FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 175784

PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
JAIME AYOCHOK y TAULI,
Accused-Appellant. August 25, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before Us is an appeal filed by Jaime Ayochok y Tauli (Ayochok) assailing the

Decision[1] dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00949,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Jaime Ayochok y Tauli, which affirmed with modifications
the Decision dated August 13, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch
6, in Criminal Case No. 18658-R.[2] The RTC found Ayochok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder.

In an Amended Information[3] dated September 21, 2001, Prosecutor Benedicto T.

Carantes charged Ayochok with Murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15 th day of July, 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then armed with a gun, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and by
means of treachery and with cruelty by deliberately and inhumanly outraging at the
victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot SPO1 CLAUDIO CALIGTAN y NGODO in the following manner, to wit: that
 while the victim was relieving himself with his back turned to the accused, the latter
coming from the blind side of the victim, shoot him several times hitting him on the
different parts of his body and there was no opportunity or means to defend himself
from the treacherous act of the assailant, thereby inflicting upon the latter:
hypovolemic shock due to massive hemorrhage; multiple gunshot wounds on the
head, neck, and upper extremities which directly caused his death.

When arraigned, Ayochok pleaded not guilty.

After trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 18658-R, the RTC rendered a Decision on
August 13, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Ayochok guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended, qualified by treachery as charged in the
Information and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased SPO1 Claudio Caligtan the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for his
death; P200,000.00 as moral damages; P378,956.50 as actual damages in connection
with his death; P2,573,096.40 as unearned income, all indemnifications being without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The accused Jaime Ayochok being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited
4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance with
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.[4]

Ayochok was committed at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on October 31,
2003.

The case was directly elevated to us for automatic review and was docketed as G.R. No.
161469. However, pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo[5] which modified the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on direct appeals from the RTC to the
Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment G.R. No. 161469 was transferred to the Court of Appeals, [6] where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 00949.

In its Decision dated June 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the
RTC judgment, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Decision subject of this

review is hereby AFFIRMED, save for several modifications in the civil aspect.
Accordingly, the civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00; moral damages reduced
 to P50,000.00; actual damages reduced to P144,375.75 and unearned income reduced
to P2,571,696.10.[7]

Initially, Ayochok filed a Motion for Reconsideration [8] of the foregoing Decision of the
Court of Appeals. Subsequently, however, Ayochok filed a Motion to Withdraw Motion for
Reconsideration with Notice of Appeal[9] since he believed there was no chance that the
appellate court would reverse itself, and prayed that the case already be forwarded to us
instead. In a Resolution dated June 14, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied Ayochoks Motion to
Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration with Notice of Appeal. In another Resolution dated
August 11, 2006, the appellate court denied Ayochoks Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated June 28, 2005.

Ayochok, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals conveying
his intention to appeal to us the Decision dated June 28, 2005 of said court. On December 29,
2006, the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals elevated to us the original records
of CA-G.R. CR No. 00949,[10] and Ayochoks appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 175784.

On February 12, 2007, we required the parties in G.R. No. 175784 to file their
supplemental briefs. [11]
Ayochok filed his Supplemental Appellants Brief[12] on May 31, 2007, while the Office of
the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation[13] on March 29, 2007, stating that it would no longer
file a supplemental brief given that its Appellees Brief, originally filed in G.R. No. 161469, is
adequate to ventilate the Peoples cause. On August 6, 2007, we submitted G.R. No. 175784 for
resolution.[14]

However, in a letter dated February 16, 2010, Julio A. Arciaga, the Assistant Director for
Prisons and Security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed us that Ayochok had died on
January 15, 2010 at the Philippine General Hospital, Manila. A copy of the death report signed
by a medical officer of the New Bilibid Prison Hospital was attached to said letter.

In a Resolution dated April 28, 2010, we noted the letter and required the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections to submit a certified true copy of Ayochoks death certificate from the
local civil registrar within five days from notice of the said resolution.

On June 22, 2010, Melind M. Alipe, Head of the Medical and Dental Division of the New
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, submitted a certified true copy of the death certificate of
Ayochok.
 Given Ayochoks death, we are now faced with the question of the effect of such death on
the present appeal.

Ayochoks death on January 15, 2010, during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not
only his criminal liability for the crime of murder committed against Senior Police Officer 1
Claudio N. Caligtan, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.

Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the following guidelines in People v.
Bayotas[15]:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the)
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

xxxx

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
 Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription.[16]

Clearly, in view of a supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on

Ayochoks appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged has become irrelevant
since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even
assuming Ayochok had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by his
death. Moreover, because Ayochoks appeal was still pending and no final judgment of
conviction had been rendered against him when he died, his civil liability arising from the
crime, being civil liability ex delicto, was likewise extinguished by his death.

Consequently, the appealed Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00949 finding Ayochok guilty of Murder, sentencing him to imprisonment, and
ordering him to indemnify his victim had become ineffectual.[17]

WHEREFORE, in view of the death of accused-appellant Jaime Ayochok y Tauli, the

Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00949 is SET
ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 18658-R before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22465 February 28, 1967

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ASCENSION P. OLARTE, defendant-appellee.
Saturnino D. Bautista for plaintiff-appellant Meris.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Ceferino S. Gaddi for plaintiff-appellant People of the
Philippines.
Chuidian Law Offices, P. V. Sison, D. Acuna, J. Asuncion, E. G. Bruno and Silverio B. de Leon for defendant-
appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is the second time the present case is brought on appeal to this Supreme Court on the identical issue of
prescription.

The antecedents of this case are briefly stated in the decision of the previous appeal (L-13027):

Defendant 'Ascension P. Olarte is charged with libel. It is alleged in the information that on or about the 24th
day of February, 1954 and subsequently thereafter said defendant had willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
written certain letters which were libelous, contemptuous and derogatory to Miss Visitacion M. Meris, 'with
evident and malicious purpose of insulting, dishonoring, humiliating and bringing into contempt the good
name and reputation' of said complainant.

It appears that on January 7, 1956, Miss Meris lodged the corresponding charge of libel with the provincial
fiscal of Pangasinan, who assigned it to an assistant provincial fiscal; that upon the latter's advice, on
February 22, 1956, she filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, a complaint for
libel against Ascencion P. Olarte that the defendant waived her right to a preliminary investigation,
whereupon the justice of the peace court forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, in
which the corresponding information was filed on July 3, 1956; that the defendant seasonably moved to
quash the information upon the ground of prescription of the offense; and that, after due hearing, the court of
first instance granted said motion and dismissed the case, with costs de oficio. Hence, this appeal by
complainant Miss Meris with the conformity of the special counsel of the office of the provincial fiscal of
Pangasinan, who represented the prosecution in said court.

This Court, likewise, stated in said previous appeal:

It is conceded that, as provided in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, 'the crime of libel ... shall prescribe
in two (2) years, which, pursuant to Article 91 of the same Code, 'shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted
by the filing of the complaint or information ....' In an affidavit, attached to the complaint filed with the justice
of the peace court, Miss Meris stated that one defamatory letter was received by her on February 27, 1954
and that there were other libelous letters, seemingly written after the first. According to another affidavit,
likewise, attached to said complaint, the subsequent letters were received on or about March 1 and 13, April
26 and May 9, 1954. The issue in the lower court, as well as in this appeal, is whether the statute of
limitations was suspended by the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court on February 22,
1956, as claimed by appellant, or continued to run until July 3, 1956, when the information was filed with the
court of first instance, as contended by the defendant. His Honor, the trial Judge adopted the latter
alternative, and, accordingly, held that the prescriptive period had expired before the filing of said
information. (Emphasis supplied)

Resolving the issue thus posed on the basis of the abovequoted facts, this Court, speaking through the then
Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, and after an extensive and exhaustive dissertation on
the applicable laws and pertinent decisions on the subject, rendered a decision, promulgated on June 30, 1960, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is our considered opinion that the filing of the complainant with the justice
of the peace court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, interrupted the running of the statute of limitations, as regards
the crime of libel with which defendant herein is charged, and that said crime has not been extinguished,
 therefore, by prescription, for which reason the order appealed from is reversed, and the records of this case
are hereby remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, conformably with law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The above ruling became final and executory, and, pursuant thereto, the lower court set the case for hearing on the
merits and the prosecution started presenting its evidence. However, on August 26, 1963, the defense presented
anew a motion to quash the information, supplemented by another motion of September 5, 1963, on the ground of
prescription of the offense charged in the information. In said motions, the defense invoked the subsequent ruling of
this Court in the case of People vs. Coquia, G.R. No. L-15456, promulgated on June 29, 1963. On November 4,
1963, the prosecution opposed said motions. The defense submitted its reply on November 13, 1963.

After due hearing on this incident, the lower court issued the appealed order, dated January 16, 1964, sustaining the
defense's new motion to quash upon the ground of prescription. In this order, the lower court, after comparing and
finding that the set of facts obtaining in the case at bar is practically identical with those of the Coquia case, opined
that inasmuch as the latter is inconsistent with or contradicts the previous decision
(L-13027) in the case at bar, promulgated on June 30, 1960, the 1963 ruling in the Coquia case indicates that this
Supreme Court intended to abandon the one made in 1960 in the first appeal of this same case (L-13027).

Not satisfied, the prosecution (special counsel of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan and the private
prosecutor jointly) interposed the present appeal to this Court on a pure question of law.

The complainant Miss Meris through her private prosecutor, filed her brief. Subsequently, the Solicitor General, in
representation of plaintiff-appellant People of the Philippines, instead of filing a brief, filed, on August 18, 1964, a
manifestation, stating to the effect that they are submitting the case without any brief, said complainant having filed
a brief in her behalf; and that they are of the opinion that the order of the lower court dismissing the case was well
taken. In view of this manifestation, defendant-appellee presented, on September 7, 1964, a motion to dismiss the
appeal.

This Court, by resolution dated October 2, 1964, denied said motion for the present.

Defendant-appellee moved to reconsider said denial but this Court, in its resolution of October 21, 1964, overruled
the defendant's motion. 1wph1.t

Thereafter, said defendant-appellee filed her brief and the case was submitted for decision.

The only issue presented for determination in this appeal is the effect of this Court's ruling on the first appeal to this
very same case (L-13027) and whether the decision in the later case of People vs. Coquia, G.R. No. L-15456, June
29, 1963, warrants the dismissal of the information in the case at bar on the ground of prescription.

Suffice it to say that our ruling in Case L-13027, rendered on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the case, and,
even if erroneous, it may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long ago. A subsequent
reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively
determined (People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, May 30, 1958; 55 O.G. 4228).

'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controling legal rule of decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court. (21 C.J.S. 330). (cited in Pinuila case, supra)

As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether
that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party being to seek a rehearing (5 C.J.S. 1277). (also cited
in Pinuila case)
It is also aptly held in another case that:

It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal
question properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that
particular case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their
power and authority to alter or modify. (Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-15548, October
30, 1962).

More categorical still is the pronouncement of this Court in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons, 1,14284-85, February
24, 1960:

It will be seen that the prisoner's stand assumes that doctrines and rulings of the Supreme Court operate
retrospectively, and that they can claim the benefit of decisions in People vs. Hernandez; People vs.
Geronimo, and People vs. Dugonon (L-6025-26, July 18, 1956; L-8936, Oct. 31, 1956; and L-8926, June 29,
1957, respectively), promulgated four or more years after the prisoner applicants had been convicted by final
judgment and started serving sentence. However, the rule adopted by this Court (and by the Federal
Supreme Court) is that judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases
previously decided (People vs. Pinuila, L-11374, promulgated May 30, 1958.)

In the foregoing decision, furthermore, this Court quoted and reiterated the rule in the following excerpts
from People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, jam cit.:

'The decision of this Court on that appeal by the government from the order of dismissal, holding that said
appeal did not place the appellants, including Absalon Bignay, in double jeopardy, signed and concurred in
by six justices as against three dissenters headed by the Chief Justice, promulgated way back in the year
1952, has long become the law of the case. It may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy as
recently interpreted by this same Tribunal. Even so, it may not be disturbed and modified. Our recent
interpretation of the law may be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively
determined. As already stated, the majority opinion in that appeal is now the law of the case.'

The same principle, the immutability of the law of the case notwithstanding subsequent changes of judicial opinion,
has been followed in civil cases:

Fernando vs. Crisostomo, 90 Phil. 585;

Padilla vs. Paterno, 93 Phil. 884;
Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. vs. Chua Guan, L-7252, February, 1955.

It is thus clear that posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court can not retroactively be applied to nullify a prior
final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or
criminal in nature.

Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines of decisions following
differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds
that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the
prescriptive term: People vs. Olarte L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106,
October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. Another series of decisions declares that to produce
interruption the complaint or information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case
on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has
reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if
it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the
case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in
declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for
action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it
is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint.

And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription " shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted", thereby indicating that the
court in which the complaint or information is filed must have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely, the
trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a
preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should
discharge the accused because no prima facie case has been shown.

Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the doctrine of the cases of People vs. Del
Rosario L-15140, December 29, 1960; and People vs. Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.

And it having been finally decided in the previous appeal that the criminal action here was not barred, the issue of
prescription is utterly foreclosed, and all that remains is to try and decide the case on the merits. It is expected that it
will be done with the utmost dispatch, this case having been already pending for many years.

Wherefore, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set aside and reversed, and the records of this case ordered
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings conformably with this decision. With costs against defendant-
appellee.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 102596. December 17, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NICASIO ENOJA @ Nick, JOSE

ENOJA @ Moros, ANTONIO GALUPAR @ Tony, RONNIE ENOJA @ Bud-oy,
and YOLLY ARMADA, accused-appellants.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision dated October 31, 1990, of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo
City, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 31550, convicting accused-appellants Nicasio Enoja @
Nick, Jose Enoja @ Moros, Antonio Galupar @ Tony, Ronnie Enoja @ Bud-oy, and Yolly Armada
of the crime of murder, and sentencing them as follows:

...Nicasio Enoja @ Nick, Jose Enoja @ Moros, and Antonio Galupar alias Tony, each to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; Yolly Armada to suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging
from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to eighteen (18) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and Ronnie Enoja alias Bud-oy to
suffer indeterminate prison sentence ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and all the said
accused, to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Siegfred Insular the sum of
P30,000.00 for his death and P19,200.00 as actual damages representing expenses, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency together with all the accessory penalties provided
for by law and to pay the costs.[1]

The five appellants, all farmers and residents of Barangay Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, are related
to each other. Jose Enoja @ Moros, Ronnie Enoja @ Bud-oy, and Yolly Armada, are the brother,
son and first cousin, respectively, of appellant Nicasio Enoja, while Antonio Galupar is a kumpadre.
Three other accused, Joel Enoja @ Mike, Melvin Castor, and Antonio Enoja, remain at-large.

The victim, Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of the New Peoples Army
(NPA). A day before the incident, the house of Romulo Enoja, brother of the Enojas, was allegedly
sprayed with bullets by the NPA, killing Romulos daughter and son. Before that, the house of
Catelina Enoja, mother of the Enojas, at Barangay Caraudan, was allegedly burned by the NPA.

The facts are not in dispute. In their consolidated brief, appellants adopted the factual findings
of the trial court, as follows:[2]

x x x [I]n the afternoon of July 2, 1987, at around 4:30 oclock, while Siegfred Insular and his wife,
Paterna, were on their way home from the market walking along the ricefield at Barangay
Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, they saw Yolly Armada with a long firearm in hand, walking on the other
side of the field towards the same direction where the couple were going.

Paterna did not at first recognize Yolly Armada as the man on the other side of the ricefield, and so,
she called the attention of her husband saying that the man was carrying a firearm. Recognizing the
man, however, Siegfred told his wife: never mind, he is Yolly Armada. The spouses Insular and
Yolly Armada continued walking until they met ways in front of the ricemill of Teodoro Salamanca
near the chapel.Siegfred greeted Armada by nodding his head to which Armada responded by also
nodding his head. Siegfred then said We will leave but as he and his wife were about to proceed on
their way, Armada blocked the couple and pointed his firearm to Siegfred with the barrel of the gun
touching the left side of the body of the latter. Suddenly, Armada fired his gun and as Siegfred
turned his back to run, Armada fired successive shots at him causing him to fall to the ground,
wounded.

Almost simultaneously, several armed men appeared and took turns in firing at Siegfred. Among
these armed men were Nicasio Enoja alias Nick, Jose Enoja alias Moros, Antonio Galupar alias
Tony, and Ronnie Enoja alias Bud-oy. The body of the victim jerked as the accused took turns in
shooting him.

After shooting Siegfred Insular, the accused turned to his wife, Paterna, and attempted to shoot her
but Paterna Insular hugged Teodoro Salamanca who was then and there present, thus prompting the
latter to shout to the accused: do not include the girl. The accused heeded the plea of Teodoro
Salamanca and refrained from shooting Paterna Insular.
Jose Enoja then turned to his brother Antonio Enoja and fired at the latter hitting him on the
thigh. Thereafter, Jose Enoja approached Siegfred Insular who was then lying on the ground and
placed the gun he used in shooting his brother, Antonio, near the hand of Siegfred Insular. Then
Jose Enoja placed some live bullets into the pocket of Siegfred Insular. Jose Enoja called for a
hammock and, in no time at all, there was a hammock brought to the place where Antonio Enoja
was loaded and, thereafter, brought to the hospital. The body of Siegfred Insular was, however, left
lying on the ground at the scene of the incident.

Nicasio Enoja announced that they would bring Paterna Insular and Teodoro Salamanca to the
ricefield where they would be made to spend the night but Paterna pleaded to Nicasio Enoja to just
bring them to the house of Patria Alcantara about five meters away from the scene of the
incident. The accused granted the request of Paterna and brought her and Teodoro Salamanca to the
house of Patria Alcantara where they were told to stay with the warning not to get out or they
would be shot. It was only the following morning, after policemen and PC soldiers had arrived that
Paterna and Salamanca were able to go out of the house of Alcantara.

The shooting incident reached the police station of Janiuay, Iloilo upon the report of one Alfredo
Galupar, and so, a joint PC-INP team under P.C. Lt. Pangina and police station commander, Sgt.
Reynaldo Sorogon went to Barangay Caraudan and conducted investigation of the incident. That
was already around 8:00 oclock in the morning of July 3, 1987. The policemen were able to
recovery several empty shells of different caliber of firearms from the crime scene. One short
homemade firearm caliber .30, with one empty shell inside the chamber was likewise found and
recovered from the ground near the left arm of the victim.

On March 11, 1988, Provincial Fiscal Vicente E. Aragona filed an Information [3] for murder against
appellants and their three companions who were still at-large. The Information alleged:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses NICASIO ENOJA alias Nick, JOSE ENOJA alias
Moros, ANTONIO GALUPAR alias Tony, RONNIE ENOJA alias Bud-oy and YOLLY ARMADA
of the crime of Murder committed as follows:

That on or about July 2, 1987, in the Municipality of Janiuay, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another with JOEL ENOJA alias Mike, MELVIN
CASTOR and ANTONIO ENOJA, who are still at large, armed with firearms and taking advantage
of superior strength to better realize their purpose, with treachery and evident premeditation and
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one SIEGFRED INSULAR with said weapon with which they were then provided, thereby
inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body which caused his death
thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On August 5, 1988, appellants were arraigned and entered their respective pleas of not guilty.
 During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Teodoro Salamanca, an
eyewitness to the shooting; Paterna Insular, widow of Siegred; Dr. Tito D. Doromal, medico-legal
officer who did the autopsy; Pfc. Juan O. Gaon, and Pfc. Moises C. Reiteracion, Integrated National
Police officers who responded to the shooting incident.

Dr. Doromal testified that the victim suffered five (5) gunshot wounds in the head and neck
area, six (6) gunshot wounds in the thoraco-abdominal regions, and two (2) gunshot wounds in the
extremities.The cause of death was maceration of the brain, secondary to gunshot wounds. [4]

Pfc. Juan O. Gaon stated that he entered the incident in the police blotter. [5] Pfc. Moises C.
Reiteracion said he was part of the team which responded to the report of the shooting incident. The
team found the body of the victim still lying on the same spot the following morning. They
recovered empty shells of different calibers and a homemade short firearm near the left arm of the
victim.[6] Pfc. Reiteracion and two companions brought the body of the victim to the funeral home. [7]

For the defense, appellants presented Atty. David Tubongbanua, 4th Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Iloilo, who recommended the dismissal of the case but was overturned by the
Provincial Fiscal.Appellants themselves testified and, except for Armada, interposed the defense of
denial and alibi.

Appellant Armada pleaded self-defense in shooting Siegfred. He claimed that while he was on
his way from Barangay Quipot to Caraudan, to attend the wake of his niece and nephew, he heard
gunshots near the chapel. When he went to the place, he saw Galupar lying wounded on the ground,
shot by Siegfred. Siegfred then attempted to shoot Armada, but the latter beat him to the
draw. Armada fired successive shots at Insular with his M-2 automatic carbine. He did not see
Paterna in the vicinity. After the shooting, Salamanca, Nicasio and Arnold came out of the rice
mill. Salamanca asked what happened and Armada answered that Siegfred shot Antonio and so, he
shot Siegfred. Armada then left and surrendered to the PC station at Jibolo, Janiuay, Iloilo City.[8]

The other appellants admitted being in the vicinity of the crime, but categorically denied any
participation in the shooting.

Nicasio claimed that he was with his son, Arnold, and Salamanca inside the latters ricemill,
milling palay when the shooting occurred. [9] However, Salamanca testified that at the time of the
incident, there was no palay milling going on. [10]

Ronnie testified that he was doing household chores in their house at Barangay Caraudan,
where his brother Rowel and sister Annelyn were lying in state, when he heard explosions coming
from the direction of the ricemill. [11] Shortly thereafter, Arnold arrived and told them that Antonio was shot by Siegfred and
requested that a hammock be brought to the scene so that Antonio could be brought to the hospital. Ronnie, Jose, and Jonathan Lazo,
Ronnies first cousin, immediately brought the hammock to the scene of the incident. [12] Ronnie thereafter saw Paterna arrive and cry
upon seeing her slain husband. Ronnie and his companions placed Antonio in the hammock, boarded him in a tricycle, and rushed him
to the hospital.[13] On the way, Ronnie heard explosions and when he looked back, he saw his uncle Joel Enoja alias Mike and his
friend, Melvin, shooting the prostrate body of Siegfred.[14]
 Jose testified that he was at his house, about 300 meters from the scene of the crime. He was
weeding in his yard when he heard gunfire. After a short while, Arnold arrived and asked him to
bring a hammock to the scene of the incident. [15]

Galupar related that he had just finished plowing his farm and was resting in his house in
Barangay Caraudan when he heard explosions. He remained at home the whole night and only
learned of the death of Siegfred the following morning. He claimed that he was implicated in the
case because he refused to act as witness for the prosecution. [16]

On October 31, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision [17] finding appellants guilty as
charged. The trial court did not give credence to Armadas claim of self-defense inasmuch as
policemen recovered several empty bullet shells from firearms of different calibers at the scene of
the crime. The short homemade firearm found near the left arm of the victim could not have been
used by the victim since it only had one empty shell in its chamber, not to mention that the victim
was right-handed. Lastly, the trial court found it highly suspicious that Antonio, who was allegedly
shot by the victim and who could have corroborated Armadas story of self-defense, went into
hiding and had not surfaced up to the present.

In this appeal, in their joint brief,[18] appellants raise the following errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING CONSPIRACY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY;

III. ASSUMING THEM GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, EXCEPT FOR APPELLANT
YOLLY ARMADA, IN NOT FINDING THAT THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WAS ONLY AN
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME.

The records show that appellant Antonio Galupar died pending appeal. Pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, the death of appellant Galupar pending appeal extinguished
his criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.

Appellant Yolly Armada escaped from the New Bilibid Prison on September 25, 1996. [19] As a
result, his appeal was dismissed and the judgment against him became final and executory. Entry of
judgment was made on January 9, 1997.[20]

In the meantime, appellant Jose Enoja jumped bail, which also resulted in the dismissal of his
appeal. Judgment against him became final and executory, and entry of judgment was made on
March 21, 1997.[21] An appellant who escapes or refuses to surrender to the proper authorities is
deemed to have abandoned his appeal, [22] hence, the judgment against him becomes a final and
executory. Nonetheless, the appeal proceeds as to the remaining appellants, Nicasio Enoja and
Ronnie Enoja, who are now detained at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. Our present
review, therefore, concerns only these two appellants.
 Appellants assail the trial courts finding of conspiracy by pointing out alleged inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Salamanca and Paterna. Appellants contend that
while Salamanca testified that it was only after Armada shot the victim that the other appellants
came one after the other and fired at the victim, Paterna testified that appellants
fired successive shots at the victim, implying that all appellants were already in the crime scene
when Armada fired at Siegfred. However, close perusal of the pertinent transcript of stenographic
notes (TSN) shows no inconsistencies in the two testimonies. Paterna actually testified that after
Armada fired at her husband, the other appellants arrived one after the other (nag-arabot abot),
[23]
and continued to fire at the prostrate body of her husband.The two testimonies constitute
cumulative evidence on who participated in the shooting of Siegfred. Both witnesses pointed to all
five accused-appellants.

On the matter of conspiracy, we have consistently held that conspiracy need not be shown by
direct proof of an agreement by the parties to commit the crime. The conduct of the malefactors
before, during or after the commission of the crime is sufficient to prove their conspiracy. Once
proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All shall be answerable as co-principals regardless of
the extent or degree of their participation. [24] In this case, circumstances indubitably show that
appellants acted concertedly to kill Siegfred. First, after appellant Armada fired at the victim
incapacitating the latter, the other accused arrived almost simultaneously and took turns in shooting
the victim. The successive shots riddled the victims body with bullets. Several empty cartridges
from guns of different calibers found in the scene and the numerous wounds of the victim indicate
plurality of assailants.[25] Second, appellant Jose Enoja thereafter fired a shot at the thigh of his
brother Antonio to make it appear that the shooting was in self-defense. Third, Jose planted a short
firearm near the body of the victim and placed bullets in the pocket of the victim. Fourth, strangely
after Antonio was brought to the hospital, he conveniently disappeared and could no longer be
located by the authorities. The aforementioned acts of the appellants clearly point to their common
purpose, concert of action, and community of interest. [26]

Appellants suggest that since Paterna was crying at the time of the shooting, she could not have
clearly witnessed the commission of the crime. This contention is disingenuous, to say the
least. Paternas crying does not impair her credibility. Witnesses of startling occurrences react
differently depending upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience. [27] Her powers of observation could even be heightened by the startling event to imprint the details in her memory. We
have gone over the records and find her testimony clear, credible and consistent with the testimony of Salamanca.

Appellants further insist that the trial court erred in finding that treachery accompanied the
killing, considering that the victim was already forewarned of the impending danger when he saw
appellant Armada carrying a firearm. Appellants contend that for treachery to exist, the offended
party is completely denied of the opportunity to defend himself, but it is not so in this case.

As the Solicitor General correctly pointed out, there was nothing in the behavior of Armada that
could have forewarned the victim of an impending danger. Both the victim and Armada knew each
other.Armada even acknowledged the greeting of the victim. The latter was walking along the
ricefield with his wife[28] when he was suddenly gunned down by the appellants. The victim gave no
provocation for the attack. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without
the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. [29] Clearly, the qualifying circumstance
of treachery is present in this case.

Considering the number of the armed assailants against the lone unarmed victim, there was also
abuse of superior strength. Since treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength this aggravating circumstance need not be appreciated separately.[30]

As an alternative defense, appellants present the theory that even assuming they participated in
the killing of Siegfred, they should only be held liable for the commission of an impossible crime
under Article 4, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, penalized under Article 59 thereof. [31] Appellants
theorize that the shots fired by Armada already resulted in the death of the victim, and hence, their
subsequent shooting of the victim merely constitutes the impossible crime of killing an already
dead person. The proposition not only completely contradicts their defense of alibi and denial, it is
also speculative as to cause of death. The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with alibi.

Appellants Nicasio and Ronnie Enoja claim that they were elsewhere during the offense. For
alibi to prosper as a defense, the accused must show that he was so far away that he could not have
been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission[32] and that his presence elsewhere renders it impossible for him to be the guilty party.
[33]
In this case, Nicasio admitted he was within the vicinity of the crime but presented the lame
excuse that he was inside Salamancas rice mill at the time of the shooting. His son, Arnold,
corroborated this testimony. But it was put in doubt by the testimony of Salamanca, who stated that
no milling of palay in his ricemill was going on at the time of the shooting. Alibi, especially when
it is corroborated mainly by relatives and friends of the accused, is held by this Court with extreme
suspicion for alibi is easy to fabricate and concoct. [34]

Both Paterna and Salamanca positively identified Nicasio Enoja as one of those who took part
in the shooting incident. Paterna categorically pointed to Ronnie Enoja as the person who shot her
husband in the right eye. [35] Appellants could not attribute any motive against these witnesses to
falsely testify against them. In the light of positive identification by witnesses who have no motive
to falsely testify, the feeble defense of alibi cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification
of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. [36]

At the time of the commission of the crime, on July 2, 1987, the penalty for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.[37]

There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, with respect to Nicasio Enojas
culpability, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty for murder in its medium period, [38] which
is reclusion perpetua.

With respect to appellant Ronnie Enoja, who was born on February 21, 1970, and was below 18
at the time of the commission of the crime, the trial court correctly appreciated the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority. Thus, the penalty next lower in degree was imposed on him in
its proper period pursuant to Article 68, second paragraph of the Revised Penal Code, which
is prision mayormaximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed upon appellant Ronnie Enoja shall be taken from the
medium period of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion temporal minimum or twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium or four (4) years and two (2) months to ten (10) years. Consequently, the trial court
correctly imposed upon Ronnie Enoja the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P30,000.00 as indemnity should be increased

to P50,000.00. However, the award of actual damages in the amount of P19,000.00 should be
deleted.Credence can only be given to claims, which are duly supported by receipts. [39] The
testimony alone of the widow, that her sister-in-law incurred about P20,000.00 expenses in
connection with the death of the victim, is insufficient basis to award actual damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, in Criminal
Case No. 31550, convicting accused-appellants Nicasio Enoja @ Nick and Ronnie Enoja @ Bud-
oy of the crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellants are ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, jointly and severally, the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity. The award of P19,200.00 as actual damages is deleted. Costs against
appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH,
BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD
INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:

This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1991 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751,
and its resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big
Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at
the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of
her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private
respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp.
("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-
1751 among others alleges the following:

1. . . .

Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant Safeguard) and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly
organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers
Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the
former appears to be the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the
latter impliedly acknowledged responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA by extending its
sympathies to plaintiffs.

Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or

defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident complained of, was under their control
and supervision. . . .

3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was on duty as
security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and
killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD,
and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);

4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the concurring negligence
of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to
him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury, while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its
having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its
employee to avoid the injury.

xxx xxx xxx

(Rollo, pp. 117-118)

Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said Civil
Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent
Judge Teodoro Regino.

On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the
scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil
liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.

Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176
of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176
applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent
argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal
case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).

Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant
Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).

Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
an industry.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of
Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by the
following: the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is an employee of
SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and
98).

Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.

On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and
SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts
necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in
shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that
mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the
facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989
states:

WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged in the verified
complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the matter as well as precedents laid down
by the Supreme Court, the complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security
 Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby
dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)

The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied.

Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence
but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners
insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the
New Civil Code.

Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for
their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the
employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may therefore proceed independently of the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela
is an employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.

Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil
Code, to wit:

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Rule 111. . . . .

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been
reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can
proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since
the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of
the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate
intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting
Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been part
of his duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within the scope
of the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.

We find for petitioners.

It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay.
Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
 Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)

It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents
evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However,
the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a
quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the
petitioner's cause of action.

The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint
itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An
examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their
right to recover damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by
Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive
case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:

. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)

The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]),
wherein the Court held:

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should be read
as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article
2176.

Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed
pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder
are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily
injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v.
Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes
not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA
293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under
Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused
in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was
charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.

Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they are
not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been established
that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private
respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence
of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both
(Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing
of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.

Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was
therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make
allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.

With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general rule is that
the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause
of action exist if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not
to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])

This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the
part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the
complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting
occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer
and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable.
Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was
actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually
liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to
prove their respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient
to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the
facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by
which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be
assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action,
the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated,
is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly
sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such
injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.