C.

POWER OF TAXATION

PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS

In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road
terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the
law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use
for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The
said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same
Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta
misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his
property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA
would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public
Works andCommunications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose.
Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to
the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private
purpose. The subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the
property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was
passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. In
accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes
only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for
the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

PUNSALAN VS MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA

FACTS
-This case is filed in the CFI of Manila by 2 lawyers, medical practitioner, CPA,
dental surgeon andpharmacist.-They filed this in their and other professional's
behalf.-The object of the suit is their aim to nullify Ordinance No. 3398 of City
of Manila, the charterauthorizing it and the refund of the taxes they paid unr protest.-
Ordinance No. 3398 was approved by the municipal board of the City of Manila on
July 25, 1950. Itimposes municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various
professions in the city and penalizes itsnon payment Note:penalty is fine and/or
imprisonment of not more than 6 mo)-Tax amount should not exceed P50/annum.-
After the said professionals paid their occupation tax under Section 201 of the
National InternalRevenue Code, they paid the tax in the said ordinance under
protest.-Lower court upheld the validity of law authorizing it but nullify the ordinance
because penalty in thesaid ordinance has no legal basis.
Issue
Whether or not the ruling of lower court is correct.
Held
-Yes, the lower court erred in saying that the imposing ordinance must be nullified
because penalty insaid ordinance has no legal basis.-Manila Charter Sec 18
provides that penalties for violation of ordinances shall not exceed P2000.00 fineor 6
mo. imprisonment or both for one single offense.-As to the professionals' claim that
the ordinance is unjust and oppressive because it createsdiscrimination within a
class in the sense that the professionals with Manila offices pay more taxes, SCruled
that:1. Since Manila is the seat of the National Government and with a population
and voluminous amount oftrade compared to other Philippine city or municipality, it
can be assumed that it offers a more lucrativefield for professionals. Therefore, it is
only fair that professionals in Manila shall pay higher occupationtax.2. The contention
of the professionals that professionals with Manila offices have to pay
tax butoutsiders who have no office in the city but practice their profession are
subject to tax is not found inthe Ordinance.3. Finally, this case cannot be tantamount
to double taxation since the first tax was imposed by the Statewhile the second tax
was imposed by a city.
Ruling
Judgment is reversed. Ordinance No. 3398 is valid. Costs against the professionals
who were theplaintiffs-appellants in this case.

LLADOC VS COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the
parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of
a new Catholic Church in the locality,m as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the
donors gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an assessment for donees
gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and
requested the withdrawal thereof.

Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.

Held: The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean
exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes
assessed on such properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from excise
taxes. A donees gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the
transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership,
but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege
of receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for
religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.

The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS AQUINO

FACTS:
Abra Valley College, an educational corporation and institution of higher
learning duly incorporated with the SEC filed a complaint to annul and
declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building
located t Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and
penalties. Paterno Millare filed through counsel a motion to dismiss the
complaint. The provincial fiscal filed a memorandum for the government wherein
they opined hat based ont he evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions
and jurisprudence, the school
building and the school lot used for educational purposes of the
A b r a Va l l e y C o l l e g e a r e e x e m p t e d f r o m p a y m e n t
o f t a x e s . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t d isagreed because of the use of the
second floor by the Director of the said school o r r e s i d e n t i a l p u r p o s e . H e
t h u s r u l e d f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d r e n d e r e d t h e assailed decision.

ISSUE:W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e l o t a n d b u i l d i n g i n q u e s t i o n a r e u s e d
e x c l u s i v e l y f o r educational purposes?

HELD:NO. It must be stressed that while the court allows a more liberal and non-
restrictive interpretation of the phrase exclusively used f
o r e d u c a t i o n a l purposes as provided for in the Article VI, Section 22,
Paragraph 3 of the
1935P h i l i p p i n e C o n s t i t u t i o n , r e a s o n a b l e e m p h a s i s h a s a l w a
y s b e e n m a d e t h a t exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purpose. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial
purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the
use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for
residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification
under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main
or primary purpose educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the
Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imag
i n a t i o n b e considered incidental to the purposes of education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly
a r r i v e d a t t h e conclusion that the school building as well as the lot
where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is
being used by the director and his family for residential purposes, but because the
first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only
a portion is used for purposes of c o m m e r c e , i t i s o n l y f a i r t h a t h a l f o f
t h e a s s e s s e d t a x b e r e t u r n t o t h e s c h o o l involved.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS INC VS FERTIPHIL CORP

Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated
under Philippinelaws, both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers,
pesticides and agriculturalchemicals.Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465,
imposing a capital recovery component of Php10.00 perbag of fertilizer. The levy was
to continue until adequate capital was raised to make PPI financiallyviable. Fertiphil
remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted
thedepository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986.After
the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy.
Fertiphildemanded from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused.
Fertiphil filed a complaintfor collection and damages, questioning the constitutionality
of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust,unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an
unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process.PPI argues that
Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because
itdoes not have a "personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct
injury as a result of its enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any
damage from the imposition because"incidence of the levy fell on the
ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the sellerfertilizer company.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of
LOI No. 1465.What is the power of taxation?

RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of
standing is a mereprocedural technicality which may be waived.The imposition of the
levy was an exercise of the taxation power of the state. While it is true that thepower
to tax can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy
was revenuegeneration. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least,
one of the real and substantialpurposes, then the exaction is properly called a
tax.Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These
powers are distinct andhave different tests for validity. Police power is the power of
the State to enact legislation that mayinterfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy
taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power isthe
regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful
subjects" and"lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted
under the police power. Thepower of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed
by inherent and constitutional limitations.

D. HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORG VS PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a

mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, PhilippineBlooming Mills Inc.,
called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned
demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of
the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedomof expression, freedom
of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the
normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if
they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while
the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts
should not absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed.
Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the
PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.

Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with
narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials
or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom
we shall be governed.

E. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

QUINTO VS COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive
officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their
government offices because at such time they are not yet treated by the law as
candidates. They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at
the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already considered
candidates.

In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of
R.A. 9369.

Issue:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

Held:

NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing
Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective
officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the
substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation
of the equal protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the
discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised
therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying
the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second
requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that
the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather
than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that
the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to
their campaign rather than to their office work.

BIRAOGO VS PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

DOCTRINE: WHEN A TRUTH COMMISSION IS CREATED TO INVESTIGATE

ANOMALIES OF A SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATION IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.

DIGEST:

FACTS:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 WAS ISSUED BY PRESIDENT NOYNOY AQUINO TO

INVESTIGATE REPORTED CASES OF GRAFT AND CORRUPTION OF THE
PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.

ISSUE:

IS THIS LEGAL?

RULING:

NO. IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. THE ARROYO

ADMINISTRATION IS BUT JUST A MEMBER OF A CLASS, THAT IS, A CLASS OF
PAST ADMINISTRATIONS. IT IS NOT A CLASS OF ITS OWN. NOT TO INCLUDE
PAST ADMINISTRATIONS SIMILARLY SITUATED CONSTITUTES
ARBITRARINESS WHICH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CANNOT
SANCTION.
The ruling of the Court:
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down
as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration[1] [87] only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has
been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically,
these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and
finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders
and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall
primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft
and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or
measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1,
involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and
thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and
the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation
clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration
and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit
the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration only. The reports of
widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for
distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also
blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and
do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it,
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.[2] [88]
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the
scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG
ventures to opine that to include other past administrations, at this point, may
unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.[3]
[89] The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and
noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds.[4]
[90]
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier
reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the
point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can
no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to
conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the bodys
limited time and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex non cogit
ad impossibilia).[5] [91]
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes
the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However,
the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The
PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other
past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be
arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted
language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[6] [92]
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is
limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is
restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not
in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law
of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights determined and all public authority administered.[7] [93] Laws that do
not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.[8]
[94] While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft
and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the
provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of
substantial distinctions would only confirm the petitioners lament that the subject
executive order is only an adventure in partisan hostility. In the case of US v.
Cyprian,[9] [95] it was written: A rather limited number of such classifications have
routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin,
gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or
membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment
rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality,
it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.[10] [96]
Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must
be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are
indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the
influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the
class.[11] [97]
The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a
law under the equal protection clause.[12] [98] Legislation is not unconstitutional
merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its
reach.[13] [99] It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal
protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to
be incomplete.[14] [100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not
considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can
be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by
step process.[15] [101] With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does
not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through
inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked.[16] [102]
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous
administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from
the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It
must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act,
event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the
past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional
discrimination.[17] [103]
To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG
clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft
and corruption committed during the previous administration.[18] [104] The OSG
points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of
the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined
in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended
accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion
to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft
and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that
they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will
still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to
include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of
the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution
of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration.[19] [105]
The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v.
Sandiganbayan,[20] [106] that the PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders
Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause. The decision,
however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was
arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of
action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is whether or not the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial
Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is
expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental
tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been
addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to
once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being
a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review
which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of
the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have
been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the
two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been
accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of
enlightenment, to wit: And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not
in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.[21]
[107]
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will
upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is
done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution.
And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then,
it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court
will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions,
all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is
important to remember this ethical principle: The end does not justify the means. No
matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to
be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional
parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.[22] [108] The Court cannot just turn a
blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its
enshrined principles.
The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this
law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase
its rectitude.[23] [109]
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly
envisioned by the present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive
issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the
test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches
of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth
and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must,
however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional
bounds for ours is still a government of laws and not of men.[24] [110]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

VILLEGAS VS HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO

Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968,

then Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The
said ordinanceprohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila
without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them
P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the
said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction
between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment
permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to
prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating
the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of
Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and
void.

ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537.

HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay
down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.
Hence an undue delegation of power.

Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because
it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens
who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution
does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based
on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every
employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether
he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he can
be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as
a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he
cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

DUMLAO VS COMELEC

Equal Protection Eligibility to Office after Being 65

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office
and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the
same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par
1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP
averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by
Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of
Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP
52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and
the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and
that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in
the eye of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.

HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would
never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have
separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be
eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the
exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate
case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide
the case. In this case, only the 3 rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the
provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that
the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is

neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class.
For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that
candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if
applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as
the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it
might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local
officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification

for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government
service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees,
aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65,
who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from
a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for
the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged
provision.

PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v. Drilon [GR L-81958,

30 June 1988]
En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 12 concur, 2 on leave
Facts: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement." It challenged the Constitutional validity of DOLEs Department
Order 1 (series of 1988), in the character of "Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers,"
in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure is assailed (1) for
"discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" (2) for being
violative of the right to travel, and (3) for being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI also
invoked Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution providing for worker participation
"in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may
be provided by law as Department Order No. 1, as contended, was passed in the
absence of prior consultations. It also claimed that it violated the Charter's non-
impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced. On 25 May
1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and Administrator of
the POEA, filed a Comment informing the Court that on 8 March 1988, the Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In
submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes
the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue: Whether Department Order 1 unduly discriminates against women.

Held: Department Order 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. Equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and
women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are
not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class. The classification made the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely
the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. There
is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances,
Filipino men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. Discrimination
in this case is justified. Further, the impugned guidelines are applicable to all female
domestic overseas workers, not all Filipina workers. Had the ban been given
universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary, due to the
fact that not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is
the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the
prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another
person or group of persons. Where the classification is based on such distinctions
that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority
groups, the better rule is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and
the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment.

HIMAGAN VS PEOPLE

Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged

for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins
younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into
suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the
PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1)
day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan
assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree,
that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service
Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.

HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of
the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years
and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension
cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same
Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second
deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge
of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as
succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to

his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are
obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere
fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the
suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the
suspension of accused be lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the
phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that
suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not
terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case
within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions
and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If
the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived
of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal
of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its
dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas
corpus.

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY VS TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY

In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City
Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum
(1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.
Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on
the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For
production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the
sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest
averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax
in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or
out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods
in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise,
shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out
Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in
the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of
the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which
effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their
turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is
discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the
city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable
to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same
class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

LCP VS COMELEC

Facts:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24
other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into
law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100
million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills
were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress,
the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution
No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all
the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On
December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga,
Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law
(Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's
signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of
their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also
lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will
share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section
285 of the Local Government Code.

Issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:

1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and
are thus unconstitutional.

2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending

cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending
bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the
income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not
affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income
than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the
classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is
not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-
viable municipalities from converting into cities.