UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

IN RE:

PIERRE ANDRE BASSON, CASE NO.:15-22239-JRS

Appellant. CHAPTER 13

CITIMORTGAGE and
FEDERAL NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, APPEAL CASE NO.:

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
__________________________________________________________________

INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT PIERRE ANDRE BASSON

______________________________
PIERRE ANDRE BASSON
Appellant Pro Se; Self Represented
5262 Keithwood Drive
Cumming, GA 30040

1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.2
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT..4
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL4
STANDARDS OF REVIEW..5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..6
ARGUMENT--ISSUES ON APPEAL
I. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in granting movants motion for
relief from the automatic stay without making any finding of fact that movant had
standing once the standing issue was raised by the Debtor in his pleadings.
Pages 8-20
II. Whether the Court erred in failing to make a finding of fact that
movant was the owner and holder of the note and security deed before granting
movants motion for relief from the automatic stay.
Pages 20-21
CONCLUSION21

CERTIFICATES: SERVICE22-23

INTERESTED PARTIES.23

RELATED CASES...23
COMPLIANCE 23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233 (2nd Cir. 1988)..13

Butner v. United States, 440 U.S (1979).. 9

Dunmore v. United States, 358 F. 3d 1107, 112 (9th Cir. 2004)..15

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 13

2
In re Alcide, 450 B.R. 526 (Bankr. E.D. Pa., May 27, 2011)..15

In re Banks, 457 B.R. 9 (8th Cir. B.A.P., Oct. 11, 2011)16

In re Brian w. Davies, cited in In re Tarantola, 4:09-BK-09703

EWH (Dist. of AZ) 13

In re Burnett, 450 B.R. 589 (Bankr. W.D. Va., April 28, 2011). 14

In re Canellas, 2010 WL 571808(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010... 24

In re Comcoach, 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983) 17

In re Escobar, 457 B.R. 229 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y., August 22, 2011)22
In re Gulley, 436 B.R. 878 (Bankr. N.D.Tex., August 23, 2010).. 15

In re Hayes,393 B.R. 259 (Bankr. Mass. 2008).. 13

In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C.D. Cal., 2008). 13

In re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174 (Bankr. D.Ariz., July 6, 2009).15
In re Jackson, 451 B.R. 24 (Bankr. E.D. Cal., June 6, 2011)..... 14

In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359 (Bankr. W.D. Wash., March 6, 2009)..... 16

In re Lee, 2009 WL 1917010 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009) 24

In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009)..13

In re Minbattiwalla, 2010 WL 694166(Bankr. S.D. N.Y.

March 1, 2010. 24

In re Morton, 866 F.2d, 866 F. 2d 561, 563 (2d Cir 1989) 15

In re Mitchell, U.S. Bankr. Ct. Dist. NV-BK-S-07-16226-LBR(2008). 14

In re Parker, 445 B.R. 301 (Bankr. D.Vt., March 18, 2011). 23

In re Ruest, Case No. 08-10512, Adv. Proc. No. 09-1035 (Bankr. D. Vt., August 23,
2011)..22

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In re Sheridan, 2009 Bankr. Lexis 552 (Bankr ID 2009)13

In re Steinberg, BAP No. WY-12-082 (10th Circuit BAP May 30, 2013.
(unpublished). 7, 8, 10

In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897 (9th Cir. B.A.P., June 10, 2011)14, 22

In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho, July 7, 2009). 21

Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991)...18

Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645 (1974)..17

Kowalski. v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128-129 (2004)...14

Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966)..11

Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008).19

St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F. 2d 688 2nd Cir.
1989).19

Valley Forge Christian Coll. V. Am. United for Sep. of Ch. & State,

454 U.S. 464, 472 (1968)..14

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)14, 19

Rules, Statutes and Other

Fed. Bankr. P. 80001 (a)5,7

Fed. Bankr.R. 3001 (c) and (d)

Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 17.21

Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code..10

4
Section 101 (5) (A) of the Bankruptcy codeA
1978 U.S.C.C.A.C. 5787, 6136.. 11

UCC 3-301. Section 101 (5) (A) of the Bankruptcy code.. 12

11 USC 362 (a).. 5

11 U.S.C. Section 101 (10)..12

Section 348 (d), 502(f), 502 (g), 502 (h), or 502 (I).. 12

28 U.S.C. 158 (a)...5

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158 (a) and

(c), which provides that the US District Court may hear appeals from final

judgments, orders and decrees. A party takes an appeal of a 28 U.S.C. 158 final

order as of right by filing a timely notice of appeal. Fed. Bankr. P. 80001 (a). The

grant or denial of a motion for relief from an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 362

5
(a) is considered a final order.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in granting movants motion for

relief from the automatic stay without making a finding of fact that movant had
standing once the standing issue was raised by the Debtor in his pleadings.
II. Whether the Court erred in failing to make a finding that movant was
the holder of the note and security deed before granting movants motion for relief
from the automatic stay and denying Debtors motion for an evidentiary hearing on
standing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The bankruptcy courts Order granting relief from the automatic stay is for

abuse of discretion. Whether movant had standing to file the motion for stay relief,

however, is a legal issue requiring de novo review.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Debtor Pierre Andre Basson filed the underlying bankruptcy case on

November 2, 2015. On February 8 2016 Debtor filed an adversary complaint

seeking a determination that CitiMortgage, Inc. and Federal National Mortgage

Association lacked legal standing, were not real parties in interest, and that said

Movants, which had filed a motion for stay relief, were not entitled to obtain the

relief they had requested and were seeking due to their lack of standing. Debtor

moved the court for an evidentiary hearing on movants standing. Debtor

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maintained that the alleged moving creditors should not be able to foreclose on his

property because said entities did not have a valid security interest on his Property.

Debtor had filed in the public records an affidavit of forgery and a affidavit in

regard to the broken chain of title regarding these entities. In its order of

September 28, 2016 the court granted movants motion for stay relief without

making any finding of fact that said movants had standing. Further, it denied

Debtors motion for an evidentiary hearing on standing. This appeal follows.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The summary of Appellants argument is as follows: the Bankruptcy Court

abused its discretion in granting relief from stay because it failed to conduct an

inquiry into the threshold issue of whether the creditor had standing to file the
motion for stay relief. Further, the Court erred by failing to make an inquiry on

standing because without standing the Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief

requested by creditor/movant and such an inquiry was required before the court

could rule on the motion for stay relief when the standing issue was raised by

Debtor. Further, the court failed to make a finding of fact as to whether movant did

in fact own and hold Debtors promissory note and security deed and erroneously

determined that movant had standing when it did not refusing to conduct an

evidentiary hearing.
ARGUMENT
I. The Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in granting relief
from stay because it failed to conduct an inquiry into the
threshold issue of whether the creditor had standing to file the
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 motion for stay relief once the issue of standing was raised by
the Debtor in his pleadings.

A mortgage creditor may seek stay relief to pursue its non-bankruptcy law

remedies in enforcing its mortgage on a debtors home. But, as in any other civil

proceeding, that creditor must demonstrate standing to invoke the courts

jurisdiction and the bankruptcy court has an affirmative obligation to determine

whether its jurisdiction has been properly invoked. (emphasis added). The

bankruptcy court failed in its affirmative obligation to do this. Appellant would cite

the case of In re Steinberg, BAP No. WY-12-082 (10th Circuit BAP May 30, 2013)

(unpublished). Here, the debtor, Dianna Kay Steinberg (Debtor), challenged the

banks standing by questioning whether it had the right to enforce the note. The

bankruptcy court granted the motion without providing an opportunity for a

hearing on that very important threshold issue. Debtor appeals the bankruptcy

courts order granting the motion for relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on

its interest on her home. We REVERSE the order of the bankruptcy court and

REMAND the motion for a determination whether the creditor holds the note or

may enforce the note on some other legal basis. For the rest of the court's ruling,

see In re: Steinberg. Although the opinion is not precedent, it is persuasive. The

panel clearly ruled on facts similar to the case at bar, that the bankruptcy court had

an affirmative duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing to address the threshold issue

of standing and that its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion by the

8
bankruptcy court. The Court further ruled that once the issue of movants

standing to enforce the Note was raised, the bankruptcy court was required to

resolve it on the merits. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has previously said as much in In

re Miller. There, the Tenth Circuit held that a secured creditor must demonstrate

that it has a right to payment by adducing evidence that it possesses the note.

And in In re Thomas, we held that if a secured creditors possession of the note is

challenged, the bankruptcy court has a duty to ensure that debtors are not

subjected to legal challenges by those without standing to do so by conducting an

evidentiary hearing (emphasis added) at which the creditor must demonstrate

either its possession of the note or some other legal basis for being able to enforce

it. Here, the bankruptcy court granted movants motion without conducting any

inquiry into that important threshold issue (emphasis added). Because the

bankruptcy court had an affirmative obligation to determine whether movant has

standing, it abused its discretion in granting relief from stay when it failed to

conduct an inquiry into whether Bank of America had possession of the original

note. We therefore reverse the order of the bankruptcy court and remand the

motion for a determination whether BOA holds the Note or may enforce the Note

on some other legal basis. It is clear from the legal authority cited, that the

bankruptcy court abused its discretion in not conducting an evidentiary hearing on

standing to determine movants standing prior to granting a motion for stay relief.

9
The bankruptcy courts decision should be reversed and remanded.
Further, the court did not consider Debtors filed objections to the motion for

stay relief, including the movants lack of standing to file the motion.
Movant never established that it is truly a real party in interest with standing

to file a motion for relief from automatic stay. Both the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code require that a motion for stay relief can

only be filed by a real party in interest. The bankruptcy court essentially ignored

Debtors Objection to movants motion. Courts throughout the country have denied

standing on motion for stay relief where movants couldnt prove standing. In re

Sheridan, 2009 Bankr. Lexis 552 (Bankr. ID. 2009); In re: Jacobson, 2009 Bankr.

WD Wash 2009); In re: Hayes, 393 B.R. 259 (Bankr. Mass. 2008); In re: Hwang,

396 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C.D. Cal, 2008). Problems with standing in cases of notes

and mortgages or security deeds assigned to securitized trusts have been evident in

many parts of the country. In the case of In re:Brian W. Davies, cited in In

re:Tarantola, Case No. 4:09-BK-09703-EWH (District of Arizona) the court

opined:
Yet again the court is called upon to decide whether the purported holder of a note

allegedly transferred into a securitized mortgage pool has standing to obtain relief

from the automatic stay. Yet again, the movant has failed to demonstrate that it has
standing. To make matters worse, the movant has filed its motion without

the fact, and only disclosed its real evidence on the day of the final evidentiary

hearing. Relief Denied.

As established in the case of In re: Mitchell, U.S. Bankr. Ct. District of NV,
10
 BK-S-0716226-LBR (2008), in a Memorandum opinion 19 August 2008, that the
motion contains no evidentiary support and [Movant] must have both

Constitutional and prudential standing and be the real party in interest under Fed.

R. Civ. Pro. 17, in order to be entitled to lift stay relief. [citing Kowalski v.

Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128-129 (2004)(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975). Constitutional standing under Article III requires, at a minimum, that a

party have suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of defendants

conduct, that the injury be traced to the challenged action, and that it is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision. Valley Forge Christian Coll. V. Am. United for

Sep. of Ch. & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1968). Beyond the Article III

requirements of injury in fact, causation and redressability, [movant] must also

have prudential standing, which is a judicially-created set of principles that places

limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts powers. See Warth v.
Seldin, Id. As a prudential matter, a plaintiff must assert his own legal interest as

the real party in interest. Dunmore v. United States, 358 F. 3d 1107 1112 (9th Cir.

2004). [a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.

Foundational issue of standing remains unproven by movant. The court should

conclude that Movant lacked standing to request relief from the automatic stay and

that it was error for the bankruptcy court to fail to conduct an evidentiary hearing

on the matter. The law relative to standing includes the following:

A Movant Lacks Standing to Exercise any State Law Remedies

Within the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, state law governs the

11
determination of property rights. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S (1979). 48,

54 (noting that absent an actual conflict with federal bankruptcy law, Congress

has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's

estate to state law); In re Morton, 866 F.2d, 866 F. 2d 561, 563 (2d Cir 1989).

Movant has not established its standing under the subject documents by valid

assignment or otherwise. Movant has not supplied the court with any evidence that

the documents were physically delivered or assigned pursuant to a written

agreement nor has Movant presented any valid written assignment of the Deed. As

Movant has failed to prove it owns the Note and has failed to present a valid

assignment, Movant has no standing to pursue its state law remedies with regard to

the Property. Unless and until Movant establishes it's standing on the record, it had

no standing to file this Motion for Stay Relief and the court would lack jurisdiction

to act on Movant's motion.

B. Movant is not a Party in Interest and therefore lacks Standing to

Request Relief from the Automatic Stay

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay on all

litigation against the Debtor, as well as any act to create, perfect, or enforce any

lien against property of the estate. 11 USC 362(a). Section 362(d) of the

Bankruptcy Code provides that [o]n request of a party in interest and after notice

and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay.... 11 USC Section 362(d)

12
(emphasis added). The term party in interest is nowhere defined in the

Bankruptcy Code. However, the Supreme Court has suggested that when an

undefined term is used in bankruptcy law, [i]n determining the term's scope---and

its limitations---the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act must ultimately govern.

Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645 (1974) (citing Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S.

375, 379 (1966).

Though courts have interpreted the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act

differently, the Second Circuit explained In re Comcoach, 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d

Cir. 1983), [b]ankruptcy courts were established to provide a forum where

creditors and debtors could settle their disputes.... The Comcoach1 court went on

to find that in order to invoke the court's jurisdiction to obtain relief from the

automatic stay, the moving party had to be either a creditor or a debtor. In Support

of this assertion, the court cited to the Bankruptcy Code's legislative history

which suggest that, notwithstanding the use of the term party in interest, it is

only creditors who may obtain relief from the automatic stay. Id. (Citing H.R.

Rep. No. 95-595, (1978, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.C. 5787, 6136).

It follows from the Second Circuit's analysis that unless Movant qualifies as a

creditor, it does not have standing to request relief from the automatic stay.

1The facts in Comcoach involved a bank, and therefore this language should not be read to
exclude from the definition of a party in interest the United States Trustee or other corporate or
corporeal entities specifically given standing in the Bankruptcy Code or applicable case law.

13
Section 101(10) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a creditor as an:

(A) Entity that has a claim against a debtor that arose at the time of or

before the order for relief concerning the debtor;

(B) Entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in section

348 (d), 502(f), 502 (g), 502 (h), or 502 (I) of this title; or

(C) Entity that has a community claim. 11 U.S.C. Section 101 (10). This

definition requires consideration of what constitutes a claim, which conveniently

is also a defined term in section 101 (5) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101 (5) (A) of the Bankruptcy code defines a claim as the right to

payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,

unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, un-matured, disputed, undisputed, legal,

equitable, secured or unsecured. Even under this broad definition movant has not

demonstrated its right to payment because, as discussed in the preceding section,

it lacks the ability to seek the state law remedy of foreclosure. Johnson v. Home

State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991) (finding that a mortgage foreclosure was a

right to payment against the debtor).

C. The Court should have had Additional Reservations Regarding the

Validity of whether Movant owns or holds the subject note and security
deed and conducted an evidentiary hearing on the standing issue.

Standing is a threshold issue in every federal case and cannot be waived; if

the litigant does not have standing, the court has no power to hear the case, even if

14
no objection has been raised. Unfortunately, not all courts exercise that affirmative

duty, so its usually up to Debtor or her attorney to ensure that claimants without

standing dont slip through. The cases below establish those basic principles:

Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008):

Assignee to claim must hold legal title at the time that it is asserted in action.

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004): Federal

court can only exercise jurisdiction when litigant meets both constitutional

and prudential standing requirements.

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975): Standing is a threshold question in

every federal case determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.

St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F. 2d 688 (2nd

Cir. 1989): Court has independent duty to examine standing.

Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233 (2nd Cir. 1988): Parties cannot consent

to waive standing.

D. Constitutional and Prudential Standing in Bankruptcy Courts

Numerous U.S. Bankruptcy Court rulings have reaffirmed the general rule

that federal court jurisdiction requires that the litigant have both Constitutional and

prudential standing. That requirement and what exactly is required to satisfy the

15
standard is elaborated upon in:

In re Jackson, 451 B.R. 24 (Bankr. E.D. Cal., June 6, 2011): For a federal

court to have jurisdiction, the proponent of a matter must have both

constitutional standing, which requires an injury fairly traceable to the

defendants allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the

requested relief, and prudential standing.

In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897 (9th Cir. B.A.P., June 10, 2011): A federal court

may exercise jurisdiction over a litigant only when that litigant meets

constitutional and prudential standing requirements; constitutional standing

requires an injury in fact, which is caused by or fairly traceable to some

conduct or some statutory prohibition, and which the requested relief will

likely redress; prudential standing embodies judicially self-imposed limits

on the exercise of federal jurisdiction; here, Wells Fargo did not establish

standing to seek relief from stay, as it did not show that it or its agent had

actual possession of the note, so that it could not establish that it was a

person entitled to enforce the note under UCC 3-301.In re Burnett, 450

B.R. 589 (Bankr. W.D. Va., April 28, 2011): In order to establish a colorable

claim, a movant for relief from stay must satisfy the constitutional

limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its

16
 exercise.

In re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174 (Bankr. D.Ariz., July 6, 2009): In addition to

the procedural real party in interest requirements of Rule 17, a litigant

must also have standing to bring a motion; a litigant must have both

constitutional standing and prudential standing for a federal court to have

jurisdiction to hear the case.

E. Party in Interest Issues in Bankruptcy Courts

In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho, July 7, 2009): To obtain stay

relief, a Movant must have standing and be the real party in interest under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17.

Standing of a Servicer. In re Alcide, 450 B.R. 526 (Bankr. E.D. Pa., May 27,

2011): To establish its status as a party in interest entitled to seek relief from

the automatic stay, a mortgage servicer must demonstrate that (1) the

initiation of a stay relief motion is within the scope of authority delegated to

the servicer by its principal and; and (2) the principal itself is a party in

interest (i.e., the principal is a party with the right to enforce the mortgage).

In re Gulley, 436 B.R. 878 (Bankr. N.D.Tex., August 23, 2010): A mortgage

loan servicer is considered a creditor with standing to file a proof of claim

by virtue of its pecuniary interest in collecting payments under the terms of

17
 the note.

In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359 (Bankr. W.D. Wash., March 6, 2009): Even if a

servicer or agent has authority to bring a motion for relief from stay on

behalf of the holder, it is the holder, rather than the servicer, that must be the

moving party, and so identified in the papers and in the electronic docketing

done by the moving partys counsel.

Possession of the Note

In re Escobar, 457 B.R. 229 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y., August 22, 2011): Where the

stay relief Movant claims rights as a secured creditor by virtue of an

assignment of rights to a promissory note secured by a lien against real

property, it must provide satisfactory proof of its status as the owner or

holder of the note; here, the movants had met this burden of proof through

their uncontroverted affidavit testimony that they were holders of the notes

by virtue of possession of the original notes executed with endorsements in

blank.

In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897 (9th Cir. B.A.P., June 10, 2011): (See Constitutional

and Prudential Standing in Bankruptcy Courts)

In re Banks, 457 B.R. 9 (8th Cir. B.A.P., Oct. 11, 2011): The bankruptcy

court erred in holding that a creditor possessed the right to enforce a note

18
 endorsed in blank where the creditor did not establish that it was in

possession of the note.

Date of Possession

In re Ruest, Case No. 08-10512, Adv. Proc. No. 09-1035 (Bankr. D. Vt.,

August 23, 2011): Even though it was undisputed that loan servicer was in

possession of the note and the note was endorsed in blank, the date that the

bank came into possession of the note was a genuine issue of material fact

sufficient to deny motion for summary judgment.

In re Parker, 445 B.R. 301 (Bankr. D.Vt., March 18, 2011): The creditor

needed to show that it was the holder of the note on the date of the debtors

bankruptcy petition.

II. The Court erred in failing to make a finding that movant

was the holder of the note and security deed before granting
movants motion for relief from the automatic stay.

The record is bereft of any foundational instrument except for

false, fraudulent and fabricated assignments. The abject failure of a servicer to

demonstrate authority to act as the holders agent is fatal to its cause. In

re:Minbattiwalla,2010 WL 694166 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. March 1, 2010) (in addition

to establishing the rights of a holder, a servicer seeking relief must show its

authority to act as the holders agent. In re: Canellas, 2010 WL 571808 (Bankr.

19
M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010). (motion for relief from stay denied after movant produced

no evidence of ownership of the note); In re: Lee, 2009 WL 1917010 (Bankr.C.D.

Cal., Jan. 26, 2009) (sanctioning attorney who pursued stay relief motion knowing

named party lacked ownership interest in note); In re: Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359

(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) (servicers declaration in support of motion for stay
relief did not establish that it had a beneficial interest in the note) In re: Fitch, 2009

WL 1514501(Bankr. N.D. OH May 28, 2009);

CONCLUSION

Based upon the facts of this case, the legal arguments and authorities cited

herein, the court should conclude as follows: The Bankruptcy Court

abused its discretion in granting relief from stay because it failed to conduct an

inquiry into the threshold issue of whether the creditor/movant had standing to file

the motion for stay relief. The Court erred by failing to make an inquiry on

standing because without standing the Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief

requested by creditor and such an inquiry was required before the court could rule

on the motion for stay relief when raised by Debtor. Therefore the Bankruptcy

Courts ruling granting the motion for stay relief should be reversed and remanded.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _____day of October, 2016.

______________________________
Pierre Andre Basson
Appellant Pro Se; Self Represented
20
 5262 Keithwood Drive
Cumming, Georgia 30040

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Appellants Initial Brief has been furnished to the undersigned parties

This_____day of October, 2016, by US Mail, Postage Prepaid.

______________________________
Pierre Andre Basson
Appellant Pro Se
5262 Keithwood Drive
Cumming, Georgia 30040

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the following are the Interested Parties in

this matter: Pierre Andre Basson, 5262 Keithwood Drive, Cumming, GA

30040.

______________________________
Pierre Andre Basson
Appellant Pro Se
5262 Keithwood Drive
Cumming, Georgia 30040

CERTIFICATE OF RELATED CASES

21
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that the following is a list of Related Cases to this

matter. NONE.

Dated this ___day of October, 2016.

_________________________
Pierre Andre Basson
Appellant Pro Se

CERTIFIATE OF COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Brief was done in accordance with

FRBP 8009 and 8010; and the local rules.

Dated this _____day of October, 2016.

_________________________
Pierre Andre Basson
Appellant Pro Se

22