FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648;
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE
RULES AND REGULATIONS. The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred
upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry
out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated
as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of
traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated
power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on
the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the
duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and
regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public.
In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state
in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To
this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may
be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government,
logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the
people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded
on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended
to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of
Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the
respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente
Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public
Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and
Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works
and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from
1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing
at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which
authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director
of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation
made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the
modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be
limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public
Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal
Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during
the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening
of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations
thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-
mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which
the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the
regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than
in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of
cases, namely: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can
be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.)
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1)
may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions
of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to
give prominence to the necessity of the case." library
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval
of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of
buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national
roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the
Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications."
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director
of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules
and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands
but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in
said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily
to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which
the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations
on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the
duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was
said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because
it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power
to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of
affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The
proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own
action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are
many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be
known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and
determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694;
36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service
Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to
observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the
theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by
permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger
amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations
calculated to promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by
the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548
constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548
was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power
of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say
the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights
of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred
upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty
which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent
curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was
said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the
right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today
may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or
other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to
yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed
that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today
things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The
development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public
opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government
to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought
within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so
considered."
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of
social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity
of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied,
with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-48926 December 14, 1987

MANUEL SOSITO, petitioner,

vs.
AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
We gave due course to this petition and required the parties to file
simultaneous memoranda on the sole question of whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to separation pay under the retrenchment program of the private
respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Manuel Sosito was employed in 1964 by the private respondent, a
logging company, and was in charge of logging importation, with a monthly salary
of P675.00, 1 when he went on indefinite leave with the consent of the company on
January 16, 1976. 2 On July 20, 1976, the private respondent, through its president,
announced a retrenchment program and offered separation pay to employees in the
active service as of June 30, 1976, who would tender their resignations not later
than July 31, 1976. The petitioner decided to accept this offer and so submitted his
resignation on July 29, 1976, "to avail himself of the gratuity benefits" promised. 3
However, his resignation was not acted upon and he was never given the separation
pay he expected. The petitioner complained to the Department of Labor, where he
was sustained by the labor arbiter. 4 The company was ordered to pay Sosito the
sum of P 4,387.50, representing his salary for six and a half months. On appeal to
the National Labor Relations Commission, this decision was reversed and it was held
that the petitioner was not covered by the retrenchment program. 5 The petitioner
then came to us.
For a better understanding of this case, the memorandum of the private
respondent on its retrenchment program is reproduced in full as follows:
July 20, 1976
Memorandum To: ALL EMPLOYEES
Re: RETRENCHMENT PROGRAM
As you are all aware, the operations of wood-based industries in the
Philippines for the last two (2) years were adversely affected by the worldwide
decline in the demand for and prices of logs and wood products. Our company was
no exception to this general decline in the market, and has suffered tremendous
losses. In 1975 alone, such losses amounted to nearly P20,000,000.00.

The company has made a general review of its operations and has come to
the unhappy decision of the need to make adjustments in its manpower strength if
it is to survive. This is indeed an unfortunate and painful decision to make, but it
leaves the company no alternative but to reduce its tremendous and excessive
overhead expense in order to prevent an ultimate closure.
 Although the law allows the Company, in a situation such as this, to
drastically reduce it manpower strength without any obligation to pay separation
benefits, we recognize the need to provide our employees some financial assistance
while they are looking for other jobs.
The Company therefore is adopting a retrenchment program whereby
employees who are in the active service as of June 30, 1976 will be paid separation
benefits in an amount equivalent to the employee's one-half (1/2) month's basic
salary multiplied by his/her years of service with the Company. Employees
interested in availing of the separation benefits offered by the Company must
manifest such intention by submitting written letters of resignation to the
Management not later than July 31, 1976. Those whose resignations are accepted
shall be informed accordingly and shall be paid their separation benefits.
After July 31, 1976, this offer of payment of separation benefits will no longer
be available. Thereafter, the Company shall apply for a clearance to terminate the
services of such number of employees as may be necessary in order to reduce the
manpower strength to such desired level as to prevent further losses.
(SGD.) JOSE G. RICAFORT
President
N.B.
For additional information and/or resignation forms, please see Mr. Vic Maceda or
Atty. Ben Aritao.

It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay was
extended only to those who were in the active service of the company as of June 30,
1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner was not eligible for the promised gratuity
as he was not actually working with the company as of the said date. Being on
indefinite leave, he was not in the active service of the private respondent although,
if one were to be technical, he was still in its employ. Even so, during the period of
indefinite leave, he was not entitled to receive any salary or to enjoy any other
benefits available to those in the active service.
It seems to us that the petitioner wants to enjoy the best of two worlds at the
expense of the private respondent. He has insulated himself from the insecurities of
the floundering firm but at the same time would demand the benefits it offers.
Being on indefinite leave from the company, he could seek and try other
employment and remain there if he should find it acceptable; but if not, he could go
back to his former work and argue that he still had the right to return as he was only
on leave.
There is no claim that the petitioner was temporarily laid off or forced to go
on leave; on the contrary, the record shows that he voluntarily sought the indefinite
leave which the private respondent granted. It is strange that the company should
agree to such an open-ended arrangement, which is obviously one-sided. The
company would not be free to replace the petitioner but the petitioner would have a
right to resume his work as and when he saw fit.
We note that under the law then in force the private respondent could have
validly reduced its work force because of its financial reverses without the obligation
to grant separation pay. This was permitted under the original Article 272(a), of the
Labor Code, 7 which was in force at the time. To its credit, however, the company
voluntarily offered gratuities to those who would agree to be phased out pursuant to
the terms and conditions of its retrenchment program, in recognition of their loyalty
and to tide them over their own financial difficulties. The Court feels that such
compassionate measure deserves commendation and support but at the same time
rules that it should be available only to those who are qualified therefore. We hold
that the petitioner is not one of them.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the
protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute
will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights
which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair
play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, this Court has inclined
more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the
employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in
every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts
and the applicable law and doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the challenged decision
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 77365 April 7, 1992

RITA CALEON, petitioner,
vs.
AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the January
28, 1987 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10990 entitled "Rita
Caleon V. Hon. Samilo Barlongay, et al." dismissing the petition for review of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, which affirmed the decision
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch XII, ejecting the petitioner.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent Agus Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of
land denominated as Lot 39, Block 28, situated at 1611-1619 Lealtad, Sampaloc,
Manila, which it leased to petitioner Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00.
Petitioner constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building.
Without the consent of the private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two
of the four doors of the apartment to Rolando Guevarra and Felicisima Estrada for a
monthly rental of P350.00 each. Upon learning of the sub-lease, private respondent
through counsel demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased premises
(Rollo, Annex "A", p. 20).
For failure of petitioner to comply with the demand, private respondent filed a
complaint for ejectment (Civil Case No. 048908) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XII against the petitioner citing as ground therefor the provisions of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Section 5, which is the unauthorized sub-leasing of part of
the leased premises to third persons without securing the consent of the lessor
within the required sixty (60)-day period from the promulgation of the new law (B.P.
25). (Rollo, Petition, p. 8).
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision ordering petitioner and all
persons claiming possession under her (a) to vacate the premises alluded to in the
complaint; (b) to remove whatever improvement she introduced on the property; (c)
to pay private respondent the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (d) to
pay the costs (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 19).
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court and on November
24, 1980, presiding judge of the RTC, the Hon. Samilo Barlongay, affirmed in toto
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 19).
The decision of the Regional Trial Court was appealed to the Court of Appeals
for review. The respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision dated January 28,
1987, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition not being prima facie meritorious, the same is
outright dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 21)
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
The principal issue in this case is whether or not the lease of an apartment
includes a sublease of the lot on which it is constructed, as would constitute a
ground for ejectment under Batas Pambansa BLg. 25.
Petitioner is of the view that Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is not applicable
because what she leased was her own apartment house which does not include a
sublease of the lot she leased from private respondent on which the apartment is
constructed.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
This issue has already been laid to rest in the case of Duellome v. Gotico (7
SCRA 841 [1963]) where this Court ruled that the lease of a building naturally
includes the lease of the lot, and the rentals of the building includes those of the lot.
Thus:
. . . the lease of a building would naturally include the lease of the lot and
that the rentals of the building include the rentals of the lot.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, under our Civil Code, the occupancy of a building or house not
only suggests but implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which
they are constructed. This is not a new pronouncement. An extensive elaboration of
this rule was discussed by this Court in the case of Baquiran, et al., v. Baquiran, et
al., 53 O.G. p. 1130.
. . . the Court of Appeals should have found the herein appellees lessees of the
house, and for all legal purposes, of the lot on which it was built as well.
But petitioner insists that the ruling in the aforecited case is not applicable to
the case at bar because the former is a damage suit while the latter is an ejectment
case.
 Be that as it may, this Court has categorically answered in the affirmative,
the principal question, common to both cases and on which rests the resolution of
the issues involved therein. Under the above ruling it is beyond dispute that
petitioner in leasing her apartment has also subleased the lot on which it is
constructed which lot belongs to private respondent. Consequently, she has violated
the provisions of Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 which is a ground for
Ejectment.
Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 enumerates the grounds for judicial
ejectment, among which is the subleasing of residential units without the written
consent of the owner/lessor, to wit:
Sec. 5 Grounds for judicial ejectment. Ejectment shall be allowed on the
following grounds:
a) Subleasing or assignment of lease of residential units in whole or in
part, with the written consent of the owner/lessor: Provided that in the case of
subleases or assignments executed prior to the approval of this Act, the
sublessor/assignor shall have sixty days from the effectivity of this Act within which
to obtain the written approval of the owner/lessor or terminate the sublease or
assignment.
Section 2(b) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 defines the term residential unit as follows:
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms Unless otherwise indicated wherever in this Act,
the following shall have the following meaning:
xxx xxx xxx
b. A residential unit refers to an apartment, house and/or land on which
another's dwelling is located used for residential purposes and shall include not only
buildings, parts or units thereof used solely as dwelling places, except motels, motel
rooms, hotels, hotel rooms, boarding houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces for
rent, but also those used for home industries, retail stores, or other business
purposes if the owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it
principally for dwelling purposes: . . .
Petitioner argued further that Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 cannot be applied in
this case because there is a perfected contract of lease without any express
prohibition on subleasing which had been in effect between petitioner and private
respondent long before the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. Therefore, the
application of said law to the case at bar is unconstitutional as an impairment of the
obligation of contracts.
It is well settled that all presumptions are indulged in favor of
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove
its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,
59 SCRA 54 [1974]). In fact, this Court does not decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases
and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota presented (Tropical Homes, Inc. v. National Housing
Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987]).
In any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of
police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general
welfare (Kabiling, et al. v. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987]). In
spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to
safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding
said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect (Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al., supra). In fact, every contract affecting public
interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the
police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated
at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for
the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate
against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount
police power (Villanueva v. Castaeda, 154 SCRA 142 [1987]).
Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, "An Act Regulating Rentals of Dwelling Units or of
Land On Which Another's Dwelling is Located and For Other Purposes" shows that
the subject matter of the law is the regulation of rentals and is intended only for
dwelling units with specified monthly rentals constructed before the law became
effective (Baens v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 634 [1983]).
Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared
by this Court as a police power legislation, applicable to leases entered into prior to
July 14, 1971 (effectivity date of RA 6539), so that the applicability thereof to
existing contracts cannot be denied (Gutierrez v. Cantada, 90 SCRA 1 [1979]).
Finally, petitioner invokes, among others, the promotion of social justice
policy of the New Constitution. Like P.D. No. 20, the objective of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 25 is to remedy the plight of lessees, but such objective is not subject to
exploitation by the lessees for whose benefit the law was enacted. Thus, the
prohibition provided for in the law against the sublease of the premises without the
consent of the owner. As enunciated by this Court, it must be remembered that
social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who
under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice
consecrated in our Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person
and give them to another who is not entitled thereto (Salonga v. Farrales, 105 SCRA
360 [1981]).
WHEREFORE, the Petition is Denied for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 120132 December 4, 1995

CRISANTA GALAY, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA WONG, represented by her Administrator, ATTY.
REYNALDO B. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
In an effort to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the
communities in urban areas, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7279
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, envisioned
to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of squatting in the metropolis.
Nevertheless, the courts continue to be swamped with cases arising from disputes
in the proper implementation of the aforementioned legislation, particularly on
matters involving the eviction, demolition and resettlement of squatters. The
present suit is among such cases.
The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals dated September 20, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33761
entitled Crisanta Galay, et al. vs. Judge Mariano I. Bacalla and Virginia Wong,
represented by her Administrator, Atty. Reynaldo B. Hernandez. Petitioners claim
that the assailed decision was based on an unauthorized compromise agreement to
which they never consented nor had any knowledge thereof.
Material hereto are the following antecedents:
Private respondent Virginia Wong, as represented by her Administrator and
Attorney-in fact, Reynaldo B. Hernandez filed an ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 38-
5830) against herein petitioners, who were alleged to have been illegally occupying
private respondents 405 square meter lot located in Quezon City which is covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51589 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
Although petitioners do not claim ownership over the subject premises, they
however disputed private respondents claim of ownership and alleged that they
have been in possession of the property in question since 1972 by virtue of the
tolerance and permission of the alleged real owner, Dr. Alejo Lopez.
On August 3, 1992, judgment was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 38, ordering the ejectment of the petitioners from the disputed
premises. 1
Upon appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court was affirmed in toto.
Still not satisfied, petitioners proceeded to the Court of Appeals and filed a
petition for review, but the petition was dismissed outright for failure to state the
material dates to show that the petition was filed on time and for not being
accompanied by certified true copies of the disputed decision.
No further appeal was interposed by petitioner, hence, the judgment became
final. This prompted private respondent to file a Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ
of Execution which was granted by the Metropolitan Trial Court in its order dated
March 25, 1994, taking into account that the judgment has already become final
and executory.
In an attempt to prevent the execution of the judgment and their consequent
eviction, petitioners filed a complaint for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch
216, alleging that herein private respondent must first comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 28(c) of R.A. 7279 regarding eviction and demolition by
court order.
In its order dated April 5, 1994, the lower court denied the prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order as the act sought to be enjoined was pursuant to a
lawful order of the court.
 Thereafter, petitioners again sought recourse from the Court of Appeals via
Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order,
claiming that the latter order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion for being
arbitrary, unjust and oppressive, and reiterating that they cannot be evicted unless
there is compliance with Section 28(c) of R.A. 7279.
On April 28, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals gave due course to the
petition and granted petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction, enjoining the
ejection of petitioners until further orders from the court.
On July 18, 1994, counsel for private respondent filed a Motion To Lift And/Or
Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, contending among others that the Urban Poor
Affairs Office [Peoples Bureau] has already been notified, as mandated by RA 7279,
and that more than 45 days had already lapsed since the notice was made in April,
1994. Thus, private respondent has substantially complied with the requirements of
RA 7279 and therefore the enforcement of the final judgment and ejectment of
petitioners is in order. Objecting to private respondents motion, petitioners argued
that RA 7279 requires not only the 45-day notice, but also the relocation of
petitioners and the grant of financial assistance to them prior to their relocation.
Furthermore, petitioners maintain that there is no extreme urgency for petitioners
eviction on account of private respondents affluence.
The case was subsequently set for hearing and oral argument, after which,
respondent court rendered the assailed decision on September 20, 1994 ordering as
follows:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to RA 7279, the Peoples Bureau is hereby ordered to
relocate the herein petitioners from subject lot of private respondent not later than
October 30, 1994. Should the relocation of petitioners be not finished on or before
October 30, 1994, the Peoples Bureau shall pay petitioners a daily allowance of
P145.00 for every day of delay of relocation but in no case shall such allowance last
for more than sixty (60) days.

Petitioners are hereby ordered to vacate the premises in question not later
than October 30, 1994, on which date the private respondent shall have the right to
take over possession thereof and, if necessary, to ask for a writ of execution for the
implementation of this disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On October 25, 1994, a new counsel entered his appearance for petitioners
and filed a motion to set aside the aforequoted decision. 12 As initially mentioned,
petitioners assert that the assailed decision was rendered based on a compromise
agreement to which they never gave their consent nor authorized their former
counsel to enter into, and for which reason said former counsel has withdrawn his
appearance as counsel of record.
 Petitioners contend that the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals was
indeed based on a compromise agreement which is evident from the following
portions of the decision:
xxx xxx xxx
When the case was called for hearing on September 14, 1994, as scheduled,
both parties were represented. Atty. Rogelio Directo stood up for the Peoples
Bureau (Urban Poor Affairs Office). And the parties, including the said representative
of the Peoples Bureau, agreed that petitioners herein are all qualified to avail of the
protection and benefits under RA 7279 and through counsel, manifested their
willingness and readiness to be relocated in accordance with said law. It was
likewise agreed by all concerned that should petitioners be not relocated within the
period of 45 days, from September 15 to October 30, 1994, the Peoples Bureau
shall pay them an allowance of P145.00, equivalent to the minimum wage, per day
of delay of relocation, until their actual transfer to the relocation site to be
designated for them. It is understood, however, that the daily allowance for
petitioners shall be for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, starting October 31,
1994. In other words, should the delay of relocation of petitioners be for more than
sixty (60) days, they shall only be entitled to the daily allowance of P145.00 per day
of delay of relocation for not more than sixty (60) days.
It was likewise agreed that on October 31, 1994, whether petitioners shall
have been relocated or not, the private respondent shall then be entitled to the
execution and implementation of this judgment, and to cause the ejectment of
petitioners from subject property litigated upon. (Emphasis supplied).
In its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, respondent Court of Appeals denied
petitioners Motion to Set Aside Decision14 and reiterated that the assailed decision
dated September 20, 1994 was a decision based on the merits and not upon a
compromise agreement.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners adamantly argue that the decision of respondent court dated
September 20, 1994 was based on an unauthorized compromise agreement, sans
their knowledge, consent and authority. Additionally, petitioners interpose the
following issues: 1) whether there can be eviction and demolition without actual
relocation; 2) can the petitioners be considered as homeless and underprivileged?;
and 3) whose duty is it to relocate them?
A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that is expressly acknowledged
as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code. It is defined in Article 2208 of the Code
as a contract whereby the parties by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. 15 Thus, a judgment upon a
compromise is a judgment embodying a compromise agreement entered into by the
parties in which they make reciprocal concessions in order to terminate a litigation
already instituted. 16
 In the present suit, the assailed decision, far from being a judgment based on
a compromise agreement, is undoubtedly a decision rendered entirely on the
merits. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the dispositive portion of the decision is
very explicit in exclusively adverting to RA 7279 as the basis for the judgment.
Nowhere did it appear nor can it be inferred therefrom that respondent courts
disposition took into account any agreement or concessions made by the parties
that is indicative of a judgment on a compromise. A scrutiny of the assailed portions
of the decision allegedly embodying the compromise agreement revealed that the
same are nothing but admissions made by the parties intended to clarify the
applicable provisions of RA 7279. In fact the said admissions are expressly laid out
in Section 28(c) (8) of RA 7279 and thus could not have been the subject of any
compromise agreement as the same are already provided in the law.
Further negating petitioners contention are the following ratiocinations made
by respondent court in denying the Motion to Set Aside Decision, with which we are
in complete accord:
After a careful study, We find movants stance barren of merit. Our Decision
promulgated on September 20, 1994 in this case was not rendered as a Judgment
by Compromise. It resolved the petition on the merits, after the lawyers of the
parties and the representative of the Urban Poor Affairs Office agreed on the
applicability of Rep. Act No. 7279 to petitioners situation. As a result of such
development of the case, Our judgment granted petitioners more than what they
have came here for. All they prayed for was to hold in abeyance execution of subject
final and executory Decision of the Quezon Metropolitan Trial Court, ordering their
ejectment; until after the expiration of forty-five (45) days from date of notice of
their ejectment to the Urban Poor Affairs Office. But the judgment in question has
recognized not only petitioners right not to be ejected sans the 45-day notice to the
Urban Poor Affairs Office, but also the right to a daily allowance of P145.00 for each
day of delay or relocation, for a period of not more than sixty (60) days, should
there be a delay in their relocation, as mandated by law.
Finally, in a desperate move to prolong the execution of the decision ordering
their eviction, petitioners invoke the principle of social justice and plead that as
underprivileged and homeless citizen, their eviction and demolition of their homes
cannot be effected unless there is adequate relocation. Moreover, petitioners
maintain that private respondent is also duty bound to share in the task of
relocating them.
The contentions are without merit. It is beyond dispute that the ejectment
suit against petitioners has already been resolved with finality way back on
February 16, 1994 when the petitioners appeal was dismissed outright by the Court
of Appeals and they did not interpose any further appeal therefrom. The subsequent
proceedings merely sought to enforce the decision ordering their ejectment from
the disputed premises, which petitioners however, repeatedly tried to thwart by
invoking non-compliance with Section 28(c) of RA 7279. Thus, upon compliance by
private respondent with the requirements of the aforesaid law, particularly on the
notice to the Peoples Bureau (Urban Poor Affairs Office) and the expiration of 45
days from said notice, petitioners right to remain in the subject lot ceased.
Resultingly, petitioners eviction must now proceed in accordance with Section 28(c)
(8), to wit:
. . . Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a
court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be
undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing
Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45)
days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the
said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be
possible within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the
prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to
the affected families by the local government unit concerned.
Anent petitioners claim that private respondent must also share the
responsibility of relocating petitioners, the same is also without any basis. The
aforecited provision is very explicit that the task of relocating the homeless and the
underprivileged shall be the responsibility of the local government unit concerned
and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of the other government
agencies. Although private individuals are not prohibited from taking part in the
relocation, there is nothing in the law either that compels them to undertake such
task on a mandatory basis, otherwise, such obligation should have been included in
the provision, either expressly or impliedly. Thus, petitioners attempt to further
burden private respondent with their relocation is unwarranted.
Equally unpersuasive is petitioners plea for social justice. In previous cases,
this Court has emphasized that never is it justified to prefer the poor simply
because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice
must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the
law. 18 In the same vein, it has been held that the policy of social justice is not
intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone
the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but
only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.
Further militating against petitioners appeal for compassion is the fact that
only recently, President Ramos himself, in the exercise of his veto power, vetoed a
congress-approved measure 20 intended to extend the moratorium on the
demolition of squatter colonies throughout the country. The Presidents action was
intended to curtail the negative influences to general growth and development in
urban areas brought about by the problem of squatting and to prevent the
legitimate landowners from being unduly deprived of the immediate use of their
properties.
In closing, we find it fitting to advert to the following pronouncements made
in the case of Martires vs. Court of Appeals:
While we sympathize with the millions of our people who are unable to afford
the basic necessity of shelter, let alone the comforts of a decent home, this
sympathy cannot extend to squatting, which is a criminal offense. Social justice
cannot condone the violation of law nor does it consider that very wrong to be a
justification for priority in the enjoyment of a right. This is what the petitioner wants
us to grant him. But we cannot heed his unjust plea because the rule of law rings
louder in our ears.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.