1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26868 February 27, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO Member of the Philippine Bar. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
REMIGIO ESTEBIA, accused-appellant.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Once again, this Court is confronted with the unwanted task of ascertaining whether certain acts and conduct of a member of the
Bar deserve disciplinary action.

The problem arose because of facts that follow:

One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First Instance of Samar, 1 and sentenced to suffer the capital
punishment. His case came up before this Court on review.

On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was appointed by this Court as Estebia's counsel de oficio. In the
notice of his appointment, Adriano was required to prepare and file his brief within thirty days from notice. He was advised that to
enable him to examine the case, the record would be at his disposal. Adriano received this notice on December 20, 1966. On
January 19, 1967, Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file appellant's brief in mimeographed form. On February 18, Adriano
again moved for a 20-day extension (his second). This was followed by a third filed on March 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on
March 27, also for fifteen days. He moved for a "last" extension of ten days on April 11. On April 21, he even sought a special
extension of five days. All these motions for extension were granted. The brief was due on April 26, 1967. But no brief was filed.

On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why disciplinary action should not
be taken against him for failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any
explanation.

For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this Court, on October 3, 1968, resolved to impose upon him a fine of
P500 payable to this Court within fifteen days from notice with a warning that upon further non-compliance with the said resolution of
September 25, 1967 within the same period of fifteen days, "more drastic disciplinary action will be taken against him." Still, counsel
paid no heed.

Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law "for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office as attorney." By express order of this
Court, the resolution was personally served upon him on December 18, 1968. He ignored the resolution.

Upon the facts just narrated, we now pass judgment.

1. By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a destitute appellant in a criminal case who is
unable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the required service." 2 A
lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert his best
efforts" in the indigent's behalf. 3

No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's brief. And yet, between December 20, 1966, when he received
notice of his appointment, and December 5, 1968, when the last show cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient
time was afforded counsel to prepare and file his brief de oficio. The death sentence below imposed was upon a plea of guilty. The
record of the proceedings leading to the lower court's sentence consists of but 31 pages. Counsel had the record since January 19,
1967. In fact, in his third motion for extension of time, he manifested that the drafting of apellant's brief "is more than half-way
through" and that "additional time is needed to review, effectuate the necessary corrections, put in final form and print the said brief."
In his motion for fourth extension, he intimated that the preparation of the brief "is almost through" and that "additional time is
needed to redraft and rehash some significant portions of said brief and have the same stencilled and mimeographed upon
completion of a definitive text." His motion for last (fifth) extension of time came with the excuse that he "suddenly got sick
(influenza) in the course of redrafting and rehashing some significant portions of said brief, which ailment hampered and interrupted
his work thereon for sometime." Finally, in his "Special Extension of Time" to file brief, he claimed that he needed only five days from
April 21, 1967 to put said brief in final form and have the same stencilled and mimeographed.lawphi1.nt

In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed, counsel's statements in his motions for extension have gone down to the
level of empty and meaningless words; at best, have dubious claim to veracity.

It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as
one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. His is to render effective assistance. The accused defendant
expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. We do not accept the paradox that responsibility is less where
the defended party is poor. It has been said that courts should "have no hesitancy in demanding high standards of duty of attorneys
appointed to defend indigent persons charged with crime." 4 For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is
expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self interest. Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever
conscious of his duties to the indigent he defends.
 2

Worth remembering is the 1905 case of In the matter of Jose Robles Lahesa. 5 He was counsel de oficio before the Supreme Court
in two cases: one for robo en cuadrilla and the other for homicide. He failed to take any action in behalf of the defendants in both
eases. This Court imposed upon him a fine of P200. Significant is the pronouncement we there made that: "This court should exact
from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the
performance of those duties necessarily result in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases and the detention of accused persons
pending appeal." The validity of the foregoing observation remains to the present day. 6 It applies to the present case.

Here, appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966. The effect of this long delay need not be essayed. We, therefore, find
that Attorney Lope E. Adriano has violated his oath that he will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his "knowledge
and discretion".

2. An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." By the oath of office, the lawyer
undertook to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities." In People vs. Carillo, 8 this Court's pointed
observation was that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's "sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."

Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit willful dis-obedience of lawful orders of this Court. A cause sufficient is
thus present for suspension or disbarment. 9 Counsel has received no less than three resolutions of this Court requiring compliance
of its orders. To be recalled is that on September 25, 1967, this Court directed him, in ten days from notice, to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time therefor.
Nothing was done by counsel for over a year. To impress upon counsel the gravity of his repeated failure to obey this Court's orders,
on October 3,1968, a fine of P500 was clamped upon him. He was directed to pay that fine in ten days. He was in that order also
required to file his brief in fifteen days. He was warned that more drastic disciplinary action would be taken upon his failure to do
either. Still he remained unmoved. Then, this Court issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968 commanding him to show
cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and
violation of his oath of office. The Court made it certain that this order would reach him. He personally acknowledged receipt thereof.
He has not paid the fine. He has done nothing.

This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed. And this, inspite of the fact that as early as March 27, 1967, when he moved for a fourth
extension of time to file his brief de oficio, he represented to this Court that all that was needed was to redraft and to rehash some
significant portions of the brief which was almost through and to have the same stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a
definitive text.

Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as patent. Disciplinary action is in order.

Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the Matter of Atty. Filoteo Dianala Jo. 10 There, as here, counsel failed to file appellant's brief
(in a criminal case) despite extensions of time granted him by this Court. Likewise, this Court issued a show-cause order why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him. The explanation was considered unsatisfactory. This Court imposed a fine of
P50 payable in ten days from notice. Attorney Dianala Jo did not pay that fine. Came the subsequent resolution of this Court
advising him to pay the fine, otherwise, he would be arrested and confined to jam. This warning was not heeded. On November 18,
1960, the Court resolved to give him ten days from notice within which to explain why he should not be suspended from the practice
of law. Despite receipt of this notice, he did not care to explain his behaviour which this Court considered as "consumacy and
unwillingness to comply with the lawful orders of this Court of which he is an officer or to conduct himself as a lawyer should, in
violation of his oath of office." He was suspended from the practice of law for three months.

In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would seem to us, reveals a propensity on the part of counsel to benumb
appreciation of his obligation as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should be accorded this Court.

For the reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney Lope E. Adriano from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period
of one (1) year.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record, in this Court, of Lope E. Adriano as member of the Bar. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Criminal Case C-1331, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Remigio Estebia, Accused".

2
Section 31, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

3
Canon 4.

4
State vs. Delaney, 351 p. 2d. 85, 90.

5
4 Phil. 298, 300.

6
See: Javellana vs. Lutero, 20 SCRA 717; Blanza vs. Arcangel, Adm. Case 492, September 5, 1967, 21 SCRA
1.

7
Section 20(b). Rule 138, Rules of Court.
 3

8
77 Phil. 572, 580.

9
Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

10
1 SCRA 31.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of
Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution
promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed
entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of
Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would
still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa
Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened
wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch
XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding
damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last
day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied
the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA
643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of
said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the
Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule
barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly
enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace
period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
 4

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if
only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since
the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor
as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
 5

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-
7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not
engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by
them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e.,
"legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same
are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes
the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements
in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical
services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the
term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being
 6

operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and
this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services
being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed
by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it
becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as
the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of
the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and

woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is
that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law,
by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to
induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A"
of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its
bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution,"
which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen
that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services,
as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper
reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which
are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning
the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like
services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
 7

However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in
other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of
law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for
the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if
such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would
then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of
carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which
should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or
otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information
given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal
under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer
should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend
any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the

Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws
must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's
acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to
the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces
a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications,
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal
right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin,
Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is
the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and
solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the
public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject
to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can
it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who
are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

 8

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose
Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in
law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the
Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent
fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a
four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only
then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist
in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect
the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the
guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the
present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name The Legal
Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure
the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal
in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a
secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has
 9

to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to
employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter
of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve.
The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce
are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is
also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify
permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service

unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice
of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . .
Our knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not
only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers,
liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the
laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes,
factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board.
Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate
and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a
lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to
be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the
larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the
same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for

which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men
who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the
technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.
 10

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for
any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law.
But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within
which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits
the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice
of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees'
wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the

adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator.
This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations
and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and
the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the
business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I
need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by
the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative

agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by
virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation
of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor
Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A.
2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making
arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is
as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-
lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage
and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute
of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.
 11

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a

legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the
mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently
it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with
advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's
book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship
with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL
OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person in a particular situation in their publication and sale of the
kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit,
there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact
with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the
finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which
might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in
the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS
2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is
not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry
may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites
of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or
"legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues
raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some
of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal
advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with
respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether
certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

 12

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23,
193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed
of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3
[1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case
at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent,
as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen
and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers
and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and
reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance
to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other
matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids
and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the
law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it
 13

will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday
Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations
of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The
Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem.
That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once
the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns.
We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-
patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich
relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property,
we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which
would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her
property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if
there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in
the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The
doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the
bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the
bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice
law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding
from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection
of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be
aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which
offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of
paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association. 29
 14

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who
has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of
encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is
not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of
law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to
those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical
for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the
practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of
the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled
the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule
against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by
the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the
lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and
offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which
even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the
same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
 15

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied
upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said
case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal
fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for
the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics
or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when
the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public
about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is
clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our
law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just
like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can
institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing
the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A"
and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office
of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and on the left side of "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." in both advertisements which were published in a newspaper of general circulation.

2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691.

3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated December 10, 1991, Rollo, 328.

4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal Affairs, 1, 10; Rollo, 209, 218.

5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on Bar Discipline, and Atty.
Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29, Rollo 414-416, 425-427.

6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Lawyers' Rights
and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del Rosario, President, 5-6; Rollo, 241-242.

7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty. Mariano M. Magsalin,
Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.

8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo, 105-106.
 16

9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-371.

10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge, WLAP Free Legal Aid Clinic,
1-2; Rollo, 169-170.

11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty. Barbara Anne C. Migallos, 8-
12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.

12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.

13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.

14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504; Rhode Island Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139, 144.

15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.

16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.

17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.

18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert and Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.

19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).

20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.

21 Rollo, 130-131.

22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373.

23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

24 Phil. Ass'n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al., 42 SCRA 302
(1971).

25 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 863, 864.

26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.

27 Lowell Bar Ass'n. vs. Loeb. 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client 64, 865.

28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.

29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974) and Shayne, The Paralegal Profession, Oceana
Publications, 1977, Appendix II and III; Rollo, 116-117.

30 Illustrations:

(a) A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-year prescribed
law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved
by the Supreme Court (Rule 138-A, Rules of Court);

(b) An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the
Government of the Philippines in a case in which the government has an interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138,
id.);

(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court for the purpose of conducting the
litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);

(d) A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, who is appointed
counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities where members of the bar are not available (Sec.
4, Rule 116, id.);

(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the Philippine Patent Office (now known
as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer) in trademark, service mark and trade
name cases (Rule 23, Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases);

(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations Commission or any Labor
Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as a party to the case; (2) he represents an organization or its
members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
 17

(3) he is duly-accredited members of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of
Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter (New Rules of
Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission);

(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant in a case falling under the
Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and

(h) Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing the studies of law in a reputable
university or school of law is deemed sufficient qualification for appointment (Sec. 233, Administrative
Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144-145.

31 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 866; Johnstown Coal and Coke Co. of New York vs. U.S., 102 Ct. Cl.
285.

32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.

33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.

34 Rule 3.01, id.

35 Rule 3.04, id.

36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.

37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.

38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).

39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: "Marriage license promptly secured thru our
assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to
wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.".

40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.

41 Op. cit., 80.

43 * * * Missing * * * .

44 Op. cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24, 1930); A.B.A. Ops. 53
(Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941), 241 (Feb. 21, 1942), 284 (Aug. 1951); and 286
(Sept. 25, 1952). .

45 Supra, Fn 2.

46 Id., 810, 825.

47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the American Bar Association Journal,
January, 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.

48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, supra, Fn 38.

49 U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil. 968 (1958).

50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No. 902-A and Sec. 121, Corporation Code.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

B.M. No. 2012 February 10, 2009

PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR PRACTICING LAWYERS

RESOLUTION
 18

Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C. Corona re: Comment of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines on our Suggested Revisions to the Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing
Lawyers, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the said Rule and its implementing
regulations in at least two (2) newpapers of general circulation.

February 10, 2009

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice
 19

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE

SECTION 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as "The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service."

SECTION 2. Purpose. - This Rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to society as agents of social change and to
the courts as officers thereof by helping improve access to justice by the less privileged members of society and
expedite the resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory free legal service by members of the bar and their
active support thereof will aid the efficient and effective administration of justice especially in cases involving
indigent and pauper litigants.

SECTION 3. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to render free legal
aid services in all cases (whether, civil, criminal or administrative) involving indigent and pauper litigants where the
assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also govern the duty of other members of the legal profession to support
the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:

(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and
quasi-judicial agencies, including but not limited to the National Labor Relations Commission, National Conciliation
and Mediation Board, Department of Labor and Employment Regional Offices, Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board and National Commission for Indigenous Peoples. The term "practicing lawyers" shall exclude:

(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice;
 20

(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;

(iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited legal clinics of law schools
and lawyers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and peoples organizations (POs) like the Free Legal
Assistance Group who by the nature of their work already render free legal aid to indigent and pauper litigants and

(iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who are employed in the private sector but
do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.

(b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those defined under Rule 141, Section 19 of the Rules of Court and Algura v.
The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga (G.R. No.150135, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);

(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and controversies that are criminal, civil and administrative in nature
in whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper litigants need legal representation;

(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or quasi-judicial body for and in behalf of an indigent or
pauper litigant and the preparation of pleadings or motions. It shall also cover assistance by a practicing lawyer to
indigent or poor litigants in court-annexed mediation and in other modes of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
Services rendered when a practicing lawyer is appointed counsel de oficio shall also be considered as free legal aid
services and credited as compliance under this Rule;

(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official national organization of lawyers in the country;

(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked with handling
legal aid cases;

(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked with disciplining
members of the Bar;

(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines located in the different geographical
areas of the country as defined in Rule 139-A and

(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the practicing lawyer rendered free legal aid services. In
the case of quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to an officer holding an equivalent or similar position.

The term shall also include an officer holding a similar position in agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or a
responsible officer of an accredited PO or NGO, or an accredited mediator who conducted the court-annexed
mediation proceeding.

SECTION 5. Requirements. -

(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of sixty (60) hours of free legal aid services to indigent
litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within a period of twelve (12) months, with a minimum of five (5)
hours of free legal aid services each month. However, where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer to render legal
aid service for more than five (5) hours in one month, the excess hours may be credited to the said lawyer for the
succeeding periods.

For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court for cases where he may render free
legal aid service. He may also coordinate with the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire about
cases where he may render free legal aid service. In this connection, the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP
Chapter shall regularly and actively coordinate with the Clerk of Court.
 21

The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within ten (10) days of the last month of each
quarter of the year.

(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate from the Clerk of Court attesting to the
number of hours spent rendering free legal aid services in a case.

The certificate shall contain the following information:

(i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was rendered, the party or parties in the said case(s) for whom the
service was rendered, the docket number of the said case(s) and the date(s) the service was rendered.

(ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing or conducting trial on a particular case in the court or
quasi-judicial body.

(iii) The number of hours actually spent attending mediation, conciliation or any other mode of ADR on a particular
case.

(iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file a pleading or for postponement of hearing or conference)
or pleading filed on a particular case shall be considered as one (1) hour of service.

The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy to be retained by the practicing lawyer, one
(1) copy to be retained by the Clerk of Court and one (1) copy to be attached to the lawyer's compliance report.

(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter within the courts
jurisdiction. The Legal Aid Chairperson shall then be tasked with immediately verifying the contents of the
certificate with the issuing Clerk of Court by comparing the copy of the certificate attached to the compliance report
with the copy retained by the Clerk of Court.

(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to the concerned lawyer. The IBP Chapter
shall also submit the compliance reports to the IBPs NCLA for recording and documentation. The submission shall
be made within forty-five (45) days after the mandatory submission of compliance reports by the practicing
lawyers.

(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies the number and
date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose
the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records.

(f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(i) and (ii), shall fill up a
form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are employed with the government or
incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice or lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court.

The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together with the payment of an
annual contribution of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000). Said contribution shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for
the support of its legal aid program.

(g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iii) shall secure a
certification from the director of the legal clinic or of the concerned NGO or PO to the effect that, during that year,
they have served as supervising lawyers in a legal clinic or actively participated in the NGOs or POs free legal aid
activities. The certification shall be submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office.

(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iv) shall fill up a form
prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are neither practicing lawyers nor covered by
Section (4)(a)(i) to (iii). The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together
with the payment of an annual contribution of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by way of support for the efforts of
 22

practicing lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid services. Said contribution shall accrue to a special fund of
the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.

(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the lawyer to a penalty of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) for
that year which amount shall also accrue to the special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.

SECTION 6. NCLA. -

(a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid committees of the IBP local chapters for the proper handling
and accounting of legal aid cases which practicing lawyers can represent.

(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of the Legal Aid Office with respect to the coordination with
Clerks of Court on legal aid cases and the collation of certificates submitted by practicing lawyers.

(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records in compliance with this Rule.

(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate to be issued by the Clerk of Court and forms mentioned
in Section 5(e) and (g).

(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the contributions and penalties that will be paid by lawyers
pursuant to this Rule to effectively carry out the provisions of this Rule. For this purpose, it shall annually submit an
accounting to the IBP Board of Governors.

The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to the Supreme Court in connection with its request for the
release of the subsidy for its legal aid program.

SECTION 7. Penalties. -

(a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet the minimum prescribed 60 hours of
legal aid service each year shall be required by the IBP, through the NCLA, to explain why he was unable to render
the minimum prescribed number of hours. If no explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds the explanation
unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall make a report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors that the erring
lawyer be declared a member of the IBP who is not in good standing. Upon approval of the NCLAs recommendation,
the IBP Board of Governors shall declare the erring lawyer as a member not in good standing. Notice thereof shall
be furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP Chapter which submitted the lawyers compliance report or the IBP
Chapter where the lawyer is registered, in case he did not submit a compliance report. The notice to the lawyer
shall include a directive to pay Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) penalty which shall accrue to the special fund for the
legal aid program of the IBP.

(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective for a period of three (3) months from the receipt of the
erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Governors. During the said period, the lawyer cannot appear in
court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel. Provided, however, that the "not in good standing" status shall subsist
even after the lapse of the three-month period until and unless the penalty shall have been paid.

(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least three (3) consecutive years shall be
the subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu proprio by the CBD. The said proceedings shall afford
the erring lawyer due process in accordance with the rules of the CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. If found
administratively liable, the penalty of suspension in the practice of law for one (1) year shall be imposed upon him.

(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form required to be submitted under this Rule or any contents
thereof shall be administratively charged with falsification and dishonesty and shall be subject to disciplinary action
by the CBD. This is without prejudice to the filing of criminal charges against the lawyer.

(e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any Chairperson of the Legal
Aid Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case is pending or by the Director of a legal clinic or responsible
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officer of an NGO or PO shall be a ground for an administrative case against the said Clerk of Court or Chairperson.
This is without prejudice to the filing of the criminal and administrative charges against the malfeasor.

SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). - A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid
service for the required number of hours in a year for the three year-period covered by a compliance period under
the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: two (2) credit units for legal ethics, two (2) credit units for trial
and pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for alternative dispute resolution, four (4) credit units for legal writing and oral
advocacy, four (4) credit units for substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and six (6) credit units for
such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(9), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.

A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for at least two
consecutive years within the three year-period covered by a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be
credited the following: one (1) credit unit for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit for trial and pretrial skills, one (1) credit
unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2) credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, two (2) credit units for
substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and three (3) credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed
by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.

SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. - The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby given authority to recommend
implementing regulations in determining who are "practicing lawyers," what constitute "legal aid cases" and what
administrative procedures and financial safeguards which may be necessary and proper in the implementation of
this rule may be prescribed. It shall coordinate with the various legal chapters in the crafting of the proposed
implementing regulations and, upon approval by the IBP Board of Governors, the said implementing regulations
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final approval.

SECTION 10. Effectivity. - This Rule and its implementing rules shall take effect on July 1,2009 after they have been
published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.