.

The case was investigated by the police of Navotas. One of the

investigators was Cpl. Wilfredo Mendoza. The latter was informed by
Reynaldo Gutierrez that one of the killers of his father was appellant
Severino Antonio. Not knowing how to file the case, Reynaldo did
not go to the police headquarters not until April 22, 1988, when he
gave his written statement to PFC. Manolo Rodriguez narrating how
his father, Gonzalo, was shot and killed by Carlito Antonio, appellant
Severino Antonio, one Oryo and still another person, and how the
four hatched the plan at about noon time at the seashore which he
(Reynaldo) overheard when he passed by.

An autopsy was performed by Dr. Benjamin Dizon, Municipal Health

Officer of Navotas. His examination showed that the cause of death
of Gonzalo Gutierrez was multiple gun shot wounds on the head,
neck and back. In the course of his post-mortem examination, he
prepared a human sketch, where he depicted and indicated that he
found bullet wounds on the head, the point of entry on the left
temple and the point of exit was on the forehead or tuktok; bullet
wounds on the back of the neck below the right ear as the point of
entry and wound on the back below the left armpit as point of exit;
and bullet wound on the back, on the left side near the waistline as
the point of entry, and wound on the front left side below the ribs as
the point of exit. x x x.
For the defense, Carlito Antonio averred that on the day the incident
happened, he left his house at around 10:00 a.m. to go to the
Magsaysay Lines at T.M. Kalaw St., Manila, in connection with his job
application as a seaman. He stayed in that office until 4:00 p.m. of
that day. After that, he proceeded to his aunt Clarita Guevarra and
arrived there at 5:30 p.m.. There he saw a child of her cousin named
Vener. He stayed there up to 10:00 p.m. as he
was exchanging stories with her aunt. The accused-appellant also
presented two (2) witnesses in the person of Mrs. Filomena Antonio
Besido and Mrs. Clarita Guevarra which substantially corroborated
his testimony.[26]

The Court, after a thorough evaluation and painstaking review of

the records of these cases, conformably with the existing laws and
jurisprudence on the matter, is of the firm position that the herein
petition lacks merit.
As the first and second assigned errors of the brothers Antonio in
these consolidated cases are identical, we shall discuss them jointly.
Both the herein petitioner Severino Antonio and accused-
appellant Carlito Antonio contend that the testimonies of the
prosecutions two principal witnesses, Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime
Robles, on the nature and position of the gunshot wounds sustained
by the victim, Gonzalo Gutierrez, and how these were inflicted, do
not correspond with, and are belied by, the physical evidence as
depicted in the testimony of Navotas Municipal Health Officer, Dr.
Benjamin Dizon, the Government doctor who conducted the post-
mortem examination of the victim. They both assail the trial court
for giving more weight to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses despite certain errors, inconsistencies and contradictions
in their declarations. In particular, they assert the following:

Gunshot wounds B-1 and B-2 do not tally with the eyewitness
account. The slug in B-1 went inside the back portion of the head
and exited at the front while the assailant was at the left side of the
victim who were both standing. But the eyewitnesses testified that
Gonzalo who was kneeling then was pleading
to Carlito, Carlito was holding his hair, answered cruelly kailangang
mamatay ka, then pulled the trigger as the gun was pointed at his
temple.

Gunshot B-2 had its slug entering at the lower behind at the right
ear and exiting at the right area with the assailant in a much higher
level. The eyewitnesses account had the shot fired immediately
after the shot at the temple as the victims head hang down. They
evidently again mistook the point of entry and exit from one
another. Note that the doctor denied the possibility that Gonzalo
was in a kneeling position even as the Fiscal led him to answer in
such a manner.[27]
 After carefully examining the records of these cases, we find the
above-quoted allegations to be untenable. The court sees no reason
to set aside the findings of fact of the trial court, which are
supported by the testimony of witnesses who have no reason
whatsoever to testify falsely against the accused-brothers. A witness
testimony ought to be entitled to great weight when his accusing
words are directed against a close relative. [28] It goes beyond logic
and normal human experience for a kinsman to prosecute a blood
relative. He risks the ire and reprisal of other relatives, if he were
not guided by truth and motivated by a quest for justice. Time and
again, we have ruled in a catena of authorities that the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed
because the trial judge is in a better position to rule on questions of
fact, he having observed the deportment of the witnesses and their
manner of testifying during the trial,[29] except when it appears in
the record that the trial court had overlooked, ignored, or
disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance
that, if considered, would alter the result.[30] The petitioner and
accused-appellant failed to demonstrate that their case falls under
such an exception. Thus, as elucidated by the court a quo:

The medico-legal findings on the cause of death of the victim,

Gonzalo Gutierrez confirms the eye witnesses accounts of the
incident. Dr. Benjamin Dizon who autopsied the remains of the
deceased confirmed that three (3) shots were fired at the victim,
with his medical finding that, the victim sustained three (3) bullet
wounds, to wit: a) bullet wounds on the head, the point of entry on
the left temple and the point of exit on the forehead Tuktok; b) bullet
wounds on the back of the neck below the right ear as the point of
entry, and wound on the back below the armpit as the point of exit;
c) bullet wound on the back, on the left side near the waistline as
the point of entry, and the wound on the front side below the ribs as
point of exit.

The finding of the doctor as to the location of the points of entry and
exit of the bullet wounds sustained by the victim, is consistent and
conformable with the eyewitnesses testimony. To the mind of the
Court, any variance thereof as to the exact location and nature of
the wounds would be inconsequential and trivial matters and would
not affect the credibility of the witnesses. It is common experience
that the human eye and mind could not perceive with mechanical
precision and with exactitude all the details of an
incident. Especially in this case when a murder was committed and
the eyewitnesses to the gruesome killing are the close relatives of
the victim and the assailants. xxx

In no occasion or instance that this Court entertains doubt as to the

credibility of the prosecutions witnesses. It always adheres to the
legal principle or doctrine that, the testimony itself must not only be
credible but also the source thereof. xxx[31]

As to the other alleged contradictions and inconsistencies

regarding the testimony of the prosecutions witnesses, we find that
they relate only to trivial, insignificant and unimportant matters and
consequently do not materially impair or impugn the very testimony
of said witnesses. Accordingly, it has been held by this Court in the
case of People vs. Daen, Jr.[32] that, a witness is not expected to
remember an occurrence with perfect recollection down to
insignificant and minute details. Errorless testimonies cannot be
expected especially when a witness is recounting details of a
harrowing experience[33] and as long as the mass of testimony jibes
on material points, the slight clashing statements dilute neither the
witnesses credibility nor the veracity of their testimony. Such
inconsistencies on minor details would even enhance credibility as
these discrepancies indicate that the responses are honest and
unrehearsed.[34]
We find that the positive testimony of eyewitnesses, like
Gutierrez and Robles, has a greater probative value than the
hypothetical statements made by a witness who was not even
present at the locus criminis, like Dr. Dizon.
The petitioner and accused-appellant further contend that the
delay in reporting the crime to the police was inexcusable and
unreasonable and that the reasons given therefor are mere
conjectures and suppositions not supported by evidence on
record. Therefore, they allege that the delay in reporting the crime
to the police authorities casts doubt on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
To this contention, we find no merit.
The delay on the part of eyewitnesses Reynaldo Gutierrez and
Jaime Robles, assuming there was any, was not unreasonable. It is a
well-established rule needing minimal discussion that delay or
vacillation in reporting a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not
impair the credibility of witnesses and their testimony nor destroy
its probative value.[35]Delay of a witness in revealing to the
authorities what he knows about a crime does not render his
testimony false, for the delay may be explained by the natural
reticence of most people and their abhorrence to get involved in a
criminal case.[36] And, the natural reluctance of witnesses to
volunteer information to the police authorities in criminal cases is
consistent with normal behavior and is a matter of judicial notice.[37]
In the case at bench, Reynaldo Gutierrez sufficiently accounted
for the delay in reporting the crime to the police, while Jaime Robles
explained the reason for his reluctance to be involved in the
case. The Court of Appeals ruled on the matter in this manner:
It would appear
that, out of sheer ignorance or lack of sufficient education, and his
being in a state of helplessness, witness Reynaldo Gutierrez was not
able to go to the police headquarters and give his statement not
until much later.

However, when Cpl. Wilfredo Mendoza was investigating the case,

he was already informed by Reynaldo that one of the killers of his
father was appellant Severino. xxx

There can be no doubt as to the presence of Reynaldo Gutierrez at

the scene of the killing to enable him to witness the shooting of his
father, as the same is confirmed by the other present witness Jaime
Robles who was also present at the scene of incident. As a matter of
fact, witness Reynaldo was prevented from extending any help to
his beleaguered father, as one of the companions of appellant held
him at bay by poking a gun at him. And as soon as the killers left,
Reynaldo went to approach his father and brought him to their
home. If Reynaldo was not there to witness the incident, appellant
could have easily checked with Sony Sengco, with whom witness
was talking immediately before his father was shot, and appellant
could have made him as his witness to dispute the witness claim
that he was there after the scene of the shooting.

As to the witness Jaime Robles, it would appear

that he did not want to be involved as he simply went to the
barangay office to look for a policeman, and having failed to find
one he simply went home. It appears that Robles is related to both
the family of appellant and the deceased. He is the cousin of the
Antonios by his father side; he is also the cousin of the deceased by
his mother
side.He was terribly depressed and saddened about the whole affair,
since the parties involved are his relatives. Be that as it may, we do
not find said witness to be a false one. As we examined the records,
he testified in a clear and straight forward manner, responsive and
positive, indicating that he is a truthful witness. We find no motive
why he should testify falsely against appellant if the truth was that
he was not there at the scene and witnessed the commission of the
crime. Hence, not withstanding the fact that he did not come
forward and report the incident to the police authorities, like other
persons or bystanders who were present and saw the incident and
did not also take the trouble to go to the police station, witness
Jaime Robles credibility was not affected thereby. It is well-known
that eyewitnesses to killings usually do not want to undergo the
trouble and inconvenience of an investigation and of appearing in
court, being grilled by lawyers and being exposed to reprisal from
the accused (People vs. Medrana, 110 SCRA 130, 141). Initial
reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal
case and their unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigations
are common and do not affect their credibility (People vs. Untalasco,
125 SCRA 159, 170)."[38] (Underlining supplied)

As to the assigned error, to wit:

The trial court, of course, denied the demurrer. But it did not say
there was proof beyond reasonable doubt of the accuseds
guilt. Neither did it consider the various points raised by the
accused against the testimonies of the alleged two
eyewitnesses. The trial court merely stated that there is
a prima facie proof the accused , and that the two eyewitnesses
pinpointed to the accused Carlito Antonio as the triggerman.'[39]

we find the contention to be not well-taken. Judicial action on a

motion to dismiss or demurrer to the evidence is left to the exercise
of sound judicial discretion. Unless there is a grave abuse thereof,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the trial courts denial of a motion
to dismiss may not be disturbed. [40] In the case at bench, the trial
court, after hearing the evidence presented by the prosecution, was
convinced that said evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding of
guilt. In its Order dated July 16, 1991 denying appellants Demurrer
to Evidence filed on April 12, 1991, the trial court stated that:

In clear contrast with the case at bar, the prosecution has at least
shown prima facie the guilt of the accused, or as frequently
stated, the essential element of the crime charged. The
uncontrovertedfacts remain that the deceased Gonzalo Gutierrez wa
s shot three (3) times on the different parts of his body at Navotas,
Metro Manila in the 20th day of January 1988 at around 7:00 P.M. The
doctor who conducted the autopsy and postmortem examination on
the body of the deceased testified that the cause of death was
gunshot wounds. That the two (2) witnesses,
namely: ReynaldoGutierrez and Jaime Robles testified that they saw
the actual killing
and pinpointed to the accused Carlito Antonio as the triggerman. As
to the motive of the killing, the Court took note that even
the accused admitted that there was existing family feud between t
he deceased and the accused-brothers, Carlito and Severino
Antonio.[41] (Underlining supplied)

Hence, although the trial court did not expressly state in its
Order[42] denying appellants demurrer to evidence that there was
proof beyond reasonable doubt, such degree of proof was actually
existing and present in the aforesaid Order. The prosecution was
successful in proving every fact and circumstance essential to show
the guilt of the accused.The court a quo found: (a) the
uncontroverted facts remain that the deceased Gonzalo Gutierrez
was shot three (3) times on the different parts of the body at
Navotas, Metro Manila in the 20th day of January 1988 at around
7:00 P.M.; (b) two (2) witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Gutierrez and
Jaime Robles testified that they saw the actual killing and pinpointed
the accused Carlito Antonio as the triggerman; and (3) the accused
admitted that there was an existing family feud between the
deceased and the accused-brothers, Carlito and Severino Antonio. [43]
Furthermore, in denying a demurrer to evidence, the court need
not state that the prosecution has established proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It is sufficient that words of similar import, such
as those stated in this case the essential elements of the crime
charged,[44] - be present to indicate that there was a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. Therefore, the trial
court did not commit any error in its Order dated July 16, 1991
denying the appellants demurrer to evidence for there was sufficient
compliance.
Going now to the alibi interposed by the accused-appellant, we
find the same to be bereft of merit.
It is undisputed jurisprudential rule that, for the defense of alibi
to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time the crime was committed but that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time
of the alleged crime.[45] This the appellant failed to prove. Moreover,
alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is mainly
established by the accused himself and his immediate relatives and
not by credible persons.[46] Besides, positive identification where
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over
alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law.[47]
In the instant case, the herein accused-appellant and petitioner
was definitely identified and established as having been in the
Antonio compound at about 6:00 P.M. of January 20, 1988 by no less
than their elder sister, Priscilla A. Gutierrez. [48] Moreover, Carlito
Antonio was positively identified by prosecution witnesses Reynaldo
Gutierrez and Jaime Robles as the one who shot and killed, together
with co-accused Severino Antonio and a certain Oryo, the victim
Gonzalo Gutierrez on January 20, 1988 at Wawa, Navotas, Metro
Manila.[49] Thus, the trial court stated:

On the other hand, witnesses, Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles

had positively identified the assailants and their testimonies
corroborate each other on material points. Both of them testified
that they personally witnessed the killing of Gonzalo Gutierrez by
accused, Carlito Antonio and his co-conspirators on the fateful
evening of January 20, 1988 in Wawa, Tangos, Navotas, Metro
Manila. They positively identified Carlito Antonio as the
gunwilder(sic) and narrated in a detailed and straight-forward
manner how the latter fired his gun at the back of the victim while
he was walking towards his house. Thereafter, Severino and Oryo
grasped the hands of the victim, and dragged the latter about four
(4) meters away towards the gate of the Ablola family, where they
forced the victim to kneel down. Carlito Antonio then grabbed the
victims head by hair and pointed a gun on his left temple and after a
few exchange of words squeezed the trigger. After the shot, the
victims head hanged forward lumungayngay and at this precise
moment Carlito shot again the victim on his neck.[50]

Finally, while in his fourth assigned error, accused-appellant

Carlito Antonio contends that:

Aside from a vague reference to a family dispute (which was

uncorroborated and the specifics of which are not stated), there is
no clear motive for the killing. With such a brutal, merciless assault,
the rage of the assailants must have been great. What brought such
anger? What impelled such demonic act? Theres no answer from the
prosecutions evidence.[51]

it is our holding that this argument is without merit, because motive

is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity
of the culprit.[52] The fact that the witnesses had positively and
categorically identified the accused as the malefactors, negatives
the need for establishing the motive for the killing of the victim.[53]
But, the motive behind the killing of Gonzalo Gutierrez was in
fact satisfactorily established by the testimony of prosecution
witness Reynaldo Gutierrez when the latter testified that:
Q. By the way, do you know any personal misunderstanding
exist between your father and your uncles before January
20, 1988?
A. Yes, sir. There was.
Q. What was that?
A. About our land, sir.
Q. You said there was a misunderstanding between your
father and the two (2) accused about your land will you
please tell this honorable court what is that
misunderstanding about the land?
A. Because they say that my father wants to act as King in ou
r compound.
Q. They complain that your father was acting as a king in
your compound, what compound are you referring to ?
A. The land of my grandmother, sir.
 Q. You said it was the land of your grandmother, in that
compound, who was residing?
A. Our house is near the house of my uncles, sir.
Q. You said your house is near the house of your uncles, who
are these uncles?
A. They are Tiyo Caring, Sebing, Areng, Betty and Erly.
Q. These Caring and Sebing, are they the same accused
Carlito Antonio and Severino Antonio in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You stated that it was complained or rather they
complained that your father was acting as a King in this
compound, who made that complaint that your father is
naghahari-harian.
A. My uncle, sir.
Q. Who in this particular, among your uncles?
A. Carlito Antonio, Sir.
Q. You said that the compound where your house and the
houses of your uncles situated is owned by your
grandmother, whose grandmother you are referring to?
A. My grandmother in my mother side, sir. [54] (Underlining
supplied)
Priscilla Gutierrez, another prosecution witness likewise
corroborated the above-quoted testimony. We quote relevant
portions of her testimony:
Q. It is admitted by the defense that you are a sister of the
accused, Carlito Antonio and Severino Antonio, now will
you please tell the Honorable Court who among the three
(3) of you is the eldest?
A. I am the one, sir.
Q. It is also admitted by the defense that you Carlito Antonio
and Severino Antonio live in the same compound?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In whose compound do you and accused, Severino and
Carlito Antonio live?
A. To our mother, sir.
Q. Do you want to tell this Honorable Court that the land on
which your houses are erected are owned by your
mother?
A. Yes, sir.
 Q. How long have you and your brothers Severino and Carlito
been neighbors in the compound owned by your mother
before January 20, 1988?
A. It has been a long time, about 20 years now, sir.
Q. As neighbors, did your husband get along with your
brothers Carlito and Severino?
A. Before we were in good terms but later on we have a misu
nderstanding between them, sir.
Q. What was that misunderstanding between your husband
and your brother, Carlito?
A. They are claiming that we are occupying a bigger portion o
f the lot and saying that my
husband was and I quote, 'NAGHAHARI-HARIAN.[55] (Under
lining supplied)
As to civil indemnity, we hold that the amount of P30,000.00
awarded by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 6741-MN dated
December 11, 1992,[56] to the heirs of the victims should be
increased to P50,000.00, in line with present jurisprudence.[57]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review in
G.R. No. 100513 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the judgment
appealed from in G.R. No. 111559, except for the above mentioned
modification, is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Padilla, (Chairman), J., on leave.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL,
LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL,
SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void
two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of
Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De
Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated
on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the
second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for
not being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of
Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would
still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out

building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but
the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the
Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided
by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners
guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed
in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August
17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25,
1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period
to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by
the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly
applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
[G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this
Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the

rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in
cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate

Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA
643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the
modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15,

1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of said
rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from

the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's
Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to
June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions
of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is,
as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension

on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period,
which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be
allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate

Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of

time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case

should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring
the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no

grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible
for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should
be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private

respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since
the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY

the instant petition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 130150 October, 1998

MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and FAR EASTERN SHIPPING
COMPANY, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari seek in unison
to annul and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals
of November 15, 1996 and its resolution 2 dated July 31, 1997 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 24072, entitled "Philippine Ports Authority, Plaintiff-
Appellee vs. Far Eastern Shipping Company, Senen C. Gavino and
Manila Pilots' Association, Defendants-Appellants," which affirmed
with modification the judgment of the trial court holding the
defendants-appellants therein solidarily liable for damages in favor
of herein private respondent.

There is no dispute about the facts as found by the appellate court,

thus

. . . On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under

the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far
Eastern Shipping Company (FESC for brevity's sake),
arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British
Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The
vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International
Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana
was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise
the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was
assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association
(MPA for brevity's sake) to conduct docking maneuvers
for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.

Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage

and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of
the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing
of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel
and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the
quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila
International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was
ideal for docking maneuvers.

When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church

by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier,
Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel
was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the
orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left
anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However,
the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of
the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued
between the crew members. A brief conference ensued
between Kavankov and the crew members. When
Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about,
Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.
 After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold,
he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was
then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed
that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter
gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the
vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained
damage too, (Exhibit "7-Far Eastern Shipping). Kavankov
filed his sea protest (Exhibit "1-Vessel"). Gavino
submitted his report to the Chief Pilot (Exhibit "1-Pilot")
who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority
(Exhibit 2-Pilot"). Abellana likewise submitted his report
of the incident (Exhibit "B").

Per contract and supplemental contract of the Philippine

Ports Authority and the contractor for the rehabilitation
of the damaged pier, the same cost the Philippine Ports
Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25 (Exhibits "D"
and "E"). 3

On January 10, 1983, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, for brevity),
through the Solicitor General, filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 39, a complaint for a sum of money against Far
Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots'
Association, docketed as Civil Case No. 83-14958, 4 praying that the
defendants therein be held jointly and severally liable to pay the
plaintiff actual and exemplary damages plus costs of suit. In a
decision dated August 1, 1985, the trial court ordered the
defendants therein jointly and severally to pay the PPA the amount
of P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and the costs of
suit. 5

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals and raised the

following issues: (1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under
compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by the
vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence? and
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is
caused by the concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and
the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

As stated at the outset, respondent appellate court affirmed the

findings of the court a quo except that if found no employer-
employee relationship existing between herein private respondents
Manila Pilots' Association (MPA, for short) and Capt. Gavino. 6 This
being so, it ruled instead that the liability of MPA is anchored, not on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but on the provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65, 7 and accordingly modified said
decision of the trial court by holding MPA, along with its co-
defendants therein, still solidarily liable to PPA but entitled MPA to
reimbursement from Capt. Gavino for such amount of the adjudged
pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to seventy-
five percent (75%) of its prescribed reserve
fund. 8

Neither Far Eastern Shipping Co. (briefly, FESC) nor MPA was happy
with the decision of the Court of Appeals and both of them elevated
their respective plaints to us via separate petitions for review
on certiorari.

In G. R. No. 130068, which was assigned to the Second Division of

this Court, FESC imputed that the Court of Appeals seriously erred:

1. in not holding Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots'

Association as the parties solely responsible for the
resulting damages sustained by the pier deliberately
ignoring the established jurisprudence on the matter;

2. in holding that the master had not exercised the

required diligence demanded from him by the
circumstances at the time the incident happened;

3. in affirming the amount of damages sustained by the

respondent Philippine Ports Authority despite a strong
and convincing evidence that the amount is clearly
exorbitant and unreasonable;

4. in not awarding any amount of counterclaim prayed

for by the petitioner in its answer; and

5. in not granting herein petitioner's claim against pilot

Senen C. Gavino and Manila Pilots' Association in the
event that it be held
liable. 9

Petitioner asserts that since the MV PAVLODAR was under

compulsory pilotage at the time of the incident, it was the
compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino, who was in command and had
complete control in the navigation and docking of the vessel. It is
the pilot who supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of a ship and his orders must be obeyed in
all respects connected with her navigation. Consequently, he was
solely responsible for the damage caused upon the pier apron, and
not the owners of the vessel. It claims that the master of the boat
did not commit any act of negligence when he failed to
countermand or overrule the orders of the pilot because he did not
see any justifiable reason to do so. In other words, the master
cannot be faulted for relying absolutely on the competence of the
compulsory pilot. If the master does not observe that a compulsory
pilot is incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is
justified in relying on the pilot. 10

Respondent PPA, in its comment, predictably in full agreement with

the ruling of respondent court on the solidary liability of FESC, MPA
and Capt. Gavino, stresses the concurrent negligence of Capt.
Gavino, the harbor pilot, and Capt. Viktor Kabankov, * shipmaster of
MV Pavlodar, as the basis of their solidary liability for damages
sustained by PPA. It posits that the vessel was being piloted by Capt.
Gavino with Capt. Kabankov beside him all the while on the bridge
of the vessel, as the former took over the helm of MV Pavlodar when
it rammed and damaged the apron of the pier of Berth No. 4 of the
Manila International Port. Their concurrent negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of the collision between the vessel
and the pier Capt. Gavino, for his negligence in the conduct of
docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel; and Capt.
Kabankov, for failing to countermand the orders of the harbor pilot
and to take over and steer the vessel himself in the face of
imminent danger, as well as for merely relying on Capt. Gavino
during the berthing procedure. 11

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 130150, originally assigned to the

Court's First Division and later transferred to the Third Division. MPA,
now as petitioner in this case, avers that respondent court's errors
consisted in disregarding and misinterpreting Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 which limits the liability of MPA. Said
pilots' association asseverates that it should not be held solidarily
liable with Capt. Gavino who, as held by respondent court is only a
member, not an employee, thereof. There being no employer-
employee relationship, neither can MPA be held liable for any
vicarious liability for the respective exercise of profession by its
members nor be considered a joint tortfeasor as to be held jointly
and severally liable. 12 It further argues that there was erroneous
reliance on Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 and the
constitution and by-laws of MPA, instead of the provisions of the Civil
Code on damages which, being a substantive law, is higher in
category than the aforesaid constitution and by-laws of a
professional organization or an administrative order which bears no
provision classifying the nature of the liability of MPA for the
negligence its member pilots. 13

As for Capt. Gavino, counsel for MPA states that the former had
retired from active pilotage services since July 28, 1994 and has
ceased to be a member of petitioner pilots' association. He is not
joined as a petitioner in this case since his whereabouts are
unknown. 14
FESC's comment thereto relied on the competence of the Court of
Appeals in construing provisions of law or administrative orders as
bases for ascertaining the liability of MPA, and expressed full accord
with the appellate court's holding of solidary liability among itself,
MPA and Capt. Gavino. It further avers that the disputed provisions
of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 clearly established MPA's
solidary liability. 15

On the other hand, public respondent PPA, likewise through

representations by the Solicitor General, assumes the same
supportive stance it took in G.R. No. 130068 in declaring its total
accord with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that MPA is solidarily
liable with Capt. Gavino and FESC for damages, and in its
application to the fullest extent of the provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 in relation to MPA's constitution and
by-laws which spell out the conditions of and govern their respective
liabilities. These provisions are clear and unambiguous as regards
MPA's liability without need for interpretation or construction.
Although Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 is a mere
regulation issued by an administrative agency pursuant to
delegated legislative authority to fix details to implement the law, it
is legally binding and has the same statutory force as any valid
statute. 16

Upon motion 17 by FESC dated April 24, 1998 in G.R. No. 130150,
said case was consolidated with G.R. No. 130068. 18

Prefatorily, on matters of compliance with procedural requirements,

it must be mentioned that the conduct of the respective counsel for
FESC and PPA leaves much to be desired, to the displeasure and
disappointment of this Court.

Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 19 incorporates

the former Circular No. 28-91 which provided for what has come to
be known as the certification against forum shopping as an
additional requisite for petitions filed with the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals, aside from the other requirements contained
in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court therefor, with the end in
view of preventing the filing of multiple complaints involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof or any other tribunal or agency.

More particularly, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42

provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner shall also submit together with the

petition a certification under oath that he has not
 theretofore commenced any other action involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he
must state the status of the same; and if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly
inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)

For petitions for review filed before the Supreme Court,

Section 4(e), Rule 45 specifically requires that such petition
shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42.

The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario
through its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is the counsel of record
for FESC in both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No. 130150.

G.R. No. 130068, which is assigned to the Court's Second Division,

commenced with the filing by FESC through counsel on August 22,
1997 of a verified motion for extension of time to file its petition for
thirty (30) days from August 28, 1997 or until September 27,
1997. 20 Said motion contained the following certification against
forum shopping21 signed by Atty. Herbert A. Tria as affiant:

CERTIFICATION

AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

I/we hereby certify that I/we have not commenced any

other action or proceeding involving the same issues in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency; that to the best of my own
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency; that if I/we should thereafter learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I/we undertake
to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to this
Honorable Court.

This motion having been granted, FESC subsequently filed its

petition on September 26, 1997, this time bearing a
"verification and certification against forum-shopping"
 executed by one Teodoro P. Lopez on September 24,
1997, 22 to wit:

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

in compliance with Section 4(e), Rule 45 in relation

to Section 2, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Civil

Procedure

I, Teodoro P. Lopez, of legal age, after being duly sworn,

depose and state:

1. That I am the Manager, Claims Department of Filsov

Shipping Company, the local agent of petitioner in this
case.

2. That I have caused the preparation of this Petition for

Review on Certiorari.

3. That I have read the same and the allegations therein

contained are true and correct based on the records of
this case.

4. That I certify that petitioner has not commenced any

other action or proceeding involving the same issues in
the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, that to the best of my own
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other
tribunal or agency, that if I should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report the fact
within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court.
(Italics supplied for emphasis.)

Reviewing the records, we find that the petition filed by MPA in G.R.
No. 130150 then pending with the Third Division was duly filed on
August 29, 1997 with a copy thereof furnished on the same date by
registered mail to counsel for FESC. 23 Counsel of record for MPA.
Atty. Jesus P. Amparo, in his verification accompanying said petition
dutifully revealed to the Court that

xxx xxx xxx

 3. Petitioner has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in this Honorable
Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, but to the best
of his knowledge, there is an action or proceeding
pending in this Honorable Court, entitled Far Eastern
Shipping Co., Petitioner, vs. Philippine Ports Authority
and Court of Appeals with a Motion for Extension of time
to file Petition For Review by Certiorari filed sometime
on August 18, 1987. If undersigned counsel will come to
know of any other pending action or claim filed or
pending he undertakes to report such fact within five (5)
days to this Honorable Court. 24 (Emphasis supplied.)

Inasmuch as MPA's petition in G.R. No. 130150 was posted by

registered mail on August 29, 1997 and taking judicial notice of the
average period of time it takes local mail to reach its destination, by
reasonable estimation it would be fair to conclude that when FESC
filed its petition in G.R. No. 130068 on September 26, 1997, it would
already have received a copy of the former and would then have
knowledge of the pendency of the other petition initially filed with
the First Division. It was therefore incumbent upon FESC to inform
the Court of that fact through its certification against forum
shopping. For failure to make such disclosure, it would appear that
the aforequoted certification accompanying the petition in G.R. No.
130068 is defective and could have been a ground for dismissal
thereof.

Even assuming that FESC had not yet received its copy of MPA's
petition at the time it filed its own petition and executed said
certification, its signatory did state "that if I should thereafter learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other
tribunal or agency, I undertake to report the fact within five (5) days
therefrom to this Honorable Court." 25 Scouring the records page by
page in this case, we find that no manifestation concordant with
such undertaking was then or at any other time thereafter ever filed
by FESC nor was there any attempt to bring such matter to the
attention of the Court. Moreover, it cannot feign non-knowledge of
the existence of such other petition because FESC itself filed the
motion for consolidation in G.R. No. 130150 of these two cases on
April 24, 1998.

It is disturbing to note that counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del
Rosario and Del Rosario, displays an unprofessional tendency of
taking the Rules for granted, in this instance exemplified by its pro
forma compliance therewith but apparently without full
comprehension of and with less than faithful commitment to its
undertakings to this Court in the interest of just, speedy and orderly
administration of court proceedings.

As between the lawyer and the courts, a lawyer owes candor,

fairness and good faith to the court. 26 He is an officer of the court
exercising a privilege which is indispensable in the administration of
justice. 27 Candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for
the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. 28 Candor in all dealings is the very essence of
honorable membership in the legal profession. 29 More specifically, a
lawyer is obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. 30 It behooves a lawyer,
therefore, to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 31 Being an officer
of the court, a lawyer has a responsibility in the proper
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to
advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and
inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of
final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these
objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper
practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged
as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. 32

Sad to say, the members of said law firm sorely failed to observe
their duties as responsible members of the Bar. Their actuations are
indicative of their predisposition to take lightly the avowed duties of
officers of the Court to promote respect for law and for legal
processes. 33 We cannot allow this state of things to pass judicial
muster.

In view of the fact that at around the time these petitions were
commenced, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had just taken effect,
the Court treated infractions of the new Rules then with relative
liberality in evaluating full compliance therewith. Nevertheless, it
would do well to remind all concerned that the penal provisions of
Circular No. 28-91 which remain operative provides, inter alia:

3. Penalties.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The submission of a false certification under Par. 2 of

the Circular shall likewise constitute contempt of court,
without prejudice to the filing of criminal action against
the guilty party. The lawyer may also be subjected to
disciplinary proceedings.
It must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping
ordained under the Rules is to be executed by thepetitioner, and not
by counsel. Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel
whose professional services have been retained for a particular
case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually
filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a
certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective
certification. It is clearly equivalent to non-compliance with the
requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 in relation to Section 4, Rule
45, and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition.

Hence, the initial certification appended to the motion for extension

of time to file petition in G.R. No. 130068 executed in behalf of FESC
by Atty. Tria is procedurally deficient. But considering that it was a
superfluity at that stage of the proceeding, it being unnecessary to
file such a certification with a mere motion for extension, we shall
disregard such error. Besides, the certification subsequently
executed by Teodoro P. Lopez in behalf of FESC cures that defect to
a certain extent, despite the inaccuracies earlier pointed out. In the
same vein, we shall consider the verification signed in behalf of MPA
by its counsel, Atty. Amparo, in G.R. No. 130150 as substantial
compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of
informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding
involving the same issues.

It bears stressing that procedural rules are instruments in the

speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should be used
to achieve such end and not to derail it. 34

Counsel for PPA did not make matters any better. Despite the fact
that, save for the Solicitor General at the time, the same legal team
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG, for short) composed of
Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F.
Simon, with the addition of Assistant Solicitor General Pio C.
Guerrero very much later in the proceedings, represented PPA
throughout the appellate proceedings in both G.R. No. 130068 and
G.R. No. 130150 and was presumably fully acquainted with the facts
and issues of the case, it took the OSG an inordinately and almost
unreasonably long period of time to file its comment, thus unduly
delaying the resolution of these cases. It took several changes of
leadership in the OSG from Silvestre H. Bello III to Romeo C. dela
Cruz and, finally, Ricardo P. Galvez before the comment in behalf
of PPA was finally filed.

In G.R. No. 130068, it took eight (8) motions for extension of time
totaling 210 days, a warning that no further extensions shall be
granted, and personal service on the Solicitor General himself of the
resolution requiring the filing of such comment before the OSG
indulged the Court with the long required comment on July 10,
1998. 35 This, despite the fact that said office was required to file its
comment way back on November 12, 1997. 36 A closer scrutiny of
the records likewise indicates that petitoner FESC was not even
furnished a copy of said comment as required by Section 5, Rule 42.
Instead, a copy thereof was inadvertently furnished to MPA which,
from the point of view of G.R. No. 130068, was a non-party. 37 The
OSG fared slightly better in G.R. No. 130150 in that it took only six
(6) extensions, or a total of 180 days, before the comment was
finally filed. 38 And while it properly furnished petitioner MPA with a
copy of its comment, it would have been more desirable and
expedient in this case to have furnished its therein co-respondent
FESC with a copy thereof, if only as a matter of professional
courtesy. 39

This undeniably dilatory disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file

required pleadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the tax-
paying public and can only be categorized as censurable inefficiency
on the part of the government law office. This is most certainly
professionally unbecoming of the OSG.

Another thing that baffles the Court is why the OSG did not take the
inititive of filing a motion for consolidation in either G.R. No. 130068
or G.R. No. 130150, considering its familiarity with the background
of the case and if only to make its job easier by having to prepare
and file only one comment. It could not have been unaware of the
pendency of one or the other petition because, being counsel for
respondent in both cases, petitioner is required to furnish it with a
copy of the petition under pain of dismissal of the petition for failure
otherwise. 40

Besides, in G.R. 130068, it prefaces its discussions thus

Incidentally, the Manila Pilots' Association (MPA), one of

the defendants-appellants in the case before the
respondent Court of Appeals, has taken a separate
appeal from the said decision to this Honorable Court,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 130150 and entitled
"Manila Pilots' Association, Petitioner, versus Philippine
Ports Authority and Far Eastern Shipping Co.,
Respondents." 41

Similarly, in G.R. No. 130150, it states

Incidentally, respondent Far Eastern Shipping Co. (FESC)

had also taken an appeal from the said decision to this
Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 130068, entitled
"Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals and
Philippine Ports Authority." 42
We find here a lackadaisical attitude and complacency on the part of
the OSG in the handling of its cases and an almost reflexive
propensity to move for countless extensions, as if to test the
patience of the Court, before favoring it with the timely submission
of required pleadings.

It must be emphasized that the Court can resolve cases only as fast
as the respective parties in a case file the necessary pleadings. The
OSG, by needlessly extending the pendency of these cases through
its numerous motions for extension, came very close to exhausting
this Court's forbearance and has regrettably fallen short of its duties
as the People's Tribune.

The OSG is reminded that just like other members of the Bar, the
canons under the Code of Professional Responsibility apply with
equal force on lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks. 43These ethical duties are rendered even more
exacting as to them because, as government counsel, they have the
added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high
standard of ethics in public service. 44 Furthermore, it is incumbent
upon the OSG, as part of the government bureaucracy, to perform
and discharge its duties with the highest degree of professionalism,
intelligence and skill 45 and to extend prompt, courteous and
adequate service to the public. 46

Now, on the merits of the case. After a judicious examination of the

records of this case, the pleadings filed, and the evidence presented
by the parties in the two petitions, we find no cogent reason to
reverse and set aside the questioned decision. While not entirely a
case of first impression, we shall discuss the issues seriatim and,
correlatively by way of a judicial once-over, inasmuch as the
matters raised in both petitions beg for validation and updating of
well-worn maritime jurisprudence. Thereby, we shall write finis to
the endless finger-pointing in this shipping mishap which has been
stretched beyond the limits of judicial tolerance.

The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is

under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of
Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85, 47 which
provides that:

Sec. 8. Compulsor Pilotage Service. For entering a

harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers
or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking
and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one
berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and
foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. . . .
In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and
responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been
specified by the same regulation in this wise:

Sec. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage.

On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot
providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for
the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at
ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be
absolved from liability if the accident is caused by
force majeure or natural calamities provided he has
exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or
minimize damage.

The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel

even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand
or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on
beard. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or
to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or
negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and
liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned
without prejudice to recourse against said Master.

Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its

pilots shall be determined by competent authority in
appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.

Sec. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots'

Association. The duties and responsibilities of the
Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a

vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot
thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed
safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall
cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to
carry out hisorder.

Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier

likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of
pilots:

Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the

direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control
thereof until he leaves it anchored free from
shoal: Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the
 moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his
instructions.

xxx xxx xxx

Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or

anchor vessels under their control when requested to do
so by the master of such vessels.

I. G.R. No. 130068

Petitioner FESC faults the respondent court with serious error in not
holding MPA and Capt. Gavino solely responsible for the damages
cause to the pier. It avers that since the vessel was under
compulsory pilotage at the time with Capt. Gavino in command and
having exclusive control of the vessel during the docking
maneuvers, then the latter should be responsible for damages
caused to the pier. 48 It likewise holds the appellate court in error for
holding that the master of the ship, Capt. Kabankov, did not exercise
the required diligence demanded by the circumstances.49

We start our discussion of the successive issues bearing in mind the

evidentiary rule in American jurisprudence that there is a
presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a
stationary object such as a dock or navigational aid. In admiralty,
this presumption does more than merely require the ship to go
forward and produce some evidence on the presumptive matter. The
moving vessel must show that it was without fault or that the
collision was occasioned by the fault of the stationary object or was
the result of inevitable accident. It has been held that such vessel
must exhaust every reasonable possibility which the circumstances
admit and show that in each, they did all that reasonable care
required. 50 In the absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the
presumption of fault attaches to a moving vessel which collides with
a fixed object and makes a prima facie case of fault against the
vessel. 51 Logic and experience support this presumption:

The common sense behind the rule makes the burden a

heavy one. Such accidents simply do not occur in the
ordinary course of things unless the vessel has been
mismanaged in some way. It is nor sufficient for the
respondent to produce witnesses who testify that as
soon as the danger became apparent everything
possible was done to avoid an accident. The question
remains, How then did the collision occur? The answer
must be either that, in spite of the testimony of the
witnesses, what was done was too little or too late or, if
not, then the vessel was at fault for being in a position
in which an unavoidable collision would occur. 52
 The task, therefore, in these cases is to pinpoint who was
negligent the master of the ship, the harbor pilot or both.

A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to

conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. In a broad
sense, the term "pilot" includes both (1) those whose duty it is to
guide vessels into or out of ports, or in particular waters and (2)
those entrusted with the navigation of vessels on the high
seas. 53 However, the term "pilot" is more generally understood as a
person taken on board at a particular place for the purpose of
conducting a ship through a river, road or channel, or from a port. 54

Under English and American authorities, generally speaking, the

pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters
connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac
vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and
reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot
is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to
insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as
pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take
entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the
master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in
localities where pilotage is compulsory. 55

It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory

pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels
approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board
pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to
create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to
pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and
property from the dangers of navigation. 56

In line with such established doctrines, Chapter II of Customs

Administrative Order No. 15-65 prescribes the rules for compulsory
pilotage in the covered pilotage districts, among which is the Manila
Pilotage District,
viz.

PARAGRAPH I. Pilotage for entering a harbor and

anchoring thereat, as well as docking and undocking in
any pier or shifting from one berth to another shall be
compulsory, except Government vessels and vessels of
foreign governments entitled to courtesy, and other
vessels engaged solely in river or harbor work, or in a
daily ferry service between ports which shall be exempt
from compulsory pilotage provisions of these
regulations: provided, however, that compulsory
 pilotage shall not apply in pilotage districts whose
optional pilotage is allowed under these regulations.

Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar

into Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Upon assuming such
office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally
accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot,
whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to
navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends
superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. 57 A pilot
57 should have a thorough knowledge of general and local
regulations and physical conditions affecting the vessel in his charge
and the waters for which he is licensed, such as a particular harbor
or river.

He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but
must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the
circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession.
Under extraordinary circumstancesm, a pilot must exercise
extraordinary care. 58
59
In Atlee vs. The Northwesrern Union Packet Company. Mr. Justice
Miller spelled out in great detail the duties of a pilot:

. . . (T)he pilot of a river steamer, like the harbor pilot, is

selected for his personal knowledge of the topography
through which he steers his vessel. In the long course of
a thousand miles in one of these rivers, he must be
familiar with the appearance of the shore on each side
of the river as he goes along. Its banks, towns, its
landings, its houses and trees, are all landmarks by
which he steers his vessel. The compass is of little use
to him. He must know where the navigable channel is, in
its relation to all these external objects, especially in the
night. He must also be familiar with all dangers that are
permanently located in the course of the river, as sand-
bars, snags, sunken rocks or trees or abandoned vessels
orbarges. All this he must know and remember and
avoid. To do this, he must be constantly informed of the
changes in the current of the river, of the sand-bars
newly made,of logs or snags, or other objects newly
presented, against which his vessel might be injured.

xxx xxx xxx

It may be said that this is exacting a very high order of

ability in a pilot. But when we consider the value of the
lives and property committed to their control, for in this
they are absolute masters, the high compensation they
 receive, the care which Congress has taken to secure by
rigid and frequent examinations and renewal of licenses,
this very class of skill, we do not think we fix the
standard too high.

Tested thereby, we affirm respondent court's finding that Capt.

Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and
diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties.
Witness this testimony of Capt. Gavino:

Court: You have testified before that the

reason why the vessel bumped the pier was
because the anchor was not released
immediately or as soon as you have given
the order. Do you remember having srated
that?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q And you gave this order to the captain of

the vessel?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q By that testimony, you are leading the

Court to understand that if that anchor was
released immediately at the time you gave
the order, the incident would not have
happened. Is that correct?

A Yes, sir, but actually it was only a

presumption on my part because there was
a commotion between the officers who are
in charge of the dropping of the anchor and
the captain. I could not understand their
language, it was in Russian, so I presumed
the anchor was not dropped on time.

Q So, you are not sure whether it was really

dropped on time or not?

A I am not sure, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You are not even sure what could have

caused the incident. What factor could have
caused the incident?
 A Well, in this case now, because either the
anchor was not dropped on time or the
anchor did not hold, that was the cause of
the incident, your Honor. 60

It is disconcertingly riddled with too much incertitude and manifests

a seeming indifference for the possibly injurious consequences his
commands as pilot may have. Prudence required that he, as pilot,
should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly
followed. As correctly noted by the trial court

Moreover, assuming that he did indeed give the

command to drop the anchor on time, as pilot he should
have seen to it that the order was carried out, and he
could have done this in a number of ways, one of which
was to inspect the bow of the vessel where the anchor
mechanism was installed. Of course, Captain Gavino
makes reference to a commotion among the crew
members which supposedly caused the delay in the
execution of the command. This account was reflected
in the pilot's report prepared four hours later, but Capt.
Kavankov, while not admitting whether or not such a
commotion occurred, maintained that the command to
drop anchor was followed "immediately and precisely."
Hence, the Court cannot give much weight or
consideration to this portion of Gavino's testimony." 61

An act may be negligent if it is done without the competence that a

reasonable person in the position of the actor would recognize as
necessary to prevent it from creating an unreasonable risk of harm
to another. 62 Those who undertake any work calling for special skills
are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do
but also possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and
ability. 63

Every man who offers his services to another, and is employed,

assumes to exercise in the employment such skills he possesses,
with a reasonable degree of diligence. In all these employments
where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services he is
understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the
degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same
employment, and if his pretensions are unfounded he commits a
species of fraud on every man who employs him in reliance on his
public profession. 64

Furthermore, there is an obligation on all persons to take the care

which, under ordinary circumstances of the case, a reasonable and
prudent man would take, and the omission of that care constitutes
negligence. 65 Generally, the degree of care required is graduated
according to the danger a person or property attendant upon the
activity which the actor pursues or the instrumentality which he
uses. The greater the danger the greater the degree of care
required. What is ordinary under extraordinary of conditions is
dictated by those conditions; extraordinary risk demands
extraordinary care. Similarly, the more imminent the danger, the
higher the degree of care. 66

We give our imprimatur to the bases for the conclusion of the Court
of Appeals that Capt. Gavino was indeed negligent in the
performance of his duties:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As can be gleaned from the logbook, Gavino ordered

the left anchor and two (2) shackles dropped at 8:30
o'clock in the morning. He ordered the engines of the
vessel stopped at 8:31 o'clock. By then,Gavino must
have realized that the anchor did not hit a hard object
and was not clawed so as to reduce the momentum of
the vessel. In point of fact, the vessel continued
travelling towards the pier at the same speed. Gavino
failed to react, At 8:32 o'clock, the two (2) tugboats
began to push the stern part of the vessel from the port
side bur the momentum of the vessel was not
contained. Still, Gavino did not react. He did not even
order the other anchor and two (2) more shackles
dropped to arrest the momentum of the vessel. Neither
did he order full-astern. It was only at 8:34 o'clock, or
four (4) minutes, after the anchor was dropped that
Gavino reacted. But his reaction was even (haphazard)
because instead of arresting fully the momentum of the
vessel with the help of the tugboats, Gavino ordered
merely "half-astern". It took Gavino another minute to
order a "full-astern". By then, it was too late. The
vessel's momentum could no longer be arrested and,
barely a minute thereafter, the bow of the vessel hit the
apron of the pier. Patently, Gavino miscalculated. He
failed to react and undertake adequate measures to
arrest fully the momentum of the vessel after the anchor
failed to claw to the seabed. When he reacted, the same
was even (haphazard). Gavino failed to reckon the bulk
of the vessel, its size and its cargo. He erroneously
believed that only one (1) anchor would suffice and even
when the anchor failed to claw into the seabed or
against a hard object in the seabed, Gavino failed to
order the other anchor dropped immediately. His claim
that the anchor was dropped when the vessel was only
1,000 feet from the pier is but a belated attempt to
 extricate himself from the quagmire of his own
insouciance and negligence. In sum, then, Appellants'
claim that the incident was caused by "force majeure" is
barren of factual basis.

xxx xxx xxx

The harbor pilots are especially trained for this job. In

the Philippines, one may not be a harbor pilot unless he
passed the required examination and training conducted
then by the Bureau of Custom, under Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65, now under the
Philippine Ports Authority under PPA Administrative
Order 63-85, Paragraph XXXIX of the Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 provides that "the pilot
shall be held responsible for the direction of the vessel
from the time he assumes control thereof, until he
leaves it anchored free from shoal: Provided, that his
responsibility shall cease at the.moment the master
neglects or refuse(s) to carry out his instructions." The
overall direction regarding the procedure for docking
and undocking the vessel emanates from the harbor
pilot. In the present recourse, Gavino failed to live up to
his responsibilities and exercise reasonable care or that
degree of care required by the exigencies of the
occasion. Failure on his part to exercise the degree of
care demanded by the circumstances is negligence
(Reese versus Philadelphia & RR Co. 239 US 363, 60 L
ed. 384, 57 Am Jur, 2d page 418). 67

This affirms the findings of the trial court regarding Capt. Gavino's
negligence:

This discussion should not however, divert the court

from the fact that negligence in manuevering the vessel
must be attributed to Capt. Senen Gavino. He was an
experienced pilot and by this time should have long
familiarized himself with the depth of the port and the
distance he could keep between the vessel and port in
order to berth safely. 68

The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt.

Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. His unconcerned
lethargy as master of the ship in the face of troublous exigence
constitutes negligence.

While it is indubitable that in exercising his functions a pilot is in sole

command of the ship 69 and supersedes the master for the time
being in the command and navigation of a ship and that he
becomes master pro hac vice of a vessel piloted by him, 70 there is
overwhelming authority to the effect that the master does not
surrender his vessel to the pilot and the pilot is not the master. The
master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the
presence of a pilot. There are occasions when the master may and
should interfere and even displace the pilot, as when the pilot is
obviously incompetent or intoxicated and the circumstances may
require the master to displace a compulsory pilot because of
incompetency or physical incapacity. If, however, the master does
nor observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or physically
incapacitated, the master is justified in relying on the pilot, but not
blindly. 71

The master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on
board his vessel, and may advise with or offer suggestions to him.
He is still in command of the vessel, except so far as her navigation
is concerned, and must cause the ordinary work of the vessel to be
properly carried on and the usual precaution taken. Thus, in
particular, he is bound to see that there is sufficient watch on deck,
and that the men are attentive to their duties, also that engines are
stopped, towlines cast off, and the anchors clear and ready to go at
the pilot's order. 72

A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he

was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship,
leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of
maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver:

Q Will you please tell us whether you have

the right to intervene in docking of your ship
in the harbor?

A No sir, I have no right to intervene in time

of docking, only in case there is imminent
danger to the vessel and to the pier.

Q Did you ever intervene during the time

that your ship was being docked by Capt.
Gavino?

A No sir, I did not intervene at the time

when the pilot was docking my ship.

Q Up to the time it was actually docked at

the pier, is that correct?

A No sir, I did not intervene up to the very

moment when the vessel was docked.
 xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Del Rosario (to the witness)

Q Mr. Witness, what happened, if any, or

was there anything unusual that happened
during the docking?

A Yes sir, our ship touched ihe pier and the

pier was damaged.

Court (to the witness)

Q When you said touched the pier, are you

leading the court to understand that your
ship bumped the pier?

A I believe that my vessel only touched the

pier but the impact was very weak.

Q Do you know whether the pier was

damaged as a result of that slight or weak
impact?

A Yes sir, after the pier was damaged.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Being most concerned with the safety of

your vessel, in the maneuvering of your
vessel to the port, did you observe anything
irregular in the maneuvering by Capt.
Gavino at the time he was trying to cause
the vessel to be docked at the pier?

A You mean the action of Capt. Gavino or his

condition?

Court:

Q Not the actuation that conform to the

safety maneuver of the ship to the harbor?

A No sir, it was a usual docking.

Q By that statement of yours, you are

leading the court to understand that there
was nothing irregular in the docking of the
ship?
A Yes sir, during the initial period of the
docking, there was nothing unusual that
happened.

Q What about in the last portion of the

docking of the ship, was there anything
unusual or abnormal that happened?

A None Your Honor, I believe that Capt.

Gavino thought that the anchor could keep
or hold the vessel.

Q You want us to understand, Mr. Witness,

that the dropping of the anchor of the vessel
was nor timely?

A I don't know the depth of this port but I

think, if the anchor was dropped earlier and
with more shackles, there could not have
been an incident.

Q So you could not precisely tell the court

that the dropping of the anchor was timery
because you are not well aware of the
seabed, is that correct?

A Yes sir, that is right.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Alright, Capt. Kavankov, did you come to

know later whether the anchor held its
ground so much so that the vessel could not
travel?

A It is difficult for me to say definitely. I

believe that the anchor did not hold the
ship.

Q You mean you don't know whether the

anchor blades stuck to the ground to stop
the ship from further moving?

A Yes sir, it is possible.

Q What is possible?

A I think, the 2 shackles were not enough to

hold the vessel.
Q Did you know that the 2 shackles were
dropped?

A Yes sir, I knew that.

Q If you knew that the shackles were not

enough to hold the ship, did you not make
any protest to the pilot?

A No sir, after the incident, that was my

assumption.

Q Did you come to know later whether that

presumption is correct?

A I still don't know the ground in the harbor

or the depths.

Q So from the beginning, you were not

competent whether the 2 shackles were also
dropped to hold the ship?

A No sir, at the beginning, I did not doubt it

because I believe Capt. Gavino to be an
experienced pilot and he should be more
aware as to the depths of the harbor and the
ground and I was confident in his actions.

xxx xxx xxx

Solicitor Abad (to the witness)

Q Now, you were standing with the pilot on

the bridge of the vessel before the inicident
happened, were you not?

A Yes sir, all the time, I was standing with

the pilot.

Q And so whatever the pilot saw, you could

also see from that point of view?

A That is right.

Q Whatever the piler can read from the

panel of the bridge, you also could read, is
that correct?

A What is the meaning of panel?

Q All indications necessary for men on the
bridge to be informed of the movements of
the ship?

A That is right.

Q And whatever sound the captain . . . Capt.

Gavino would hear from the bridge, you
could also hear?

A That is right.

Q Now, you said that when the command to

lower the anchor was given, it was obeyed,
is that right?

A This command was executed by the third

mate and boatswain.

Court (to the witness)

Q Mr. Witness, earlier in today's hearing, you

said that you did not intervene with the
duties of the pilot and that, in your opinion,
you can only intervene if the ship is placed
in imminent danger, is that correct?

A That is right, I did say that.

Q In your observation before the incident

actually happened, did you observe whether
or not the ship, before the actual incident,
the ship was placed in imminent danger?

A No sir, I did not observe.

Q By that answer, are you leading the court

to understand that because you did not
intervene and because you believed that it
was your duty to intervene when the vessel
is placed in imminent danger to which you
did not observe any imminent danger
thereof, you have not intervened in any
manner to the command of the pilot?

A That is right, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Assuminp that you disagreed with the
pilot regarding the step being taken by the
pilot in maneuvering the vessel, whose
command will prevail, in case of imminent
danger to the vessel?

A I did nor consider the situation as having

an imminent danger. I believed that the
vessel will dock alongside the pier.

Q You want us to understand that you did

not see an imminent danger to your ship, is
that what you mean?

A Yes sir, up to the very last moment, I

believed that there was no imminent danger.

Q Because of that, did you ever intervene in

the command of the pilot?

A Yes sir, I did not intervene because I

believed that the command of the pilot to be
correct.

Solicitor Abad (to the witness)

Q As a captain of M/V Pavlodar, you consider

docking maneuvers a serious matter, is it
not?

A Yes sir, that is right.

Q Since it affects not only the safety of the

port or pier, but also the safety of the vessel
and the cargo, is it not?

A That is right.

Q So that, I assume that you were watching

Capt. Gavino very closely at the time he was
making his commands?

A I was close to him, I was hearing his

command and being executed.

Q And that you were also alert for any

possible mistakes he might commit in the
maneuvering of the vessel?
A Yes sir, that is right.

Q But at no time during the maneuver did

you issue order contrary to the orders Capt.
Gavino made?

A No sir.

Q So that you were in full accord with all of

Capt. Gavino's orders?

A Yes sir.

Q Because, otherwise, you would have

issued order that would supersede his own
order?

A In that case, I should t,ke him away from

his command or remove the command from
him.

Court (to the witness)

Q You were in full accord with the steps

being taken by Capt. Gavino because you
relied on his knowledge, on his familiarity of
the seabed and shoals and other
surroundings or conditions under the sea, is
that correct?

A Yes sir, that is right.

xxx xxx xxx

Solicitor Abad (to the witness)

Q And so after the anchors were ordered

dropped and they did not take hold of the
seabed, you were alerted that there was
danger already on hand?

A No sir, there was no imminent danger to

the vessel.

Q Do you mean to tell us that even if the

anchor was supposed to take hold of the
bottom and it did not, there was no danger
to the ship?
A Yes sir, because the anchor dragged on
the ground later.

Q And after a few moments when the anchor

should have taken hold the seabed bur not
done (sic), as you expected, you already
were alerted that there was danger to the
ship, is that correct?

A Yes sir, I was alerted but there was no

danger.

Q And you were alerted that somebody was

wrong?

A Yes sir, I was alerted.

Q And this alert vou assumed was the

ordinary alertness that you have for normal
docking?

A Yes sir, I mean that it was usual condition

of any man in time of docking to be alert.

Q And that is the same alertness when the

anchor did not hold onto the ground, is that
correct?

A Yes sir, me and Capt. Gavino (thought)

that the anchor will hold the ground.

Q Since, as you said that you agreed all the

while with the orders of Capt. Gavino, you
also therefore agreed with him in his failure
to take necessary precaution against the
eventuality that the anchor will not hold as
expected?

Atty. Del Rosario:

May I ask that the question . . .

Solicitor Abad:

Never mind, I will reform the question.

xxx xxx xxx

Solicitor Abad (to the witness)

 Q Is it not a fact that the vessel bumped the
pier?

A That is right, it bumped the pier.

Q For the main reason that the anchor of the

vessel did not hold the ground as expected?
73
A Yes sir, that is my opinion.

Further, on redirect examination, Capt. Kabankov fortified his

apathetic assessment of the situation:

Q Now, after the anchor was dropped, was

there any point in time that you felt that the
vessel was in imminent danger.

A No, at that time, the vessel was not in

imminent, danger, sir. 74

This cavalier appraisal of the event by Capt. Kabankov is

disturbingly antipodal to Capt. Gavino's anxious assessment of the
situation:

Q When a pilot is on board a vessel, it is the

piler's command which should be followed at
that moment until the vessel is, or goes to
port or reaches port?

A Yes, your Honor, but it does not take away

from the Captain his prerogative to
countermand the pilot.

Q In what way?

A In any case, which he thinks the pilot is

not maneuvering correctly, the Captain
always has the prerogative to countermand
the pilot's order.

Q But insofar as competence, efficiency and

functional knowledee of the seabed which
are vital or decisive in the safety (sic)
bringing of a vessel to the port, he is not
competent?

A Yes, your Honor. That is why they hire a

pilot in an advisory capacity, but still, the
safety of the vessel rest(s) upon the
Captain, the Master of the vessel.

Q In this case, there was not a disagreement

between you and the Captain of the vessel
in the bringing of the vessel to port?

A No, your Honor.

Court:

May proceed.

Atty. Catris:

In fact, the Master of the vessel testified

here that he was all along in conformity with
the orders you, gave to him, and, as matter
of fact, as he said, he obeyed all your
orders. Can you tell, if in the course of giving
such normal orders for the saf(e) docking of
the MV Pavlodar, do you remember of any
instance that the Master of the vessel did
not obey your command for the safety
docking of the MV Pavlodar?

Atty. del Rosario:

Already answered, he already said yes sir.

Court:

Yes, he has just answered yes sir to the

Court that there was no disagreement
insofar as the bringing of the vessel safely to
the port.

Atty. Catris:

But in this instance of docking of the MV

Pavlodar, do you remember of a time during
the course of the docking that the MV
Pavlodar was in imminent danger of
bumping the pier?

A When we were about more than one

thousand meters from the pier, I think, the
anchor was not holding, so I immediately
ordered to push the bow at a fourth quarter,
 at the back of the vessel in order to swing
the bow away from the pier and at the same
time, I ordered for a full astern of the
engine. 75

These conflicting reactions can only imply, at the very least,

unmindful disregard or, worse, neglectful relinquishment of
duty by the shipmaster, tantamount to negligence.

The findings of the trial court on this aspect is noteworthy:

For, while the pilot Gavino may indeed have been

charged with the task of docking the vessel in the
berthing space, it is undisputed that the master of the
vessel had the corresponding duty to countermand any
of the orders made by the pilot, and even maneuver the
vessel himself, in case of imminent danger to the vessel
and the port.

In fact, in his testimony, Capt. Kavankov admitted that

all throughour the man(eu)vering procedures he did not
notice anything was going wrong, and even observed
that the order given to drop the anchor was done at the
proper time. He even ventured the opinion that the
accident occurred because the anchor failed to take hold
but that this did not alarm him because.there was still
time to drop a second anchor.

Under normal circumstances, the abovementioned facts

would have caused the master of a vessel to take
charge of the situation and see to the man(eu)vering of
the vessel himself. Instead, Capt. Kavankov chose to rely
blindly upon his pilot, who by this time was proven ill-
equipped to cope with the situation.

xxx xxx xxx

It is apparent that Gavino was negligent but Far

Eastern's employee Capt. Kavankov was no lesss
responsible for as master of the vessel he stood by the
pilot during the man(eu)vering procedures and was
privy to every move the latter made, as well as the
vessel's response to each of the commands. His choice
to rely blindly upon the pilot's skills, to the point that
despite being appraised of a notice of alert he continued
to relinquish control of the vessel to Gavino, shows
indubitably that he was not performing his duties with
the diligence required of him and therefore may be
charged with negligence along with defend;int Gavino. 76
As correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals

We are in full accord with the findings and disquisitions

of the Court a quo.

In the present recourse, Captain Viktor Kavankov had

been a mariner for thirty-two years before the incident.
When Gavino was (in) the command of the vessel,
Kavankov was beside Gavino, relaying the commands or
orders of Gavino to the crewmembers-officers of the
vessel concerned. He was thus fully aware of the
docking maneuvers and procedure Gavino undertook to
dock the vessel. Irrefragably, Kavankov was fully aware
of the bulk and size of the vessel and its cargo as well as
the weight of the vessel. Kavankov categorically
admitted that, when the anchor and two (2) shackles
were dropped to the sea floor, the claws of the anchor
did not hitch on to any hard object in the seabed. The
momentum of the vessel was not arrested. The use of
the two (2) tugboats was insufficient. The momentum of
the vessel, although a little bit arrested, continued (sic)
the vessel going straightforward with its bow towards
the port (Exhibit "A-1 ). There was thus a need for the
vessel to move "full-astern" and to drop the other
anchor with another shackle or two (2), for the vessel to
avoid hitting the pier. Kavankov refused to act even as
Gavino failed to act. Even as Gavino gave mere "half-
astern" order, Kavankov supinely stood by. The vessel
was already about twenty (20) meters away from the
pier when Gavino gave the "full-astern" order. Even
then, Kavankov did nothing to prevent the vessel from
hitting the pier simply because he relied on the
competence and plan of Gavino. While the "full-astern''
maneuver momentarily arrested the momentum of the
vessel, it was, by then, too late. All along, Kavankov
stood supinely beside Gavino, doing nothing but relay
the commands of Gavino. Inscrutably, then, Kavankov
was negligent.

xxx xxx xxx

The stark incompetence of Kavankov is competent

evidence to prove the unseaworthiness of the vessel. It
has been held that the incompetence of the navigator,
the master of the vessel or its crew makes the vessel
unseaworthy (Tug Ocean Prince versus United States of
America, 584 F. 2nd, page 1151). Hence, the Appellant
FESC is likewise liable for the damage sustained by the
Appellee. 77
We find strong and well-reasoned support in time-tested American
maritime jurisprudence, on which much of our laws and
jurisprudence on the matter are based, for the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals adjudging both Capt. Gavino and Capt. Kabankov
negligent.

As early as 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court declared, through Mr.

Justice Swayne, in The Steamship China vs. Walsh, 78 that it is the
duty of the master to interfere in cases of the pilot's intoxication or
manifest incapacity, in cases of danger which he does not foresee,
and in all cases of great necessity. The master has the same power
to displace the pilot that he has to remove any subordinate officer of
the vessel, at his discretion.

In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court, this time through Mr. Justice
Brown, emphatically ruled that:

Nor are rye satisfied with the conduct of the master in

leaving the pilot in sole charge of the vessel. While the
pilot doubtless supersedes the master for the time being
in the command and navigation of the ship, and his
orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her
navigation, the master is not wholly absolved from his
duties while the pilot is on board, and may advise with
him, and even displace him in case he is intoxicated or
manifestly incompetent. He is still in command of the
vessel, except so far as her navigation is concerned, and
bound to see that there is a sufficient watch on deck,
and that the men are attentive to their duties.

. . . (N)orwithstanding the pilot has charge, it is the duty

of the master to prevent accident, and not to abandon
the vessel entirely to the pilot; but that there are certain
duties he has to discharge (notwithstanding there is a
pilot on board) for the benefit of the owners. . . . that in
well conducted shipsthe master does not regard the
presence of a duly licensed pilot in compulsory pilot
waters as freeing him from every, obligation to attend to
the safety of the vessel; but that, while the master sees
that his officers and crew duly attend to the pilot's
orders, he himself is bound to keep a vigilant eye on the
navigation of the vessel, and, when exceptional
circumstances exist, not only to urge upon the pilot to
use every precaution, but to insist upon such being
taken. 79 (Italics for emphasis.)

In Jure vs. United Fruit Co., 80 which, like the present petitions,
involved compulsory pilotage, with a similar scenario where at and
prior to the time of injury, the vessel was in the charge of a pilot
with the master on the bridge of the vessel beside said pilot, the
court therein ruled:

The authority of the master of a vessel is not in

complete abeyance while a pilot, who is required by law
to be accepted, is in discharge of his functions. . . . It is
the duty of the master to interfere in cases of the pilot's
intoxication or manifest incapacity, in cases of danger
which he does not foresee, and in all cases of great
necessity. The master has the same power to displace
the pilot that he has to remove any subordinate officer
of the vessel. He may exercise it, or not, according to his
discretion. There was evidence to support findings that
piaintiff's injury was due to the negligent operation of
the Atenas, and that the master of that vessel was
negligent in failing to take action to avoid endangering a
vessel situated as the City of Canton was and persons or
property thereon.

A phase of the evidence furnished support for the

inferences . . . that he negligently failed to suggest to
the pilot the danger which was disclosed, and means of
avoiding such danger; and that the master's negligence
in failing to give timelt admonition to the pilot
proximately contributed to the injury complained of. We
are of opinion that the evidence mentioned tended to
prove conduct of the pilot, known to the master, giving
rise to a case of danger or great necessity, calling for
the intervention of the master. A master of a vessel is
not without fault in acquiescing in canduct of a pilot
which involves apparent and avoidable danger, whether
such danger is to the vessel upon which the pilot is, or
to another vessel, or persons or property thereon or on
shore. (Emphasis ours.)

Still in another case involving a nearly identical setting, the captain

of a vessel alongside the compulsory pilot was deemed to be
negligent, since, in the words of the court, "he was in a position to
exercise his superior authority if he had deemed the speed
excessive on the occasion in question. I think it was clearly
negligent of him not to have recognized the danger to any craft
moored at Gravell Dock and that he should have directed the pilot to
reduce his speed as required by the local governmental
regulations. His failure amounted to negligence and renders the
respondent liable." 81 (Emphasis supplied.) Though a compulsory
pilot might be regarded as an independent contractor, he is at all
times subject to the ultimate control of the ship's master. 82
In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master
being required to permit him to navigate it, if the master observes
that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the
dury of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no such
reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the
pilot, but not blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a
situation arose where the master, exercising that reasonable
vigilance which the master of a ship should exercise, observed, or
should have observed, that the pilot was so navigating the vessel
that she was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and there was
in the exercise of reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for
the master to intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the
master should have acted accordingly. 83 The master of a vessel
must exercise a degree of vigilance commensurate with the
circumstances. 84

Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, 85 we

defer to the findings of the trial court, especially as this is affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. 86 But even beyond that, our own
evaluation is that Capt. Kabankov's shared liability is due mainly to
the fact that he failed to act when the perilous situation should have
spurred him into quick and decisive action as master of the ship. In
the face of imminent or actual danger, he did not have to wait for
the happenstance to occur before countermanding or overruling the
pilot. By his own admission, Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt.
Gavino's decisions, and this is precisely the reason why he decided
not to countermand any of the latter's orders. Inasmuch as both
lower courts found Capt. Gavino negligent, by expressing full
agreement therewith Capt. Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt.
Gavino.

In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his

own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to third
parties for damages sustained in a collision. Such negligence of the
pilot in the performance of duty constitutes a maritime tort. 87 At
common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted
exclusively by the negligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel
compulsorily. 88 The exemption from liability for such negligence
shall apply if the pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault. Since,
a pilot is responsible only for his own personal negligence, he
cannot be held accountable for damages proximately caused by the
default of others, 89 or, if there be anything which concurred with the
fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the vessel master and
owners are liable.

Since the colliding vessel is prima facie responsible, the burden of

proof is upon the party claiming benefit of the exemption from
liability. It must be shown affirmatively that the pilot was at fault,
and that there was no fault on the part of the officers or crew, which
might have been conducive to the damage. The fact that the law
compelled the master to take the pilot does not exonerate the
vessel from liability. The parties who suffer are entitled to have their
remedy against the vessel that occasioned the damage, and are not
under necessity to look to the pilot from whom redress is not always
had for compensation. The owners of the vessel are responsible to
the injured party for the acts of the pilot, and they must be left to
recover the amount as well as they can against him. It cannot be
maintained that the circumstance of having a pilot on board, and
acting in conformity to his directions operate as a discharge of
responsibility of the owners. 90 Except insofar as their liability is
limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owner are liable
for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the
owners or those in charge of the vessel. Where the pilot of a vessel
is not a compulsory one in the sense that the owner or master of the
vessel are bound to accept him, but is employed voluntarily, the
owners of the vessel are, all the more, liable for his negligent act. 91

In the United States, the owners of a vessel are not personally liable
for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law,
the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the
vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by
the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the
sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of
the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the
pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the
injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto,
the owners are liable. 92 But the liability of the ship in rem does not
release the pilot from the consequences of his own
negligence. 93 The rationale for this rule is that the master is not
entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a
compulsory pilot is in charge. 94

By way of validation and in light of the aforecited guidepost rulings

in American maritime cases, we declare that our rulings during the
early years of this century in City of Manila vs. Gambe, 95 China
Navigation Co., Ltd. vs. Vidal, 96and Yap Tica & Co. vs. Anderson, et
al. 97 have withstood the proverbial test of time and remain good
and relevant case law to this day.

City of Manila stands for the doctrine that the pilot who was in
command and complete control of a vessel, and not the owners,
must be held responsible for an accident which was solely the result
of the mistake of the pilot in not giving proper orders, and which did
not result from the failure of the owners to equip the vessel with the
most modern and improved machinery. In China Navigation Co., the
pilot deviated from the ordinary and safe course, without heeding
the warnings of the ship captain. It was this careless deviation that
caused the vessel to collide with a pinnacle rock which, though
uncharted, was known to pilots and local navigators. Obviously, the
captain was blameless. It was the negligence of the pilot alone
which was the proximate cause of the collision. The Court could not
but then rule that

The pilot in the case at bar having deviated from the

usual and ordinary course followed by navigators in
passing through the strait in question, without a
substantial reason, was guilty of negligence, and that
negligence having been the proximate cause of the
damages, he is liable for such damages as usually and
naturally flow therefrom. . . .

. . . (T)he defendant should have known of the existence

and location of the rock upon which the vessel struck
while under his control and management. . . . .

Consistent with the pronouncements in these two earlier cases, but

on a slightly different tack, the Court in Yap Tico & Co. exonerated
the pilot from liability for the accident where the orders of the pilot
in the handling of the ship were disregarded by the officers and crew
of the ship. According to the Court, a pilot is ". . . responsible for a
full knowledge of the channel and the navigation only so far as he
can accomplish it through the officers and crew of the ship, and I
don't see chat he can be held responsible for damage when the
evidence shows, as it does in this case, that the officers and crew of
the ship failed to obey his orders." Nonetheless, it is possible for a
compulsory pilot and the master of the vessel to
be concurrently negligent and thus share the blame for the resulting
damage as joint tortfeasors, 98 but only under the circumstances
obtaining in and demonstrated by the instant petitions.

It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render

a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient
that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes
other than piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a
person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for
only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the
injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such
cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to
one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or
wrongful acts of the other concurrent rortfeasor. 99 Where several
causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be
had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was
more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence
of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result
and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. 100

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is

solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where
the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to
the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a
third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage under Article 2194 101 of the Civil Code. 102

As for the amount of damages awarded by the trial court, we find

the same to be reasonable. The testimony of Mr. Pascual Barral,
witness for PPA, on cross and redirect examination, appears to be
grounded on practical considerations:

Q So that the cost of the two additional piles

as well as the (two) square meters is already
included in this P1,300,999.77.

A Yes sir, everything. It is (the) final cost

already.

Q For the eight piles.

A Including the reduced areas and other

reductions.

Q (A)nd the two square meters.

A Yes sir.

Q In other words, this P1,300,999.77 does

not represent only for the six piles that was
damaged as well as the corresponding two
piles.

A The area was corresponding, was

increased by almost two in the actual
payment. That was why the contract was
decreased, the real amount was
P1,124,627.40 and the final one is
P1,300,999.77.

Q Yes, but that P1,300,999.77 included the

additional two new posts.

A It was increased.

Q Why was it increased?

A The original was 48 and the actual was 46.

Q Now, the damage was somewhere in

1980. It took place in 1980 and you started
the repair and reconstruction in 1982, that
took almost two years?

A Yes sir.

Q May it not happen that by natural factors,

the existing damage in 1980 was
aggravated for the 2 year period that the
damage portion was not repaired?

A I don't think so because that area was at

once marked and no vehicles can park, it
was closed.

Q Even if or even natural elements cannot

affect the damage?

A Cannot, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said in the cross-examination that

there were six piles damaged by the
accident, but that in the reconstruction of
the pier, PPA drove and constructed 8 piles.
Will you explain to us why there was change
in the number of piles from the original
number?

A In piers where the piles are withdrawn or

pulled out, you cannot re-drive or drive piles
at the same point. You have to redesign the
driving of the piles. We cannot drive the
piles at the same point where the piles are
broken or damaged or pulled out. We have
 to redesign, and you will note that in the
reconstruction, we redesigned such that it
necessitated 8 plies.

Q Why not, why could you not drive the

same number of piles and on the same
spot?

A The original location was already

disturbed. We cannot get required bearing
capacity. The area is already disturbed.

Q Nonetheless, if you drove the original

number of piles, six, on different places,
would not that have sustained the same
load?
103
A It will not suffice, sir.

We quote the findings of the lower court with approval.

With regards to the amount of damages that is to be

awarded to plaintiff, the Court finds that the amount of
P1,053,300.00 is justified. Firstly, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur best expounded upon in the landmark case
of Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. (21 SCRA 279)
establishes the presumption that in the ordinary course
of events the ramming of the dock would not have
occurred if proper care was used.

Secondly, the various estimates and plans justify the

cost of the port construction price. The new structure
constructed not only replaced the damaged one but was
built of stronger materials to forestall the possibility of
any similar accidents in the future.

The Court inevitably finds that the plaintiff is entitled to

an award of P1,053,300.00 which represents actual
damages caused by the damage to Berth 4 of the Manila
International Port. Co-defendants Far Eastern Shipping,
Capt. Senen Gavino and Manila Pilots Association are
solidariiy liable to pay this amount to plaintiff. 104

The Solicitor General rightly commented that the adjudicated

amount of damages represents the proportional cost of repair
and rehabilitation of the damaged section of the pier. 105

Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the

vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the
negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the
vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and
control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and
proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her
negligent management or navigation. 106

FESC's imputation of PPA's failure to provide a safe and reliable

berthing place is obtuse, not only because it appears to be a mere
afterthought, being tardily raised only in this petition, but also
because there is no allegation or evidence on record about Berth No.
4 being unsafe and unreliable, although perhaps it is a modest pier
by international standards. There was, therefore, no error on the
part of the Court of Appeals in dismissing FESC's counterclaim.

II. G.R. No. 130150

This consolidated case treats on whether the Court of Appeals erred

in holding MPA jointly and solidarily liable with its member pilot.
Capt. Gavino, in the absence of employer-employee relationship and
in applying Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, as basis for the
adjudged solidary liability of MPA and Capt. Gavino.

The pertinent provisions in Chapter I of Customs Administrative

Order No. 15-65 are:

PAR. XXVII. In all pilotage districts where pilotage is

compulsory, there shall be created and maintained by
the pilots or pilots' association, in the manner
hereinafter prescribed, a reserve fund equal to
P1,000.00 for each pilot thereof for the purpose of
paying claims for damages to vessels or property
caused through acts or omissions of its members while
rendered in compulsory pilotage service. In Manila, the
reserve fund shall be P2,000.00 for each pilot.

PAR. XXVIII. A pilots' association shall not be liable

under these regulations for damage to any vessel, or
other property, resulting from acts of a member of an
association in the actual performance of his duty for a
greater amount than seventy-five per centum (75%) of
its prescribed reserve fund; it being understood that if
the association is held liable for an amount greater than
the amount above-stated, the excess shall be paid by
the personal funds of the member concerned.

PAR. XXXI. If a payment is made from the reserve

fund of an association on account of damages caused by
a member thereof, and he shall have been found at
fault, such member shall reimburse the association in
 the amount so paid as soon as practicable; and for this
purpose, not less than twenty-five per centum of his
dividends shall be retained each month until the full
amount has been returned to the reserve fund.

PAR. XXXIV. Nothing in these regulations shall relieve

any pilots' association or members thereof, individually
or collectively, from civil responsibility for damages to
life or property resulting from the acts of members in
the performance of their duties.

Correlatively, the relevant provisions of PPA Administrative Order

No. 03-85, which timery amended this applicable maritime
regulation, state:

Art. IV

Sec. 17. Pilots' Association The Pilots in a Pilotage District shall

organize themselves into a Pilots' Association or firm, the members
of which shall promulgate their own By-Laws not in conflict with the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Authority. These By-Laws
shall be submitted not later than one (1) month after the
organization of the Pilots' Association for approval by the General
Manager of the Authority. Subsequent amendments thereto shall
likewise be submitted for approval.

Sec. 25. Indemnity Insurance and Reserve Fund

a) Each Pilots' Association shall

collectively insure its membership at the rate of P50,000.00 each
member to cover in whole or in part any liability arising from any
accident resulting in damage to vessel(s), port facilities and other
properties and/or injury to persons or death which any member may
have caused in the course of his performance of pilotage
duties. . . . .

b) The Pilotage Association shall

likewise set up and maintain a reserve fund which shall answer for
any part of the liability referred to in the immediately preceding
paragraph which is left unsatisfied by the insurance proceeds, in the
following manner:

1) Each pilot in the

Association shall contribute from his own account an amount of
P4,000.00 (P6,000.00 in the Manila Pilotage District) to the reserve
fund. This fund shall not be considered part of the capital of the
Association nor charged as an expense thereof.
 2) Seventy-five percent (75 %) of the reserve fund shall be set aside
for use in the payment of damages referred to above incurred in the
actual performance of pilots' duties and the excess shall be paid from
the personal funds of the member concerned.

xxx xxx xxx

5) If payment is
made from the reserve fund of an Association on account of damage
caused by a member thereof who is found at fault, he shall reimburse
the Association in the amount so paid as soon as practicable; and for
this purpose, not less than twenty-five percentum (25 %) of his
dividend shall be retained each month until the full amount has been
returned to the reserve fund. Thereafter, the pilot involved shall be
entitled to his full dividend.

6) When the
reimbursement has been completed as prescribed in the preceding
paragraph, the ten percentum (10%) and the interest withheld from
the shares of the other pilots in accordance with paragraph (4)
hereof shall be returned to them.

c) Liability of Pilots'
Association Nothing in these regulations shall relieve any Pilots'
Association or members thereof, individually or collectively, from
any civil, administrative and/or criminal responsibility for damages
to life or property resulting from the individual acts of its members
as well as those of the Association's employees and crew in the
performance of their duties.

The Court of Appeals, while affirming the trial court's finding of

solidary liability on the part of FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino,
correctly based MPA' s liability not on the concept of employer-
employee relationship between Capt. Gavino and itself, but on the
provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65:

The Appellant MPA avers that, contrary to the findings and

disquisitions of the Court a quo, the Appellant Gavino was not and
has never been an employee of the MPA but was only a member
thereof. The Court a quo, it is noteworthy, did not state the factual
basis on which it anchored its finding that Gavino was the employee
of MPA. We are in accord with MPA's pose. Case law teaches Us that,
for an employer-employee relationship to exist, the confluence of
the following elements must be established: (1) selection and
engagement of employees; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power
of dismissal; (4) the employer's power to control the employees with
respect to the means and method by which the work is to be
performed (Ruga versus NLRC, 181 SCRA 266).
 xxx xxx xxx

The liability of MPA for damages is not anchored on Article 2180 of

the New Civil Code as erroneously found and declared by the
Court a quo but under the provisions of Customs Administrative
Order No. 15-65, supra, in tandem with the by-laws of the MPA. 107

There being no employer-employee relationship, clearly Article

2180 108 of the Civil Code is inapplicable since there is no vicarious
liability of an employer to speak of. It is so stated in American law,
as follows:

The well established rule is that pilot associations are immune to

vicarious liability for the tort of their members. They are not the
employer of their members and exercise no control over them once
they take the helm of the vessel. They are also not partnerships
because the members do not function as agents for the association
or for each other. Pilots' associations are also not liable for
negligently assuring the competence of their members because as
professional associations they made no guarantee of the
professional conduct of their members to the general public. 109

Where under local statutes and regulations, pilot associations lack

the necessary legal incidents of responsibility, they have been held
not liable for damages caused by the default of a member
pilot. 110 Whether or not the members of a pilots' association are in
legal effect a copartnership depends wholly on the powers and
duties of the members in relation to one another under the
provisions of the governing statutes and regulations. The relation of
a pilot to his association is not that of a servant to the master, but of
an associate assisting and participating in a common purpose.
Ultimately, the rights and liabilities between a pilots' association and
an individual member depend largely upon the constitution, articles
or by-laws of the association, subject to appropriate government
regulations. 111

No reliance can be placed by MPA on the cited American rulings as

to immunity from liability of a pilots' association in ljght of existing
positive regulation under Philippine law. The Court of Appeals
properly applied the clear and unequivocal provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65. In doing so, it was just being
consistent with its finding of the non-existence of employer-
employee relationship between MPA and Capt. Gavino which
precludes the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

True. Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 does not categorically

characterize or label MPA's liability as solidary in nature.
Nevertheless, a careful reading and proper analysis of the correlated
provisions lead to the conclusion that MPA is solidarily liable for the
negligence of its member pilots, without prejudice to subsequent
reimbursement from the pilot at fault.

Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability
only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the
nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65, which as an implementing rule has
the force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary
liability.We note the Solicitor General's comment hereon, to wit:

. . . Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 may be a

mere rule and regulation issued by an administrative
agency pursuant to a delegated authority to fix "the
details" in the execution or enforcement of a policy set
out in the law itself. Nonetheless, said administrative
order, which adds to the procedural or enforcing
provisions of substantive law, is legally binding and
receives the same statutory force upon going into effect.
In that sense, it has equal, not lower, statutory force and
effect as a regular statute passed by the legislature. 112

MPA's prayer for modification of the appellate court's decision under

review by exculpating petitioner MPA "from liability beyond seventy-
five percent (75 %) of Reserve Fund" is unnecessary because the
liability of MPA under Par. XXVIII of Customs Administrative Order
No. 15-65 is in fact limited to seventy-five percent (75 %) of its
prescribed reserve fund, any amount of liability beyond that being
for the personal account of the erring pilot and subject to
reimbursement in case of a finding of fault by the member
concerned. This is clarified by the Solicitor General:

Moreover, contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the

provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 do
not limit the liability of petitioner as a pilots' association
to an absurdly small amount of seventy-five per centum
(75 %) of the member pilots' contribution of P2,000.00
to the reserve fund. The law speaks of the entire reserve
fund required to be maintained by the pilots' association
to answer (for) whatever liability arising from the
tortious act of its members. And even if the association
is held liable for an amount greater than the reserve
fund, the association may not resist the liability by
claiming to be liable only up to seventy-five per centum
(75 %) of the reserve fund because in such instance it
has the right to be reimbursed by the offending member
pilot for the excess. 113
WHEREFORE, in view of all of the foregoing, the consolidated
petitions for review are DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario,
specifically its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is REPRIMANDED and
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of heedless
disregard of its undertakings under the Rules shall be dealt with
more severely.

The original members of the legal team of the Office of the Solicitor
General assigned to this case, namely, Assistant Solicitor General
Roman G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, are ADMONISHED
and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of unduly
delaying proceedings due to delayed filing of required pleadings
shall also be dealt with more stringently.

The Solicitor Genral is DIRECTED to look into the circumstances of

this case and to adopt provident measures to avoid a repetition of
this incident and which would ensure prompt compliance with orders
of this Court regarding the timely filing of requisite pleadings, in the
interest of just, speedy and orderly administration of justice.

Let copies of this decision be spread upon the personal records of

the lawyers named herein in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., are on official leav

A.M. No. R-705-RTJ August 23, 1989

LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, LEONILA FUERTES and

EDGARDO SERVANDO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, RTC, Br. 51, Puerto Princess
City and ANNA BELLE CARDENAS,respondents.

A.M. No. R-698-P August 23, 1989

JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant,

vs.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br.
52, Puerto Princess City, respondent.

A.M. No. 2909 August 23, 1989

JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant,

vs.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br.
52, Puerto Princess City, respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:

In a complaint under oath dated July 21, 1986, docketed as Adm.

Matter No. R-705-RTJ, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Branch
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Puerto
Princess City 1 Mrs. Leonila Fuertes and Mr. Edgardo Servando
charged Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, then Presiding Judge of RTC,
Branch 51, Puerto Princess City 2 with:

1. Estafa through falsification of public or official

documents, by verifying official hours rendered by one
employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who
never reported for duty from August 1983 to May 1984
by encashing and receiving salaries of said Miss
Cardenas through forgery of payee's signature in the
treasury warrants, thus deceiving the government and
defrauding the Government treasury of a big amount of
money;

2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting,

demanding, receiving bribed (sic) money in exchange
for favorable resolutions and decisions from different
litigants in Branch 52, where said Judge was temporarily
assigned from November 1984 to April 1986 and of
which one of the undersigned complainant (sic), LIGAYA
GONZALES-AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court;

3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his

subordinate Edgardo Servando as part and condition of
his continued employment in Branch 51, where Judge
Abaya is the presiding judge.,

Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August
29, 1986, filed in compliance with the Court Resolution of August 12,
1986. He asserted that these charges were concocted in retaliation
against the administrative complaint docketed as Adm. Matter No.
698-P he earlier filed on July 18,1986 against one of his accusers,
Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave misconduct
in having forged his signature in a probation order in Criminal Case
No. 4995 of the RTC, Branch 52, Puerto Princess, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz," for attempted murder. Adm.
Matter No. 698-P was followed by a petition dated August 5,1986
docketed as Adm. Case No. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. Ligaya
Gonzales-Austria based on the same alleged offense.

After Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment on the

charges against her, the Court resolved to consolidate these related
cases.

On October 28, 1986, the Court granted the motion of the

complainants in Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ to amend their
complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as defendant in the
charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. It was
averred therein that the initial exclusion was due to oversight and
that it was never intended to exclude her as a co-principal.

By resolution of December 11, 1986, the cases were referred to

Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera for investigation, report
and recommendation. Based on the evidence presented by the
parties, Justice Herrera finds the respondents guilty of the charges
against them and thereby recommends:

1. The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge

Abaya except earned leave credits;

2. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as

Court Stenographer;

3. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of

Atty. Ligaya G. Austria in AC-2909. 4

We now consider these well-thought out recommendations.

I. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. R-705-RTJ:

a. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge

Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas. The gravamen of this charge is
that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as Stenographic
Reporter of Branch 51, RTC, Palawan in August 1983 upon the
recommendation of Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein, was a
ghost employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never
reported for work during said period, being then employed at
Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. Notwithstanding, with
her knowledge and consent, Judge Abaya verified as true and
correct her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly
showing that she rendered service and incurred no absences or
tardiness from August 9 to September 30, 1983 and rendered
service for the period from October 1, 1983 to May 31, 1984 and
was granted leave of absence from March 14 to 30, 1984 and from
April 23 to 27, 1984. Thus, she was paid her salaries corresponding
to the periods allegedly worked. Some of the Treasury Warrants
covering her salaries were, according to complainants, encashed by
Judge Abaya by forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature.

Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently denied the

charges, countering that the latter worked as stenographic reporter
from August 1983 to May 31, 1984.

We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to

be supported by substantial evidence. Especially damaging to the
pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas rendered
service as stenographic reporter during the period under
consideration are the school records of the Holy Trinity College,
showing that Annabelle Cardenas was attending school in the first
semester of school year 1983-1984 from 2:00 P.M. to 8:15
P.M. 5 While she claimed to have been permitted by her teacher to
attend her typing and stenography classes after office hours, the
school records reveal that she has other subjects such as Business
Organization and Management (3 units), Ten Commandments (3
units), Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting for
Single Proprietorship (3 units), her attendance in which can be
safely concluded from the passing grades she received in said
subjects. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion are the Daily
Time Records of Princess Tours 6 showing that Annabelle Cardenas
acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was supposedly
rendering service as stenographic reporter. Her explanation that her
name was placed on the daily time record as team leader, although
she did not actually conduct the tours reflected therein is too
shallow to merit belief.

It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under

consideration, the court calendar for Branch 51 never once carried
Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her attendance at a court
session. Moreover, she could not produce any single order,
transcript or official stenographic notes that had been taken by her
in any case, civil or criminal. All she presented were so-called
practice notes.

Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle Cardenas

who was collecting her salary "without intervention from your
respondent. 7 It was however proved that Judge Abaya collected
Annabelle Cardenas' salaries on several occasions, as in fact, said
Annabelle Cardenas even executed a special power of attorney in
his favor authorizing him not only to collect the treasury warrants
but to endorse and negotiate them as well. 8 Be that as it may, we
find the evidence insufficient on the one hand to overthrow the
explanation of respondents that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle
Cardenas' salaries in Manila so that he could bring the same to
Candon, Ilocos Sur for delivery to her mother, who is a good friend
of the Judge; and on the other hand to support complainants' theory
that Judge Abaya appropriated the money for himself.

b. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by Soliciting,

Demanding and Receiving Bribe Money against Judge Abaya. The
act complained of was allegedly committed by Judge Abaya while
temporarily assigned to Branch 52, RTC Palawan vice Judge Jose G.
Genilo Jr., who was temporarily assigned to Batangas City. It must be
recalled that complainant Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria was then
Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52.

It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 entitled "People vs. Henry Arias
and Fernando Oniot for murder, in consideration of the sum of P
2,000.00 given by Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, complainant and mother of
the victim in the aforesaid case.

Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, a school teacher, testified that she went to

Branch 52 at about 5:00 P.M. on August 13, 1985 in response to a
telephone call from court stenographer Nelly Vicente that Judge
Abaya wanted to see her personally. Nelly Vicente referred her to
Carmencita P. Baloco, the officer-in-charge who then called Judge
Abaya from the other branch. Judge Abaya directed her to the
adjoining courtroom where he told her, "Ang kaso ninyo ay medyo
tagilid, 50-50 dahil walang eyewitness." (Your case is shaky with
only a 50-50 chance of winning because there is no eyewitness.)
She retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted
that there was none because the supposed eyewitness had his back
turned when her son was stabbed. Nonetheless, the Judge assured
her that he would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay
magagawan ko ng paraan dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa mga
decision dito").lwph1.t When Mrs. Fuertes asked the Judge what
he wanted, he told her that he has a problem. "Kailangan ko ng pera
Limang Libo at Ide-deny ko ang bail na mga acusado" (I need Five
Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). Mrs. Fuertes
expressed puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was
the aggrieved party, but the Judge cut her off by saying he needed
the money badly before he leaves for Manila. Mrs. Fuertes answered
that she would have to consult her brothers-in-law about the matter.
The Judge told her to see him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the
evening.

Mrs. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the then

prosecuting fiscal, now Judge Angel R. Miclat about the matter.
Although they were all against the Idea of her acceding to the
Judge's demand, she delivered the amount of Pl,200.00 to Judge
Abaya on August 15,1985 in his chambers, telling him that was all
she could afford. Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never
mind" and that he would just contact her at the next trial for the
final judgment. 9

Roselyn Teologo, stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated

that portion of Mrs. Fuertes' testimony relating to the phone call of
Nelly Vicente to Mrs. Fuertes, the latter's arrival on August 13, 1985
at Branch 52 and Mrs. Fuertes having been closeted with Judge
Abaya inside the courtroom for about 20 minutes. She further
testified that Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and
Mrs. Fuertes' conversation remarked, "Grabe ito, nanghihingi ng
pera." (This is terrible, he is asking money.) She added that when
Judge Abaya emerged from the courtroom, he instructed her not to
tell anybody that Mrs. Fuertes had been there. 10

Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R.

Miclat, then acting City Fiscal for Puerto Princess City handling
Criminal Case No. 5304. He testified that Mrs. Fuertes came to him
in August of 1986 to inform him that Judge Abaya was asking
P5,000.00 from her so that the bail application of the accused would
be denied. While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge
Abaya, he was informed later on that Mrs. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya
not the amount being asked, but only about P1,200.00. 11

Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were the

entries in Mrs. Fuertes' diary, thus:

August 13, 1985 called by Judge Abaya to see him after

office hours. He asked me for my case was 50-50. 12

August 15, I went to town to see Baby Francisco, gave

P2,000 and I brought the money to Judge. 13

July 2, 1986 Judge Abaya with companion Rufo Gonzales

and Celia Fernandez. Purpose they convinced me to sign
my name in the affidavit stating that I will deny the
previous affidavit I made stated that Judge asked from
me certain amount and his request was granted. But I
did not sign and asked me to see him in town at the
residence of Menchie his niece personally nakiusap kay
Baby upang mai-deny ang affidavit ko through Atty.
Austria ay nakiusap pa rin. He is talking care Nanette na
idinay ko. 13-A

Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money

from Mrs. Fuertes. He alleged that the bail application of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 was denied, not because of any
outside interference, but because the evidence of guilt was strong.
He surmised that Mrs. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been pressured
by Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him out of
sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. Fuertes might have been blaming
him for the delay in the resolution of the criminal case against her
son's alleged killers.

We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive reasons for

giving full faith and credence to Mrs. Fuertes' testimony:

We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. Fuertes, a

school teacher, would impute such a serious offense
against a judge unless it be the truth. Mrs. Fuertes is not
a disgruntled litigant. Judge Abaya having denied the
petition for bail of the suspected killer of Mrs, Fuertes'
son, she should, under normal circumstances be grateful
to the Judge. Yet she charged him with a serious offense,
and travelled all the way from Palawan to Manila to
testify against the Judge. Under the circumstances, We
cannot accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs.
Fuertes perjured herself just to accommodate the
vengeanceful ire of Atty. Austria against Judge Abaya.
That would be contrary to the ordinary prompting of
men.

Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mrs. Fuertes is

too rich in details brought out on cross-examination
which cannot simply be swept aside as mere
fabrications. They find support in collateral but highly
significant circumstances pointed to by Mrs. Teologo,
such as (1) the visible presence of Mrs. Fuertes in the
courtroom in conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon of August 15, (should be 13)
1985; and (2) the highly credible testimony of Judge
Miclat on the report made to him by Mrs. Fuertes, as
then acting City Fiscal, on the solicitation of Judge
Abaya. It certainly cannot be said that Mrs. Fuertes
merely concocted her story at the time regarding the
solicitation of Judge Abaya in connection with the
pending case of the suspected killers of her son. There
was absolutely no motive for her to do So. 14

c. Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. It is alleged

that Judge Abaya exacted portions of the salaries of two (2)
employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a condition for their
continued employment. Edgardo Servando, one of the complainants
herein, and who was appointed stenographer on September 3, 1984
upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya, declared that such
recommendation was made in consideration of his agreement to
give Judge Abaya Pl,000.00 from his initial salary and thereafter a
monthly amount of P400.00, which undertaking he complied with.
However, in December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for
the Christmas vacation asked him for Pl,000.00 from as fringe
benefits, medical allowance and year-end bonus, he was unable to
comply as he did not then have cash, the payment of said benefits
having been in checks. A week later, he received a notice of
termination effective at the close of business hours on December
31, 1984 from the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of
Judge Abaya. 15

Nilo Jamora, a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since

his employment in said Branch, Judge Abaya had been exacting
from him P350.00 every payday, which exaction ceased only in
March 1986 when Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her charges
against Judge Abaya. He further stated that when he refused to
retract his charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money, the latter demoted
him to process server. 16

Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge, labelling the same as sheer
vindictiveness due to Servando's termination and Jamora's
demotion, fanned by Atty. Austria's proddings. He insists that the
personnel action taken on Servando and Jamora was due to their
inefficiency.

While the investigating officer, Justice Herrera observed that both

Servando and Jamora "testified in a natural and straightforward,
albeit in an angry manner without attempting to conceal their
contempt for Judge Abaya, 17 he concluded that "the evidence in this
regard would be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of
ample corroboration. It would simply be the word of one against a
judge. 18

We are in accord with this observation, for indeed, the charge if true
is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it requires more than a bare
allegation to sustain it. In this regard, we give respondent Judge the
benefit of the doubt.

In summation, we find Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya guilty of grave

and serious misconduct affecting Ms integrity and moral character
which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had his
resignation not been accepted.

The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote justice
by administering it fairly and impartially. In regarding justice as a
commodity to be sold at a price, Judge Abaya betrayed the very
essence of magistracy. In complicity with Annabelle Cardenas, he
likewise abused the trust and confidence of the people,
shortchanging them of services undoubtedly vital to the speedy
administration of justice.

The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice.

From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the
law. 19 For him then to transgress the highest ideals of justice and
public service for personal gain is indeed a demoralizing example
constituting a valid cause for disenchantment and loss of confidence
in the judiciary as well as in the civil service system.

By these acts, Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and

unworthiness of the honor and requisites attached to his office. As
he had previously resigned, we hereby order the forfeiture of his
retirement benefits, except earned leave credits, as recommended
by the investigating officer Justice Herrera.

We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in consequence of her

grave misconduct as above-described the penalty of removal from
office as Court Stenographer with prejudice to her re-appointment to
the Judiciary.

II. A.M. No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909

The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in A.M. No. R-

698-P and for disbarment in Adm. Case No. 2909 against Atty.
Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Clerk of Court of Branch 52, RTC
Palawan, stem from her act of having allegedly forged the signature
of Judge Abaya in a probation order dated April 22, 1986 in Criminal
Case No. 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide.

Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation

order and of having promulgated it, but explains that these were
done with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya, who had
asked her to prepare orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his
load of presiding over two (2) branches. She adverts to Judge
Abaya's order of November 4, 1985 which granted accused
Leonardo Cruz' motion for reconsideration of the order denying
probation. This order, which carried certain conditions, set the
promulgation of the probation order on January 16, 1986 at 8:00
o'clock in the morning. In the meantime, Judge Abaya requested
Atty. Austria to prepare the probation order with the day and month
in blank for the signature of the Judge.

On January 16,1986, Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation

was reset to April 16, 1986. On the latter date, the provincial warden
failed to bring the accused to court, hence the promulgation of the
probation order was again reset to June 3, 1986, with Judge Abaya
allegedly giving instructions before he left for Manila to promulgate
said order even in his absence should the probationer Leonardo Cruz
arrive in court.

On April 21, 1986, Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the
probation order be promulgated the following day, April 22, 1986 as
he had to leave for Coron in the same pumpboat that brought him to
Puerto Princess and he had no money to sustain him up to the time
the Judge arrives from Manila. As requested, the promulgation was
set on April 22, 1986, only for Atty. Austria to discover that Judge
Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order. In view of the
predicament of Leonardo Cruz and the authority granted to her by
Judge Abaya, Atty. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name to the
probation order and promulgated it.

Atty. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency (Art.
1881 of the Civil Code) 20 in that having been granted full authority
to promulgate the probation order, she necessarily had the authority
to sign the Judge's name if the need arose. She further maintains
that as Judge Abaya never complained about the alleged forgery, he
is deemed to have ratified it and is now estopped from questioning
her authority. Lastly, she compares the probation order to a writ of
execution which is usually done by the Clerk of Court. 21

Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive. As

thoroughly explained by Justice Herrera:

.....her explanation that she is the one preparing

decisions and orders in Branch 52 with the knowledge
and consent of Judge Abaya during the time that the
latter was acting as Presiding Judge of said branch and
that she was directed to promulgate the probation order
in favor of Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the judge
overlooked to sign the order, even if true, is not a valid
justification for her to simulate the signature of Judge
Abaya in the probation order. This is patently illegal. As
a lawyer and branch clerk of court, she ought to know
that under no circumstances is her act of signing the
name of the judge permissible. She could have probably
released the order with the statement that it is upon
orders of the judge or by authority of the judge but she
could not under any circumstance make it appear as she
did in this case that the Judge signed the order when in
fact he did not. The duties of the clerk of court in the
absence of any express direction of the Judge is well
defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court
which reads:

Sec. 5. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction

of the judge. In the absence of the judge, the clerk
 may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving
applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the
issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter
of course under these rules, and may also, when
directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts of
executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and
receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the
settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to
guardianship, trusteeships, or receiverships, and
forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence
to the judge, together with his findings in relation to the
same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and
include the same in his report.

Signing orders in the name of, and simulating the

signature of the judge is not one of them.

Atty. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted

as agent of the Judge is wholly devoid of merit. The
judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is
strictly personal to the Judge because of, and by reason
of his highest qualification, and can never be the subject
of agency. That would not only be contrary to law, but
also subversive of public order and public policy. Nor
could her void act in signing the name of the judge be
validly ratified by the latter. Judge Abaya himself is
bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to
sign his name in his official capacity in a matter pending
adjudication before him. The issuance of the order in
question is strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in
the judge which is beyond his authority to delegate. 22

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may

not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. 23 However, if that
misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency,
then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
ground. 24

We find Atty. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect

her qualification as a member of tile Bar, for precisely as a lawyer,
she ought to have known the illegality of the act complained of.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya,

Annabelle Cardenas and Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria guilty as
charged, except that of illegal exaction against Judge Abaya, the
Court hereby orders:
1. In Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, the FORFEITURE of the retirement
benefits of Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, except his earned leave
credits; and the DISMISSAL from office of Annabelle Cardenas as
Stenographic Reporter with prejudice to her reappointment to the
Judiciary; and,

2. In Adm. Matter No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909, the
resignation of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria as Branch Clerk of Court
IS ACCEPTED as of December 31, 1987 and any and all benefits
accruing during her government service are declared forfeited,
except her earned leave credits. Her SUSPENSION as a member of
the Bar for a period of one year from the finality of this decision is
further decreed.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for the

filing of appropriate criminal charges against respondents if
warranted.

Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the respondents'

respective personal records.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and

Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar

Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN,

ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY.
GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for

disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for
disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty.
Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo
and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their
acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential

letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer
to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade
of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention
of the Court to"The starling fact that the grade in one examination
(Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason
or another, before the bar results were released this
year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed,
according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C.
Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He
further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that
the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also
underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to the release
of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or
request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned.
If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without
formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when
proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary
todue process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates
got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to
be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not
afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these
matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the

records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in
five subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful
bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes
which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the
respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records
revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one
Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in
the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a
grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a
grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court
of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for
the 1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman
requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar
examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the
matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar

Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks
of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for
doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn

statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation
to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the
same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a

formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March
5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten
(10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering
that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he
did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the
Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99,
rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court
"to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31,
rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm.

Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38,
rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed
another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his
answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47,
rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by
the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not
respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked
examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a
number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24,
Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.
was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No.
1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was
also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-
evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of
Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50%
This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another
successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg
and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in
the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation

upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y
Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of
Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged
with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of
Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the
same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of
August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang
declared that he does not remember having been charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar

examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required
under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973
and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-
respondents were required to submit their memoranda.
Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up

permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be
gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo,
who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their
direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to
the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered

as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the
Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances
under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination
notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later

Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian,
examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year,

while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty.
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he
(Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in
all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low
one in another, he will bring back the latter to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of
grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this

year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in
Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him
the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned
will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it
was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court
to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back

to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files
I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation

of the answers were based on the same standard used
in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos.
3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was
reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with
 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis
supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his

allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional
statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were

not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the
reconsideration of these answers because of the same
evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10
remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of

examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity
of its owner until I received this resolution of the
Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the
examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith

and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in
view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo,
based on the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or

about October 16, 1971, relationship
between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had
developed to the point that with respect to
the correction of the examination booklets of
bar candidates I have always followed him
and considered his instructions as reflecting
the rules and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect to the same;
that I have no alternative but to take his
words;

b) That considering this relationship

and considering his misrepresentation to me
as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother
any more to get the consent and permission
of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself
from all members of the Supreme Court and
specially the chairman of the Bar Committee
for fear that I might be identified as a bar
examiner;
 xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received

by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who
made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo,

examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in
his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my

residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred
notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to
1400) which according to my record was on February 5,
1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m.
riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with
at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him
an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and,
after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was
possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee
obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar
Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if
I recall correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or

re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do
so because the same was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular examinee's name had
not been identified or that the code number decode and
the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant
told me that the name of the examinee in the case
present bearing code number 661 had not been
identified or revealed; and that it might have been
possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said
examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's

representations to me, and as it was humanly possible
that I might have erred in the grading of the said
notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the
answer, and graded it in accordance with the same
standards I had used throughout the grading of the
entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee
 deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing
with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that the code
number of the examinee in question had not been
decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected
the total grade in the notebook and the grade card
attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I
also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to
item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my
personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought
with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy the grading sheet"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis
supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as

"Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced
therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement
and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in

political and international law, code numbered 661, I did
know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know
his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5,
1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do
not know him personally, and that I have never met him
even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was

authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly
asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority
as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded
or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance
was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the
regular course of express prohibition in the rules and
guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar
Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as,
unless called, I refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be
identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at

about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt
it inappropriate to verify his authority with the
Chairman. It did not appear to me that his
representations were unauthorized or suspicious.
Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official
vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel,
accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and
thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar
Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used
to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in

the same condition as when I submitted the same. In
agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered
661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the
correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971,considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall
correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that
the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in
the position to know and that there was nothing
irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade

obtained by the examinee with notebook code
numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased
by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the
examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore
stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass,
notwithstanding the representation that he had passed
the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar

Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest,
the examiner in said subject would review the notebook.
Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the
names of the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it.

It had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know
the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract
with him before or rather the review and even up to the
present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his
affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver

and collect examination books to my residence at 951
Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed

correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping
in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1)
paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular
examinee had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal
Law would be raised a few points to 75%then he would
make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%,

that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the
mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the

examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated

that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and
without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in
question who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit

dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part

of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of
the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had
previously graded and submitted to him. He informed
me that he and others (he used the words "we") had
reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review
the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade
 that I had previously given. He explained that the
examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but
that because of the comparatively low grade that I had
given him in Remedial Law his general average was
short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought
that if the paper were reviewed I might find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far
as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my
attention to the fact in his answers the examinee
expressed himself clearly and in good enough
English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether
I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and
submitted was entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's

authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to
me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-
evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I
recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I
increased the grades in some items, made deductions in
other items, and maintained the same grades in other
items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had
totalled the new grades that I had given after re-
evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points,
but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo

reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted

in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned
in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he
could be faulted for not having verified from the
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the
legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein
respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such
omission, that

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for

the first time, he was not aware, not having
been apprised otherwise, that it was not
within the authority of the Bar Confidant of
 the Supreme Court to request or suggest
that the grade of a particular examination
notebook be revised or reconsidered. He
had every right to presume, owing to the
highly fiduciary nature of the position of the
Bar Confidant, that the request was
legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular

examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer
written in the notebook. Testing the answers
by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of
doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that
particular subject that the said examine
failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher
grade than that previously given to him, but
that he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given
the passing grade of 75%. It should also be
mentioned that, in reappraising the answers,
herein respondent downgraded a previous
rating of an answer written by the
examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his

affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar

Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were
held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all
other subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I

would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this
particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a

Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade
of 61%;
 That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating
the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to
increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly

initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated

the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I

hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination
notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with
the agreement made during one of the deliberations of
the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate
fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should
make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate
concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I

made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook
No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I
have never met up to this time this particular bar
examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo
stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the

entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the
record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize
all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five
merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum
circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect
that

... in the correction of the papers,

substantial weight should then be given to
clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),
 I took it upon myself to bring them back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-
checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately

after the release of the results of the examinations, we
are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees
that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them
would copy their answers and have them checked by
their professors. Eventually some of them would file
motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-
evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such
motions or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but

just the same they have to be denied because the result
of the examinations when released is final and
irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such

instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks
back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation"
(Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the

examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as
bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether
or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does
not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having
brought to the attention of the Committee during the
meeting a matter concerning another examinee who
obtained a passing general average but with a grade
below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed
to remove the disqualification by way of raising the
grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook
in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby
raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to
pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is
one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
 Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that
his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to
undermine his integrity because he did it in all good
faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation,

respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to,
and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the

examiners concerned into believing that the examinee
involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact
of the matter being that the notebooks in question were
submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
believing in all good faith that they so merited on the
basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and
marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion
marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all
the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry

into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January

and the early part of February, 1972, on my
way back to the office (Bar Division) after
lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake
ticket. I have always made it a point that the
moment I think of so buying, I pick a number
from any object and the first number that
comes into my sight becomes the basis of
the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the
first number that I saw was "954" boldly
printed on an electrical contribance
(evidently belonging to the MERALCO)
attached to a post standing along the right
sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the
Supreme Court building from San Marcelino
street and almost adjacent to the south-
eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo
High School(photograph of the number
'954', the contrivance on which it is printed
and a portion of the post to which it is
attached is identified and marked as Exhibit
4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-
a-Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded

to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that
would contain such number. Eventually, I
found a ticket, which I then bought, whose
last three digits corresponded to "954". This
number became doubly impressive to me
because the sum of all the six digits of the
ticket number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try
somewhat instinctively to link or connect it
with said number whenever possible. Thus
even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968 when I
first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I either started with
the number "27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and
marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure
"27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo;
1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list as
Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List
as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at
the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27)

was born out of these incidents in my life, to
wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with
the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was
stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke out on December 8,
1941. While I was still confined at the
hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed
by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
resulting in many casualties. From then on, I
regarded November 27, 1941 as the
beginning of a new life for me having been
saved from the possibility of being among
the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I
 was able to get out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February
27, 1947, I got married and since then we
begot children the youngest of whom was
born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon

after buying the ticket, I resumed my work
which at the time was on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus checking, I came
upon the notebooks bearing the office code
number "954". As the number was still fresh
in my mind, it aroused my curiosity
prompting me to pry into the contents of the
notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the
writing and language and the apparent
soundness of the answers and, thereby,
believing in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum
(Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that
they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside
and later on took them back to the
respective examiners for possible review
recalling to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely the
matter to their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could

have reference to either of the two cases which I
brought to the attention of the committee during the
meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back
to the respective examines, namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a

passing general average but with a grade
below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh.
9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile
Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951
with the original grade of 4% increased to
50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-
Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a

borderline general average of 73.15% with a
grade below 60% (57%) in one subject
which, at the time, I could not pinpoint
having inadvertently left in the office the
 data thereon. It turned out that the subject
was Political and International Law under
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 1622 identified and marked as
Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in
Political and International Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original
grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-
evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This
notebook in Political and International Law is
precisely the same notebook mentioned in
the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next

preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook
was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile
Law in the former; and only Political and International
Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I
made known to the Committee and pursuant to which
the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even

volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so,
notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee
that there was very little time left and that the increase
in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly
substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject
carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate

the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn
statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of
the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going
over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August
27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post
provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted,

among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former

BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him
before except once when, as required by the latter
respondent submitted certain papers necessary for
taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme

Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official
release thereof; why should it now reconsider a
"passing" case, especially in a situation where the
respondent and the bar confidant do not know each
other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course
of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire

situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which
respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this

Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had
no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in
particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never
knew this man intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant
Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar

Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are
evidently purported to show as having redounded to the
benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise:
First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination
papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the
paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to
have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades
was done among those of others, then it must have
been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to
increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only
respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the
influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be
unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein
Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of
Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant
Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this
could be disastrous in effect because that would be
presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
 Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar
themselves and the result of their work that year, as
also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are
deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution,
and which only goes to show said narration of facts an
unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973

would make this Respondent Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence
of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent.
The evident imputation is denied and it is contended
that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their
duties and that they should be regarded as such in the
consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent

Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the
stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers
of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the
respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,
who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of

December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo
approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the
process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there
made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review
of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one
subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the
examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp.
3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo

brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of
passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to
75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the
belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court
and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular
notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number
95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know
the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said
booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed

in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee
Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing
average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of

February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati,
Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which
respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded.
Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review
the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given,
explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said
notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given
said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought
that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet
find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of
respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee
expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to
Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic,

knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze
and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory;
in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo

that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's)
discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo,
as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and
further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-
evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo,
resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular
subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo
authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the
notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's
code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in
his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75;
Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang

could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five
subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when

respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo,
Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in
Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected,
respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular
examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all
other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law;
and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark
be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar
examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is
possible the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is
the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in
just one subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time
with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased
to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then
made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and
accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office
Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general

average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing
marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks,

respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one
examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the
latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political
Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished
correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject
Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that particular
notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade.
Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the
justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the
failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from
64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also
revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same.
The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code
Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66
and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo
by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this
particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to
him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average
but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court,
leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the
failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of
the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-
evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was
received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's

general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in
three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of
examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo
neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by
securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the
examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February

8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-
Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi,
p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee,

respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a
candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within hearing of the
order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent
Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular
paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then
reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,
decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not
however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for
consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the

information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject
and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the
re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent
Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he
had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with
Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo

went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the
last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the
residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to
respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February,
1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee.
respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's
notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo,
after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review
and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to
respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent
Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo
re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an
increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number
1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto
Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V,
pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE

RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR
SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his
own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25%
to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8)
weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the
1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the
passing average for that year's examination without any grade
below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his
lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority
from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the
said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned

that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects
and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo
sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted
paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-
Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162;
Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar
Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith
and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in
doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to
the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..."
(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation,

the said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the
examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination
papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the
examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the
examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is
not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz,

Pardo and Pamatian whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent
Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the

respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by
extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and
hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise
from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of
the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the
Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the
trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating
the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted
in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be
admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized

respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat,
the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang
failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects
while his general average was only 66.25% which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the
examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing.
In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing
mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor
subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of
Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as
follows:

BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.
 5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the

answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances
already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was
increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the
great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations
and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees
Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook
was re-evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and
Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela
Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely

nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function
is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he
will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of
passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted
to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the
Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73,
etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of
the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon
the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-
all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner.
Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and
the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly
act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes
himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as
the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to

Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite
belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out
Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more
than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from
70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101,
rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases.
This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute
good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners
for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted
average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that
the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were
more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was
inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the
unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or
the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation
before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good
faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and
International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile
Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of
Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give
him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and
one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the
members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate
when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg
and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively
as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code
number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by
respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of
Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore,
it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on
August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he
filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN

MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO
EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO
QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO
PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS
GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred
back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law
respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the
notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two
cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee
during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter
decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-
evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86,
rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these
two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented
at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51,
rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the
Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.).
The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and
record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on
leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45,
rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials
of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not
yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74,
rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that

there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially
brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's
examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that
the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was
changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said
examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of
Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo
presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing
Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit
9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47
crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of
Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo
did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he

remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who
obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-
16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was
not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he
is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline
of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was
taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with

Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was
referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to
the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the
case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up,
respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly
re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number
954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem

was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not
certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-
61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that
was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-
evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on

February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the
Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate
or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation
No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation
No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a

grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee
had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-
evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:

BA
 Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162,
rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was
referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade
of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade
was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the

answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of
the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation
was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in
Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be
covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee
because even at the time of said referral, which was after the
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects,
Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-
evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75%
under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by
Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of

having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations
and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be
disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be

disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is
believed that they should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.

Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,

should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a
necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his
answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates

to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of
discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers'
Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The
determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required
passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics,
Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar

Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who
acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as
examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to
each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the
Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same
time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in
accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always
be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the
designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct
of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court
and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination

answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly
established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and
confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to
pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion
with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He
is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an
examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether
the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or
not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is
immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents
that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance
with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in

connection, among others, with the character requirement of
candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant
for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the
old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before
the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character
(Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound
to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case,
pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as
to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to
determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the
Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally indicted,
acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending
becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar
examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year
1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving
moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all
other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course
true that the application form used by respondent Galang when he
took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the
disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already
intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof
of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider
them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character.
And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the
Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral
character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's
involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by
its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing
upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and
1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and
third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court
for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under
oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by
any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and
that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966,
when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the
application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants
required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether
involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the
applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been
charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other
officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a
pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet,
respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal
from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was
then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and
thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is

guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his
pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no
pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court
that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang
was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the

Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his
license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS
741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that

the respondent, in withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he
applied for admission, information respecting so serious
a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of
fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law

examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for
admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither
the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have
been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners
v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he

was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to
him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred

in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the
exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the
character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of
the state from which he comes. The finding of
indictments against him, one of which was still
outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which
should have been submitted to the court, with such
explanations as were available. Silence respecting them
was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165
NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in

any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the
Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally
admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was
called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen
years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time,
indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and
good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of
the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal
resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should
not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was,
as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the
Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation
for such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang,

alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations
and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE
have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's
certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be

granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to
be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a
disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity
is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him
with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit
him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the
bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.

Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this
jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the
Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or
false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's
educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme
Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of
Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators
contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re:
Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character
[In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the
Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57
Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and
Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro,
the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were
falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of
public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General

Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the

re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All,
however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity
of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did
the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the
records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so
declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-
evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any
consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter

of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar
examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater
care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before
acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They
could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee,
who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least
the respondents-examiners should have required respondent
Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the
average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to
have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was
on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the
examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could
have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have
been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo

claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent
Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto
Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents
Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades
of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of
respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said
that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my
subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact
average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a
passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be
the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also
allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69,
rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this
particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject
except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination
notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular
examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is
this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be
done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it
with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what
i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I
could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong,
what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct
although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78
instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-

evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and
Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in
grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were
to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and
deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own
words:

Montecillo

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of

the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time"

(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2,
Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate
concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it
was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court
to do so and in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the
paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith

and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in
view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio
Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
33-34, rec.).

Manalo

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee

concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving
the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that said examinee failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given him,
but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Pardo

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have

erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31,1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I
recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by

respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-
evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the
re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and
competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the

increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo
attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the

respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their
actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition
of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-
examiners that their participation in the admission of members to
the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public
interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so are required
to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the
performance of their duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on

November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian
"in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's)
alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom
said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will
show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm.
Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor
and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away
on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out
during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his
defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the
filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also
against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until
this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or
misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable
outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal",
does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of
the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee,
who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or
revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective
subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971
Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations,
went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the
purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar
Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner
Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination
booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of
the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official
release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly
expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint
in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of
delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the
bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal

machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the
1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo

immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations
in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as
Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife

acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with
an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the
amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated
March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972.
On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and
his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said
house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total
amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80,
Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972,
date of inscription April 20, 1972: Second mortgage
P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument
April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972).
[D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as
down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which
according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of
the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo
claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his
savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from
his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received
by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in
dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3,
rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00

savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully
reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on
January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed

under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only
P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed
under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which
shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit
listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the
amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount
of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized because the
transaction therein involved did not push through
(Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent
Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of

respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is
extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of
$2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in
his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on
January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he
allegedly received from his sister at the time he
received the $200 was not even presented by
respondent during the investigation. And according to
Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a
loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In
fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by
them. And furthermore, during the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator
the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was
not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering
that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family
of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has
saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion,
therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo
was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is
inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for
the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 date of instrument; August 23, 1972 date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second
mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was
redeemed by respondent and was subsequently
cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in
favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed
by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled
on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence,
only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the
encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According
to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the
GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May
of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and retirement
(filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as
part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed,
however, as an item in his liabilities in the same
statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets

and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued atP5,200.00.
That he acquired this car sometime between January,
1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the
fact that no such car or any car was listed in his
statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the
years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that
his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of
November, 1972) Statement, his listed total
assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth
P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official

release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the
acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to
link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal
machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with
respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or
to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in
the acquisition of the above properties came from
respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the
Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had
informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the
1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential
Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12,
1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court,
respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His
resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973
but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the

results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on
vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973,
obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a
part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot
(Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo

under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No.
1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public

officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official
duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or

removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or
money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec.
8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's
aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not
presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were
examined as they are part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts

between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar
Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of

Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from
his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at
the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to
1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was
connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans
including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the
position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator,
Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator
(Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of
time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with
applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive
as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of
filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father

who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational
benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-
law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955,
respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to
1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during
the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of
Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears,
however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the
approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita
Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and
furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to

the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational
benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the
said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I.
Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine
Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86,
rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS
and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered
to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.).
The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the
GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the

Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several
benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability
benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the
course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the
application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he
does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met
him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to

the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially

while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49,
rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which

Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his
guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of
the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his

chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its
meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the

Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined
there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes
on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the
Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He
was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January
16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was
attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army,
43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in
the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945
date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947,
Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the
corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be
withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from
the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong
disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative
Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT

VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG,
alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS
NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muoz Palma

and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Antonio, J., is on official leave.

Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

 EN BANC

VILLASANTA April 30, 1957

In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality,

vs.
HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent.

Ramon J. Diaz for respondent.

PARAS, C. J.:

G.R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said
case originated from a criminal action filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan by the complainant against the respondent for
a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the
respondent was found guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the
Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The appeal by certiorari taken to
this Court by the respondent was dismissed for lack of merit.

The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful

bar candidate, from being admitted to the bar. The basic facts are
the same as those found by the Court of Appeals, to wit: On April 16,
1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal,
Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the
complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of
her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage
contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on
March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back by the
respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace
and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses.
Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together as
husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a
religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the
corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish
priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the
production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage
contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple
returned to Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends.
The complainant then discovered that the respondent was
previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the
criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present
complaint for immorality in this court..

Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513 and the

complaint, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent is
immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case
involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the
second marriage (even his act in making love to another woman
while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and
existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality.

Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of

Court, the respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being
admitted to the bar. So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix JJ., concur.

A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso
Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and
breach of trust. The complainant spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had, by
means of fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his
knowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of their only residential
lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case against one
Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without their authority.

In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against
him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office
of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City,
Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit
thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings
on the administrative case until 15 July 1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to
release him from the duty of investigating the case.

On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his
stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who
resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.

Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal
Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement
of the investigation. Both motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21
September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete the investigation of
the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty
(30) days from notice.

On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and

Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as Report, after setting out the facts and
proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General presented the following:

FINDINGS

Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from

respondent a loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage (Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p. 16, records). In the
lwph1.t

said Real Estate Mortgage document, however, it was made to appear

that the amount borrowed by complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by
this discrepancy, respondent assured complainants that said document
was a mere formality, and upon such assurance, complainants signed the
same. The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a
Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave the
document to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent exacted
from complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is beyond
dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously
paid the obviously usurious interest for three months: September, October
and November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due to financial
reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest,
respondent prepared a new document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate
Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C,
replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this
time the sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00,
purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real Estate
Mortgage, a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was
inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction
in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30,
1976. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to
complainants, respondent insisted that complainants sign the same,
again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality.
Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent, complainants signed the
document. Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought the same
document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the document was
notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it.

Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the

second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to ask
from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For
their failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976,
applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate
mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position Paper). All the requirements
of Act No. 3135, as amended, re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were
ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was
transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved
property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.

When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of
March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p.
6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having known the legal implications of
the provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they had
executed, complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already
been transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the
same to a third person.

Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the
amount of P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979
to pay their obligation, hoping that they could redeem their property,
although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage.

Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave
complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper),
which indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00.
The computation was made in respondent's own handwriting.
Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their
hearts. Hence, the instant competent for disbarment against respondent
filed on October 5, 1979.

Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains

that what appears on the two documents allegedly executed by
complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5,
1975 and another P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and
claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to
complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan,
respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the
P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino
Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection,
thus making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said document.
Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or
P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants
were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America
(IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property,
at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was
clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had already paid the
original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants
knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition
of the property in question was in accordance with their contract and the
law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any right of the
complainants.

After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we

find against respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained
an actual cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that
out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage,
P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the P6,000.00
but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest, computed as follows: the first
loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly due on August 31, 1975.
Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500.00 on September 30,
1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently,
beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the
execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months
lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00, which amount plus
the P2,000.00 complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to
respondent for collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the
previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in
P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second Real Estate
Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an

agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
complaining all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, as between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following
cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express

the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the
agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term

"agreement" includes wills.

There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate

Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the
inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily signed by the
complainants. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced
their agreement to writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing
the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in
the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.

However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as

aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, applies in this case.From the facts
obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to
sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent
representations of respondent that each of the successive documents
was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent,
being a lawyer, should have at least explained to complainants the legal
implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the
provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event
of default in payments on the part of complainants. While it may be
conceded that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises
complainants of the legal implications of the contract, it is of common
knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired
practice. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by
sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he
would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract. This
respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that
complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their
obligation to him, as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from
the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it may be stated that
complainants, per advice of respondent himself, returned the proceeds of
the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30, 1976, considering that
the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and not
enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which
per computation of respondent would already have earned interest of
P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).

Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of
P5,000.00, and that this was the reason why complainants were able to
mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is
incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any
encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate
Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only
P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B,
p. 14, rec.).

Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of

Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he
could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the
same amount, for only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand pesos.
Respondent's denial is spacious.

Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same
for the simple reason that the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3)
years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With its lapse
of time, respondent demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated
substantial interest for three years, as shown by his own computation in
as own handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position
Paper, Folder No. 2).lwph1.t

In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer
is worth quoting:

In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect
to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the
version of the complainants or the version of the respondent.

In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants
in filing the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully
examined and considered. At the beginning there was a harmonious
relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so
that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it
is but human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the
complainants the latter would be grateful to the former. However, in the
case at bar, complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in
spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the
respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a better position financially,
socially and intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned, complainants
were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the
respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the
respondent has done to them. It is for this reason therefore that the
undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants rather
than of the respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as a lawyer
could really see to it that the transaction between the complainants and
himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides, there is ample
evidence in the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in
lending money at least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of
ten per cent a month is but common among money lenders during the
time of the transactions in question'

Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent,
who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for
estafa, against accused Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case with
the accused without their consent and received the amount of P500.00 as
advance payment for the amicable settlement, without however, giving to
the complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and
payment.

Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable
settlement was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman
Melendre[z].

We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.

It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused

Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of
P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between complainants and
respondent was not yet strained, and respondent, as counsel of the
complainants in this case, knew that complainants were merely interested
in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent on his own volition talked to
accused and tried to settle the case amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted
the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then the only amount
carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent
and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent did
not inform complainants about this advance payment, perhaps because
he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2,000.00 before
turning over the whole amount to complainants.

At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned

P500.00 to respondent, but they were ashamed then to ask directly of
respondent what the money was all about.

On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the
complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in
respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot and, more so, upon
respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to
redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his
way home and confronted him on the P500.00 that had been given to
respondent. Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt
(Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance payment for the
supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against
him.

Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then

filed a motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and
relieved respondent as their counsel.
 The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of
the witnesses in testifying, had this to say:

With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received
P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the
complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was given
to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the
complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is
the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said
case. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent
received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance
payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and
the accused or the respondent received said amount from the accused
without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is true as
alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the
complainants as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it
that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was
not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How
come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given
to the respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent
as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on
him? If it is really true that complainants have knowledge and have
consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the
efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the
same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their
private prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying
the claim of the respondent.'

Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against

respondent Decena are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals for which he may be suspended. The moral turpitude for which an
attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his
professional or non- professional attitude (Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA
859). The complained acts of respondent imply something immoral in
themselves, regardless of the fact whether they are punishable by law.
The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the
moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of Nebraska
C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).

A parting comment.

All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.

Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too

much. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they
executed and considering that they admitted they did not understand the
contents of the documents, they did not bother to have them explained by
another lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise,
for a period of three years, they did not bother to ask for respondent the
status of their lot and/or their obligation to him. Their complacency or
apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss
of their property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent.
Hence, respondent's liability merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)

and made the following recommendation:

 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I.
Decena be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5)
years. 3

The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several
hearings during the investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T.
Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While
only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal
Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the complainants presented a number of witnesses who,
after their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for respondent; complainant
Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long
delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the
Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a change of
procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective
position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of
their separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer
form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also
filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in support
thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987, which had been set for the cross examination of
the complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the complainants refused to submit
themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17
December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived,
had become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the
complainants' position paper, not having passed through any cross-examination and argues
that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination
constitutes a denial of his right to due process.

We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses
against him has been violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso
Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the proceedings shows that respondent
had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants (those
whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to, but
had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a
clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent had in fact
requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he
had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also
instances where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the
hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear.
That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's)
right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in
his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had been
deprived below of the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses.

After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence
presented by both parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor
General.

The following acts of respondent:

1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the
amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;

2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;

3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976

that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;
 4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage
documents and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances
that they were merely for purposes of "formality";

5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from

complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
property; and

6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real

estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had
a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time.

constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We
agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in
themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts
constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals."
The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct
which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in
fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute the anti-usury law.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity,
that is, done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for
estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the
first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil
liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of the
complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance
payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment
and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show that
respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and
consent of complainants. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable
"settlement" and of the P500.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso
Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And respondent never did turn over
to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that
lawyers cannot "without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive
anything in discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash. 6 Respondent's failure
to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of
the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in

his personal or non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his
professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness
to remain in the legal profession, the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name
from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he
shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on
the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member
of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in
the practice of law. 8

In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the
complainants in his private transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable
rates of interest, considered together with the acts of professional misconduct committed
by respondent attorney, compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good
moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name
shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be
FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of
respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., in Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gr;no-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-42992 August 8, 1935

FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, respondent-appellee.
In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO.

Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf.

DIAZ, J.:

In a motion filed in this case, which is pending resolution because the second motion for
reconsideration of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, who represents the herein petitioner,
has not been acted upon to date, for the reason that the question whether or not the
decision which has already been promulgated should be reconsidered by virtue of the
first assignment of error relied upon in said petitioner's brief, has not yet been
determined, for which purpose the case was set for hearing on August 5, 1935, said
attorney inserted a paragraph the translation of which reads as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of
this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and
constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within out power in order that this
error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we
should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do,
the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court
and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same
time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the
affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of "sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice.

When the court's attention was called to said paragraph, it required Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving
him a period of ten days for that purpose. In this answer attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
far from regretting having employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in his
motion, reiterated them several times contending that they did not constitute contempt
because, according to him it is not contempt to tell the truth.

The phrases:

. . . and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls . . . .

. . . because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he
has a right to do, the judicial outrage . . . .

and ... we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the
affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of "sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice", disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable
disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceed in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the
rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and
mocking from which the words "outrage" and "mockery" used therein are derived,
mean exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish
Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish
Language, 15th ed., pages 132 and 513).

The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least
necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the
essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the
many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to
make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because
both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by reason of their
natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial
judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion

contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after
the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in
his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he
claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he
states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it
odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion
promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism,
a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of
public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise
than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of
the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not
only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not right (Malcolm, Legal
Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is : a priest of justice (In reThatcher, 80 Ohio
St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes
distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining
the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief.

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is
that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

At this juncture, it is not amiss to invite attention to the provisions of rule 1 of Chapter 2 of
Legal Ethics, which reads as follows:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend
themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust
criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a
judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities. In such cases but not otherwise, such charges should be
encouraged and the person making them should be protected.

In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend
the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases
which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where
the same conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention
is no excuse from liability (13 C.J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are
justified by the facts a valid defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified
by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always
be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of
intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into
consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he
prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order
to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others by following the bad example, from
taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said
attorney with the justice it deserves.

Briefly, this court is of the opinion and so holds that the act committed by Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco constitutes a contempt in the face of the court (in facie curiae) and,
reiterating what this court said on another occasion that the power to punish for contempt
is inherent in the courts in order that there be due administration of justice (In re Kelly, 35
Phil., 944), and so that the institution of the courts of justice may be stable and said
courts may not fail in their mission, said attorney is ordered to pay a fine of P200 within
the period of ten days, and to be reprimanded, and he is hereby reprimanded; and it is
ordered that the entire paragraph of his motion containing the phrases which as has been
stated, constitute contempt of court be stricken from the record de oficio. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

From 1918 when in the case of the United States vs. Bustos (37 Phil., 731), it was
declared that "The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct", until the present, I have consistently and steadfastly stood for
the fullest expression of freedom of speech. I stand for the application of that basic
principle now.

The language which the majority of the court finds contemptuous and punishes as such
is found in a second motion of reconsideration in an election case, a class of cases out of
which arise more bitter feelings than any other. The motion is phrased in vigorous
language, in fact vigorous and convincing enough to induce the granting of a rehearing
on the merits. It is hardly necessary to add that that action was taken entirely
uninfluenced by the peroration of the motion here judicially penalized.

Following microscopic examination in the majority opinion of the paragraph, attention is

directed to words which prophesy the loss of public confidence in the courts and the
growth of Sakdalism. If, however, the passage flowing from the pen of Mr. Francisco be
set side by side with passages written by the late Mr. Justice Johnson in the case
of Garchitorena vs. Crescini and Imperial ( [1918, 39 Phil., 258), little difference in
phraseology will be noted. One came from a lawyer and is condemned; the other came
from a judge and is accepted.

The main burden of the charge is that threats against this court were made by the
respondent. Admittedly a lawyer should maintain a respectful attitude towards the courts.
Any attempt on the part of a lawyer to influence the action of the court by intimidation will
justify not alone punishment for contempt but also disbarment. But does anyone believe
that the action taken in this case has been obtained by coercion or could be obtained by
such methods? Judges are of sterner stuff than weak plants which bend with every
wind.1avvphil.et

The lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up for his rights even in the face of a
hostile court. He owes entire devotion to the interests of his client. His zeal when a case
is lost, which he thinks should have been won, may induce intemperate outbursts. Courts
will do well charitably to overlook professional improprieties of the moment induced by
chagrin at losing a case.

So that it may not be assumed that the position taken by me is isolated or peculiar, permit
me to offer a few corroborative authorities.

Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was the pioneer
authority in the subject of professional ethics. Speaking for the court in one case, he said:
"No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members
of the bar. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability
to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very
judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system." (Ex
parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep., 637.)

Mr. Justice Brewer was first a member of the Supreme Court of Kansas and
subsequently was elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the former
capacity, in sustaining a contempt of court, he nevertheless observed: "We remark again,
that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded
expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that, in every case
where a judge decides for one party, he decides against another; and ofttimes both
parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment, therefore, is
great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than bitter feeling, which
often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought
to be patient, and tolerate everything which appears but the momentary outbreak of
disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party ashamed of such outbreak,
and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence." (In rePryor [1877], 26
Am. Rep., 747.)

The late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States was until recently
the leader of progressive thought in American jurisprudence. In a dissenting opinion in a
famous case, he said: "When it considered how contrary if is to our practice and ways of
thinking for the same person to be accuser and sole judge in a matter which, if he be
sensitive, may involve strong personal feeling, I should expect the power to be limited by
the necessities of the case 'to insure order and decorum in their presence'. ... I confess
that I cannot find in all this or in the evidence in the case anything that would have
affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still less can I find there anything that
obstructed the administration of justice in any sense that I possibly can give to those
words." (Toledo Newspaper Co. vs. United States [1917], 247 U.S., 402.)

In 1922 Attorney Feliciano Gomez was charged with having said in effect that the
Supreme Court had decided the election protest in favor of Cailles because Governor-
General Wood, out of friendship for Cailles, had invited members of the court to
Malacaang previous to formulating the decision, and there, following a secret
conference, had offered them a banquet. The proceedings for contempt initiated against
the respondent by the Attorney-General were halted by the court. In he opinion it was
said: "We doubt very much if any one would think for a moment that memory of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity for a
social courtesy and the favor of the Chief Executive. ... We feel also, that litigants and
lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the
moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to
condone even contemptuous language." (In re Gomez [1922], 43 Phil., 376.)

To punish for direct contempt of the Supreme Court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with
scrupulous care. The members of the court sit as prosecutors and as judges. Human
sensitiveness to an attorney's unjust aspersions on judicial character may induce too
drastic action. It may result in the long run in making of lawyers weak exponents of their
clients' causes. Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and
impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by
chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The
Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of
the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do
well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the
lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case.

Mr. Francisco assures us that it has not been his intention to be recreant to the respect
and consideration which he has always shown the highest tribunal in the Philippines, and
that the language of the last paragraph of his motion of June 19 was not meant to offend
the dignity of the court. I do not think that the language found in Mr. Francisco's motion
constitutes contempt of court, but conceding that it did require explanation, I would
accept his disavowal of wrong intent at its face value. I would not mark the record of a
member of the bar of long and honorable standing with this blemish. With due deference
to the opinion of the majority, I must strongly dissent therefrom.

Vickers, J., concurs.

G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M.
Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988. We
have reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of the
argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no
sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that Resolution.
The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and references to foreign
texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this
jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the

conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of the
"Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for Reconsideration.
 1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to
charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict him of direct
contempt."

In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez
is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of
the court and member of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a
technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are aware that courts in the United
States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct contempts' as "contempts
in the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded the
contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading filed before the
Court and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez
as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon
the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the
Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to
explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given the
most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted
to present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose
punishment upon the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of
the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as constituting
"direct contempt."

2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this
Court to charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the
Revised Rules of Court."

In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of
Court pointing out that:

[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the
Supreme Court such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the
terms of Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the
charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.

The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for
referral of this case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer to
Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139,
referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not the
only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under Section 1
(entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or suspension
of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the
complaint under oath of another in writing" (Parentheses supplied). The procedure
described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided for suspension or
disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another person, rather than a
procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own motion. It
is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate motu proprio proceedings for
which it did not find probable cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus, there is no
need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral is made "for investigation to
determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent"
(Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated against the respondent. The
Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular
case, further factual investigation is needed. In the present case, as pointed out in
the per curiam Resolution of the Court (page 18), there was "no need for further
investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him" and
that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense: his
defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those
statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his
freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law
and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such
issues."

In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for Reconsideration
is from a dissentingopinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United State. 1 It may be
pointed out that the majority in Green v. United States,through Mr. Justice Harlan, held,
among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power to impose sentences in excess of
one year for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter
of constitutional right; nor does the (US) Constitution require that contempt subject to prison
terms of more than one year be based on grand jury indictments.

In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:

Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less

dubious manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is
that from the foundation of the United States the constitutionality of the
power to punish for contempt without the intervention of a jury has not
been doubted. The First Judiciary Act conferred such a power on the
federal courts in the very act of their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of
the Judiciary Committee of eight that reported the bill to the Senate, five
member including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief Justice,
Ellsworth, had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Oliver
Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb Strong, Ricard Basett,
William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no less
than nineteen member including Madison who contemporaneously
introduced the Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the Convention. And
when an abuse under this power manifested itself, and led Congress to
define more explicitly the summary power vested in the courts, it did not
remotely deny the existence of the power but merely defined the
conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of the law
concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.

xxxxxxxxx

Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court
throughout its existence . In at least two score cases in this Court, not to
mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower federal courts, the power
to punish summarily has been accepted without question. ... 2

To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at
best. The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for
contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather he
upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its
claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and most
especially from those who are officers of the court.

3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to
apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present
danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more
modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court
which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."

The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic
incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the
testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate
a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse.
The clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out
the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not,
however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad v.
Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:

...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred

position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA
191 [1963]. It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:

"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would

appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press.The realities of
life in a complex society preclude however, a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist
that all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition."

The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of
speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media
as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests
test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed.,
p. 79). The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation
or type of situation (Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,supra, p. 899). (Emphasis
Supplied) 4

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we
believe that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiamResolution
of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the
Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to
threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public order. 5 What
is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive
evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but
also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country
and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the
bar and officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as
palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more
far reaching in its implications for society.

4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this

Court to hold that intent is irrelevant in charges of misconduct." What the
Court actually said on this point was:
 Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the
Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as
characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not,
however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words
and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that the
respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited
no repentance (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).

The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities
(understood as pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the
processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from
an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that
respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail
over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear
import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind
incompatible with those acts or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one
accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting that
while he may have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he actually acted from high
motives and kind feelings for the latter.

5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court
to punish respondent for contempt of court for out of court publications."

Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern
trends in the United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of contempt.
We are, however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in our
jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document the state of our case law on this
matter in its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of this case
that would suggest to this Court that that case law, which has been followed for at least
half a century or so, ought to be reversed.

6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of

indefinite suspension from the practice of law constitutes "cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it difficult to consider
this a substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the
respondent's suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or
"inhuman," has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration
of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction
has the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his own
good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his
willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct
rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. The denial is FINAL.

The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988
and the Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 219 September 29, 1962

CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P.
PATALINGHUG, respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an original complaint filed with this Court charging respondents with
unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother
lawyer, and praying that respondents be dealt with accordingly.

The facts which led to the filing of this complaint are as follow: In May, 1952, petitioner
was retained by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her case (Sp. Proc. No. 2-J) in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Testate Estate of Macario Barrera". By
January, 1955, petitioner had contemplated the closing of the said administration
proceedings and prepared two pleadings: one, to close the proceedings and declare
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as universal heir and order the delivery to her of the
residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the rendition of final accounting and
partition of estate. At this point, however, the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera
refused to countersign these two pleadings and instead advised petitioner not to file
them. Some weeks later, petitioner found in the records of said proceedings that
respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had filed on January 11, 1955 a written
appearance as the new counsel for Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955
petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On
February 7, 1955, the other respondent, Atty. Francisco E. F. Remotigue, entered his
appearance, dated February 5, 1955.

Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were unethical and
improper for the reason that they had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as
attorney for the estate and the administratrix and, taking advantage of her goodwill,
intrigued against the preparation of the final inventory and accounting and prodded Mrs.
Barrera not to consent to petitioner's decision to close the administration proceedings;
that before their appearance, they brought petitioner's client to their law office and there
made her sign four documents captioned "Revocation of Power of Attorney" and sent the
same by mail to several corporations and establishments where the Estate of Macario
Barrera is owner of certificates of stocks and which documents purported to disauthorize
the petitioner from further collecting and receiving the dividends of the estate from said
corporations, when in fact and in truth the respondents fully knew that no power of
attorney or authority was given to the petitioner by his client, the respondents motive
being to embarrass petitioner to the officials, lawyers and employees of said
corporations, picturing him as a dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted by his client all
with the purpose of straining the relationship of the petitioner and his client, Nieves Rillas
Vda. de Barrera; and that Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to
petitioner.

In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated that when he entered his appearance on
January 11, 1955 the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera had already lost
confidence in her lawyer, the herein petitioner, and had in fact already with her a pleading
dated January 11, 1955, entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion
to Cite Atty. Casiano Laput", which she herself had filed with the court.1awphl.nt

In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that when he filed his appearance on
February 7, 1955, the petitioner has already withdrawn as counsel.

After separate answers were filed by the respondents, the Supreme Court referred the
case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor
General recommended the complete exoneration of respondents.

It appears and it was found by the Solicitor General that before respondent Atty.
Fortunato Patalinghug entered his appearance, the widow administratrix had already filed
with the court a pleading discharging the petitioner Atty. Casiano Laput. If she did not
furnish Atty. Laput with a copy of the said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty.
Patalinghug but that of the said widow. It appears that the reason why Mrs. Barrera
dismissed petitioner as her lawyer was that she did not trust him any longer, for one time
she found out that some dividend checks which should have been sent to her were sent
instead to petitioner, making her feel that she was being cheated by petitioner. Moreover,
she found that withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank and Bank of the Philippine
Islands have been made by petitioner without her prior authority.

We see no irregularity in the appearance of respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug as

counsel for the widow; much less can we consider it as an actual grabbing of a case from
petitioner. The evidence as found by the Solicitor General shows that Atty. Patalinghug's
professional services were contracted by the widow, a written contract having been made
as to the amount to be given him for his professional services.

Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on February 5, 1955, as counsel for Mrs. Barrera after
Atty. Patalinghug had entered his appearance, and his (petitioner's) filing almost
simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to an
acquiescence to the appearance of respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the
widow. This should estop petitioner from now complaining that the appearance of Atty.
Patalinghug was unprofessional.

Much less could we hold respondent Atty. Remotigue guilty of unprofessional conduct
inasmuch as he entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955, only on February 7,
same year, after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional services on
January 11, 1955, and after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance on
February 5, 1955.

With respect to the preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of power of

attorney as complained of by petitioner, the Solicitor General found that the same does
not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely
to safeguard the interest of the administratrix. Evidently, petitioner's pride was hurt by the
issuance of these documents, and felt that he had been pictured as a dishonest lawyer;
for he filed a case before the City Fiscal of Cebu against Atty. Patalinghug and the widow
for libel and falsification. It was shown, however, that the case was dismissed.

No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these are hereby
dismissed and the case closed.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977

JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and DOMINGO
FORTEZA, JR., respondents.

SANTOS, J:

In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the
Order of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for Relief from
Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan.

The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:

Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1,

1971, in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo
Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza
against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed as
Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W.
Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1

Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6,
1972, despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was
allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial
court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration was then
filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the case for
the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. Said Motion for
Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law firm. The
same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:

a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in
Court by declaring him in default, it being contrary to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter;
 b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case;

c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly award of moral

damages is contrary to law; and

d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.2

The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same
law firm. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a different
counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same was denied and the decision
became final on June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court, presided by
respondent Judge for execution. 3

A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court
which was granted by respondent Judge. 4

On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief
from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to
the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had
not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated
and/or levied upon without due process of law. 5

In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the
issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". . a clear case of
dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and,
that the grounds relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in the appeal before the
Court of Appeals ... " 6

On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of
execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for
the satisfaction of the judgment. 7

Hence the instant Petition.

Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory
maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged
fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the
filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the
Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the
subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default,
petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the
judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and
justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the
proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by
counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was
predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April
6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow
this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already
taken well over six years to resolve,

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is
hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209
Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days
from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in
Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
Fernando, (Chairman) Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &

VICTORIANO TENAZASpetitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
& QUINTIN MUNINGrespondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue
presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en
banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case
No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for
professional services in the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled,

"PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial
Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with
backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became
final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning
complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.
On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable
amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation
indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages,
and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services
Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and
appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and
subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%

Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought
to be voided in the present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of
late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration,
but, considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this
Court admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as
respondent's answer to the petitioner for review. 2 The case was considered submitted for
decision without respondent's brief. 3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers'

Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that
an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union
president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal
Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less
immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that

In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the

parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel ...

is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of
Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same
section adds that

it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to

examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to
assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly
qualified members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said
court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to
compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court,
providing

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. An attorney

shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of

attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court
be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot,
 therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession,
as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients
and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:

But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not
licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the
great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot be
recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the
jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5

No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has
been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time. 6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; 7 that acting
as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an
act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would
leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also
leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures. 10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-
lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to
recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded
attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-
lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that
said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the
aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's
fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose
because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the
present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension
but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it
being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as
co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's
fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor
organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its
members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and
economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may
prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which
provides:

Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases Appeals. Any person aggrieved by any order of
the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial
burden of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law
before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed
to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before
the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that
respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose.
But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken
up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons
alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded
10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are
affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor

and Makasiar, JJ. concur.